**The 1NC falsely assumed a priori that power is a substance which can be characterized in a certain way and then attempts to assign it particular characteristics based on certain underlying trend. This is a conceptual error akin to saying that ‘a wind is made of dry leaves’ or actually believing ‘there is never any objections to the government in dictatorships’. Power is not a substance but rather a movement through actant objects and is almost always negotiable and the thinner it’s stretched the weaker it gets. Rather than resent bureaucratic forms of thought we should admire it for its venal flaws**

**Harman ‘9** Graham, professor of philosophy American University of Cairo, “Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics” p. 21-22

**It is never the actant in naked purity that possesses force, but only the actant involved in its ramshackle associations with others, which collapse if these associations are not lovingly or brutally maintained:** ‘In order to extend itself, an actant must program other actants so that they are unable to betray it, despite the fact that they are bound to do so […]. ***We always misunderstand the strength of the strong*. Though people attribute it to the purity of an actant, it is invariably due to a tiered array of weaknesses’** (PF, p. 201). Anticipating his later full-blown rejection of modernism, **Latour scoffs at the notion that the imperialist West succeeded by purifying objective truth from the naïve superstition of gullible Indians. The Spaniards triumphed over the Aztecs** not through the power of nature liberated from fetish, but instead **through a mixed assemblage of priests, soldiers, merchants, princes, scientists, police, slavers** (PF, pp. 202-3). Call them legion, for they are many. **Imperialism is not an almighty center, but a chain of raggedy forces in equal parts spiritual, intellectual, and economic. The same sort of motley-coloured force is unleashed by politicians**, and hence **Latour is among the few present-day philosophers who admires politicians rather than sneering at their venal compromises: ‘It takes something like courage to admit that we will *never do better* than a politician** [… **Others] simply have somewhere to hide when they have made their mistakes. They can go back and try again. Only the politician is limited to a single shot and has to shoot in public’** (PF, p. 210). And again: **‘What we despise as political “mediocrity” is simply the collection of compromises that we force politicians to make on our behalf’ (PF, p. 210). The politician forever balances information, funding, threats, kindness, politeness, loyalty, disloyalty, and the perpetual search for ways and means. In this respect the politician is the model for every sort of actor. To declare oneself untainted by strife between conflicting forces is to deny that one is an actant.** Yet there are only actants, forever lost in friendships and duels. **Any attempt to see actants as the reducible puppets of deeper structures is doomed to fail. The balance of force makes some actants stronger than others, but** miniature trickster objects turn the tide without warning**: a pebble can destroy an empire if the Emperor chokes at dinner. Forces are real, and real tigers are stronger than paper ones, but everything is negotiable (PF, p. 163). There is no pre-established harmony among the actants in the world, but only a *post*-established harmony** (PF, p. 164). The current order of things is the result of a long history of negotiations and midnight raids of one actant against the weak points of others. **It takes work to subordinate serfs to the Czar or equations to a theory. The world could have been otherwise. But neither is there merely a random play of chance, since the Tartar hordes do not vanish from the Middle East with a wave of the hand. Harmony is a result, not a guiding principle**.

**The permutation solves – we should not identify identity in static categories – instead affirming an ontology of becoming allows us to formulate true resistance**

**Tormey 6**

(Simon Tormey, Politics at University of Nottingham, Parliamentary Affairs 2006 59(1): 138-154, dml)

