# Notes

You’re picking fights

Repudiate our heritage --- race treason --- must be done in a way that gives people an opportunity to be traitors before they speak

It gives them a holier than thou attitude

# 1nc

Because I could not stop for Death,  
He kindly stopped for me;  
The carriage held but just ourselves  
And Immortality.  
  
We slowly drove, he knew no haste,  
And I had put away  
My labour, and my leisure too,  
For his civility.  
  
We passed the school where children played,  
Their lessons scarcely done;  
We passed the fields of gazing grain,  
We passed the setting sun.  
  
We paused before a house that seemed  
A swelling of the ground;  
The roof was scarcely visible,  
The cornice but a mound.  
  
Since then 'tis centuries; but each  
Feels shorter than the day  
I first surmised the horses' heads  
Were toward eternity.\*

\*Emily Dickinson "Because I could not stop for Death"

<http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/english/melani/cs6/stop.html>

from *The Poems of Emily Dickinson*, Ralph W. Franklin ed., Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Copyright © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Copyright © 1951, 1955, 1979, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

#### Desire creates the illusion of the self and the suffering that defines the human condition --- to break down our separation, we must cease conceiving of ourselves as isolated individuals and groups in competition with one another

**DOLLIMORE 1998** (Jonathan Dollimore 1998 (Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, p 54-56.)

Siddhartha Gautama (560-477 BC) was a prince who, because of his high privilege, encountered suffering and death relatively late in life. Legend tells us that when he did eventually encounter them the trauma was the greater, and changed his life: he became Buddha, the Enlightened One. In the religion he founded, life is experienced as a permanent intrinsic unsatisfactoriness manifested as suffering (dukkha) and pain: birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five groups of grasping [the elements, skandbasy which make up a person] are painful. ('Sermon at Benares', in Burtt, p. 30) Everything about life involves suffering and dissatisfaction, a sense of lack. If we strive to overcome that lack we fail, and suffering becomes marked by a renewed craving, now intensified by an acute sense of loss. Suffering derives directly from the fact that everything that exists is radically mutable. In particular, happiness, if it is achieved, cannot last. Suffering haunts happiness from the outside and the inside. Where Buddhism differs from Western religions is in the full acceptance of mutability; happiness lies in achieving that acceptance. Suffering is perpetuated by, and inseparable from, ignorance, and mitigated by wisdom. The deepest ignorance is to fail to see, or to disavow, the fact that everything that exists is mutable and transient. The force of this position may be seen, again, in contrast with Christianity; for the Buddhist the source of suffering is ignorance rather than sin. And the real source of suffering is desire (kama) or craving (tanha, literally 'thirst'), both of which are intrinsic to, constitutive of, humankind. There is a Buddhist doctrine of 'conditioned arising' or 'dependent origination' which asserts that everything that exists is dependent on certain prevailing conditions; nothing is intrinsically self-sufficient, independent or stable. This is especially true of selfhood. Buddhism completely denies the idea of a transcendent or autonomous self so powerful in Western religion and philosophy. To believe that there is some essential inner self or consciousness which is the real me, ultimately identifiable apart from everything that happens to me, is an illusion: What we call a personality is just an individual stream of becoming; a cross-section of it at any given moment in an aggregate of the five skandhas which (as long as it continues) are in unstable and unceasing interaction with each other, (p. 86) There is no I. Even to believe in an I which possesses emotions (albeit helplessly) is mistaken. One of the problems with desire, and why it cannot make us happy, is that it presupposes a self which does not exist; at the core of our being we are empty. Everything that constitutes the individual is marked by the unsatisfactoriness and suffering which is dukkha. Nor is there such a thing as the soul. The person is only a fleeting series of discontinuous states held together by desire, by craving. When desire is extinguished the person is dissolved. Since life and suffering are synonymous, the extinction of desire is the goal of human endeavor. Until that happens we continue to exist through a series of rebirths. It is not death as such which is deplored, but rebirth; it is not death but rebirth which we must escape. So much so that in some early texts rebirth is described as 'redeath'. Desire perpetuates life, which is synonymous with suffering, and which leads to death. Desire perpetuates death; it keeps one dying. The self is merged with ultimate reality not by identifying the core of the self (soul/essence) with ultimate reality (God/the universal) but by extinguishing self into non-being (nirvana). This is the aspect of Buddhism which has fascinated Western philosophers like Schopenhauer and artists like Wagner; with whatever degree of misinterpretation, they have been drawn by the ideas of empowerment through renunciation, nullification and quiescence; of the apparent ability to move freely with the mutability and change which arc the apparent cause of suffering; of choosing freely not to pursue the illusion of freedom, in a sense to eliminate the illusion of self; of becoming discontinuous, mindless. Not to escape mutability but to become it; not to just go with the flow of endless change, but to become it. To achieve the state of nirvana - that is, a state of being which is essentially empty of desire and striving. The wisdom of Buddhism does not desire to transcend change or to affirm an essential ultimate relationship of self to the absolute and unchanging (Platonic forms, the Christian God); nor does the Buddhist desire to die or to cease to be (the death drive): he or she does not desire annihilation but rather learns how to cease desiring. Nirvana is the utter cessation of desire or craving; it means extinction.

