**All the other cards are the same as other debates so here are the relevant new ones**

**salvation is an attempt to become One before the moment of subtraction, whereas we position an ethos of exuberance towards Nothingness**

**Land '12** Nick, former Lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University, *Fanged Noumena* ed. Ray Brassier and Robin Mackay "Shamanic Nietzche" in *Nietzsche: A Critical Reader* 1993

The death of God is a religious event - a transgression, experiment in damnation, and stroke of antitheistic warfare - but this is not to say it is preeminently a crime. **Hell has no interest in our debauched moral currency.** To confuse reactive dabblings in sin with expeditions in damnation is Christian superficiality; the Dantean error of imagining that one could earn oneself an excursion in Hell, as if the infernal too was a matter of justice. **Our crimes are mere stumblings on the path to ruin; just as every projected *Hell on Earth* is a strict exemplar of idolatry. Transgression is not criminal action, but tragic fate; the intersection of an economically programmed apocalypse with the religious antihistory of poetry. It is the inevitable occurrence of impossibility**, which is not the same as death, but neither is it essentially different. This ambivalence responds to that of death 'itself', which is not ontological but labrynthine: a relapse of composition that is absolute to discontinuity, yet is nothing at the level of immanence. **The very individuality that would condition the possibility of a proprietary death could only be achieved if death were impossible. One dies because discontinuity is never realized, but this means that there is never 'one' who dies. Instead there is an unthinkable communication with zero, immanence, or the sacred. 'There is no feeling that throws one into exuberance with greater force than that of nothingness.** But **exuberance** is not at all annihilation; it is the surpassing of the shattered attitude, it **is transgression'**. (Bataille, *Oevres*)

**ignorant of Nothingness, any knowledge hubristically collapses under its own self-congratulatory incompleteness. if the 1ar cannot interpret the void then you should reject all their knowledge claims and vote neg on presumption**

**Heidegger '67** William V. Spanos “The Question of Philosophy and *Poiesis* in the Posthistorical Age: Thinking/Imagining the Shadow of Metaphysics” boundary 2 / Spring 2000, citing

 Heidegger, ‘‘What Is Metaphysics?’’ in Basic Writings, 95–96

‘What is remarkable is that, precisely in the way scientific man secures to himself what is most properly his, he speaks of something different. **What** [according to science] **should be examined are beings only, and besides that— nothing; beings alone**, and further—nothing; solely beings and beyond that —nothing. **What about this nothing?** . . . **The nothing—what else can it be for science but an outrage and a phantasm? If science is right, then only one thing is sure: science wishes to know nothing of the nothing.’**

**their attempt to resist the void within our performance is precisely our link argument -- true poetry unstrings words from sense. the 1ac is a ruin, the best we can aspire to is a delerium**

**Land '12** Nick, former Lecturer in Continental Philosophy at Warwick University, *Fanged Noumena* ed. Ray Brassier and Robin Mackay "Shamanic Nietzche" in *Nietzsche: A Critical Reader*1993

**Yes, the poet must be a visionary. The East knows a true lucidity, but to be an inheritor of the West is to hack through jungles of indiscipline, devoured by vile ands and words unstrung from sense, until the dripping foliage of delerium opens out onto a space of comprehensive ruin. This has never been understood, nor can it be. The foulness of our fate only deepens with the centuries, as the tracts of insanity sprawl. From bodies gnawed by tropical fevers we can swim out through collapse to inexistence forever, destined for Undo.**

#### Learning this lesson is a pre-requisite to policy relevance---speaker credibility is infinitely more important in the policy environment

**Branson 2007** (Josh, edebate, http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2007-May/071122.html, 5/31)

I wrote about this at length back when we were arguing about the Harrison card, so I won’t rehash all that stuff again. But I will say that this was, for me, one of the two biggest differences between debate and the “real” policy arena. Copley News Service (I don’t mean to overly focus on that card, it’s just the most obvious example) and its ilk routinely pass for pretty much 100% credible evidence in debates, where it is completely useless in the policy world.