As opposed to the ‘majoritarian’ logic of ontology, an ontology of becoming involves *resisting* the superior codes and meanings of the social field, rather than allowing them to subordinate difference to the Same, as in the case of analogy and associations.12 This translates as a continual struggle against ‘territorialising’ attempts to envelop within the categories and codes that underpin sociality, and in particular against being subsumed within logics of representation. It means resisting subordination to the process of ‘molar’ aggregation that identitarian logics foster. This might be in terms of resisting the ‘leftist’ reduction of singularity to class identity, the ‘progressive’ reduction to group, collective or communal identity (Irish white male), or the conservative reduction to national or sub-national descriptors (‘decent, law-abiding citizen’). It means resisting the view that singularity can be encompassed within group or collective identities and hence that such identities can be thought of as prior to the singularity—as ‘capturing’ singularity. Becoming minoritarian is, rather, posited as an ‘eternal’ process of affirmation of difference through the rejection of attempts to reduce difference to the same. This is in contrast to processes of ontological representation that subsume difference within identity, one that requires ‘no further action’ on the part of the one represented (‘Everyone recognises that … ’). It is this essential passivity between that which represents and that which is represented which signals for Deleuze the denial of difference. Something is represented, but it is not—and cannot be—the singularity. It is the ‘singular’ that always escapes reduction to the Same. Becoming minoritarian, setting a face against representation, categorisation, pigeonholing is a denial or negation of the logic of representation; but this is a denial that is itself active and thus constitutive of difference itself. Through the denial—Deleuze wants to say—the singular affirms its singularity as opposed to any collective, group, genetic or ‘given’ identity that others attempt to impose upon it. The act of negating is in this sense affirmative of difference, as opposed to sameness considered in representational terms. To assert that ‘I am not like that’ is a negation; but it is also a form of affirmation on these terms. It is a disavowal of the possibility of being contained by the representative claim, whilst at the same time an affirmation of singularity. Here then the importance of the (rereading of) ‘eternal return’: it is the process of becoming that affirms difference. Difference cannot in this sense be mute or silent; but must ‘speak’ for itself. As Deleuze and Guattari make clear, ‘[b]ecoming minoritarian as the universal figure of consciousness is called autonomy’.13 Difference must actively posit itself as different. Failing that, it will be resubsumed or overcoded within majoritarian categories as a passive element of the Same. So we can see how Nietzsche’s concept of the ‘noble’ becomes employed for radical purposes, despite the ‘elitism’ of the concept read on face value. On a Deleuzian reading, Nietzsche’s ‘noble’ is the subject who succeeds in differentiating herself from ‘the majority’.14 Nobility is the quality of distinctiveness, and to be distinct one has in this sense to establish a (pathos of) distance from that which/those who would seek to subsume being within representative categories. To be clear, the figure of the ‘majority’ here is not numerical but impositional, a device by which voices are silenced in the name of Reason, ‘common sense’, ‘our’ intuitions, ‘the Good’.15 For Deleuze, the ‘pathos of distance’ required to establish nobility does not involve a distancing from the other(s) in the form of a re-emergent hierarchy, but a distancing from that which seeks to deny difference.16 The Aristoi are the different; whereas the hoi poloi (as it were) are those who subsume difference, singularity, ontological uniqueness within representational categories—perhaps through nothing more than their own complicity in the system of binaries. The Aristoi are ‘minor’, whereas those who embrace ressentiment and the desire to reduce idiosyncrasy and creativity to a representable sameness, are the ‘majority’—as Nietzsche confirms in The Genealogy of Morals. In this sense autonomy as a becoming-other is a form of active resistance, a ‘line of flight’, rather than an ‘achievement’ or ‘act’ of the sort associated with identitarian politics. There is no resting place for difference, but rather a continuous positing and repositing of difference via resistance to new territorialising logics, codes, and new forms of representation. Yet as it stands, difference seems still to be a very ‘singular’ quality, and thus at best to issue in an ethics of resistance (one should resist becoming trapped in identities others create for us). What is lacking according to critics such as Ernesto Laclau is a post-representational politics able to augment or even supplement representational strategies and schemas.17 How does the critique of representation move beyond the ‘singular’ towards the collective, if it does?

