### 1nc

#### We are navigating the most complex arrangement in the world, the human cognitive environment

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In semiotics when one speaks about texts and languages there is a much broader connotation of these two terms than in our daily use of them. So a text can be any content supported by any transmission medium and implemented in a language appropriate to that medium – independent of whether such language is symbolic, iconic or a combination of both, and also independent of whether it is intended to unimodal or multimodal reception, if seen from the cognitive point of view. In some sort of atomistic, and rather static, view, the “semiotic universe” could be regarded as the totality of individual texts and isolated languages as they relate to each other. In this case, says Lotman (2005/1984), all structures will look as if they are constructed out of individual bricks. According to him it is more useful to take a more organic and dynamic point of view: all semiotic space may be regarded as a unified system in a dynamic process. In this case, primacy does not lie in one or another sign of whatever language, but in the “greater system”, namely the “Semiosphere”. The semiosphere is the semiotic space, outside of which the whole of communication, i.e.: semiosis itself, cannot exist.

In his Semiotic Theory of Culture, Lotman (2005/1984; 1990), defines the Semiosphere as “the whole semiotic space of the culture in question”. In analogy to Vernadsky’s biosphere, the semiosphere is the necessary virtual semiotic space for the existence and functioning of all languages. It is a sort of emergent dynamic system (or process) that could not be seen as just the sum total of all past and existing different languages and cultural products (i.e. texts) that are and have been implemented in such languages.

This semiotic space, the semiosphere, is **the necessary condition for culture to continue its historical unfolding**. It has a diachronic dimension in the sense that through the use of languages and media we are in touch with the “virtual” facts (since they don’t exist anymore) and narratives from the past and from many different cultural currents that have taken life throughout human history. It also simultaneously has a synchronic dimension implied by the active cultural process of the present where **so many languages, cultural texts and currents mingle continuously in many dynamic layers of the whole semiosphere**. The continuous diachronic-synchronic interplay determines the extension or the reach of a particular culture in a particular period. If we consider the current state of contemporary globalised culture we can claim that the evolution of the technosphere has enormously augmented the possibilities to navigate and reach synchronically and diachronically much larger extensions of the semiosphere than ever before. The hyper availability of texts and cultural representations of all kinds in real time expand the geography of human knowledge and cultural production as never before. Not only because of ease of access but also because of accumulated quantity. But more is not necessarily better, as a positivistic view of progress would claim. The semiosphere is a dynamic space were many small and big, past and present, “sub-semiospheres” continuously interact creating new layers of meanings, transforming information and knowledge by **continuous translations and interpretations of the old and the new**, of the official and the fringe, of what belongs to the center of a given sub-semiosphere and what **comes from the periphery to conquer the center and transform its very nature**.

One feature claimed by Lotman is the semiosphere’s incredible heterogeneity. The languages that fill up the semiotic space are various and they relate to each other along a spectrum that may go from complete mutual translatability to complete mutual untranslatability. At all stages of development there are contacts with texts and cultural products coming in from cultures which formerly lay beyond the boundaries of the given semiosphere. Because of the impossibility of complete translatability these “cultural invasions”, sometimes by whole cultural layers, affect the internal structure of the “world picture” of a given culture. These dynamic relations, superpositions and transformations get a critical and hypercomplex nature when it comes to “digital culture”. Across any synchronic section of the semiosphere different languages, texts and cultural processes at different stages of development may be in conflict. For example, some texts may be immersed in languages not their own while the codes to decipher them may be entirely absent. **The acceleration of these processes may have huge consequences for the tensions and trade-offs between cultural diversity and homogenization and for the emergence and proliferation of the thousands of unsustainable cultural details** to which Bateson was referring. The concept of semiosphere brings cultural analysis into contact with the history of culture and with the newest phenomena in culture (Torop, 2005), including of course what interests us here, i.e.: “digital culture”.

The virtual space of culture that we are calling, after Lotman, the semiosphere, has always counted with a physical substrate for its maintenance and actualization. In this regard the first cognitive technology that needs to be mentioned is natural language itself, both for synchronic and diachronic communication, starting with oral tradition. Even at this stage there is a physical substrate for the dynamic cultural exchange (in the semiosphere), in this case the network of human beings with their physiological bodies and cognitive systems. But there has also been all along the development of multimodal cognitive technologies to support the expansion of the semiosphere, also of highly iconic nature, as the long history of media illustrates, from cave paintings to augmented reality. Until we find ourselves in the present technospheric configuration of connectivity, pervasiveness and synchronicity in which new technologies have given rise to what we call “digital culture”, due merely to an extension of the semiosphere’s substrate, i.e. the technosphere – and both its synchronic and diachronic reach – allowed by the advent of digital technology.

