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#### Energy production excludes ANY conversion or transformation process – limited to extraction

Energici (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February 2012 “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

#### Violation – the plan affects only the secondary forms of energy production

#### That’s a voter –

#### First, Limits – Secondary production is an catch-all category – explodes the literature base

Kim Woodard (Research Assistant at the Resource Systems Institute of the East-West Center, Chairman and CEO of Javelin Investments) 1980 “The International Energy Relations of China” p. 457

Secondary energy production can most easily be defined as the conversion of one energy fuel to another. As such, it is a catch-all category that can be used to provide a cluster of statistical energy production series that do not easily fall into either primary production or energy consumption categories. The number and variety of secondary energy production statistics could be multiplied indefinitely by an ever sharper differentiation of substages in the flow of energy commodities through society. I have chosen co include just a few forms of secondary energy production in this analysis—coke production, thermal electric power generation, total electric power generation, total refined petroleum production, the differentiated production of petroleum fuels, plant use of energy in energy production, and the use of hydrocarbons in the production of petrochemical and fertilizer feedstocks. These were statistics that were available for the Chinese case or could be generated by inference from primary energy data and a few oversimplified assumptions. All the secondary energy production statistics presented in this section were generated by the computer and then rounded to a reasonable level of approximation. All the statistics presented for various forms of secondary energy production are general estimates, and none have been tested directly against whatever data exist in the Chinese press. Validation of the statistics would require separate in-depth analysis of each secondary energy production industry—a task far beyond the means of this book. These statistics, therefore, should be taken as a point of reference, not the final word.

#### Second, Precision - Separating primary and secondary forms of energy is key to overall energy policy – precision outweighs

Sara Øvergaard (Senior Executive Officer in the Department on Energy Statistics at Statistics Norway) September 2008 “Issue paper: Definition of primary and secondary energy” <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/londongroup/meeting13/LG13_12a.pdf>

The ability to separate primary and secondary energy is important in energy statistics. The Energy Balance is set up to record the flow of new energy entering the system of national energy supply, its transformation and losses until end use. To avoid double counting, it is important to be able to separate new energy entering the system, (primary) and the energy that is transformed within the system (secondary). Internationally agreed definitions on primary and secondary energy are therefore important in order to compare Energy Balances. A consistent differentiation between primary and secondary energy is also useful in energy planning when developing long-range policies and for energy analysts who are concerned with broader energy or environmental issues, such as conversion losses, transmission losses, distribution, energy efficiency measures and carbon emissions from energy sources. When defining primary and secondary energy, it is important that the definition is operational and founded on the laws of physics. The definitions must be operational, meaning that it should be helpful for statisticians enabling them to make a clear and consistent division between primary and secondary energy based on information about the sources that the energy is embodied in and the processes that it has been part of. The definition of primary and secondary energy should be founded on physics, and not on the ability of statisticians to measure or record it. For example, in the OECD/IEA/Eurostat, Energy Statistics Manual2, the major difference between the Eurostat and the IEA Energy Balance format lies in the presentation of the production of primary and secondary fuels. Statisticians can for example due to measurement problems choose to assume that the actual mechanical energy taken from a hydro source is equal to the electric generated energy, but this should not influence the fact that hydro is a primary energy source, and that the electricity produced from this source is secondary energy.

#### Broadly defining ‘restriction’ is bad – obliterates subtleties in meaning, undermines all legal and policy analysis under the topic

Eric Heinze (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, Queen Mary. He has held fellowships from the Fulbright Foundation and the French and German governments. He teaches Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, Human Rights and Public International Law. JD Harvard) 2003 “The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse” http://mey.homelinux.org/companions/Eric%20Heinze/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20%28839%29/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20-%20Eric%20Heinze.pdf

Variety of ‘restrictions’

The term ‘restriction’, defined so broadly, embraces any number of familiar concepts: ‘deprivation’, ‘denial’, ‘encroachment’, ‘incursion’, ‘infringement’, ‘interference’, ‘limitation’, ‘regulation’. Those terms commonly comport differences in meaning or nuance, and are not all interchangeable in standard legal usage. For example, a ‘deprivation’ may be distinguished from a ‘limitation’ or ‘regulation’ in order to denote a full denial of a right (e.g. where private property is wholly appropriated by the state 16 Agents without compensation) as opposed to a partial constraint (e.g. where discrete restrictions are imposed on the use of property which nonetheless remains profitably usable). Similarly, distinctions between acts and omissions can leave the blanket term ‘restriction’ sounding inapposite when applied to an omission: if a state is accused of not doing enough to give effect to a right, we would not colloquially refer to such inaction as a ‘restriction’. Moreover, in a case of extreme abuse, such as extrajudicial killing or torture, it might sound banal to speak merely of a ‘restriction’ on the corresponding right. However, the term ‘restriction’ will be used to include all of those circumstances, in so far as they all comport a purpose or effect of extinguishing or diminishing the right-seeker’s enjoyment of an asserted right. (The only significant distinction which will be drawn will be between that concept of ‘restriction’ and the concept of ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The terms ‘breach’ or ‘violation’ will be used to denote a judicial determination about the legality of the restriction.6) Such an axiom may seem unwelcome, in so far as it obliterates subtleties which one would have thought to be useful in law. It must be stressed that we are seeking to eliminate that variety of terms not for all purposes, but only for the very narrow purposes of a formal model, for which any distinctions among them are irrelevant.

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#### Their attempt to use natural gas exports to master the world presupposes the existence of an incomplete self that must achieve mastery over the world around us to achieve completion – nuclear technology is their method of doing so – this ignores the ultimate reality that there is no self – the prior question is reorienting our relationship towards technology

**Loy 3 –** card-carrying Buddhist

(David, *Technology and Cultural Values: on the edge of the third millennium*, pp.176-187, dml)

According to Buddhism, this ego-self is illusory because it **corresponds to nothing substantial**: it is sunya, "empty". Instead of being separate from the world, my sense-of-self is one manifestation of it. In contemporary terms, the sense-of-self is an impermanent, because interdependent, construct. Furthermore, I think we are all at least dimly aware of this, for our lack of a more substantial, Cartesian-like self means that our ungrounded sense-of-self **is** haunted **by a profound insecurity which we can** never quite manage **to resolve**. We usually experience this insecurity as the feeling that "something is wrong with me", a feeling which we understand in different ways according to our particular character and situation. Contemporary culture conditions many of us into thinking that what is wrong with us is that we do not have enough money, or enough sex; academics, like aspiring Hollywood actors, are more likely to understand the problem as not being famous enough (not published enough, not read enough, etc.). But all these different ways of understanding our lack encourage the same trap: I try to ground myself and **make myself feel more real** **by** modifying **the world "outside" myself**. I try to subjectify myself by objectifying myself. Unfortunately, nothing in our notoriously-impermanent world can fill up the bottomless pit at the core of my being -- bottomless, because there is really no-thing to fill up. To put it another way, no amount of money or fame in the world can ever be enough if that is not what I really want.

According to Buddhism, such personal "reality projects" -- these ways we try to make ourselves feel more real -- **cannot be successful, for a very different approach is needed** to overcome our sense of lack. Instead of trying to ground ourselves somewhere on the "outside", we need to look "inside". Instead of **running away** from this sense of emptiness at our core, we need to become more comfortable with it and more aware of it, in which case it can transform from a sense of lack into the source of our creativity and spontaneity [Loy (1996)].

The above describes our individual problem. Now the big question: is the same thing true collectively? Can this shed any light on **our contemporary attitude toward technology?** Individually, we usually address the problem of our lack of self-grounding by trying to ground ourselves somewhere in the world -- e.g., in the size of our bank account or in the number of people who know our name. Are we collectively attempting to solve the problem of our collective lack of self-grounding in a similar fashion, by trying to ground ourselves in the world? In this case, **by** objectifying **and** transforming **the world technologically?**

Technology is not applied science. It **is the expression of a deep longing,** an original longing that is present in modern science from its beginning. This is the desire of the self to seek its own truth through the mastery of the object... The power of technique is not to connect thought effectively to nature; **it alters nature to its own purpose**. Its aim is to master its being; to own it. [Verene: 107]

What is that deep longing? Remember the problem of life-meaning that, I have suggested, motivates (or contributes to) our dualism between nature and culture/technology. Despite their material insecurity, most premodern societies are quite secure in another way: for such people, the meaning of their lives is determined for them, for better and worse. From our perspective they may be "stuck," but insofar as they do not know of any alternative they are able to enjoy themselves as much as their situation allows. In contrast, our freedom to determine the meaning of our lives, and the direction of our own societies, means we have lost such security due to the lack of any such "natural" ground for us. In compensation, has technological development **become our collective security project?**

Today we have become so familiar with rapid scientific and technological development that **we have come to think of it as natural,** which in this case means: something that does not need to be explained. But in what sense is it natural to "progress" from the Wright brothers' biplane to a moon-landing within one lifetime? (Bertrand Russell was already an adult when the Wright Brothers first flew; he lived long enough to watch the first moon-landing on television.) In response to the anxiety produced by our alienation from a more original type of "natural" condition, **we try to make ourselves feel more real by** reorganizing **the whole world until we can see our own image reflected in it everywhere**, in the "resources" with which we try to secure and manipulate the material conditions of our existence.

This is why so many of us have been able to dispense with the consolations of traditional religion: now we have other ways to control our fate, or at least try to. But we must also understand how that impels us: because the traditional security provided by religious meaning -- grounding us in God, etc. -- has been taken away from us, we have not been able to escape the task of trying to construct our own self-ground. According to Mahayana Buddhism, however, such projects **are doomed from the start**, for nothing can have self-existence: that everything interpenetrates everything else means that all things are composed of "non-self" elements -- an important truth for a species so wholly dependent on its deteriorating physical environment.

