### framework

#### the ballot should be used to situate the educational value of debate within the larger societal knowledge-building effort, rather than tracing out the debates that have already happened in the literature

#### Tinnell, 11 – Department of English, University of Florida (John, The Fibreculture Journal, issue 18 2011, *FCJ-121 Transversalising the Ecological Turn: Four Components of Felix Guattari’s Ecosophical Perspective*, http://eighteen.fibreculturejournal.org/2011/10/09/fcj-121-transversalising-the-ecological-turn-four-components-of-felix-guattari%E2%80%99s-ecosophical-perspective/)

Guattari stipulates that his ecosophical perspective is ‘at once applied and theoretical, ethicopolitical and aesthetic’ (Guattari, 2008: 44). Nowhere is this blend more evident than in his discussions of machines, which are informed by numerous disciplines from second-order cybernetics to modernist art, as well as concepts set forth by Lacan and Deleuze. [9] Guattari uses the term “machine” to refer at once to actual and virtual properties. (He is not simply pointing to the technical appliances that the term often refers to in everyday conversation.) Machines are actual in that the word denotes existing institutions, groups, and practices, but machines also address the virtual possibilities of collectivity and thus function as a theoretical metamodel. In his assessment of the contemporary psychological landscape, Guattari (1995: 58) claims that ‘individual and collective subjectivity lack modelization’ and, further, that this lack explains the stasis of many social movements, including environmentalism. For this reason, Guattari insists that the development of alternative diagrams for the production of subjectivity (in contrast to Oedipal model, for example) must become ‘an immense site’ of theoretical work and lead to ‘the invention of new practices’ (Guattari, 1995: 58). 21 Without the existential recomposition (e.g., the subject to components of subjectification) that theoretical metamodels engender, the ecosophical project of nascent subjectivity becomes lost to itself. Nascent subjectivity is entirely dependent on the capacity to install one’s thinking into ‘a constantly mutating socius’ (Guattari, 2008: 45). In this sense, the ‘effects of the machinic phylum on subjectivity’ detailed in Chaosmosis should be read right alongside of the challenges and tasks Guattari proposes at the conclusion of The Three Ecologies (Genosko, 2009: 70). Ultimately, Guattari’s machines (be they desiring, celibate, abstract, aesthetic, etc.) have two crucial, praxis-oriented objectives: (1) to help “the individual” install himself into collective dimensions (becoming-machine); (2) to help institutions and groups evolve autopoietically through processual encounters with—and complex articulations of—disparate sources of alterity (nascent subjectivity at the collective level). 22 In many ways, Guattari’s version of the machine could be regarded as an appropriate figure or emblem for poststructuralism. Breaking with the (dogmatic) sign systems of structuralism, Guattari’s focus on machines also performs an important inversion of phenomenology’s tendency to ‘reduce the objects under consideration to a pure intentional transparency’ (Guattari, 2008: 25). And yet, though he explicitly distances his thought from structuralism and phenomenology, Guattari does retain important traces of each these intellectual movements. His writing on machines incorporates a preference for studying contextualised structural objects, but the methods he advocates (schizoanalysis, transversality, etc.) clearly emphasise the need for “spontaneous receptivity”, a quality esteemed by many phenomenologists, which encourages us to encounter each phenomenon in its heterogeneity **rather than overwrite its expression according to the structure of our own interpretative frameworks**. In grasping Guattari’s important theoretical distinctions between machine and structure, one should acknowledge, as Watson aptly notes, that the two terms are ‘inseparable’ and ‘dependent on one another’ as a conceptual pair, in much the same way as we might say of poststructuralism and structuralism (Watson, 2009: 39). Thus, the notion of structure must play a crucial role in discussions of the machine, even though Guattari writes about structures with evident distain. 23 For Guattari, machines pose at least three qualitative differences to “structures” (the obvious emblem of structuralism). First of all, machines express an affective logic of intensities (or “pathic logic”), while structures operate according to the logic of discursive sets. Discursive sets presuppose a separation between subject and object, and for this reason, ‘The truth of a proposition answers to the law of the excluded middle: each object appears in a relationship of binary opposition with a ‘foundation’’ (Guattari, 1995: 28). With the logic of intensities, the relationship between subject and object remains open or in question; therefore, the machine ‘extracts complex forms from chaotic materials’ because ‘there is no extrinsic global reference’ (Guattari, 1995: 28). Indeed, the logic of intensities is the flow quintessential to ethico-aesthetic paradigms. Structures, however, smack of scientific paradigms in that they slow down or bracket chaos and alterity in order to erect a referent (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 118). To combine the terms of What is Philosophy? with Chaosmosis (published in consecutive years), machines-as-philosophy seek to articulate a ‘consistency specific to’ chaos or alterity, whereas structures-as-science use the referent to ‘actualize the virtual,’ and, by extension, to define sources of alterity through reference to known variables (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 118). [10] 24 From the polarity above, we can clearly distinguish machines and structures in terms of their opposing attitudes towards alterity or difference. A structure defines difference only in relation to itself, while machines ‘direct us towards a more collective machinism without delimited unity, whose autonomy accommodates diverse mediums of alterity’ (Guattari, 1995: 42). The machinic drive for autopoiesis necessitates a process of undergoing all the heterogeneous elements operative in the event, which “heterogenises” the machine clean of any dominant, unifying, or universal trait (Guattari, 1995: 39). Machines initiate processes of resingularisation precisely by allowing themselves to breakdown as they disjoin and rejoin to form new configurations immanent to the singularity of the event. As such, machines offer strong metamodels for negotiating refrain-intersections through the invention of ‘new ecological practices’, upon which Guattari comments in The Three Ecologies, ‘their objective being to processually activate isolated and repressed singularities that are just turning in circles’ (Guattari, 2008: 34). In fact, as Watson reminds us, the rationale and language Guattari employs to describe eco-praxes hold much in common with his writing on schizoanalysis, and we may see them as intricately related projects (Watson, 2009: 184). 25 Moreover, as a consequence of these two prior distinctions, machines embody an awareness of their own fluidly and finitude, whereas structures, like Guattari’s diagnosis of ‘capitalist subjectivity’, are ‘intoxicated with and anaesthetized by a collective feeling of pseudo-eternity’ (Guattari, 2008: 34). In addition to dividing human experience of the socius into rigid categories (e.g., nature vs. culture), structures naturalise the divisions they construct by ‘stabilizing the maximum number of existential refrains’ (Guattari, 2008: 34). Given our knowledge of machines and structures in Chaosmosis, we can (re)approach The Three Ecologies to gain an even greater command of this crucial opposition: 26 The principal common to the three ecologies is this: each of the existential Territories with which they confront us is not given as an in-itself [en-soi], closed in on itself, but instead as a for-itself [pour-soi] that is precarious, finite, finitized, singular, singularized, capable of bifurcating into stratified and deathly repetitions or of opening up processually from a praxis that enables it to be made ‘habitable’ by a human project. (Guattari, 2008: 35) 27 This passage in particular—its language of ‘in-itself’ (structure) and ‘for-itself’ (machine)—speaks to the important role of Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of groups in Guattari’s thinking on disjunctive collectivity, which his machines diagram. 28 Gary Genosko has already demonstrated the degree to which Guattari’s early distinction between subjugated groups and subject groups is an appropriation of Sartre’s writings on seriality and fusion. For our purposes, it is also useful to consider machines and structures in this context. Guattari inherits Sartre’s passion for thinking about group behavior precisely because he shares Sartre’s hatred of seriality, which Fredric Jameson defines as ‘the mode of human interaction which corresponds to the domination of the practico-inert’ (Jameson, 1974:147). [11] In other words, a population is subjugated by seriality whenever they relate to one another automatically via behavior that is mass-proscribed by an elite, seemingly invisible authority. On the other hand, according to Genosko, a subject group ‘has liquidated its seriality and come together in “the flash of a common praxis”’ (Genosko, 2008: 60). Subject groups connect in response to an event rather than the mandates of a leader or doctrine. Subject groups illustrate a disjunctive mode of collectivity in their priority for a processual engagement in dynamic encounters with sources of alterity, rather than the stability and dominion of a self-asserted structure. For Guattari, this mode of group subjectivity—like the machine—signifies a solidarity that occurs without the dogmatic influence of any leaders. Furthermore, the subject group measures its collectivity not by the amount of people participating in the group, but rather on the quality of difference articulated among group members, as well as the group’s capacity to register the enunciations of (non)human assemblages outside of the group. [5] Consequently, a subject group attentive to its own ecology—the diversity of its (ephemeral) constituency and the broader institutions and environment with which it interacts—is quick to (re)shape itself in response to a wide spectrum of mental-social-environmental forces. When “isolated” structures are brought into working proximity, structure breaks apart, and this disjunction is necessary for true collectivity. Again, this is a monumental insight of Guattari’s ecosophy: relationships of mutual constructivism and acts of co-creation are predicated upon commitments to disjunction—the processual breakdown of structures into machines. 29 Genosko makes a critical point that Guattari’s distinctions between machine and structure, subject group and subjugated group, are “non-absolute” (Genosko, 2008: 60). For instance, an institution or group that operates à la the machine is not necessarily machinic by nature—it could devolve at any moment into the seriality of a structure. But the same holds true of the inverse (i.e., structure to machine), and this conviction is the cause of Guattari’s optimism regarding the potential impacts of remaking social practices. In critiquing what he calls “Integrated World Capitalism” (IWC), Guattari simultaneously sets up a contrast against which to invent eco-praxes and he specifies a target discourse at which to direct ecosophical interventions. Throughout The Three Ecologies, Guattari suggests a generative opposition between the ecosophical goal of nascent subjectivity and the limits of IWC’s “capitalist subjectivity”: 30 A capitalist subjectivity is engendered through operators of all types and sizes, and is manufactured to protect existence from any intrusion of events that might disturb or disrupt public opinion. It demands that all singularity must be either evaded or crushed in specialist apparatuses and frames of reference. Therefore, it endeavors to manage the worlds of childhood, love, art, as well as everything associated with anxiety, madness, pain, death, or a feeling of being lost in the Cosmos…IWC forms massive subjective aggregates. (Guattari, 2008: 33)

