# Round 2 – Neg vs Wyo/Ind MP

## 1NC

### 1nc t

#### Financial incentives are committed funds directly tied to production

Webb, 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public* *funds are* either disbursed or *contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive ***effects*** which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### That makes the plan a nonfinancial incentive

**Shapiro**, associate – Energy, Environment & Public Utilities Practice Group @ Cozen O'Connor, publisher – Green Building Law Blog, **2011**

(Shari, “Code Green: Is 'Greening' the Building Code the Best Approach to Create a Sustainable Built Environment?” Planning & Environmental Law 63:6, p. 3-12)

The explosion of state and local green building regulations has been extraordinary and has led to interesting regulatory experimentation. Many state and local governments begin by mandating green building practices for public buildings. Some local governments have expanded that mandate to require green building practices for both public and private development, often for new construction over a certain square footage. Others have sought to encourage green building practices through financial incentives. Still others have used non-financial incentives like expedited permitting or increased density to encourage the development of green buildings.

Mandatory green building requirements work very much like traditional "command and control" environmental regulations, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act being preeminent examples. Direct regulation may mandate specific green building practices or the achievement of a green building standard such as the USGBCs Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard.3 Green building codes such as CALGreen, discussed in detail below, fall into this regulatory category.

Financial incentives have taken the form of direct grants from government entities,4 tax incentives, and rebates.5 Other forms of financial incentives for green buildings are rebates of the typical government-related costs of building, such as application fees.6

Local governments are also experimenting with nonfinancial incentives for green building practices. These incentives are often attractive to municipalities because they do not deplete public finances directly and are therefore easier to get passed in difficult financial times or with teluctant constituencies.7 Examples of nonfinancial incentives include increased floor-to-area ratios for green buildings8 and expedited permitting processes.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Limits – makes the topic bidirectional – allows imposition of requirements on one energy source in order to incentivize another – explodes research because the list of negative incentives is massive

#### 2. Ground – predictable negative offense is limited to direct incentives for each energy source – allowing negative incentives arbitrarily give the aff unpredictable spin on core generics like politics and energy trade off disads.

### 1nc eulogy

**Next off is the eulogy of Ian Young:**

Of Death I try to think like this –

The Well in which they lay us

Is but the likeness of the Brook

That menaced not to slay us,

But to invite by that Dismay

Which is the Zest of sweetness

To the same Flower Hesperian,

Decoying but to greet us –

I do remember when a Child

With bolder Playmates straying

To where a Brook that seemed a Sea

Withheld us by its roaring

From just a Purple Flower beyond

Until constrained to clutch it

If Doom itself were the result,

The boldest leaped, and clutched it –

Emily Dickinson, 1882.

Accessed in this article

**Deppman 2K** – assistant professor of Foreign Languages and Humanities at Eastern Kentucky University

(Jed, “Dickinson, Death, and the Sublime”, The Emily Dickinson Journal 9.1 (2000) 1-20, dml)

### 1nc time image

**We begin with the venal sin of a World snarled in perplexity...**

**Murakami '11** Haruki, cat enthusiast, novelist *1Q84* p.380-381

Still, **Tengo**'s reading of the story was his and his alone. He could not help feeling a certain sympathy for the trusting men and women who were "left in a pool of mysterious question marks" after reading *Air Chrysalis*. He **pictured a bunch of dismayed-looking people clutching at colorful flotation rings as they drifted aimlessly in a large pool full of question marks. In the sky above them shone an utterly unrealistic sun.** Tengo felt a certain sense of responsibility for having foisted such a state of affairs upon the public. **But who can possibly save all the people of the world?** Tengo thought. **You could bring all the gods of the world into one place, and still they couldn't abolish nuclear weapons or eradicate terrorism. They couldn't end the drought in Africa or bring John Lennon back to life. Far from it -- the gods would just break into factions and start fighting among themsevles, and the world would probably become even more chaotic than it is now.** Considering the sense of powerlessness that such a state of affairs would bring about, **to have people floating in a pool of mysterious question marks seems like a minor sin.**

**The performative act of the 1ac universalizes a mode of diachronic time which organizes existence around a meter; hours, days, weeks... the 1AC represents a detailed schedule for disaster designed to proliferate social systems of control and eclipse the lifeworld**

**Hall '9** John R, Professor of Sociology at UC Davis "Apocalypse in the Long Run: Reflections on Huge Comparisons in the Study of Modernity"

**Apocalyptic times and modern times** The configurational history of the apocalyptic in the west that I have just sketched spans a long period of objective time. However, **focusing solely on objective time is an impediment to understanding** either **the apocalyptic** (as we have seen, itself encompassing multiple possible temporalities) or modernity. Instead, a historical phenomenology of multiple temporalities sets certain markers along a pathway toward describing modernity itself as what Elisabeth Clemens (2007) calls a 'recomposition 6 a temporal hybrid that I have described elsewhere as the Empire of Modernity (2009: chap. 5). Thinking about modernity as a complex hybrid of multiple and overlapping temporal forms of action can displace the simplistic binaries of modernity and tradition, advanced and underdeveloped society. Such recognition of the multiple temporalities in play under the sign of modernity offers a way of transcending the radical opposition in social theory between accounts of administrative legal-rational modernity versus accounts of the strategic conflicts of imperialism as bases of social order. Most centrally, the 'Empire of Modernity has developed through a centuries-long series of projects and initiatives centered in the interacting diachronic time of modernity and strategic time of empire. The shape and span of the resulting social order are plastic and subject to myriad institutional patterns, new formulations, and reconstructions. My sketch, short though it is, begins to demonstrate how an historical phenomenology can reframe a series of modern theoretical conundrums. *The diachronic axis of modernity* To begin with, as Peter Wagner (1984) argued, modern society depends upon forms of 'discipline that order social activity, but simultaneously must orchestrate conditions of 'liberty that underwrite the potential of individuals to act autonomously in pursuing their own interests 6 albeit in socially appropriate ways. Essentially, modern disciplining emanates from the realm of diachronically organized action. In figure 1, I characterized diachronic temporality as the medium of social action organized along legal and rational lines, in which the flow of events becomes subject to routinization and calculation. Here, if Weberss sociology of legal-rational authority is restricted to considering the state, bureaucracy, and legitimacy, its focus is too narrow. Weberss legal-rational typification must instead be understood to extend the legitimate exercise of power outward to the entire range of diachronic operations in the social. In this, it merges seamlessly with Michel Foucaultss argument that governmentality is diffuse in its exercise. The diachronic is not just about power and bureaucracy; more broadly, it encompasses the ordering and coordination of social activity in any domain. In these terms**, the diachronic** is emergent, not fixed (Whitrow 1988: chap. 10; 181Z82). It **encompasses the ever more precise measurement of duration and the 'disembedding of units of time that can be moved around on schedules** (Lash and Urry 1994: 229). **Because diachronic time makes possible the projection of alternative future events, it puts into play the planning of the future, such that any given present is no longer simply a 'here and now, but also, the realization of a (past) projected future and the anticipation of events to come, already plugged into diachronic schedules.** Because diachronic time itself undergoes development (Luhmann 1982: 284Z 86), we continue to witness ever novel constructions of the diachronic that underwrite ever novel integrations of technology and 'nature across divergent spheres of lifeworldly social activities. This expansion transpires through the differentiation of multiple diachronic worlds 6 quintessentially of government agencies, business corporations, and increasingly, diachronically centered social- movement organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Each has its: distinctive temporal horizons; administrative arrangements; opportunities of power by way of legitimacy, decrees, laws, patents, property rights, and popular support or acquiescence; claims of jurisdictional span for goal-oriented operations of administration and policing; and capacities of resource mobilization. In the world where diachronic temporality predominates, social systems both proliferate within organizations interfacing with their environments, and differentiate in relation to one another. Thus, the diachronic world emblematic of modernity is not 'the system, but a pluralized welter of interconnected, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory 'systems (Luhmann 1982) Among diverse channels carrying the spread of the diachronic, surely one of the most significant has involved multiple and emergent relationships with strategic temporalities. On this front, **operations within diachronic rational bureaucracy have subordinated legitimate exercise of strategic violence to administrative (and judicial) regulation. The upshot is (incomplete) diachronic organization, administration, and regulation of how strategic violence is deployed in contending nation-state territorial empires, in interstate war, and in the broader supra-national governmentality of the Empire of Modernity**. Along a different channel, **diachronic governmentality has extended operations and regulative frameworks to bring various kinds of order to zones of temporally strategic lifeworldly activity that previously lay beyond its effective policing 6 from crime and non-legitimate violence, to the play of strategic action in economic activities such as 'markets. The interrelations between actions framed in diachronic and strategic temporality are facilitated because both these temporal orientations are centered on unfolding sequences of events.** Disjunctures and aporias, when they occur, tend to arise because of the difference between the diachronic emphasis on repetition and calculability, versus the emphasis in strategic temporality on one-off actions meant to shape the future course of events. Simply put, manufacturing and governmental administration depend on certain temporal enactments, chess and war, on radically different ones. Nevertheless, when harnessed in relation to one another, the diachronic and the strategic enhance the prerogatives of social power. The interfaces, disjunctures, and aporias between the diachronic and synchronic temporalities are quite different. Here, Habermass's theory of lifeworld colonization and Foucaultss model of governmentality describe an overall dynamic in which **diachronically organized action is undertaken to organize the here-and- now according to goals external to the social actors who are the object of its organization and discipline. The operations of colonization and governmentality toward the lifeworld are diverse**. They encompass not only education, labor market regulation, social welfare administration, health services, and the like, but also policing of families and sexuality, and the mediated permeation of lifeworlds through popular entertainment, marketing and advertising, mass media and the internet, the orchestration of consumption and leisure (and consumption as leisure), and the design of social lifeworldly spaces that Baudrillard dubbed 'simulacra (such as shopping malls, fast-food restaurants, and tourist destinations) to mimic the imaginaries of consumer desire (Hall, Neitz, and Battani 2003). People acting in the here-and-now thus routinely interface with external diachronicallyZ ordered systems and agents of governmentality as we move through daily life.

**And The Final Countdown is just sooo Europe -- their impacts understanding of risk is a function of a Time-Image which narrates Apocalypse as a necessary alternative to History -- this construction of Eurocentric historical time is the discursive motor of slavery, colonialism and global wars**

**Restrepo '9** Eduardo, Modernidad y diferencia Seminario de la Maestría en Estudios Culturales Universidad Javeriana Semestre II de 2009 Edificio 27, salón 505, www.ram-wan.net/restrepo/modernidad/Ch\_07Modernity.doc

One of the most common ways modernity has been understood is as the production of new organizations and/or experiences of time (and to a lesser extent, space). Most frequently, **the chronotope of modernity is assumed to be History: modernity is the invention of History**, and the acceptance, even the celebration and institutionalization of change; it stands against stasis (as tradition). **This modern time is linear, a movement from a past through a fleeting present into a future. The future passes into the past through an ever-disappearing present.** Or in a slight but important variation, the present is the articulation of different temporalities—past futures and futures past, embodying “the contingencies of the past [and the future] in the present” (Scott, 220). Kosseleck divides the experience of time into the “space of experience,” the past made present, embodying the particularity of a past remembered, and the “horizon of expectations,” the future made present, embodying the diffuse possibilities of a future anticipated. While the latter defines and surpasses the former, Kosseleck argues that the modern age constitutes a break in which the gap between these two dimensions or planes of the experience of time has considerably expanded. One of the most famous (in the English speaking world at least) statements of this chronotope is Marshall Berman’s Marxist-influenced vision of modernity as a particular attitude towards and experience of the increasingly rapid and dense actualizations of change: “A mode of vital experience—experience of space and time, of the self and others, of life’s possibilities and perils . . . **To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world—and at the same time, that threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are . . . To be modern is to be part of a universe in which . . . All that is solid melts into air” (15).To be modern is to make oneself at home in the maelstrom, to embrace and even desire change. Modernity is a the experience of History. But there is no guarantee how this linear temporality is lived out.** For some is it about **the future as defined by a teleological sense of progress rather than apocalypse.** For David Bromfield, writing about Perth Australia, “The ‘modern’ was only marginally understood . . . as implying the future . . . The modern is much more commonly a known history . . .” (quoted in Morris, 1998, 16). Gyekye (280) similarly conceives modernity as a commitment to innovation and change: the “cultivation of the innovative spirit or outlook . . . can be said to define modernity.” Modernity is the incessant claim to produce the new.[[1]](#endnote-1) And yet, Gyekye also contests any account that ignores the complexity not only of modernity but also of notions of innovation and change. After all, he points out, traditional societies also change and often seek change, while on the other side, modern societies always embody and embrace traditions. Similarly Gaonkar warns against those who emphasize the place of change in modernity, ignoring on the one hand the growing importance of routine and, on the other, that change itself is a new modality of power; as Cesaire, Chakrabarty (2000) and others have argued, **this construction of history as a linear temporality is powerfully articulated to a variety of forms of violence and brutality, exhibited most clearly in slavery, colonialism and global wars.**