The result is that no amount of material security ("resources") can provide the kind of grounding we crave, the sense of reality we most need -- a need which is best understood as spiritual, for that helps us to see the fundamental contradiction that defeats us. Unfortunately, **we cannot manipulate the natural world** in a collective attempt to self-ground ourselves, and then also hope to find in that world a ground greater than ourselves. Our incredible technological power means we can do almost anything we want, yet the ironic consequence is that **we no longer know what we want to do**. Our reaction to this has been to grow and "develop" ever more quickly, but to what end? ... To keep evading these deepest questions about the meaning of our lives, one suspects. Our preoccupation with the means (the whole earth as "resources") means we perpetually postpone thinking about ends: where are we all going so fast? Or are we running so fast because we are trying to get away from something?

Another way to put it is that our technology **has become our attempt to own the universe**, an attempt that is always frustrated because, for reasons we do not quite understand, we never possess it fully enough to feel secure in our ownership. For many people dubious of this project, Nature has taken over the role of a more transcendental God, because like God it can fulfill our need to be grounded in something greater than we are; our technology cannot fill that role, because it is motivated by the opposite response, attempting to banish all such sacrality by extending our control. Our success in "improving" nature means we can no longer rest peacefully in its bosom.

Yet there seems to be a problem with this "lack" approach: doesn't it smear all technological development with the same Buddhist brush? Instead of deconstructing the nature vs. technology duality, doesn't such a perspective risk falling into the same pro-nature, anti-progress attitude that was questioned earlier?

In response, it is necessary to emphasize that **this approach** does not imply **any wholesale rejection of modern technology**. Remember that the Buddhist emphasis is on **our motivations.** This does not necessarily mean that any particular technology is bad in itself, insofar as **it is our problematic and confused negative motivations** that tend to lead to negative consequences. This allows us to **evaluate** specific situations by applying a Buddhist rule-of-thumb: is our interest in developing this new technology due to our greed or ill-will; and -- applying the third criterion of ignorance or delusion -- can we become clear about why we are doing this? Among other things, this means: do we clearly understand how this will reduce dukkha, and what its other effects will be?

Such questions encourage us, in effect, **to transform our motivations**, in a way that would enable us to evaluate technologies **in a more** conscious **and** thoughtful **fashion**. One crucial issue in this process, of course, is who the "we" is. Transformative technologies have often been initiated **without much thought of their long-range consequences** (e.g., automobiles), but sometimes they have been imposed by elites with a firm belief in their superior understanding (e.g., nuclear power). The evaluation process I am suggesting would involve engaging in a much more thorough and wide-ranging democratic discussion of what we collectively want from a technology. This will not stop us from making mistakes, but at least **they will be our collective mistakes**, rather than those of elites that may have more to gain and less to lose than the rest of us. Also, this will **inevitably slow down** the development of new technologies, something I see as usually being not a disadvantage but an advantage because it will allow for a more painstaking scientific and sociological evaluation less subverted by desire for profit or competitive advantage.

#### The solution to the world’s problem lies in the recognition that there is no solution – suffering and conflict aren't external obstacles, instead they are internal blockages – we must accept the world as it comes to us or we are doomed to the path of Don Quixote, fighting imaginary windmills for all eternity

**Khema 94**  (Ayya, 1994, Buddhist monk, “All of us beset by Birth, Decay, and Death.” Buddhism Today, <http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/philosophy/thera/003-allofus-5.htm>)

If you have ever read Don Quixote, you'll remember that he was fighting windmills. Everybody is doing just that, fighting windmills. Don Quixote was the figment of a writer's imagination, a man who believed himself to be a great warrior. He thought that every windmill he met was an enemy and started battling with it. That's exactly what we are doing within our own hearts and that's why this story has such an everlasting appeal. It tells us about ourselves. Writers and poets who have survived their own lifetimes have always told human beings about themselves. Mostly people don't listen, because it doesn't help when somebody else tells us what's wrong with us and few care to hear it. One has to find out for oneself and most people don't want to do that either. What does it really mean to fight windmills? It means fighting nothing important or real, just imaginary enemies and battles. All quite trifling matters, which we build into something solid and formidable in our minds. We say: "I can't stand that," so we start fighting, and "I don't like him," and a battle ensues, and "I feel so unhappy," and the inner war is raging. We hardly ever know what we're so unhappy about. The weather, the food, the people, the work, the leisure, the country, anything at all will usually do. Why does this happen to us? Because of the resistance to actually letting go and becoming what we really are, namely nothing. Nobody cares to be that. Everybody wants to be something or somebody even if it's only Don Quixote fighting windmills. Somebody who knows and acts and will become something else, someone who has certain attributes, views, opinions and ideas. Even patently wrong views are held onto tightly, because it makes the "me" more solid. It seems negative and depressing to be nobody and have nothing. We have to find out for ourselves that it is the most exhilarating and liberating feeling we can ever have. But because we fear that windmills might attack, we don't want to let go. Why can't we have peace in the world? Because nobody wants to disarm. Not a single country is ready to sign a disarmament pact, which all of us bemoan. But have we ever looked to see whether we, ourselves, have actually disarmed? When we haven't done so, why wonder that nobody else is ready for it either? Nobody wants to be the first one without weapons; others might win. Does it really matter? If there is nobody there, who can be conquered? How can there be a victory over nobody? Let those who fight win every war, all that matters is to have peace in one's own heart. As long as we are resisting and rejecting and continue to find all sorts of rational excuses to keep on doing that there has to be warfare. War manifests externally in violence, aggression and killing. But how does it reveal itself internally? We have an arsenal within us, not of guns and atomic bombs, but having the same effect. And the one who gets hurt is always the one who is shooting, namely oneself. Sometimes another person comes within firing range and if he or she isn't careful enough, he or she is wounded. That's a regrettable accident. The main blasts are the bombs which go off in one's own heart. Where they are detonated, that's the disaster area. The arsenal which we carry around within ourselves consists of our ill will and anger, our desires and cravings. The only criterion is that we don't feel peaceful inside. We need not believe in anything, we can just find out whether there is peace and joy in our heart. If they are lacking, most people try to find them outside of themselves. That's how all wars start. It is always the other country's fault and if one can't find anyone to blame then one needs more "Lebensraum," more room for expansion, more territorial sovereignty. In personal terms, one needs more entertainment, more pleasure, more comfort, more distractions for the mind. If one can't find anyone else to blame for one's lack of peace, then one believes it to be an unfulfilled need. Who is that person, who needs more? A figment of our own imagination, fighting windmills. That "more" is never ending. One can go from country to country, from person to person. There are billions of people on this globe; it's hardly likely that we will want to see every one of them, or even one-hundredth, a lifetime wouldn't be enough to do so. We may choose twenty or thirty people and then go from one to the next and back again, moving from one activity to another, from one idea to another. We are fighting against our own dukkha and don't want to admit that the windmills in our heart are self-generated. We believe somebody put them up against us, and by moving we can escape from them. Few people come to the final conclusion that these windmills are imaginary, that one can remove them by not endowing them with strength and importance. That we can open our hearts without fear and gently, gradually let go of our preconceived notions and opinions, views and ideas, suppressions and conditioned responses. When all that is removed, what does one have left? A large, open space, which one can fill with whatever one likes. If one has good sense, one will fill it with love, compassion and equanimity. Then there is nothing left to fight. Only joy and peacefulness remain, which cannot be found outside of oneself. It is quite impossible to take anything from outside and put it into oneself. There is no opening in us through which peace can enter. We have to start within and work outward. Unless that becomes clear to us, we will always find another crusade.

#### Our impacts outweigh – voting negative breaks the shackles of the ego through embracing its annihilation

**Perreira 10 –** Ph.D. candidate at UC Santa Barbara

(Todd LeRoy, ““Die before you die”: Death Meditation as Spiritual Technology of the Self in Islam and Buddhism”, The Muslim World Vol 100, Issue 2-3, 247-267, dml)