#### **Framework is a re-education camp; by trying to remap our subjectivity, they create a binary assimilation or failure – this inbreeds knowledge until we see creative thinking and advocacy become regurgitation of tired perspectives.**

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Whether it be in the realms of civics, work, or everyday cultural life, we are in the midst of enormous change. To remain apt, education must reflect these changes. Maybe, there are even times and places where educators can lead change.

Take civics. For better or worse, the key phenomenon in the realm of civics is that the nation-state is shrinking. Whatever the root causes—small government conservatism, globalisation, or the new dynamics of a post–Cold War world—the realities of this change are felt everywhere.

The society of self-regulating community—civil society—is becoming a more significant locus of action and decision. The Internet is governed, not by any state, but through the community of experts and interested parties that is the World Wide Web Consortium. Diasporic communities are governed, not by home governments, but by highly distributed community organisations whose points of connection are common cultural principles. In education, we are witnessing the rise of community and private schooling and the self-managing public school, as well as the need for teaching **to become an increasingly self-regulated profession**. As the state contracts, there is no alternative to creating governance structures within the communities of practice of civil society.

With the shrinking of the state, a certain kind of society disappears, too. Compare the relationship of state and civil society today with the command societies of the 20th century—the communism of Lenin and Mao, the fascism of Hitler and interwar Japan, and the paternalistic regimentation of the West’s welfare state. When a greater capacity to decide and act is devolved to civil society, a higher level of participation and reflexivity is required of citizens.

So deep is this change that it extends even to the nature of personality. The society of the strong state established relationships of command and compliance at every level, not just in the state itself but in workplaces (the bosses and supervisors whose orders were to be obeyed), in homes (the heads of households who made decisions and disciplined), in schools (the orders of headmasters and teachers, **mandated curricular content and tests of definitively correct answers**).

