# 1nc

#### The aff ignores the prior question of Native American colonization --we are colonial occupiers of stolen land.

**Churchill, 03** (Ward, Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader, “I am Indigenist: Notes on the Ideology of the Fourth World”).

Leaving aside questions concerning the validity of various treaties, the beginning point for any indigenist endeavor in the United States centers, logically enough, in efforts to restore direct Indian control over the huge portion of the continental U. S. which was plainly never ceded by native nations. Upon the bedrock of this foundation, a number of other problems integral to the present configuration of power and privilege in North American society can be resolved, not just for Indians, but for everyone else as well. It’s probably impossible to solve, or even to begin meaningfully addressing, certain of these problems in any other way. Still, it is, as they say, “no easy sell” to convince anyone outside the more conscious sectors of the American Indian population itself of the truth of this very simple fact. In part, uncomfortable as it may be to admit, this is because even the most progressive elements of the North American immigrant population share a perceived commonality of interest with the more reactionary segments. 47 This takes the form of a mutual insistence upon an imagined “right” to possess native property, merely because they are here, and because they desire it. The Great Fear is, within any settler state, that if indigenous land rights are ever openly acknowledged, and native people therefore begin to recover some significant portion of their land, that the settlers will correspondingly be dispossessed of that—most notably, individually held homes, small farms and ranches, and the like—which they’ve come to consider “theirs. ”48 Tellingly, every major Indian land recovery initiative in the U. S. during the second half of the twentieth century—those in Maine, the Black Hills, the Oneida claims in New York State, and Western Shoshone land claim are prime examples—has been met by a propaganda barrage from right-wing organizations ranging from the Ku Klux Klan to the Republican Party warning individual nonindian property holders of exactly this “peril. ” 49 I’ll debunk some of this nonsense in a moment, but first I want to take up the posture of self-proclaimed left radicals in the same connection. And I’ll do so on the basis of principle, because justice is supposed to matter more to progressives than to right-wing hacks. Allow me to observe that the pervasive and near-total silence of the left in this respect has been quite illuminating. Nonindian activists, with only a handful of exceptions, persistently plead that they can’t really take a coherent position on the matter of Indian land rights because, “unfortunately, ” they’re “not really conversant with the issues” (as if these were tremendously complex). Meanwhile, they do virtually nothing, generation after generation, to inform themselves on the topic of who actually owns the ground they’re standing on. 50 Listen up folks: The record can be played only so many times before it wears out and becomes just another variation of “hear no evil, see no evil. ” At this point, it doesn’t take Einstein to figure out that the left doesn’t know much about such things because it’s never wanted to know, or that this is so because it has always had its own plans for utilizing land it has no more right to than does the status quo it claims to oppose. 51 The usual technique for explaining this away has always been a sort of pro forma acknowledgement that Indian land rights are of course “really important” (yawn), but that one “really doesn’t have a lot of time” to get into it. (I’ll buy your book, though, and keep it on my shelf even if I never read it. ) Reason? Well, one is just “too busy” working on “other issues” (meaning, things that are considered to actually be important). Typically enumerated are sexism, racism, homophobia, class inequities, militarism, the environment, or some combination thereof. It’s a pretty good evasion, all in all. Certainly, there’s no denying any of these issues their due; they are all important, obviously so. But more important than the question of whose land we’re standing on? There are some serious problems of primacy and priority embedded in the orthodox script. 52 To frame things clearly in this regard, let’s hypothesize for a moment that all of the various nonindian movements concentrating on each of the above-mentioned issues were suddenly successful in accomplishing their objectives. Let’s imagine that the United States as a whole were somehow transformed into an entity defined by the parity of its race, class, and gender relations, its embrace of unrestricted sexual preference, its rejection of militarism in all forms, and its abiding concern with environmental protection. (I know, I know, this is a sheer impossibility, but that’s my point. ) When all is said and done, the society resulting from this scenario is still, **first and foremost, a colonialist society**, an imperialist society in the most fundamental possible sense, with all that that implies. 53 This is true because the scenario does nothing at all to address the fact that whatever is happening happens on someone else’s land, not only without their consent, but through an adamant disregard for their rights to the land. Hence, **all it means is that the invader population has rearranged its affairs in such a way as to make itself more comfortable** at the continuing expense of indigenous people. The colonial equation remains intact and may **even be reinforced** by a greater degree of participation and vested interest in maintenance of the colonial order among the settler population at large. The dynamic here is not very different from that evident in the American “Revolution” of the late eighteenth century, is it? 55 And we all know very well where that led, don’t we? Should we therefore begin to refer to socialist imperialism, feminist imperialism, gay and lesbian imperialism, environmentalist imperialism, Afroamerican and la Raza imperialism? I hope not. I hope instead that this is mostly just a matter of confusion, of muddled priorities among people who really do mean well and would like to do better. 56 If so, then all that is necessary to correct the situation is a basic rethinking of what it is that must be done, and in what order. Here, I’ll advance the straightforward premise that **the land rights of “First Americans” should serve as a first priority** for attainment of everyone seriously committed to accomplishing positive change in North America.

#### The origins of violence towards the other began, not with theoretical misdirection, but with the genocide of the Native Americans. The only way to address these issues is to begin by taking this material reality seriously.

**Rogin, 88** (http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Political\_Repression/Political\_Repression\_US.html. “Political Repression in the United States”, from the book *Ronald Reagan: The Movie and other episodes in political demonology,* Michael, Prof of Poli Sci UC Berkeley).