I’ve been wondering for a while how serious this issue is…and I think that it’s fairly serious. Debate trains us as debaters and coaches to look for a certain type of evidence (see Antonucci’s quite elegant explanation of my thoughts on this matter: evidence that contains simple and easy-to-consume analogies, flamboyant claims, simple and direct rhetorical claims etc), and at least for me, I’ve found myself falling into that trap when doing CSIS work this year at times.

When debaters read academic journals or law reviews in debates, they quickly skip over all the ‘background’ and ‘history’ and much of the grunt legwork that underlines all the final substantive claims of the article, jumping to the conclusions of each section. We want conclusions listed with a succinct summary of each warrant, so that it’s easy to read quickly, simply explained, and rhetorically direct.

This really hit me hard this year, when working on things that I thought I was already pretty damn knowledgeable about---nuclear weapons. I went into the year thinking I was going to be God’s gift to the nonprolif department, because ‘none of these people have had debate, so they won’t really understand all the nonprolif issues as well as I do, no matter how much expertise they may have.’

Well, that’s not the way it worked at all, at least for me. No doubt in a collegiate debate judged by one of ya’ll I could have killed them all on the Pan K, probably even if we talked slow, but in the real world, I was kind of surprised to find that the knowledge generated by debate proved to be fairly damn cursory and artificial. I could rattle off a list of most of the arguments for/against most of the general nonproliferation doctrines, but a lot of the empirical and factual basis for these arguments was completely missing in my brain. I could make the basic claim for almost anything in the field, but the technical issues that underlines a lot of them (the names and locations of the Russian CW destruction plants, an understanding of how the fine points of the budget process works, how a capital market sanction would actually be implemented, where did we get our intelligence that revealed Chinese serial proliferators selling bombs to AQ Khan, how does a centrifuge cascade work and why exactly would multilateral sanctions undermine Iran’s ability to get uranium gas piping technology, the names of the key players in the various foreign governments that make nonproliferation policy etc) was all missing.

**The plan justification implies a pinioned open-ness to an undoomed future as a good which we can always never afford -- it is this economical open-ness that a negative ballot makes sacrificial to the Outside**