**The World has already world ended -- this is our competitive Time-Image -- our only political choice is to radically foreclose the 1AC enframing of The End**

**Thomas '2** Robert, Lecturer on Humanities, San Francisco State University, "Remnants of the World: Agamben and Messianic Affect" Published in *Crossings*, *Special Issue: The Uses of Religion*, (No.5/6, 2002/2003):

269 - 295 http://www.gestures.org/remnants.pdf

**The world has already ended, we just don’t know it yet.**What can this statement mean? **By stating this, I do not mean that the earth, universe, whatever we want to call “everything that exists** (Spinoza’s “God”?) or even immanence itself **has radically and literally come to an end**, nor do I mean that we are on the verge of imminent apocalypse. What I do mean by this statement, **what I hope to capture with this formulation, is the *affect* (or subjective experience*)*7 of a life lived in a “state of exception” that has become the norm**. In this sense, **it is meant to point to the proliferation of the radical separation accomplished in the exception. The “taking of the outside”8 accomplished in the exception is a radical separation of our bodies from themselves, from immanence—the outside, the “world”—as a non-essential, exterior foundation for politics, thought, and subjectivity**. In this sense, **this statement is meant to point to the despair of a life lived in separation from itself—from, even, its own encounters, relations, and exposures. Life in the state of exception is that which everywhere remains profoundly separated from itself. Life divided from life. A life that is perpetually emptied out, reduced to the brutal fact of mere survival (*naked life*)—the biopolitical production of life as mere survival**.9 What *remains* of the world in the exception? Insofar as the time of and for the world (the outside) has grown short—insofar as the post-war era is marked by a state of perpetual suspension, a radical deferral and delay of the potential of subjectivity, thought, and politics—we can read this situation as the *beginning* of the end of time; of and for the political, of and for thought, of and for life. **Within the closure of the outside that marks the exception, the time for any potential politics has grown short. There is little time left for the political—that is, before any hope of a politics becomes permanently suspended. Time is running out. The time that is left, the time that remains for life, for politics, for thought, has become contracted. This is the problem of messianic time.** According to Agamben, Benjamin was the first to grasp the link between the state of exception and the messianic event in Jewish mysticism; that is, between the status of the law in the “state of exception” and the confrontation with the law marked by the arrival of the Messiah. The arrival of the Messiah does not, as is commonly thought, mark the end of time. It is not, as it has been assumed in many interpretations of Benjamin’s “Theses,” the time of the apocalypse, or the Last Days, but rather a time marked by the suspension of the Law.10 With the arrival of the Messiah, “the hidden foundation of the law [as *being in force without significance*] comes to light, and the law itself enters into a state of perpetual suspension.”11 **The arrival of the Messiah inaugurates a radical suspension of the Law. Messianism is,** according to Agamben, **“a theory of the state of exception—except for the fact that in Messianism there is no authority in force to proclaim the state of exception; instead, there is the Messiah to subvert its power.”**12 In the Jewish tradition, this is the time of the messianic event. **Between the time of the creation, which includes the time of the end of the world, and the time *after* the end of the world, there is the time of the Messiah.13 This time is a *remnant*—it is the (non-relational) time that remains in the disjunction between two traditional concepts of time (historical or chronological time, and a “future” time *after* the end of the world).**14 Messianic time, then, is an “immanent time. A time *within* time.”15 What is truly historical is not what redeems time in the direction of the future, or even the past; it is rather what fulfills time in the excess of a medium. The messianic Kingdom is neither the future (the millennium) nor the past (the golden age): it is, instead, *a remaining time*.16 “Messianism,” as Agamben makes clear, “is not the end of time, but the time of the end.”17 It is *the time that is left*. What can it mean, Agamben asks throughout *Il tempo che resta*, to think this *remnant* of time? Following Agamben, I would like to ask how this contraction of time that marks our present relates to our ability to think and experience something called the world? **What can it mean to think the world as that which has already ended, without our being able to say why or, even *that* we fully know that this event has happened?** **It is in this image of the end of the world, I think, that the “now of recognizability** <*Jetz der Erkennbarkeit*>”18 **of the potential of the world (the outside) and its radical destruction and separation in the exception comes to us. How can we think—when thought itself, according to Deleuze, is based on an exteriority without reserve—in a situation that implies and enforces a radical separation from experience, one that would “take” any, potentially every, encounter with the outside? How, in the “taking of the outside” of the exception, is radical exteriority possible? And how, following Deleuze’s singular individuation, can thought be based on our unique experiences, encounters and relations—all of which “happen” in a space of radical exteriority, in the world— when it is precisely the “taking” of this that is accomplished in the exception?** All of this is to ask, how can we think exposure in the exception?19 I am employing the term “world” here in the sense that Nietzsche uses it in his thought of the eternal return which, among much else, is also a theory of the world.20 **For Nietzsche, the “world” is the abyss in which subjectivity and exteriority coincide in the exact same moment—a moment that is grasped, or should we say expressed and performed, in the ethical stance of the return: the willing of the eternal return of all that exists (the abyss), and the affirmation of chance and chaos. Deleuze’s statement regarding the loss of the “world” cited above refers, I think, to this conception of the world**. In the speculations that follow, I want to delimit my inquiry to this aspect of the return—as an abyssal theory of the world in which subjectivity and exteriority coincide in the same moment (within the abyss). Such delimitation allows us to simultaneously blur the distinction between the ethical and epistemological thought of the return without, at the same time, completely abandoning every aspect of the latter (which seems both unnecessary and undesirable). In this delimited sense, my statement about the end of the world means two things. In the first place, it means the loss of the concept of an abyssal encounter with the world (as an existential-ontological and epistemological foundation) contained explicitly in Nietzsche’s “eternal return.” In other words, the “end of the world” as the experience of the exception means the end of the eternal return, of any truly abyssal thought as the basis for thinking exteriority and subjectivity (I will explain this in more detail below).21 Secondly, my statement is a play on the idea that without such a thought (which has influenced much, if not all, post-war thought on exteriority), we cannot think; it is the end of the world for thought, politics, and subjectivity. In other words, this statement points to the reaction to the thought of the exception and the problems it exposes, the unnecessary fear, I think, with which it has been met by theorists of radical exteriority. **The separation from the outside (which is also, to say, from our “selves”) accomplished in the exception means that our ability to have a relation to the world, to make use of its potential—for thought, for life, for politics—has become permanently “policed”** in the post-war era. The exception constitutes what Agamben calls a “prior movement”22 not only for our lives, but also for any corresponding theory of exposure, affect, and “becoming.”23 **The exception,** in other words**, may *precede* our ways of thinking about both subjectivity and exteriority. What can it mean to say that the world and our relation to it have become suspended? Any effort to affirm our lives today as exposure and vulnerability—as the encounter of an abyssal body with an abyssal world— runs up against this limit of a “world” that, defined in this sense, has effectively ended.**