**Their movement fails – identity struggles serve to reaffirm violent power struggles – only an ontology of becoming solves**

**Tormey 6**

(Simon Tormey, Politics at University of Nottingham, Parliamentary Affairs 2006 59(1): 138-154, dml)

As is clear, ‘normativity’ is underpinned here by ontological rather than epistemological considerations. This is to say that critique has to proceed from a rejection of the ground of representation: the sameness of the political ‘subject’ and the ability of mechanisms of philosophico-political capture to ‘represent’ her. If we move from a position that insists that people can be represented without doing violence to them, to one where every act of representation is seen as a limitation on the subject’s becoming, then the ‘starting point’ of political philosophy as long practised has to be rethought. As we noted above, the representative function was deployed quite explicitly as a means of filling the hole of political authority created by the waning of temporal and religious authority. This in turn led to the problematic of early liberal thought: the state exists, how can it be legitimated? For liberals (and indeed non-liberals) the answer was to create a unified aggregate, The People, which could then be represented by those who govern.18 On a Deleuzo–Guattarian reading the figure of The People is, however, a ‘passive aggregate’ or ‘denumerable set’ like ‘the majority’, ‘the nation’ or ‘the young’. This is to say they are collective categories deployed rhetorically to justify actions without reference to the actual views of those who ‘compose’ the ‘it’ in question. ‘What The People want’, is not what people want, but rather what it is that someone thinks the people want. It is what the ‘representatives’ of The People’s interests want. For Deleuze and Guattari active aggregates, that is aggregates composed of singularities, are self-constituting and contingent, not immobile metaphors for passive groups of individuals denied a voice. There is no People as such, just a minoritarian ‘multitude’, a disaggregated, shifting, ‘nondenumerable set’.19 There is no outside, no point from which the legislator can gaze down upon the collective. The legislator is thus a redundant figure where difference is posited as ‘sovereign’.20 Since there is no ‘speaking for’ singularities, those whose orientation is to respect singularity ‘listen’ rather than speak. Indeed it is the demand that others listen that is perhaps the quintessential post-representational demand. Not presuming to know, not ‘speaking for others’, is in this particular respect the stance of the ‘post-representative’. Secondly, the implication is that in post-representational space (‘smooth’ space), nothing inheres. Every arrangement or distribution is ‘immanent’ to the ‘multiplicity’ itself rather than resting on a transcendental premise, a primordial ‘contract’, duty or obligation divined by fictive, ideological or ‘intuitionist’ strategies of the sort that has classically undergirded representational thought. This is not to say that it is impossible for arrangements to arise whereby a collectivity interacts for mutual benefit, or that the relations that do arise are necessarily ephemeral or doomed to fail or crumble. It is that the terms upon which those interactions depend do not lie outside or beyond the collective itself in a mythic, original or inaugurating ‘act’. To recall earlier themes, no one may ‘speak for’ the singular and thus the distinct voice is preserved as unique, different—and not as part of a ‘majority’ or, indeed a minority that seeks ‘representation’. Such a stance is thus explicitly anti-‘systemic’ in that it represents ‘immanence’ and ‘deterritorialisation’ over the ‘transcendentalism’ and ‘territoriality’ of normative thought that seeks to evade the contingency of human artifice. It is concerned with the creation and preservation of forms of interaction in which difference is not represented, but can speak for itself alongside other singularities. In place of the hierarchies of ‘statist thought’, with its vertical relations of ruler and ruled, governors and governed, representatives and represented, emerge flat, horizontal, ‘immanent’ kinds of relations. Deleuze is, it has to be noted, much less interested in the ‘how’ of such relations, than in their availability in theoretical, philosophical and normative terms. Hence perhaps the suggestiveness of existing accounts of Deleuze’s politics. There is, he merely insists, an ‘outside’ of verticality, of hierarchy, and it is the task of post-representative or ‘nomadic’ forms of thought to think how they might be developed.

#### We are students performing distinct pedagogies –despair and hopeless prevents social change and destroys value to life. Vote aff to endorse hope – this is an ethical action that is a precursor to all forms of political change

**Denzin** prof soc, comm, and humanities @ U Illinois urbana-champagne **2k3** (Norman, “Performing [Auto] Ethnography Politically” The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies, 25:257–278, www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.167.4086)