**Negarestani ‘8** Reza, philosopher, artist “cyclonopedia: complicity with anonymous materials” p.195-199

In the mid-eighties, before succumbing to his petromantic nympholepsy, Hamid Parsani re-addresses his book, Defacing the Ancient Persia, as a guide to strategic openness (which, he insists, is the enduring concern of the Middle East). Following his analysis of the Aryanistic holocaust and its relationship with the genealogy of monotheism, the book indeed can be read as a syncretic approach to a broad array of communications and modes of living in the Middle East, an openness with a polytical edge, as he emphasizes: ‘It **[openness] is certainly not made for social dynamics or lifestyles instrumentalized within liberal societies. Openness is what turns the very body of the free world upside down throughout human history — if, of course, we assume that the free world has ever been more than a mere institution of a more tolerable regime or religion**,’ Parsani writes in his later notes on Defacing the Ancient Persia. The book had already been tagged by hostile critics as ‘a maximalist and verbose treatise about everything except Persia, informed by every discipline except archeology’ and hailed by a few disciples as ‘the obligatory reference book for traveling to the Middle East’. In any case, it is more than a misreading to take Parsani’s Defacing the Ancient Persia for a mere collection of phenomenal discoveries and theories. As Parsani himself confesses, his book pursues an awkward dissection of the conundrum of openness in the Middle East’.34
If the so-called despotic institutions of the Middle East have survived liberalism, and have grown stronger instead of being shattered into miserable pieces long ago, it is because **openness can never be extracted from the inside of the system or through a mere voluntary or subjective desire for being open.** Openness can never be communicated by liberalism (not to mention the free world’).
According to his critics, Parsani’s re-reading of Defacing the Ancient Persia aims to remobilize its already fleshed-out topics on the current Tellurian Dynamics with the fluid efficiency of petroleum’ (Parsani’s phrase). For Parsani, however, this process of re-writing (or reinterpretation’, according to critics) had the virtue of gathering all of his inquiries under the enigma of openness:
It seems to me that so-called middle-eastern life, more than anything else, suggests a communication dynamics, and is an answer to the enigma of openness rather than being a contemporary orientalist lifestyle with a political or humanist edge.
**In the light of Parsani’s references to ‘the enigma of openness’, the Hyperstition team decided to question and reinvestigate its early notes on openness in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s politics of becoming. However, this time the reading was not conducted on wholly philosophical grounds but rather against a new background, that of the mess-hysteria of Parsani’s works — a textual sketch resistant to any high-octane philosophical psychosis.** In this way, Parsani’s works could be hammered out new edges and relevancies.
In Defacing the Ancient Persia**, human history is an experimental research process in designing and establishing modes of openness to the outside. Openness is not ultimately, so to speak, the affair of humans, but rather the affair of the outside — everything minus the human, even the human’s own body.** But openness is not only associated with human history. Parsani argues that the Earth, as the arch-puppeteer and occult-manipulator of planetary events, has a far more sophisticated openness of its own. **If the human is the subject of openness or the one who opens himself to his outside, then the Earth is ‘the inside-out subject’ of human openness.** Undoubtedly, human openness is full of twists. This includes social openness, gender communications, and openness between populations and governments of the contemporary world, whether cultural or petrological. Parsani shows **that human openness has a strategic and twisted spirit for which every communication is a tactic and every openness is a strategy to be unfolded.** If this is the case, then the Earth must enjoy a womb-dark and an ocean-deep scheme — if not conspiracy — in its openness and communications with both organisms and its solar outside. It is difficult to study the politics, culture and economy of the world without questioning its issues and concerns regarding the ethics of openness. Middle-eastern studies would be impossible without the question of openness. (Anush Sarchisian
in her comments on Defacing the Ancient Persia, 1994)
**Openness comes from the Outside, not the other way around. Nietzschean affirmation was never intended to support liberation or even to be about openness at all. It was an invocation of the outside, in its exteriority to the human and even to the human’s openness (which includes desires for being open to the outside).** Radical openness has nothing to do with the cancelation of closure; it is a matter of terminating all traces of parsimony and grotesque domestication that exist in so-called emancipatory human openness. The blade of radical openness thirsts to butcher economical openness, or any openness constructed on the affordability of both the subject and its environment. The target of radical openness is not closure but economical openness. **Radical openness devours all economic and political grounds based on ‘being open’.
Affirmation does not attain openness to the world but maintains closure progressively through the grotesque domestications of economical openness. On the first level of its operation, affirmation advocates ‘being open to’ as an anthropomorphic and regulated mode of openness; it renders everything more affordable, more economically open and more purposeful. Affirmation is initially involved with the manipulation of the boundaries (of systems) whose machinery is based on transforming openness into an instance of affordability, turning economic openness into a survival economy. Economical openness is not about how much one can be open to the outside, but about how much one can afford the outside**. Therefore, openness, in this sense, is intrinsically tied to survival. The survival economy, in the same vein, is the realization of all manifestations of communication as the prolonging of survival; affordability in all its forms guarantees survival.

**Life itself is exterior to the act of survival -- the only ethical act is to affirm the present tense as a form of nourishment for the Unworld**

