# Round 3 – Neg vs GWU

## 1NC

### 1

#### Restrictions must legally mandate less production, not just regulate it

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/88icecrm.pdf>

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### Production is extraction, conversion, and distribution of energy – including R&D is a limits explosion

Koplow 4 Doug Koplow is the founder of Earth Track in Cambridge, MA. He has worked on natural resource subsidy issues for 20 years, primarily in the energy sector "Subsidies to Energy Industries" Encyclopedia of Energy Vol 5 2004www.earthtrack.net/files/Energy%20Encyclopedia,%20wv.pdf

3. SUBSIDIES THROUGH THE FUEL CYCLE

Because no two fuel cycles are exactly the same, examining subsidies through the context of a generic fuel cycle is instructive in providing an overall framework from which to understand how common subsidization policies work. Subsidies are grouped into preproduction (e.g., R&D, resource location), production (e.g., extraction, conversion/generation, distribution, accident risks), consumption, postproduction (e.g., decommissioning, reclamation), and externalities (e.g., energy security, environmental, health and safety).

3.1 Preproduction

Preproduction activities include research into new technologies, improving existing technologies, and market assessments to identify the location and quality of energy resources.

3.1.1 Research and Development

R&D subsidies to energy are common worldwide, generally through government-funded research or tax breaks. Proponents of R&D subsidies argue that because a portion of the financial returns from successful innovations cannot be captured by the innovator, the private sector will spend less than is appropriate given the aggregate returns to society. Empirical data assembled by Margolis and Kammen supported this claim, suggesting average social returns on R&D of 50% versus private returns of only 20 to 30%.

However, the general concept masks several potential concerns regarding energy R&D. First, ideas near commercialization have much lower spillover than does basic research, making subsidies harder to justify. Second, politics is often an important factor in R&D choices, especially regarding how the research plans are structured and the support for follow-on funding for existing projects.

Allocation bias is also a concern. Historical data on energy R&D (Table III) demonstrate that R&D spending has heavily favored nuclear and fossil energy across many countries. Although efficiency, renewables, and conservation have captured a higher share of public funds during recent years, the overall support remains skewed to a degree that may well have influenced the relative competitiveness of energy technologies. Extensive public support for energy R&D may also reduce the incentive for firms to invest themselves. U.S. company spending on R&D for the petroleum refining and extraction sector was roughly one-third the multi-industry average during the 1956-1998 period based on survey data from the U.S. National Science Foundation. For the electric, gas, and sanitary services sector, the value was one-twentieth, albeit during the more limited 1995-1998 period.

3.1.2 Resource Location

Governments frequently conduct surveys to identify the location and composition of energy resources. Although these have addressed wind or geothermal resources on occasion, they most often involve oil and gas. Plant siting is another area where public funds are used, primarily to assess risks from natural disasters such as earthquakes for large hydroelectric or nuclear installations. Survey information can be important to evaluate energy security risks and to support mineral leasing auctions, especially when bidders do not operate competitively. However, costs should be offset from lease sale revenues when evaluating the public return on these sales. Similarly, the costs of siting studies should be recovered from the beneficiary industries.

3.2 Production

Energy production includes all stages from the point of resource location through distribution to the final consumers. Specific items examined here include resource extraction, resource conversion (including electricity), the various distribution links to bring the energy resource to the point of final use, and accident risks.

#### The aff decreases regulations, not restrictions. Voter for limits because they manipulate terminology to expand the hardest part of the rez to debate

Sinha 6

<http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/>

Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

#### Precision—restrictions must be a distinct term for debate to occur

Eric Heinze (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, Queen Mary. He has held fellowships from the Fulbright Foundation and the French and German governments. He teaches Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, Human Rights and Public International Law. JD Harvard) 2003 “The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse” http://mey.homelinux.org/companions/Eric%20Heinze/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20%28839%29/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20-%20Eric%20Heinze.pdf

Variety of ‘restrictions’

The term ‘restriction’, defined so broadly, embraces any number of familiar concepts: ‘deprivation’, ‘denial’, ‘encroachment’, ‘incursion’, ‘infringement’, ‘interference’, ‘limitation’, ‘regulation’. Those terms commonly comport differences in meaning or nuance, and are not all interchangeable in standard legal usage. For example, a ‘deprivation’ may be distinguished from a ‘limitation’ or ‘regulation’ in order to denote a full denial of a right (e.g. where private property is wholly appropriated by the state 16 Agents without compensation) as opposed to a partial constraint (e.g. where discrete restrictions are imposed on the use of property which nonetheless remains profitably usable). Similarly, distinctions between acts and omissions can leave the blanket term ‘restriction’ sounding inapposite when applied to an omission: if a state is accused of not doing enough to give effect to a right, we would not colloquially refer to such inaction as a ‘restriction’. Moreover, in a case of extreme abuse, such as extrajudicial killing or torture, it might sound banal to speak merely of a ‘restriction’ on the corresponding right. However, the term ‘restriction’ will be used to include all of those circumstances, in so far as they all comport a purpose or effect of extinguishing or diminishing the right-seeker’s enjoyment of an asserted right. (The only significant distinction which will be drawn will be between that concept of ‘restriction’ and the concept of ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The terms ‘breach’ or ‘violation’ will be used to denote a judicial determination about the legality of the restriction.6) Such an axiom may seem unwelcome, in so far as it obliterates subtleties which one would have thought to be useful in law. It must be stressed that we are seeking to eliminate that variety of terms not for all purposes, but only for the very narrow purposes of a formal model, for which any distinctions among them are irrelevant.

### 2

#### The modern energy system traps us into the belief of a false euphoric future while overlooking how this same system dooms us to ecological destruction, resource wars, democratic authoritarianism and extinction

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 1-3]

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss ,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings-almost one-third of the planet's population-experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact-and sometimes exacerbated-social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smi l, 2003: 370- 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who ' early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner too c heap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, ctted tn the New York Ttmes 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the "magical fire" or the prolifera~ ion of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize "inherently safe reactors" (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in "sustainable energy alternatives" that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, "green" energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy "haves" and "havenots." 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291 ), "today's nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people" as "micropower meets village power." Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a "solar global economy ... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world's cultural diversity" (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (I 934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ... an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations ... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity-here are the enemies. The living organism demands ali fe-sustaining environment. Modernity's formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity's supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era's social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the "democratic authoritarian bargain" ( 1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce "every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority" **on the condition that society demands only what the regime is** capable and **willing to offer**. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford's work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### The impact is extinction – neoliberal ideology creates its own crises – their offense operates under ideological blinders within scholarship that prevent recognition of the consequences of energy neoliberalism

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(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

The current version of capitalist ideology, which **absorbs energy scholars** (and even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, **was** consciously shaped **to co-opt the language of social movements** seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). **There can be no acknowledgement of** slavery**,** racism**,** sexism**, or** ecological destruction among other issues, because **all of these undermine the** basic thesis neoliberal writers actively promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present capitalism as **raising all boats**, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization” (Pellow 2007, 41). **The blinders imposed by this view** continue to infect energy studies despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus **becomes the solution for poverty** associated with inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights in existing critical work on energy, they **provide an alternative approach** to energy that belies **the notion that “there is no alternative.”** They share a common commitment, as social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual **class and racial inequalities** around the global and between North and South **have only worsened in the past half-century**—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction “**are intimately linked** because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that basically **allow business to** continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus **are reluctant to break with capitalism as a system**, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, **internalizing** more of the world in **the market system is a** total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing the internalities.” **This is an** ecological **and** social **imperative**.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-thannothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must be found at every turn and **crises represent** especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It is a system geared toward **profit at all cost and can have** no rational response. The problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first place. **The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of** real alternatives**, and understand ourselves as subjects**, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with **much of the ¶ damage irreversible**. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ **create geopolitical instability.** The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

#### The aff’s fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail.

Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]

Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact **reproduce** a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the **legitimating moral gloss** of the **‘force for good’** rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and **sparking long-term trends of** rising crime rates, property **destruction**, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while **providing profits** for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the **active defence** of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based **system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions** and processes of global governance **does not work for billions of people or** for **planetary ecological systems**. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that **keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed.** 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a **growing consensus** that long-term stability, particularly the **reduction of violent conflict**, will require **far greater political**, economic and environmental equity **on a global scale**, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and **transform the** rules-based **system into a more equitable form**. A growing literature now argues that prevailing **western approaches to** understanding, managing and ameliorating global **insecurity** and its violent symptoms are **inadequate and unsustainable**. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate **significant** negativefeedback, or ‘blowback’, from **unintended outcomes** that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, **the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky**: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘**inevitably leads to a** loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process **with no end in sight**. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generatingnew and potentially more dangerous **risks** deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatresof conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the **erosion of civil liberties** and the **securitization of daily life.** There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could **generate more**, and potentially **more lethal, risks than it resolves** or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, **wholly counterproductive.** 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### Vote neg – must investigate epistemological underpinnings of energy production – the alt prevents a “growth at all costs” society that culminates in endless crises and oppression

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

All work on energy, society, and climate change may be divided into two broader theoretically significant categories based on its main underlying assumptions. On the one hand, there are sociologists whose proposals to solve global issues like climate change **involve tweaking the system** through policy, personal consumption choices, or technological change. On the other hand, you have sociologists **calling for** system-wide social and ecological change. In other words, some sociologists limit their studies to **changes that are possible** within the capitalist system, while others document the ways in which **capitalism is** incompatible **with** ecological and social **justice goals** and call for a **more significant transformation** of the world system.

One reason this central divide is so relevant to energy studies is that climate change has been **driven by the economic growth inherent to capitalism**. The key conflict that arises in climate negotiations, and which is constantly alluded to in environmental negotiations between nations, is that between ecological, social, and economic priorities (Clark and York 2005; Bazilian 2009; York 2010). Energy developments are **conditioned by these competing priorities**. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2008) puts the issue plainly: “Energy use is largely driven by economic growth.” Problems with energy developments are thus in large part problems of scale **related to the level of economic throughput**. And the scale of energy consumption remains coupled in capitalist economies with economic growth in spite of efficiency gains, as critical sociologists of energy have demonstrated (York 2010; York, et al. 2011). For this reason, energy debates, like other issues in environmental sociological theory, often **center on the tension between economic growth and ecological change**. There are striking differences in how this tension and the possibility of overcoming it are understood by various theoretical positions. The most influential approach to energy issues in the broader society and policy circles is mirrored in environmental sociology in the ecological modernization perspective. It is the most optimistic that the tension between economic growth and ecological change may be transcended (social justice is not integrated in their analysis.)

Ecological modernizationists emphasize “the possibility, actuality and desirability of a green Capitalism” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 23). They claim there is a “growing independence of ecological rationality vis-à-vis other (e.g. economic and political) rationalities” (22) in the governance of society and institutions. “The basic premise of ecological modernization theory is…[that there is a] centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social practices and institutions of modern society” (Mol 2002, 93). The authors see “continued industrial [and technological] development as offering **the best option for escaping from the ecological crises** of the developed world” (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001, 702). This new breed of modernizers suggest “we have entered a new industrial revolution, one of radical restructuring of production, consumption, state practices and political discourses along ecological lines” (Sonnenfield 2009, 372).

Ecological modernization began as “**essentially a political program**” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 18) and remains **geared toward** influencing policy (Mol, Sonnenfield, and Spaargaren 2009, 11). That this perspective **might be popular in a world where those in power suggest capitalism will solve the climate crisis** it created is not surprising. Ecological modernization theorists themselves have represented the significance of their ideas via the extent to which **they share the perspective of** those in power, and by the taming of the environmental movement, which was forced into an establishment mold (Spaargaren and Mol 2009, 72–75).

Though it integrates popular assumptions, the ecological modernization perspective actually **is in conflict with** over a hundred years **of sociological and ecological analyses** (starting with that of the classical theorists, like Marx and Weber, and early energy scholars developing the study thermodynamics). This insidious perspective also is in conflict with the founding principles of environmental sociology, based on the New Ecological Paradigm, which include “recognition of: (1) limits to growth, (2) nonanthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s balance, (4) untenability of exemptionalism, and (5) ecological crisis” (Foster 2012). Therefore, Foster (2012) refers to the ecological modernization perspective as the new exemptionalism and the third stage of denialism **hindering necessary and urgent scientific development and change**:

The third stage of denial has the look and feel of greater realism, but actually constitutes a more desperate and dangerous response. It admits that capitalism is the problem, but also **contends that capitalism is the solution**. This general approach emphasizes what is variously referred to as "sustainable capitalism," "natural capitalism," "climate capitalism," "green capitalism," etc. In this view we can continue down the same road of capital accumulation, mounting profits, and exponential economic growth -- while at the same time miraculously reducing our burdens on the planetary environment. It is business as usual, but with greater efficiency and greater accounting of environmental costs. (Foster 2011a)

Ecological modernization is a way then to **avoid** any significant challenge **to the status quo**. Because of this it **ignores the** seriousness **and** scale **of ecological degradation** (York and Rosa 2003), but also **the inequalities** necessarily embedded **in the social relations of capitalism**. There is no real gender, race, class, or any kind of social justice analysis there, **even if justice is mentioned in passing** in their work (usually in response previous criticisms).

Despite all of these problems, the penetration of the assumptions undergirding this perspective is clear in the sociology of energy and climate change. The conscious and unconscious adoption of the main tenets of the modernization framework stands out in the sociology articles published since the boom in climate change research starting in 2005. A key term search in Sociological Abstracts of the 1,734 peer-reviewed articles published since 2005 with “climate change” or “energy” in the title yields the following results: many more mention technology (424), technological change (96), alternative energy (110), or renewable energy (160) than mention energy conservation (120), economic growth (96), or capitalism (35). Shockingly, only 22 mention inequality and only 9 equality.

**The blinders imposed by** perspectives such as **ecological modernization** in the sociological work on energy and climate change, and broader environmental sociological theory, means that

environmental sociology today is therefore faced with a double challenge, emanating both from without and within: developing means to combat the planetary rift, and confronting the new exemptionalism, which threatens to overthrow environmental sociology as a critical tradition. With respect to the latter challenge, the problem is to be found **not in the concept of ecological modernization itself,** which is obviously useful in limited contexts, and reflects real-world processes, but rather the elevation of ecological modernization **into an overall environmental theory resurrecting the basic postulates of human exemptionalism**. (Foster 2012)

This makes the theoretical perspective proposed in this thesis all the more important **and** urgent, for the sociology of energy and for environmental sociology as a whole. Because the sociology of energy is taking off, **the climate crisis is only worsening, and** new scholars **are being trained en masse,** it is a crucial moment **in the theoretical development** of what will now be sustained sociological attention to energy. As bad as things are, they are only expected to get worse. Energy increasingly will be forced onto the broader sociological agenda (Dunlap 2010; Webler and Tuler 2010). **If energy justice is not** at the heart of the sociology of energy that takes root, our formulations will necessarily **impose blinders that make it** impossible to understand**, or** propose meaningful changes **to address, the interpenetrating depredations of social inequality and environmental destruction** associated with the modern energy regime.

### solvency

#### Vote neg on presumption – they don’t have a single card that says the military will buy or adopt the tech post lifting of restrictions – it’s their burden to produce this prior to making any advantage claims

#### No tech - substantial and wide ranging engineering breakthroughs are required and ignoring this risks catastrophic accidents

**Bronstein, 11** - a recent a recent graduate of the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. He holds a Masters of public policy and a certiﬁcate in science, technology, and public policy. Before coming to Michigan, Max was a Science Assistant in the Ofﬁce of the Director at the National Science Foundation. He has also held positions at with the House Committee on Science & Technology, the National Institutes of Health, and the University of Michigan (Max, “Harnessing rivers of wind: A technology and policy assessment of high altitude wind power in the U.S.” Technological Forecasting & Social Change 78 (2011) 736–746, Science Direct) **HWP = High altitude Wind Power, GBW = Ground Based Wind, TRC/DBR/HAK are all different prototypes for HWP systems, but TRC = Tethered Rotorcraft**

The continued development of the TRC design will require major improvements and innovations in minimizing the weight of the system and the thousands of feet of tether required for successful operation. Rapid advances in material science, speciﬁcally in the area of carbon nanotubes or other lightweight, high-tensile materials could greatly facilitate the viability and deployment of the TRC. Such materials would be essential in constructing both the body and rotors of the craft and connecting it to a groundbased power station. Recently, the federal government and the private sector have made massive investments into energy storage research, which will undoubtedly play an important role in fostering HWP. New and innovative battery designs could offer an affordable and scalable method for the massive electricity storage that is needed for constant power output suitable for distribution. While many engineering hurdles have been overcome in the TRC design, it is clear that further development and commercialization will depend upon advances in related ﬁelds of science and technology.