The analytical semiosphere/technosphere dichotomy illustrates the more general considerations of the distinction, in the specific case of media, between “content” and “form”. By referring to Lotman’s dynamic cultural ecology we obtain a more dynamic model in order to better characterize the complexity of the issue. The “content” stored in the technosphere is on a continuous basis dynamically actualized and transformed by the interactive cognitive and semiotic process of millions of human agents. As eloquently put by neuroscientist Steven Rose: “With its hundred billion nerve cells, with their hundred trillion interconnections, the human brain is the most complex phenomenon in the known universe – always, of course, excepting the interaction of some six billion such brains and their owners within the socio-technological culture of our planetary ecosystem!” (Rose, 2005) to which we would like to add the further complexity given by the diachronic interaction of our current six billion brains with the many other billions that have preceded us.

#### The 1ac uses Linear shots in the dark --- point predictions are impossible to obtain sufficient knowledge

**Bernstein et al, 2k** (Steven Bernstein.,Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber**,**University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley**. “**God Gave Physics the Easy Problems”European Journal of International Relations2000; 6; 43.)

Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors**. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if** an appropriate catalyst **will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing**what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information **reliably** and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context isultimately **a set of mental constructs**. We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships - even if they existed - could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. ***Any*regularities** would be 'soft'; they **would be** the outcome of processes that are embedded *Overcoming Physics Envy*The conception of **causality** on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this - given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in **closed** **systems**. Open systems can be influenced by **external** **stimuli**, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this *a priori*from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As**physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible**. The risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theorytesting' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5

### Post-Nature World 1nc

#### Nuclear dominance becomes a pole that our collective human work becomes drawn to --- technologies oriented around control divide us from nature

Kinsella 2k5 (William, assoc prof comm @ NC State“One Hundred Years of Nuclear Discourse: Four Master Themes and Their Implications for Environmental Communication” Environmental Communication Yearbook, vol. 2, 49-72.)

The theme of nuclear entelechy provides a basis for some concluding observations on nuclear discourse and its relationship to environmental communication. In an influential essay that was centrally concerned with entelechy, although it did not employ that term, Heidegge**r** (1977) developed an existentialist concept of technology as a mode of "revealing."For Heidegger, technology was a way of apprehending the world, through which the essence of the world is revealed to humans, but also a way by which the essence of humanity is revealed**.** Through this dual revealing, both the world and the human agent (or the human species) are brought to completion**.** From this perspective, we can view the present nuclear situation, and the present environmental situation, as revealing the telos toward which the human community and the world are moving.Rather than responding fatalistically, we can use these signs to understand, and potentially reconstruct, ourselves and our relationship to the world.Heidegger distinguished sharply between traditional technologies such as windmills or waterwheels, which draw on the forces present in the natural world while conforming to those forces, and modern technologies such as nuclear power plants**,** which intervene radically in the world to reorder it for human purposes. In the latter mode, the world is viewed exclusively as a "standing reserve," a collection of resources to be organized and made available for use. In this regard, nuclear technologies are among the most radically interventionist, or most "modern," of all. Although they are modern in the sense of being historically new, they are also archetypical products of a modernist discursive formation that is now almost 4 centuries old. That discourse, in turn, has roots that are much older. The contemporary dilemmas posed by nuclear technologies are products of how we discursively construct the world and our relationship with it, and of how we act on the world within that conceptual framework. Nuclear discourse structures a social and cultural order in which the "conquest" of the atom provides a model, and a legitimating symbol, for the domination of nature more generally. Ultimately, that domination extends beyond the material domain to the domains of society, culture, and politics. The themes of mystery, potency, secrecy, and entelechy are useful not only for illuminating how this process has operated thus far, but also for raising questions about where the process is leading and how we might choose that endpoint more consciously.

#### This creates a genocidal nuclear telos that is at the core of their prolif impacts

Kato, 12 – a Lecturer and Researcher at the University of Hawai'i system (Masahide T., *Expanding Our Collective Conceptual Horizon*, http://kdebate.com/kato.html)

Another important element of discourse or imagery that became outdated with the CTBT is a type of grammar where the nation-state still holds its sovereign status. The nation state or the State party is now a global enforcer of this contract of industrial civilization. The territory and jurisdiction of a given nation-state is subjugated to the global enforcement, to which each signatory nation-state is obligated to contribute. In some ways, it is similar to hosting a gathering of supra states such as the WTO and the IMF, as the nation-state is there to enforce a global contract, not to protect its citizens. The actual subject of the treaty is the transnational corporate sovereign that effaces itself behind the contract. You could say it's a biopolitical grammatical turn where the subject is the network of nuclear capital and the object is the agent unauthorized by the super states. The nation-state status is accorded as a party to the contract, which in essence is nothing but a transnational enforcer. Therefore, the political battles between the US, backed by TNCs (Transnational Conglomerates), on one hand, and N. Korea, Iran, and other “rogue” states that behave or might behave as “unauthorized agents” on the other hand, seems at first to be over the latter’s nation-state sovereign status. However, it is misleading to see the contestation over the sovereign status in the context of north-south conflict, because the “rogue” state’s claim to a nation-state narrative can corner them into the “existential state” wherein **the state’s suicidal and genocidal tendencies become indistinguishable** 1. Fundamentally, what we are witnessing here is the process in which the state’s self-other destructive tendencies culminate in the nuclear state. In other words, the state sovereignty – regardless of whether it’s a “rational” industrial state or a “beastly” rogue state – achieves its telos in **holding the nuclear capital at the center of its existence**: it sovereignly presides over the life and death of the other as well as its own simultaneously through the sheer power of mass destruction and contamination. The recent nuclear disaster in Japan brought this contradiction of nuclear existential state to a broad daylight where a suicidal/genocidal “war” can be triggered by nature **even if the nuclear fixed capital is officially not designed for a militaristic purpose**.