HOPE, PEDAGOGY, AND THE CRITICAL IMAGINATION As an interventionist ideology the critical imagination is hopeful of change. It seeks and promotes an ideology of hope that challenges and confronts hopelessness (Freire, 1999, p. 8). It understands that hope, like freedom, is “an ontological need” (Freire, 1999, p. 8). Hope is the desire to dream, the desire to change, the desire to improve human existence. Hopelessness is “but hope that has lost its bearings” (Freire, 1999, p. 8). **Hope is ethical. Hope is moral.** Hope is peaceful and nonviolent. Hope seeks the truth of life’s sufferings. Hope gives meaning to the struggles to change the world. Hope is grounded in concrete performative practices, in struggles and interventions that espouse the sacred values of love, care, community, trust and well-being (Freire, 1999, p. 9). Hope, as a form of pedagogy, confronts and interrogates cynicism, the belief that change is not possible, or is too costly. Hope works from rage to love. It articulates a progressive politics that rejects “conservative, neoliberal postmodernity” (Friere, 1999; p. 10). Hope rejects terrorism. Hope rejects the claim that peace comes at any cost. The critical democratic imagination is pedagogical in four ways. First, as a form of instruction, it helps persons think critically, historically, sociologically. Second, as critical pedagogy, it exposes the pedagogies of oppression that produce and reproduce oppression and injustice (see Freire, 2001, p. 54). Thirdly, it contributes to an ethical self-consciousness that is critical and reflexive. It gives people a language and a set of pedagogical practices that turn oppression into freedom, despair into hope, hatred into love, doubt into trust. Fourth, in turn, this self-consciousness shapes a critical racial self-awareness. This awareness contributes to utopian dreams of racial equality and racial justice. The use of this imagination by persons who have previously lost their way in this complex world is akin to being “suddenly awakened in a house with which they had only supposed themselves to be familiar (Mills, 1959, p. 8). They now feel that they can provide themselves with critical understandings that undermine and challenge “older decisions that once appeared sound” (Mills, 1959, p. 8). Their critical imagination enlivened, persons “acquire a new way of thinking . . . in a word by their reflection and their sensibility, they realize the cultural meaning of the social sciences” (Mills, 1959, p. 8). They realize how to make and perform changes in their own lives, to become active agents in shaping the history that shapes them.

**Our criticism impact-turns their prioritization arguments -- placing emphasis on certain identity category as necessary for resistance represents a political cul-de-sac that makes liberation impossible and re-entrenches the harms they describe**

**Day ‘5** Richard, professor in the department of global development at Queen's University “Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements” http://www.scribd.com/doc/19280772/Gramsci-is-Dead