#### The submission of personal experience as evidence of group experience asserts the tyranny of the individual. It is a mimicry of the liberal politics of the powerful that demand minority groups submit a single entity to speak on their behalf in order to foreclose a discussion of broader edifices of power. This guarantees that the political potential of the 1AC will simply become another alibi to turn politics into policing

**Scott, 92** – professor of sociology at Princeton (Joan, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity,” The Identity in Question (Summer, 1992), pp. 12-19, JSTOR)

There is nothing wrong, on the face of it, with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra Mohanty puts it this way:

There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is political" has been recraftedin the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle.5

Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This individualizing, personalizing conception has also been behind some of the recent identity politics of minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its internal critics, "political correctness."

It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this operating. In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression re-places analysis, and this testimony comes to stand for the experience of the whole group. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-becomes the only test of true knowledge.

The exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics into a policing operation: **the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity; the test of membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to** endorse certain principles and **engage in specific political actions**, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently "of" the group. That all of this isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group.

#### Just as Don Quixote fought windmills, the aff is fighting against the world itself --- to give up violence,, we must first give up this sort of violence within our own hearts

**Khema 1994** (Ayya Khema 1994 Buddhist monk, “All of us beset by Birth, Decay, and Death.” Buddhism Today, <http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/philosophy/thera/003-allofus-5.htm)\>