#### Incorporating awareness of our dialoguing with the natural world is crucial to reversing a genocidal tradition

George E. **Tinker,** Iliff School Of Technology, **1996** [Defending Mother Earth: Native American Perspectives On Environmental Justice, Ed. Jace Weaver, P. 171-72]

My suggestion that we take the recognition of indigenous sovereignty as a priority is an overreaching one that involves more than simply justice for indigenous communities around the world. Indeed, such a political move will necessitate a **rethinking of consumption patterns** in the North, and a shift in the economics of the North will cause a concomitant shift also in the Two-thirds World of the South. The relatively simple act of recognizing the sovereignty of the Sioux Nation and returning to it all state-held lands in the Black Hills (for example, National Forest and National Park lands) would generate immediate international interest in the rights of the indigenous, tribal peoples in all state territories. In the United States alone it is estimated that Indian nations still have legitimate (moral and legal) claim to some two-thirds of the U.S. land mass. Ultimately, such an act as return of Native lands to Native control would have a significant ripple effect on other states around the world where indigenous peoples still have aboriginal land claims and suffer the ongoing results of conquest and displacement in their own territories. American Indian cultures and values have much to contribute in the comprehensive reimagining of the Western value system that has resulted in our contemporary ecojustice crisis. The main point that must be made is that **there were and are cultures that take their natural environment seriously and attempt to live in balance with the created whole around them in ways that help them not overstep environmental limits**. Unlike the West’s consistent experience of alienation from the natural world, these cultures of indigenous peoples consistently experienced themselves as part of the that created whole, in relationship with everything else in the world. They saw and continue to see themselves as having responsibilities, just as every other creature has a particular role to play in maintaining the balance of creation as an ongoing process. This is ultimately the spiritual rationale for annual ceremonies like the Sun Dance or Green Corn Dance. As another example, Lakota peoples planted cottonwoods and willows at their campsites as they broke camp to move on, thus beginning the process of reclaiming the land humans had necessarily trampled through habitation and encampment. We now know that indigenous rainforest peoples in what is today called the state of Brazil had a unique relationship to the forest in which they lived, moving away from a cleared area after farming it to a point of reduced return and allowing the clearing to be reclaimed as jungle. The group would then clear a new area and begin a new cycle of production. The whole process was relatively sophisticated and functioned in harmony with the jungle itself. So extensive was their movement that some scholars are now suggesting that there is actually very little of what might rightly be called virgin forest in what had been considered the “untamed” wilds of the rainforest. What I have described here is more than just a coincidence or, worse, some romanticized falsification of Native memory. Rather, I am insisting that there are peoples in the world who live with an acute and cultivated sense of their intimate participation in the natural world as part of an intricate whole. For indigenous peoples, this means that when they are presented with the concept of development, it is sense-less. Most significantly, one must realize that this awareness is the result of self-conscious effort on the part of the traditional American Indian national communities and is rooted in the first instance in the mythology and theology of the people. At its simplest, the worldview of American Indians can be expressed as Ward Churchill describes it: Human beings are free (indeed, encouraged) to develop their innate capabilities, but only in ways that do not infringe upon other elements – called “relations,” in the fullest dialectical sense of the word – of nature. Any activity going beyond this is considered as “imbalanced,” a transgression, and is strictly prohibited. For example, engineering was and is p not permanently alter the earth itself. Similarly, agriculture was widespread, but only within norms that did not supplant natural vegetation. Like the varieties of species in the world, each culture has contributed to make for the sustainability of the whole. Given the reality of eco-devastation threatening all of life today, the survival of American Indian cultures and cultural values may make the difference for the survival and sustainability for all the earth as we know it. What I have suggested implicitly is that the American Indian peoples may have something of values – something corrective to Western values and the modern world system – to offer to the world. The loss of these gifts, the loss of the particularity of these peoples, today threatens the survivability of us all. What I am most passionately arguing is that we must commit to the struggle for the just and moral survival of Indian peoples as peoples of the earth, and that this struggle is for the sake of the earth and for the sustaining of all life. It is now imperative that we change the modern value of acquisitiveness and the political systems and economics that consumption has generated. The key to making this massive value shift in the world system may lie in the international recognition of indigenous political sovereignty and self-determination. Returning Native lands to the sovereign control of Native peoples around the world, beginning in the United States, is not simply just; the survival of all may depend on it.