Masterless Indians had challenged European institutional restraints at the beginning of American history. Early settlers made Indians a threat to community. By the Age of Jackson, Americans celebrated their own independence, which Indian tribalism threatened to confine. White Americans contrasted their own freedom, disciplined by self-restraint, with the subversive, idle, and violent freedom of the Indians. The self-reliant American gained his freedom, won his authority, and defined the American national identity in violent Indian combat in the West. With the perceived closing of the continental frontier in the 1890s the policy of Manifest Destiny was extended to Asia. The suppression of the Philippine independence movement after the Spanish-American war caused hundreds of thousands of deaths. America was, according to those who carried out and defended its Philippine policy, continuing Its conquest over and tutelage of primitive tribes. Indian policy also set precedents for twentieth-century interventions in Latin America. The country's expansionist history against savage peoples of color culminated rhetorically and in practice in the war in Vietnam. Counterinsurgent, savage warfare returned in the 1980s to the New World, Central American arena where it had always prospered, as the United States supported death squads in San Salvador and terror bombing and a scorched earth policy in the El Salvador countryside, the torture and murder of Guatemalan Indians, and terrorist attacks by "freedom fighters" on the people and government of Nicaragua. Calling the Nicaraguan contras "the moral equal of our Founding Fathers," President Reagan laid claim to a tradition for which other citizens of the United States might wish to make reparation. Indian policy also had domestic implications. Indians were the first people to stand in American history as emblems of disorder, civilized breakdown, and alien control. Differences between reds and whites made cultural adaptation seem at once dangerous and impossible. The violent conquest of Indians legitimized violence against other alien groups, making coexistence appear to be unnecessary. The paranoid style in American politics, as Richard Hofstadter has labeled it, goes back to responses to Indians. The series of Red scares that have swept the country since the 1870s have roots in the original red scares. Later countersubversive movements attacked aliens, but the people who originally assaulted reds were themselves aliens in the land. Responses to the Indians point to the mixture of cultural arrogance and insecurity in the American history of countersubversion. The identity of a self-making people, engaged in a national, purifying mission, may be particularly vulnerable to threats of contamination and disintegration. The need to draw rigid boundaries between the alien and the self suggests fears of too dangerous an intimacy between them. Just as fears of subversion moved from Indians to other social groups, so did techniques of control. The group ties of workers and immigrants were assaulted in the name of individual freedom. State violence, used to punish Indians who allegedly preferred war to labor, was also employed against striking workers. A paternal model of interracial relations developed in slavery as well as in Indian policy. Finally, Indians shared their status as beneficiaries of meliorist confinement with the inmates of total institutions. These arenas-slavery, the asylum, labor relations, and radical dissent-form the major loci of American political suppression.

#### They give a stimulant to a predator culture --- more growth doesn’t do anything besides propelling us further into our current trajectory

**Tremblay 10** – (Francois, 2/28/10, http://francoistremblay.wordpress.com/2010/02/28/what-is-the-economy/, RBatra)

We routinely talk about “the economy” as if it were a self-evident concept. We say “the economy is growing” and “the economy is in bad shape,” without really discussing what it is exactly that we’re referring to. There are three measures we use more or less interchangeably when we discuss “the economy”: GDP, retail sales and employment.

The GDP includes, to generalize, everything produced and consumed within a country or exported to other countries. In this “everything in one pot” view, everything counts, regardless of its causes or its effects on society. You contract an illness and buy medical care, you’re in a wreck and pay for car repairs, you buy cigarettes or alcohol based on an addiction, factories are rebuilt after a war, shells and fighter planes are built to destroy those factories, a lumber company cuts down a forest down to the last tree, the government spends billions on a new boondoggle, a corporation charges you monopoly prices, there’s a gas discount and everyone’s filling up. **Even though all these things are symptomatic of social problems, they are counted as part of “the economy.” The genocide in Iraq is a boon to “the economy”** (although, in the long term, war spending has a persistent negative effect on GDP and employment, either through inflation, higher interest rates, or increased taxes). Mindless consumption is a boon to “the economy.”

The money in the big pot could be going to cancer treatments or casinos, violent video games or usurious credit-card rates. It could go towards the $9 billion or so that Americans spend on gas they burn while they sit in traffic, or the billion plus that goes to such drugs as Ritalin and Prozac that schools are stuffing into kids to keep them quiet in class. The money could be the $20 billion or so that Americans spend on divorce lawyers each year, or the $41 billion on pets, or the $5 billion on identity theft, or the billions more spent to repair property damage caused by environmental pollution. The money in the pot could betoken social and environmental breakdown- misery and distress of all kinds. It makes no difference. You don’t ask. All you want to know is the total amount, which is the GDP. So long as it is growing then everything is fine.

Jonathan Rowe, co-director of West Marin Commons

One might reply that this is a misguided criticism, since the GDP is precisely meant as a “kitchen sink” metric for all production. But the GDP is also often criticized for omitting to count many vast areas of trade, including housekeeping, production for self-consumption, black markets and underground economies (which in some societies are bigger than the white market), crime, and barter. The only logical conclusion is that the subject most conducive to growth is a person who is perpetually just sick enough to need medical care but not enough to stop working, morbidly obese from constant eating, always drives everywhere, hires maids instead of cleaning his own house, and does not interact with anyone but Wal-Mart workers.