Should TRC technology be widely deployed, there are a variety of consequences or concerns that could arise. TRCs are designed to operate at altitudes of up to 10,000 m, which is the approximate cruising altitude for most commercial airliners. This creates the potential for a catastrophic midair collision. From a technical standpoint, this challenge could be addressed by implementing no- ﬂy zones in the vicinity of HWP farms, but this creates a potential for these zones to be disregarded due to human or instrument failure. In practice, these systems would need to be concentrated as farms, but this poses yet another engineering challenge. There is the possibility that a TRC could collide with another platform in the same area and therefore steps must be taken to ensure adequate spacing and control of platforms. TRCs also rely upon continuous winds in order to remain aloft. However, jet streams have been shown to drift [42], which could cause a platform to rapidly lose lift resulting in a catastrophic descent. Furthermore, it is unclear as to how a platform would react to a rotor failure due to a mechanical malfunction. These potentially massive platforms could cause signiﬁcant damage if they fall and endanger power station personnel and property in the vicinity.

The promise of inexpensive, zero-carbon, and abundant wind energy will continue to drive the development of HWP. This technology holds the potential to meet the energy demands of the nation, while reducing dependence on fossil fuels like coal, oil, and natural gas. Of the currently proposed designs, it seems that TRCs have received the most scrutiny and appear to be the leading approach to HWP engineering. However, if this technology is to become feasible, a wide variety of engineering challenges must be overcome and many of these advances will rely upon advances in other areas of science and technology. Should TRCs become widely deployed, several precautionary measures will need to be put in place to prevent midair collisions with commercial aircraft or other TRC platforms. Despite these challenges, this technology could become a viable solution for the marketplace and may offer a pathway to abundant, inexpensive, and carbon-free electricity.

#### Not cost competitive - massive economic and infrastructure barriers to adoption

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Despite the several advantages offered by HWP, there still remain a variety of technical barriers that must be adequately addressed if this technology is to become viable. Foremost is the intermittency issue. It is estimated that current GBW turbines are operating at generating capacity only 30% of the time. In contrast, a properly sited HWP array can generate electricity 80% of the time [27]. Even though the winds aloft tend to be much steadier and stronger than at ground level, the variability will require a reliable ground-based energy storage system to smooth the power delivery curve. Several storage systems have been proposed, including compressed air, pumped hydroelectric, and battery arrays, but it is not clear which is idealized for HWP systems [28]. Aside from variability in wind velocity, the jet stream and other currents can shift location on a seasonal basis. To deal with this issue, some have discussed the prospect of portable arrays [29], which could be un-tethered and relocated so as to follow the jet stream or other air currents. This would also require a series of ground-based power stations located along the seasonal route.

Both the DBR and TRC systems will require a tether for power transmission and for proper control and placement of the system itself. However, for systems designed to operate at 10,000 m, the weight and drag of such a tether could become a signiﬁcant engineering challenge and may be prohibitively expensive. The Sky WindPower Corporation has designed a TRC prototype that utilizes a 10 mm tether comprised of aluminum conductors in a Vectran ﬁber composite that weighs 115 kg/km [30]. According to the manufacturer, Vectran is a multiﬁlament yarn spun from a liquid crystal polymer with very high strength to weight ratios and has been used in a variety of high altitude applications [31]. Roberts et al. report that the transmission efﬁciency of the prototype tether is 90%, but it has not been tested in the extreme conditions of the Jet Stream and it remains unclear as to how durable these materials will be in wind speeds up to 300 mph. Carbon nanotubes may offer a potential solution to this engineering challenge, but at the time of this writing this technology is relatively immature and while the price has been decreasing [32], it is likely outside the price range for HWP applications. Furthermore, as the system altitude increases, the transmission line will require increasingly higher voltages in order to ameliorate transmission loss [33].

Since these systems will be subjected to harsh weather conditions and a steady stream of high winds, they will likely require frequent maintenance periods during the initial phases of deployment. These environmental conditions combined with the myriad of moving parts required for these systems could pose a signiﬁcant barrier to the growth of this technology. That is, maintenance of the equipment will have high costs for specialized parts and labor, and maintenance periods could result in signiﬁcant downtime. In some instances, these costs could eclipse the revenues from electricity sales. The scalability of these systems may also prove problematic. The HWP platforms are limited by size and weight constraints that are less of an issue for GBW turbines. In regards to the TRC technology, it is unclear just how many rotors or what platform size would optimize power generation.

#### This means the plan won’t attract private financing

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Some of the leading HWP ﬁrms like Magenn Power Inc., Sky WindPower Corp., and KiteGen are largely supported by private investors. These investors are most interested in turning a short or medium term proﬁt from HWP. Proﬁt could be realized if one of the aforementioned ﬁrms was bought out by a larger company, through licensing of a deployable HWP system, or through an industrial partnership whereby a manufacturer partners with the HWP ﬁrm. Regardless of the proﬁt mechanism, signiﬁcant uncertainty remains as to when these small, R&D heavy ﬁrms will be able to create a deployable, revenue generating system. Hence, investors are concerned with facilitating the R&D process as much as possible and ensuring that a viable system is ultimately produced as it is the gateway to proﬁt and return on investment. But this goal of shortening the R&D process can place ﬁrms at odds with investors, who may lack an understanding of the technical barriers to commercialization. In addition, investors may have a lower technical standard for a product to be deemed commercializable, which can create a conﬂict between the investors and researchers/engineers that may have more stringent and technically sound commercialization criteria.

Private investors and venture capital ﬁrms hold enormous economic authority as they are the primary source of funding for commercialization of high technology products. However, it is important to point out that 2009 represented the lowest level of VC investment since 1997, with a 37% decrease in investment from 2008 [43]. VC ﬁrms in general have become more risk averse and conservative in their investments, which creates an additional barrier for companies hoping to bridge the ‘Valley of Death’ and successfully commercialize HWP.

VC ﬁrms and other investors control the amount of funding available and are continuously reevaluating their investments and the potential for proﬁt. Should an insurmountable technical or non-technical barrier arise, investors may pull out of the project or attempt to redirect it all together. The researchers/engineers however, will likely have a much higher tolerance and optimism for addressing these issues, which can set the stage for yet another conﬂict among these key stakeholders. It is also important to point out that investors and venture capital ﬁrms in particular have signiﬁcant political power, which can be exercised through the National Venture Capital Association, an active lobbying group in Washington, DC [44].

#### The military won’t buy it

**Murdoch, 12 –** senior advisor with the Defense and National Security Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Clark, “The Defense Budget’s Double Whammy: Drawing Down While Hollowing Out from Within” 10/18, <http://csis.org/files/publication/121018_Murdoch_DefenseBudget_Commentary.pdf>)

Thus, this drawdown will be much more serious than those of years past. Why? Because the aggregate impact of inflation in the cost of personnel, health care, operations and maintenance (O&M), and acquisitions results in a defense dollar that “buys” less and less capability.

This internal cost inflation is driving DoD toward a zero-sum trade-off between personnel end-strength and modernization (see Figure 2).

Among the largest contributors to internal cost inflation is the military personnel (including health care) account. As DoD’s own “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices: January 2012” has noted, “the cost of military personnel has grown at an unsustainable rate over the last decade…Within the base budget alone…personnel costs increased by nearly 90 percent or about 30 percent above inflation [since 2001], while the number of military personnel has increased by only about 3 percent.”

Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs have similarly ballooned over the past few decades. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports in “Long-Term Implications of the 2012 Future Years Defense Program” that O&M costs per active-duty service member doubled from $55,000 to $105,000 (in constant 2012 dollars) between 1980 and 2001. These costs rose to $147,000 in DoD’s 2012 base-budget request and were projected to “grow at more than one and one-half times the historical (pre-2001) rate through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) period, reaching $161,000 in 2016.” While the rate of growth is expected to slow beyond 2016, CBO expects per capita O&M costs to reach $209,000 by 2030.

In combination, inflation in these accounts will squeeze out all funding for modernization (procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation [RDT&E]) in 2020, as depicted in Figure 2, if current trends are allowed to continue. This will, in the absence of extensive reform, force DoD to choose between sustaining endstrength and sustaining modernization. It cannot do both.

The Zero-Sum Trade-Off

The CSIS study team calculates that restoring modernization’s share of the FY2021 defense budget to 32 percent (the level of effort in the FY2001 budget) would require cutting end-strength by 455,000 active-duty service members, leaving the services with an end-strength of 845,000 (see Figure 3). This zero-sum trade-off will produce far more severe and disruptive consequences than is generally recognized by the department, requiring, at the very least, a wholesale recalibration of U.S. defense strategy and force posture.

The Squeeze on Discretionary Spending

This choice between modernization and end-strength will almost certainly remain even if sequestration is averted by congressional action. This is because discretionary spending tradespace (for both defense and nondefense accounts) is being squeezed out by mandatory spending—which includes spending on veteran benefits, income security, social security, Medicare, and Medicaid—and interest payments. And given Democratic aversion to entitlement cuts and Republican antipathy to tax increases, the defense budget, which constitutes 54 percent of discretionary spending, will likely be forced to absorb additional reductions under any scenario. (Estimates of the scale of alternatives to sequestration range from a total of $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion. Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Carl Levin has suggested that an additional $100 billion reduction over 10 years would be “realistic”.)

Regardless of the distribution of any cuts, however, mandatory spending and interest payments are expected to consume the entirety of the U.S. budget by 2036, leaving no discretionary tradespace for either defense or nondefense accounts (see Figure 4).

#### There isn’t enough recoverable high altitude wind to solve and the plan causes widespread climatic instability

**Science Daily, 11** (“Gone With the Wind: Why the Fast Jet Stream Winds Cannot Contribute Much Renewable Energy After All” 11/30, <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/11/111130100013.htm>)

The assumption that high jet steam wind speeds in the upper atmosphere correspond to high wind power has now been challenged by researchers of the Max Planck Institute for Biogeochemistry in Jena, Germany. Taking into account that the high wind speeds result from the near absence of friction and not from a strong power source, Axel Kleidon and colleagues found that the maximum extractable energy from jet streams is approximately 200 times less than reported previously. Moreover, climate model simulations show that energy extraction by wind turbines from jet streams alters their flow, and this would profoundly impact the entire climate system of the planet.

Jet streams are regions of continuous wind speeds greater than 25 m/s that occur at altitudes of 7-16 km. Their high speeds seem to suggest an almost unlimited source of renewable energy that would only need airborne wind energy technology to utilize it. Claims that this potential energy source could "continuously power all civilization" sparked large investments into exploitation of this potential energy resource. However, just like any other wind and weather system on Earth, jet streams are ultimately caused by the fact that the equatorial regions are heated more strongly by the sun than are polar regions. This difference in heating results in large differences in temperature and air pressure between the equator and the poles, which are the driving forces that set the atmosphere into motion and create wind. It is this differential heating that sets the upper limit on how much wind can be generated and how much of this could potentially be used as a renewable energy resource.

It is well known in meteorology that the high wind speeds of jet streams result from the near absence of friction. In technical terms, this fact is referred to in meteorology as "geostrophic flow." This flow is governed by an accelerating force caused by pressure differences in the upper atmosphere, and the so-called Coriolis force arising from Earth's rotation. Because the geostrophic flow takes place in the upper atmosphere, far removed from the influence of the surface and at low air density, the slow-down by friction plays a very minor role. Hence, it takes only very little power to accelerate and sustain jet streams. "It is this low energy generation rate that ultimately limits the potential use of jet streams as a renewable energy resource," says Dr. Axel Kleidon, head of the independent Max Planck Research Group 'Biospheric Theory and Modelling'. Using this approach based on atmospheric energetics, Kleidon's group used climate model simulations to calculate the maximum rate at which wind energy can be extracted from the global atmosphere. Their estimate of a maximum of 7.5 TW (1 TW = 10^12 W, a measure for power and energy consumption) is 200-times less than previously reported and could potentially account for merely about half of the global human energy demand of 17 TW in 2010.

Max Planck researchers also estimated the climatic consequences that would arise if jet stream wind power would be used as a renewable energy resource. As any wind turbine must add some drag to the flow to extract the energy of the wind and convert it into electricity, the balance of forces of the jet stream must also change as soon as energy is extracted. If 7.5 TW were extracted from jet streams as a renewable energy source, this would alter the natural balance of forces that shape the jet streams to such an extent that the driving atmospheric pressure gradient between the equator and the poles is depleted. "Such a disruption of jet stream flow would slow down the entire climate system. The atmosphere would generate 40 times less wind energy than what we would gain from the wind turbines," explains Lee Miller, first author of the study. "This results in drastic changes in temperature and weather."

#### Warming causes extinction

**Sify 10** – Sydney newspaper citing Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at University of Queensland and Director of the Global Change Institute, and John Bruno, associate professor of Marine Science at UNC (Sify News, “Could unbridled climate changes lead to human extinction?”, <http://www.sify.com/news/could-unbridled-climate-changes-lead-to-human-extinction-news-international-kgtrOhdaahc.html>, WEA)

The findings of the comprehensive report: 'The impact of climate change on the world's marine ecosystems' emerged from a synthesis of recent research on the world's oceans, carried out by two of the world's leading marine scientists. One of the authors of the report is Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, professor at The University of Queensland and the director of its Global Change Institute (GCI). 'We may see sudden, unexpected changes that have serious ramifications for the overall well-being of humans, including the capacity of the planet to support people. This is further evidence that we are well on the way to the next great extinction event,' says Hoegh-Guldberg. 'The findings have enormous implications for mankind, particularly if the trend continues. The earth's ocean, which produces half of the oxygen we breathe and absorbs 30 per cent of human-generated carbon dioxide, is equivalent to its heart and lungs. This study shows worrying signs of ill-health. It's as if the earth has been smoking two packs of cigarettes a day!,' he added. 'We are entering a period in which the ocean services upon which humanity depends are undergoing massive change and in some cases beginning to fail', he added. The 'fundamental and comprehensive' changes to marine life identified in the report include rapidly warming and acidifying oceans, changes in water circulation and expansion of dead zones within the ocean depths. These are driving major changes in marine ecosystems: less abundant coral reefs, sea grasses and mangroves (important fish nurseries); fewer, smaller fish; a breakdown in food chains; changes in the distribution of marine life; and more frequent diseases and pests among marine organisms. Study co-author John F Bruno, associate professor in marine science at The University of North Carolina, says greenhouse gas emissions are modifying many physical and geochemical aspects of the planet's oceans, in ways 'unprecedented in nearly a million years'. 'This is causing fundamental and comprehensive changes to the way marine ecosystems function,' Bruno warned, according to a GCI release. These findings were published in Science

### shipping

#### 1ac Fail. The status quo solves and the plan doesn’t affect it – SkySails is a brand that already offers this technology to the shipping industry. Their evidence is a company press release

**Royal DSM, 11** –global science-based company active in health, nutrition and materials “SKYSAILS – NEW ENERGY FOR SHIPPING,” <http://www.dsm.com/en_US/cworld/public/media/downloads/publications/backgrounder_skysails_new_energy_for_shipping_with_relevant_sources.pdf>)