#### Hegemony never existed – system is de-centralized, applying hegemonic mythology to policy causes blowback and destroys cooperation

Doran, 09 (Charles F., Andrew W. Mellon Prof. of International Relations, Director of the Global Theory and History Program, Director of the Center for Canadian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U., “Fooling Oneself: The Mythology of Hegemony” International Studies Review, Vol. 11.1)

More than a catalogue of techniques other governments use to resist U.S. titular hegemony, this book informs an important question, long-debated, about the concept of hegemony. If the United States is a hegemon, why does a balance of power, composed of rivals that severely disagree with hegemonic domination, not form against the dominant United States? Building on the guidelines proposed by Wohlstetter (1964, 1968) and Elmore (1985) for the making of sound policy, namely, to see the world through the lens of the other so as to anticipate what others might conclude and do, the book critiques the very notion of hegemony. In this review, I argue from the perspective that the current conception of hegemony has neither historical nor theoretical justification (Doran 1991, pp. 117-121), and that many of the categories and examples assessed here bear witness to this reality. Joseph Nye (1990) distinguished between hegemony based on domination and control and a state carrying out a leadership role. Historically, as Doran (1971) argued, all military attempts at hegemonic domination in the central system failed; other members of the system rolled back these bids for hegemony forcefully, and the subsequent peace was neither designed nor governed (Ikenberry 1989; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Gaddis 2002) by any single state. Hegemony therefore involved *attempts* at centralized control, but never realized control. Instead, equilibrium among highly unequal states (Kissinger 2005) preserved the de-centralized nature of the international system (Vasquez 1993). Mearsheimer (2001) concurred that, as opposed to regions (Hurrell 2004) such as Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union or as opposed to the relationship between colonies and mother country (Mckeown 1983), hegemony in the central system never existed. The central international system is pluralistic, de-centralized, and subject to the rules of balance. Across long periods of history, the structure of the system changes as states follow their respective trajectories of relative power, reflecting their ability to carry out a variety of foreign policy roles. And at any point in time, states are located at highly unequal positions on these evolving power cycles. But a hegemon, a single all-powerful state, has never dominated and controlled; nor does it today; nor will it in the future. The United States is an “ordinary power” (Rosecrance 1976) like others, just more powerful, and, accordingly, more capable of providing certain leadership functions in the system. The choice of “global leadership” is far different from that of “global domination” (Brzezinski 2004). Failure to understand this reality has gotten the United States into the situation that is described in this book. The articles in *Hegemony Constrained* provide strong evidence in support of the claim that the reason a balance of power of disaffected states has not formed against the US is that, in other than defensive terms (Keohane 1984), hegemony does not exist except in the minds of a few theorists of international relations and influential advocates in policy circles. Not unexpectedly, other governments have discovered tactics to elude and to minimize the effect of such applications within US foreign policy. The excesses of application in the George W. Bush administration are the outcome of a mythology long in the making, extending from E.H. Carr’s extrapolation from British colonialism, and nurtured through American theorizing about the existence of a hegemon that dominates the system until a new rising state defeats and replaces the prior hegemon in a systems transforming war (Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski and Thompson 1989; Kugler and Lemke 1996;Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdol-Lahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000). In the aftermath of the collapse of bipolarity, the belief that unipolarity meant such hegemony began affecting foreign policy decision-making and rhetoric during the Clinton administration (when America was proclaimed “the biggest bulldog on the block”). Quite in contrast is the argumentation of all prior administrations, going back to the Eisenhower administration, a time when America enjoyed greater relative power differentials (Pollins 1996) than those existing today. Yet, led by a groundswell of neo-conservative foreign policy thought (Krauthamer 1991;Mastanduno 1997; Wohlforth 1999; Kagan 2002; Barnett 2004), intellectual elites have so committed themselves to the hegemonic thesis that they have blinded themselves to the consequences of their own speculation. Should they be surprised when the “hierarchy” of international relations turns out to be non-existent, or the capacity to control even very weak and divided polities is met with frustration? Americans have invented a mythology of hegemonic domination that corresponds so poorly to the position they actually find themselves in that they cannot comprehend the responses of other governments to their actions. Bobrow and his fellow writers show the dozens of ways that other governments find to evade, and to subvert, the proscriptions and fulminations emanating from Washington. By creating a mythology of hegemony rather than learning to work with the (properly conceived) balance of power, the United States has complicated its foreign policy and vastly raised the costs of its operation (Brown et al. 2000; Brzezinski 2004). By destroying a secular, albeit brutal, Sunni Arab center of power in Iraq, the United States must now contend with a far greater problem (Fearon 2006) of itself having to hold the country together and to balance a resurgent Iran. Bogged down in Iraq, it is unable to deter aggression against allies elsewhere such as Georgia and the Ukraine, or to stop the growing Russian penetration of Latin America. By waving the flag of hegemony, the United States finds that very few other governments see the need to assist it, because hegemony is supposed to be self-financing, self-enforcing, and self-sufficient.

#### The aff gives a stimulant to a predator culture

**Street, 05** (March 18th, http://www.doublestandards.org/street1.html, Paul, Those Who Deny the Crimes of the Past: American Racist Atrocity Denial, Paul Street is research director at the Chicago Urban League. His articles, essays, and reviews have appeared in In These Times, Z Magazine, Monthly Review, Dissent, Journal of Social History, Mid-America, and the Journal of American Ethnic History).