Take that archetypical command personality Howard Roark, modern architect and towering individual in Ayn Rand’s procapitalist novel The Fountainhead (1952/1996). At the vanguard of unadorned modernism, he stands alone against the world, unwilling to compromise his designs, and for his singularity of purpose, he triumphs. At almost the same moment, anticapitalist Mexican artist Diego Rivera was painting the heroes of modernity on the murals of the Rockefeller Centre in New York. Overlooking the mighty works of modern man—the cities, the bridges, the industrial landscapes whose horizons are punctured by smokestacks— were the heroic engineer, the heroic architect, the heroic intellectual, the heroic political leader, the heroic gang-supervisor, and (his Rockefeller patrons also hoped) the heroic capitalist. Rivera was removed from the job when it became obvious that among the faces of the heroes was a likeness of Lenin. Notwithstanding 20th-century sensitivities to their ideological differences, Roark and Lenin were equally command personalities and in that sense substitutable in the tableau of modernism. Both left and right, in their time, lionised command personalities.

For every command personality, there had to be a multitude of unquestioning functionaries, and upon their compliance the system depended. The ideal citizen of the strong state was compliant; the ideal worker of the capitalist or communist industrial enterprise was compliant; the ideal learner in the classroom of disciplined knowledge was compliant.

Today, the command personality is an anachronism. At work, for instance, crude command structures are replaced by a more sophisticated cultural co-option—the co-option of teamwork, vision and mission, and corporate culture, in which everyone is supposed to personify the enterprise, to think and will and act the enterprise. Roark’s aesthetic insistence has become an archaism—he would let his business fail before compromising on the rigorous modernism of his designs. “Any colour you like, so long as it’s black,” said another heroic command personality, Henry Ford. Today, there can be no entrepreneurial heroism because the customer is always right and products and services need to be customised to mesh with the multiple subjectivities of niche markets—the big SUVs, the smart sports cars, the spacious family cars, the microcars for crowded cities, cars of any hue and trim—so many permutations, in fact, that sometimes an individual order has to be placed before a vehicle is manufactured. Fordist mass production is displaced by today’s mass customisation.

In our lives as cultural beings as well, there has been a profound shift in the intersubjective balance of power. Take something as fundamental as narrative. In everyday family and community life, the narratives of gaming have become a bigger business than the narratives of Hollywood. From the most impressionable of ages, children of the Nintendo, PlayStation, and X-Box generation have become inured to the idea that they can be characters in narratives, capable of determining or at least influencing the story’s end. They are content with being no less than actors rather than audiences, players rather than spectators, agents rather than voyeurs, users rather than readers of narrative. Not content with programmed radio, they build their own playlists on their iPods. Not content with programmed television, they read the narratives of DVD and Internet-streamed video at varying depth (the movie, the documentary about the making of the movie) and dip into “chapters” at will. Not content with the singular vision of sports telecasting of mass television, they choose their own angles, replays, and statistical analyses on interactive digital television. Meanwhile, the autocreative potentials of the digital media and the “semantic web” have only begun, with phenomena such as blogging. These potentials create new economies of cultural scale, geographies of distribution, and balances of cultural power. The costs of owning the means of producing widely communicable meaning have been hugely reduced, and with this, the small and the different have become as viable as the large and the generic (Cope & Kalantzis, 2004).

Whether it be in the domains of governance, work, or cultural life, the command society is giving way to the society of reflexivity. Or so we might say in moments of strategic optimism. In moments of pessimism we might experience these same phenomena as fragmentation, egocentrism, randomness, ambiguity, and anarchy. And when this pessimism turns to fear, we might want to return to earlier, simpler command structures—in nations, workplaces, households, and schools.

Pessimists and optimists alike can agree that we are in the midst of a transformation that is creating new forms of subjectivity and new kinds of personality. These transformations can be viewed from within a systemic perspective and beyond it. From a systemic point of view, these are the kinds of governance structures, the kinds of organisations, and the kinds of people required today for the most conservative, small government, and proenterprise points of view. We hear these points of view ex pressed in the public rhetoric of innovation and creativity, the knowledge economy, and individual autonomy and responsibility. Notwithstanding the high-sounding rhetoric, these transformations when left to run their course may only legitimate and even exacerbate systemic inequities—iniquities, indeed.

History, however, is more open-ended than that. Inevitably, human systems are so complex that they allow possibilities outside the scope anticipated by their progenitors and apologists. For every moment when the ideologues of small government succeed in shrinking the state, there is another moment in which people learn the civilities of self-government in their various communities of practice; for every moment when command structures in workplaces are replaced by collaborationist structures, there is another moment in which people acquire the collaborative competencies of socially directed work; for every moment when compliant personalities are replaced by the egocentrism of individualism, there is another moment in which new relationships of codependence and mutual reliance are created and the bonds of sociability are extended and deepened. Whatever the domain, there is a shift in the balance of power and in the moral economy of agency that favours egalitarianism and liberty—and this, despite and beyond prevailing systems and structures of power. **From this, something genuinely new could emerge**.

Whether one’s agenda is to support today’s systems of governance, work, and culture or to create new and more equitable ones, subjectivity and agency loom larger than they did in the era of the command society. Yet, all too often, our institutions and practices of schooling reflect the epistemological frames of reference and personality types of the command society, in the communication patterns of classroom discourse, for instance, or the information architectures of curriculum, or the rigid expectations of “right” and “wrong” answers in testing regimes.

We educators have been struggling to develop a new dynamics of agency for a century now, starting with the progressivisms of John Dewey and Maria Montessori. One of the solutions to the problem of agency in learning has been a “constructivism” derived from a 20th-century psychological canon in which Piaget’s theories dominate. In the context of a command society, however, their emphasis was on the level and extent of receptivity at a particular age or at a particular cognitive stage. The raw materials of “intelligence” were biologised, and variations were accounted for **in terms of individualised “capability**” and the increments of what was supposed to be innate, universal development. Today, the cognitive sciences do a similar psychological job. Their agenda is to account for the mechanisms of receptivity more than for the mechanisms in which learned knowledge is genuinely made by conscious agency.

If, however, one follows and extends a line of thought begun by Vygotsky, other possibilities for pedagogy emerge. If knowledge is a psychological construct that is more social than individual, if learning is the stuff of active appropriation of the world in a social context, if educability amounts to more than equation of external transmission with individual receptivity, what then are the bases of a theory of pedagogy?