GREEN SHIPPING – WIND POWER AS ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVE Cutting-edge solutions in the field of renewable energy are needed in order to meet these challenges. SkySails is offering a technology that contributes both to cutting ship operating costs while significantly reducing ship emissions at the same time. It is a simple fact: Wind is cheaper than oil and the most economic and environmentally sound source of energy on the high seas. It was little more than a century ago that wind was the sole source of power for the world's merchant fleet. The ready availability of cheap oil at the beginning of the 20th century led to the steady replacement of sails with diesel power. The introduction of the diesel engine changed the face of shipping. Classic sail propulsion can no longer be used in today’s world of cargo shipping. Conventional sail systems simply cannot generate the propulsion power required for modern ships. Also, those tall masts would severely restrict the cargo capacity on deck and make loading and unloading in port extremely difficult. The tilt (or heeling) caused by the large lever arms of sails secured to masts would pose a serious safety risk. In addition, high investment costs for mast supported sail systems lower their profitability significantly. Ships are long-lasting capital goods which are in operation for 25 years and more. The shipping industry’s greatest challenge will be to quickly and efficiently retrofit the existing cargo fleet in order to rapidly reduce the emission of climate-damaging greenhouse gases. This will not be possible with mast supported sails as it would require considerable modifications of the ships’ structures which in turn would be too expensive. SkySails offers an innovative propulsion system that meets the demands of today’s shipping industry and allows cargo ships to use wind energy on a grand scale once more. The SkySails-System consists of three main components: A towing kite with rope (flying system), a launch and recovery system, and a control system for automatic operation. The amount of space that the SkySails-System occupies on the ship is negligible from an economic standpoint. This is because the system’s deck components are installed in the area of the forecastle, which is not used for cargo anyway. The textile towing kite is easy to stow when folded and requires very little space on board ship. A folded 160m² SkySails for example is only the size of a telephone booth. Furthermore, there are no superstructures which may obstruct loading and unloading at harbors or navigating under bridges, since the towing kite is recovered when approaching land. The heeling caused by the SkySails-System is minimal and virtually negligible in terms of ship safety and operation. The tractive forces of the SkySails towing kite are transmitted to the ship at deck level. The lever arm which causes the inclined position (heeling) of conventional sailing ships is thus shortened. The towing kite is controlled by an autopilot during flight. The ship‘s regular crew is adequate for operating the system and no additional personnel costs will arise. Depending on the prevailing wind conditions, a ship’s average annual fuel consumption and emissions can be reduced by 10 to 35% by using the SkySails-System. The latest SkySails product generation has a maximal propulsion power of more than 2 MW (approx. 2,700 horse powers; equivalent ship engine) and can save up to 10 tons of oil per day – this equals cost savings of approx. US-$ 5,000 per day. For comparison: A normal family home needs 2 tons of oil for heating and warm water - per year. The worldwide patented SkySails-System generates tractive force using large, dynamically flying towing kites, which in terms of physics is the most effective form of utilizing wind energy. With a good wind the SkySails SKS C 320 can produce a pulling force in the towing rope of more than 320 kilonewton (kN) – a force greater than the thrust of both engines on an Airbus A321. The 32-meter width of the towing kite is just about as broad as the total wingspan of the A321. SkySails propulsion is the only wind-propulsion system that can not only be installed on newbuildings, but easily retrofitted onto most existing cargo ships as well. SkySails technology thus offers a solution that can make a major and quick environmental impact by reducing the carbon emissions of the existing “old” ships in the world’s merchant fleet. The UN body IMO (International Maritime Organisation) attaches great importance to SkySails with regard to climate protection: in its latest GHG Emissions study 9 , the IMO states that the SkySails technology has the potential to save approx. 100 million tons of CO2 per year when applied broadly on ships of the world’s merchant fleet. This corresponds to ca. 11% of Germany’s CO2 emissions. With its innovative wind propulsion system for cargo ships, SkySails as the market and technology leader offers one of the worldwide most attractive technologies for simultaneously reducing operating costs and CO2 emissions.

#### It’s already selling the tech

**Royal DSM, 11** –global science-based company active in health, nutrition and materials “SKYSAILS – NEW ENERGY FOR SHIPPING,” <http://www.dsm.com/en_US/cworld/public/media/downloads/publications/backgrounder_skysails_new_energy_for_shipping_with_relevant_sources.pdf>)

At the end of 2007 SkySails installed two pilot systems on board the cargo vessels MV “Michael A.” of Reederei Wessels and MV “Beluga SkySails” of Beluga Shipping. The MS “Theseus”, another ship belonging to Reederei Wessels, was equipped with a SkySails-System in summer 2009. And beginning of 2010, the first SkySails-System was installed on a fishing trawler within the context of a pilot project. SkySails’ first customers (Beluga Group and Reederei Wessels GmbH) are satisfied and have already ordered further systems. A first series of cargo ships of Reederei Wessels is currently being outfitted successively. The cargo ship systems installed so far have been undergoing long-term sea trials during regular shipping operations for the past 3 years and have been developed further continuously. The insights and experience gained during long-term testing were fed simultaneously into the SkySails product development effort which was advanced in parallel. SkySails will now finalize product development of the next larger system for cargo ships – the SKS C 320 – and then start production of the systems in larger quantities. Since the end of 2008, SkySails has the Zeppelin Power Systems GmbH & Co. KG, a subsidiary of the venerable Zeppelin Group, as strategic partner at its side. With the start of series production the joint venture company Zeppelin SkySails Sales & Service GmbH & Co. KG will exclusively handle worldwide sales and servicing of SkySails propulsion. At the end of 2010, the Dutch concern Royal DSM N.V. made an investment in SkySails as part of SkySails' latest round of financing, which was with a total volume of € 15 million the highest CleanTech venture capital investment in Germany of the year.

#### Shipping industry adaption is solving price increases

**Boardley, 12** - Marine Director of Lloyd’s Register and is responsible for worldwide operations as well as strategy and business development. Over his 24 year career in the maritime industry, Tom had held several senior management positions in the container shipping and ports industry. Tom is an engineering graduate of Oxford University and is also a fellow of the Royal Institute of Naval Architects. (Tom, “The Shipping Industry Innovates with New Fuels, New Engines, and New Designs” gCaptain, 3/6, <http://gcaptain.com/fuels-engines-designs/>)

Emissions regulation and higher fuel oil prices are driving change in shipping today. Future fuels, the future for marine engines and tomorrow’s ship designs are key areas that we are working on to help the marine industry to reduce emissions and find greater efficiencies.

Regulations requiring ships to produce less locally harmful pollutants, such as sulphur oxide (SOx) and nitrogen oxide (NOx), in emission control areas (ECAs) such as the Baltic and North Sea are due to be made stricter from 2015. Ships will need either to switch to different, cleaner, fuels or install abatement systems – ‘scrubbers’ – to extract harmful emissions. Approximately 80–90% of merchant vessels will enter an ECA during their lifetimes and more ECAs are expected – particularly in the Mediterranean and the Far East – in the future.

In terms of greenhouse gases (GHG), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed global energy design and energy management regulations that will help reduce the tonne mile GHG impact of shipping. The Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and, for new ships, the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) will come in to force in 2013. These are the first such global regulations to mitigate GHG emissions made by any United Nations agency.

But with the consequences for shipping of the UNFCCC process still not clear after COP 17, a global GHG regime seems as remote as ever. The agreement to the second Kyoto Protocol commitment period, covering mainly EU member states, makes it more likely that the European Union will take action on shipping – indeed it is starting the process of investigating how a regional GHG scheme could work for shipping. As a global industry requires global regulation it is far from clear what the impact of regional imperatives will be.

At the same time the price of fuel oil has been rising dramatically. Existing ships were developed to operate in a world where ships’ bunkers were available at US$150 a tonne. Bunker oil is now in the US$700-800 range. So, the economics of ship operations have changed.

New technologies and innovation

The result is that the shipping world is fast becoming a more complex place. New technologies and innovation will play a vital role in the immediate and long-term future of shipping.

Lloyd’s Register has talked about this as a ‘new paradigm’. Any evolution will be gradual but already we can see changes happening.

New fuels, new engines and new designs are becoming available.

The difficulty for shipowners, builders, equipment makers and, do not forget, financiers, is not only what technology to support, but when to invest. The future is further clouded by the weak market outlook and the hangover of the biggest boom in new ordering in history – the new ships still being built are, in the main, little different to the ships in demand a decade or more ago.

Most new technology being brought into operation now has been developed for relatively small or niche markets such as ferries and inland waterways – sectors where exposure to new regulation is most concentrated and where local emissions and other factors are felt most keenly.

**Sea power is irrelevant for future conflicts**

**Jarkowsky, 2** (Lt. Col. Jeffrey Jarkowsky, US Army War College, “’Boots on the Ground’–Will US Landpower still be decisive in future conflicts?” Stinet)

The role of seapower is unlikely to change from the vision expressed in current naval doctrine and vision. With no naval competitor in sight, the U.S. Navy's focus on projection of U.S. power ashore, and protection of global trade, fits the conditions expected in the future. The opening round of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM has demonstrated the capability and contribution of seapower to America's future conflicts. The nature of the conflict will determine whether seapower can be decisive. Quite obviously, in a limited seaborne conflict, such as protecting shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, seapower was and can be the decisive element. In more general conflicts of the type we have recently seen and are likely to deal with again, although a key contributor, seapower is not likely to be the sole decisive force in achieving the conflict's objectives

#### Oil is the great peacemaker – risk of shocks ensures diplomacy instead of conflict

Roger Howard, 11-29-2008; Roger Howard is a writer and broadcaster on international relations. His books include Iran in Crisis? (Zed, 2004), What’s Wrong with Liberal Interventionism (Social Affairs Unit, 2006) and Iran Oil: The New Middle East Challenge to America (IB Tauris, 2006). He has written widely for newspapers and journals ranging from the Daily Mail and Daily Express to the National Interest and the RUSI Journal. “An Ode to Oil” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html

Oil can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability because many conflicts, in almost every part of the world, can threaten a disruption of supply and instantly send crude prices spiraling. Despite the recent price falls, the market is still vulnerable to sudden supply shocks, and a sharp increase would massively affect the wider global economy. This would have potentially disastrous social and political results, just as in the summer many countries, including France, Nepal and Indonesia, were rocked by violent protests at dramatic price increases in gasoline. Haunted by the specter of higher oil prices at a time of such economic fragility, many governments have a very strong incentive to use diplomacy, not force, to resolve their own disputes, and to help heal other people's. This is true not just of oil consumers but producers, which would also be keen not to watch global demand stifled by such price spikes. Consider the events of last fall, when the Ankara government was set to retaliate against the Iraq-based Kurdish guerrillas who had killed 17 Turkish soldiers and taken others prisoner in a cross-border raid on Oct. 21, 2007. Even the mere prospect of such an attack sent the price of a barrel surging to a then record high of $85 because the markets knew that the insurgents could respond by damaging a key pipeline which moves 750,000 barrels of oil across Turkish territory every day. Not surprisingly, the Bush administration pushed very hard to prevent a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq -- State Department spokesman Sean McCormack aptly described the frenzy of diplomatic activity as a "full-court press" -- not just to avoid shattering the vestiges of Iraq's political structure but also to stabilize oil prices. In the end it was American pressure that averted a major incursion, allowing crude prices to quickly ease. And the Turks would also have been aware that any invasion could have prompted retaliatory damage on the oil pipeline, losing them vast transit fees. In general, oil is such a vital commodity, for consumers, producers and intermediaries alike, that it represents a meeting point for all manner of different interests. Sometimes it offers an opportunity for competitors and rivals to resolve differences, as in March 1995, when Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to break deadlock with Washington by offering a technically very demanding oil contract to Conoco. Today, the symbiotic energy requirements of Europe and Russia allows scope to improve mutual relations, not least if European governments act in unison to impose the rules of the European Union's energy charter on Moscow. Oil also gives consumers a chance to penalize, or tempt, international miscreants, just as U.S. sanctions are forcing the Tehran regime to reassess its cost-benefit analysis of building the bomb. What cannot go unchallenged is a facile equation between oil on the one hand, and war, bloodshed and, in America's particular case, strategic vulnerability on the other. For oil, fortunately, can often be our guardian.

### heg

#### SCS aggression won’t escalate

-red lines solve

-all actors are rational and wouldn’t fight

-if it’s true it would escalate now that’s a reason war wouldn’t happen

-their ev is premised on hawkish rhetoric, experts unanimously conclude neg

-intervening actors prevent escalation through dialogue

**Sieg 12** – writer for Reuters

(Linda, “Japan, China military conflict seen unlikely despite strain”, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/23/us-china-japan-confrontation-idUSBRE88M0F220120923>, dml)

(Reuters) - **Hawkish** Chinese **commentators** have urged Beijing to prepare for military conflict with Japan as tensions mount over disputed islands in the East China Sea, but most **experts say** chances the Asian rivals will decide to go to war are slim.

A bigger risk is the possibility that an unintended maritime clash results in deaths and boosts pressure for retaliation, but even then Tokyo and Beijing are **expected to seek to manage the row** before it becomes a full-blown military confrontation.

"That's the real risk - a maritime incident leading to a loss of life. If a Japanese or Chinese were killed, there would be a huge outpouring of nationalist sentiment," said Linda Jakobson, director of the East Asia Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney.

"But I still cannot seriously imagine **it would lead to an attack** on the other country. I do think **rational minds would prevail**," she said, adding economic retaliation was more likely.

A feud over the lonely islets in the East China Sea flared this month after Japan's government bought three of the islands from a private owner, triggering violent protests in China and threatening business between Asia's two biggest economies.

Adding to the tensions, China sent more than 10 government patrol vessels to waters near the islands, known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan, while Japan beefed up its Coast Guard patrols. Chinese media said 1,000 fishing boats have set sail for the area, although none has been sighted close by.

Despite the diplomatic standoff and rising nationalist sentiment in China especially, **experts agree** neither Beijing nor Tokyo **would intentionally escalate** to a military confrontation what is already the worst crisis in bilateral ties in decades.

U.S. PRESSURE

"The chances of a military conflict are very, very slim because neither side wants to go down that path," said **former People's Liberation Army officer**, Xu Guangyu, now a senior consultant at a government-run think tank in Beijing.

Pressure from the United States, which repeated last week that the disputed isles were covered by a 1960 treaty obliging Washington to come to Japan's aid if it were attacked, is also working to restrain both sides, security experts said.

"I very seriously do not think any of the involved parties - Japan, China and including the United States because of its defense treaty (with Japan) - want to see a military conflict over this dispute," said the Lowy Institute's Jakobson.

"**They don't want to risk it**, they don't seek it and they do not intend to let it happen."

Still, the possibility of a clash at sea remains.

While the presence of the Chinese surveillance ships - none of which is a naval vessel - and Japan Coast Guard ships in the area might appear to set the stage for trouble, military experts said each side would try to steer clear of the other.

"The bad news is that China sent ships to the area. The good news is that they are official ships controlled by the government," said Narushige Michishita at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.

"This is good news because they are not likely to engage in aggressive action because that would really exacerbate the situation and turn it into a major crisis," said Michishita.

The Chinese ships, he said, had another mission besides asserting China's claims to the islands and nearby waters.

"My guess is that some (Chinese) official patrol boats are there to watch out for fishing boats ... to stop them from making problems," Michishita said.

FISHING BOATS WILD CARD

Military specialists say the Chinese patrol vessels are well disciplined as are the Japan Coast Guard ships, while the two sides have grown accustomed to communicating.

"Both sides are ready, but both sides are very well under control," said a former senior Japanese military official.

What worries observers most is the risk that a boat carrying Chinese fishermen slips through or activists try to land, sparking clashes with Japan's Coast Guard that result in deaths - news of which would spread like wildfire on the Internet.

In 1996, a Hong Kong activist drowned in the nearby waters.

Diplomatic and economic relations chilled sharply in 2010 after Japan arrested a Chinese trawler captain whose boat collided with a Japan Coast Guard vessel. This time, tensions are already high and China is contending with a tricky once-in-a-decade leadership change while Japan's ruling party faces a probable drubbing in an election expected in months.

"Two rational governments of major countries **would not intentionally decide to enter into a major war with each other over** a few uninhabited rocks," said Denny Roy, an Asia security expert at the East-West Center in Hawaii.