If you have ever read Don Quixote, you'll remember that he was fighting windmills. Everybody is doing just that, fighting windmills. Don Quixote was the figment of a writer's imagination, a man who believed himself to be a great warrior. He thought that every windmill he met was an enemy and started battling with it. That's exactly what we are doing within our own hearts and that's why this story has such an everlasting appeal. It tells us about ourselves. Writers and poets who have survived their own lifetimes have always told human beings about themselves. Mostly people don't listen, because it doesn't help when somebody else tells us what's wrong with us and few care to hear it. One has to find out for oneself and most people don't want to do that either. What does it really mean to fight windmills? It means fighting nothing important or real, just imaginary enemies and battles. All quite trifling matters, which we build into something solid and formidable in our minds. We say: "I can't stand that," so we start fighting, and "I don't like him," and a battle ensues, and "I feel so unhappy," and the inner war is raging. We hardly ever know what we're so unhappy about. The weather, the food, the people, the work, the leisure, the country, anything at all will usually do. Why does this happen to us? Because of the resistance to actually letting go and becoming what we really are, namely nothing. Nobody cares to be that. Everybody wants to be something or somebody even if it's only Don Quixote fighting windmills. Somebody who knows and acts and will become something else, someone who has certain attributes, views, opinions and ideas. Even patently wrong views are held onto tightly, because it makes the "me" more solid. It seems negative and depressing to be nobody and have nothing. We have to find out for ourselves that it is the most exhilarating and liberating feeling we can ever have. But because we fear that windmills might attack, we don't want to let go. Why can't we have peace in the world? Because nobody wants to disarm. Not a single country is ready to sign a disarmament pact, which all of us bemoan. But have we ever looked to see whether we, ourselves, have actually disarmed? When we haven't done so, why wonder that nobody else is ready for it either? Nobody wants to be the first one without weapons; others might win. Does it really matter? If there is nobody there, who can be conquered? How can there be a victory over nobody? Let those who fight win every war, all that matters is to have peace in one's own heart. As long as we are resisting and rejecting and continue to find all sorts of rational excuses to keep on doing that there has to be warfare. War manifests externally in violence, aggression and killing. But how does it reveal itself internally? We have an arsenal within us, not of guns and atomic bombs, but having the same effect. And the one who gets hurt is always the one who is shooting, namely oneself. Sometimes another person comes within firing range and if he or she isn't careful enough, he or she is wounded. That's a regrettable accident. The main blasts are the bombs which go off in one's own heart. Where they are detonated, that's the disaster area. The arsenal which we carry around within ourselves consists of our ill will and anger, our desires and cravings. The only criterion is that we don't feel peaceful inside. We need not believe in anything, we can just find out whether there is peace and joy in our heart. If they are lacking, most people try to find them outside of themselves. That's how all wars start. It is always the other country's fault and if one can't find anyone to blame then one needs more "Lebensraum," more room for expansion, more territorial sovereignty. In personal terms, one needs more entertainment, more pleasure, more comfort, more distractions for the mind. If one can't find anyone else to blame for one's lack of peace, then one believes it to be an unfulfilled need. Who is that person, who needs more? A figment of our own imagination, fighting windmills. That "more" is never ending. One can go from country to country, from person to person. There are billions of people on this globe; it's hardly likely that we will want to see every one of them, or even one-hundredth, a lifetime wouldn't be enough to do so. We may choose twenty or thirty people and then go from one to the next and back again, moving from one activity to another, from one idea to another. We are fighting against our own dukkha and don't want to admit that the windmills in our heart are self-generated. We believe somebody put them up against us, and by moving we can escape from them. Few people come to the final conclusion that these windmills are imaginary, that one can remove them by not endowing them with strength and importance. That we can open our hearts without fear and gently, gradually let go of our preconceived notions and opinions, views and ideas, suppressions and conditioned responses. When all that is removed, what does one have left? A large, open space, which one can fill with whatever one likes. If one has good sense, one will fill it with love, compassion and equanimity. Then there is nothing left to fight. Only joy and peacefulness remain, which cannot be found outside of oneself. It is quite impossible to take anything from outside and put it into oneself. There is no opening in us through which peace can enter. We have to start within and work outward. Unless that becomes clear to us, we will always find another crusade.

#### Mythical identification involves the assertion of one component of their situatedness as a defining and distinguishing trait --- we should challenge this exclusionary vision of community because it lays the foundation for mass destruction

**Glowacka ‘6** (Culture Machine, Vol 8 (2006) Community and the Work of Death: Thanato-Ontology in Hannah Arendt and Jean-Luc Nancy, Dorota Glowacka ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HUMANITIES; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR MA(Wroclaw), PhD(SUNY)