In Theravada Buddhism, death (marana ) is understood simply as the “interruption of the life faculty included within [the limits of] a single becoming (existence).” Buddhism distinguishes between two types of death: timely and untimely. A death determined by the “exhaustion of merit or the exhaustion of the life span” is considered a timely death whereas a death determined by “kamma (Skt. karma) that interrupts [other, life-producing] kamma” is regarded as an untimely death. 52 Human birth and death are, like all other phenomena, subjected to an impersonal principal of causation known as paticca samuppada - ¯ , “dependent origination.” Buddhism regards the idea of a permanent soul or atta (Skt. a¯tman) as a mental projection which has no corresponding reality and, as such, **is dangerous for it leads to false notions of “me” and “mine.**” The view that the self has an inner essence or eternal soul is nurtured on what are called the “three poisons” — greed, hatred, and delusion, around which the wheel of birth and death (samsara ¯ ) turns. According to the Buddha’s analysis what, by convention, is called the “self” is, in fact, constituted by the congeries of ﬁve aggregates or khandhas (matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) which, in relation to paticca samuppada - ¯ or the law of cause and effect, are inherently impermanent. This explains why corpse meditation has long been, and continues to be, a practice vital to Buddhism: “For all its grave stillness **there is nothing more dynamic than a corpse**.” 53 It is the event of impermanence taking place before the eyes of the meditator. The corpse therefore serves as the ideal object lesson: **to “die” before you die is to die to false notions of an enduring self**. In spite of these two radically different perspectives both Islam and Buddhism agree that **the central human predicament is** not death but the unsatisfactoriness **that results from our identiﬁcation with a self** that hankers for the things of this world. According to al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯ the cause of this dissatisfaction is rooted in ignorance due to: (1) lengthy hopes and (2) desire for the things of this world. By lengthy hopes he means we generally go about our lives under the pretext that we can expect to enjoy a long and healthy life. To maintain this fantasy, **we plunge ourselves into the pursuit** of pleasure, wealth, and prestige and, in the process, become so “engrossed” **we fail to recognize how brief and ephemeral these frivolities are** in actuality. The Buddha offered an analogous perspective. The term he designated for the unsatisfactoriness of life is dukkha or suffering and it conveys a similar notion in that its cause is attributed to a thirsting or craving (tanha ) for sense pleasures that ultimately entrap us in the rounds of birth and death. And, as in Suﬁsm, it is the failure to penetrate the veil of ignorance (avijja¯) that keeps us from knowing the true nature of the self. Whether it is a question of gaining insight into the insubstantial nature of the “self ” (anatta), as in the case of the Buddhism, or, a need to effect a decisive break with that aspect of the “self ” (nafs) “engrossed” in worldly affairs and lengthy hopes as we ﬁnd in Suﬁsm, what is apparent in both traditions is that the experience of dying before dying seems to introduce two new forms of experience which were previously absent. The ﬁrst — that of introspection — **appears to be linked to a new knowledge of how one/I/you/we should live our lives** while the other is primarily one of interrogation — **the minute level of scrutiny required of one who goes to battle with his[/her] own demons**. This occurs at the very moment in al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯’s spiritual biography when, for the ﬁrst time, he conducts an examination of his motives for teaching and it culminates in the anxiety attack that robs him of the ability to speak in the lecture hall. In the case of Ajahn Chah this process of introspection and interrogation takes the form of an internal dialogue, one that is not willed but arises spontaneously at the moment he is seized with terror to the point of paralysis and is forced to confront the basis for his fears of death. In both cases, and this is signiﬁcant, each man temporarily loses the ability to control his external voice and, in the process, gains a new possibility for giving space over in his life to the authority of an interior voice. Thus, to access this new ﬁeld of experience one **must be willing to submit to a practice of “dying**” to those aspects of the self that otherwise stand in the way of spiritual development. There is also the possibility that **an intimate knowledge of death and dying may**, in fact, be an important vector **through which notions of the ethical life are transmitted** within the boundaries and parameters of a given tradition. If this is the case, if dying before dying **contributes to the formation of oneself as an ethical subject**, if it is generative of experiencing or imagining a new sense subjectivity, or at least new possibilities for reforming the old sense of self, then it appears to be **a process of identity formation that is both morally compelling and expansive**. By “dying” one rehearses, as it were, a role inscribed in the narrative ethics transmitted and performed by countless virtuosi through the ages. We saw how the ordination procedure of a new monk, together with his ﬁrst instruction in meditation, reenacts the Buddha’s response to his own confrontation with death by choosing to go forth with the Great Renunciation. Al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯’s ethical interiorization begins with his recognition that God, through the call of the inner voice beckoning him to take to the road, compelled him to renounce (i.e., “die”) to his attachment to a comfortable teaching post in what was then one of the most prestigious centers of learning in the world. New research into his life suggests this decision to turn away from the comforts of worldly life toward a life of “seclusion” (‘uzla) may also have been prompted by reports about the life of the Prophet Muhammad and about al-Ash‘arı¯, who, like other ﬁgures of Islam, had a life-changing experience at the age of forty. 54 Because turning one’s life around at age forty is a recurring motif in Muslim biographies, if true, this would conﬁrm that his decision to abandon his teaching post and embrace a mystical path of seclusion can also be understood in terms of Flood’s idea of asceticism, that is, as the “internalizing of tradition” and the shaping of the narrative of one’s life in accordance with the narrative of tradition. 55

#### Use the ballot to engage in meditative affirmation of the status quo.

**Astma 6 –** Professor of Philosophy at Columbia College

(Stephen, “Against Transcendentalism: Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life and Buddhism”, *Monty Python and Philosophy* ebook copy, dml)