"But unfortunately, you can arrive at war in ways other than that - through unintended escalation, in which both countries start out at a much lower level, but each of them think that they must respond to perceived provocation by the other side, both very strongly pushed into it by domestic pressure. That seems to be where we are now and it is difficult to see how countries can get out of that negative spiral."

Others, however, were more confident that an unplanned clash could be kept from escalating into military conflict.

"That's not really a major possibility, because there are still **broad channels of communication between the two sides,** and they would help prevent that happening. Both sides could still talk to each other," said former senior PLA officer Xu.

"Even before anything happened, you would also have the U.N Secretary General and others **stepping in to ensure that the situation** does not get out of control."

#### Current DOD energy improvements solve

**Lowe, 12 -** Advocacy Communications Director at the Truman National Security Project (Benjamin, “Clean Energy Critical to Security” 5/21, National Journal’s Experts blog, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php>)

The U.S. military accounts for 2% of our nation’s petroleum use and 93% of the U.S. government’s energy use, making them the largest institutional energy user in the world. For every $10 rise in the price of oil, the Department of Defense must come up with an extra $1.3 billion annually, which must be diverted from training, maintenance, and other mission-essential programs.

That’s why the military has invested in a wide range of energy independence programs across all branches of service. Smart grids connected to renewable energy sources ensure military bases don’t go dark if the electric grid fails. Solar panels at remote forward operating bases in Afghanistan reduce the number of dangerous fuel convoys needed to resupply troops on the front lines. Many such programs are already saving both money and lives—and are becoming increasingly effective as the military continues these vital investments.

#### 1). No impact to decline, increased competition from decline will manifest itself in non-violent forms- attempting to embed American liberalism creates antagonism that frays the world order

**Mazarr 12** \*Michael J. Mazarr is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College [“Rivalry’s New Face” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 54:4, 83-106, PDF]

The persistence of rivalry In the years following the Cold War, several theories competed to explain the emerging shape of the international system. The ‘clash of civilisations’, the end of history, homogenising globalisation, core/gap theory – all tried to capture the essence of the post-Cold War moment. None proved entirely accurate: commitment to end-of-history forms of social organisation and values has proved incomplete; resistance to globalisation is as striking as its universality; cultures have not, uniformly, clashed. And then 9/11 arrived, to brush aside, at least in the United States, much serious thinking about global trends in favour of a simplified narrative about ideological warfare. After 9/11, the urgent priority of the ‘war on terror’ monopolised the attention of senior levels in government and fostered a strategic myopia. It is well past time to consider alternative strategic narratives. With the rise of emerging power centres in many parts of the globe and an obvious assertiveness on the part of leading states, a number of commentators have dusted off forecasts for a return to deepening and intensifying global rivalry. Coming years will see mounting rivalry – of a sort. But rather than reflecting a return to the geopolitical power-balancing characteristic of an earlier era, this escalating competitiveness will display forms and patterns unique to its own age. Various shades of this pattern, too complex for reductive labels (but which we might term ‘entangled rivalry’), are evident in the emerging system. There are persuasive reasons to expect the international system to be characterised by intensifying levels of rivalry and competition, not only between and among states, but among a wide range of actors. The human tendency to view the larger world in ‘us versus them’ terms makes competition a default expectation.3 Political leaders have both political and career self-interest – as well as patriotism – in mind when they take steps that favour their own country’s power and influence over others.4 A more even distribution of global power would bring greater competition: in a rigid hierarchy, those locked into subordinate positions do not see an opportunity to challenge for influence, while a more equitable distribution can create ‘ambiguous status hierarchies’, as William Wohlforth has suggested. These ‘generate more dissatisfaction and clashes’ as states feel emboldened to assert interests previously abandoned as forlorn hopes.5 This would presumably be true even of a perceived equalisation of power and status, which is certainly emerging today as a sense of US dominance fades. Recent events bear out such expectations. A crowd of emerging powers, from China and India to Brazil, Turkey, Argentina and Indonesia is determined to claim a greater say in the direction of world order. China has increasingly promoted its interests in the South China Sea, sending naval patrols to underline territorial and resource claims. India desires a regional and global role commensurate with its self-image as a great power. Brazil aims to boost its regional and global influence through a regional trade bloc (UNASUR) and ties with other emerging powers such as Russia, India, China and South Africa; Brazil’s current president, Dilma Rousseff, speaks of her country becoming a true ‘world power’ and ‘great nation.’6 Turkey has evolved what some have termed a ‘neo-Ottoman’ foreign policy, calling for reform in Syria and revised Israeli settlements policies, offering an alternative solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and promoting itself as the leading voice of the Muslim community. Growing assertiveness in what Fareed Zakaria has termed the ‘post- American world’7 is not restricted to powers outside the ‘liberal core’. Germany has since at least 2002 offered a more independent ‘German way’; its post-war sense of humility and constraint is giving way to greater firmness as it looms over a troubled Europe as an economic superpower. Japan, too, is emerging from its self-imposed shell with enhanced military power and a greater willingness to confront Chinese regional ambitions. Nor is the pattern restricted to states. Non-state actors are fully engaged as participants in this competitive mixture, whether asserting goals or interests against states or vis-à-vis one another. Global crime cartels have become sophisticated paramilitary and financial organisations with influence and reach that dominate the economics, social life and politics of large areas of Central and South America. On issues such as information security, hackers, quasi-state cyber militias, corporations, bands of ‘white hat’ cyber-security gurus, and states are engaged in a constant struggle for mastery of global networks. It should come as little surprise, then, that recent years have witnessed increasingly self-interested, assertive state and non-state actors clashing more vigorously, a development that will challenge the post-Cold War vision of a global community built on shared values and introduce a fluid dynamic of self-interested, prideful, nationalistic assertion of identity by many actors operating within and among increasingly integrated, globalising societies. To offer just one well-known example, over the last several years, Russia has transformed from a somewhat compliant, post-Cold War transitional state into a much more aggressive power determined to advance its perceived interests and its own view of world politics. Russia’s assertiveness has shown itself in the country’s 2008 intervention in Georgia, in its natural-gas coercion directed against Europe, in cyber attacks on Estonia, and in efforts to block Western initiatives on issues such as the Syrian rebellion. The potential for rivalry is exacerbated by volatile psychological and sociological dynamics within increasingly integrated societies. Nationalism and social grievances have become symptomatic of a period already defined by hostile reactions to a globalised cosmopolitanism that has developed according to US and Western rules, and a sense that tradition, culture and identity are under siege. This creeping ontological insecurity is exacerbated by a generalised crisis of governance: regimes and political leaders cannot solve pressing social challenges, either because of polarised or fragmented political contexts, corruption, the influence of wealthy elites or a lack of tools adequate to the job. A fascinating recent report on European populist movements from the London think tank Demos concluded that their members ‘are young, angry, and disillusioned with the current crop of automaton political elites, who they do not think are responding to the concerns and worries they face in their lives’.8 That sensibility has become a leitmotif of our time: the reassertion of group identity, often grounded in nostalgia and manifest in utopian ideologies, is a common response to a sense of failed governance. It is likely that a number of these competitive societies will pass through years of turbulent domestic dynamics. Countries as diverse as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey each face, in different ways and to different degrees, looming challenges at home: expanding democratic governance alongside more closed class or political traditions; job-seeking crowds composed of the highly educated children of growing middle classes; the need for continued growth pressing up against constraints in cultural norms, transparency and institutional effectiveness. The result may be domestic unrest, pressures that could divert attention and energies from ambitions for global prominence, or the emergence of a perceived need (and justification) for belligerence and foreign adventures. Already, there has been a palpable swelling of national and cultural assertion in the service of independent identity. We see this in China’s turbulent public reactions to the slightest perceived foreign slight, such as over the 2008 Olympics; in the Russian nostalgia for past greatness; in the brandishing of politicised national destinies in Turkey, Indonesia and Brazil; in the identity politics that have surged to the forefront of Japanese–Korean relations over issues such as shrine visits and the treatment of former ‘colonial collaborators’; in the extremist nationalism that has clawed its way to parliamentary victories in European countries; and in the growing sense, in Germany and Japan, that post-war guilt has lasted long enough. Partly, this reflects the revenge of popular will, a reassertion of politics, against the technocratic aspects of an impersonal globalism. A belligerent nationalism offers psychic rewards that a bland, cosmopolitan consumerism does not. As realists have been predicting, global rivalry and competition is set to become more aggressive and pointed, at a time when the rules and norms undergirding the post-war international system are dangerously fraying. A perception of growing antagonism **(the conviction, for example, of many Chinese, Russians and Indians** that the United States is hostile to their burgeoning power) is putting down deep roots. Yet in critical ways, this neo-rivalry will differ from prior episodes, in terms of both what today’s powers want and how they expect to achieve it. A limited rivalry Between 1863 and 1866, Otto von Bismarck helped to engineer a series of crises and political-military manoeuvres that firmly established Prussia as a rising power at the centre of Europe. First came an 1863–64 confrontation with Denmark over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which the Danes had ruled for four centuries. A new Danish king overreached in claiming the areas as an ‘integral part’ of his country, in violation of a treaty. Bismarck saw an opportunity to grab and annex the two regions.9 He allied with Austria to enforce the treaty, demanded that the Danes relinquish the duchies and, when they refused, marched an army of overwhelming strength into Schleswig, forcing their capitulation. But, according to the way of things in Europe at the time, by 1866 Prussia would be at war with its former partner, Austria. Indeed, part of Bismarck’s motive in forming the alliance was to overextend and distract the Hapsburgs in preparation for assaulting them; in the years that followed, Bismarck repeatedly provoked his erstwhile ally. Throughout the spring of 1866 he broadcast his intention to go to war; when it began, the culminating event, at Sadowa, involved half a million combatants. A closely fought battle was decided by the arrival of an additional Prussian column that fell upon an Austrian flank; the Austrians were driven from the field. As this brief anecdote suggests, before accepting claims that the international system ‘is beginning to look like late-nineteenth century world politics’, as Thomas Henriksen has claimed,10 we should remind ourselves of how, precisely, states and statesmen saw the world before the post-war era, and how they behaved. A return to classic realpolitik is unlikely, if not impossible: changes in the character of societies, emerging norms, and the evolving character of the global system, while hardly altering human nature or making war impossible, have profoundly altered the preferences of national elites and wider populations. The assertiveness of states may be growing, but a host of intersecting trends have reshaped the preferences

, interests and (in many cases) values of states and their leaders. In prior phases of rivalry, great powers generally served the interests of ruling groups or classes. States constituted the dominant actors. They sought a range of goals, including economic objectives and such ephemeral values as honour and pride, but core political-military concerns – balances of military strength; territorial, demographic and geographic measures of greatness; geostrategic, chessboard-style power plays – served as the lens through which other objectives were viewed. States felt constantly vulnerable to attack from neighbours engaged in a shifting pattern of threatening alliances. They saw war as a legitimate tool of statecraft, and its prospect was often thrilling to leaders and populaces regularly nurtured in traditions of military glory and periodically anxious to prove themselves through conflict. All of these factors have been profoundly altered by a range of accumulating social, economic, political and cultural trends. The result is that, as much as general claims about humankind’s propensity for competition, conflict and rivalry remain apt, twenty-first-century geopolitical rivalry is not likely, in broad terms, to mirror its earlier counterparts. While today’s emerging powers possess many of the same basic goals as their predecessors – Robert Kagan lists ‘influence, wealth, security, status, and honor’ as among these goals11 – the perspectives they bring to those objectives have been decisively altered. The way states view both the character of their leading objectives (for example, the nature of ‘security’) and the most appropriate and beneficial tools to achieve them has evolved dramatically. While states still aspire to national ‘greatness’, regional influence and global recognition, today’s emerging powers are stepping onto a stage set for the wealth, investment and trade that they covet, and know they must tread carefully as they make their way to greater prominence. They do not seek to overthrow the existing order, but to prosper within it and to reform patterns of influence to their benefit. Few have unresolved land or princely disputes with neighbours, and none boast the territorial or imperial lust for conquest and acquisition so typical of earlier great powers. As much as states seek identity, recognition and influence, moreover, analyses of these factors stress that they are multidimensional: states can travel many roads to their ‘place in the system’. Accumulating political-military power, challenging the established order and other behaviours traditionally associated with great-power politics are only one such road, and today the least favoured. 12 The dominant priority of states today is furnishing a context that offers the greatest opportunity for the advancement of prosperity. To a substantial degree, the legitimacy of states and their ruling classes now rests on ongoing development and enhanced national well-being. This trend is also associated with the rise of specific social classes and interest groups within states that prioritise wealth accumulation and stability. To pursue such interests, states and other actors must participate in global networks of a thousand varieties. Webs of information built around the Internet are increasingly essential for business and civic organisations; capital markets furnish the lifeblood of growth; global professional groups allow specialists to stay on the cutting edge of their field; standards-setting groups lay the foundation for technological progress. While not an absolute constraint on state action, these facts do confront decision-makers with vulnerabilities and risks, and an interest in the stability of the larger network on which their economic and political fates depend. The effect of networked dependencies is borne out in decisions by all rising powers to consciously tie their economic and political fates to this global system.13 The leading example of such a choice remains China, which made a bet on growth and development as the avenue to political legitimacy, and integration in the world community as the route to that end. Thus, it is not just Chinese economic growth, but the political future of the Communist Party, that is linked to advancing prosperity. Russia, too, depends on global networks not only for energy sales but foreign investment: total foreign direct investment ran to $185.8 billion for 2004–08 alone, reaching 4.5% of GDP; after a decline with the financial crisis it had recov- ered to $18.4bn in 2011, with total foreign investment of all types hitting $190 billion.14 From Brazil to India, Turkey to South Korea, Indonesia to Chile, the rising powers of the new era view their fates as tangled up with global trading systems, capital markets, energy and information networks, and other forms of exchange and mutual reliance. The choice of means to pursue competitive objectives is also influenced and constrained by the reactions of others to one’s own strategies, actions that are now substantially magnified in a far more integrated system whose members are aware of its dependence on stability. Recognition is a two-way street: states cannot unilaterally claim recognition or a global role; others must assent to it.15 Acceptance can turn to rejection when an integrated system that demands stability confronts a malcontent. In today’s era of competitive nations, national strength derives from a state’s ability to attract investment and generate innovation, productivity and creative communities. The sources of national greatness are fluid rather than fixed; they can escape national boundaries and are acquired and preserved, not with force, but through participation in global networks. States that regularly behave irresponsibly will find themselves excluded and stagnating. These trends have the potential to create what might be termed a ‘rule of self-defeating brutality’: states or groups that employ violence or bare-knuckled intimidation will generate revulsion and penalties (both within and among societies) which, even if not immediately decisive on the model of traditional military campaigns, nonetheless accumulate to decisive effect. Human psychological tendencies, combined with the character of a more integrated system, magnify these effects: research has demonstrated a desire to punish violations of perceived norms, even when the violator and victim are both strangers.16 While imperfect, punitive international reaction to rogues such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran (as well as to destabilising non-state actors, from pirates to terrorists), and regional deterrent reactions to Chinese bellicosity, offer hopeful evidence of such an effect at work. Rivalry has also been constrained by the vanishing instrumental value of territorial aggression. The cost of military action is much higher than it once was, thanks in part to nuclear weapons, but also to the advancing techniques and effectiveness of insurgencies. At the same time, in a knowledge economy, conquest hardly pays the way it once did. Apart from actions by a very small handful of ‘aggressor states’, recent wars (the Iraq War in 2003, the Russia–Georgia War in 2008, Libya in 2011) have generally aimed at imposing a temporary, localised, controlled shock: removing a tyrant from power, sending a signal. They are, in their way, limited in means and ends, even though they can become bogged down in a manner that their authors did not intend or anticipate. Large-scale military action is less attractive now than at any time in modern history.17 To be clear, these changes in value and interest do not come close to indicating that war has become ‘obsolescent’, as John Mueller has claimed.18 Innumerable wars throughout history have begun without either (or any) side desiring conflict. Miscalculation, accident, misunderstanding, stubborn allies and stubbornly held commitments can pull states into war despite the barriers of interdependence. Nor does the new paradigm presume that states will cease to use military force as a tool of statecraft. As continuing Chinese naval actions in the Pacific, Russian manoeuvring opposite Georgia and many other examples make clear, states will use armed force to posture and signal. Yet a fundamental shift in context has occurred, with dramatic implications for the way states view their core objectives: where once they saw dominantly zero-sum political-military competition, with an overlay of trade and engagement, as the precondition for achieving national goals, today the world is dominated by positive-sum economic and cultural competition in which the stability of the system is vital. The Russia of today, as insistent and nationalistic as it may be, is not the Russia of 1815, or 1848, or 1905. The priorities of its leading social sectors are resolutely middleclass and consumerist. Its economic fate is inextricably bound to the global economy. Its ambitions, as intense as they remain, are entangled in a web of constraints. And just as important, a shift is taking place in the tools states will employ to promote their interests and achieve their goals. While military action remains in the background, alternative means will be more feasible, powerful and preferred than in earlier eras of rivalry.