This observation is based on a few scattered passages in *Empire*, but is refl ective, I would claim, of a general tendency in Hardt and Negri’s work. They are highly critical, for example, of Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘revisionist’ reading of Gramsci: ‘Poor Gramsci, communist and militant before all else, tortured and killed by fascism … was given the gift of being considered the founder of a strange notion of hegemony that leaves no place for a Marxian politics’ (235 n. 26). What would a properly marxist reading of hegemony look like? Hardt and Negri approvingly cite Lenin’s analysis of imperialism, and give him credit for recognizing, at least implicitly, the existence of a fundamental dichotomy in modes of radical struggle: ‘*either world communist revolution or Empire*’ (2000: 234, italics in original). In their comments on the *Rethinking Marxism* dossier, they declare themselves as being ‘indebted to Slavoj Žižek for the reformulation of this question [of the ability of the multitude to make decisions] in Leninist terms’ (2001: 242). It is somewhat jarring to see two autonomists reaching back behind western marxist readings of Gramsci to recover a properly leninist conception of hegemony. Yet it seems clear that the project of counter-Empire, as they conceive it, would be oriented in just this way. ‘Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization’, they write in *Empire*: ‘Empire [must be met] with a counter-Empire’ (2000: 207). Near the end of the book, they suggest that ‘the actions of the multitude against Empire’ already ‘affi rm [the] hegemony’ of an ‘earthly city’ that is replacing the modern republic (411). This eschatological tone is maintained in a later interview, where the authors argue that ‘a catholic (that is, global) project is the only alternative’ (2002: 184). Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, Negri is known for this kind of approach in his own political practice, as evidenced by the comments of a fellow autonomist militant: Negri can be taken as an emblematic figure: every time he set foot in spaces that were opening up, in this case within the philosophical community or within the community of intellectual debate in general, he immediately tried to impose his hegemony on them or in any case force them into a hegemonic strategy. Therefore, immediately the mechanism of the party was put into play. The paradox of Autonomia was that of being born from the dissolution of the political groups only to maintain within itself the logic of the party, in other words that of the executive that had to direct, impose hegemony, address, to rein in to a common strategy and tactic everything that moved, whatever the aspect or contradiction. (Marazzi 2002) Thus, although it may be internally differentiated and fluid, the task of the multitude—as it is envisaged by Hardt and Negri at any rate—is to counter one totalizing force with another, to struggle for hegemony in the leninist sense of this term. Another problem with the project of the constituent power of the multitude has already been alluded to in the discussion of classcentrism above. Although at times Hardt and Negri present the multitude as a ‘plane of singularities, an open set of relations, which is not homogeneous or identical with itself’ (2000: 103), they also have a tendency to think of it as something singular, totalizable. ‘[I]f we are consigned to the non-place of Empire, can we construct a powerful non-place and realize it concretely?’ (208). ‘The counterEmpire must also be a new global vision, a new way of living in the world’ (214). Each of these questions and statements can, and should, be rendered differently if the multitude is to be theorized as ‘not a new body but a multiplicity of bodies’ (2001: 243). That is: if we are consigned to the non-place of Empire, can we construct powerful non-*places* and realize *them* concretely? Or: **counter-Empire must also be a *disparate but affi nite set* of new global *visions*, new *ways* of living in the world. This is not a matter of mere grammar, although the language one uses in such cases is obviously important. It is a matter of the distinction between hegemonic and affi nitybased forms, of the difference between a desire to build ‘a coherent project of counterpower’** (2001: 242) **versus the desire to allow for incoherence within the ranks of those who oppose the neoliberal order, each for their own reasons. The question being raised here is who, precisely, *is, or can be,* part of the multitude?** Is the multitude perhaps identical with the ‘new proletariat’ (Hardt and Negri 2000: 53), understood as ‘a broad category that includes all those whose labour is directly or indirectly exploited by and subjected to capitalist norms of production and reproduction’ (52)? If we accept the autonomist argument that immaterial labour is becoming increasingly important, and the factory ubiquitous, then everyone, everywhere, will eventually become part of the proletariat. This seems to be the sense of the following passage: In the biopolitical context of Empire … the production of capital converges ever more with the production and reproduction of social life itself; it thus becomes ever more diffi cult to maintain distinctions among productive, reproductive, and unproductive labour. Labour—material or immaterial, intellectual or corporeal—produces and reproduces social life, and in the process is exploited by capital. (402) What, then, of the relationship between proletariat and multitude? Hardt and Negri don’t say, but it would seem that the multitude is the proletariat made militant, the self-valorizing proletariat; to invoke an old distinction from which workerism must attempt to distance itself, it would seem that the multitude is nothing other than the new proletariat *for-itself*. Reading the relationship between these concepts in this way helps us to understand why Hardt and Negri sometimes write as though the multitude already exists—they claim it has created Empire, for