Retail sales is another metric that gets trotted out in the mainstream media, especially around Christmas. The assumption here is that the more money people spend during the year, the better off “the economy” is. But **this is counter-intuitive, as spending can be motivated by all sorts of reasons, including inflation, short-term biases, and outright fraud**. People are tricked into buying goods by marketing campaigns and a panoply of retail tricks and lies. Retail sales do not take into account the quality of products or what they may do to our quality of life, and under that point I could repeat a lot of the things I said above. **They also do not include the consequences of depending on big retail corporations for our livelihood, or the consequences of globalization on the third world.**

Saving money is actually a very positive thing for the well-being of the individual, and yet increased savings (as we are seeing right now) wreak havoc on “the economy.” Unfortunately, people generally under-save and get in debt too easily for their own good, partially due to human psychology and partially due to the centralized banking system which causes scarcity of credit.

**Measuring employment suffers from the same general flaws, as it does not take into account the nature of the jobs in question: not only the quality of the work environment, the wage, or the work structure (especially how hierarchical it is), but also what the work itself entails**. It’s easy to see what a CEO, a commodities trader or a monopoly banker contribute to the corporatist system, but very difficult to see their contribution to the well-being of society. Even though they are “employed,” it’s hard to say that a soldier, a policeman or a bureaucrat, on the whole, contribute anything positive to society. **Employment statistics, therefore, are at best very incomplete, and at worst completely misleading.**

If these three metrics do not measure general well-being, or even how well the economy fulfills our needs, what do they measure? The GDP measures how much is produced and consumed. Retail sales measure how much is consumed, and how much surplus is generated. Employment measures how many people are participating to production. It is not the nature of production or consumption that is examined, but the concept of production and consumption themselves. The only possible conclusion we can arrive at, is that **these metrics measure** **the health of the corporatist system, not well-being or the fulfillment of needs.**

The underlying premise behind the use of these metrics is shared by all parties and ideologies on the mainstream political spectrum: growth is inherently good. Not all of these ideologies support the idea that growth should be completely unlimited and unchecked (Greenies, for instance, believe that growth should be tempered with environmental considerations), **but they all judge growth as a primary objective.** Not only that, but they believe that growth alone can solve socio-economic problems, the good old tried-and-true statist technique of “if we project enough force and throw enough money at a problem, it will eventually disappear.” If “the economy” keeps growing, goes the argument, then we’ll have more money to pump into health care, we’ll have more money to pump into education, we’ll have more money to pump into social programs, and everything will correct itself. A shining example of this insanity, Mosler’s Law, states that “there is no financial crisis so deep that a sufficiently large increase in public spending cannot deal with it.”

This is the same kind of argument that statists use when talking about government and corporatism, of the “we just need to put good people in charge” type. Putting better people or more money in a broken system won’t fix it. Solely producing more goods cannot change the balance of power in a society and cannot correct **inefficiencies and immoralities caused by the very fabric of the economy that produces them**. On the contrary, **one can only expect it to make the problems worse, because it maintains the viability of the current capital-democratic system.**

#### Given the aff's negligence, our alternative is to reject the affirmative’s ontological ignorance --- this is a crucial starting point by addressing the material conditions of violence.

**Churchill, 03** (Ward, Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader, “I am Indigenist: Notes on the Ideology of the Fourth World”).

Not only is it perfectly reasonable to assert that a restoration of native control over unceded lands within the U. S. would do nothing to perpetuate such problems as sexism and classism, but the reconstitution of indigenous societies this would entail stands to free the affected portions of North America from such maladies altogether. Moreover, it can be said that the process should have a tangible impact in terms of diminishing such things elsewhere. The principle is this: sexism, racism, and all the rest arose here as concomitants to the emergence and consolidation of the eurocentric state form of sociopolitical and economic organization. **Everything the state does**, everything it *can* do, **is entirely contingent upon its maintaining its internal cohesion**, a cohesion signified above all by its pretended territorial integrity, its ongoing domination of Indian Country. Given this, it seems obvious that the literal dismemberment of the state inherent to Indian land recovery correspondingly reduces the ability of the state to sustain the imposition of objectionable relations within itself. It follows that realization of indigenous land rights serves to undermine or destroy the ability of the status quo to continue imposing a racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, militaristic order upon *non*indians. A brief aside: anyone with doubts as to whether it’s possible to bring about the dismemberment from within of a superpower state in this day and age ought to sit down and have a long talk with a guy named Mikhail Gorbachev. It would be better yet if you could chew the fat with Leonid Brezhnev, a man who we can be sure would have replied in all sincerity—only three decades ago—that this was the most outlandish idea he’d ever heard. Well, look on a map today, and see if you can find the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It ain’t there, my friends. Instead, you’re seeing, and you’re seeing it more and more, the reemergence of the very nations Léon Trotsky and his colleagues consigned to the “dustbin of history” clear back at the beginning of the century. These megastates are not immutable. They *can* be taken apart. They *can* be destroyed. But first we have to decide that we can do it, and that we *will* do it. So, all things considered, when indigenist movements like AIM advance slogans like “U. S. Out of North America, ” nonindian radicals shouldn’t react defensively. They should cheer. They should see what they might do to help. When they respond defensively to sentiments like those expressed by AIM, what they are ultimately defending is the very government, the very order they claim to oppose so resolutely. And if they manifest this contradiction often enough, consistently enough, pathologically enough, then we have no alternative but to take them at their word, that they really are at some deep level or other aligned—all protestations to the contrary notwithstanding—with the mentality which endorses our permanent dispossession and disenfranchisement, our continuing oppression, our ultimate genocidal obliteration as self-defining and self-determining peoples. In other words, they make themselves part of the problem rather than becoming part of the solution.