#### Conflict will erupt if norms do not govern new means of balancing- maintaining power projection undermines the imposition of these norms

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The emerging shape of rivalry Rivalry, therefore, is natural to human politics and social dynamics. It appears to be accelerating, and yet classic, state-on-state realpolitik is fatally mismatched to the realities of the age. What model are we therefore likely to see? Three fundamental trends in the global scene are likely to help shape the answer. The first is the emergence of a hyper-networked era. Nearly all states have become participants in a globalising, brittle, volatile global commons, their societies profoundly exposed in an era of networked interdependence. The fundamental dependence of states and their institutions, including firms, on global markets, global capital, the Internet and associated information networks, and the vulnerabilities of so-called ‘critical infrastructures’ (from agriculture to water to telecommunications and shipping), is one of the most significant emerging facts of social life. Robert Miller and Irving Lachow of the Information Resources Management College call the result ‘strategic fragility’, and argue that the United States has achieved ‘greater productivity and prosperity at the risk of greater exposure to widespread systemic collapse’.19 Connectivity is set to accelerate in coming years with developments such as web-enabled ‘Smart Grids’ for energy and the embedding of IP addresses into dozens of home appliances and electronic goods. Cascading vulnerabilities exist at multiple levels: cyber tools can be used to cause economic or resource damage; physical attacks on key shipping, transit or energy-supply nodes could have ripple effects across entire economies. If an essential grounding principle of economically advanced, developed states in the postmodern era involves providing a context for the pursuit of well-being and prosperity, then risks to fragile, interdependent networks that underpin this legitimacy go to the very sustainability of these societies as effective social contracts. The second trend shaping the emerging version of rivalry is the diffusion of power to a variety of agents that cross borders and influence a broad range of issues. These ‘non-state’ actors are widely discussed today,20 and include groups that have quasi-state status, such as Hizbullah; globespanning corporations whose revenues match the GDP of some countries; activist groups, terrorist networks and hacker organisations; and powerful individuals. The baseline trend is clear enough: where once states were the basic actors on the stage of geopolitical rivalry, occasionally challenged by insurgencies or other momentary exceptions to their predominance, today a vastly more kaleidoscopic portrait has emerged comprising hundreds of actors – states, supra-state institutions, non-governmental organisations, global criminal enterprises, corporations, political and activist movements either with transnational ambitions or organisational structures, terrorist and militant groups, and more. We should think of the emerging system as composed not of ‘states’ and ‘others’ but, to better capture the rough equality between the actors, a complex environment of ‘agents’. The crowding of the global political stage extends even into states, as seen in the emergence of intensely nationalistic, aggressive, quasi-state actors, such as Chinese or Russian ‘cybermilitias’ or Pakistan’s state-sponsored militant groups. These groups reflect state interests and take some direction from governments, but are not fully under the control of their sponsor states, and often advocate, and take, more extreme actions than governments. The upshot of this trend is a world of hundreds of powerful agents, each with goals, interests, missions and values they are aiming to promote, preserve and protect. Each collaborates with some counterpart agents and views others as competitors. In such a context, ‘rivalry’ takes on a vastly more encompassing, self-organising and complex meaning than it has held before. Non-state actors will often feel less constrained than states, because many of the factors that have altered states’ interpretation of their objectives do not apply in equal measure, or at all, to such actors. Some of them are not seeking recognition and therefore will not be deterred by the prospect of a failure by others to accept their status. Some harbour extreme, narrow ideologies hostile to the entire global system. We face a bifurcating world of intensifying constraints on state actors and a proliferating crowd of nonstate agents operating largely free of these limitations, but with the ability to drag states into conflict. Non-military instruments of power In 1999, two colonels in the Chinese army, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, put forth what they hoped would become an important statement on geo- politics in the newly unfolding twenty-first century. In their monograph Unrestricted Warfare, they argued that major war had become passé, and contended that classical warfare was giving way to new forms of rivalry. ‘Only a fool like Saddam Hussein would seek to fulfill his own wild ambitions by outright territorial occupation’, they argued. Competition and conflict were not ending, however; they had ‘re-invaded human society in a more complex, more extensive, more concealed, and more subtle manner’.21 This brilliant, insightful, sometimes dense and often ambiguous manifesto remains an important guidebook to a third trend shaping the new rivalry: the growing dominance of non-military avenues of competition. Because of the burgeoning network vulnerabilities described above, states and non-state actors will be able to deploy non-military instruments of power with devastating effect. And partly due to the constraints on more elaborate forms of conflict, non-military instruments seem set to become the dominant expressions of rivalry, joining and frequently replacing, though not ruling out altogether, traditional Napoleonic–Calusewitzian warfare as the preferred methods for agents to coerce and influence other agents, to defend their interests, or to gain something of value. Because of these changes in emphasis, the colonels argued, the whole purpose of conflict was evolving; prior warfare involved ‘using armed force to compel an enemy to submit to one’s will’, whereas new forms of conflict would employ ‘all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests’.22 Such tools allow states to injure challengers without employing the largescale military force that now seems both dangerous and generally archaic. These tools tend to be: • non-violent; • open to use by a wide range of agents, from states down to highly capable individuals; • often capable of being used without attribution, or even with misdirected attribution; • capable of harming the domestic tranquility and well-being of other states, or the effectiveness and well-being of other agents, calling into question two essential aspects of legitimacy; • targeted at vulnerabilities inherent in intensifying global networks; and • capable of inflicting substantial damage, including physical destruction and death. As such tools become the default mechanisms of rivalry, they have the potential to wreak serious havoc on targeted states and non-state agents. States and other agents are now highly vulnerable to attack by cyber means, for example, in part because of the continuing vulnerability of a wide range of social and economic infrastructures to hacking. Many elements of social life, from finance to government services to energy to the Internet (itself now an increasingly essential repository of business processes and information banks), have become susceptible to this weapon. The vulnerability of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which run everything from dams to power plants, has been well documented.23 Energy, natural resources, public works, supply-chain management, transportation and database management in a dozen fields – these and many other areas can be disrupted with cyber techniques.24 Major cyber attacks, such as the April 2007 assault on Estonia by what were subsequently identified as Russian ‘cyber militias’, constitute acts of aggression, a form of conflict, and an effort to teach rivals a lesson and coerce behaviour, all accomplished in non-military ways. Economic tools comprise a second broad category of non-military influence. Sanctions are well known, but the increasingly interconnected, capital-dependent, automated character of modern financial and economic systems furnishes extensive opportunity for coercion and mischief-making. China could threaten to withhold purchases of US Treasury securities, and has already hinted at leading a drive to replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. The European Union has employed economic statecraft to gain influence, especially on its periphery. In a more pointed fashion, states and non-state actors could target specific firms, possibly with short-selling attacks, or go after computer programs that now control between 50– 75% of daily stock-trading volume in what has become known as ‘high frequency trading’.25 States and non-state actors are also looking to energy and natural resources as a means of manipulating geopolitics for self-interested advan- tage. Oil embargoes have been familiar for decades, but probably the best recent example of this approach has been Russia’s repeated use of resourcebased coercion, particularly natural gas.26 China’s manipulation of the market for rare earth minerals in the wake of a dispute with Japan has already been discussed.27 Another, potentially more decisive tool of influence is information – everything from social media to more direct forms of propaganda and other means of shaping narratives and reality. Countries could manipulate information channels for strategic advantage, either limiting access by their own citizens or else conspiring to create disruptive events in other countries. A leading example today is Wael Ghonim’s role, and by extension the role of Facebook and other social-media mechanisms, in fomenting and perpetuating the Arab Spring.28 To gain strategic advantage in a crisis, countries could use such tools in a coordinated fashion to disrupt social stability. A competitor could decide to conduct a persistent campaign of long-term disruption, encouraging, for example, the sort of social-media-fuelled riots that tore through some areas of England in August 2011.29 To many, such tools are subject to powerful constraints, precisely due to the interdependence and mutuality of the emerging era.30 Actions taken to harm a rival in economic or infrastructure terms could easily boomerang; China, it is frequently said, cannot threaten to dump US Treasury securities as a form of coercive power, because Washington knows that for Beijing to do so would be to commit economic suicide. Some have argued that Russia’s energy supplies to Europe actually make Moscow dependent on the continent, rather than providing leverage over it.31 Of course, such concerns did not prevent Russia from suspending natural-gas shipments to Ukraine, and thus to the West, in winter 2009, thus leaving millions in the cold. Clearly, non-military tools offer dozens of avenues to punishment, coercion, signalling, score-settling, and demonstrations of pride and power. A final development that deserves special mention is the immediate, sensationalistic, increasingly extreme media that is taking hold of public perceptions in so many countries. Publics (often ill-informed to begin with) that are trying to grapple with a complex strategic context will increasingly be bombarded with shrill, disposable narratives that mislead rather than inform. This trend will serve to exacerbate many of the factors mentioned above, from the mutual suspicions of major states to the public reaction to attacks on social well-being, and will undermine the patience and pragmatism so urgently required to preserve stability in the emerging era. Characteristics of entangled rivalry A major hallmark of the postmodern era is that, at a time when shared challenges demand collective responses, and extreme forms of rivalry now seem obviously self-defeating, human habits of self-interested behaviour and collective expressions of pride, honour and grievance have not vanished. Those habits may become even more pronounced in a world that has traded a few major actors, each accountable to the common good of a sovereign space, for hundreds, many of them accountable only to some narrow self-interested goal such as a single issue or profit – or, in fact, accountable to no one at all. Entangled rivalry is likely to have a number of particular characteristics. It will substantially complicate the categorisation of states: under the new order it is far more difficult to distinguish friends, enemies and allies. Entangled rivalry will require nations to deal with counterparts who count as rivals, even enemies, on one issue but whose cooperation is needed on others. The challenge will be especially severe for the United States, for whom such ambiguous relationships do not come easily. The new era will also tend to complicate the management of security policy by blurring boundaries of all kinds – between defence and civilian activities; between professions and disciplines; between types of government responses; and between crime and war, as agents (such as militant groups in Mexico or Afghanistan, or hacker organisations) engage in actions that appear to citizenries like both. Most fundamentally, the blurring of boundaries calls into question the definition of one of the most significant and loaded terms in classical geopolitics: an ‘act of war’. Distinguishing an act of war from just one more incident in a long string of harassment gestures – as during the Russian hacker attacks on Estonia – becomes a challenging and politically charged proposition, a problem that a clever aggressor could use to its advantage. In the new era of rivalry, conflicts do not ‘end’, but persist, a trend that will further blur the boundary between peace and war. States have traditionally recognised the onset of war as a sharp, discontinuous action or event (a ‘Pearl Harbor’) that indicates the formal ‘onset of hostilities’. In the future, a recurrent set of actions (economic sabotage, cyber intrusions) could represent persistent mutual harassment, a grey area in which states are not sure when they have gone to war, or when wars have ended. These actions, in a world of dozens of state and non-state actors with overlapping interests, may be in truth not fully coordinated; they may represent the agglomeration of actions by a competitive government, non-state patriotic groups, corporations and elements of the regime acting partly independently. This pattern will complicate such common nationalsecurity practices as deterrence and retaliation. It will also magnify challenges to constitutional questions of war-making, for it risks the emergence of a permanent state of emergency in which no head of state will be able to request public debate or permission for every cyber attack, economic sanction or social-media campaign their security establishment urges them to conduct. States will regularly steal intellectual property, engage in probing or destructive hacking, and use state power to enhance their own economic prospects at the expense of others. Given such persistent insults, a country like the United States could begin to feel as if it is under siege, and react by increasingly treating other states as something more than competitors – as enemies. The risk of gradual escalation into major war and miscalculation is very great. On the other side of the ledger, despite the vulnerabilities of networks, the default tools of the emerging rivalry will focus on targets – social stability, economic growth, financial stability, the regularity of information flows – with an inherent bounce-back capability. While a powerful collection of cyber and economic blows might set a country’s development back, it would not directly and imminently threaten its territorial integrity, and the leadership and population would have an expectation of future recovery to prior levels. Competition aimed at fluid and recovering, rather than static and irrevocable, targets will help to keep rivalry under constraint. That effect may be counteracted, however, by a tendency, in an era of media hype and public obsession with relatively minor events, for states to overreact to the perturbations in the system. The critical difference between contemporary expressions of rivalry and the Cold War strategic stand-off lies in the former’s capacity to affect the domestic social stability and daily life of nations on a regular basis. The political stakes of aggression against brittle social networks will be very high, even if the objective strategic stakes are moderate. Indeed, some non-state actors will attempt to provoke just such exaggerated reactions: the 9/11 attacks themselves can be viewed not as the harbinger of a clash between Islam and the West, but as one more example of an emerging pattern of high-profile instabilities. The challenge in coming years will be to manage such incidents calmly and pragmatically, without loading them up with more significance than they can bear. Strategy for an era of entangled rivalry The emergence of an era of entangled rivalry suggests the need for a paradigm shift, from deterrence of state-based malcontents seeking power through military aggression and coercion to the management of a much wider scope of state competition and non-linear systemic risk. The most important implication of an era of entangled rivalry is the requirement to redouble international efforts to establish rules, norms, collective (state and non-state) answers to challenges, firebreaks to escalation and miscalculation, and other mechanisms of risk management for a fragile system under stress. Signalling deterrent credibility to key emerging powers will be necessary, but defaulting to a pattern of shifting fleets and treaties around the globe to counteract political-military power would merely exacerbate the inherent risks of the system tipping over into more dramatic rivalries. **(By the same token, spending massive efforts to reshape the internal dynamics of remote countries under the guise of doctrines such as the ‘responsibility to protect’, when major systemic factors risk spiralling out of control, would be equally misguided.)** A key priority should be building norms, agreements and institutions that keep various agents locked into stable habits. A good example would be – as challenging as such an accord looks at the moment – some form of treaty on limits to cyber attacks. Along with that comes a second major implication, that the character of national security is shifting from external rivalry to internal competition, from international deterrence to domestic resiliency. Domestic challenges, from financial-market stability to immigration to radicalisation to water supplies, will dominate the security obsessions of populations, the planning concerns of businesses, and the agendas of policymakers. The most likely routes to conflict stem from financial crises, spurts of nationalism and accelerating exchanges of non-military confrontation that affect domestic well-being, instability from radicalism or terrorism, or other injuries to the well-being of a state’s homeland. The lesson is that actions to enhance social resiliency are critical to the stability of the system as a whole, and additional investments – indeed, a bolder national strategy – for resiliency in the face of network vulnerabilities would be an important step toward reducing the risks of escalation from non-military competition. Even as a new era comes into being, however, it does not replace the old one overnight. Thus, a key challenge for leading powers, and especially the United States, becomes dealing with the echo of fading patterns without, in doing so, exacerbating the growing tendencies to rivalry. Many Asian nations, for example, most certainly view Chinese power as a possible politicalmilitary challenge, and are thankful for the US regional role as a counterweight. These considerations are legitimate, both because the perceptions constraining old-style realpolitik could wane and because a precipitous abandonment of the support system for global order measured in these terms could cause states to react in unpredictable ways. **As has been widely discussed, the United States will not have the resources, willpower or international legitimacy to play this role in the same guise that it has in the past – but** in an era of entangled rivalry, it will not have to**.** The wide range of tools and actors that are beginning to populate the global environment offers dozens of avenues for the United States to exercise power, both attractive and punitive, in innovative new ways. The task for US strategists is to conceive of principles for a more limited, sustainable, but still highly influential and effective US posture that takes advantage of the characteristics of the emerging era. The most profound risk inherent in this fluid, fractious system is that rising competition will push states to a tipping point – of confrontation, aggression, self-interested troublemaking, and rejection of norms – when now-powerful constraints on adventurism fall away, and a controlled rivalry descends into chaos. Such a risk would most likely be grounded in an accumulation of domestic factors such as identity politics, the growing use of provocative non-military tools, and the actions of extreme and ideological non-state catalysts. Most of all, it will be exacerbated by the effect of popular opinion: citizenries have great trouble comprehending paradox in national strategy. It will be a profound challenge to explain to publics that governments will be partnering with or offering aid to a country that just last month was bitterly opposing a different policy of their own. In such an environment, two key objectives must be to preserve and strengthen the norm against misbehaviour in a mutually dependent network; and to control the perturbations that could generate escalatory cycles. **To serve these goals, a less-dominant but critical role for the United States becomes a modified version of the role it has played for the last halfcentury: leading efforts to maintain system stability**. The great risk is that the United States will be tempted to play this role largely according to the rules of a passing era rather than an emerging one. Rather than maintaining a defence establishment capable of the quixotic task of projecting power into every corner of the globe, the United States can and should develop new tools to preserve deterrent effects to aggression, ranging from conflict- resolution mechanisms to asymmetric swarming strategies involving informational and economic means. So much for the normative agenda, or what the United States and other leading powers ought to do. A parallel question is what they will do. Leaders remain prone to misperception and wishful thinking. Some states have commitments on their books that they may be unwilling to slough off in a crisis, even if to honour them risked self-immolation. Domestic politics in a dozen guises can push states toward confrontation. These factors exacerbate the problem of fragmented governments: one radical, obdurate ministry in an otherwise pragmatic regime could spark a provocation that would engender a violent popular backlash, and push countries on the road to conflict. The chances for the successful version of required system management, with its intricate, intuitive judgements and patient responses to incitements, may be beyond the capacities of many states, and leaders. Several routes to destabilisation loom; history raises serious doubt about whether governments can be persistently clever enough, leaders perceptive and restrained enough, and citizenries patient and tolerant enough of complexity to perform the sort of precise calibration that the new era demands. There may be reasons to think the risks of warfare are exiting the stage of world politics, have not quite gone off, and could be called back for an encore at any time. Yet in another of the era’s manifold paradoxes, focusing too greatly on this residual risk by spending time, effort, attention and resources preparing to fight wars that remain possible risks undermining, both perceptually and in terms of actual provocations, the trends making such wars less feasible, attractive and likely all the time. The tasks for strategists and statesmen have become demanding indeed.