Upon close inspection, Buddha shows, paradise crumbles. The atman, on the other hand, is a no show. The Buddha thinks that atman is nowhere to be found except in the literary inventions of Hinduism and the confusions of its followers. Buddhism, contrary to all dualistic theories, asserts that **we are not made up of two metaphysically different parts**, a permanent spirit and an impermanent body. Buddhism breaks with most religions, East and West, by recognizing that we are each a finite tangle of qualities, all of which eventually exhaust themselves, and none of which, conscious or other, carries on independently. All humans, according to Buddha, are composed of the five aggregates (khandas ); body (rupa), feeling (vedana), perception (sanna), dispositions or volitional tendencies (sankhara) and consciousness (vinnana). If the Buddha was standing around in the battlefield setting of the Bhagavad Gita, he would certainly chime-in and object to Krishna’s irresponsible claim that a permanent soul resides in Arjuna and his enemies. Show me this permanent entity, the Buddha would demand. Is the body permanent? Are feelings permanent? What about perceptions, or dispositions, or even consciousness? The Buddha says “If there really existed the atman, there would be also something that belonged to this atman. As however, in truth and reality, neither an atman nor anything belonging to an atman can be found, is it not really an utter fool’s doctrine to say: This is the world, this am I; after death I shall be permanent, persisting and eternal?” (Mijjhima Nikaya) Buddha examines all the elements of the human being, finds that they are all fleeting, and finds no additional permanent entity or soul amidst the tangle of human faculties. There is no ghost in the machine. What’s So Grotesque about That? In their rejection of transcendentalism, Buddhism and Monty Python converge in their celebrations of the grotesque. The Python crew seems to relish the disgusting facts of human biology and they take every opportunity to render them through special effects. Throughout Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, blood spurts, vomit spews, babies explode from birth canals, decapitated heads abound, and limbs putrefy. Theravada Buddhism also celebrates the revolting, treating it as a meditation focus for contemplating the lack of permanence. The transcendentalist consoles herself with the idea that this physical body may decay and perish, but an eternal soul will outlast the material melt-down—not so for the Buddha. In an attempt to undercut human vanity and demonstrate the impermanence of all things, Buddhist scriptures are filled with nauseating details about rotting carcasses and putrid flesh. In the Anguttara Nikaya, for example, the scripture asks, “Did you never see in the world the corpse of a man or a woman, one or two or three days after death, swollen up, blue-black in color, and full of corruption? And did the thought never come to you that you also are subject to death, that you cannot escape it?” (III, 35) When I was at a monastery in Southern Thailand, I chanced upon some reproductions of “dhamma paintings” from the mid-nineteenth century. These pictures were from a Chaiya manuscript discovered nearby, and they depicted, in detail, the “Ten Reflections on Foulness” (asubha kammatthana). The paintings illustrate the various uses of corpses as objects for contemplating impermanence. Following the great Theravadan philosopher Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga text (“Path of Purification”), the artist rendered decaying corpses in rather comprehensive stages of dismemberment and putrification. According to Buddhaghosa, staring at a bloated corpse will be particularly useful to me if I’m feeling overly attached and arrogant about the shape and morphology of my body. If instead I’m feeling snobby or bigoted about my skin’s color or complexion, I should focus on the livid corpse that ranges from green to blue-black in color. Or, if I mistakenly feel that my body is my own, I am to rectify this error by meditating on a worm-infested corpse (puluvaka). As Buddhaghosa explains, “The body is shared by many and creatures live in dependence on (all parts and organs) and feed (on them). And there they are born, grow old, and die, evacuate and pass water; and the body is their maternity home, their hospital, their charnel ground, their privy and their urinal.” Buddhist “mindfulness” (meditational awareness) about the body is being aware of its transience, its brevity, its fugacity. The physical body is slowly macerating, and to try to hold onto it or recompose it is a pipe-dream. The single issue that invited comment from film reviewers when Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life was released was its wallow in the grotesque. One exclaimed that the film’s “ramshackle bouts of surreal physical comedy—a clotted mass of frenzied bodies, debris, mud, and gore—induce feelings of revolt and despair.”53 In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, however, this reviewer got it just backward. Far from despairing, the Pythons aimed to smash the deceptive veneer of puritanical snobbery that devalues the flesh and overvalues the invisible spirit. Like Buddhism, Python asks us to “say yes” to our true nature, **filled as it is with impermanence and unpleasantness.** At first this may seem jarring and disturbing, but in the long run **it is preferable to self-deception through figmentary transcendent reality**. Buddha’s rejection of a permanent transcendental soul is known as the anatta, or “no-self ” doctrine (and the companion doctrine that rejects the idea of a permanent God is called paticca samuppada, or “dependent arising,” because it denies the need for any transcendent uncaused cause). The most important Buddhist critique of the transcendental soul finds place in Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life. It is the idea that belief in unseen, eternal, and divine realities ultimately **distracts us from our own humanity**. Transcendentalism **dehumanizes us by feeding selfish craving**. If we embrace a worldview that pivots on the idea that we will attain immortality, then we are going to be overly concerned with our soul’s protection and its future fate. We become **more concerned with saving our own souls** than valuing and attending to the needs of those around us. Simply put, belief in a soul and a heaven of blissful happiness actually **makes you less ethical in this life**. The rejection of souls, heaven, and God, does not lead, as so many critics contend, to bleak egoistic nihilism. Many transcendentalists foretell a gloomy picture without the security of otherworldly meaning, predicting rampant hedonism (pure pleasure seeking) or nihilistic apathy. The Buddha disagrees and thinks that these life patterns are to be avoided as much as otherworldly dogmatism. The extremes, excesses, and general sufferings of the hedonist strategy and the nihilist strategy are revealed in the film. Terry’s Jones’s Mr. Creosote, for instance, is the giant embodiment of the crass pursuit of sensual gratification. After gorging himself on multiple servings of food and wine at a fancy French restaurant, his unchecked desire for the pleasures of chocolate puts him over the edge. Though he claims he can eat no more, Cleese easily seduces him with a single, small, “vaffer-thin” chocolate mint. Mr. Creosote then begins to inflate and he soon explodes, showering the restaurant in his blood and entrails. Obviously, such hedonism and self-gratification is not an appropriate fall-back for those who reject transcendental metaphysics and ethics. Nor is it appropriate to give oneself over to despair or indifference. The folly of that is illustrated in the movie’s gruesome portrayal of a liver transplant. After Graham Chapman starts the bloody business of removing this poor chap’s liver in his dining room, his partner, Cleese, chats up the man’s wife (Terry Jones in drag) in the kitchen. Cleese asks if she too would give up her liver, but she replies, “No . . . I don’t want to die.” Cleese perseveres and introduces her to Eric Idle, who steps out of her refrigerator and commences a musical tour of the sublime immensity of the universe and the tiny insignificance of her life: Just remember that you’re standing on a planet that’s evolving And revolving at nine hundred miles an hour, That’s orbiting at nineteen miles a second, so it’s reckoned, A sun that is the source of all our power. The sun and you and me and all the stars that we can see, Are moving at a million miles a day In an outer spiral arm, at forty thousand miles an hour, Of the galaxy we call the Milky Way. The Universe itself keeps on expanding and expanding In all of the directions it can whizz As fast as it can go, at the speed of light you know, Twelve million miles a minute, and that’s the fastest speed there is. So remember when you’re feeling very small and insecure How amazingly unlikely is your birth And pray that there’s intelligent life somewhere up in space Because there’s bugger all down here on earth. “Makes you feel so sort of insignificant, doesn’t it?” Cleese and Chapman ask. “Can we have your liver then?” She gives in—“Yeah. All right, you talked me into it”—and the two doctors set upon her with their knives. Just as Mr. Creosote succumbs to sensual overindulgence, this housewife opts for a groundless underindulgence. Just because she realizes she lives in an almost infinitely large universe, that is no reason for her to think that her life is worthless in itself and not worth continuing. This is what the extreme nihilist does (indeed, this is what nihilism is all about), and the Python crew is showing us the absurdity of it. Life **does not become meaningless** once you give up the idea that you are playing a role in a transcendentally planned drama. The values of family, work, love, understanding, simple pleasures, and peace, **don’t go away** once you reject transcendent meaning. Nor does the woman’s natural desire for self-preservation and the avoidance of suffering evaporate once she realizes her own finitude. Transcendental dogmatism is dehumanizing, but so are the opposing extremes of hedonism and nihilistic skepticism. The Buddha made this point explicitly when he argued for a Middle Way between all opposing extremes. Just as **one should find a middle way** between the slaveries of excessive indulgence and excessive asceticism (self-denial), so too one must avoid embracing both absolutist worldviews (like Palin’s toadying transcendentalist chaplain) and relativist worldviews (where all values and meanings are leveled or negated). The Buddha’s Middle Way doctrine seeks to reclaim human values and meaning by avoiding overly rigid blind faith and also avoiding distracting speculations about matters that are remote from lived experience. Back Down to Earth So, what are these more down-to-earth human values that must be rescued from transcendental flights-of-fancy and nihilistic negativity? In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, the extremely modest list of values offered at the end as final “answers” to the meaning of life make good sense. They are introduced by Palin (in drag) as he interrupts the Vegas-style celebration of perpetual Christmas. “Well, that’s the end of the film,” she announces. “Now here’s the Meaning of Life.” She opens an envelope and reads, “Well, it’s nothing special. Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get some walking in, and try and live together in peace and harmony with people of all creeds and nations.” This rather modest sounding list makes perfect sense if we no longer pine for some more grand transcendental meaning. Once we dispatch both the otherworldly values (toadying to God and conserving our sperm, for example) and the otherworldly “realities” which ground those values (soul, heaven, God), then **matters of meaning become markedly more pragmatic and demystified**. Like Buddha’s philosophy, the essential goals in life become attempts to realize moderation, actualize one’s potential, and reduce suffering. When we try to make issues of ultimate meaning more melodramatic than this, we end up with the distracting and dehumanizing edifices of transcendentalism. The Buddha offers us Four Noble Truths that can be used to fight these temptations and distractions. First, he says “All life is suffering, or all life is unsatisfactory (dukkha).” This seems pessimistic at first, but he’s simply pointing out that to have a biological body is to be subject to pain, illness, and eventually death. To have family and friends means that we are open to inevitable loss, disappointment, and also betrayal. But more importantly, even when we feel joy and happiness, these too are transient experiences that will fade because all things are impermanent. Second, the Buddha says “Suffering is caused by craving or attachment.” When we have a pleasurable experience we try to repeat it over and over or try to hang on to it and turn it into a permanent thing. Sensual experiences are not themselves the causes of suffering—they are inherently neutral phenomena. It is the psychological state of craving that rises up in the wake of sensations which causes us to have unrealistic expectations of those feelings—sending us chasing after fleeting experiences that cannot be possessed. The Third Noble Truth states that the cure for suffering is non-attachment or the cessation of craving. In the Samyutta Nikaya text, the Buddha says that the wise person “regards the delightful and pleasurable things of this world as impermanent, unsatisfactory and without atman (any permanent essence), as a disease and sorrow—it is he who overcomes the craving” (12:66). And the Fourth Noble Truth is an eight-fold path that helps the follower to steer a Middle Way of ethical moderation. Following the simple eight-fold path, which contains simple recommendations similar those listed at the end of Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, allows the follower to overcome egoistic craving. Perhaps the most important craving that must be overcome, according to Buddha, is the craving for immortality. The Buddha claimed that giving up transcendental tendencies would help us to better see the people all around us who need our help. We would become more compassionate, he argued, because we would not be distracted by cravings for the “other world.” Mind the Mindfulness As the Pythons suggest, however, not all dehumanizing distraction comes from “above.” Often, we lose sight of compassion and humane living by drowning ourselves in a sea of trivial diversions. In existential terms, we lose our “authentic self ” in the unimportant hustle and bustle of everyday matters. Consider again the executives of the Very Big Corporation of America. Later in the film, we learn that just before they were attacked by the mutineers sailing the Crimson Permanent Assurance they were having a meeting about “Item Six on the Agenda, the Meaning of Life.” The board chairman, Graham Chapman, turns things over to Michael Palin: “Now Harry, you’ve had some thoughts on this.” “That’s right, yeah. I’ve had a team working on this over the past few weeks,” Palin explains in his best American accent: What we’ve come up with can be reduced to two fundamental concepts. One, people are not wearing enough hats. Two, matter is energy; in the Universe there are many energy fields which we cannot normally perceive. Some energies have a spiritual source which act upon a person’s soul. However, this soul does not exist ab initio, as orthodox Christianity teaches; it has to be brought into existence by a process of guided self-observation. However, this is rarely achieved owing to man’s unique ability to be distracted from spiritual matters by everyday trivia. The other Board members sit quietly through Palin’s impressive and important report. But, they need clarification about one of the more important points: “What was that about hats again?” one of them asks. Distraction reigns again in Part IV, Middle Age, when the hyper-pleasant, smiley, and vapid American couple (Palin and, in drag, Idle) are served up a “philosophy conversation” in the form of flashcard prompts. The waiter (Cleese) tries to get the insipid couple started on their philosophy conversation by asking, “Did you ever wonder why we’re here?” They fail utterly to stay on topic. “Oh! I never knew that Schopenhauer was a philosopher,” Idle exclaims. Palin responds, “Yeah. . . . He’s the one that begins with an S. WIFE: “Oh.” HUSBAND: “Um [pause] . . . like Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Does Nietzsche begin with an S?” HUSBAND: “There’s an S in Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Oh wow! Yes there is. Do all philosophers have an S in them?” HUSBAND: “Yeah I think most of them do.” WIFE: “Oh! Does that mean [the popular singer] Selina Jones is a philosopher?” HUSBAND: “Yeah, Right. She could be. She sings about the meaning of life.” WIFE: “Yeah, that’s right, but I don’t think she writes her own material.” HUSBAND: “No. Maybe Schopenhauer writes her material?” WIFE: “No. Burt Bacharach writes it.” HUSBAND: “There’s no S in Burt Bacharach.” If we combine this tedious conversation and the Boardroom’s fascination with hats, the results of Palin’s research begins to make sense. Human beings must “create” their “souls” day-by-day (rather than simply discover them, ready made) through “a process of guided self-observation.” The great enemy of this process, these sketches show, **is distraction**. This is a conception of the soul that the Buddha could agree with. It embraces impermanence, avoids transcendentalist metaphysics, and accepts the view that we must actively cultivate our “souls.” This is the point of Buddhist “mindfulness” (sati)—a powerful meditation that cuts through the dehumanizing distractions. There’s nothing mystical or particularly fancy about it. **You can do it in your daily activities as well as in isolated contemplation**. It just requires you to focus your mind and senses in the present moment, and to resist the mind’s natural tendency to wander off into the past or future, **to replay events or imagine scenarios that fill our minds** with worries, regrets, hopes or cravings. Mindfulness is a state of awareness that comes from training and discipline, a state that shuts out the drifting distractions of life and reveals the uniqueness of each present moment. In doing this careful attending, one can become more present in his or her own life. Mindfulness helps to rehumanize a person by taking their head out of the clouds. And according to Buddhism it reconnects us better with our compassionate hearts by revealing other human beings as just human beings. Once the distractions of trivia, or theoretical, transcendental, or ideological overlays are removed, **we may become better able to know ourselves** and compassionately recognize ourselves in others. We may even come to learn that, in fact, we should all wear more hats. But **we will only know for sure if we are less distracted and more mindful**.