Building on Vygotsky, Bill Cope and I have been proposing a theory of learning that is grounded epistemologically rather than psychologically. By “epistemological,” we mean what we do to know (Kalantzis & Cope, 2004, 2005). As humans, we might be driven by the mystery of human consciousness, but the critical question is what we do with its drives. Here are some acts of knowing that we have been considering of late as a part of our Learning by Design research and development project: we experience (by immersion, making tacit connections in familiar or new contexts); we conceptualise (by abstracting, naming things, and developing explicit generalisations); we analyse (inferring and interpreting cause, effect, and human interest);we apply (by making an intervention in the world of use able things and meanings, be that intervention predictable and appropriate or innovative). In every one of these acts of knowing, we learn the world by doing something in the world.

The command society could never trust learners to be agents of knowing. Instead, they were the receptors of knowledge—although even this was a conceit of power, because now we understand the perennial role of the reader, the listener, or the viewer. We thought that they were receptors because this illusion also drove our politics, our workplaces, our public culture, and our pedagogy. In hindsight there was resistance as often as there was compliance, even if that resistance was branded subversion, laziness, or failure at school.

Today, we can remain under no such illusion. The increasingly critical self-governing structures of civil society, the tricks and tropes of the self-managing work team, the user-driven narratives of popular culture make any such illusions impossible. The children of Nintendo will simply walk away if the pedagogy served up to them by institutionalised schooling does not engage every fibre of their subjectivity. The workplace of the near future will simply be uncompetitive if its workers do not contribute their all, from their creative potential to their ability to maintain relationships of supple reflexivity across the myriad niche customers and affiliates. **The cultures of the near future will ossify if they fail to leave space for the “readers” to follow their own proclivities and shape their own cultural ends**.

The minute that one allows so much scope for agency, one finds oneself facing layers upon layers of difference. One discovers actually existing agencies in the massively plural and not the fabrications and falsifications of the command society with its one-people–one-state nationalism, of the regime of mass production and mass consumption, and of the pretensions to cultural homogeneity of the society of mass media and mass culture. The differences are material (class, locale), corporeal (race, gender, sexuality, ability/disability) and circumstantial (culture, life experience, interest, affinity). We can acknowledge these differences, perform neat demographic metrics, and, in the name of diversity, build programmes to suit group by group. Or we may think that we can, at least until we encounter a deeper difference that, in the interstices of these demographics or even solidly in the middle of each demographic, defies neat categorisation and prediction. These differences are manifest in the profoundly variable dispositions and sensibilities that one encounters from person to person. This is the stuff of the lifeworld, not individualised personality. Such difference is accountable in terms of the infinitely variable and therefore always uniquely complex range of sociocultural influences that come to bear on any one individual. The more we take agency for real, the more multifarious its manifestations become.

And to face all these agencies in one classroom! The solution of the command society was that of one teacher talking at the middle of the class, one textbook telling one narrative one chapter at a time, one test evaluating one way of knowing. **The result was assimilation** to the middle way **or failure**.

Constructivism blandly suggests that we bring agency into this picture. It is as if we can give all learners the same dose of agency, commensurate with their stage of the template of human developmentalism. But it is not just agency in the abstract that we have to harness. The complexity is such that the simple nostrums of constructivism serve us poorly indeed.

If it is to be at all relevant, the classroom of the reflexive society must allow alternative starting points for learning (what the learners perceive to be worth learning, what engages the particularities of their identities). It must allow for alternative forms of engagement (the varied experiences that need to be brought to bear on the learning; the different conceptual bents of learners; the different analytical perspectives that the learners may have on the nature of cause, effect, and human interest; and the different settings in which they may apply or enact their knowledge). It must allow for different learning styles (preferences, for instance, for particular emphases in knowledge making and patterns of engagement—experiential, conceptual, analytical, or applied). It must allow for different modalities in meaning making, embracing alternative expressive potentials for different learners. And it must allow for alternative pathways and destination points in learning.

#### Separation of perspectives is an inadequate foundation for thinking – every topic begins with a problem area – by isolating and separating questions of philosophy, ecology, and policy within that problem area, the explanations we use to craft strategies are limited by the scope of inquiry.

**Webb and Gulson, 12 –** University of British Columbia, Canada AND University of New South Wales, Australia (P. Taylor and Kalervo, *Policy prolepsis in education: Encounters, becomings, and phantasm*, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 33:1, 87-99)

Up until the 1980s, it was commonly assumed that education policy represented the implementation of solutions to educational problems, and that educational research should and could contribute to policy effectiveness (Simons, Olssen, & Peters, 2009). While in the 1990s and 2000s, critical policy studies in education challenged this view, it is the case that a techno-rational characterization of education policy still has a stranglehold on education policy makers and educational researchers. Technorationality in the development and implementation of policy is paralleled in educational policy research which is increasingly required to be for policy and the expected ‘solutions’ to indetermi+nate problems, and eventually, to be aimed at evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of reforms (Rizvi & Lingard, 2009). Debates about policy have become claims and counterclaims about methodology and related issues of rigour and what counts as legitimate evidence (Wiseman, 2010). Techno-rational approaches to policy development and research imply that variations in policy meaning, implementations, and outcomes are attributable to actor’s incorrect interpretations, or imply a certain set of literacy skills in reading or decoding policy have atrophied (Cohen, 1990). As such, these approaches suggest that actors have **misinterpreted a ‘fixed meaning’ of policy**, thus **assuming these meanings are objective, accessible, and complete**. In this paper when we talk about policy interpreters we are referring to actors, or crudely, end-users of policy, in what Bowe, Ball, and Gold (1992) identify as the context of practice, or the realm of ‘policy enactments’ (Ball, Hoskins, Maguire, & Braun, 2010). We argue, in refrain of Ball (1994) and (Ball et al., 2010), that various levels of policy, including the complexities, ambiguities and ambivalences associated with making, delivering, receiving, resisting and/or transforming policy, require analyses of policy that **acknowledge and work with problematizations** 1 **rather than reductions of complexities**. This is to work with and within, what (Youdell 2011), following Deleuze and Guattari has termed the education assemblage. Furthermore, and against the above backdrop, our departure point for this paper is to work from a critical policy studies orientation (Simons et al., 2009), to rethink and reorient a key claim made consistently in critical policy studies over the last 20 years. This contention is that **policy is not a seamless process** from development to implementation. 2 Like Ball (1994), we agree that policy is **characterized by incompleteness**, ad hocery and ‘the ‘‘wild profusion’’ of local practice’ (p. 10). Policy is always and only a contingent and provisional fixing. Part of these claims of the provisional lie in the idea of interpretation, that educational policy is involved with semiotics (Ball, 1990), including teachers as semioticians of curriculum policy (Rizvi & Lingard, 2009). In refuting ideas of techno-rationality in analyses of (neoliberal) policy implementation, we **do not relinquish politics**. Like Youdell (2011), we believe that various forms of post-structural analyses of education . . . and the practices they espouse have received varying degrees of recognition and takeup in the mainstream of education theory and practice, and while for the most part they have been remained marginal, they have been legitimate, recognizable and speakable. (2011, p. 10) What is of interest for us in this paper is that in the midst of this turbulence surrounding education policy, the concept policy **remains untouched**. It is the **legitimacy of evidence**, for example, that is contested, not what policy is (Cf., Ball, 1994), not whether policy **can actually do the work for which it is claimed**, and **what effects are** **produced** and continually produced in the name of policy. In this paper our understanding of education policy is informed from Ball’s (1994) idea that ‘policy is both text and action, words and deeds, it is what is enacted as well as what is intended’ (p. 10). Throughout, we refer to policy documents, including: press releases, government decisions, legislation, formal authorizations, mandates, laws, speeches, white papers, reports, and curricula. We also refer to policy intentions that attempt to construct, prevent, and/or solve a ‘problem’ (Miller & Rose, 2008); send a (symbolic) message; resolve political tensions; and maintain the status quo (e.g., regulate, standardize, cement).