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#### Social justice outweighs – structural violence explains proximate causes – psychologically ingrains genocidal tendencies into humanity which is the root of escalation in warfare – ethics demands a neg ballot

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

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(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “**little” violences** produced in the **structures**, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the **ease** with which humans are capable of **reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons** and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “**invisible” genocides** not because they are secreted away or **hidden from view**, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a **genocidal capacity** among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive **hypervigilance** to the less dramatic, **permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible** (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which **mass violence and genocide** are born, it is **ingrained** in the **common sense of everyday social life**. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “**priming**” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push **social consensus** toward **devaluing** certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Comparative evidence – focus on nuclear extinction is misplaced, has no scientific basis, and reifies imperialism

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(Brian, “Extinction politics”, <http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/84sana1.html>, dml)

By the 1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world's population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of 'overkill' - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several times over - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[2] with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[3] In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth.[4] Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth's surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell's book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[3] The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is 'nuclear winter': the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[5] The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be 'limited' in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A 'limited' nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[6] The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[7] There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[8] Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[9] - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement, the workers' control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[10] But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades.

### framework

#### You should be an intellectual evaluating the knowledge claims of the 1AC, ballot determines its desirability – if we win their epistemological foundations are suspect we should win irrespective of plan enactment – that’s Holleman – implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency – our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

[GREEN]

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic **policy decisions** ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) **are isolated** from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and **treated as matters of** technocratic design and **implementation**, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. **In the process, democratic participation** in ¶ decision-making **is either limited to an already** highly-**commodified**, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral **politics**, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a **highly reductionist notion** of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. **By** treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately **trying to insulate policy-making from** ¶ popular **politics** and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is ¶ itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second ¶ caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being ¶ removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being ¶ insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes **exposed to the “distortions” of** a ¶ politics of **rent-seeking and speculation**—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the ¶ Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a ¶ bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among ¶ themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries ¶ (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount ¶ of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, ¶ however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal ¶ reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), ¶ private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government ¶ control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago ¶ schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even ¶ though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as ¶ in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of ¶ the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern ¶ the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to ¶ health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable **shift from** rights-based policymaking forged through public **deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on** ¶ economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of **technocratic calculation**. In this ¶ regard, as noted above, the **treatment of subjectivity** solely in behaviorist terms of economic ¶ incentives **functions as the key conceptual choice** that makes the technocratization of public ¶ policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ¶ ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of ¶ neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

#### If we win framework we don’t need an alt – the ballot is a referendum on whether the aff is a productive approach to academia – if a student turns in an F paper the teacher doesn’t have to write a better paper to conclude it was bad – shifting our decisionmaking criteria is sufficient and a coherent political strategy that spills over

[GREEN]

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

#### We enrich energy discussion – their framework masks over oppression, is epistemologically bankrupt, and causes serial policy failure

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

Linking our knowledge of social and ecological crises creates a basis for **an approach to energy that is** sociologically coherent **(recognizing** systemic injustices **and** power inequalities) and ecologically grounded. Recent work towards making such links may be found in systems ecology and in broader environmental sociological theory, in particular, the theory of the ecological rift, feminist ecology, and the environmental justice literature. Scholars from each of these latter perspectives have called for **more integrated theory in environmental sociology**, with greater attention given to the relationship between injustice and ecological degradation (Pellow 2000, 2007; Salleh 2009; Foster, York, and Clark 2010). Coming out of the natural sciences, systems ecologist and energy scholar Howard T. Odum also went to significant lengths to unite social and ecological science, with a focus on the urgent need for society at one and the same time to address environmental inequalities and restore the earth’s systems, disrupted as a result of capitalism’s growth (Odum 2007). Odum worked to overcome the nature/society dualism highlighted as a theoretical weakness in sociology by feminist ecologists, among others, by bringing economy and ecology under a unified ecological analysis. My goal is to put these theoretical developments in a context in which they can **complement one another and informs the ongoing development of the critical sociology of energy**.

The ecological rift: A framework for synthesis

Feminist ecologist Ariel Salleh (2010) highlighted that we remain in need of developing an integrated ecosocial analysis that recognizes the primary importance of “reproductive activities and regenerative provisioning” and includes “inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” (213, 215). Salleh sees the basis for an integrated theoretical approach in the ecological rift analysis emerging from Marxist sociology:

Climate change, biodiversity loss, and social precarity are each results of capitalist overproduction. In responding to this globalizing overshoot, **activists need a** materialist analysis **of social relations**, as well as a materialism that engages ecological processes. The dialectical tools of Marxist sociology already offer a basis for such a synthesis, but it remains a big ask for wider publics, because Eurocentric convention splits economics and ecology apart. (205)

The ecological rift framework, **which integrates** social**,** economic**, and** ecological **analysis, also puts** social justice **at its center**. Because it adopts an **openly emancipatory framework**, in ecological and social terms, it is an instance of “strong reflexivity” in theory, characterized by **a** critical distance **from the status quo that makes it possible to** question everything (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 305). This separates it from approaches characterized by what feminist standpoint theorists refer to as examples of “weak objectivity” that “attempt to separate the positive from the normative” (305). **Objectivity**, the way it is sometimes understood, **is** never possible **in this society** “because science is **a socially embedded and often an elitist activity**, such exclusion of values is impossible” (305). Not acknowledging this reality results in social science that **unreflexively adopts the master perspective, therefore often reflecting the** conceptual limits **of the dominant ideology**.

**Absent “strong reflexivity**” on the part of social science, **it is** impossible **to see the ways** in which “our ontological concepts of nature are often **bound to systems of oppression**” (305). Strong reflexivity in environmental social science demands adopting the vantage point of those deemed “Others” and a basis in critical ecology (306). Such reflexivity is at the heart of the ecological rift perspective. It thus builds on the best classical work and at the same time is **part of the development of critical approaches** in environmental sociology, such as critical human ecology, feminist ecology, and environmental justice, that break down disciplinary boundaries and make a contemporary, critical sociology of energy, with **energy justice** at its core, possible.

#### Even if they win policy simulation is good that makes the kritik more important – ethical and methodological questions are critical to avoid policy failure

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(Keith, with Liu Ping Hui and Stephen McKay, “Evidence and Ethics in Infrastructure Planning”, International Journal of Applied Science and Technology Vol. 2 No. 5; May 2012, dml)

Lack of transparency on matters of policymaking and decision taking raise more ethical questions than answers. There was a definitive disinclination by key respondents to answer on such matters, inferring a reluctance to engage in fearless speech (Foucault, 1983). Nonetheless, such is the importance of these questions that **those who** provide leadership and **wield power** must be cognisant **of the ramifications** of not upholding the **ethical standards** and principles of legitimacy which justify their position. The professional-political relationship in decision taking is masked in shadow, though this investigation has yielded knowledge inferring that ethical dilemmas face planning practitioners on a daily basis, albeit that most do not perceive it to be a serious issue, as one respondent put it “it‟s just part of the job”.

Such perceptions undermine the ethos upon which the profession is founded and must be redressed. Rudimentary knowledge means that only speculation is possible on the dynamic which is located at the hub of policymaking and decision taking, therefore **only those** interacting at the foci of power **truly understand how outputs emerge** from interactive discursive processes. The evidence from this investigation did, however, indicate that cognisance must not just be taken of the professional-political relationship but the professional-professional relationship in the wider planning context. While the sample is admittedly small, there is clearly an issue to address with regard to the impact of power on professional ethics. Professionals, whatever their rank, **have** a responsibility **to dissent** (Marcuse, 1976) and it is disconcerting to think that where organisational legitimacy (Tilling, 2004) is taken as read, power-laden structures (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998) may be conducive to the development of an inherent fear to express opinion as it might damage how, at best, they are perceived by their superiors or, at worst, impede career development.

While specifically testing the integrity of professional practitioners is almost impossible, **it is** vitally important **that those who influence decisions** at locations where power is wielded **hold true to** the ethical principles underpinning the profession. Failure to do so will ultimately lead to **a catastrophic breakdown of societal approval** (Kapland and Ruland, 1992) of the planning profession. Such a scenario may ultimately be conducive to the development and implementation of inappropriate policies and strategies **which contribute to the demise of the environment** which we strive to protect. Evidence from other jurisdictions suggests that the new infrastructure paradigm for operational practice is generally well placed to face such challenges in terms of “expertise and knowledge” (Sheridan, 2010, p. 10). The findings from this investigation suggest that commissioners and inspectors in the wider planning context are perceived as having the ethical robustness to distance themselves from challenges presented by powerbrokers; and the inherent nature of the approach is such that, unlike advocates who tactically manipulate knowledge or flagrantly misrepresent the truth, commissioners are programmed to use a balance sheet approach underpinned by impartiality (Marcuse, 1976). The task for the IPC commissioners is to remain cognisant of such ethical challenges and match the expectations achieved by their counterparts in other planning decision making arenas.

### at: owen

#### Owen’s wrong – theory doesn’t kill relevance – need to ask epistemological questions to avoid policy failure – this card will win us the debate

**Reus-Smit 12** – Professor of International Relations at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy

(Christian, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2012 vol. 40 no. 3 525-540, dml)

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend.

Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13

Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided.

Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance**.**

Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance.

Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

**Owen votes neg—their framing of the world is neither neutral nor inevitable**

Owen 2 David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton “Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3

The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.14 The point of these remarks is to **call critically into question the background picture** (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘**What is to be done?’** **invites** a degree of **arrogance that is** all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . **The most pressing questions** of the age **call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites** and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

### at: economic predictions good

#### Predictions of solvency based on economic calculations fail

**Bifo 11** – Whit Whitmore’s pen name

(Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *After the Future* pg 64-66 (of my copy), dml)

Economics became a science when, with the expansion of capitalism, rules were established as general principles for productive activity and exchange. But if we want these rules to function **we must be able to quantify the basic productive act**. The time-atom described by Marx is the keystone of modern economics. Calculating the time necessary for the production of a commodity makes possible the regulation of the entire set of economic relations. But when the main element in the global productive cycle is **the unforeseeable work of the mind**, the unforeseeable work of language, when self-reproducing information becomes the universal commodity, **it is** no longer possible **to reduce the totality** of exchanges and relations **to an economic rule**. Drucker continues: In any system as complex as the economy of a developed country, **the** statistically insignificant **events**, the events at the margin, **are likely to be the decisive events**, short range at least. By definition they **can neither be** anticipated **nor** prevented. Indeed, they cannot always be identified even after they have had their impact. (Drucker 1989: 166) Economic science is founded on a quantitative and mechanistic paradigm that could comprehend and regulate industrial production, the physical manipulation of mechanical matter, but is unable to explain **and regulate the process of immaterial production** based on an activity that can’t easily be reduced to quantitative measurements and the repetition of constants: mental activity. Due to the new technologies, Jacques Robin (1989: 39) explains how even the concept of productivity fails to resist the challenge raised by the new realities like growth without job creation. With the new technologies the majority of production costs are determined by research and equipment expenses that actually precede the productive process. Little by little, in digitalized and automated enterprises, production is no longer subjected to the variations concerning the quantity of operational factors. Marginal cost, marginal profits: these bases of neoclassical economic calculations **have lost a good part of their meaning**. The traditional elements of salary and price calculation are crumbling down. Mental work is not computable in precise and predictable terms like the work performed by an industrial worker. Therefore, the determination of value – the keystone of classical economy both as a science and as daily economic practice – **becomes aleatory and indefinable**. “Realist” economies (the economies based on the relationship to a computable amount of labor time) were governed by their goals: a naïve goal of producing use value for the satisfaction of specific needs, or a subtler goal of valorization as the increase of invested capital. Now, instead, it is impossible to explain our economies on the basis of their goals, whether we identify them with the intentions of certain individuals or certain groups or with the goals of an entire society. The economy is governed by a code, not by its goals: Finality is there in advance, inscribed in the code. The order of goals has simply ceded its place to a molecular play, as the order of signified has yielded to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory commutation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 59) In Baudrillard’s vision, the economy therefore appears as a hyperreality, a simulated, double, and artificial world that cannot be translated in terms of real production. Consequently, economic science **can no longer explain the fundamental dynamics governing humanity’s productive activities**; nor can it explain their crisis. Economics has to be replaced by a global science whose characteristics and field of inquiry are still unknown: a science that would be able to study the processes of formation of Cyberspace, i.e. the global network of signs-commodities.