### 1nc china

**Their attempt to describe China as an objective threat arrogantly presumes that China exists as an object that can be known. This pseudoscientific description of Chinese hostility only reifies the justifications for violent American containment strategies that result in a self-fulfilling prophecy**

Chengxin **Pan, 2004** (Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, June-July 2004 v29 i3 p305(27), The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics)

China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics.

**Their form of politics translates into a policymaking of aggressive containment that culminates in war**

Chengxin **Pan, 2004** (Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, June-July 2004 v29 i3 p305(27), The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics)

Thus, even in the face of such a potentially explosive incident, the self-fulfilling effect of the "China threat" discourse has not been acknowledged by mainstream U.S. China analysts. To the contrary, deterring and containing China has gained new urgency. For example, in the aftermath of this standoff, neoconservative columnists Robert Kagan and William Kristol (chairman of the Project for the New American Century) wrote that "not only is the sale of Aegis [to Taiwan] ... the only appropriate response to Chinese behavior; We have been calling for the active containment of China for the past six years precisely because we think it is the only way to keep the peace." (87) Although the sale of the Aegis destroyers was deferred, President George W. Bush approved an arms package for Taiwan that included so-called "defensive" weapons such as four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel submarines, and twelve P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, as well as minesweeping helicopters, torpedoes, and amphibious assault vehicles. On this arms sale, David Shambaugh, a Washington-based China specialist, had this to say: "Given the tangible threats that the Chinese military can present to Taiwan--particularly a naval blockade or quarantine and missile threats--this is a sensible and timely package." (88) Given the danger and high stakes involved, some may wonder why China did not simply cooperate so that there would be no need for U.S. "containment." To some extent, China has been cooperative. For example, Beijing was at pains to calm a disgruntled Chinese public by explaining that the U.S. "sorry" letter issued at the end of the spy-plane incident was a genuine "apology," with U.S. officials openly rejecting that interpretation. On the Taiwan question, China has dropped many of its previous demands (such as "one China" being defined as the People's Republic). As to the South China Sea, China has allowed the ASEAN Regional Forum to seek a negotiated solution to the Spratly Islands dispute and also agreed to join the Philippines as cochairs of the working group on confidence-building measures. (89) In January 2002, China chose to play down an incident that a presidential jet outfitted in the United States had been crammed with sophisticated satellite-operated bugs, a decision that, as the New York Times puts it, "illustrates the depth of China's current commitment to cultivating better relations with the United States." (90) Also, over the years, China has ratified a number of key nonproliferation treaties and pledged not to assist countries in developing missiles with ranges that exceed the limits established under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). More recently, China has collaborated with the United States in the war on terrorism, including issuing new regulations to restrict the export of missile technology to countries usually accused by the United States of aiding terrorists. Indeed, as some have argued, by any reasonable measure China is now more responsible in international affairs than at any time since 1949. (91) And yet, the real problem is that, so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough. For instance, Iain Johnston views the constructive development of China's arms-control policy as a kind of "realpolitik adaptation," rather than "genuine learning." (92) From this perspective, however China has changed, it would remain a fundamentally threatening other, which the United States cannot live with but has to take full control of. I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China." (93) For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile-defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, it is not impossible that the two countries, and possibly the whole region, might be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually make war more likely.

**No Taiwan war**

**Saunders and Kastner 2009** – \*Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, \*Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and former China Security Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Phillip and Scott, International Security, 33.4, “Bridge over troubled water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan peace agreement”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.87, WEA)

Most observers agree that the issue of Taiwan’s status is not ripe for resolution. China remains committed to the ultimate goal of unification and refuses to renounce the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence. Former President Jiang Zemin emphasized the goal of unification, and China’s policies sometimes implied a timetable for achievement of that objective.2 China’s policy toward the Taiwan issue, however, has undergone a significant shift under President Hu Jintao, who has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future.3

On Taiwan, public opinion polls consistently show strong (more than 75 percent) public support for maintaining the status quo. Only a small percentage favors either immediate independence or immediate unification with China.4 Although this polling reflects conditional preferences that factor in the likelihood of China using force if Taiwan were to declare independence,5 it accurately reflects the widespread view on Taiwan that permanent resolution of the issue of Taiwan’s status is not presently possible. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to mobilize voters by highlighting Taiwan’s separate identity and sought ways to emphasize Taiwan’s sovereignty during President Chen Shui-bian’s term in office, the KMT has adjusted the emphasis in its cross-strait policy to more closely match the views of mainstream Taiwan voters. In the 2008 presidential campaign, KMT candidate (and eventual victor) Ma Ying-jeou articulated “three nos” that would govern policy toward China in his administration. These were a pledge that there would be no pursuit of de jure independence, no negotiations with the mainland about unification, and no use of force.6 President Ma reiterated these points in his May 20, 2008, inaugural address.

Collectively, these positions suggest that China and Taiwan may be prepared to defer the issue of Taiwan’s status for resolution at some point in the future. **Both sides have expressed the desire to improve relations, expand cross-strait contacts, and negotiate a peace agreement** between Taipei and Beijing. These goals were articulated in the joint press communiqué issued following KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s April 2005 meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.7 Hu Jintao reiterated China’s willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Taiwan in his statements at the October 2007 17th Party Congress: “On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of cross-straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development.”8 Both candidates in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election called for negotiation of a peace agreement with Beijing, and President Ma repeated the call in his inaugural address.9 Upon assuming office, Ma moved quickly to restart dialogue between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the semiofficial bodies that previously served as vehicles for cross-strait dialogue.10

### 1nc heg

**Heg causes war and prolif-recalcitrant power balancing takes out the benefits of heg**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conºict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

**Extinction**

Asal and Beardsley 09 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

#### Hegemony never existed – system is de-centralized, applying hegemonic mythology to policy causes blowback and destroys cooperation

Doran, 09 (Charles F., Andrew W. Mellon Prof. of International Relations, Director of the Global Theory and History Program, Director of the Center for Canadian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U., “Fooling Oneself: The Mythology of Hegemony” International Studies Review, Vol. 11.1)

More than a catalogue of techniques other governments use to resist U.S. titular hegemony, this book informs an important question, long-debated, about the concept of hegemony. If the United States is a hegemon, why does a balance of power, composed of rivals that severely disagree with hegemonic domination, not form against the dominant United States? Building on the guidelines proposed by Wohlstetter (1964, 1968) and Elmore (1985) for the making of sound policy, namely, to see the world through the lens of the other so as to anticipate what others might conclude and do, the book critiques the very notion of hegemony. In this review, I argue from the perspective that **the current conception of hegemony has neither historical nor theoretical justification** (Doran 1991, pp. 117-121), and that many of the categories and examples assessed here bear witness to this reality. Joseph Nye (1990) distinguished between hegemony based on domination and control and a state carrying out a leadership role. **Historically**, as Doran (1971) argued, **all military attempts at hegemonic domination** in the central system **failed; other members** of the system **rolled back these bids** for hegemony forcefully, and the subsequent peace was neither designed nor governed (Ikenberry 1989; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Gaddis 2002) by any single state. Hegemony therefore involved *attempts* at centralized control, but never realized control. Instead, **equilibrium among highly unequal states** (Kissinger 2005) **preserved the de-centralized** nature of the **international system** (Vasquez 1993). Mearsheimer (2001) concurred that, as opposed to regions (Hurrell 2004) such as Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union or as opposed to the relationship between colonies and mother country (Mckeown 1983), hegemony in the central system never existed. **The central international system is pluralistic, de-centralized, and subject to the rules of balance.** Across long periods of history, **the structure of the system changes as states follow their respective trajectories of relative power**, reflecting their ability to carry out a variety of foreign policy roles. And at any point in time, **states are located at highly unequal positions on these evolving power cycles. But a hegemon, a single all-powerful state, has never dominated** and controlled; nor does it today; nor will it in the future. **The United States is an “ordinary power”** (Rosecrance 1976) like others, **just more powerful**, and, accordingly, more capable of providing certain leadership functions in the system. The choice of “global leadership” is far different from that of “global domination” (Brzezinski 2004). Failure to understand this reality has gotten the United States into the situation that is described in this book. The articles in *Hegemony Constrained* provide strong evidence in support of the claim that **the reason a balance of power of disaffected states has not formed against the US is that**, in other than defensive terms (Keohane 1984), **hegemony does not exist except in the minds of a few theorists of international relations and influential advocates in policy circles.** Not unexpectedly, **other governments have discovered tactics to elude** and to minimize the effect of **such applications within US foreign policy.** The **excesses of application in the** George W. **Bush administration are the outcome of a mythology long in the making, extending from** E.H. Carr’s extrapolation from **British colonialism**, and **nurtured through American theorizing about the existence of a hegemon that dominates the system until a new rising state** defeats and **replaces the prior hegemon** in a systems transforming war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996;Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdol-Lahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000). In the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarity, the belief that unipolarity meant such hegemony began affecting foreign policy decision-making and rhetoric during the Clinton administration (when America was proclaimed “the biggest bulldog on the block”). **Quite in contrast** is the argumentation **of all prior administrations, going back to the Eisenhower administration**, a time when America enjoyed greater relative power differentials (Pollins 1996) than those existing today. Yet, **led by a groundswell of neo-conservative foreign policy thought** (Krauthamer 1991;Mastanduno 1997; Wohlforth 1999; Kagan 2002; Barnett 2004), **intellectual elites have so committed themselves to the hegemonic thesis that they have blinded themselves to the consequences** of their own speculation. **Should they be surprised when the “hierarchy” of international relations turns out to be non-existent**, or the capacity to control even very weak and divided polities is met with frustration? **Americans have invented a mythology of hegemonic domination that corresponds so poorly to the position they actually find themselves in that they cannot comprehend the responses of other governments** to their actions. Bobrow and his fellow writers show the dozens of ways that other governments find to evade, and to subvert, the proscriptions and fulminations emanating from Washington. **By creating a mythology of hegemony rather than learning to work with the** (properly conceived) **balance of power, the United States has complicated its foreign policy and vastly raised the costs of its operation** (Brown et al. 2000; Brzezinski 2004). By destroying a secular, albeit brutal, Sunni Arab center of power in Iraq, the United States must now contend with a far greater problem (Fearon 2006) of itself having to hold the country together and to balance a resurgent Iran. Bogged down in Iraq, it is unable to deter aggression against allies elsewhere such as Georgia and the Ukraine, or to stop the growing Russian penetration of Latin America. **By waving the flag of hegemony, the United States finds that very few other governments see the need to assist it, because hegemony is supposed to be self-financing, self-enforcing, and self-sufficient.**