It is especially important to appreciate the significance of the vicious, often explicitly genocidal "homeland" assaults on native-Americans, which **set foundational racist and national-narcissist patterns for subsequent U.S. global butchery**, disproportionately directed at non-European people of color. The deletion of the real story of the so-called "battle of Washita" from the official Seventh Cavalry history given to the perpetrators of the No Gun Ri massacre is no small detail. Denial about Washita and Sand Creek (and so on) encouraged US savagery at Wounded Knee, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in the Philippines, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in Korea, the denial of which encouraged US savagery in Vietnam, the denial of which (and all before) has recently encouraged US savagery in Afghanistan and Iraq. It's a vicious circle of recurrent violence, well known to mental health practitioners who deal with countless victims of domestic violence living in the dark shadows of the imperial homeland's crippling, stunted, and itself-occupied social and political order. Power-mad US forces deploying the latest genocidal war tools, some suggestively named after native tribes that white North American "pioneers" tried to wipe off the face of the earth (ie, "Apache," "Blackhawk," and "Comanche" helicopters) are walking in bloody footsteps that trace back across centuries, oceans, forests and plains to the leveled villages, shattered corpses, and stolen resources of those who Roosevelt acknowledged as America's "original inhabitants." Racist imperial carnage and its denial, like charity, begin at home. **Those who deny the crimes of the past are likely to repeat their offenses in the future** as long as they retain the means and motive to do so.  It is folly, however, for any nation to think that it can stand above the judgments of history, uniquely free of terrible consequences for what Ward Churchill calls "imperial arrogance and criminality." Every new U.S. murder of innocents abroad breeds untold numbers of anti-imperial resistance fighters, ready to die and eager to use the latest available technologies and techniques to kill representatives – even just ordinary citizens – of what they see as an American Predator state. This along with much else will help precipitate an inevitable return of US power to the grounds of earth and history. As that fall accelerates, the U.S. will face a fateful choice, full of potentially grave or liberating consequences for the fate of humanity and the earth. It will accept its fall with relief and gratitude, asking for forgiveness, and making true reparation at home and abroad, consistent with an honest appraisal of what Churchill, himself of native-American ancestry, calls "the realities of [its] national history and the responsibilities that history has bequeathed": goodbye American Exceptionalism and Woodrow Wilson's guns. Or Americans and the world will face the likely alternative of permanent imperial war and the construction of an ever-more imposing U.S. fortress state, perpetuated by Orwellian denial and savage intentional historical ignorance. This savage barbarism of dialectically inseparable empire and inequality will be defended in the last wagon-train instance by missiles and bombs loaded with radioactive materials wrenched from lands once freely roamed by an immeasurably more civilized people than those who came to destroy.

### Framework 1nc

#### **We should embrace an empathetic dialogue with the world outside of this – this sort of ontological shift can serve as a catalyst for renewal of the energy in our society**

Rifkin 10 [Jeremy, masters degree in international affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, January 2010, Huffington Post, “The Empathic Civilization': Rethinking Human Nature in the Biosphere Era”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization\_b\_416589.html]

What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history? The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. **The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring**, organizing and managing more **complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible**. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex. Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also **change human consciousness in the process**. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness. **Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks**. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction. By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others. Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed. In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet. When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life. The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also changes human consciousness. The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history.

#### Debate involves the trading of utopian imaginaries for ballots --- metrics like political feasibility are irrelevant

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(Brian and David, “Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 18 (1997) 23-35, dml)

Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address “something we can ACTUALLY DO” as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT” (“Fantasy as Reality” 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible.

Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position, nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of *Beavis and Butthead*, social criticism is what good citizens do**.**

Debate differs from other species of social criticism because debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit. Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly deconstructive. Instead, such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change, whether that criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

One way to understand the distinction between debate as policy-making and debate as social criticism is to examine Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder’s agenda-building theory.5 Cobb and Elder are well known for their analytic split of the formal agenda for policy change, which includes legislation or other action proposed by policy makers with formal power (e.g., government bureaucrats, U.S. Senators), from the public agenda for policy change, which is composed of all those who work outside formal policy-making circles to exert influence on the formal agenda. Social movements, lobbyists, political action committees, mass media outlets, and public opinion polls all constitute the public agenda, which, in turn, has an effect on what issues come to the forefront on the formal agenda. From the agenda-building perspective, one cannot understand the making of public policy in the United States without comprehending the confluence of the formal and public agenda.

In intercollegiate debate, the policy-making metaphor has given primacy to formal agenda functions at the expense of the public agenda. Debaters are encouraged to bypass thinking about the public agenda in outlining policy alternatives; appeals for policy changefrequentlyare made by debaters under the strange pretense that they and/or their judges are members of the formal agenda elite. Even arguments about the role of the public in framing public policy are typically issued by debaters as if those debaters were working within the confines of the formal agenda for their own, instrumental advantage. (For example, one thinks of various social movement “backlash” disadvantage arguments, which advocate a temporary policy paralysis in order to stir up public outrage and mobilize social movements whose leaders will demand the formal adoption of a presumably superior policy alternative.) The policy-making metaphor concentrates on the formal agenda to the near exclusion of the public agenda, as the focus of a Katsulas or a Dempsey on the “real-world” limitations for making policy indicates.