#### Taking the decolonization of North America seriously is the only way to control the state. It is impossible to end oppression without starting in Indian Country. Otherwise, extinction is inevitable.

**Churchill, 03** (Ward, Acts of Rebellion: The Ward Churchill Reader, “Radioactive Colonization”).

It is worth observing that the ensuing decolonization of Native North America would offer benefits to humanity extending far beyond itself. Every inch of territory and attendant resources withdrawn from U. S. “domestic” hegemony diminishes the relative capacity of America’s corporate managers to project themselves outward via multilateral trade agreements and the like, consummating a “New World Order” in which most of the globe is to be subordinated and exploited in accordance with models already developed, tested, and refined through their applications to Indian Country. Overall, elimination of this threat yields the promise of an across-the-board recasting of relations between human beings, and of humans with the rest of nature, which is infinitely more equitable and balanced than anything witnessed since the beginnings of European expansionism more than 500 years ago. In the alternative, if the current psychopolitical/socioeconomic status quo prevails, things are bound to run their deadly course. Felix Cohen’s figurative miners will inevitably share the fate of their canary, the genocide they so smugly allow as an “acceptable cost of doing business” blending perfectly into their own **autogenocide until the grim prospect of species extinction has at last been realized**. There is, to be sure, a certain unmistakable justice attending the symmetry of this scenario (“What goes around, comes around, ” as Charlie Manson liked to say).

#### Their predictions are Linear shots in the dark --- these questions are extraordinarily difficult to ascertain accurate information about—biases and limited context prefigure flawed interpretations of incomplete data sets.

**Bernstein et al, 2k** (Steven Bernstein.,Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber**,**University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley**. “**God Gave Physics the Easy Problems”European Journal of International Relations2000; 6; 43.)

Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors**. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if** an appropriate catalyst **will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing**what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information **reliably** and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context isultimately **a set of mental constructs**. We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships - even if they existed - could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. ***Any*regularities** would be 'soft'; they **would be** the outcome of processes that are embedded *Overcoming Physics Envy*The conception of **causality** on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this - given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in **closed** **systems**. Open systems can be influenced by **external** **stimuli**, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this *a priori*from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As**physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible**. The risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theorytesting' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5

#### Every ounce of defense we win against the case is offense---repetition of impact inflation serves as the catalyst for accelerating warfare

**Willcox, 05** – PhD University of Kent (David R. *PROPAGANDA, THE PRESS AND CONFLICT*, http://potsdam.yorex.org/sites/potsdam.yorex.org/files/propaganda%20and%20press.pdf)

Media technology advances do not only affect the perception of conflict. Changes in the nature of warfare have also altered both the ability to cover war and the style in which it is reported. The First and Second World Wars presented a fight for national survival not evident in later twentieth-century conflicts involving British armed forces. The post1945 Cold War era, whereby a bipolar ideological conflict defined the nature of hostilities, has been surpassed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even during the relatively short time span between the Gulf War and the Kosovo Conflict, it is evident that different military, political and ideological incentives for justifying entry into hostilities have formed. Furthermore, once conflict has begun its nature is also susceptible to change. The Gulf War eventually required a decisive ground offensive, a move initially deemed unimaginable in some early press reports. The Kosovo Conflict was fought from the air alone, shattering the widely held assumptions that the successful outcome of such conflicts was not militarily viable. To add further differentials, Kosovo operations were fought under NATO command unlike the US-led forces in the Gulf War. In these respects, the nature of a conflict introduces a further variable into the influences affecting media coverage of hostilities. The character of conflict has shifted in focus away from massed military formations attempting to utilize tactical equilibrium to sustain international peace, as during the Cold War. Instead, British, and usually American, operations have predominantly begun to **rely** up**on technological superiority** to inflict defeat with the minimum of risk to Western forces. Such developments **affect the way** in which **conflict is presented to and accepted** by an audience. In essence, as Michael Ignatieff argues, this movement has brought about the development of a concept of **virtual war**. 7 Western publics are shielded from the reality of hostilities by sanitized news coverage and by a sanitized version of combat in which only the enemy appears to suffer greatly. This suffering, however, is not portrayed in human terms comparable with Western losses. The enemy is **dehumanized through propaganda** and the destruction deemed acceptable whereas public opinion constrains the acceptable number of Western casualties. Modern technology enables the presentation of conflict in a computerized style, both distorting the reality of war and lending itself to presentation using visual media. With an increased military specialization and reliance on the high-tech, it is becoming harder for journalists to comprehend fully the military hardware being used. Difficulties in understanding the technology employed are compounded by media constraints that hinder the number of reporters permanently employed to cover specific areas, such as defence. Society then further compounds the gap between civilian and military comprehension as an absence of any formal military experience in many cases exacerbates this lack of military understanding. The problem of non-specialized knowledge of defence issues is best illustrated by the Daily Mail’s coverage of the Gulf War. Owing to visa difficulties, it was necessary to send Richard Kay, their Royal Correspondent, to cover the events in the Gulf. The lack of an established worldwide network of reporters in distinct locations can in turn lead to accusations of erratic selection of newsworthy items. In an environment **where media coverage appears to be operating at saturation level**, there is a temptation to believe in the concept that coverage should be all encompassing. Yet, the existing contemporary academic and popular debates have **stressed the commercial demands imposed on the press**. Coverage of events often appears erratic, presenting the modern world as chaotic, without structure, and prone to sudden international flashpoints. This is caused, according to Philip Taylor, by the media’s random approach to selecting newsworthy items. Taylor explains: [O]ther people’s war appear to erupt from nowhere on our **t**ele**v**ision screens until the crisis subsides, and the media lose interest. The causes and consequences of those crises rarely command media attention. This leaves the impression of a chaotic and turbulent world when, in reality, **there is an ‘order’ functioning in the** invisible **background** of daily global life. But order is hardly newsworthy. It is the crises, the coups, the famines, the earthquakes, which make the headlines. 8 Newspapers are event driven and cover conflict only as long as it remains an asset to the commercial and entertainment value of the media product. Events sell papers and keeping Newspapers, the reporter and the wider context 23reporters on location to cover unfolding stories methodically wastes resources and fails to warrant column inches. This argument is not confined to newspapers and appears consistent with commentary concerning the wider media. As Nik Gowing of BBC World explains, ‘the response of news organisations at all levels has become increasingly variable and unpredictable…a crisis in one part of the world can easily be viewed elsewhere as irrelevant’. 9 However, to suggest this is a new phenomenon is somewhat misleading. While it is necessary to stress the erratic appearance of news reportage one must not assume that this is a significantly new development. The piecemeal representation of events, filtered through editorial processes and the limitations of time and space, is merely the continuation of a traditional approach to journalism. The perception that this issue is greater in the modern era stems from the plethora of news sources available to the public. Greater coverage does not necessarily equate to broader or more in-depth appreciation of world events. When events do appear on the news agenda the surprise is exacerbated simply by the belief that news should be more comprehensive, rather than the actual reality of the nature of coverage.