### 1nc neolib

#### Market solutions make wind a neoliberal messiah—assumes a “natural” consumerism that can’t be sustained

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

The search for harmonized market-style policies to strengthen the energy¶ status quo in the face of its mounting challenges reflects the growing political power of energy neoliberalism in an era of economic globalization¶ (Dubash, 2002; Dubash and Williams, 2006). The two processes build a com-¶ plimentary, if circular, politics in support of conventional energy: the logic is¶ that global economic development requires energy use, which can only be¶ properly planned if international capitalist institutions can be assured that¶ the lubricant of globalization, namely, the unfettered power of markets, is¶ established by enforceable policy (Byrne et al., 2004). Correspondingly, resulting carbon emissions can only eventually be abated if economic globalization is protected so that international capitalist institutions find it profitable¶ to begin to lower carbon emissions and/or sequester them.¶ 15¶ Consumers and¶ producers, rather than citizens, are judged to be the proper signatories to the¶ social contract because these participants, without the stain of politics, can¶ find rational answers to our problems.¶ In sum, conventionalists counsel against preconceiving the social and¶ environmental requirements for an energy transition, preferring a continuation of the existing energy regime that promises to deliver a “reasonable,”¶ “practical” future consistent with its past. Scheer (2002: 137) describes the¶ erroneous assumption in such reasoning: “The need for fossil energy is a¶ practical constraint that society must respect, for better or worse; whereas¶ proposals for a swift and immediate reorientation...are denounced as irresponsible.” An orderly transition is thus forecast from the current energy¶ status quo of fossil fuel and nuclear energy dominance to a new energy status¶ quo with possibly less carbon, but surely with giant-sized fossil and nuclear¶ energy systems in wide use.¶ **The Sustainable Energy Quest**¶The problems of the conventional energy order have led some to regard¶ reinforcement of the status quo as folly and to instead champion sustainable¶ energy strategies based upon non-conventional sources and a more intelligent ideology of managed relations between energy, environment, and society consonant with environmental integrity. This regime challenger seeks to¶ evolve in the social context that produced the conventional energy regime,¶ yet proposes to fundamentally change its relationship to the environment (at¶ least, this is the hope). Technologies such as wind and photovoltaic electricity are purported to offer building blocks for a transition to a future in which¶ ills plaguing modernity and unsolved by the conventional energy regime¶ can be overcome (Lovins, 1979; Hawken et al., 2000; Scheer, 2002; Rifkin,¶ 2003; World Bank, 2004b).¶ While technical developments always include social, material, ecological, intellectual, and moral infrastructures (Winner, 1977: 54 - 58; Toly, 2005),¶ and may, therefore, be key to promoting fundamentally different development pathways, it is also possible that technologies, even environmentally¶ benign ones, will be appropriated by social forces that predate them and,¶ thereby, can be thwarted in the fulfillment of social promises attached to the¶ strategy. Indeed, if unaccompanied by reflection upon the social conditions¶ in which the current energy regime thrives, the transition to a renewable¶ energy regime may usher in very few social benefits and little, if any, political¶ and economic transformation. This is the concern that guides our analysis¶ (below) of the sustainable energy movement.¶ At least since the 1970s when Amory Lovins (1979) famously posed the¶ choice between “hard” and “soft” energy paths, sustainable energy strategies¶ have been offered to challenge the prevailing regime. Sometimes the promise¶ was of no more than “alternative” and “least cost” energy (Energy Policy¶ Project of the Ford Foundation, 1974a, 1974b; O’Toole, 1978; Sant, 1979),¶ but adjectives such as “appropriate,” “natural,” “renewable,” “equitable,”¶ and even “democratic” have also been envisioned (Institute for Local SelfReliance, 2005; Scheer, 2002: 34).¶ 16¶ The need to depart from the past, especially in light of the oil crises of the 1970s and the energy-rooted threat of¶ climate change that has beset policy debate since the late 1980s, united¶ disparate efforts to recast and reconceive our energy future.¶ Partly, early criticisms of the mainstream were reflective of a broader social¶ agenda that drew upon, among other things, the anti-war and anti-corporate¶ politics of the 1960s. It was easy, for example, to connect the modern energy¶ regime to military conflicts of the period and to superpower politics; and it¶ was even easier to ally the mainstream’s promotion of nuclear power to the¶ objectives of the Nuclear Club. With evidence of profiteering by the oil¶ majors in the wake of the 1973-1974 OPEC embargo, connecting the energy¶ regime with the expanding power of multinational capital was, likewise, not¶ difficult. Early sustainable energy strategies opposed these alliances, offering promises of significant political, as well as technological, change.¶ However, in the thirty years that the sustainable energy movement has¶ aspired to change the conventional regime, its social commitments and politics have become muddled. A telling sign of this circumstance is the shifted¶ focus from energy politics to economics. To illustrate, in the celebrated work¶ of one of the movement’s early architects, subtitles to volumes included¶ “breaking the nuclear link” (Amory Lovins’ Energy/War, 1981) and “toward¶ a durable peace” (Lovins’ Soft Energy Paths, 1979). These publications offered poignant challenges to the modern order and energy’s role in maintaining that order.¶ Today, however, the bestsellers of the movement chart a course toward¶ “natural capitalism” (Hawken et al., 2000), a strategy that anticipates synergies between soft path technologies and market governance of energy-environment-society relations. Indeed, a major sustainable energy think tank has¶ reached the conclusion that “small is profitable” (Lovins et al., 2002) in¶ energy matters and argues that the soft path is consistent with “economic¶ rationalism.” Understandably, a movement that sought basic change for a¶ third of a century has found the need to adapt its arguments and strategies to¶ the realities of political and economic power. Without adaptation, the conventional energy regime could have ignored soft path policy interventions¶ like demand-side management, integrated resource planning, public benefits¶ charges, and renewable energy portfolio standards (see Lovins and Gadgil,¶ 1991; Sawin, 2004), all of which have caused an undeniable degree of decentralization in energy-society relations. In this vein, it is clear that sustainability¶ proponents must find ways to speak the language and communicate in the¶ logic of economic rationalism if they are to avoid being dismissed. We do not¶ fault the sustainable energy camp for being strategic. Rather, the concern is¶ whether victories in the everyday of incremental politics have been balanced¶ by attention to the broader agenda of systemic change and the ideas needed¶ to define new directions.¶ A measure of the sustainable energy initiative’s strategic success is the¶ growing acceptance of its vision by past adversaries. Thus, Small is Profitable was named ‘Book of the Year’ in 2002 by The Economist, an award¶ unlikely to have been bestowed upon any of Lovins’ earlier works. As acceptance has been won, it is clear that sustainable energy advocates remain¶ suspicious of the oil majors, coal interests, and the Nuclear Club. But an¶ earlier grounding of these suspicions in anti-war and anti-corporate politics¶ appears to have been superseded by one that believes the global economy¶ can serve a sustainability interest if the ‘raison de market’ wins the energy¶ policy debate. Thus, it has been suggested that society can turn “more profit¶ with less carbon,” by “harnessing corporate power to heal the planet” (Lovins,¶ 2005; L. H. Lovins and A. B. Lovins, 2000). Similarly, Hermann Scheer (2002:¶ 323) avers: “The fundamental problem with today’s global economy is not¶ globalization per se, but that this globalization is not based on the sun—the¶ only global force that is equally available to all and whose bounty is so great¶ that it need never be fully tapped.” However, it is not obvious that market¶ economics and globalization can be counted upon to deliver the soft path¶ (see e.g. Nakajima and Vandenberg, 2005). More problematic, as discussed¶ below, the emerging soft path may fall well short of a socially or ecologically¶ transforming event if strategic victories and rhetorics that celebrate them¶ overshadow systemic critiques of energy-society relations and the corresponding need to align the sustainable energy initiative with social movements to¶ address a comprehensive agenda of change.¶ **Catching the Wind**¶To date, the greatest success in ‘real’ green energy development is the¶ spread of wind power. From a miniscule 1,930 MW in 1990 to more than¶ 47,317 MW in 2005, wind power has come of age. Especially noteworthy is¶ the rapid growth of wind power in Denmark (35 percent per year since 1997),¶ Spain (30 percent per year since 1997), and Germany (an astonishing 68¶ percent per year since 2000), where policies have caused this source to threaten¶ the hegemony of fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Wind now generates more¶ than 20 percent of Denmark’s electricity and the country is the world leader in¶ turbine manufacture. And as the Danes have demonstrated, offshore wind has¶ the potential to skirt some of the land-use conflicts that have sometimes beset¶ renewable energy alternatives. Indeed, some claim that offshore wind alone¶ might produce all of Europe’s residential electricity (Brown, 2004). National¶ energy strategists and environmental movements in and beyond Europe have¶ recognized the achievements of the Danes, Spaniards, and Germans with initiatives designed to imitate their success.¶ What are the characteristics of this success? One envied feature is the¶ remarkable decline in the price of wind-generated electricity, from $0.46 per¶ kWh in 1980 to $0.03 to $0.07 per kWh today (Sawin, 2004), very close to¶ conventionally-fueled utility generating costs in many countries, even before environmental impacts are included. Jubilant over wind’s winning market performance, advocates of sustainable energy foresee a new era that is¶ ecologically much greener and, yet, in which electricity remains (comparatively) cheap. Lester Brown (2003: 159) notes that wind satisfies seemingly¶ equally weighted criteria of environmental benefit, social gain, and economic efficiency:¶ Wind is...clean. Wind energy does not produce sulfur dioxide emissions or nitrous¶ oxides to cause acid rain. Nor are there any emissions of health-threatening mercury¶ that come from coal-fired power plants. No mountains are leveled, no streams are¶ polluted, and there are no deaths from black lung disease. Wind does not disrupt the¶ earth’s climate...[I]t is inexhaustible...[and] cheap.¶ This would certainly satisfy the canon of economic rationalism.¶ It is also consistent with the ideology of modern consumerism. Its politics¶ bestow sovereignty on consumers not unlike the formula of Pareto optimality,¶ a situation in which additional consumption of a good or service is warranted¶ until it cannot improve the circumstance of one person (or group) without¶ decreasing the welfare of another person (or group).¶ 17¶ How would one know¶ “better off” from “worse off” in the wind-rich sustainable energy era? Interestingly, proponents seem to apply a logic that leaves valuation of “better” and¶ “worse” devoid of explicit content. In a manner reminiscent of modern economic thinking, cheap-and-green enthusiasts appear willing to set wind to¶ the task of making “whatever”—whether that is the manufacture of low-cost¶ teeth whitening toothpaste or lower cost SUVs. In economic accounting, all¶ of these applications potentially make some in society “better off” (if one¶ accepts that economic growth and higher incomes are signs of improvement).¶ Possible detrimental side effects or externalities (an economic term for potential harm) could be rehabilitated by the possession of more purchasing power,¶ which could enable society to invent environmentally friendly toothpaste¶ and make affordable, energy-efficient SUVs. Sustainable energy in this construct cooperates in the abstraction of consumption and production. Consumption-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose, and, relatedly,¶ production-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose are not issues. The¶ construct altogether ignores the possibility that “more-is-better” consumption-production relations may actually reinforce middle class ideology and¶ capitalist political economy, as well as contribute to environmental crises¶ such as climate change. In the celebration of its coming market victory, the¶ cheap-and-green wind version of sustainable energy development may not¶ readily distinguish the economic/class underpinnings of its victory from those¶ of the conventional energy regime.¶ Wind enthusiasts also appear to be largely untroubled by trends toward¶ larger and larger turbines and farms, the necessity of more exotic materials to¶ achieve results, and the advancing complications of catching the wind. There¶ is nothing new about these sorts of trends in the modern period. The trajectory of change in a myriad of human activities follows this pattern. Nor is a¶ critique per se intended in an observation of this trend. Rather, the question¶ we wish to raise is whether another feature in this pattern will likewise be¶ replicated—namely, a “technological mystique” (Bazin, 1986) in which social life finds its inspiration and hope in technical acumen and searches for¶ fulfillment in the ideals of technique (Mumford, 1934; Ellul, 1964; Marcuse,¶ 1964; Winner, 1977, 1986; Vanderburg, 2005).¶ This prospect is not a distant one, as a popular magazine recently illustrated. In a special section devoted to thinking “After Oil,” National Geographic approvingly compared the latest wind technology to a well-known¶ monument, the Statue of Liberty, and noted that the new machines tower¶ more than 400 feet above this symbol (Parfit, 2005: 15 - 16). It was not hard to¶ extrapolate from the story the message of Big Wind’s liberatory potential.¶ Popular Science also commended new wind systems as technological marvels, repeating the theme that, with its elevation in height and complexity¶ lending the technology greater status, wind can now be taken seriously by¶ scientists and engineers (Tompkins, 2005). A recent issue of The Economist¶ (2005) included an article on the wonder of electricity generated by an artificial tornado in which wind is technologically spun to high velocities in a¶ building equipped with a giant turbine to convert the energy into electricity.¶ Indeed, wind is being contemplated as a rival able to serve society by the¶ sheer technical prowess that has often been a defining characteristic of modern energy systems.¶ Obviously, wind energy has a long way to go before it can claim to have¶ dethroned conventional energy’s “technological cathedrals” (Weinberg,¶ 1985). But its mission seems largely to supplant other spectacular methods of¶ generating electricity with its own. The politics supporting its rapid rise¶ express no qualms about endorsing the inevitability of its victories on tech-¶ nical grounds. In fact, Big Wind appears to seek monumental status in the¶ psyche of ecologically modern society. A recent alliance of the American¶ Wind Energy Association and the U.S. electric utility industry to champion¶ national (subsidized) investment in higher voltage transmission lines (to¶ deliver green-and-cheap electricity), illustrates the desire of Big Wind to¶ plug into Giant Power’s hardware and, correspondingly, its ideology (see¶ American Wind Energy Association, 2005, supporting “Transmission Infrastructure Modernization”). The transformative features of such a politics are¶ unclear. Indeed, wind power—if it can continue to be harvested by everlarger machines—may penetrate the conventional energy order so successfully that it will diffuse, without perceptible disruption, to the regime. The air¶ will be cleaner but the source of this achievement will be duly noted: science¶ will have triumphed still again in wresting from stingy nature the resources¶ that a wealthy life has grown to expect. Social transformation to achieve¶ sustainability may actually be unnecessary by this political view of things, as¶ middle-class existence is assured via clean, low-cost and easy-to-plug-in wind¶ power.

#### The aff’s fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail.

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Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact **reproduce** a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the **legitimating moral gloss** of the **‘force for good’** rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and **sparking long-term trends of** rising crime rates, property **destruction**, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while **providing profits** for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the **active defence** of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based **system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions** and processes of global governance **does not work for billions of people or** for **planetary ecological systems**. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that **keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed.** 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a **growing consensus** that long-term stability, particularly the **reduction of violent conflict**, will require **far greater political**, economic and environmental equity **on a global scale**, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and **transform the** rules-based **system into a more equitable form**. A growing literature now argues that prevailing **western approaches to** understanding, managing and ameliorating global **insecurity** and its violent symptoms are **inadequate and unsustainable**. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate **significant** negativefeedback, or ‘blowback’, from **unintended outcomes** that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, **the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky**: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘**inevitably leads to a** loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process **with no end in sight**. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generatingnew and potentially more dangerous **risks** deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatresof conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the **erosion of civil liberties** and the **securitization of daily life.** There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could **generate more**, and potentially **more lethal, risks than it resolves** or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, **wholly counterproductive.** 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### Technocratic management makes extinction inevitable—no aff proposal can solve.

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### Vote neg – must investigate epistemological underpinnings of energy production – alternative prevents a “growth at all costs” society that culminates in endless crises and oppression

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

All work on energy, society, and climate change may be divided into two broader theoretically significant categories based on its main underlying assumptions. On the one hand, there are sociologists whose proposals to solve global issues like climate change **involve tweaking the system** through policy, personal consumption choices, or technological change. On the other hand, you have sociologists **calling for** system-wide social and ecological change. In other words, some sociologists limit their studies to **changes that are possible** within the capitalist system, while others document the ways in which **capitalism is** incompatible **with** ecological and social **justice goals** and call for a **more significant transformation** of the world system.