Debate as social criticism does not entail exclusion of formal agenda concerns from intercollegiate debate. The specified agent of action in typical policy resolutions makes ignoring the formal agenda of the United States government an impossibility. However, one need not be able to influence the formal agenda directly in order to discuss what it is that the United States government should do. Undergraduate debaters and their judges usually are far removed—both physically and functionally—from the arena of formal-agenda deliberation. What the disputation of student debaters most closely resembles, to the extent that it resembles any real-world analog, is public-agenda social criticism. What students are doing is something they really CAN do as students and ordinary citizens; they are working in their own modest way to shape the public agenda.

While “social criticism” is the best explanation for what debaters do, this essay goes a step further. The mode of criticism in which debaters operate is the production of utopian literature. Strictly speaking, debaters engage in the creation of fictions and the comparison of fictions to one another. How else does one explain the affirmative advocacy of a plan, a counterfactual world that, by definition, does not exist? Indeed, traditional inherency burdens demand that such plans be utopian, in the sense that current attitudes or structures make the immediate enactments of such plans unlikely in the “real world” of the formal agenda. Intercollegiate debate is utopian because plan and/or counterplan enactment is improbable. While one can distinguish between incremental and radical policy change proposals, the distinction makes no difference in the utopian practice of intercollegiate debate.

More importantly, intercollegiate debate is utopian in another sense. Policy change is considered because such change, it is hoped, will facilitate the pursuit of the good life. For decades, intercollegiate debaters have used fiat or the authority of the word “should” to propose radical changes in the social order, in addition to advocacy of the incremental policy changes typical of the U.S. formal agenda. This wide range of policy alternatives discussed in contemporary intercollegiate debate is the sign of a healthy public sphere, where thorough consideration of all policy alternatives is a possibility. Utopian fiction, in which the good place that is no place is envisioned, makes possible the instantiation of a rhetorical vision prerequisite to building that good place in our tiny corner of the universe. Even Lewis Mumford, a critic of utopian thought, concedes that we “can never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in utopia; but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all” (Mumford 24-25).

An objection to this guiding metaphor is that it encourages debaters to do precisely that to which Snider would object, which is to “make believe” that utopia is possible. This objection misunderstands the argument. These students already are writers of utopian fiction from the moment they construct their first plan or counterplan text. Debaters who advocate policy change announce their commitment to changing the organization of society in pursuit of the good life, even though they have no formal power to call this counterfactual world into being. Any proposed change, no matter how small, is a repudiation of policy paralysis and the maintenance of the status quo. As already practiced, debate revolves around utopian proposals, at least in the sense that debaters and judges lack the formal authority to enact their proposals. Even those negatives who defend the current social order frequently do so by pointing to the potential dystopic consequences of accepting such proposals for change.

#### Without these ontological shifts first, Energy infrastructure has empirically entrenched global ills more and more

**Byrne and Toly 2k6** (john, Noah, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse” Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, And Society in Conflict. Eds John Byrne, Noah Toly, and Leigh Glover. Pgs 1-32. Transaction Publishers. )

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system’s operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings—almost one-third of the planet’s population—experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact—and sometimes exacerbated—social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smil, 2003: 370 - 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector’s performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of “energy futures” that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who, early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg, 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner “too cheap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, cited in the New York Times 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the “magical fire” or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize “inherently safe reactors” (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in “sustainable energy alternatives” that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, “green” energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy “haves” and “havenots.” 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291), “today’s nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people” as “micropower meets village power.” Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a “solar global economy... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world’s cultural diversity” (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet’s climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime’s operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (1934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ...an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity—here are the enemies. The living organism demands a life-sustaining environment. Modernity’s formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity’s supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era’s social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the “democraticauthoritarian bargain” (1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce “every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority” on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford’s work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### Making use of the socius and its incredible head

**Moten and Harney, 10** – (Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, *Policy and Planning*, http://www.darkmatter101.org/site/2010/04/19/policy-and-planning/)

The hope that Cornel West wrote about in Social Text in 1984[1] was not destined to become policy in 2008. The ones who practiced it, within and against the grain of every imposed contingency, always had a plan. In and out of the depths of Reaganism, against the backdrop and by way of a resuscitory irruption into politics that Jesse Jackson could be said both to have symbolized and quelled, something West indexes as black radicalism, which “hopes against hope…in order to survive in the deplorable present” (p.10-11), asserts a metapolitical surrealism that sees and sees through the evidence of mass incapacity, cutting the despair it breeds. Exuberantly metacritical hope has always exceeded every immediate circumstance in its incalculably varied everyday enactments of the fugitive art of the impossible. This art is practiced on and over the edge of politics, beneath its ground, in animative and improvisatory decomposition of its inert body. It emerges as an ensemblic stand, a kinetic set of positions, but also takes the form of embodied notation, study, score. Its encoded noise is hidden in plain sight from the ones who refuse to see and hear—even while placing under constant surveillance—the thing whose repressive imitation they call for and are. Now, a quarter century after West’s analysis, after an intervening iteration that had the nerve to call hope home while serially disavowing it and helping to extend and prepare its almost total eclipse, the remains of American politics exudes hope once again. Having seemingly lost its redoubled edge while settling in and for the carceral techniques of the possible, having thereby unwittingly become the privileged mode of expression of a kind of despair, hope appears now simply to be a matter of policy. Policy, on the other hand, now comes into view as no simple matter.