#### Debate is composed of utopian imaginaries --- political feasibility is irrelevant

**McGee and Romanelli 97** – Assistant Professor in Communication Studies at Texas Tech AND Director of Debate at Loyola University of Chicago

(Brian and David, “Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 18 (1997) 23-35, dml)

Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address “something we can ACTUALLY DO” as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT” (“Fantasy as Reality” 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible.

Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position, nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of *Beavis and Butthead*, social criticism is what good citizens do**.**

Debate differs from other species of social criticism because debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit. Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly deconstructive. Instead, such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change, whether that criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

One way to understand the distinction between debate as policy-making and debate as social criticism is to examine Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder’s agenda-building theory.5 Cobb and Elder are well known for their analytic split of the formal agenda for policy change, which includes legislation or other action proposed by policy makers with formal power (e.g., government bureaucrats, U.S. Senators), from the public agenda for policy change, which is composed of all those who work outside formal policy-making circles to exert influence on the formal agenda. Social movements, lobbyists, political action committees, mass media outlets, and public opinion polls all constitute the public agenda, which, in turn, has an effect on what issues come to the forefront on the formal agenda. From the agenda-building perspective, one cannot understand the making of public policy in the United States without comprehending the confluence of the formal and public agenda.

In intercollegiate debate, the policy-making metaphor has given primacy to formal agenda functions at the expense of the public agenda. Debaters are encouraged to bypass thinking about the public agenda in outlining policy alternatives; appeals for policy changefrequentlyare made by debaters under the strange pretense that they and/or their judges are members of the formal agenda elite. Even arguments about the role of the public in framing public policy are typically issued by debaters as if those debaters were working within the confines of the formal agenda for their own, instrumental advantage. (For example, one thinks of various social movement “backlash” disadvantage arguments, which advocate a temporary policy paralysis in order to stir up public outrage and mobilize social movements whose leaders will demand the formal adoption of a presumably superior policy alternative.) The policy-making metaphor concentrates on the formal agenda to the near exclusion of the public agenda, as the focus of a Katsulas or a Dempsey on the “real-world” limitations for making policy indicates.

Debate as social criticism does not entail exclusion of formal agenda concerns from intercollegiate debate. The specified agent of action in typical policy resolutions makes ignoring the formal agenda of the United States government an impossibility. However, one need not be able to influence the formal agenda directly in order to discuss what it is that the United States government should do. Undergraduate debaters and their judges usually are far removed—both physically and functionally—from the arena of formal-agenda deliberation. What the disputation of student debaters most closely resembles, to the extent that it resembles any real-world analog, is public-agenda social criticism. What students are doing is something they really CAN do as students and ordinary citizens; they are working in their own modest way to shape the public agenda.

While “social criticism” is the best explanation for what debaters do, this essay goes a step further. The mode of criticism in which debaters operate is the production of utopian literature. Strictly speaking, debaters engage in the creation of fictions and the comparison of fictions to one another. How else does one explain the affirmative advocacy of a plan, a counterfactual world that, by definition, does not exist? Indeed, traditional inherency burdens demand that such plans be utopian, in the sense that current attitudes or structures make the immediate enactments of such plans unlikely in the “real world” of the formal agenda. Intercollegiate debate is utopian because plan and/or counterplan enactment is improbable. While one can distinguish between incremental and radical policy change proposals, the distinction makes no difference in the utopian practice of intercollegiate debate.

More importantly, intercollegiate debate is utopian in another sense. Policy change is considered because such change, it is hoped, will facilitate the pursuit of the good life. For decades, intercollegiate debaters have used fiat or the authority of the word “should” to propose radical changes in the social order, in addition to advocacy of the incremental policy changes typical of the U.S. formal agenda. This wide range of policy alternatives discussed in contemporary intercollegiate debate is the sign of a healthy public sphere, where thorough consideration of all policy alternatives is a possibility. Utopian fiction, in which the good place that is no place is envisioned, makes possible the instantiation of a rhetorical vision prerequisite to building that good place in our tiny corner of the universe. Even Lewis Mumford, a critic of utopian thought, concedes that we “can never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in utopia; but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all” (Mumford 24-25).