### at: perm

#### this also proves they cede the political through expertism and the logic of fungibility and competition

[GREEN]

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) **replaces critical thinking** about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process,¶ [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over¶ physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of¶ existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically¶ and technologically unassailable.¶ **Triumphant Energy Capitalism**¶Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to¶ market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just¶ as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical¶ preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005)¶ are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and¶ increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the¶ current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen¶ the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic¶ growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged¶ to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives¶ that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that¶ willingly invests in its own perpetuation.¶ While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the¶ conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings,¶ there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is¶ faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables-based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a¶ redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources¶ are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project,¶ according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of¶ growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional¶ energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel¶ capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference¶ with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature.¶ In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet¶ about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of¶ energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such¶ steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does¶ it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might¶ jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the¶ movement’s quest?¶ **Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse**¶After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy¶ futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of¶ governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new¶ technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector¶ and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics¶ 21¶ in which¶ the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high¶ technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities,¶ contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere.¶ Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition¶ (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy¶ and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”¶ Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is¶ important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the¶ two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of¶ more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a¶ sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy¶ visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal¶ of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological¶ marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start¶ the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and¶ social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree¶ to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.¶ 22¶ Nothing is said¶ on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be.¶ If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct,¶ then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of¶ acquiescence to things as they are. Building an **inquiry into energy as a social**¶ **project will require** the recovery of a **critical voice that can interrogate**, rather¶ than concede, **the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and**¶ capitalist **political economy**. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate¶ an energy-society order in which **energy systems evolve in response to social**¶ **values** and goals, **and not simply according** to the dictates of technique,¶ **prices**, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability¶ camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is¶ non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources¶ need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage¶ the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent¶ possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the¶ global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy¶ services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to¶ between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance¶ of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed¶ professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the¶ life-world of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to¶ design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life.¶ Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot¶ overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe¶ of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism¶ are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965:¶ 52) explained why **the democratic-authoritarian bargain** and Western capitalism **should be rejected:**¶God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the¶ West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today¶ keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, **it would strip the world bare** like locusts. Unless the capitalists of¶ India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and¶ by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of¶ the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or¶ being destroyed by them.¶ As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric¶ light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places¶ efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social¶ problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our¶ political-economic problem.¶ The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

### link – green military

#### the aff is a smokescreen for rampant militarism and domination – they are trying to prop up a dying system – no chance of a link turn or a perm

Parr 9 – Associate Professor in the Department of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati

(Adrian, *Hijacking Sustainability* pg 79-82, dml)

However, the goal of greening the military **fails to distinguish properly** between integrating environmental policies into its management systems and the function of the military profession, which Samuel Huntington chillingly described as the “direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence.”3 Exploiting principles of sustainability **as part of the military arsenal** in effect **distorts the fundamental premise of sustainability**—working to meet the needs of the present generation without undermining future generations’ ability to meet their own needs—if not because the military is ultimately a regressive structure, the very nemesis of civil society and democratic life. If we briefly look to Naomi Klein’s “Disaster Capitalism” thesis that demonstrates the complicity between US democracy-building, waging war, and capitalism, then the political goals that the military sets out to realize are **ultimately unsustainable at their core**. If the capitalist economic engine feeds off of the reconstruction industry in war-torn parts of the world, then **any army sustainability goal is a paradox** in terms.4 Clearly, the proposition to transform the culture of the military to be more environmentally friendly and focused on advancing and using principles of sustainability is a cynical exercise and, as argued below, it **is used to conceal the fact that the effects of military power are fundamentally unsustainable**. If one rejects that there exists a common ground between the military and sustainable development and recognizes that it is derisive that the military—**an organization committed to waging war**—is worried about its ecological footprint, then the reality of environmental degradation and human well-being seems very different from the ecogeopolitical conception of environmental security that Braden Allenby defines as “the intersection of environmental and national security considerations at a national policy level.”5 The shuffling of environmental concerns and military values to bring the organization closer to civil society is surprisingly, in many ways, the effect of Left, liberal politics. Bacevich explains, and I would agree with him, that “liberals have grown comfortable with seeing the military establishment itself not as an obstacle to social change but **as a venue in which to promote it**, pointing the way for the rest of society on matters such as race, gender and sexual orientation.”6 And I would add to the mix of progressive causes Bacevich lists the issue of sustainability. Contemporary ecogeopolitical discourse combines discourses of ecopolitics and geopolitics. Its arguments primarily fall into two main categories. The first argument wrongfully puts forward a utilitarian line of reasoning: the environment must be protected in order to enhance national and individual security. This position assumes that a sustainable approach to the culture of the military will maximize environmental benefits and hence the security of everyone. The second argument relates to the preservation of US sociopolitical ideals—life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—in which the military has mistakenly become the theater in which these are played out. Both positions, which underpin the Clinton military greening initiative that sought to turn environmental issues into a national security concern, overlook **the serious implications of applying military-based mechanisms to assess the value of life**. For instance, it is wrong to ask the soldier in Guantanamo Bay who is beating a semiconscious prisoner what the value of his victim’s life is. The only person who can answer that question is the victim. The same logic applies to how we evaluate the relationship between the military and environmental and social issues, for militaristic uses of power **are not premised upon a model of collaboration and cooperation; they are oppressive structures of domination**. In short, military power **does not empower the subject of violence to assert agency** in the way that sustainability culture attempts to—in fact, quite the opposite. The discourse of military power cannot translate seamlessly into a discourse of sustainability. Ultimately, **an unbridgeable chasm exists** between the fragile truth of civil society and its values, and the military, which is not the same as saying that the military is unnecessary; rather, my point is that **the policy to green the military is insincere at best because it conceals the fact that the military’s function is to conduct wa**r. And, if anything, the work of the environmental activist or those involved with sustainable development cannot be equated with military systems. This chapter traces how a common ground between the discourse of a US military ethic and that of a sustainable ethic has been constructed, going on to argue that one of the biggest challenges facing sustainability culture is how to reassert their separation. The military uses the popularity of the discourse and practice of sustainability as a “tool for mission accomplishment” and the maintenance of an asymmetric advantage in respect to perceived threats.7 My first premise, then, is that **the policy to green the US military in an effort to maximize security is merely a smokescreen for US militarism**. In 1989, when the Cold War came to a close, the bipolar balance of power set by the standoff between the Soviets and the United States dramatically ended. Accordingly, the singular threat to US security grew elusive. Over time it became apparent that threats to national security were no longer restricted to state actors. Drug traffickers, insurgents, terrorists, organized crime, and environmental degradation all were perceived to pose serious challenges to US national security. Without one dominant threat in place, the meaning of national security **became harder to define**; meanwhile, the definition of America as the dominant global power went unchallenged.8 As Clinton’s first secretary of state, Warren Christopher declared the world after the fall of the Soviet Union was “a world transformed.”9 The effect of this transformation was the evaporation of politics. As the line between domestic and foreign policy dissolved so too did the political lines delimiting different ideological positions (communism and liberal democracy). In this manner, a limitless principle was anxiously inaugurated as the new mode of political life.

### link – econ rationality

#### THIRD is economic irrationality – the presupposition of market logic as the only way agents act imposes a violent calculative logic on an irrational world – this makes violence and collapse inevitable

**Bifo 11** – Whit Whitmore’s pen name

(Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *After the Future* pg 110-114 (of my copy), dml)

The fantastic collapse that has shaken the global economy since September 2008 has opened a new phase in the history of the world. After some months of amazement and confusion, media, political institutions and economists have started to repeat the self-reassuring mantra: recovery is coming soon. I do not know what will happen next, but I think that the word recovery means very little in the current situation. What is sure, in my opinion, is that the workers will not recover if neoliberal ideology is not abandoned, and if the myth of growth is not substituted with a new kind of narration. Unemployment is rising everywhere and salaries are falling. And the huge debt accumulated for the rescue of the banks is weighing upon the future of society. More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economists the central dogma of growth, profit and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation is not perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of production of scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried work. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d’etre, and it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated. The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times on September 6th 2009: After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies, in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds. They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money. Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It’s not new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure. The logic of speculation is different from the logic of spectacle that was dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle is the mirrorization of life, the transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation. Speculation is the subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of present life with future money that will never come, because death will come before. The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”. Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

### at: inevitable

#### Not inevitable in this frame—you have agency over this round and affirming that is an ethical gesture

**Korten, Ph.D.,** **95**. BA in psychology from Stanford University, MBA and Ph.D. degrees from the Stanford Business School, former Associate Professor of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business. David, When Corporations Rule The World, p. 261-2.

No sane person seeks a world divided between billions of excluded people living in absolute deprivation and a tiny elite guarding their wealth and luxury behind fortress walls. No one rejoices at the prospect of life in a world of collapsing social and ecological systems. Yet we continue to place human civilization and even the survival of our species at risk mainly to allow a million or so people to accumulate money beyond any conceivable need. We continue to go boldly where no one wants to go. We are now coming to see that economic globalization has come at a heavy price. In the name of modernity we are creating dysfunctional societies that are breeding pathological behavior—violence, extreme competitiveness, suicide, drug abuse, greed, and environmental degradation—at every hand. Such behavior is an inevitable consequence when a society fails to meet the needs of its members for social bonding, trust, affection, and a shared sacred meaning. The threefold crisis of deepening poverty, environmental destruction, and social disintegration is a manifestation of this dysfunction. **There is nothing inevitable about** the collective madness of **pursuing policies that deepen the dysfunction.** The idea that we are caught in the grip of irresistible historical forces and inherent human imperfections to which we have no choice but to adapt is pure fabrication. Economic globalization is being advanced by conscious choices made by those who see the world through the lens of corporate interest. There are human alternatives, and those who view the world through the lens of the human interest have both the right and the power to choose them. Healthy societies depend on healthy, empowered local communities that build caring relationships among people and help us connect to a particular piece of the living earth with which our lives are intertwined. Such societies must be built through local-level action, household by household and community by community. Yet we have created an institutional and cultural context that disempowers the local and makes such action difficult, if not impossible. To correct the deep dysfunction, we must shed the illusions of our collective cultural trance, reclaim the power we have yielding to failing institutions, take back responsibility for our lives, and reweave the basic fabric of caring families and communities to create places for people and other living things. It is within our means, but it will require transforming the dominant belief systems, values, and institutions of our societies—and Ecological Revolution comparable to the Copernican Revolution that ushered in the scientific-industrial era. The parallels are instructive.

### at: space col add-on

**All previous human spaceflight is insignificant – long term colonization is still infeasible.**

**Launius 10** – (2010, Roger, PhD, Curator, Planetary Exploration Programs, National Air and Space Museum, expert on Aerospace history, fellow and board member of the American Astronautical Society, “Can we colonize the solar system? Human biology and survival in the extreme space environment,” Endeavour Volume 34, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 122-129, science direct, DH)

Although microbial life might survive the extreme conditions of space, for Homo sapien sapiens the space environment remains remarkably dangerous to life. One space life scientist, Vadim Rygalov, remarked that ensuring human life during spaceflight was largely about providing the basics of human physiological needs. From the most critical – meaning that its absence would cause immediate death, to the least critical – these include such constants available here on Earth of atmospheric pressure, breathable oxygen, temperature, drinking water, food, gravitational pull on physical systems, radiation mitigation, and others of a less immediate nature. As technologies, and knowledge about them, stand at this time, humans are able to venture into space for short periods of less than a year only by supplying all of these needs either by taking everything with them (oxygen, food, air, etc.) or creating them artificially (pressurized vehicles, centrifugal force to substitute for gravity, etc.).10 Spaceflight would be much easier if humans could go into hibernation during the extremes of spaceflight, as did the Streptococcus mitis bacteria. Resolving these issues has proven difficult but not insurmountable for such basic spaceflight activities as those undertaken during the heroic age of space exploration when the United States and the Soviet Union raced to the Moon. Overcoming the technological hurdles encountered during the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs were child's play in comparison to the threat to human life posed by long duration, deep space missions to such places as Mars. Even the most sophisticated of those, the lunar landings of Project Apollo, were relatively short camping trips on an exceptionally close body in the solar system, and like many camping trips undertaken by Americans the astronauts took with them everything they would need to use while there. This approach will continue to work well until the destination is so far away that resupply from Earth becomes highly problematic if not impossible if the length of time to be gone is so great that resupply proves infeasible. There is no question that the U.S. could return to the Moon in a more dynamic and robust version of Apollo; it could also build a research station there and resupply it from Earth while rotating crews and resupplying from Earth on a regular basis. In this instance, the lunar research station might look something like a more sophisticated and difficult to support version of the Antarctic research stations. A difficult challenge, yes; but certainly it is something that could be accomplished with presently envisioned technologies.11 The real difficulty is that at the point a lunar research station becomes a colony profound changes to the manner in which humans interact with the environment beyond Earth must take place. Countermeasures for core challenges – gravity, radiation, particulates, and ancillary effects – provide serious challenges for humans engaged in space colonization (Figure 4).

### at: violence down

#### Wars increasing—disproves their theory—and neolib doesn’t solve it

**Hadley**, History Today editor, **2011**

(Kathryn, “Alarming increase in wars”, 7-12, http://www.historytoday.com/blog/2011/07/alarming-increase-wars, DOA: 7-4-12, ldg)

New research by Professors Mark Harrison from the University of Warwick and Nikolaus Wolf from Humboldt University has revealed that between 1870 and 2001, the frequency of wars between states increased steadily by 2% a year on average. Between 1870 and 1913, the frequency of ‘pairwise’ conflicts (the numbers of pairs of countries involved in conflicts) increased on average by 6% per year. The frequency of wars increased by 17% per year in the period of the First and Second World Wars, and by 31% per year during the Cold War. In the 1990s, the frequency of wars between states rose by 36% per year.¶ Professor Mark Harrison explained how: ‘**The number of conflicts has been rising** on a stable trend. Because of two world wars, the pattern is obviously disturbed between 1914 and 1945 but remarkably, after 1945 the frequency of wars resumed its upward course on pretty much the same path as before 1913.’¶ The graph below illustrates this increase in pairwise conflicts. It only includes wars between states and does not include civil wars. Conflicts range from full-scale shooting wars and uses of military force to displays of force (sending warships and closing borders, for example). Although Harrison and Wolf’s study does not measure the intensity of violence, it reflects the readiness of governments to settle disputes by force.¶ According to Harrison and Wolf, this increase in the frequency of pairwise conflicts can be explained by two principal factors: economic growth and the proliferation of borders. The number of countries has thus almost quadrupled since 1870, rising from 47 countries in 1870 to 187 in 2001.¶ Harrison continued: ‘More pairs of countries have clashed because there have been more pairs. This is not reassuring: it shows that there is a close connection between wars and the creation of states and new borders.’¶ Looking specifically at the countries that have initiated disputes, the study shows that there is no tendency for richer countries (defined by a higher GDP per head) to make more frequent military interventions than others. The readiness to engage in war is spread relatively uniformly across the global income distribution.¶ Thinkers of the Enlightenment believed, and many political scientists still believe today, that the political leaders of richer and more democratic countries have fewer incentives to go to war. Over the course of the twentieth century, on the whole, countries have become richer, more democratic and more interdependent. Yet, Harrison and Wolf’s study disproves the theory that as GDP increases countries are less likely to engage in warfare.