#### Switch-side debate is inclusive exclusion – fairness and predictability are products of predetermined concepts about how debate should be – their framework is an attempt to overcode subjectivity, and maybe we should deterritorialize that map of a curriculum.

**Reid-Brinkley, 12** (Transcription of Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley lecturing WGA DF in November 2011, Carrollton, GA, *Fairness, Predictability and Knowledge-Making Practices*, http://resistanceanddebate.wordpress.com/2012/06/20/fairness-predictability-and-knowledge-making-practices-2/)

I think one of the smartest arguments I saw Louisville (around 2008) make, which is really reformist in their intent but could be potentially revolutionary, was their argument that the debate community is in violation of the racial social contract for engagement. Louisville then argued that this justified their not being topical on the Aff so all of the oppositions fairness and predictability claims must be read against this original violation of the contract. Their argument wasn’t that we should just get rid of fairness or predictability claims. Once we get to a point where the kind of changes that we are identifying, like in knowledge making practices etc., then fairness and predictability claims may be more useful in that context. But if predictability claims are designed to maintain a certain manner of knowledge production or certain systems of power, then they are in violation of this idea of a social contract, they feed into the argument about the ontological status of the black in the context of anti-blackness. It demonstrates or operationalizes that the black has no place in civil society. When the black intends to speak from that position or to simply highlight that position in civil society, then how does society respond, it crowds it out, it says no. It says, you are out of place or out of order, you represent chaos. And what does the system do when it is confronted by chaos? It resolves the chaos to bring it back into order. The current ordering demands that society maintain the positionality of the black as the ontological other, while simultaneously structurally adjusting the black into civil society. Arguments like you can read a topical version of your affirmative seems like an example of the kind of structural adjustment Wilderson speaks to. We are not just critiquing topic selection or topic development, we are also critiquing knowledge production in areas that we define in terms of research. So why isn’t your affirmative about Egypt and the concept of the development of democracy in the context of anti-blackness a predictable affirmative in the research literature. The reason it’s not predictable is because it’s not in the confines of the space we have identified as available for research. Your whole argument is an argument against the normative manner in which we draw the circle within the research literature. Your argument isn’t that there shouldn’t be a circle, that the topic can’t function as a circle. Sure we could attempt to affect the knowledge making practices by changing the topic or the process of selection for topics, but I fear that that may just be a surface level reformist change that won’t result in a change in the practices of knowledge that we participate in within the debate space. In other words, even if we changed topics to go beyond the traditional wording of contemporary topics, that may not result in changes in what the community conceptualizes as potential research areas within these new topic areas. If we really got into diversifying what we think of as areas of research, it’s not like we wouldn’t define some boundary with the topic, but what fits in the area of the topic would necessarily expand. To some extent that’s not that problematic, look how many affirmative’s are on this topic, we have all of these countries. You can do democracy assistance in any way, but we have decided that the only way that you can do democracy assistance is based on the way that the USFG has budgeted it. Because we have decided that that should be the line of predictability. We could have decided that the line of predictability lay elsewhere. In other words, **the lines we draw are arbitrary, but not neutral**. How about we just draw the line at what academic research has decided is the available space of conversation surrounding democracy assistance. Or how about we define it in the context of not just academic research but also what revolutionary activists, who are producing grassroots scholarship may have to add to the discussion. **This style is not designed to allow people to say anything that they please in a debate round**. At the end of criticism of normative debate practice, the project isn’t that we should be doing the same thing for the next 40 years of debate competition, instead this is a temporary intercession or intervention into the debate space. That temporary intervention is designed to create some potential changes in how we engage in topic selection, how we engage in research, who we believe are potential avenues for expert evidence, all of those things could potentially change. So that we could then understand what would be predictable in that frame because that would become the research space. The students in the movement are asking fundamental questions about what democracy is and what it means to participate in it. That they do so by questioning the practices of democracy within the United States in order to begin making an argument about how the United States can begin to help and support democratic revolutions abroad is an attempt to highlight the problematic practices of democracy and efforts to demonstrate its shortcomings. Otherwise we end up exporting our own democracy, which we admit is deeply flawed, to other nations absent a discourse of critically interrogating democracy, as not just a system of government, but a practice of everyday life. Debate changes, it grows, so there’s no reason why the debate community can’t come up with a means of stabilizing forms of predictability and provide fairness in terms of debatable ground in the context of this expansion or complication of what we consider as the available area of research.