Why is the idea of community so powerful that it is possible for its members to willingly die for such limited imaginings?' (Anderson, 1983: 7) The anthropologist's answer is that the Western conception of community has been founded on the mythical bond of death between its members, who identify themselves as subjects through the apology of the dead heroes. Yet is not this endless recitation of prosopopeia, which serves as the self-identificatory apparatus par excellence, also the most deadly mechanism of exclusion? Whose voices have been foreclosed in the self-addressed movement of the epitaph? Indeed, who, in turn, will have to suffer a death that is absolute, whose negativity will not be sublated into the good of communal belonging, so that community can perpetuate itself? 'Two different deaths': it is the 'they' who will perish, without memory and without a remainder, so that the 'we' can be endlessly resurrected and blood can continue to flow in the veins of the communal body, the veins now distended by the pathos of this recitation. The question I would like to ask in this paper is whether there can be the thinking of community that interrupts this sanguinary logic. A collectivity that projects itself as unified presence has been the predominant figure of community in the West. Such community reveals itself in the splendor of full presence, 'presence to self, without flaw and without any outside' (Nancy, 2001:15; 2003a: 24), through the re-telling of its foundational myth. By infinitely (self)communicating the story of its inauguration, community ensures its own transcendence and immortality. For Jean-Luc Nancy, this immanent figure of community has impeded the 'true' thinking of community as being-together of humans. Twelve years after writing his seminal essay 'The Inoperative Community', Nancy contends that 'this earth is anything but a sharing of humanity -- it is a world lacking in world' (2000: xiii). In Being Singular Plural (1996), Nancy returns to Heidegger's discussion of Mitsein (Being-with) in Being and Time, in order to articulate an ontological foundation of being-together or being-in-common and thus to move away from the homogenizing idiom of community. Departing from Heidegger's habit of separating the political and the philosophical, however, Nancy situates his analysis in the context of global ethnic conflicts, the list of which he enumerates in the 'Preface',3 and to which he returns, toward the end of the book, in 'Eulogy for the Mêlée (for Sarajevo, March 1993)'. The fact that Nancy has extended his reflection on the modes of being-together to include different global areas of conflict indicates that he is now seeking to re-think 'community' in a perspective that is no longer confined to the problematic of specifically Western subjectivity. This allows me to add to Nancy's 'necessarily incomplete' list the name of another community-in-conflict: the Polish-Jewish community, and to consider, very briefly, the tragic fact of the disappearance of that community during the events of the Holocaust and in its aftermath. Within a Nancean problematic, it is possible to argue that the history of this community in Poland, which has been disastrous to the extent that it is now virtually extinct, is related, as in Sarajevo, to a failure of thinking community as Being-with. What I would like to bring out of Nancy's discussion, drawing on the Polish example in particular, is that rethinking community as being-in-common necessitates the interruption of the myth of communal death by death understood as what I would refer to, contra Heidegger, as 'dying-with' or 'Being-in-common-towards-death'. Although Nancy himself is reluctant to step outside the ontological horizon as delineated by Dasein's encounter with death and would thus refrain from such formulations, it is when he reflects on death (in the closing section of his essay 'Of Being Singular Plural' in Being Singular Plural), as well as in his analysis of the 'forbidden' representations of Holocaust death in Au fond des images (2003b), that he finds Heidegger's project to be lacking (en sufferance). This leads me to a hypothesis, partly inspired by Maurice Blanchot's response to Nancy in The Unavowable Community (1983), that the failure of experiencing the meaning of death as 'dying-with' is tantamount to the impossibility of 'Being-with'. In the past and in the present, this failure has culminated in acts of murderous, genocidal hatred, that is, in attempts to erase a collectivity's proper name, and it is significant that many of the proper names on Nancy's list fall under the 1948 United Nations' definition of the genocide as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group'.4 The Polish national narrative has been forcefully structured by communal identification in terms of the work of death, resulting in a mythical construction from which the death of those who are perceived as other must be excluded. It is important to underscore that the history of Polish-Jewish relations has never been marred by violence of genocidal proportions on the part of the ethnic Poles. I will argue nevertheless that what this history discloses is a fundamental failure to produce modes of co-habitation grounded in ontological being-in-common. As became tragically apparent during the Holocaust and in its aftermath, Poles' disidentification with their Jewish neighbors led to an overall posture of indifference toward (and in some cases direct complicity in) their murder. Again, I will contend that this failure of 'Being-with' in turn reveals a foreclosure of 'dying-with' in the Polish mode of communal belonging, that is, a violent expropriation of the Jewish death. At this fraught historical juncture of ontology and politics, I find it fruitful to engage Nancy's forays into the thinking of death and the community with Hannah Arendt's reflection on the political and social space. In 'The Nazi Myth' (1989), which Nancy co-authored with Lacoue-Labarthe, Arendt's definition of ideology as a self-fulfilling logic 'by which a movement of history is explained as one consistent process' (The Origins of Totalitarianism, qtd in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, 1989: 293) is the starting point for the analysis of the myth. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe elaborate Aredn't analysis in order to argue that the will to mythical identification, which saw its perverse culmination in the extermination of European Jews during the Nazi era, is inextricable from the general problematic of the Western metaphysical subject.