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Independently they don’t meet financial incentives

UNCATD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 2000 “Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment¶ A Global Survey” http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteipcmisc3\_en.pdf

Most countries, irrespective of their stage of development, employ a wide variety of

incentives to realize their investment objectives. Developed countries, however, more frequently employ financial incentives such as grants, subsidized loans or loan guarantees. It¶ is generally recognized that financial incentives are a direct drain on the government budget,¶ and as such, they are not generally offered by developing countries to foreign investors.¶ Instead, these countries tend to use fiscal incentives that do not require upfront use of¶ government funds.

#### including indirect fiscal incentives explodes the topic and makes the literature base unamangable

Florence Hubert and Nigel Pain (National Institute for Economic and Social Research) March 2002 “Fiscal Incentives, European Integration, and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment” http://www.niesr.ac.uk/pubs/dps/dp195.PDF

Comparable data can be obtained for all these measures for all European countries. It should¶ be noted that using these measures means that the definition of ‘fiscal incentives’ is somewhat¶ broader than normal, as all types of investors may be affected by them. lii the econometric work¶ the host country levels are entered as ratios to a (GDP) weighted average of the levels in other¶ European Union economies. including Germany. This is because location choice depends upon¶ the relative costs of competing locations. not just the costs of any one particular location.4 As the¶ variables are entered as ratios. it would not be expected that they could account for the¶ permanent upward trend in the stock of inward FDI many locations. However they may be¶ important indicators of fluctuations in the level of fiscal assistance over time. and can affect¶ flows of new investment for several years.

#### The aff involves the production of energy WITHIN the human energy system – primary production is the PROCESS of taking a natural resource across that line for the first time

Sara Øvergaard (Senior Executive Officer in the Department on Energy Statistics at Statistics Norway) September 2008 “Issue paper: Definition of primary and secondary energy” <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/londongroup/meeting13/LG13_12a.pdf>

The most important distinguishing characteristics of primary and secondary energy are the process/activity involved for humans to make use of the energy in the source. To take it from the start, all energy on earth originally comes from the sun, through natural energy chains the energy from the sun is transferred to other forms of energy, kinetic or stored. The first law of thermodynamics state that “Energy can neither be created nor destroyed”. In other words it merely changes its form from one to another. So energy transformations occur naturally all the time, but it is first when humans use labour or materials to extract, collect or transform the energy embodied in a source that it enters our energy system. A formal definition should preferably be able to: 1) recognize the human factor, 2) recognize that the important differentiating factor is the activity or process of extraction, capture or transformation and 3) include the purpose of the activity. The human factor is not mentioned in UN or OECD/IEA/Eurostat manual definitions. In defining primary energy it may not be necessary to include this, but for secondary energy it can be useful for separating natural energy transformation and human-made energy transformation. For primary energy the important distinguishing characteristics is the process of extraction or capture. Primary energy is extracted or captured from sources, and through this extraction and capture, the physical and chemical characteristics of the energy is not changed. For example hard coal which is extracted from the ground. It is only cleaned and separated from rocks and other non-energy substances, but the physical and chemical property of the energy in the hard coal itself is not changed. As specified in the UN definition, cleaning, separation and grading of the energy components in a source, is not an energy transformation process, and the energy in hard coal is therefore not secondary energy. For secondary energy the important distinguishing characteristics is the process of transformation. Energy transformation is any process of transforming one form of energy to another. Energy of fossil fuels, solar radiation, or nuclear fuels, which are all primary, can be converted into other energy forms such as electricity and heat that are more useful to us. All energy that has been subjected to human-made transformation is secondary energy. Figure 1 gives a schematic illustration of primary versus secondary energy The purpose of the activity of extraction, capture or transformation is to make the energy available for trade and use. Extraction and collection from energy sources can also be used for non-energy purposes. This aspect is only stressed in the definition of primary energy suggested by Tim Simmons for InterEnerStat. Based on these points, and as a starting point for discussion, we have a proposal for a new definition of primary energy: “Primary energy is energy embodied in sources which involve human induced extraction or capture, that may include separation from contiguous matrial, cleaning or grading, to make the energy available for trade, use or transformation” For secondary energy, a proposal for a new definition: “Secondary energy is energy embodied in commodities that comes from human induced energy transformation

#### The phrase “energy production” is too imprecise – our interpretation is critical to maintain the integrity of the topic and our analysis of energy policy

Tom Noyes (works in health care finance in the Wilmington area. He has worked in city government, led two non-profit organizations, directed communications for four political campaigns and earned an MBA in finance) December 2005 “Economics and the Environment, Part 1: What Happens When We Light a Fire” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/12/08/170460/--Economics-and-the-Environment-Part-1-What-Happens-When-We-Light-a-Fire

If we wish to be precise, we wouldn't use the phrase "energy production." Most of what we call "energy production" involves burning something. A ton of coal is an asset. Smoke coming out a smokestack is not an asset. Setting fire to an asset is not production. It can economically useful by keeping us warm or converting iron ore to steel, but it is not, strictly speaking, production, defined as the creation of an asset. This simple rephrasing of what happens when we light a fire leads to useful insights into economics and the environment. Consider the similar phrase, "timber production." A tree standing in a forest may not be considered to have any economic value. But when a logger cuts down the tree, it becomes an asset as soon as it hits the ground and is hauled off to the lumber mill. Understanding that it is a fallacy to say that an asset can be created when something is destroyed suggests that we need to look more closely at the assumptions underlying the way we think about economics and the environment.

#### Even if you don’t buy that – ‘Energy production’ as a term refers to primary production

NBSC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) 2002 “7. Production and Consumption of Energy” http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/classificationsmethods/definitions/t20020517\_402787580.htm

Total Energy Production refers to the total production of primary energy by all energy producing enterprises in the country in a given period of time. It is a comprehensive indicator to show the capacity, scale, composition and development of energy production of the country. The production of primary energy includes that of coal, crude oil, natural gas, hydro-power and electricity generated by nuclear energy and other means such as wind power and geothermal power. However, it excludes the production of fuels of low calorific value, bio-energy, solar energy and the secondary energy converted from the primary energy.

**What the rest of the community does doesn’t matter, what the framers intended also doesn’t matter --- this is a question of what the topic should look like, not what it has become**

**The text of the rez should be the primary determinant of how we view it**

**Weaver, 7** (Aaron, PhD candidate in politics and society, “An Introduction to Original Intent.” Fall 2007 (Baylor University: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies): 1-9. http://www.thebigdaddyweave.com/BDWFiles/originalism.pdf)

Discovering the “original intent” behind the religion clauses of the First Amendment is much more difficult than Edwin Meese, Antonin Scalia or any other 21 Ibid, originalist wants to admit. Contrary to the revisionist history being pushed by originalists who desire extensive government accommodation of religion**, the founders did not always agree with one another**. We simply **can not determine with sufficient accuracy the collective inten**t of the Founding Fathers and the Framers of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause

of the First Amendment. Those scholars in search of “original intent” have returned with strikingly inconsistent accounts of original intent. Thus, the originalism of Scalia, Meese, and Rehnquist is ambiguous at best and downright dishonest at worst. We do not know nor can we be expected to accurately determine the intent or understanding of what the First Amendment meant to each person who cast their vote. After all, delegates to the Constitutional Convention were voting on the text of the First Amendment, not Madison’s writings or the private correspondence of the Framers. **The text** of the First Amendment **reigns** **supreme**. Authorial intent must take a backseat to the actual text. Justices should examine the text first and scour it for as much meaning as it will generate before turning to extrinsic evidence of intent. However, original intent is hardly irrelevant but simply subordinate to the text. **Extrinsic evidence does not control the text. The text controls the text.**

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**We’ll internal link turn all of their military power arguments-eminent military power makes all of our threats non-credible and prevents peaceful resolution to crises-a world of parity is the only way to access credible threats and military power**