By policy we mean not a particular policy, as in company policy or public policy, but rather policy as something in contradistinction to planning. By policy we mean **a resistance to the commons from above, arrayed in the exclusive and exclusionary uniform/ity of imposed consensus**, that both denies and at the very same time seeks to destroy the ongoing plans, the fugitive initiations, the black operations of the multitude.[2] As a resistance from above, policy is a class phenomenon because it is the means to advantage in the post-fordist economy, a means that takes on the character of politics in an economy dominated structurally by immaterial labour. This economy is powered by the constant insistence on a radical contingency producing a steady risk for all organic and non-organic forms, a risk that allows work against risk to be harvested indefinitely.

Policy is the form that opportunism takes in this environment. It is a demonstration of willingness to be made contingent and to make contingent all around you by demonstrating an embrace of the radically extra-economic, political character of command today.[3] It is a demonstration designed to separate you from others, in the interest of a universality reduced to private property that is not yours, for your own survival, for your own advantage in this environment. Opportunism sees no other way, has no alternative, but separates itself by its own vision, its ability to see the future of its own survival in this turmoil against those who cannot imagine surviving in this turmoil (even if they must all the time) and are thus said by policy to lack vision, and in the most extreme cases to be without interests, on the one hand, and in capable of disinterestedness, on the other.[4] Every utterance of policy, no matter its intention or content, is first and foremost a demonstration of one’s ability to be close to the top in the hierarchy of the post-fordist economy. (Thus every utterance of policy on the radical Left is immediately contradiction.)

As an operation from above designed to make the multitude productive for capital, policy must first deal with the fact that the multitude is already productive for itself. **This productive imagination is its genius, it’s impossible, and nevertheless material, collective head**. And this is a problem because plans are afoot, black operations are in effect, and in the undercommons, all the organizing is done. The multitude uses every quiet moment, every peace, every security, every front porch and sundown to plan, to launch, to improvise an operation. It is difficult for policy to deny these plans directly, to ignore these operations, to pretend that those already in motion need to stop and get a vision, to contend that base communities for escape need to believe in escape. And if this is difficult for policy then so too is the next and crucial step, teaching the value of radical contingency, teaching how to participate in change from above. Of course, some plans can be dismissed – plans hatched darker than blue, on the criminal side, out of love. But most will instead require another approach.

So what is left for those who want to dwell in policy? Obviously the most salient and consistent aspect of policy – help and correction. Policy will help. Policy will help with the plan, and even more policy will correct the planners. Policy will discover what is not yet theorized, what is not yet fully contingent, and most importantly what is not yet legible. Policy is correction. Policy distinguishes itself from planning by distinguishing those who dwell in policy and fix things, from those who dwell in planning and must be fixed. This is the first rule of policy. It fixes others. In an extension of Foucault we might say of this first rule that it remains concerned with how to be governed just right, how to fix others in a position of equilibrium, even if this today requires constant recalibration. But the objects of this constant adjustment provoke this attention because they just don’t want to govern at all.

And because such policy emerges materially from post-fordist opportunism, policy must optimally for each policy-maker fix others as others, as those who have not just made an error in planning (or indeed an error by planning) but who are themselves in error. And from the perspective of policy, of this post-fordist opportunism, there is indeed something wrong with the multitude. They are out of joint – instead of constantly positing their position in contingency, they seek solidity, a place from which to plan, some ground on which to imagine, some love on which to count. Nor is this just a political problem from the point of view of policy, but an ontological one. **Seeking fixity, finding a steady place from which to launch a plan, hatch an escape signals a problem of essentialism**, of beings who think and act like they are something in particular, like they are somebody, although at the same time that something is, from the perspective of policy, whatever you say I am.

To get these planners out of this problem of essentialism, this fixity and repose, this security and base, they have to come to imagine they can be more, they can do more, they can change, they can be changed. Because right now, there is something wrong with them. We know there is something wrong with them because they keep making plans. And plans fail. Plans fail because that is policy. Plans must fail because planners must fail. **Planners are static, essential, just surviving**. **They do not see clearly**. **They hear things.** **They lack perspective. They fail to see the complexity**. Planners have no vision, no real hope for the future, just a plan here and now, an actually existing plan.

They need hope. They need vision. They need to have their sights lifted above the furtive plans and night launches of their despairing lives. Vision. Because from the perspective of policy it is too dark in there to see, in the black heart of the multitude. You can hear something, you can feel something, feel people going about their own business in there, feel them present at their own making. But hope can lift them above ground into the light, out of the shadows, away from these dark senses.