#### We affirm the body without organs --- through the continuous destratification with one another, we are already becoming-different --- understanding the way that difference is formed out of a foundation of sameness can help us transform and reimagine our current predicaments

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Post-queer rhizomatic politics is one that is directed outwards rather than inwards. The continuous flows of dialogical-becomings--\_-the indefinite breaks and connections—are always moving forward where something new is always created out of something given. Unlike the arborescent-subject that is directed inwards, rhizomatic dialogical-becomings are always deterritorialized as they maintain an ongoing state of becoming a body without organs (BwO). The complex flows of desiring-machines described above persistently strive to become a BwO as their connections try to reach pure deterritorialization. In this section, I want to consider how the BwO is a virtual affect of dialogical-becomings. It does not encapsulate desiring-machines but is an additional (anti-)production together with desiring-machines. The BwO is a fundamental aspect of post- queer politics because it speaks to the production of intensities that emerge when the flows of desiring-machines stop. Deterritorializations are not finalized states or binary oppositions. They offer an important strategy for contemporary politics because they do not directly oppose a structure (such as the queer/ heteronormative dyad) but instead remap a system through creative lines of flight (the plateauing of queer and post-queer). We can think of the BwO as a limit that continuously seeks to deterritorialize without ever reterritorializing (even though, as you will see belo reterritorializations are often coupled with deterritorializations). As Brian Massumi writes: Think of the body without organs as the body outside any determinate state, poised for any action in its repertory; this is the body from the point of view of its potential, or virtuality. Now freeze it as it passes through a threshold state on the way from one determinate state to another. This is a degree of intensity of the body without organs. It is still the body as virmality but a lower level of virtuality, because only the potential states involved in the bifurification from the preceding state to the next are effectively superposed in the threshold state. (1992, 70) The BwO is therefore not opposed to desiring-machines but is instead in a constant tension with them. The term itself—Body without Organs—is not in opposition to the organism. It is against what the organism stands for: organization. We can think of the subject as such an organization where all meaning refers back to a central core and all movement corresponds with a central tendency. The BwO not only challenges the arboreal structures of life but also works within a different realm as that of the rhizome where it does not break flows (rhizomatic breaks and connections) but desires continuous flows. Unlike the subject that requires external agencies for meaning such as language structures or discursive realms, the BwO is pure intensity: The body without organs is nonproductive; nonetheless it is produced, at a certain place and a certain time in the connective synthesis, as the identity of producing and the product: the schizophrenic table is a body without organs. The body without organs is not the proof of an original nothingness, nor is it what remains of a lost totality. Above all, it is not a projection; it has nothing whatsoever to do with the body itself, or with an image of the body. It is the body without an image. This imageless, organless body, the nonproductive, exists right there where it is produced, in the third stage of the binary-linear series. It is perpetually reinserted into the process of production. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 8) We can think of the BwO as a plane of immanence rather than stratification.’3 It may seem as if desiring-machines and BwO are a part of two different systems. They are in fact two forms of the same principle: desiring-machines and BwO are both a part of the productions of productions of life. It is through the tension that they share that every production becomes an anti-production because dialogical-becomings, for instance, can not maintain a multiplicity of desiring-machines and are unable to fully become a BwO. Dialogical-becomings are schizo. Capital is perhaps the most widely referenced example of a BwO. It is the becoming-BwO of capitalism that creates the illusion that everything is produced through it. Although capital can be transformed into something concrete (i.e., money can purchase goods) it can not do anything on its own. Capital is a miraculating machine that creates the desire for a BwO to overcome the flows of desiring-machines: the BwO deterritorializes the organization of capitalism by opting for flows and smooth spaces. The capitalist machine transforms desiring- machines into BwO by creating the ultimate schizophrenic that “plunges further and further into the realm of deterritorialization, reaching the furthest limits of the decomposition of the socius on the surface of his own body without organs” (35). The capitalist-schizo becomes the surplus product of capitalism as it seeks the limits of capitalism itself. Although the BwO is unachievable, it becomes a seemingly preferred state: “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 150). It is not a heightened awareness of the self, nor is it a fully embodied self. Unlike in significations, representations, and identifications, the BwO is no self at all. In fact, the BwO is prior to such a subjective capacity The tension between desiring-machines (reterritorializations) and BwO (deterritorializations) works within a different realm than, say, the subjective