example—while in other instances they assume that it needs to be brought into being, as in the quotes above. But **even on this friendly reading of their postmodern marxism, a further question is begged by the apparent ease with which the proletariat is supposed to awaken into multitude—I am referring here to the question of building solidarity across very real divisions of race, sex, sexuality, class, region, and so on. ‘Cosmopolitical liberation’ (2000: 64), if we can give it any meaning at all, will mean different things to different individuals and groups at different times, in different places**. **Some, like Hardt and Negri, will agree that state-supported proletarianization links us all; that fighting capitalism and the state form are the ‘fundamental’ struggles. Others will disagree, holding instead that overturning patriarchy or heteronormativity or racism is the most important task**. Autonomist marxism’s inability to deal adequately with these questions led, in the 1970s, to the breaking away of many of the women involved in the movement to form Lotta Feminista (Wright 2002: 134–5), and the internal feminist critique remained cogent in the 1990s (Del Re 1996). **The realities of radical struggle in the postmodern condition show that *cosmopolitical liberation under a single sign is a modernist fantasy*. Total liberation does not exist, it never has existed, and it never will exist; to seek it is to give in to a Utopian urge to free the entire world once and for all, to achieve the transparent society.** This is a key insight of poststructuralist theory that Hardt and Negri refuse to take on board, and which drives their rejection of Laclau and Mouffe’s deconstruction of the leninist understanding of hegemony. Although, as I have indicated, I do not agree with their turn to a liberal politics, and would push their conclusions further towards a logic of affi nity, Laclau and Mouffe’s work has the benefi t of making it clear that we cannot simply assume that something like ‘the multitude’ exists, nor can we hope to bring together the multitudes under a single sign without reproducing all that is bound up with the logic of hegemony. This point has been reinforced by a number of readers of *Empire*, some of whom are otherwise quite friendly to its project. Pramod K. Mishra has pointed out that Hardt and Negri’s book is ‘Eurocentric in the deployment of sources, theories, knowledges, and historical events (2001: 96), and has questioned its association of the new proletariat with ‘third world nomads’. Many of these subjects, he notes, ‘have either become [a] miniature Bill Gates or aspire to be one’ (98). This is to say that most of those who leave the ‘Third World’—and certainly those who participate most closely in immaterial labour—are the elite in education, wealth and culture, and ‘have no desire whatsoever to dismantle Hardt and Negri’s Empire’ (98). Sourayan Mookerjea makes a similar point regarding Hardt and Negri’s conception of ‘the global’ and their consequent dismissal of ‘the local’: ‘Is Hardt and Negri’s distrust of local struggles, their inability to conceive how the defense of the local or even of national sovereignty might in specific circumstances itself be a route to ‘democratic globalization’ only a consequence of a surreptitious privilege given to the conditions of struggle in the United States?’ (Mookerjea 2003: 2). **These critiques clearly echo those that have been brought forth in feminist contexts by women of the global South. Yet, despite its citation of some postcolonial literature, the analysis of the proletariat in *Empire* is essentializing and homogenizing; it *assumes the existence* of something that needs to be constructed, not just textually but*politically.* There quite simply *is no multitude* right now, except in the sense that there has always already been a multitude, that is, an occasionally linked, but generally disparate field of struggles with no coherence or unity. If the multitudes are ever to come together in any way, this will be the result of a long process of building solidarity and dealing with differences and structured oppressions that plague movements for radical alternatives as much as they do the political mainstream. We simply cannot wish away or have done with racism, heterosexism, classism and other forms of prejudice**. Like the state form and capitalism, **they are ever-present as possibilities**, and therefore must be continuously acknowledged and warded off to the greatest extent possible. **To put it simply: calling ‘everyone’ proletariat (or anything else for that matter) is to stumble blindly into a political impasse, and has the unfortunate effect of alienating precisely those with whom one might hope to build links of solidarity.** Given that they are working with a leninist conception of hegemonic social change, it should not be surprising that Hardt and Negri fail to avoid the most persistent danger of this approach. But, as I have noted, they also draw surreptitiously from anarchism, which has been working for a long time on some of the questions that seem to plague them after writing *Empire*, and which therefore might be able to offer some guidance: How can all this [the constituent power of the multitude] be organized? Or better, how can it adopt an organizational figure? How can we give to these movements of multitudes of bodies, which we recognized are real, a power of expression that can be shared? We still do not know how to respond to these questions (2001: 243) At the broadest level, an anarchist response might be: you are posing yourself the wrong questions. ‘All of this’ is always already organized, and your ‘we’, whatever that might be, cannot ‘give’ it anything without destroying what it is. You must ‘be still, and wait without hope / for hope would be hope for the wrong thing’ (Eliot 1944: 28). That is, **you must trust in non-unifi ed, incoherent, non-hegemonic forces for social change, because hegemonic forces cannot produce anything that will look like change to you at all.**