#### All our offense on switch-side debate applies here – agonism presupposes clear boundaries between subject-positions and demarcations in the debate – but subjects are always interconnected – they try to shut out certain subjectivities which prevents genuine encounters with difference – only we force a confrontation with difference that does not try to assimilate it – this proves that debate isn’t key to access this

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(Boel, “The ethic-aesthetic way of wonders”, InFormation Vol 1 no 1, pg 19-38, dml)

The reactivating of social space **without closing the personal space** is a key aspect in the ideological navigation of the „land projects‟. In his Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Gregory Bateson discusses flexibility, that is, an ability to change or adapt in relation to human sociality, intellectuality and nature: I suggest then that a healthy ecology of human civilization would be defined somewhat as follows: A single system of environment combined with human civilization in which the flexibility of the civilization shall match that of the environment to create an on-going complex system, **open-ended for** **slow change of even basic** (hard-programmed) **characteristics**. (Bateson, 2000, p.502) A problem for the ecosopher then, whose overreaching goal is flexibility, is the need to insist, even tyrannically, on this flexibility in order for it to persist. Deleuze and Guattari were inspired by Bateson, and their insistence on „becoming‟ might be seen as related to Bateson‟s focus on flexibility. Bateson continues: “From all of this it follows that to maintain the flexibility of a given variable, either that flexibility must be exercised, or the encroaching variables must be directly controlled” (Bateson, 2000, p.511). Accordingly we underline the importance of immediate manoeuvring, of singular choice and action.13 Returning to the ethics presented in the ecosophy of Guattari, we are prompted to connect and co-think mentality, sociality and environment. The concept of ecology indicates the organic character that any non-moralistic and affective ethicality must have, based on the sustainable balance of subject, community and nature/environment. This is implied in Guattari‟s work as well as in the ecosophy of Næss. Ecological relationality is a given, not a choice, but ecology opens up **many possible choices**, many possible ethicalities. Ethics is not only non-moralistic, it is also affective as well as non-coherent or discontinuous. Despite the focus here on ethicality and sustainability, I wish to stress again that ecological systems **do not indicate harmonious zones** or conflict free wholes, collaboration and co-existence **always involve** **conflicts of interests and negotiation**. It is the complex organization, the possible consideration of “everything” and the finely scaled balance that makes ecology a valid perspective, and that makes it a life perspective where a common work or project **can be realized** **on the basis of, not by the elimination of, difference**: all relations **have to be based on and consist of difference and disagreement** (Mouffe, 2000; Mouffe & Laclau, 2001). For example, in ecological studies one of the defined forms of interaction, mutualism, where both parties are benefitting from a relationship, is seen as reciprocal exploitation rather than cosy partnership (Begon, Townsend & Harper, 2006, p. 381).

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#### What is material? The affirmative disagrees with their representation of economics as a monocausal explanation for how power functions – the world is a collection of differences and attempting to impose a singular model of knowing on it paradoxically makes analysis impossible

**Manuel DeLanda, 1997**, Adjunct Associate Professor – Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation – Columbia University, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, p. 46-8

Even in this age of huge multinational corporations, the command element in the commercial mixture is far from 100 percent. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith, who sharply differentiates between spontaneous economic activity (markets) and planned economic processes (big business), calculates that today roughly half of the Western economy has been taken over by capitalist hierarchies. The other half comprises the low-profit regions, which those hierarchies willingly abandon to the market. According to Galbraith, what gives capitalism this freedom of motion is economy of scale, which is why since the Middle Ages commercial capitalism has been associated with wholesale and not retail. A large firm is better able to absorb shocks and fluctuations and create the plans and strategies that may win it a degree of independence from market forces, indeed the ability to control and manipulate those forces to a certain degree. Such considerations led Braudel to the startling conclusion that "we should not be too quick to assume that capitalism embraces the whole of western society, that it accounts for every stitch in the social fabric...that our societies are organized from top to bottom in a 'capitalist system.' On the contrary...there is a dialectic still very much alive between capitalism on one hand, and its antithesis, the 'non-capitalism' of the lower level on the other."56 And he adds that, indeed, capitalism was carried upward and onward on the shoulders of small shops and "the enormous creative powers of the market, of the lower story of exchange.... [This] lowest level, not being paralysed by the size of its plant or organization, is the one readiest to adapt; it is the seedbed of inspiration, improvisation and even innovation, although its most brilliant discoveries sooner or later fall into the hands of the holders of capital. It was not the capitalists who brought about the fast cotton revolution; all the new ideas came from enterprising small businesses."57 There is a misconception, widely shared by economists and philosophers on either side of the political spectrum, that capitalism developed in several stages, being at first competitive and subservient to market forces and only later, in the twentieth century, becoming monopolistic. However, starting in the thirteenth century, capitalists engaged in various noncompetitive practices, in order to create the large accumulations of money that have always characterized the upper levels of the trade pyramid. As we discussed, the early medieval fairs, the meeting points of rich merchants from all over Europe, were veritable hierarchies of meshworks, in which the luxury and money markets dominated the upper echelons. Neither in the long-distance trade of prestige goods nor in the worlds of precious metals and credit did supply and demand reign supreme. On the contrary, most fortunes in these areas were made by the manipulation of these market forces through a variety of noncompetitive practices. There was, of course, intense competition among rich merchants and families, much as today large corporations compote with one another, but these rivalries among oligopolies are fundamentally different from the kind of "anonymous competition" in which small producers and traders engage.58 From the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, not only did individual businesses engage in monopolistic practices, entire cities did too, even groups of cities. By means of noncompetitive practices, a town could greatly aid its merchants and financiers, protecting them from foreign rivals, and stimulating the accumulation of money within its walls. The medieval cities that controlled the Mediterranean and the Baltic and North Seas financed much of their growth from manipulation of markets and by acquiring exclusive control of certain flows, such as spices and silks from the Levant in the case of Venice, or salt in the case of Lübeck. With a monopoly on luxury goods, won and maintained by military force, fourteenth-century Venice dominated the cities around it, not only the small towns constituting its supply regions but other giant towns, such as Florence and Milan. In the north, between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, cities like Lübeck and Bruges formed a meshwork of cities known as the Hanseatic League, which was capable of collective action without a centralized organization behind it. The league also engaged in monopolistic practices to trap the towns within its zone of economic influence in a web of supervision and dependence.59 We will return shortly to other forms of market manipulation which, according to Braudel, have always characterized certain commercial institutions since the Middle Ages. This will make clear how wrong it is to assume (as many economists to the right and center of the political spectrum tend to do) that market power is something that may be dismissed or that needs to be studied only in relation to some aberrant institutional forms such as overt monopolies. But certain conceptions from the left (particularly the Marxist left) also need to be corrected, in particular, a teleological conception of economic history in terms of a linear progression of modes of production. In this Braudel explicitly agrees with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: capitalism could have arisen anywhere and long before it did in Europe.60 Its emergence must be pictured as a bifurcation, a phase transition that might have taken place somewhere else had the conditions been right (for instance, in the huge camel caravans along the Salk Road in the thirteenth century).61 Moreover, the institutions that emerged after this bifurcation must be viewed not as replacing previous institutions (i.e., markets) but as fully coexisting with them without forming a societywide "system." It is true that prices across Europe were pulsating to the same rhythm from medieval times and this gave the entire continent a certain economic coherence (sometimes referred to as a "world-economy"), but it would be a mistake to confuse world-economies with the "capitalist system," since India, China, and Islam also formed coherent economic areas (as powerful as those of Europe) without giving rise to capitalism.62 The conceptual confusion engendered by all the different uses of the word "capitalism" (as "free enterprise" or as "industrial mode of production" or, more recently, as "world-economy") is so entrenched that it makes an objective analysis of economic power almost impossible. One could, of course, simply redefine the term "capitalism" to include "power to manipulate markets" as a constitutive part of its meaning and to rid it of some of its teleological connotations. But as philosophers of science know well, when a theory begins redefining its terms in an ad hoc way to fit the latest round of negative evidence, it shows by this very act that it has reached the limits of its usefulness. In view of this, it would seem that the only solution is to replace this tired word with a neologism, perhaps the one Braudel suggested, "antimarkets," and to use it exclusively to refer to a certain segment of the population of commercial and industrial institutions.63