One reason this central divide is so relevant to energy studies is that climate change has been **driven by the economic growth inherent to capitalism**. The key conflict that arises in climate negotiations, and which is constantly alluded to in environmental negotiations between nations, is that between ecological, social, and economic priorities (Clark and York 2005; Bazilian 2009; York 2010). Energy developments are **conditioned by these competing priorities**. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA 2008) puts the issue plainly: “Energy use is largely driven by economic growth.” Problems with energy developments are thus in large part problems of scale **related to the level of economic throughput**. And the scale of energy consumption remains coupled in capitalist economies with economic growth in spite of efficiency gains, as critical sociologists of energy have demonstrated (York 2010; York, et al. 2011). For this reason, energy debates, like other issues in environmental sociological theory, often **center on the tension between economic growth and ecological change**. There are striking differences in how this tension and the possibility of overcoming it are understood by various theoretical positions. The most influential approach to energy issues in the broader society and policy circles is mirrored in environmental sociology in the ecological modernization perspective. It is the most optimistic that the tension between economic growth and ecological change may be transcended (social justice is not integrated in their analysis.)

Ecological modernizationists emphasize “the possibility, actuality and desirability of a green Capitalism” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 23). They claim there is a “growing independence of ecological rationality vis-à-vis other (e.g. economic and political) rationalities” (22) in the governance of society and institutions. “The basic premise of ecological modernization theory is…[that there is a] centripetal movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social practices and institutions of modern society” (Mol 2002, 93). The authors see “continued industrial [and technological] development as offering **the best option for escaping from the ecological crises** of the developed world” (Fisher and Freudenburg 2001, 702). This new breed of modernizers suggest “we have entered a new industrial revolution, one of radical restructuring of production, consumption, state practices and political discourses along ecological lines” (Sonnenfield 2009, 372).

Ecological modernization began as “**essentially a political program**” (Mol and Jänicke 2009, 18) and remains **geared toward** influencing policy (Mol, Sonnenfield, and Spaargaren 2009, 11). That this perspective **might be popular in a world where those in power suggest capitalism will solve the climate crisis** it created is not surprising. Ecological modernization theorists themselves have represented the significance of their ideas via the extent to which **they share the perspective of** those in power, and by the taming of the environmental movement, which was forced into an establishment mold (Spaargaren and Mol 2009, 72–75).

Though it integrates popular assumptions, the ecological modernization perspective actually **is in conflict with** over a hundred years **of sociological and ecological analyses** (starting with that of the classical theorists, like Marx and Weber, and early energy scholars developing the study thermodynamics). This insidious perspective also is in conflict with the founding principles of environmental sociology, based on the New Ecological Paradigm, which include “recognition of: (1) limits to growth, (2) nonanthropocentrism, (3) fragility of nature’s balance, (4) untenability of exemptionalism, and (5) ecological crisis” (Foster 2012). Therefore, Foster (2012) refers to the ecological modernization perspective as the new exemptionalism and the third stage of denialism **hindering necessary and urgent scientific development and change**:

The third stage of denial has the look and feel of greater realism, but actually constitutes a more desperate and dangerous response. It admits that capitalism is the problem, but also **contends that capitalism is the solution**. This general approach emphasizes what is variously referred to as "sustainable capitalism," "natural capitalism," "climate capitalism," "green capitalism," etc. In this view we can continue down the same road of capital accumulation, mounting profits, and exponential economic growth -- while at the same time miraculously reducing our burdens on the planetary environment. It is business as usual, but with greater efficiency and greater accounting of environmental costs. (Foster 2011a)

Ecological modernization is a way then to **avoid** any significant challenge **to the status quo**. Because of this it **ignores the** seriousness **and** scale **of ecological degradation** (York and Rosa 2003), but also **the inequalities** necessarily embedded **in the social relations of capitalism**. There is no real gender, race, class, or any kind of social justice analysis there, **even if justice is mentioned in passing** in their work (usually in response previous criticisms).

Despite all of these problems, the penetration of the assumptions undergirding this perspective is clear in the sociology of energy and climate change. The conscious and unconscious adoption of the main tenets of the modernization framework stands out in the sociology articles published since the boom in climate change research starting in 2005. A key term search in Sociological Abstracts of the 1,734 peer-reviewed articles published since 2005 with “climate change” or “energy” in the title yields the following results: many more mention technology (424), technological change (96), alternative energy (110), or renewable energy (160) than mention energy conservation (120), economic growth (96), or capitalism (35). Shockingly, only 22 mention inequality and only 9 equality.

**The blinders imposed by** perspectives such as **ecological modernization** in the sociological work on energy and climate change, and broader environmental sociological theory, means that

environmental sociology today is therefore faced with a double challenge, emanating both from without and within: developing means to combat the planetary rift, and confronting the new exemptionalism, which threatens to overthrow environmental sociology as a critical tradition. With respect to the latter challenge, the problem is to be found **not in the concept of ecological modernization itself,** which is obviously useful in limited contexts, and reflects real-world processes, but rather the elevation of ecological modernization **into an overall environmental theory resurrecting the basic postulates of human exemptionalism**. (Foster 2012)

This makes the theoretical perspective proposed in this thesis all the more important **and** urgent, for the sociology of energy and for environmental sociology as a whole. Because the sociology of energy is taking off, **the climate crisis is only worsening, and** new scholars **are being trained en masse,** it is a crucial moment **in the theoretical development** of what will now be sustained sociological attention to energy. As bad as things are, they are only expected to get worse. Energy increasingly will be forced onto the broader sociological agenda (Dunlap 2010; Webler and Tuler 2010). **If energy justice is not** at the heart of the sociology of energy that takes root, our formulations will necessarily **impose blinders that make it** impossible to understand**, or** propose meaningful changes **to address, the interpenetrating depredations of social inequality and environmental destruction** associated with the modern energy regime.

### warming

#### Warming’s irreversible

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Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse gases increased over the course of the 20th century due to human activities. The human-caused increases in these gases are the primary forcing that accounts for much of the global warming of the past fifty years, with carbon dioxide being the most important single radiative forcing agent (1). Recent studies have shown that the human-caused warming linked to carbon dioxide is nearly irreversible for more than 1,000 y, even if emissions of the gas were to cease entirely (2–5). The importance of the ocean in taking up heat and slowing the response of the climate system to radiative forcing changes has been noted in many studies (e.g., refs. 6 and 7). The key role of the ocean’s thermal lag has also been highlighted by recent approaches to proposed metrics for comparing the warming of different greenhouse gases (8, 9). Among the observations attesting to the importance of these effects are those showing that climate changes caused by transient volcanic aerosol loading persist for more than 5 y (7, 10), and a portion can be expected to last more than a century in the ocean (11–13); clearly these signals persist far longer than the radiative forcing decay timescale of about 12–18 mo for the volcanic aerosol (14, 15). Thus the observed climate response to volcanic events suggests that some persistence of climate change should be expected even for quite short-lived radiative forcing perturbations. It follows that the climate changes induced by short-lived anthropogenic greenhouse gases such as methane or hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) may not decrease in concert with decreases in concentration if the anthropogenic emissions of those gases were to be eliminated. In this paper, our primary goal is to show how different processes and timescales contribute to determining how long the climate changes due to various greenhouse gases could be expected to remain if anthropogenic emissions were to cease. Advances in modeling have led to improved AtmosphereOcean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) as well as to Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs). Although a detailed representation of the climate system changes on regional scales can only be provided by AOGCMs, the simpler EMICs have been shown to be useful, particularly to examine phenomena on a global average basis. In this work, we use the Bern 2.5CC EMIC (see Materials and Methods and SI Text), which has been extensively intercompared to other EMICs and to complex AOGCMs (3, 4). It should be noted that, although the Bern 2.5CC EMIC includes a representation of the surface and deep ocean, it does not include processes such as ice sheet losses or changes in the Earth’s albedo linked to evolution of vegetation. However, it is noteworthy that this EMIC, although parameterized and simplified, includes 14 levels in the ocean; further, its global ocean heat uptake and climate sensitivity are near the mean of available complex models, and its computed timescales for uptake of tracers into the ocean have been shown to compare well to observations (16). A recent study (17) explored the response of one AOGCM to a sudden stop of all forcing, and the Bern 2.5CC EMIC shows broad similarities in computed warming to that study (see Fig. S1), although there are also differences in detail. The climate sensitivity (which characterizes the long-term absolute warming response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations) is 3 °C for the model used here. Our results should be considered illustrative and exploratory rather than fully quantitative given the limitations of the EMIC and the uncertainties in climate sensitivity. Results One Illustrative Scenario to 2050. In the absence of mitigation policy, concentrations of the three major greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide can be expected to increase in this century. If emissions were to cease, anthropogenic CO2 would be removed from the atmosphere by a series of processes operating at different timescales (18). Over timescales of decades, both the land and upper ocean are important sinks. Over centuries to millennia, deep oceanic processes become dominant and are controlled by relatively well-understood physics and chemistry that provide broad consistency across models (see, for example, Fig. S2 showing how the removal of a pulse of carbon compares across a range of models). About 20% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon **remains in the atmosphere for** many **thousands of years** (with a range across models including the Bern 2.5CC model being about 19 4% at year 1000 after a pulse emission; see ref. 19), until much slower weathering processes affect the carbonate balance in the ocean (e.g., ref. 18). Models with stronger carbon/climate feedbacks than the one considered here could display larger and more persistent warmings due to both CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases, through reduced land and ocean uptake of carbon in a warmer world. Here our focus is not on the strength of carbon/climate feedbacks that can lead to differences in the carbon concentration decay, but rather on the factors that control the climate response to a given decay. The removal processes of other anthropogenic gases including methane and nitrous oxide are much more simply described by exponential decay constants of about 10 and 114 y, respectively (1), due mainly to known chemical reactions in the atmosphere. In this illustrative study, we do not include the feedback of changes in methane upon its own lifetime (20). We also do not account for potential interactions between CO2 and other gases, such as the production of carbon dioxide from methane oxidation (21), or changes to the carbon cycle through, e.g., methane/ozone chemistry (22). Fig. 1 shows the computed future global warming contributions for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide for a midrange scenario (23) of projected future anthropogenic emissions of these gases to 2050. Radiative forcings for all three of these gases, and their spectral overlaps, are represented in this work using the expressions assessed in ref. 24. In 2050, the anthropogenic emissions are stopped entirely for illustration purposes. The figure shows nearly irreversible warming for at least 1,000 y due to the imposed carbon dioxide increases, as in previous work. **All published studies to date**, which use multiple EMICs and one AOGCM, show largely irreversible warming due to future carbon dioxide increases (to within about 0.5 °C) on a timescale of at least 1,000 y (3–5, 25, 26). Fig. 1 shows that the calculated future warmings due to anthropogenic CH4 and N2O also persist notably longer than the lifetimes of these gases. The figure illustrates that emissions of key non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as CH4 or N2O could lead to warming that both temporarily exceeds a given stabilization target (e.g., 2 °C as proposed by the G8 group of nations and in the Copenhagen goals) and remains present longer than the gas lifetimes even if emissions were to cease. A number of recent studies have underscored the important point that reductions of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions are an approach that can indeed reverse some past climate changes (e.g., ref. 27). Understanding how quickly such reversal could happen and why is an important policy and science question. Fig. 1 implies that the use of policy measures to reduce emissions of short-lived gases will be less effective as a rapid climate mitigation strategy than would be thought if based only upon the gas lifetime. Fig. 2 illustrates the factors influencing the warming contributions of each gas for the test case in Fig. 1 in more detail, by showing normalized values (relative to one at their peaks) of the warming along with the radiative forcings and concentrations of CO2 , N2O, and CH4 . For example, about two-thirds of the calculated warming due to N2O is still present 114 y (one atmospheric lifetime) after emissions are halted, despite the fact that its excess concentration and associated radiative forcing at that time has dropped to about one-third of the peak value.