#### Still vote neg if they win violence down—proves there’s an opening to abandon the current paradigm, but the telos of peace enforced by neoliberal violence makes that impossible—voting aff naturalizes an artificial peace that can’t be achieved

**Dalby 11** Simon Dalby, Carleton University "PEACE AND GEOPOLITICS: IMAGINING PEACEFUL GEOGRAPHIES" Nov 2011 http-server.carleton.ca/~sdalby/papers/PEACEFUL\_GEOGRAPHIES.pdf

This paper suggests this focus on war and violence has to be read against rapidly shifting geographies and the recent general trend of reduced violence in human affairs. Whether this is the promise of the liberal peace, a transitory imperial pax, something more fundamental in human affairs, or a temporary historical blip remains to be seen, but substantial empirical analyses do suggest that violence is declining (Human Security Report 2011). This stands in stark contrast to realist assertions of war as the human condition as well as to repeated warnings about the supposed dangers to international order of rising Asian powers. Likewise the remilitarization of Anglo-Saxon culture since 9/11 has suggested that warring is a routine part of modern life. But the nature of war has changed in some important ways even if contemporary imperial adventures in peripheral places look all too familiar to historians. Peace, all this crucially implies, is a matter of social processes, not a final Telos, a resolution of the tensions of human life, nor a utopia that will arrive sometime. In Christian terms the aspirational "Kingdom of God" is a work in progress.¶ Nick Megoran (2011) in particular has suggested that the geography discipline needs to think much more carefully about peace making and the possibilities of non-violence as modes of political action. The key question is focused on in the Megoran's pointed refusal to accept the simplistic dismissal of the efficacy of non-violence given the obvious prevalence of violence. The point of his argument is that non-violence is a political strategy in part to respond to violence, to initiate political actions in ways that are not hostage to the use of force. In doing so, especially in his discussion of resistance to Nazi policies in Germany during the war, Megoran (2011) underplays the important points about legitimacy as part of politics, and likewise hints at the important contrast between non-violence as a strategic mode of political action. Implied here is that while war may be politics by other means, to gloss the classic Clausewitzian formulation, non¬violence is politics too. But politics plays in the larger geopolitical context, and this must not be forgotten in deliberations concerning the possible new initiatives geographers might take in thinking carefully about disciplinary contributions to peace research and practice.¶ Contemporary social theory might point to Michel Foucault, and the argument drawn from his writings that politics is the extension of war rather than the other way round. Given the interest in biopolitics and geogovernance within the discipline these matters are obviously relevant but the connection to peace needs to be thought carefully beyond formulations that simply assume it as the opposite of wars (Morrissey 2011). This is especially the case given the changing modes of contemporary warfare and the advocacy of violence as an appropriate policy in present circumstances. The modes of warfare at the heart of liberalism suggest that the security of what Reid and Dillon (2009) call the biohuman, the liberal consuming subject, involves a violent series of practices designed to pacify the world by the elimination of political alternatives. The tension here suggests an imperial peace, a forceful imposition of a state of non-war. In George W. Bush's terms justifying the war on terror, a long struggle to eliminate tyranny (Dalby 2009a). Peace is, in this geopolitical understanding, what comes after the elimination of opposition. In late 2011 such formulations dominated discussions of the death of Colonel Gadaffi in Libya.¶ The dramatic transformation of human affairs in the last couple of generations do require that would-be peaceful geographers look both to the importance of non-violence and simultaneously to how global transformations are changing the landscape of violence and social change, all of it still under the threat of nuclear devastation should major inter-state war occur once again. The re-emergence of non-violence as an explicit political strategy, and in particular the use of Gene Sharp's (1973) ideas of non-violent direct action in recent events pose these questions very pointedly. Geographers have much to offer in such re-thinking that may yet play their part in a more global understanding of how interconnected our fates are becoming and how inappropriate national state boundaries are as the premise for political action in a rapidly changing biosphere.¶ But to do so some hard thinking is needed on geopolitics, and on how it works as well as how peace-full scholarship might foster that which it desires. Linking the practical actions of non-violence from Tahrir Square to those of the Occupy Wall Street actions, underway as the first draft of this paper was keyboarded, requires that we think very carefully about the practices that now are designated in terms of globalization. Not all this is novel, but the geopolitical scene is shifting in ways that need to be incorporated into the new thinking within geography about war, peace, violence and what the discipline might have to say about, and contribute to, non-violence as well as to contestations of contemporary lawfare (Gregory 2006).¶ Whether the delegitimization of violence as a mode of rule will be extended further in coming decades is one of the big questions facing peace researchers. The American reaction to 9/11 set things back dramatically, an opportunity to respond in terms of response to a crime and diplomacy was squandered, but the wider social refusal to accept repression and violence as appropriate modes of rule has interesting potential to constrain the use of military force. The professionalization of many high technology militaries also reduces their inclination to involve themselves in repressing social movements, although here Mikhail Gorbachev's refusal to use the Red Army against dissidents in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s remains emblematic of the changes norms of acceptable rule that have been extended in the last few generations.¶ Geopolitics has mostly been about rivalries between great powers and their contestations of power on the large scale. These specifications of the political world focus on states and the perpetuation of threats mapped as external dangers to supposedly pacific polities. Much geopolitical discourse specifies the world as a dangerous place, hence precisely because of these mappings, one supposedly necessitating violence in what passes for a realist interpretation of great powers as the prime movers of history (Mearsheimer 2001). Geopolitical thinking is about order and order is in part a cartographic notion. Juliet Fall (2010) once again emphasizes the importance of taken for granted boundaries as the ontological given of contemporary politics. Politics is about the cartographic control of territories, as Megoran (2011) too ponders regarding the first half of the twentieth century, but it also about much more than this, despite the fascination that so many commentators have with the ideal form of the supposedly national territorial state. Part of what geographers bring to the discussion of peace is a more nuanced geographical imagination than that found in so much of international studies (Dalby 2011a).¶ On the other hand much of the discussion of peace sees war as the problem, peace as the solution. Implied in that is geopolitics as the problem, mapping dangers turns out to be a dangerous enterprise insofar as it facilitates the perpetuation of violence by representing other places as threats to which our place is susceptible. But this only matters if this is related to the realist assumptions of the inevitability of rivalry, the eternal search for power as key to humanity's self-organisation and the assumption that organized violence is the ultimate arbiter (Dalby 2010). Critical geopolitics is about challenging such contextualizations, and as such its relationships to peace would seem to be obvious, albeit as Megoran (2011) notes mostly by way of a focus on what Galtung (1969, 1971) calls negative peace. Given the repeated reinvention of colonial tropes in contemporary Western political discourse such critique remains an essential part of a political geography that grants peoples "the courtesy of political geography" (Mitchell and Smith 1991). Undercutting the moral logics of violence, so frequently relying on simplistic invocations of geographical inevitability, to structure their apologetics, remains a crucial contribution.

## 1NR – Case

### SOLVENCY

#### Aff studies rely on a bottom up methodology to estimate global wind potential – they’re based purely on global estimations of wind speed. Our 1nc Science Daily evidence is from a study by Miller at the Max Planck Institute – his was one of the only studies not relying on this method

**Castro, 11** - Applied Physics, Campus Miguel Delibes, University of Valladolid, 47011 Valladolid, Spain (Carlos, “Global wind power potential: Physical and technological limits” Energy Policy 39 (2011) 6677–6682, Science Direct)

All of these studies that evaluate the technical power potential of wind energy (see Table 1), except the one by Smil (2008) (with no explicit methodology) and the one by Miller et al. (2010) that calculates a physical–geographical potential, use a bottom-up methodology: they take the wind speed in many locations of the Earth’s surface, exclude the areas that are considered not suitable for wind farms, and calculate the energy that would be trapped in those locations with the technically available present or future windmills.

### NAVY

#### Utilizing larger ships and slowing speeds is saving fuels costs

**Irvine, 12** (Dean, “Shipping looks to clean up its act” CNN, 12/18, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/17/business/eco-green-shipping-singapore/index.html>)

Financially, the shipping industry is in the doldrums, suffering from over capacity and high oil prices. With tough times have come new ideas on how to cut costs and improve the environmental impact of shipping.

These days many shipping lines believe that bigger is better, not just for the shipping companies' bottom line, but also the environment.

"The bigger the ship the lower the fuel consumption, that's one thing," said Thomas Riber Knudsen, Asia Pacific CEO of shipping line Maersk. "The most important thing that we're doing (to reduce costs) on all our ships is we're reducing speed so simply sailing slower than we would normally do.

"There is a benefit in financial terms. Our biggest financial cost is fuel consumption; (cutting it) happens to be very good for the environment so probably there is shared interest there."

As well as travelling slower, new ships like the Eugen Maersk have other fuel-saving and potentially environmentally-friendly features, such as a redesigned bow and special paint to reduce friction through the water

### heg

Mazarrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr

**First is credibility -U.S. capabilities are perceptually in decline independent of what they actually are means they don’t have uniqueness for any of their offense, but maintaining power projection creates overconfidence in u.s. policy makers which causes great power war- and distracts from building a sustainable deterrence posture**

**Mazarr 12 \***Michael J. Mazarr is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College [https://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency” Fall 2012]

The default response to looming failures in strategic posture has so far been, and will likely continue to be, to chip away at its edges and avoid exhausting fundamental reform. Some would argue that persistence, or incremental change, is the best course: avoiding the risks\_to U.S. credibility, to the international system, to the domestic political health of whatever administration waded into it\_of recalibrating U.S. power in the form of cascading loss of faith in American credibility.22 This is a mistake; in fact, refusing to come to terms with U.S. strategic insolvency will damage U.S. credibility and global stability to a far greater degree. A well-managed readjustment will better avoid the pitfalls of strategic insolvency.23 Persisting without reform substantially increases the risk of a number of specific strategic perils. Global strategies and specific military plans lose credibility. As the leading power is overtaken by others, if it refuses to prioritize and attempts instead to uphold all its commitments equally, the credibility of its regional plans, postures, and threats is destined to erode. Recent literature on credibility argues that it is not based merely on past actions, but from an adversary’s calculations of the current power capabilities at a state’s disposal.24 When Hitler’s Germany was considering whether to take seriously the pledges and commitments of the Western allies, for example, he paid much more attention to their existing capabilities, their current national will, and the perceived feasibility of their strategic posture than to reputations formed over years or decades of actions. Indeed, such judgments seem to derive not from a checklist of a rival’s defense programs or military actions, but from a much more diffuse and visceral sense of the trajectory of a state’s power relative to its current posture. What is now clear is that the consensus of such perceptions is shifting decisively against the tenability of the existing U.S. paradigm of global power projection. It is, in fact, natural for rising challengers to see weakness in the leading power’s capacities as a by-product of the growing self-confidence and faith in their own abilities. There is already abundant evidence of such perceptual shifts in the assertive leaders and elites of rising powers today, who\_while respecting continuing U.S. strengths and expecting the United States to remain the primus inter pares for decades to come, perhaps indefinitely\_nonetheless see current U.S. global commitments as excessive for a debt-ridden and ‘‘declining’’ power. In China, as a leading example, senior officials and influential analysts view the United States as troubled, overextended, and increasingly unable to fulfill its defense paradigm. They believe that the United States will continue as a global power, but expect it to be in a different guise.25 Conversations with business, government, and military officials from burgeoning powers such as India, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia produce the same broad theme: Structural trends in economics, politics, and military affairs are undermining the degree of American predominance and the sustainability of the existing paradigm of U.S. influence. A leading theme is a growing belief in the social and economic decay of the U.S. model and the inability of U.S. political system to address major issues. Recent polls and studies of opinion in emerging powers come to many of the same conclusions.26 These perceptions will be fed and nurtured by parallel actions and trends which will undercut the viability of the existing paradigm. Critics at home are already suggesting that the United States will be unable to sustain the demands of its ‘‘strategic tilt to Asia’’ given planned budget cuts, or meet the requirements of both Middle East and Asian contingencies.27 As the United States is forced to pursue cost-saving measures, such as cancellations of major weapons systems or troop reductions from key regions, the sense of a paradigm in free-fall will accelerate. We see this already in the recommendations in many reports, even those arguing for a general promotion of forward deployment, for a reduction if not elimination of the U.S. force presence in Europe.28 In addition to a loss of global credibility, a paradigm in crisis also threatens the credibility of specific U.S. military and foreign policy doctrines. When concepts and doctrines flow from stressed conventional-wisdom worldviews, those concepts and doctrines begin to take on the air of empty rhetoric. A good parallel was the British ‘‘two-power’’ doctrine (the notion that the Royal Navy should match the world’s next two best fleets combined), which eventually became a form of self-reassurance without strategic significance. After a certain point, Aaron Friedberg explains, ‘‘official analyses of Britain’s position took on an air of incompleteness and unreality.’’29 One can begin to sense this tendency in some recent U.S. conceptual statements, such as AirSea Battle: from all the public evidence, this concept appears to respond to growing challenges to U.S. power projection capabilities with an immense amount of vague rhetoric about intentions,30 coupled with bold new plans to expand planned military efforts in precisely the region where such insertion of military might is becoming more problematic. Meantime, the heyday of counterinsurgency doctrine appears to have come and gone. A perception of strategic insolvency, if not corrected by a readjustment of priorities and commitments, will trigger a decline in perceived credibility of threats and promises. The risk then becomes that, in a future scenario, an American administration will lurch into a crisis assuming that it can take actions with the same effect as before. Instead, a pledge or demand will be ignored by an adversary (or an ally or friend) now unimpressed with the viability of U.S. defense policy\_and the United States will find itself in a conflict that its degraded defense posture could not forestall. Advocates of the current paradigm agree with the risk, but have a different solution: expand the defense budget; reaffirm global commitments; reassure allies. But the United States simply does not have that option because, as argued above, the factors closing down on the current paradigm are not merely momentary or reversible\_they are structural. The only way out is a recalibrated strategic posture. A related risk, then, is a form of strategic opportunity cost. Every ounce of energy spent trying to prop up an obsolete strategic paradigm forfeits the opportunity to discover new and sustainable ways of meeting the same U.S. interests and goals. The pivot to Asia is a perfect example. Instead of pursuing the pivot and institutionalizing an unsustainable U.S. regional position, Washington should be constructing and moving toward a post-primacy architecture in Asia. The fact is that we have a limited grace period—perhaps a decade, perhaps less—to put into place regional and global security architectures for a postprimacy world, structures that envision a revised while still prominent role for the United States. Using that precious and dwindling time to prop up a fraying paradigm would be counterproductive.

**Second is diplomacy- U.S. hegemonic legitimacy is in in decline, states will not acquiesce to U.S. diplomatic overtures now- maintaining power projection makes U.S. policy makers believe they can deescalate conflicts they actually can’t which draws the U.S. in**

**Mazarr 12 \***Michael J. Mazarr is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War College [https://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallMazarr.pdf, “The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency” Fall 2012]

Diplomacy increasingly fails. A parallel risk has to do with the ebbing force of U.S. diplomacy and influence. International power is grounded in legitimacy, and in many ways it is precisely the legitimacy of the leading power’s global posture that is under assault as its posture comes into question. Historically, rising challengers gradually stop respecting the hegemon’s right to lead, and they begin to make choices on behalf of the international community, in part due to strategies consciously designed to frustrate the leading power’s designs. Germany, under Bismarck and after, is one example: It aspired to unification and to its ‘‘rightful place’’ as a leading European power\_as its power and influence accumulated, its willingness to accept the inherent legitimacy of the existing order as defined by other states, and the validity and force of their security paradigms, declined proportionately. At nearly all points in this trajectory, German leaders did not seek to depose the international system, but to crowd into its leadership ranks, to mute the voices of others relative to its own influence, and to modify rather than abolish rules. We begin to see this pattern today with regard to many emerging powers, but especially of course, China’s posture toward the United States.31 As was predicted and expected in the post-Cold War context of growing regional power centers, the legitimacy of a system dominated by the United States is coming under increasing challenge. More states (and, increasingly, non-state actors) want to share in setting rules and norms and dictating outcomes. The obvious and inevitable result has been to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. While measuring the relative success of a major power’s diplomacy over time is a chancy business (and while Washington continues to have success on many fronts), the current trajectory is producing a global system much less subject to the power of U.S. diplomacy and other forms of influence. Harvard’s Stephen Walt catalogues the enormous strengths of the U.S. position during and after the Cold War, and compares that to recent evidence of the emerging limits of U.S. power. Such evidence includes Turkey’s unwillingness to support U.S. deployments in Iraq, the failure to impose U.S. will or order in Iraq or Afghanistan, failures of nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, the Arab Spring’s challenges to long-standing U.S. client rulers, and more.32 As emerging powers become more focused on their own interests and goals, their domestic dynamics will become ever more self-directed and less subject to manipulation from Washington, a trend evident in a number of major recent elections.33 Washington will still enjoy substantial influence, and many states will welcome (openly or grudgingly) a U.S. leadership role. But without revising the U.S. posture, the gap between U.S. ambitions and capabilities will only grow. Continually trying to do too much will create more risk\_risk of demands unmet, requests unfulfilled, and a growing sense of the absurdity of the U.S. posture. Such a course risks crisis and conflict. Similarly, doubt in the threats and promises underpinning an unviable U.S. security posture risks conflict: U.S. officials will press into situations assuming that their diplomacy will be capable of achieving certain outcomes\_and will make demands and lay out ultimatums on that basis\_only to find that their influence cannot achieve the desired goals, and they must escalate to harsher measures. The alternative is to shift to a lesser role with more limited ambitions and more sustainable legitimacy.