Whether the hope is Fanonian redemption or Arendtian revaluation, policy will fix these humans. Whether they lack consciousness or politics, utopianism or common sense, hope has arrived. With new vision, planners will become participants. And participants will be taught to reject essence for contingency, as if planning and improvisation, flexibility and fixity, and complexity and simplicity were opposed within an imposed composition there is no choice but to inhabit, as **some exilic home**. All that could not be seen in the dark heart of the multitude will be supposed absent as policy checks its own imagination. But most of all they will participate. Policy is a mass effort. Left intellectuals will write articles in the newspapers. Philosophers will hold conferences on new utopias. Bloggers will debate. Politicians will surf. Change is the only constant here, the only constant of policy. Participating in change is the second rule of policy.

Now hope is an orientation toward this participation in change, this participation as change. This is the hope policy gives to the multitude, a chance to stop digging, and start circulating. Policy not only offers this hope, but enacts it. Those who dwell in policy do so not just by invoking contingency but riding it, by in a sense, proving it.

Those who dwell in policy are prepared. They are legible to change, liable to change, lendable to change. Policy is not so much a position as a disposition, a disposition toward display. This is why policy’s chief manifestation is governance.

Governance should not be confused with government or governmentality. Governance is the new form of expropriation. It is the provocation of a certain kind of display, a display of interests as disinterestedness, a display of convertibility, a display of legibility. Governance offers a forum for policy, for bidding oneself, auctioning oneself, to post-fordist production. Governance is harvesting of immaterial labour but a willing harvest, a death drive of labour. As capital cannot know directly affect, thought, sociality, imagination, it must instead prospect for these in order to extract and abstract them as labour. This is the real bio-prospecting. Governance, the voluntary but dissociative offering up of interests, willing participation in the general privacy and privation, grants capital this knowledge, this wealth-making capacity. Who is more keen on governance than the dweller in policy? On the new governance of universities, hospitals, corporations, governments and prisoners, on the governance of NGO’s, of Africa, of peace processes? Policy offers to help by offering its own interests, and if it really seeks to be valuable, provoking others to offer up their own interests too.

But governance despite its own hopes to universality, is for the initiated, for those who know how to articulate interests disinterestedly, who know why they vote (not because someone is black or female but because he or she is smart), who have opinions and want to be taken seriously by serious people. In the mean time, policy also orders the quotidian sphere of aborted plans. Policy posits curriculum against study, child development against play, careers against jobs. It posits voice against voices, and gregariousness against friendship. Policy posits the public sphere, and the counter-public sphere, and the black public sphere against the illegal occupation of the illegitimately privatized.

Policy is not the one against the many, the cynical against the romantic, or the pragmatic against the principled. It is simply baseless vision. It is against all conservation, all rest, all gathering, cooking, drinking and smoking if they lead to marronage. Policy’s vision is to break it up, move along, get ambition and give to your children. Policy’s hope is that there will be more policy, more participation, more change. However, there is also a danger in all this participation, a danger of crisis.

When the multitude participates in policy without first being fixed, this leads to crisis. Participation without fully entering the enlightenment, without fully functioning families, without financial responsibility, without respect for the rule of law, without distance and irony, participation that is too loud, too fat, too loving, too full, too flowing, too dread. This leads to crisis. People are in crisis. Economies are in crisis. We are facing an unprecedented crisis, a crisis of participation, a crisis of faith. Is there any hope? Yes, there is, if we can pull together, if we can share a vision of change. For policy, any crisis in the productivity of radical contingency is a crisis in participation, which is to say, a crisis provoked by the wrong participation of the multitude. This is the third rule of policy.

The crisis of the credit crunch cause by sub-prime debtors, the crisis of race in the U.S. elections produced by Reverend Wright and Bernie Mac, the crisis in the Middle East produced by Hamas, the crisis of obesity produced by unhealthy eaters, the crisis of the environment produced by Chinese and Indians, are all instances of uncorrected, unmanaged participation. If the multitude is to stop its sneaky plans only to participate in this way, crisis is inevitable. But policy diagnoses the problem: participation must be hopeful, it must have vision, it must embrace change. Participants must be fashioned who are hopeful, visionary, change agents. Those who dwell in policy will lead the way, toward concrete changes in the face of the crisis.

Be smart. Believe in change. This is what we have been waiting for. It’s time for the Left to offer solutions. Now’s the time, before its night again, and you start hearing D.O.C. They got a secret plan of their own and they won’t be corrected. Before you get stopped by KRS One and asked for your plan, before Storm says ‘holla if you understand my plan ladies.’ Before you start singing another half-illiterate fantasy. Before you are in the ongoing amplification at the dark heart of the multitude, the operations in its soft centre. Before someone says let’s get together and get some land, where we’ll still plan to be communist about communism, still plan to be unreconstructed about reconstruction and still plan to be absolute about abolition. Policy can’t see it, policy can’t read it, but it’s intelligible if you got a plan.