#### No extinction – empirically denied

**Carter 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CMarc%5CDesktop%5CSurviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

**Apocalyptic rhetoric on climate change draws on religious Salvationism to justify violent Final Solutions -- this narrative of global suffering as the comeuppance for human evil is the ultimate form of hubris -- the World is resilient**

**Brinsmead 8**-[Robert, “Apocalyptic and Climate Change Alarmism,” August 2008, <http://www.bobbrinsmead.com/e_apocalyptic.html>, DKP]

**Apocalyptic has a 100% failure rate.** Yet the question is raised whether climate change apocalyptic might be the one awful instance when apocalyptic proves to be right - like the boy who repeatedly cried “Wolf!” Apocalyptic takes its name from an aberrant form of Judaism that developed around 200 B.C. It prevailed until the bar Cochba revolt in 135 C.E. That was when it finally managed to destroy itself in an ill-conceived “end-time” conflict with the Romans. After this, Rabbinic Judaism pronounced a curse on any Jew who persisted with apocalyptic. Scholars of apocalyptic literature and apocalyptic movements recognize that this development within Judaism was the classical form of apocalyptic, providing a kind of paradigm for other apocalyptic movements right down to our day, including especially America’s religious Right, Marxism and Environmentalism. Apocalyptic has been called “a theology [or a world view] of despair,” meaning that it is an outlook that has lost faith in the historical process. After Judaism had been ruled by one great power after another (Babylon, Persia, Greece and Syria), it lost faith that its aspirations for independent statehood under its own Davidic king would take place within the ordinary historical process. It therefore focused on a very bloody “end-time” solution that would terminate the ordinary historical process. The hallmark of apocalyptic is to see the world getting worse and worse – whether that is the ruling powers getting worse and worse (Jewish apocalyptic), humanity getting worse and worse (Christian apocalyptic), capitalist society getting worse and worse (Marxist apocalyptic), or the environment getting worse and worse (Greenpeace-style apocalyptic). In the case of the apocalyptic Zealots within Judaism, (if I may borrow some striking imagery from Albert Schweitzer) they threw themselves on the wheel of history in a last desperate effort to make it turn. The wheel turned, but it crushed them rather than ending Greco-Roman civilization and the historical process. **With its 100% failure rate, apocalyptic movements illustrate one thing that apocalyptic environmentalism is yet to learn: it is people who are fragile, not the world with its historical process. Its climate change alarmism is just another form of Salvationism - in this case the salvation of a supposedly fragile earth that is about to be destroyed by human activity**. When even school children are being conscripted to play a role in “saving the planet” by doing good little deeds like cutting back on water and [energy consumption](http://www.bobbrinsmead.com/e_apocalyptic.html), planting trees and riding bikes instead of using cars, we may see how far this apocalyptic salvationism has penetrated the popular culture. Suppose we ask a good geologist such as Professor Ian Plimer to tell us, especially in the context of the current global warming panic, whether the earth is so fragile that it calls for human efforts to save it. Plimer has already given his published answer, and it is almost like a snort of derision. In *The Past is the Key to the Present*, Plimer says: “For at least the last 2500 Ma, the continents have been pulled apart and stitched back together. Every time the continents are pulled apart, huge quantities of volcanic H2O, CO2 and CH4 are released into the atmosphere and greenhouse conditions prevail. When continents stitch together, mountain ranges form. Mountains are stripped of soils, new soils form and remove CO2 from the atmosphere, these soils are stripped from the land and the CO2 becomes locked in sediments on the ocean floor. When atmospheric CO2 is low, glaciation occurs. Large climate cycles can be related to plate tectonics.” (The full [paper](http://www.bobbrinsmead.com/e_apocalyptic.html) may be viewed at [www.climatechangeissues.com/files/science/Plimer.doc](http://www.climatechangeissues.com/files/science/Plimer.doc) ) Plimer goes on like this for page after page, portraying planet earth being pelted and pummelled with asteroids, intense global volcanism, mass extinctions, great ice ages, inter-glacial periods much warmer than our present “five minutes” of global warming, enormous sea-level changes, variations in atmospheric carbon dioxide from 6% to our present 0.037% and lower. In short**, a planet that has survived what planet earth has survived for 4.5 billion years is anything but fragile.** Plimer has also said that he wrote *A Short History of Planet Earth* because he “was inspired by a Greenpeace banner which read ‘Stop Climate Change.’ To stop climate change, one must stop supernova eruptions, solar flaring, sunspots, orbital wobbles, meteorites, comets, life, mountain building, erosion, weathering, sedimentation, continental drift, volcanoes, ocean currents, tides and ice armadas – no mean feat, even for Greenpeace!” [www.smedg.org.au/plimer0701.html](http://www.smedg.org.au/plimer0701.html) Whether the earth, including its climate system, is fragile or resilient goes to the heart of the climate change debate. The kind of world view that we bring to the debate determines how the facts about C02 and the climate are interpreted. For instance, if in discussion with a climate alarmist you point out that CO2 represents only 3.6% of all greenhouse gases, and that humans produce only about 3% of all CO2 emissions, you may then make the point that the human contribution is only 0. 18% - not much more than 1 part in a 1000 of all greenhouse gases. If anyone quibbles on the exact percentages here, you can double the human contribution and it is still comes out a very tiny number in the whole greenhouse equation. When the warming alarmists are confronted with these facts, they must resort to the argument that the climate is so finely tuned and earth’s systems are so fragile that this small human contribution – a human burp in a thunderstorm when compared with the vast natural greenhouse emitters - will cause a catastrophic tipping point in the earth’s fragile climate system. There is no danger that this super-tough, resilient old planet will not be able to take a bit of extra CO2 in its stride as it has repeatedly done in its past history anyway. So much for the myth of the fragile earth! **It is also a dangerous myth because like all apocalyptic myths it has the capacity to hurt people.** The policies being advocated by the climate change alarmists call for drastic economic and social changes, and they won’t be satisfied until they have destroyed civilization as we know it. If climate apocalyptic goes the way of all apocalyptic in being impatient and intolerant, no changes are going to be rapid enough or severe enough to inaugurate its post-industrial age. It will therefore throw itself on the wheel of history to force it to turn. We should already know the outcome.

### grid

Their chemical industry impact is nonsensical – cross-x

Scheer assumes total transition – and all our K links prove that their tech gets manipulated for bad means

Disease

**Extinction impossible and ahistorical**

**Posner 5** (Richard A., Judge U.S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, Professor Chicago School of Law, January 1, 2005, Skeptic, Altadena, CA, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but **none has come close** to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of **limited lethality**; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time. That the human race has not yet been destroyed by germs created or made more lethal by modern science, as distinct from completely natural disease agents such as the flu and AIDS viruses, is even less reassuring. We haven't had these products long enough to be able to infer survivability from our experience with them. A recent study suggests that as immunity to smallpox declines because people am no longer being vaccinated against it, monkeypox may evolve into "a successful human pathogen," (9) yet one that vaccination against smallpox would provide at least some protection against; and even before the discovery of the smallpox vaccine, smallpox did not wipe out the human race. What is new is the possibility that science, bypassing evolution, will enable monkeypox to be "juiced up" through gene splicing into a far more lethal pathogen than smallpox ever was.

**Intervening action solves—SARS proves**

**Nishiura 5** (H Nishiura Bangkok School of Tropical Medicine, Mahidol University,Thailand , K Patanarapelert, M Sriprom, W Sarakorn, S Sriyab , Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Mahidol University and I Ming Tang Institute of Science and Technology for Research and Development, Mahidol University “EVIDENCE BASED PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY AND PRACTICE Modelling potential responses to severe acute respiratory syndrome in Japan: the role of initial attack size, precaution, and quarantine” http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Modelling\_Potential\_Responses\_to\_Sev ere\_Acute\_Respiratory\_Syndrome\_in\_Japan.pdf August 29, 2005)

There has been an intensive assessment of the different public health interventions that contributed substantially to the eventual curtailing of the epidemic in Hong Kong.27 It is well known that an effective strategy requires aggressive public health measures in combination with stringent hospital infection control practices that meet the recommendations of World Health Organisation.29 30 The SARS pandemic has shown that governments and public health officials need to consider the use of quarantine as a public health tool to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, particularly when other preventive interventions (for example, vaccines and antibiotics) are unavailable.31 From our study, it is shown that either 100% effective precautionary measures or quarantine would lead to decline in the incidence. Both of them reduce R0 in a linear way unlike the practice of isolation. The importance in the coverage should be therefore emphasised. Although recent studies with modelling14 15 provided us with dynamics of SARS including transmissibility as well as the impact of quarantine and isolation, the role of precautionary steps was not taken into consideration. Precautionary measures themselves are quite important especially in hospital settings because a high proportion of the SARS patients were healthcare workers as was pointed out.

### china

**No impact to the Chinese economy and the response measures check**

Coonan 08 (10/25, Clifford, IrishTimes.com, “China's stalling boom has globe worried,” http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2008/1025/1224838827729.html)

All of this downbeat news feeds into a growing suspicion that China has had its cake and eaten for way too long, and that there is simply no precedent for a country growing and growing without some kind of respite. Establishing what that pause will look like and what it means to the rest of the world is the latest challenge facing global analysts. A hangover is considered inevitable and the Olympics, while meaningless economically, are widely considered the psychological trigger for China to face a slowdown. Despite all this gloom, however, writing China off is premature. The Beijing government is well placed to help protect the economy from the worst ravages of a global downturn. It has spent the last two years trying to fight inflation and cool the overheating economy, so it's a lot easier for it to take the foot off the brakes than it is to put them on in the first place. The central bank has lowered its benchmark interest rate twice in the past two months, the first time in six years. The State Council is increasing spending on infrastructure, offering tax rebates for exporters and allowing state-controlled prices for agricultural products to rise. Expect significant measures to kick-start the property market to avoid house prices falling too drastically. China has a lot of plus points to help out. Chinese banks did not issue subprime loans as a rule, and the country's €1.43 trillion in hard-currency reserves is a useful war chest to call on in a downturn*.* The currency is stable and there are high liquidity levels, all of which give China the most flexibility in the world to fend off the impact of the global financial crisis, says JP Morgan economist Frank Gong. China is now a globalised economy, but its domestic market is still massively underexploited, and it is to this market that the government will most likely turn. While it is a globalised economy committed to the WTO, China is also a centralised economy run by the Communist Party, and it has no real political opposition at home to stop it acting however it sees fit to stop sliding growth. Should the economy start to worsen significantly, public anger will increase, but China has been so successful in keeping a tight leash on the internet and the media that it is difficult for opposition to organise itself in a meaningful way. Recent years of surging growth in China have certainly done a lot to keep global economic data looking rosy, but perhaps China's influence has been somewhat oversold*.* It is not a big enough economy by itself to keep the global economy ticking over, accounting for 5 per cent of the world economy, compared to the United States with a muscular 28 per cent. And whatever about slowing growth, 9 per cent is still an admirable rate, one that European leaders gathered this weekend in Beijing for the Asian-Europe Meeting would give their eye teeth to be able to present to their constituencies.

**Their attempt to describe China as an objective threat arrogantly presumes that China exists as an object that can be known. This pseudoscientific description of Chinese hostility only reifies the justifications for violent American containment strategies that result in a self-fulfilling prophecy**

Chengxin **Pan, 2004** (Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, June-July 2004 v29 i3 p305(27), The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics)

China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics.