An objection to this guiding metaphor is that it encourages debaters to do precisely that to which Snider would object, which is to “make believe” that utopia is possible. This objection misunderstands the argument. These students already are writers of utopian fiction from the moment they construct their first plan or counterplan text. Debaters who advocate policy change announce their commitment to changing the organization of society in pursuit of the good life, even though they have no formal power to call this counterfactual world into being. Any proposed change, no matter how small, is a repudiation of policy paralysis and the maintenance of the status quo. As already practiced, debate revolves around utopian proposals, at least in the sense that debaters and judges lack the formal authority to enact their proposals. Even those negatives who defend the current social order frequently do so by pointing to the potential dystopic consequences of accepting such proposals for change.

# Small Farms

#### Ignorance of the colonial tradition makes solving the environment impossible

George E. **Tinker,** Iliff School Of Technology, **1996** [Defending Mother Earth: Native American Perspectives On Environmental Justice, Ed. Jace Weaver, P. 171-72]

My suggestion that we take the recognition of indigenous sovereignty as a priority is an overreaching one that involves more than simply justice for indigenous communities around the world. Indeed, such a political move will necessitate a **rethinking of consumption patterns** in the North, and a shift in the economics of the North will cause a concomitant shift also in the Two-thirds World of the South. The relatively simple act of recognizing the sovereignty of the Sioux Nation and returning to it all state-held lands in the Black Hills (for example, National Forest and National Park lands) would generate immediate international interest in the rights of the indigenous, tribal peoples in all state territories. In the United States alone it is estimated that Indian nations still have legitimate (moral and legal) claim to some two-thirds of the U.S. land mass. Ultimately, such an act as return of Native lands to Native control would have a significant ripple effect on other states around the world where indigenous peoples still have aboriginal land claims and suffer the ongoing results of conquest and displacement in their own territories. American Indian cultures and values have much to contribute in the comprehensive reimagining of the Western value system that has resulted in our contemporary ecojustice crisis. The main point that must be made is that **there were and are cultures that take their natural environment seriously and attempt to live in balance with the created whole around them in ways that help them not overstep environmental limits**. Unlike the West’s consistent experience of alienation from the natural world, these cultures of indigenous peoples consistently experienced themselves as part of the that created whole, in relationship with everything else in the world. They saw and continue to see themselves as having responsibilities, just as every other creature has a particular role to play in maintaining the balance of creation as an ongoing process. This is ultimately the spiritual rationale for annual ceremonies like the Sun Dance or Green Corn Dance. As another example, Lakota peoples planted cottonwoods and willows at their campsites as they broke camp to move on, thus beginning the process of reclaiming the land humans had necessarily trampled through habitation and encampment. We now know that indigenous rainforest peoples in what is today called the state of Brazil had a unique relationship to the forest in which they lived, moving away from a cleared area after farming it to a point of reduced return and allowing the clearing to be reclaimed as jungle. The group would then clear a new area and begin a new cycle of production. The whole process was relatively sophisticated and functioned in harmony with the jungle itself. So extensive was their movement that some scholars are now suggesting that there is actually very little of what might rightly be called virgin forest in what had been considered the “untamed” wilds of the rainforest. What I have described here is more than just a coincidence or, worse, some romanticized falsification of Native memory. Rather, I am insisting that there are peoples in the world who live with an acute and cultivated sense of their intimate participation in the natural world as part of an intricate whole. For indigenous peoples, this means that when they are presented with the concept of development, it is sense-less. Most significantly, one must realize that this awareness is the result of self-conscious effort on the part of the traditional American Indian national communities and is rooted in the first instance in the mythology and theology of the people. At its simplest, the worldview of American Indians can be expressed as Ward Churchill describes it: Human beings are free (indeed, encouraged) to develop their innate capabilities, but only in ways that do not infringe upon other elements – called “relations,” in the fullest dialectical sense of the word – of nature. Any activity going beyond this is considered as “imbalanced,” a transgression, and is strictly prohibited. For example, engineering was and is p not permanently alter the earth itself. Similarly, agriculture was widespread, but only within norms that did not supplant natural vegetation. Like the varieties of species in the world, each culture has contributed to make for the sustainability of the whole. Given the reality of eco-devastation threatening all of life today, the survival of American Indian cultures and cultural values may make the difference for the survival and sustainability for all the earth as we know it. What I have suggested implicitly is that the American Indian peoples may have something of values – something corrective to Western values and the modern world system – to offer to the world. **The loss of these gifts, the loss of the particularity of these peoples, today threatens the survivability of us all**. What I am most passionately arguing is that we must commit to the struggle for the just and moral survival of Indian peoples as peoples of the earth, and that this struggle is for the sake of the earth and for the sustaining of all life. It is now imperative that we change the modern value of acquisitiveness and the political systems and economics that consumption has generated. The key to making this massive value shift in the world system may lie in the international recognition of indigenous political sovereignty and self-determination. Returning Native lands to the sovereign control of Native peoples around the world, beginning in the United States, is not simply just; the survival of all may depend on it.