limits of identities categories where subjects become intelligible through their associations with identity norms. Everything for desiring-machines and BwO is pure difference. The intensities involved in such a relationship are before the coding structures of subjectivity that stratify subjects. It is the abovementioned intensities that make post-queer politics so creative because they challenge the structured organization of organs and biologically defined bodies. Desiring-machines and BwO offer a new language for thinking about life itself without reducing the experiences of such relationships to the stratification of language. The creativity of post-queer dialogical-becomings rests in the potential to deterritorialize stratified structures that limit life to predetermined organizations. Despite the BwO existing prior to the subjective capacities of, say, psychoanalysis and discursive norms, this certainly does not imply that deterritorializations can not offer strategies for rethinking life as it is accounted for through representations, significations, and identifications. We can, for example, think of the various codings of subjectivity that have permeated identity politics and subsequently the queer/heteronormative dyad as territorialized stratifications that are in concert with BwO. Stratifications, or strata, take hold of intensities by territorializing them. For instance, they appropriate the BwO’s flows of pure difference by organizing dialogical-becomings as subjects of reiterative norms. The strata codes and territorializes such becomings but the BwO constantly attempts to deterritorialize these territorializations. **Despite queer’s interest in a politics of identity that seeks to consider bodies as mobile and fluid, these movements can never escape the territorializations of identity norms because they are always in relation to heteronormative coding and the overall arboreal organization of bodies that are directed inwards**. Deleuze and Guattari describe three types of strata that help to think through the territorializations of the queer/heteronormative dyad: the organism, signifiance, and sub jectification. The surface of the organism, the angle of signiflance and interpretation, and the point of subjectification or subjection. You will be organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body—otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted—otherwise you’re just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement—otherwise you’re just a tramp. To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes disarticulation (or n articulation) as the property of the plane of consistency, experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 159) This call to dismantle the organism does not imply that we just get rid of the subject or cut the body from stratification. We recall from above that the BwO and all its intensities comes before the subject and the organization of the body as an organism and so a politics of becoming calls for a return to these productive flows of desire: “opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and territories and deterritorializations measured with the craft of a surveyor” (160). Post-queer dialogical-becomings seek to deterritorialize the three great strata that territorialize life through significations, representations, and identifications. This project is but one line of flight that can plateau subjugated sub jectivities. Its intent is to map various intensities so as to smooth these assemblages by moving towards a plane of immanence. The first step is to identify the strata involved and then consider the assemblages that constitute such strata. For example, the organism codes an aboreal life by creating various assemblages that define what it means to be “human”; sigmflance codes meaning through discourse where language has become the primary means for thinking about experience; and subjectification creates subjects by coding them through social norms. The purpose of this is to locate flows of intensities—not by discovering a BwO but by creating one in the process of deterritorializing the strata. The queer/heteronormativity dyad has resulted in an arboreal dyad. The extensions of an arboreal tree go through its central root that supports the whole tree. The queer/heteronorrnative dyad is such a root where all politics emerge from it. Post-queer rhizomatic politics, in contrast, do not strictly move or extend from a main root such as the queer/heteronormative dyad. With that said, dialogical-becomings can engage this binary by plateauing it through its rhizomatic connections that can spout from any point. The arboreal organization of queer/heteronormativity prohibits a politics of becoming because movement stops when there is a need to refer back to this dyad. In other words, the queer/heteronormative dyad halts queer politics when the politics of queer is predominantly concerned with disrupting heteronormative structures. Post-queer rhizomatic politics is about deterritorializing politics itself rather than opposing an a priori structure. This project is one line of flight amongst many that can remap contemporary politics as we know it today. Despite queer’s keen investment in a conceptualization of identity through mobilities and fluidities, **its politics can only go so far because of its arboreal references to heteronormativity**. Let me be clear that I am not demanding an outright rejection of the queer/heteronormative strata for, as we recall from above, this can result in further territorializations. I am also not suggesting an absolute denunciation of this relationship nor am I disputing the important developments that queer politics have made. I am instead calling for the production of different lines of flight and new assemblages that can smoothen the strata so as to not be limited by structural organizations.