**Negarestani ‘8** Reza, philosopher, artist “cyclonopedia: complicity with anonymous materials” p.210-213

**The problematic of Life can be superficially — if not ironically — embraced by posing this question: Generally, we believe that life makes survival possible; but if life is the source of living then why do we need to survive? If life is the so-called vital source, then why is the act of living as an appropriation and a survivalist regulation necessary? Why is survival possible, or do we need to survive if life is already a source of living? Once we realize that the ethics of life is external to that of survival, and that survival is a resistance to the epidemic and overpowering presence of life, then we can say that to be pro-life is to be essentially anti-survival.** Yet more grievously, when it comes to the exteriority of life to the living being, survival is intrinsically impossible.
In the third chapter of his book, Parsani suggests that the Aryans who settled on the Iran plateau were exceptionally flexible in regard to their environment. Flexibility was the central element of the circumspect politics of the
**Aryans, both for survival and for keeping their genetic purity intact; the two most crucial objectives which led them to migrate and spread along a long path from Asia to Europe. It was not, in fact, their desire for peace that continually pushed the Aryans to be open to new people — especially the original populations of the regions they occupied — but fear of their doom, monomania for noble perfectionist purity and monopolistic hygiene.** The Aryans’ obsession for exclusion had to be pursued by any means possible, even by selective and controlled inclusion of other populations. For the Aryans everything took place at the edge of survival and purity — a purity which had to be maintained through closure as an carefully appropriated and regulated openness’, a flexible but severely restricted and economical openness whose limits are mapped by affordance and dynamic capacity: I am open to you as long as I can afford you and what you bring for me.
The most effective way to survive and to save the purging purity of the race — to live unpolluted — was to blend in with the crowd. This was the Aryan stratagem. However, it proved to be a total misadventure for the Aryans who settled on the Iran plateau: They made themselves open to the sorcerous popuation of the plateau for whom everything was external to survival. For this population, unlike the Aryans, openness was effectuated as the exteriorization of life to survival, a silent aggression against survival from within. **When you open the door for someone, anyone can come in; and once they enter, they unlock doors of their own. Following the Aryans’ stratagem, Cyrus 11(550-530 BC) would be able to expand the Persian Empire with no real obstacle, except for the northern nomads who fiercely resisted the outbreak of this new soft domination. Cyrus conquered Babylonia (Babel) and Egypt, and many other territories, one after another, attached them to his still-larval empire whose growth was dangerously rapid.** This new empire tried to assimilate the whole of Asia, Africa and Europe by the single formula of initial conflict followed by peace with the enemy — after conquering their land — by believing in their beliefs and affirming their request to be free in the realm of Aryans’. The people living on the Iran plateau before the Aryans arrived were adept sorcerers and necromancers. **For them, life’ was not survival, nor was survival identified with ‘evading death’. Survival was not a reactionary process to (Un) life, nor a temporary anthropomorphic escape out of which death’s inevitability rises. Death unfolds through the process of live-ing or survival from the outset to the end as a predestined necrocratic regime. Survival presupposes death from the beginning; so-called actual death is merely the eventuation of the real death, or the impossibility of survival in affording the exteriority of life. The course of living or survival is where death not only becomes a terminus-event but a propulsive and conducting power which starts to work even before one begins to live (death becomes the director of one’s life).** **The ethos of survival or vitalism is necrocracy. For the sorcerous crowd of the pre-Aryan lran plateau, survival was not supposed to hold death back as long as possible but to feed the (Un)life. For them, survival and the scrabbling will to survive were sorcerous rituals to feed the Outside, to feed what is external to ‘so-called life as live-ing’, an occult practice for feeding the avatars of the Outside. Living was itself a feeding project, and survival in general was a strategy, the most pragmatic polytics for engaging the Outside**. They believed that survival fed an unthinkable Abomination, an ultimate outsider which their Zoroastrian descendants called Druj. The longer you endure, the more you feed the Outside (interlocking with the outside on the plane of strategy). In the Avestan language of ancient Persia, Druj — from a Sanskrit origin — meant blackening, the chaotic aspects of falsity, fraud and strategy. The idea of ritual as a communion with this openness, then, developed the pragmatics of a new survival system practically and religiously conscious of its own repression and the exteriority of life.

#### It also turns their impact---repetition of impact inflation serves as the catalyst for accelerating warfare

**Willcox, 05** – PhD University of Kent (David R. *PROPAGANDA, THE PRESS AND CONFLICT*, http://potsdam.yorex.org/sites/potsdam.yorex.org/files/propaganda%20and%20press.pdf)