**They can’t overcome a litany of other subsidies and policies prioritizing large farm development**

**Boyce, 2004** ( James K. July, Ph.D. in economics from Oxford, Prof. at Amherst,  A Future for Small Farms? Biodiversity and Sustainable Agriculture, <http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_51-100/WP86.pdf> )

The small farmer is today an endangered species. In the industrialized countries of the global North, the number of farmers has been dwindling for generations. In the United States, for example, the total number of farms fell from 6.8 million in 1935 to fewer than 2 million today (Stam and Dixon, 2004). Referring to trends in Europe, where the farming population is now declining by three percent annually, a recent *The New York Times*editorial derides the idea that every village that was inhabited in Charlemagne’s day must be sustained,’ and declares that ‘more consolidation, in the form of larger-scale farming and an abandonment of absurdly inefficient production, is inevitable.’1

In the developing countries of the global South, governments and international agencies alike appear to be intent on following the same path. Fifty years after the publication of Sir Arthur Lewis’s (1954) dual-economy model, in which economic development was identified with the transfer of labor from the ‘subsistence’ agricultural sector to the ‘capitalist’ industrial sector, the assumption that small farms are destined for the dustbin of history remains conventional wisdom.‘Those *indios*,’ a Guatemalan official told me a few years ago, referring to the country’s indigenous majority, ‘as long as they grow maize just like their grandparents, they’ll be poor just like their grandparents.’2

Rather than simply letting nature take its ostensible course, governments often seek to speed it along, promoting agricultural ‘modernization’ by means of subsidies and other policies that favor large-scale farming, purchases of farm machinery and chemical inputs, and more uniformity in the choice of crops and varieties. In a sense, these policies aim to subsume agriculture itself, and not only its erstwhile labor force, into the industrial economy. Even if the demise of the small farm were not a foregone conclusion, these policies could make it a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Food prices

**Empirically–food crises are effected by local factors, not global prices**

**Paarlberg, 08 -** professor of political science at Wellesley College and a visiting professor of government at Harvard University (Robert, “The Real Food Crisis,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 6/27, lexis)

Ironically, it was only when the so-called food crisis of the 1970s came to an end, during the slow-growth decade of the 1980s, that food circumstances in poor countries significantly worsened. In Latin America, even though world **food prices** were falling sharply, the number of hungry people increased from 46 million to more than 60 million. The reason was a regional "debt crisis" triggered by higher U.S. interest rates after 1979. The number of hungry people also increased sharply in Africa during the 1980s. The reason was faltering farm production, exacerbated in some regions by severe drought and civil conflict. The price for imported food was down, but hunger was up. Most real food crises are local rather than global.

# Econ

#### Economics as a science fails - their predictions are useless

**Bergmann 5** (Barbara, Professor Emerita of Economics at Maryland and American and trustee of the Economists for Peace and Security, July, "The Current State of Economics: Needs Lots of Work," Annals of the American Academy of POoitical and Social Science, Sage Publications, JSTOR)

More than two hundred years have passed since the publication of The Wealth of Nations, yet we are still far from having a science we can rely on to prevent major malfunctions of the economy or to treat them when they do occur. A nation's economy is a difficult entity to study. Yet the inherent difficulty of the subject matter is not the only problem. The study of the economy has not developed as have other sciences, in which direct observation and data collection by the scientists themselves play a large part. Most members of the economics profession study and create economic theory that is neither inspired nor validated by observation. There is little direct engagement by economists with people, businesses, banks, markets; little inquiry as to who does what and why; little observing at firsthand of any actual economic functioning.1 There are exceptions: a relatively small segment of the profession is doing hands-on research on the way people behave when faced with economic decisions. However, they are only in the earliest stagey of developing a body of knowledge that could inform economic policy making. And only a handful have yet ventured out of the laboratory, where observations are made on students playing the part of the economic actors, to go into the field, where the behavior of real economic actors going about their business is to be seen. One indication of the poor state of development of economics is the well-known and much ridiculed lack of agreement among professional economists on policy with regard to such vital issues as unemployment, budget deficits, taxes, inflation, international trade, the promotion of growth, and the government regulation of business. What is even more disturbing than the lack of agreement is the fact that political ideology quite obviously determines which side of any controversy about economic theory or economic policy any particular economist is likely to take. The invasion of scientific argument by nonscientific considerations—sympathies for particular groups, attachment to certain extrascientific beliefs or value judgments—is not totally unheard of in the physical sciences, but there its effect, unlike the situation in economics, is minor. A few professional biologists of some eminence are fundamentalist Christians who reject the theory of evolution. But the factual evidence for evolution is so overwhelming that their numbers remain tiny, and their influence on ongoing research and theorizing among biologists is nil. In economics, on the other hand, evidence that has so far been collected on most of the important issues is scarce, indirect, difficult to interpret, and not well suited to provide answers that would settle the controversies. This is particularly true in macroeconomics, which deals with such issues as unemployment, inflation, and foreign trade. As a result, evidence is seldom decisive in winning adherents to a particular view of any economic issue. The failure of appeals to evidence to settle controversies decisively and the pervasive influence of ideology combine to allow great freedom to the formulators of economic theory. Without fear of contradiction, at least from the faction to which they belong, economists can and do purvey far-fetched notions to considerable acclaim, some of which are referred to below. Material gain and career advancement also come into play. Any particular economic policy holds the possibility of adding to the income and wealth of some people and subtracting from the income and wealth of others. Politicians beholden to particular groups in the population can pick and choose among economists. This gives an incentive for economists to divide themselves into two camps, so that whichever party comes to power will have a ready-made corps of economists willing and ready to recommend policies congenial to the party's constituency.

#### No econ impact

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### No impact—last recession proves econ doesn’t determine conflict or instability

**Barnett 2009** – senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review (8/25, Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” World Politics Review, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>, WEA)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

So, to sum up:

No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?);

The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places);

Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered);

No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy);

A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and

No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis.

Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis?

Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed.

Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis?

If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism.

At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please!

Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon?

Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

#### There in so such thing as the global economy—economic links are regional

**Fletcher 2010** – Adjunct Fellow at the San Francisco office of the U.S. Business and Industry Council (7/7, Ian, Huffington Post, “The myth of the global economy”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/the-myth-of-the-global-ec\_b\_638546.html, props to Mustafa for the cite, WEA)

If there's one thing everyone knows these days, whether they're happy about it or not, it's that we live in a "global" economy. This fact is taken as so obvious that anyone who disputes it is regarded as not so much wrong as simply ignorant -- not even worth arguing with. So it may come as a shock to many that, in reality, the cliche that we live in a borderless global economy does not survive serious examination. The key is to ignore the Thomas Friedmanesque rhetoric the media is flooded with and get down to some hard numbers. The easiest hard number is this: Because the U.S. is roughly 25 percent of the world economy, a truly borderless world would imply that imports and exports would each make up 75 percent of our economy, since our purchase and sale transactions would be distributed around the world. This would entail a total trade level (imports plus exports) of 150 percent of GDP. Instead, our total trade level is 29 percent: imports are 17 percent and exports 12 percent. So our economy is nowhere near borderless. Furthermore, as our trade is almost certainly destined to be balanced by import contraction, rather than an export boom, in the next few years, our trade level is almost certainly poised to go down, not up. So unless the U.S. can somehow magically find a way to keep sucking in $300 to $700 billion a year in imports it doesn't pay for with exports, America in a few years will be importing significantly less and will be a less globalized economy. A truly unified world economy would also mean that rates of interest and profit would have to be equal everywhere--because if they weren't, the differences would be arbitraged away by the financial markets. But this is nowhere near being the case: Interest rates and corporate profits vary widely around the world. Economists James Anderson and Eric van Wincoop have calculated that the average cost of international trade (ignoring tariffs) is the equivalent of a 170 percent tariff. Even between adjacent and similar nations like the U.S. and Canada, national borders still count: Canadian economist John McCallum has documented that trade between Canadian provinces is on average 20 times as large as the corresponding trade between Canadian provinces and American states. And much of international trade is interregional anyway, not global, being centered on European, North American, and East Asian blocs; this is true for just under 50 percent of both agriculture and manufactured goods. In reality, the world economy remains what it has been for a very long time: a thin crust of genuinely global economy (more visible than its true size due to its concentration in media, finance, technology, and luxury goods) over a network of regionally-linked national economies, over vast sectors of every economy that are not internationally traded at all (70 percent of the U.S. economy, for example). On present trends, it will remain roughly this way for the rest of our lives. The world economy in the early 21st century is not even remotely borderless. Another stubborn reality is that, contrary to what some people seem to think, the nation-state is a long way from being economically irrelevant. Most fundamentally, it remains relevant to people because most people still live in the nation where they were born, which means that their economic fortunes depend upon wage and consumption levels within that one society. Unemployed Americans are learning this the hard way right now. Capital is a similar story. Even in the early 21st century, it hasn't been globalized nearly as much as often imagined. And it also cares very much about where it lives, frequently for the same reasons people do. (Few people wish to live or invest in Zimbabwe; many people wish to live and invest in California.) For a start, because 70 percent of America's capital is human capital, a lot of capital behaves exactly as people do, simply because it is people. Another 12 percent has been estimated by the World Bank to be social capital, the value of institutions and knowledge not assignable to individuals. So although liquid financial capital can indeed flash around the world in the blink of an electronic eye, this is only a fraction (under 10 percent) of any developed nation's capital stock. Even most nonhuman capital resides in things like real estate, infrastructure, physical plant, and types of financial capital that don't flow overseas -- or don't flow very much. (Economists call this "don't flow very much" phenomenon home bias, and it is well documented.) As a result, the output produced by all this capital is still largely tied to particular nations. So although capital mobility certainly causes big problems of its own, it is nowhere near big enough to literally abolish the nation-state as an economic unit. Will it do so one day? Even this is unlikely. Even where famously dematerializing and globalizing assets, like fiber optic telecom lines, are added -- assets that supposedly make physical location irrelevant--they are still largely being added where existing agglomerations of capital are. For example, although fiber optic backbones have gone into places like Bangalore, India, which were not global economic centers a generation ago, big increments of capacity have also gone into places like Manhattan, Tokyo, Silicon Valley, and Hong Kong, which were already important. As a result, existing geographic agglomerations of capital are largely self-reinforcing and here to stay, even if new ones come into being in unexpected places (often through decisions made by national governments). And these agglomerations have national shape because of past history; legacy effects can be extremely durable. Previous technological revolutions, such as the worldwide spread of railroads, were at least as big as current innovations like the Internet, and they didn't abolish the nation-state. Ironically, the enduring relevance of the national economy is clearest in some of the "poster child" countries of globalization, like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Ireland. In each of these nations, economic success was the product of policies enacted by governments that were in some sense nationalist. Japan industrialized after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to avoid being colonized by some Western power. Taiwan did it out of fear of mainland China. South Korea did it out of fear of North Korea. Ireland did it to escape economic domination by England. In each case, the driving force was not simply desire for profit. This exists in every society (including resource-rich basket cases like Nigeria, where it merely produces gangsterism), but does not reliably crystallize into the policies needed for economic growth. The driving force was national political needs that found a solution in economic development.