**Monteiro 10** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. His research and teach­ing focuses on international relations theory and security studies. He is currently writing a book on the causes of conflict in a unipolar world. Professor Monteiro received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009 [http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105216monteiro.pdf, Spring Summer 2010, “Why U.S. Does Not Deter Challenges”]

Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

**Kagan’s wrong – liberal order’s not intrinsic to primacy and their impacts are threat inflation – his studies are flawed and he concedes no impact**

**Preble 12** – vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (seriously, even Cato doesn’t like Kagan)

(Christopher, “The Critique of Pure Kagan”, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>, dml)

It is a familiar refrain. But, as with Kagan’s earlier works, The World America Made combines questionable international-relations theory, questionable economics and questionable politics. To the extent that Kagan has had a hand in building today’s world, he has constructed it around **too much military capacity** in the hands of a single power and **too little capacity in the hands of nearly everyone else**. The result is a wide and growing gap between the promises Washington has made to protect others from harm and America’s political will to honor those promises if they ever come due. The world is **both** more complicated **and** more durable **than Kagan imagines**. The United States **does not need to police the globe** in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. **Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights** hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagan’s assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement **without resorting to** fearmongering **and t**hreat inflation. Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation’s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security—the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates—they grow even less supportive. KAGAN’S FLAWED analysis begins with a fundamental misconception about the international system and the relations of states within it. His worldview perceives two types of countries: those that are congenitally incapable of dealing with urgent security challenges on their borders or in their respective regions; and a crafty, rapacious few who are forever scheming to intimidate, disrupt or simply devour the hapless and the helpless. Within this dichotomy, however, is a third sort of country, the only one of its kind. The United States enjoys a privileged place in the world order, explains Kagan. Its power is unthreatening because it is relatively distant from others. And, according to Kagan, the costs of this power are easily borne by the wealthiest country in the world. Kagan’s world order “is as fragile as it is unique,” and “preserving [it] requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.” The message today is consistent with that from sixteen years ago when he and William Kristol first made the case for what they called “benevolent global hegemony.” In other respects, however, the story that emerges from The World America Made is subtly different. Anticipating a rising tide of pessimism and gloominess within the American electorate, Kagan at times resorts to the tone of a pep talk. Whereas he once highlighted the “present dangers” confronting the United States (in a volume coedited with Kristol, published in 2000), he now says the world today isn’t as dangerous as it once was—during the Cold War, for example, or at other periods in American history. Looking ahead, he says, China has its own set of problems, is unlikely to make a bid for regional hegemony and is unlikely to succeed if it tries. Likewise, we shouldn’t be overly frightened by China’s growing economic power, Kagan explains, which will lag well behind that of the United States for years. Other global challenges are more modest still. The object of these relatively optimistic assessments is to convince Americans that they can manage to hold on to their position of global dominance for many years without bankrupting themselves financially or exhausting themselves emotionally. This line of argument cuts against Kagan’s other claims, however, both in this volume and elsewhere, that the United States should spend even more on its military and that Washington should use this military more often, and in more places, than it has in the recent past. In other critical ways, Kagan’s assessment of global politics has remained remarkably consistent, even if the tone of this current volume is slightly less alarmist. In the past, he has argued that **the world would collapse into a brutal, Hobbesian hell** if the U.S. military were smaller and fought in fewer wars or if the U.S. government were less inclined to extend security guarantees to other countries. **Today, he merely suggests such a scenario is** possible and warns it would be foolish to gamble on the outcome. Kagan’s too-casual rejection of any reasonable alternative to American hegemony reveals the crucial flaw **in his reasoning**, however, given that he predicts we might not be afforded a choice in the future. If the United States can’t sustain its current posture indefinitely, a wiser long-term grand strategy would set about—preferably now—**easing the difficult and sometimes dangerous transitions that often characterize major power shifts**. Rather than continuing to discourage other countries from tending to their security affairs, the United States should welcome such behavior. Kagan’s reassuring tone—about China’s unique vulnerabilities, for example—actually buttresses that competing point of view. After all, if a distant, distracted hegemon like the United States can manage the challenge posed by China, and if it can do so while preventing wars and unrest in several other regions simultaneously, then Asian nations **would be at least equally capable of accomplishing the same** **task** given that they will be focused solely on their own security primarily in just that one region. KAGAN REFUSES to consider this possibility. He writes that the “most important features of today’s world—the great spread of democracy, the prosperity, the prolonged great-power peace—have depended directly and indirectly on power and influence exercised by the United States.” It follows, therefore, that the world would become considerably less democratic, less prosperous and less peaceful if the United States were to withdraw militarily from Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Of course, **he** can’t actually prove either claim to be true**, and he concedes as much**. Instead, he bases his case on a particular set of beliefs about how the world works and about the United States’ unique characteristics within that system. Kagan asserts that the world requires a single, order-inducing hegemon to enforce the rules of the game and that America must perform this role because its global economic interests demand it. He also believes that the United States has a special obligation, deriving from its heritage as a “dangerous nation,” to spread democracy and human rights. What’s more, America’s military might is the essential ingredient that leads to its international influence. The spread of democracy and market capitalism, Kagan claims, is made possible by U.S. power but would retreat before autocracy and mercantilism if that power were seen to be waning. The attractiveness of America’s culture, economics and political system—the vaunted “soft power” in Joseph Nye’s telling—is fleeting and would dissipate if Americans were to commit what Kagan calls “preemptive superpower suicide.” How other nations respond to U.S. power also follows a familiar pattern. In Kagan’s telling, allies will bandwagon with us if we are committed to defending them but bolt like frightened racehorses at the first sign of trouble. Would-be challengers will back down in the face of U.S. power but rush to exploit opportunities for conquest if Uncle Sam exhibits any hesitation or self-doubt. And Kagan simply dismisses any suggestion that other countries might chafe at American dominance or fear American power. His ideas represent something close to the reigning orthodoxy in Washington today and for the past two decades. Inside the Beltway, there is broad, bipartisan agreement on the basic parameters of U.S. foreign policy that Kagan spells out. This consensus contends that the burden of proof is on those who argue against the status quo. The United States and the world have enjoyed an unprecedented stretch of security and prosperity; it would be the height of folly, the foreign-policy establishment asserts, to upend the current structure on the assumption that an alternative approach would represent any improvement. But such arguments combine the most elementary of post hoc fallacies with unwarranted assumptions and idle speculation. **Correlation** does not prove causation. **There are** many factors **that could explain** the **relative peace** of the past half century. Kagan surveys them all—including economic interdependence, evolving norms governing the use of force and the existence of nuclear weapons—and concludes that U.S. power is the only decisive one. But, once again, **he concedes that** he cannot prove it**.**

**Hegemony has no relationship to globalization-inherent incentives mean globalized liberalism is inevitable**

**Gartzke 9** \*Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego [Gartzke Power Shuffle: Will the Coming Transition Be Peaceful? [Gartzke, Erik](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlink:lateralsearch/sng/author/Gartzke,+Erik/$N?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks). [Current History](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Current+History/$N/41559?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks)[108. 721](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.issuebrowselink:searchpublicationissue/41559/Current+History/02009Y11Y01$23Nov+2009$3b++Vol.+108+$28721$29/108/721?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks) (Nov 2009): 374-380]

Too often, the tendency has been to equate US leadership with the US-inspired system. In previous epochs, this sort of assumption was natural, given that hegemons imposed parochial systems of governance on their worlds. Today, it is much less clear that changes in international leadership require a fundamental reordering of the global system of governance - any more than a change in the chairmanship of the European Union, say, means dramatic changes in the direction of that organization. The emergence of multipolarity does not in itself invite the prospect of world instability and conflict. The connection between decline and violence is tenuous at best. Nor is there a good reason to believe that war would alter in any fundamental way America's relative decline. Shooting at another nation will not increase the appeal of US products or reduce the US debt. Nor will rising powers help their commercial enterprises through the use of force. Given the fact that power depends on wealth in the modern world, nations are much better off if they can find ways to avoid disrupting markets and burdening budgets, especially when the most valuable assets are no longer readily conquerable. If war will not prevent the conditions that lead the United States to lose influence or that enable a challenger to rise, then war of any significant intensity is a futile act.

**Unipolarity destroys coordination necessary to stop the next epidemic-abandoning heg solves**

**Weber et al. 7 \***Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, [“How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy]

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. **Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand**. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. **These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American powe**r. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. **As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, we’re not likely to get any help.** Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can’t change that alone.