#### Utopian imaginaries

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(Brian and David, “Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 18 (1997) 23-35, dml)

Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address “something we can ACTUALLY DO” as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT” (“Fantasy as Reality” 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible.

Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position, nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of *Beavis and Butthead*, social criticism is what good citizens do**.**

Debate differs from other species of social criticism because debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit. Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly deconstructive. Instead, such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change, whether that criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

One way to understand the distinction between debate as policy-making and debate as social criticism is to examine Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder’s agenda-building theory.5 Cobb and Elder are well known for their analytic split of the formal agenda for policy change, which includes legislation or other action proposed by policy makers with formal power (e.g., government bureaucrats, U.S. Senators), from the public agenda for policy change, which is composed of all those who work outside formal policy-making circles to exert influence on the formal agenda. Social movements, lobbyists, political action committees, mass media outlets, and public opinion polls all constitute the public agenda, which, in turn, has an effect on what issues come to the forefront on the formal agenda. From the agenda-building perspective, one cannot understand the making of public policy in the United States without comprehending the confluence of the formal and public agenda.

In intercollegiate debate, the policy-making metaphor has given primacy to formal agenda functions at the expense of the public agenda. Debaters are encouraged to bypass thinking about the public agenda in outlining policy alternatives; appeals for policy changefrequentlyare made by debaters under the strange pretense that they and/or their judges are members of the formal agenda elite. Even arguments about the role of the public in framing public policy are typically issued by debaters as if those debaters were working within the confines of the formal agenda for their own, instrumental advantage. (For example, one thinks of various social movement “backlash” disadvantage arguments, which advocate a temporary policy paralysis in order to stir up public outrage and mobilize social movements whose leaders will demand the formal adoption of a presumably superior policy alternative.) The policy-making metaphor concentrates on the formal agenda to the near exclusion of the public agenda, as the focus of a Katsulas or a Dempsey on the “real-world” limitations for making policy indicates.

Debate as social criticism does not entail exclusion of formal agenda concerns from intercollegiate debate. The specified agent of action in typical policy resolutions makes ignoring the formal agenda of the United States government an impossibility. However, one need not be able to influence the formal agenda directly in order to discuss what it is that the United States government should do. Undergraduate debaters and their judges usually are far removed—both physically and functionally—from the arena of formal-agenda deliberation. What the disputation of student debaters most closely resembles, to the extent that it resembles any real-world analog, is public-agenda social criticism. What students are doing is something they really CAN do as students and ordinary citizens; they are working in their own modest way to shape the public agenda.

While “social criticism” is the best explanation for what debaters do, this essay goes a step further. The mode of criticism in which debaters operate is the production of utopian literature. Strictly speaking, debaters engage in the creation of fictions and the comparison of fictions to one another. How else does one explain the affirmative advocacy of a plan, a counterfactual world that, by definition, does not exist? Indeed, traditional inherency burdens demand that such plans be utopian, in the sense that current attitudes or structures make the immediate enactments of such plans unlikely in the “real world” of the formal agenda. Intercollegiate debate is utopian because plan and/or counterplan enactment is improbable. While one can distinguish between incremental and radical policy change proposals, the distinction makes no difference in the utopian practice of intercollegiate debate.