Media technology advances do not only affect the perception of conflict. Changes in the nature of warfare have also altered both the ability to cover war and the style in which it is reported. The First and Second World Wars presented a fight for national survival not evident in later twentieth-century conflicts involving British armed forces. The post1945 Cold War era, whereby a bipolar ideological conflict defined the nature of hostilities, has been surpassed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even during the relatively short time span between the Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict, it is evident that different military, political and ideological incentives for justifying entry into hostilities have formed. Furthermore, once conflict has begun its nature is also susceptible to change. The Gulf War eventually required a decisive ground offensive, a move initially deemed unimaginable in some early press reports. The Kosovo Conflict was fought from the air alone, shattering the widely held assumptions that the successful outcome of such conflicts was not militarily viable. To add further differentials, Kosovo operations were fought under NATO command unlike the US-led forces in the Gulf War. In these respects, the nature of a conflict introduces a further variable into the influences affecting media coverage of hostilities. The character of conflict has shifted in focus away from massed military formations attempting to utilize tactical equilibrium to sustain international peace, as during the Cold War. Instead, British, and usually American, operations have predominantly begun to **rely** up**on technological superiority** to inflict defeat with the minimum of risk to Western forces. Such developments **affect the way** in which **conflict is presented to and accepted** by an audience. In essence, as Michael Ignatieff argues, this movement has brought about the development of a concept of **virtual war**. 7 Western publics are shielded from the reality of hostilities by sanitized news coverage and by a sanitized version of combat in which only the enemy appears to suffer greatly. This suffering, however, is not portrayed in human terms comparable with Western losses. The enemy is **dehumanized through propaganda** and the destruction deemed acceptable whereas public opinion constrains the acceptable number of Western casualties. Modern technology enables the presentation of conflict in a computerized style, both distorting the reality of war and lending itself to presentation using visual media. With an increased military specialization and reliance on the high-tech, it is becoming harder for journalists to comprehend fully the military hardware being used. Difficulties in understanding the technology employed are compounded by media constraints that hinder the number of reporters permanently employed to cover specific areas, such as defence. Society then further compounds the gap between civilian and military comprehension as an absence of any formal military experience in many cases exacerbates this lack of military understanding. The problem of non-specialized knowledge of defence issues is best illustrated by the Daily Mail’s coverage of the Gulf War. Owing to visa difficulties, it was necessary to send Richard Kay, their Royal Correspondent, to cover the events in the Gulf. The lack of an established worldwide network of reporters in distinct locations can in turn lead to accusations of erratic selection of newsworthy items. In an environment **where media coverage appears to be operating at saturation level**, there is a temptation to believe in the concept that coverage should be all encompassing. Yet, the existing contemporary academic and popular debates have **stressed the commercial demands imposed on the press**. Coverage of events often appears erratic, presenting the modern world as chaotic, without structure, and prone to sudden international flashpoints. This is caused, according to Philip Taylor, by the media’s random approach to selecting newsworthy items. Taylor explains: [O]ther people’s war appear to erupt from nowhere on our **t**ele**v**ision screens until the crisis subsides, and the media lose interest. The causes and consequences of those crises rarely command media attention. This leaves the impression of a chaotic and turbulent world when, in reality, **there is an ‘order’ functioning in the** invisible **background** of daily global life. But order is hardly newsworthy. It is the crises, the coups, the famines, the earthquakes, which make the headlines. 8 Newspapers are event driven and cover conflict only as long as it remains an asset to the commercial and entertainment value of the media product. Events sell papers and keeping Newspapers, the reporter and the wider context 23reporters on location to cover unfolding stories methodically wastes resources and fails to warrant column inches. This argument is not confined to newspapers and appears consistent with commentary concerning the wider media. As Nik Gowing of BBC World explains, ‘the response of news organisations at all levels has become increasingly variable and unpredictable…a crisis in one part of the world can easily be viewed elsewhere as irrelevant’. 9 However, to suggest this is a new phenomenon is somewhat misleading. While it is necessary to stress the erratic appearance of news reportage one must not assume that this is a significantly new development. The piecemeal representation of events, filtered through editorial processes and the limitations of time and space, is merely the continuation of a traditional approach to journalism. The perception that this issue is greater in the modern era stems from the plethora of news sources available to the public. Greater coverage does not necessarily equate to broader or more in-depth appreciation of world events. When events do appear on the news agenda the surprise is exacerbated simply by the belief that news should be more comprehensive, rather than the actual reality of the nature of coverage.