**Their form of politics translates into a policymaking of aggressive containment that culminates in war**

Chengxin **Pan, 2004** (Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, June-July 2004 v29 i3 p305(27), The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics)

Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88) Given the danger and high stakes involved, some may wonder why China did not simply cooperate so that there would be no need for U.S. "containment." To some extent, China has been cooperative. For example, Beijing was at pains to calm a disgruntled Chinese public by explaining that the U.S. "sorry" letter issued at the end of the spy-plane incident was a genuine "apology," with U.S. officials openly rejecting that interpretation. On the Taiwan question, China has dropped many of its previous demands (such as "one China" being defined as the People's Republic). As to the South China Sea, China has allowed the ASEAN Regional Forum to seek a negotiated solution to the Spratly Islands dispute and also agreed to join the Philippines as cochairs of the working group on confidence-building measures. (89) In January 2002, China chose to play down an incident that a presidential jet outfitted in the United States had been crammed with sophisticated satellite-operated bugs, a decision that, as the New York Times puts it, "illustrates the depth of China's current commitment to cultivating better relations with the United States." (90) Also, over the years, China has ratified a number of key nonproliferation treaties and pledged not to assist countries in developing missiles with ranges that exceed the limits established under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). More recently, China has collaborated with the United States in the war on terrorism, including issuing new regulations to restrict the export of missile technology to countries usually accused by the United States of aiding terrorists. Indeed, as some have argued, by any reasonable measure China is now more responsible in international affairs than at any time since 1949. (91) And yet, the real problem is that, so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough. For instance, Iain Johnston views the constructive development of China's arms-control policy as a kind of "realpolitik adaptation," rather than "genuine learning." (92) From this perspective, however China has changed, it would remain a fundamentally threatening other, which the United States cannot live with but has to take full control of. I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely.

## 2NC – Neolib

### 2nc neolib ov v2

#### Social justice outweighs – structural violence explains proximate causes – psychologically ingrains genocidal tendencies into humanity which is the root of escalation in warfare – ethics demands a neg ballot

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “**little” violences** produced in the **structures**, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the **ease** with which humans are capable of **reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons** and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “**invisible” genocides** not because they are secreted away or **hidden from view**, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a **genocidal capacity** among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive **hypervigilance** to the less dramatic, **permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible** (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which **mass violence and genocide** are born, it is **ingrained** in the **common sense of everyday social life**. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “**priming**” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push **social consensus** toward **devaluing** certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### Your role as an educator is to promote social justice – it’s the only path towards alleviating structural inequalities – any link is a reason to vote neg for ethics

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(Jan, “Social justice in education today”, Acta Academica 2011: 43(1), dml)

4. Accept the geo-historical context of the struggle as something that must be reconciled with attempts to create social justice. This implies that the state must work with communities to repair damaged solidarities by reconciling autonomy and interdependence (Giddens 1991). This also **implies the abolishment of structural forms of oppression** that restrict peoples’ access to resources and opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities or capabilities for living a decent human life (Young 2002). In doing so care must be taken not to create new forms of exclusion **that will**, in turn, create new forms **of social injustice**. Similarly, it must ensure fairness in terms of rewards. One cannot reward state officials with considerable bonuses when they are failing to deliver the social services intended to create a just society. Justice is done when each member of an organisation receives a reward equivalent to the contribution s/he makes (Rawls 1971, Miller 1999). **This** also applies to education. **One cannot reward a child if no contribution was forthcoming**. For example, One cannot promote a child to the next grade automatically if s/he did not participate in the educational process on an equal basis with others.

4. Conclusion

A theory of social justice in education **is essential**. Brighouse (2002: 181) states that until recently there was no theory of justice in education and that one cannot simply read a theory off from Rawls, Young, Giddens, or any other author. This article critically reviewed a number of theories that could inform such a theory of social justice in education. It argued that **social justice is** an ideal – a vision that **must become** a way of life that permeates all aspects of being human. For this reason it cannot be legislated or achieved by means of international conventions or declarations – albeit important instruments to promote social justice; **social justice must be** lived. It requires that every citizen **must take the responsibility to** protect**,** advance **and** promote **the values, principles and ideals of social justice**. The road to achieving this is, however, obstructed by geo-historical and scarcity challenges confronting developing countries. These challenges and their negative impact on achieving social justice in education **must be addressed** in an ordered and well-structured manner without creating new forms of social injustice. **As long as poverty, unemployment and high levels of violence exist, there** cannot be social justice. This is the real challenge and it is a journey on which all developing countries and their people must embark. In Long walk to freedom Nelson Mandela (1994a: 751) asserts:

Some say that (the liberation of the oppressed and the oppressor) has now been achieved. But I know that **that is not the case**. The truth is that we are not yet free: we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed. We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is **not merely to cast off one’s chains**, but to live in a way **that** respects **and** enhances **the freedom of others**.

### 2nc fw

#### Implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency – our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

[GREEN]

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic **policy decisions** ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) **are isolated** from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and **treated as matters of** technocratic design and **implementation**, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. **In the process, democratic participation** in ¶ decision-making **is either limited to an already** highly-**commodified**, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral **politics**, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a **highly reductionist notion** of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. **By** treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately **trying to insulate policy-making from** ¶ popular **politics** and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is ¶ itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second ¶ caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being ¶ removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being ¶ insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes **exposed to the “distortions” of** a ¶ politics of **rent-seeking and speculation**—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the ¶ Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a ¶ bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among ¶ themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries ¶ (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount ¶ of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, ¶ however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal ¶ reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), ¶ private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government ¶ control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago ¶ schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even ¶ though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as ¶ in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of ¶ the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern ¶ the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to ¶ health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable **shift from** rights-based policymaking forged through public **deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on** ¶ economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of **technocratic calculation**. In this ¶ regard, as noted above, the **treatment of subjectivity** solely in behaviorist terms of economic ¶ incentives **functions as the key conceptual choice** that makes the technocratization of public ¶ policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ¶ ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of ¶ neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

#### Shifting our decisionmaking criteria is sufficient and a coherent political strategy that spills over

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The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

#### We enrich energy discussion – their framework masks over oppression, is epistemologically bankrupt, and causes serial policy failure

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(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

Linking our knowledge of social and ecological crises creates a basis for **an approach to energy that is** sociologically coherent **(recognizing** systemic injustices **and** power inequalities) and ecologically grounded. Recent work towards making such links may be found in systems ecology and in broader environmental sociological theory, in particular, the theory of the ecological rift, feminist ecology, and the environmental justice literature. Scholars from each of these latter perspectives have called for **more integrated theory in environmental sociology**, with greater attention given to the relationship between injustice and ecological degradation (Pellow 2000, 2007; Salleh 2009; Foster, York, and Clark 2010). Coming out of the natural sciences, systems ecologist and energy scholar Howard T. Odum also went to significant lengths to unite social and ecological science, with a focus on the urgent need for society at one and the same time to address environmental inequalities and restore the earth’s systems, disrupted as a result of capitalism’s growth (Odum 2007). Odum worked to overcome the nature/society dualism highlighted as a theoretical weakness in sociology by feminist ecologists, among others, by bringing economy and ecology under a unified ecological analysis. My goal is to put these theoretical developments in a context in which they can **complement one another and informs the ongoing development of the critical sociology of energy**.

The ecological rift: A framework for synthesis

Feminist ecologist Ariel Salleh (2010) highlighted that we remain in need of developing an integrated ecosocial analysis that recognizes the primary importance of “reproductive activities and regenerative provisioning” and includes “inputs by class, race, and sex-gendered others” (213, 215). Salleh sees the basis for an integrated theoretical approach in the ecological rift analysis emerging from Marxist sociology:

Climate change, biodiversity loss, and social precarity are each results of capitalist overproduction. In responding to this globalizing overshoot, **activists need a** materialist analysis **of social relations**, as well as a materialism that engages ecological processes. The dialectical tools of Marxist sociology already offer a basis for such a synthesis, but it remains a big ask for wider publics, because Eurocentric convention splits economics and ecology apart. (205)

The ecological rift framework, **which integrates** social**,** economic**, and** ecological **analysis, also puts** social justice **at its center**. Because it adopts an **openly emancipatory framework**, in ecological and social terms, it is an instance of “strong reflexivity” in theory, characterized by **a** critical distance **from the status quo that makes it possible to** question everything (Foster, Clark, and York 2010, 305). This separates it from approaches characterized by what feminist standpoint theorists refer to as examples of “weak objectivity” that “attempt to separate the positive from the normative” (305). **Objectivity**, the way it is sometimes understood, **is** never possible **in this society** “because science is **a socially embedded and often an elitist activity**, such exclusion of values is impossible” (305). Not acknowledging this reality results in social science that **unreflexively adopts the master perspective, therefore often reflecting the** conceptual limits **of the dominant ideology**.

**Absent “strong reflexivity**” on the part of social science, **it is** impossible **to see the ways** in which “our ontological concepts of nature are often **bound to systems of oppression**” (305). Strong reflexivity in environmental social science demands adopting the vantage point of those deemed “Others” and a basis in critical ecology (306). Such reflexivity is at the heart of the ecological rift perspective. It thus builds on the best classical work and at the same time is **part of the development of critical approaches** in environmental sociology, such as critical human ecology, feminist ecology, and environmental justice, that break down disciplinary boundaries and make a contemporary, critical sociology of energy, with **energy justice** at its core, possible.

### 2nc perm

#### The perm fails—ad hoc reconfiguration of your relation to neolib undermines critical thinking—the alt alone is the only conceptually coherent approach—this also proves they cede the political through expertism and the logic of fungibility and competition

[GREEN]

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When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) **replaces critical thinking** about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process,¶ [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over¶ physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of¶ existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically¶ and technologically unassailable.¶ **Triumphant Energy Capitalism**¶Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to¶ market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just¶ as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical¶ preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005)¶ are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and¶ increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the¶ current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen¶ the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic¶ growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged¶ to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives¶ that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that¶ willingly invests in its own perpetuation.¶ While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the¶ conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings,¶ there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is¶ faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables-based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a¶ redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources¶ are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project,¶ according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of¶ growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional¶ energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel¶ capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference¶ with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature.¶ In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet¶ about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of¶ energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such¶ steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does¶ it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might¶ jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the¶ movement’s quest?¶ **Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse**¶After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy¶ futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of¶ governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new¶ technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector¶ and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics¶ 21¶ in which¶ the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high¶ technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities,¶ contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere.¶ Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition¶ (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy¶ and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”¶ Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is¶ important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the¶ two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of¶ more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a¶ sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy¶ visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal¶ of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological¶ marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start¶ the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and¶ social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree¶ to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.¶ 22¶ Nothing is said¶ on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be.¶ If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct,¶ then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of¶ acquiescence to things as they are. Building an **inquiry into energy as a social**¶ **project will require** the recovery of a **critical voice that can interrogate**, rather¶ than concede, **the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and**¶ capitalist **political economy**. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate¶ an energy-society order in which **energy systems evolve in response to social**¶ **values** and goals, **and not simply according** to the dictates of technique,¶ **prices**, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability¶ camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is¶ non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources¶ need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage¶ the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent¶ possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the¶ global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy¶ services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to¶ between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance¶ of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed¶ professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the¶ life-world of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to¶ design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life.¶ Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot¶ overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe¶ of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism¶ are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965:¶ 52) explained why **the democratic-authoritarian bargain** and Western capitalism **should be rejected:**¶God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the¶ West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today¶ keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, **it would strip the world bare** like locusts. Unless the capitalists of¶ India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and¶ by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of¶ the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or¶ being destroyed by them.¶ As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric¶ light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places¶ efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social¶ problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our¶ political-economic problem.¶ The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

### 2nc poverty down

#### We control uniqueness—inequality is high and rising

**Pogge 2011** – PhD, Director of the Global Justice Program and Leitner Professor of Philosophy and International Affairs at Yale University (12/7, Thomas, Financial Task Force, “Endless Poverty Is A Human Rights Failure”, http://www.financialtaskforce.org/2011/12/07/endless-poverty-is-a-human-rights-failure/, WEA)

Contrary to much official rhetoric, these problems are not being overcome. The number of chronically undernourished people, for instance, has risen since the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome where the world’s governments promised to halve it by 2015. Reported at 788 million in 1996, this number has in 2009 broken above 1 billion for the first time in human history.

A key driver of the persistence of severe poverty is rising global inequality. While the top five percent of the world’s population increased its share of global household income from 42.9 to 46.4 percent in the 1988–2005 period, the share of the poorest quarter declined by a third from 1.16 to 0.78 percent — despite all the development assistance.[1] Clearly, and unsurprisingly, the rules of the world economy are better aligned with the interests of the world’s affluent than with those of the poor.

The Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development has been analyzing and fighting some important structural injustices in our global financial system, calling attention, for instance, to how corporate tax evasion in developing countries is facilitated through lax accounting standards for multinational corporations. Since they are not required to do country-by-country reporting, such corporations can easily manipulate transfer prices among their subsidiaries to concentrate their profits where they are taxed the least. As a result, they may report little to no profits in the countries in which they extract, manufacture or sell goods or services, having their worldwide profits taxed instead in some tax haven where they only have a paper presence. Task Force member Global Financial Integrity (GFI) estimates that, during the 2000–2008 time period, trade mispricing deprived developing countries of US$382.6 – US$405 billion per annum.

Even more important, as seen over the last year, existing rules have allowed banks to accept for private depositfunds from public officials in developing countries. The funds found stashed by Gaddafi in various accounts exceed the annual GDP of Libya and are clearly proceeds of corruption. This type of complicity could easily be avoided: banks are already under strict reporting requirements with regard to funds suspected of being related to terrorism or drug trafficking. Yet many banks still eagerly accept and manage embezzled funds — and legally so, with secrecy laws ensuring that their banks remain attractive for such illicit deposits. GFI estimates that developing countries have lost an average of $342- 404.7 billion annually during the 2000–2008 period due to leakages via bankingsystems—more than four times the amount they have received in official development assistance. The impact of this financial drain on the livelihood of the poor is magnified by the effects of corruption on the quality of governance.

### 2nc neolib good

#### Neolib engenders its own crises – pure focus on production and consumption makes solutions to structural inequalities impossible – their failure to recognize social injustices created by capital dooms solvency and naturalizes exploitative structures – only the critique accesses root cause – this evidence is the bee’s knees – oh also their authors are all bought off, reject them

**Holleman 12** – Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Oregon

(Hannah, “ENERGY JUSTICE AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIOLOGY OF ENERGY”, <http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/12419/1/Holleman_oregon_0171A_10410.pdf>, dml)

The current version of capitalist ideology, which **absorbs energy scholars** (and even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, **was** consciously shaped **to co-opt the language of social movements** seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). **There can be no acknowledgement of** slavery**,** racism**,** sexism**, or** ecological destruction among other issues, because **all of these undermine the** basic thesis neoliberal writers actively promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present capitalism as **raising all boats**, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization” (Pellow 2007, 41). **The blinders imposed by this view** continue to infect energy studies despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus **becomes the solution for poverty** associated with inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights in existing critical work on energy, they **provide an alternative approach** to energy that belies **the notion that “there is no alternative.”** They share a common commitment, as social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual **class and racial inequalities** around the global and between North and South **have only worsened in the past half-century**—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction “**are intimately linked** because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that basically **allow business to** continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus **are reluctant to break with capitalism as a system**, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, **internalizing** more of the world in **the market system is a** total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing the internalities.” **This is an** ecological **and** social **imperative**.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-thannothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must be found at every turn and **crises represent** especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It is a system geared toward **profit at all cost and can have** no rational response. The problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first place. **The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of** real alternatives**, and understand ourselves as subjects**, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

## 1NR – Time Image

### 2nc time image ov

**Debate serves the social function as a performative machine erecting lived Worlds upon a Time-Image. Whereas the 1AC reads Apocalypse through a Time-Image of mainstream newspaper and academic hermeneutics to suggest a world emptied of humanity, our argument is that such a notion is the creation of a historically Eurocentric Time-Image which views extinction as the only alternative to Western domination. Our role of the ballot is to unpack the social history of the 1AC thereby reading affirmative possibility into apocalyptic events. This social engagement is a prerequiste for understanding present events**

**Hall '9** John R, Professor of Sociology at UC Davis "Apocalypse in the Long Run: Reflections on Huge Comparisons in the Study of Modernity"

**Words matter, but they are unstable in both their meanings and the things to which they refer.** From this, it is possible to unfold central challenges concerning historical comparisons meant to link sociological understandings of past and present. In *Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity (2009), I confront a series of* such challenges. As the booss subtitle indicates, **Apocalypse offers a history of the apocalyptic in the longue durée, over a period of some 3500 years, that is, since the emergence of the so-called axial civilizations and religions in the ancient Middle East, and in a way that connects to the seeming antithesis of the apocalyptic 6 modernity. Until recently, most academics relegated the Apocalypse to the realm of prophetic visions that served as grist for cartoons** in The New Yorker. Even today, historical sociologists who study revolutions, social movements, work, bureaucracies, or families might not grant equivalent analytic status to the apocalyptic. Even if they did, central problems would remain, notably, how to salvage comparative sociological analysis in the face of slack relationships between popular uses of apocalyptic language and the seemingly ephemeral things to which they are said to refer. Surely, to study the apocalyptic in the long run is to enter a hermeneutic house of bedlam. **Yet recent mainstream invocations of the apocalyptic (for example, in The New York Times) suggest that we are already in that hermeneutic house. The question, then, is how to make sense of this (for us) historically unprecedented situation. What I will call 'the apocalyptic' encompasses a broad range of beliefs, actions, and social processes centered on cultural disjunctures concerned with 'the end of the world** and thereafter. As the meaning of the ancient Greek word apokalyptein suggests, an apocalyptic crisis is marked by 'disclosure. In ways that people often read the Bibless New Testament, disclosure means 'revelation of Godss will, purpose, or plan, either through prophecy or in events themselves. However, apocalypse can be shifted out of its typically religious register by noting that apocalyptic texts usually are not about the End, but about the Present Crisis. Ordinarily, the culture of an established social order, especially its religious legitimations, screens off everyday life from the harsh light of ultimate reality (Berger 1967: chap. 2). However, sometimes powerful, seemingly uncontrollable forces envelop collective social experience. **Apocalypse as disclosure unveils aspects of the human condition or present historical moment that pierce the protective screen, just as a loved oness death proves traumatic for those who survive, but on a wider scale. Previously taken-for-granted understandings of 'how things are' break down. Historically new possibilities are revealed, awesome enough to undermine normal perceptions of reality for those involved, thereby leading people to act in unprecedented ways, outside their everyday routines**. Sociologically, then, apocalypse encompasses more than the end time of Godss final judgment, or some absolute and final battle of Armageddon. **Rather than the actual end of the world, the apocalypse is typically 'the end of the world as we know it', an extreme social and cultural disjuncture in which dramatic events reshape the relations of many individuals at once to history. If the apocalyptic is construed in these terms, might it be analyzed like any other sociohistorical phenomenon? My central thesis is that studying the apocalypse brings to the fore in a distilled way central problems about whether and how historical/comparative sociology can contribute to understanding connections and parallels between past and present. Indeed, studying the apocalypse unexpectedly alters our terms for engaging in comparative and historical sociology more generally, and for understanding modernity.**

### 2nc try or die

**Predictions about cause and reaction to events constructed through the complex social systems of international politics are almost by definition worthless**

**Bernstein et al '0** Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber**,** *University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley***.** “*God Gave Physics the Easy Problems”* European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet **the most relaxed** 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states - **are close to trivial**, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that **the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought**, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for *predictive* theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. *Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model* Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about *trillions* of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often **impossible** to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of **polarity**, relative power and the **balance of power** are among the most widely used independent variables, **but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures** for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of **deterrence outcomes**, and about the criteria for **democratic** **governance** and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is **not merely the result of** intellectual anarchy or **sloppiness** - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, **it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves.** Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on **'idealizations'**, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but **implicit 'theories'** about actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). **If** problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we **would still find it** difficult, if not **impossible, to construct large enough samples** of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the **variation across time and the complexity of the interaction** among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory **extraordinarily low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. **Even when all the underlying conditions are present**, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors.** Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing** what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it **very hard to access that information reliably** and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; **that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs.** We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the **values** and **behavioral repertories** of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality.

Law-like relationships - even if they existed - could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. *Any* regularities would be 'soft'; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded *Overcoming Physics Envy* The conception of **causality** on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this - given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in **closed** **systems**. Open systems can be influenced by **external** **stimuli**, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this *a priori* from the causal statement itself. Nor will **complete** **knowledge** (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily **allow us to project its future course of development.** In a practical sense, **all social systems** (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). **As physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible**. The risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theorytesting' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5

**Voting negative inverts the prioritization of offense and defense -- if we prove that any one of their scenarios are implausible then you should assign the entire aff zero risk and vote for the status quo**

**Armstrong and Green ‘7** Scott, Professor of Economics at UPenn’s Wharton School of Business, Kesten, Business and Economic Forecasting Unit, Monash University, Australia “GLOBAL WARMING: FORECASTS BY SCIENTISTS

VERSUS SCIENTIFIC FORECASTS” *Energy & Environment* · Vol. 18, No. 7+8, 2007

http://www.forecastingprinciples.com/files/WarmAudit31.pdf

**Research on forecasting has been conducted since the 1930s. Empirical studies that compare methods in order to determine which ones provide the most accurate forecasts in specified situations are the most useful source of evidence.** Findings, along with the evidence, were first summarized in Armstrong (1978, 1985). **In the mid- 1990s, the Forecasting Principles Project was established with the objective of summarizing all useful knowledge about forecasting. The knowledge was codified as evidence-based principles, or condition-action statements, in order to provide guidance on which methods to use when.** The project led to the *Principles of Forecasting* handbook (Armstrong 2001): the work of 40 internationally-known experts on forecasting methods and 123 reviewers who were also leading experts on forecasting methods. The summarizing process alone required a four-year effort. The forecasting principles are easy to find: They are freely available on forecastingprinciples.com, a site sponsored by the International Institute of Forecasters. The Forecasting Principles site has been at the top of the list of sites in Internet searches for “forecasting” for many years. **A summary of the principles, currently numbering 140, is provided as a checklist in the Forecasting Audit software available on the site. The site is often updated in order to incorporate new evidence on forecasting as it comes to hand.** A recent review of new evidence on some of the key principles was published in Armstrong (2006). There is no other source that provides evidence-based forecasting principles. The strength of evidence is different for different principles, for example some principles are based on common sense or received wisdom. Such principles are included when there is no contrary evidence. Other principles have some empirical support, while 31 are strongly supported by empirical evidence. **Many of the principles go beyond common sense, and some are counter-intuitive. As a result, those who forecast in ignorance of the forecasting research literature are unlikely to produce useful predictions. Here are some well-established principles that apply to long-term forecasts for complex situations where the causal factors are subject to uncertainty** (as with climate): • ***Unaided judgmental forecasts by experts have no value.*****This applies whether the opinions are expressed in words, spreadsheets, or mathematical models. It applies regardless of how much scientific evidence is possessed by the experts. Among the reasons for this are: a) Complexity: People cannot assess complex relationships through unaided observations. b) Coincidence: People confuse correlation with causation. c) Feedback: People making judgmental predictions typically do not receive unambiguous feedback they can use to improve their forecasting. d) Bias: People have difficulty in obtaining or using evidence that contradicts their initial beliefs. This problem is especially serious for people who view themselves as experts.** • *Agreement among experts is weakly related to accuracy*. This is especially true when the experts communicate with one another and when they work together to solve problems, as is the case with the IPCC process. • *Complex models (those involving nonlinearities and interactions) harm accuracy because their errors multiply.* Ascher (1978), refers to the Club of Rome’s 1972 forecasts where, unaware of the research on forecasting, the developers proudly proclaimed, “in our model about 100,000 relationships are stored in the computer.” Complex models also tend to fit random variations in historical data well, with the consequence that they forecast poorly and lead to misleading conclusions about the uncertainty of the outcome. Finally, when complex models are developed there are many opportunities for errors and the complexity means the errors are difficult to find. Craig, Gadgil, and Koomey (2002) came to similar conclusions in their review of long-term energy forecasts for the US that were made between 1950 and 1980. • *Given even modest uncertainty, prediction intervals are enormous*. Prediction intervals (ranges outside which outcomes are unlikely to fall) expand rapidly as time horizons increase, for example, so that one is faced with enormous intervals even when trying to forecast a straightforward thing such as automobile sales for General Motors over the next five years. • ***When there is uncertainty in forecasting, forecasts should be conservative*. Uncertainty arises when data contain measurement errors, when the series are unstable, when knowledge about the direction of relationships is uncertain, and when a forecast depends upon forecasts of related (causal) variables. For example, forecasts of no change were found to be more accurate than trend forecasts for annual sales when there was substantial uncertainty in the trend lines (Schnaars and Bavuso 1986). This principle also implies that forecasts should revert to long-term trends when such trends have been firmly established, do not waver, and there are no firm reasons to suggest that they will change. Finally, trends should be damped toward no-change as the forecast horizon increases.**