**Ethical judgments about capitalism in the abstract should be avoided – its complete abandonment is neither possible nor desirable – an insistence on meshwork alternatives will result in worse forms of oppression**

**Manuel DeLanda, 1997**, Adjunct Associate Professor – Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation – Columbia University, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, p. 66-70

Thus, much as sedimentary rocks, biological species, and social hierarchies are all stratified systems (that is, they are each the historical product of a process of double articulation), so igneous rocks, ecosystems, and markets are self-consistent aggregates, the result of the coming together and interlocking of heterogeneous elements. And just as the diagram defining the “stratifying abstract machine” may turn out to require more complexity than our basic diagram of a double articulation, so we may one day discover (empirically or through theorizing and computer simulations) that the diagram for the meshwork-producing process involves more than the three elements outlined above. Moreover, in reality we will always find mixtures of markets and hierarchies, of strata and self-consistent aggregates. As Simon says, it may seem prima facie correct to say that whereas markets figure most prominently in coordinating economic activities in capitalist countries, hierarchic organizations play the largest role in socialist countries. But that is too simple a formula to describe the realities which always exhibit a blend of all the mechanisms of coordination. The economic units in capitalist societies are mostly business firms, which are themselves hierarchic organizations, some of enormous size, that make only a modest use of markets in their internal functioning. Conversely socialist states use market prices to a growing extent to supplement hierarchic control in achieving inter-industry coordinatnon.99 There is one final aspect of meshwork dynamics I must examine before returning to our exploration of the “geological” history of human societies. We may wonder why, given the ubiquity of self-consistent aggregates, it seems so hard to think about the structures that populate the world in any but hierarchical terms. One possible answer is that stratified structures involve the simplest form of causal relations, simple arrows going from cause to effect.100 According to Magoroh Maruyana, a pioneer in the study of feedback, Western thought has been dominated by notions of linear (nonreciprocal) causality for twenty-five hundred years. It was not until World War II that the work of Norman Wiener (and engineers involved in developing radar systems) gave rise to the study of negative feedback and with it the beginning of nonlinear thinking. The classic example of negative feedback is the thermostat. A thermostat consists of at least two elements: a sensor, which detects charges in ambient temperature, and, an effector, a device capable of changing the ambient temperature. The two elements are coupled in such a way that whenever the sensor detects a change beyond a certain threshold it causes the effector to modify the surrounding temperature in the opposite direction. The cause-and-effect relation, however, is not linear (from sensor to effector) since the moment the effector causes a change in the surrounding temperature it thereby affects the subsequent behavior of the sensor. In short, the causal relation does not form a straight arrow but folds back on itself, forming a closed loop. The overall result of this circular causality is that ambient temperature is maintained at a given level. Maruyana opposes negative feedback with "positive feedback" (a form of nonlinear causality that we have already encountered in the form of autocatalysis). While the first type of reciprocal causality was incorporated into Western thought in the 1950s, the second type had to wait another decade for researchers like Stanislav Ulam, Heinz Von Foerster, and Maruyana himself to formalize and develop the concept.101 The turbulent dynamics behind an explosion are the clearest example of a system governed by positive feedback. In this case the causal loop is established between the explosive substance and its temperature. The velocity of an explosion is often determined by the intensity of its temperature (the hotter the faster), but because the explosion itself generates heat, the process is self-accelerating. Unlike the thermostat, where the arrangement helps to keep temperature under control, here positive feedback forces temperature to go out of control. Perhaps because positive feedback is seen as a destabilizing force many observers have tended to undervalue it relative to negative feedback. (In the so-called Gaia hypothesis, for instance, where stabilizing negative feedback is postulated to exist between living creatures and their environment, positive feedback is sometimes referred to pejoratively as "anti-Gaian.")102 Maruyana sees the question in different terms. For him the principal characteristic of negative feedback as its homogenizing effect: any deviation from the temperature threshold at which the thermostat is set is eliminated by the loop. Negative feedback is "deviation-counteracting." Positive feedback, on the other hand, tends to increase heterogeneity by being "deviation-amplifying": two explosions set off under slightly different conditions will arrive at very different end states, as the small original differences are amplified by the loop into large discrepancies.103 We have already observed the many roles that positive feedback has played in the turbulent history of Western towns. However, it is important to distinguish between simple autocatalytic dynamics and complex autocatalytic loops, which involve not only self-stimulation but self-maintenance (that is, positive feedback and closure). Another way of stating this distinction is to say that the increase in diversity that mutually stimulating loops bring about will be short-lived unless the heterogeneous elements are interwoven together, that is, unless they come to form a meshwork. As Maruyana writes, "There are two ways that heterogeneity may proceed: through localization and through interweaving. In localization the heterogeneity between localities increases, while each locality may remain or become homogenous. In interweaving, heterogeneity in each locality increases, while the difference between localities decreases."104 In other words, the danger with positive feedback is that the mere production of heterogeneity may result in isolationism (a high diversity of small cliques, each internally homogeneous). Hence the need for intercalary elements to aid in articulating this diversity without homogenization (what Maruyana calls "symbiotizatson of cultural heterogeneity"). Negative feedback, as a system of control and reduction of deviation, may be applied to human hierarchies. Decision making in stratified social structures does not always proceed via goal- directed analytic planning but often incorporates automatic mechanisms of control similar to a thermostat (or any other device capable of generating homeostasis).105 On the other hand, social meshworks (such as the symbiotic nets of producers whom Jacobs describes as engaged in volatile trade) may be modeled on positive-feedback loops as long in our model also incorporates a means for the resulting heterogeneity to be interwoven. Moreover, specific institutions will likely be mixtures of both types of reciprocal causality, and the mixtures will change over time, allowing negative or positive feedback to dominate at a given moment.106 The question of mixtures should be also kept in mind when we judge the relative ethical value of these two types of structure. If this book displays a clear bias against large, centralized hierarchies, it is only because the last three hundred years have witnessed an excessive accumulation of stratified systems at the expense of meshworks. The degree of homogeneity in the world has greatly increased, while heterogeneity has come to be seen as almost pathological, or at least as a problem that must be eliminated. Under the circumstances, a call for a more decentralized way of organizing human societies seems to recommend itself. However, it is crucial to avoid the facile conclusion that meshworks are intrinsically better than hierarchies (in some transcendental sense). It is true that some of the characteristics of meshworks (particularly their resilience and adaptability) make them desirable, but that is equally true of certain characteristics of hierarchies (for example, their goal-directedness). Therefore, it is crucial to avoid the temptation of cooking up a narrative of human history in which meshworks appear as heroes and hierarchies as villains. Not only do meshworks have dynamical properties that do not necessarily benefit humanity (for example, they grow and develop by drift, and that drift need not follow a direction consistent with a society's values), but they may contain heterogeneous components that are themselves inconsistent with a society's values (for example, certain meshworks of hierarchies). Assuming that humanity could one day agree on a set of values (or rather on a way of meshing a heterogeneous collection of partially divergent values), further ethical judgments could be made about specific mixtures of centralized and decentralized components in specific contexts, but never about the two pure cases in isolation. The combinatorial possibilities—the number of possible hybrids of meshworks and hierarchies—are immense (in a precise technical sense),107 and so an experimental and empirical attitude toward the problem would seem to be called for. It is surely impossible to determine purely theoretically the relative merits of these diverse combinations. Rather, in our search for viable hybrids we must look for inspiration in as many domains as possible. Here, we have looked to a realm that would normally seem out of bounds: the mineral world. But in a nonlinear world in which the same basic processes of self-organization take place in the mineral, organic, and cultural spheres, perhaps rocks hold some of the keys to understanding sedimentary humanity, igneous humanity, and all their mixtures.