More importantly, intercollegiate debate is utopian in another sense. Policy change is considered because such change, it is hoped, will facilitate the pursuit of the good life. For decades, intercollegiate debaters have used fiat or the authority of the word “should” to propose radical changes in the social order, in addition to advocacy of the incremental policy changes typical of the U.S. formal agenda. This wide range of policy alternatives discussed in contemporary intercollegiate debate is the sign of a healthy public sphere, where thorough consideration of all policy alternatives is a possibility. Utopian fiction, in which the good place that is no place is envisioned, makes possible the instantiation of a rhetorical vision prerequisite to building that good place in our tiny corner of the universe. Even Lewis Mumford, a critic of utopian thought, concedes that we “can never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in utopia; but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all” (Mumford 24-25).

An objection to this guiding metaphor is that it encourages debaters to do precisely that to which Snider would object, which is to “make believe” that utopia is possible. This objection misunderstands the argument. These students already are writers of utopian fiction from the moment they construct their first plan or counterplan text. Debaters who advocate policy change announce their commitment to changing the organization of society in pursuit of the good life, even though they have no formal power to call this counterfactual world into being. Any proposed change, no matter how small, is a repudiation of policy paralysis and the maintenance of the status quo. As already practiced, debate revolves around utopian proposals, at least in the sense that debaters and judges lack the formal authority to enact their proposals. Even those negatives who defend the current social order frequently do so by pointing to the potential dystopic consequences of accepting such proposals for change.

# Link Wall – Community

**The process of community inclusion neutralizes difference and ensures exclusion**

**Morin ‘6** (Culture Machine, Vol 8 (2006) Putting Community Under Erasure: Derrida and Nancy on the Plurality of Singularities Marie-Eve Morin Department of Philosophy. 3-45 Assiniboia Hall. University of Alberta.

First, communities tend to neutralise differences by treating all members as brothers, that is, as the same. The other belongs to my community only insofar as he is like me, and the 'us' -- the group of those who belong together -- appears as a homogeneous group. It is because of this tendency to homogenise that fraternity can include apparent non-brothers (such as women) and that the fraternal community can present itself as universal. The woman gets included in fraternity when she becomes a brother for humanity, that is, when she is not (completely) woman anymore. Because 'man' is the archetype of humanity and 'brother' the archetype of the relation between siblings, the woman can become human or sibling only insofar as she resembles the archetypes of 'man' or 'brother'. Fraternity as a process of universalisation is a process of inclusion, but here 'to include' means to neutralise difference. Second, communities are inscribed in a field of opposition; they define themselves in an oppositional logic, by excluding 'them,' that is, those who do not belong, those who are not 'brothers,' not 'the same'. If I can identify my brothers, then by using the same criterion, I can also identify those who are not my brothers. All groups function in the same way: they define a criterion which functions as a wall erected around the group, a wall filled with certain type of openings that let only the right elements in. Of course, some criteria of appurtenance are more inclusive than others because they are shared by more people. But no matter how inclusive a group is, it is always possible to find elements that are excluded.

**Reject the aff- Rejection is the only way to deconstruct the myth of the community**

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Thus the community of human beings excludes animals, and the community of beings in general excludes ghosts. To escape this double violence, it is necessary, according to Derrida, to cut the bond that binds me to, or excludes me from, a group. Only then will there be an experience of the other, or a relation to the other, which will respect and do justice to its otherness, its difference. Though Nancy does not criticise fraternity directly, his discussion of the interruption of myth serves the same purpose. The myth presents the community to the community itself; it is the identificatory mechanism of a community. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy explain: A myth is a fiction in the strong, active sense of shaping or moulding, or as Plato himself says, of 'plasticity': it is a fictionning, whose role is to propose, if not to impose, models and types, -- types by whose imitation an individual ' or a city, or a whole people ' can grasp and identify itself. (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 1991: 34) The interruption of myth means that it becomes impossible for us to represent our common origin. Because the genealogical relation rests on a phantasmatic commonality of origin, the loss of common origin means the impossibility of recognising each other as brother. In their having been interrupted, myths do not disappear, but they no longer function as the ground of communal belonging: it becomes impossible for us to gather around the narration of our common origin. The interruption does not build a community, it un-works it, that is, it lets a space open in the identification of the community with itself. This un-working is the active incompleteness of community: it prevents the community from effecting itself as work.