### 2nc apocalypticism good

**The repetition and litany of catastrophe in the 1ac numb us to real danger and misdirect political energy from meaningful social change**

**Davidson, '0** BioScience 50(5):433-440. 2000 Economic Growth and the Environment:Alternatives to the Limits Paradigm CARLOS DAVIDSON Carlos Davidson is a conservation biologist with a background in economics. He is currently studying landscape-scale patterns of amphibian decline in California in the Section of Evolution and Ecology, University of California, Davis

Is the limits metaphor a politically useful way to conceptualize environmental problems? If someone thinks that there is a cliff ahead in the road, she tells the driver, “There's a cliff.” If that is not sufficient, she says, “It is a big cliff and we all are going to die if we go over.” The limits approach assumes that “if only people understood” (i.e., saw the cliff and how big it is), they would stop their environmentally destructive practices (put on the brakes). After all, if the car crashes, everyone dies. All sane people are assumed to share a common interest in preventing a crash. The hope is that the existence and recognition of ecological limits external to society will force society to stop destructive practices. The limits perspective leads people to focus on pointing out limits and to emphasize the catastrophe that awaits if the limits are transgressed. As a consequence, writing about environmental degradation often has an apocalyptic tone. Environmentalists have often predicted impending catastrophes (e.g., oil depletion, absolute food shortages and mass starvation, or biological collapse). **This catastrophism is ultimately damaging to the cause of environmental protection. First, predictions of catastrophe, like the boy who cries wolf, at first motivate people's concern, but when the threat repeatedly turns out to be less severe than predicted, people ignore future warnings**. Secondly, the belief in impending catastrophe has in the past led some environmentalists to support withholding food and medical aid to poor nations (Hardin 1972), forced sterilization (Ehrlich 1968), and other repressive measures. Not only are these positions repulsive from a social justice perspective, they **also misdirect energy away from real solutions**. And, by blaming poor and third world people for global environmental problems, these views have tended to limit support for environmentalism to the affluent in the first world. Fortunately, environmentalists of widely differing political perspectives, including some leading limits thinkers, now see alleviating human misery and poverty as essential to solving global environmental problems (Athanasiou 1996, Daily and Ehrlich 1996, Ehrlich 1997). In addition to recognizing the need to address poverty and inequality, recent limits writing has reduced its focus on catastrophe. Historically, the limits metaphor has been part of a broader environmental and social analysis developed by authors such as Donella and Dennis Meadows, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, and Herman Daly. I refer to this broader analysis as the limits perspective. By focusing on aggregate quantities of natural resources, consumption, and population, the limits perspective depoliticizes our understanding of environmental destruction. What we consume, how much we consume, and how goods are produced are all political decisions that change over time and vary from country to country. Yet in the limits perspective, consumption and production technology are seen as more or less fixed, and significant social change is not even considered a possibility. In the most simplistic analyses, human population growth becomes the only variable in explaining environmental destruction. Similarly, many biologists who write on environmental issues erroneously apply the concept of carrying capacity to human society, and as a result ignore the social and political aspects of resource use. In animal populations, carrying capacity is the maximum population that can be sustained on the available resources in a given area. For human societies, however, carrying capacity has no real meaning unless consumption, technology, and a whole host of social variables are set at fixed levels (Cohen 1995). Viewing technology, consumption, and all social variables as fixed is implicit in the limits perspective, yet these variables are key to understanding the problem (Cohen 1995). For this reason, a recent high-profile statement of the limits perspective (Arrow et al. 1995) suggests moving away from the use of the carrying capacity concept.The environmental destruction that is decried by the limits perspective is often real, even if it does not result from a transgressed limit, but there is something missing from this perspective. **The focus on the cliff and catastrophe means that important political questions are often not asked: Why are we driving so fast?** Who benefits from driving in this manner? Who has the right to decide how we drive and why? What views and beliefs support the current arrangements? Who benefits least from the current arrangements and might support change?

**No possibility of link-turn -- even if debating existential risk is good, using it as a starting point for political discussion poisons the well and hamstrings policy innovation. Reject the politics of scare-tactics as a conservative trap**

**Nordhaus & Shellenberger '7** (Ted and Michael, Managing Directors of American Environics, A social values research and strategy firm, *Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility*, pg. 187, Print)

In America, the political left and political right have conspired to create a culture and politics of victimization, and all the benefits of resentment and cynicism have accrued to the right. That’s because **resentment and apocalypse are weapons that can be used only to advance a politics of resentment and apocalypse. They are the weapons of the reactionary and the conservative — of people who fear and resist the future**. Just as environmentalists believe they can create a great ecological politics out of apocalypse, liberals believe they can create a great progressive politics out of resentment; they cannot. **Grievance and victimization make us smaller and less generous and can thus serve only reactionaries and conservatives.** As liberals and environmentalists lost political power, they abandoned a politics of the strong, aspiring, and fulfilled for a politics of the weak, aggrieved, and resentful. The unique circumstances of the Great Depression — a dramatic, collective, and public fall from prosperity — are not being repeated today, nor are they likely to be repeated anytime soon. Today’s reality of insecure affluence is a very different burden. **It is time for us to draw a new fault line through American political life, one that divides those dedicated to a politics of resentment, limits, and victimization from those dedicated to a politics of gratitude, possibility, and overcoming.** The challenge for American liberals and environmentalists isn’t to convince the American people that they are poor, insecure, and low status but rather the opposite: to speak to their wealth, security, and high status. It is this posture that motivates our higher aspirations for fulfillment. **The way to get insecure Americans to embrace** an expansive, generous, and **progressive politics** **is not to tell them they are weak but rather to point out all the ways in which they are strong.**

### 2nc perm

**Compromise only re-invites Apocalyptic blackmail --** our world has ended -- we cannot even speak your language any longer -- the only thing left is to cut open teleology itself, to expose that this torture trapped in the image of thought must be contested with every splinter of our broken selves. Only by suspending the End question as a starting point for politics can we resist their weakness of thought

**Thomas '2** Robert, Lecturer on Humanities, San Francisco State University, "Remnants of the World: Agamben and Messianic Affect" Published in *Crossings*, *Special Issue: The Uses of Religion*, (No.5/6, 2002/2003):

269 - 295 http://www.gestures.org/remnants.pdf

One of the final works that the artist, writer, and activist David Wojnarowicz ever created, **“Untitled, 1992”** (Gelatin-silver print and silk-screened text, 38 X 26”), **features an image of a pair of broken and bandaged hands, with an accompanying text** that was originally recorded, in slightly different form, in his final diary entry dated August 1, 1991.66 The text, in red, laid over the black and white image of broken and bandaged hands reads: **Sometimes I come to hate people because they can’t see where I am**. I’ve gone empty, completely empty and all they see is the visual form: my arms and legs, my face, my height and posture, the sounds that come from my throat. But I’m fucking empty. **The person I was just one year ago no longer exists; drifts spinning slowly into the ether somewhere way back there. I’m a xerox of my former self. I can’t abstract my own dying any longer. I am a stranger to others and to myself and I refuse to pretend that I have history attached to my heels**. I am glass, clear empty glass. **I see the world spinning behind and through me. I see casualness and mundane effects of gesture made by constant populations. I look familiar but I am a complete stranger being mistaken for my former selves. I am a stranger and I am moving**. I am moving on two legs, soon to be on all fours. I am no longer animal vegetable or mineral. I am no longer made of circuits or discs. I am no longer coded and deciphered. I am all emptiness and futility. **I am an empty stranger, a carbon copy of my form. I can no longer find what I am looking for outside myself. It doesn’t exist out there.** Maybe it’s only in here, inside my head. **But my head is glass and my eyes have stopped being cameras, the tape has run out and nobody’s words can touch me. No gesture can touch me. I’ve been dropped into all of this from another world and I can’t speak your language any longer**. See the signs I try to make with my hands and fingers. See the vague movements of my lips among the sheets. I’m a blank spot in a hectic civilization. I’m a dark spot in the air that dissipates without notice. I feel like a window, maybe a broken window. I am a glass human. I am a glass human disappearing in rain. I am standing among all of you waiving my invisible arms and hands. I am shouting my invisible words. I am getting so weary. I am growing tired. I am waiving to you from here. I am crawling and looking for the aperture of complete and final emptiness. I am vibrating in isolation among you. I am screaming but it comes out like pieces of clear ice. I am signaling that the volume of all of this is too high. **I am waving. I am waving my hands. I am disappearing. I am disappearing but not fast enough**. Wojnarowicz was bedridden from December of 1991 until his death from an AIDS related illness in July of 1992, so this is one of the last works he created. Perhaps this image and its accompanying text need to be read along with the “final” works of Foucault, Deleuze, and Benjamin, per Agamben’s project, in *Homo Sacer* (as a Messianic moment), particularly with regard to the questions of subjectivity it raises. The image and text are startling in what they evoke: Wojnarowicz’s hands, his body, his potential to touch other bodies and the world, to encounter anything at all—including, perhaps, his “self”—has become completely broken. **What *remains* of the world may be**, perhaps, **our failed encounter with it—and not,** let us hope, **any final or, teleological end to the world, to thought itself. The idea that the world really is ending, that thought and politics are no longer possible, needs to be resisted** (insofar as this exposes the radical separation accomplished by the exception). But this resistance should not be at the expense of an immanent subjectivity that remains immersed in a world that, for it, really is at an end precisely because there is no possibility of working on the questions I am raising here, due both to the contraction of time in everyday life, and the radical separation of potentiality from itself. It is in this dual sense that the “end of the world” must be suspended: we cannot allow the realization of any such teleological “end” to happen. **The latter experience of the “end,” as a subjective experience of the outside and the political as that which is broken, has, for far too long now, been “policed” by an abyssal thought of exteriority placed, ironically, in the service of the former “end.” It is time to begin the work of suspending both of these “ends.”** The reception of *Homo Sacer* in the U.S. is instructive in this respect. The reaction to the thought of the exception (particularly among theorists of radical exteriority) is most unfortunate (and something, as Agamben’s own work suggests, we should take note of and learn from). But, rather than dwell on the negativity of this experience (which, as a graduate student, I can only describe as extreme), **perhaps it would be more productive for us to think the “loss” of the eternal return, the “end of the world,” as a failure, an error, that we can now begin to inhabit as thought.** When I was first formulating my thoughts along these lines, I mentioned my work to a colleague and his response was one of complete horror. “That leaves us,” he said, “with absolutely nothing.” Perhaps from the preceding exposition one can gather that I beg to differ. It may be that we, as theorists working at the end of the 20th and the birth of the 21st century, never “had” anything to begin with (at least with respect to the thought of the return as a theory of the world—a thought which may be wholly inadequate to the period of time, *after* World War II, in which it emerged as a popular current of thought). Maybe the very idea that we actually “had” something with any of our lines of thought contributed to this failure to see and experience something that was happening all around us (the exception). And with it, a failure to see a prior limit on the important work that we have expounded so much energy on over the past 30 years. In other words, maybe **it is time for us to inhabit our own failure of thought, which may be the weakness of all thought in the face of the exception. Perhaps, this weakness of thought, this failure to “know” what it is that we are thinking and doing at any given moment, will open up lines of thought that we had previously not considered**. It’s just a thought.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)