**Disease – It leads to extinction**

**GREGER 08 –** M.D., is Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States (Michael Greger, , Bird Flu: A Virus of Our Own Hatching, <http://birdflubook.com/a.php?id=111>)

Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: “All of these [new diseases] were advance patrols of a great army that is preparing way out of sight.”3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg don’t think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. “Some people think I am being hysterical,” he said, referring to pandemic influenza, “but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with microbes—bacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.”3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.”3149 Because the pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who “stop running” go extinct. So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the **human race is losing the race**.3150 In a Scientific American article titled, “Will We Survive?,” one of the world’s leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, “Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.”3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutation—two percent of the genome—has taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So who’s going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up “may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.”3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. “Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154

## 1nr

### china

**Willcox, 05** – PhD University of Kent (David R. *PROPAGANDA, THE PRESS AND CONFLICT*, http://potsdam.yorex.org/sites/potsdam.yorex.org/files/propaganda%20and%20press.pdf)

Media technology advances do not only affect the perception of conflict. Changes in the nature of warfare have also altered both the ability to cover war and the style in which it is reported. The First and Second World Wars presented a fight for national survival not evident in later twentieth-century conflicts involving British armed forces. The post1945 Cold War era, whereby a bipolar ideological conflict defined the nature of hostilities, has been surpassed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even during the relatively short time span between the Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict, it is evident that different military, political and ideological incentives for justifying entry into hostilities have formed. Furthermore, once conflict has begun its nature is also susceptible to change. The Gulf War eventually required a decisive ground offensive, a move initially deemed unimaginable in some early press reports. The Kosovo Conflict was fought from the air alone, shattering the widely held assumptions that the successful outcome of such conflicts was not militarily viable. To add further differentials, Kosovo operations were fought under NATO command unlike the US-led forces in the Gulf War. In these respects, the nature of a conflict introduces a further variable into the influences affecting media coverage of hostilities. The character of conflict has shifted in focus away from massed military formations attempting to utilize tactical equilibrium to sustain international peace, as during the Cold War. Instead, British, and usually American, operations have predominantly begun to **rely** up**on technological superiority** to inflict defeat with the minimum of risk to Western forces. Such developments **affect the way** in which **conflict is presented to and accepted** by an audience. In essence, as Michael Ignatieff argues, this movement has brought about the development of a concept of **virtual war**. 7 Western publics are shielded from the reality of hostilities by sanitized news coverage and by a sanitized version of combat in which only the enemy appears to suffer greatly. This suffering, however, is not portrayed in human terms comparable with Western losses. The enemy is **dehumanized through propaganda** and the destruction deemed acceptable whereas public opinion constrains the acceptable number of Western casualties. Modern technology enables the presentation of conflict in a computerized style, both distorting the reality of war and lending itself to presentation using visual media. With an increased military specialization and reliance on the high-tech, it is becoming harder for journalists to comprehend fully the military hardware being used. Difficulties in understanding the technology employed are compounded by media constraints that hinder the number of reporters permanently employed to cover specific areas, such as defence. Society then further compounds the gap between civilian and military comprehension as an absence of any formal military experience in many cases exacerbates this lack of military understanding. The problem of non-specialized knowledge of defence issues is best illustrated by the Daily Mail’s coverage of the Gulf War. Owing to visa difficulties, it was necessary to send Richard Kay, their Royal Correspondent, to cover the events in the Gulf. The lack of an established worldwide network of reporters in distinct locations can in turn lead to accusations of erratic selection of newsworthy items. In an environment **where media coverage appears to be operating at saturation level**, there is a temptation to believe in the concept that coverage should be all encompassing. Yet, the existing contemporary academic and popular debates have **stressed the commercial demands imposed on the press**. Coverage of events often appears erratic, presenting the modern world as chaotic, without structure, and prone to sudden international flashpoints. This is caused, according to Philip Taylor, by the media’s random approach to selecting newsworthy items. Taylor explains: [O]ther people’s war appear to erupt from nowhere on our **t**ele**v**ision screens until the crisis subsides, and the media lose interest. The causes and consequences of those crises rarely command media attention. This leaves the impression of a chaotic and turbulent world when, in reality, **there is an ‘order’ functioning in the** invisible **background** of daily global life. But order is hardly newsworthy. It is the crises, the coups, the famines, the earthquakes, which make the headlines. 8 Newspapers are event driven and cover conflict only as long as it remains an asset to the commercial and entertainment value of the media product. Events sell papers and keeping Newspapers, the reporter and the wider context 23reporters on location to cover unfolding stories methodically wastes resources and fails to warrant column inches. This argument is not confined to newspapers and appears consistent with commentary concerning the wider media. As Nik Gowing of BBC World explains, ‘the response of news organisations at all levels has become increasingly variable and unpredictable…a crisis in one part of the world can easily be viewed elsewhere as irrelevant’. 9 However, to suggest this is a new phenomenon is somewhat misleading. While it is necessary to stress the erratic appearance of news reportage one must not assume that this is a significantly new development. The piecemeal representation of events, filtered through editorial processes and the limitations of time and space, is merely the continuation of a traditional approach to journalism. The perception that this issue is greater in the modern era stems from the plethora of news sources available to the public. Greater coverage does not necessarily equate to broader or more in-depth appreciation of world events. When events do appear on the news agenda the surprise is exacerbated simply by the belief that news should be more comprehensive, rather than the actual reality of the nature of coverage.

**Kellner, 08**Douglas Kellner, professor of philosophy at UCLA, "Preface The Ideology of HIgh-Tech/Postmodern War vs. the Reality of Messy Wars." <http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/2008_Kellner_MessyWarPreface_ver29052008FINAL.pdf>

Hence, phenomenal new military technologies are being produced in the Third Millennium, described as the instruments of an emergent postmodern warfare, and envisaged earlier by Philip K. Dick and other SF writers. These military technologies, described in Messy Wars, are changing the nature of warfare and are part of a turbulent technological revolution with wide-ranging effects. They are helping to engender a novel type of highly intense "hyperwar," cyberwar, or technowar, where technical systems make military decisions and humans are put out of the loop, or are forced to make instant judgments based on technical data. As computer programs displace military planners and computer simulations supplant charts and maps of the territory, technology supersedes humans in terms of planning, decision making and execution. On the level of the battlefield itself, human power is replaced by machines, reducing the soldier to a cog in a servomechanism. These developments are alarming and led French theorist Paul Virilio (1989, 84) to comment in War and Cinema: The disintegration of the warrior's personality is at a very advanced stage. Looking up, he sees the digital display (optoelectronic or holographic) of the windscreen collimator; looking down, the radar screen, the onboard computer, the radio and the video screen, which enables him to follow the terrain with its four or five simultaneous targets; and to monitor his selfnavigating Sidewinder missiles fitted with a camera of infra-red guidance system. **The autonomization of warfare and** ongoing **displacement of humans by technology** creates the specter of technology taking over and the possibility of **military accidents**, leading to, Virilio warns us, the specter of global **catastrophe**. There is a fierce argument raging in military circles between those who want to delegate more power and fighting to the new "brilliant" weapons opposed to those who want to keep human operators in charge of technical systems. Critics of cyberwar worry that as technology supplants human beings, taking humans out of decision-making loops, the possibility of accidental firing of arms at inappropriate targets and even nuclear war increases. Since the 1980s, Virilio criticized the **accelerating speed of modern technology** and indicated how it was producing developments that were spinning out of control, and that, in the case of military technology, could lead to **the end of the human race** (see Virilio and Lotringer’s Pure War 1983). For Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current era unfolds such that "the new war machine combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the disappearance of places in vehicular extermination" (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased pace of destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and computer-governed networks constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer geostrategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, creating "a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe" (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, "strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day," with microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing the way for what Virilio calls "pure war," a situation where military technologies and an accompanying technocratic system come to dominate every aspect of life. In Virilio's view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological growth and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing "a state of emergency" where nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species. This consists of a shift from a "geo-politics" to a "chrono-politics," from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever commands the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant sociopolitical force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific form of accident and a nuclear accident would be catastrophic. Hence, in the contemporary era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency with hightech networks that enables military state to **impose its imperatives** on ever more domains of political and social life, as shown in Messy Wars’ chapter 3 about war environment.

**Bernstein et al, 2k** (Steven Bernstein.,Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber**,**University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley**. “**God Gave Physics the Easy Problems”European Journal of International Relations2000; 6; 43.)

Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors**. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if** an appropriate catalyst **will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing**what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information **reliably** and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context isultimately **a set of mental constructs**. We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships - even if they existed - could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. ***Any*regularities** would be 'soft'; they **would be** the outcome of processes that are embedded *Overcoming Physics Envy*The conception of **causality** on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this - given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in **closed** **systems**. Open systems can be influenced by **external** **stimuli**, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this *a priori*from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As**physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible**. The risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theorytesting' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5

**No China war**

Robert J. Art, Fall 2010 Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall 2010): p359(33)

The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability vis-a-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically. These three benchmarks--China's ambitions will grow as its power grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising-dominant power dyads--are the starting points from which to analyze America's interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.

**Won’t pass the nuclear threshold**

**Moore 6** (Scott; Research Assistant – East Asia Nonproliferation Program – James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies – Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat,” 10/18, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_80.html>)

Despite the tumult, there is broad consensus among experts that the concerns generated in this discussion are exaggerated. The size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is small, estimated at around 200 warheads;[3] Jeffrey Lewis, a prominent arms control expert, claims that 80 is a realistic number of deployed warheads.[4] In contrast, the United States has upwards of 10,000 warheads, some 5,700 of which are operationally deployed.[5]

Even with projected improvements and the introduction of a new long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the DF-31A China's nuclear posture is likely to remain one of "minimum deterrence."[6] Similarly, despite concern to the contrary, there is every indication that China is extremely unlikely to abandon its No First Use (NFU) pledge.[7] The Chinese government has continued to deny any change to the NFU policy, a claim substantiated by many Chinese academic observers.[8] In sum, then, fears over China's current nuclear posture seem somewhat exaggerated.

This document, therefore, does not attempt to discuss whether China's nuclear posture poses a probable, general threat to the United States; most signs indicate that even in the longer term, it does not. Rather, it seeks to analyze the most likely scenarios for nuclear conflict. Two such possible scenarios are identified in particular: a declaration of independence by Taiwan that is supported by the United States, and the acquisition by Japan of a nuclear weapons capability.

Use of nuclear weapons by China would require a dramatic policy reversal within the policymaking apparatus, and it is with an analysis of this potential that this brief begins. Such a reversal would also likely require crises as catalysts, and it is to such scenarios, involving Taiwan and Japan, that this brief progresses. It closes with a discussion of the future of Sino-American nuclear relations.