**Our alternative is to reject their representation of homogenous capitalist system in which we are all cogs – Our discursive rejection is key to a new hope in transforming economic institutions**

**Manuel DeLanda, 1997**, Adjunct Associate Professor – Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation – Columbia University, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, p. 266-274

When we think that the majority of equations used in science are linear and that a linear conception of causality dominated Western thought for over two millennia, we may be inclined to think that our lack of familiarity with questions of self-organized heterogeneity and our tendency to think about complexity in terms of homogeneous hierarchies derive from the way we represent the world to ourselves. No doubt, the entrenchment in the academic and scientific worlds of certain discursive practices informed by linear thinking and linear representation is indeed part of our problem. But to try to reduce a complex situation to a question of representations is, in turn, a homogenizing force very much alive today among social critics. Here we have argued that both the world of objective referents and the world of labels and concepts have undergone processes of uniformation and standardization, so that both discursive and nondiscursive practices need to be taken into account when tracing the history of our homogenization. In short, as our industrial, medical, and educational systems became routinized, as they grew and began to profit from economies of scale, linear equations accumulated in the physical sciences and equilibrium theories flourished in the social sciences.14 In a sense, even though the world is inherently nonlinear and far from equilibrium, its homogenization meant that those areas that had been made uniform began behaving objectively as linear equilibrium structures, with predictable and controllable properties. In other words, Western societies transformed the objective world (or some areas of it) into the type of structure that would "correspond" to their theories, so that the latter became, in a sense, self-fulfilling prophecies. Today, our theories are beginning to incorporate nonlinear elements, and we are starting to think of heterogeneity as something valuable, not in an obstacle to unification. Negative and positive feedback have been added to older linear notions of causality, enriching our conceptual reservoir. Even some materials (such as fiberglass and other composites) have increased our awareness of the limitations imposed by uniformity and our awareness of the great advantages of meshworks in industrial design.15 In short, our theories are shedding some of their homogeneity. Although this is a welcome development we still have to deal with the world of referents, with the thousands of routinized organizations that have accumulated over the years, with the spread of standardized languages, and with the homogenized gene pools of our domestic plants and animals, to mention only the examples discussed in this book. Changing our way of thinking about the world is a necessary first step, but it is by no means sufficient: we will need to de-stratify reality itself, and we must do so without the guarantee of a golden age ahead, knowing full well the dangers and possible restratifications we may face. It is important, however, not to confuse the need for caution in our exploration of the nonlinear possibilities of (economic, linguistic, biological) reality, and the concomitant abandonment of utopian euphoria, with despair, resentment, or nihilism. There is, indeed, a new kind of hope implicit in these new views. After all, many of the most beautiful and inspiring things on our planet may have been created through destratification, A good example of this may be the emergence of birdsongs: the mouth became destratified when it ceased to be a strictly alimentary organ, caught up in the day-to-day eating of flesh, and began to generate other flows (nerves) and structures (songs) where the meshwork element dominated the hierarchical.16 The emergence of organic life itself, while not representing a more perfect stage of development than rocks, did involve a greater capacity to generate self-consistent aggregates, a surplus of consistency.17 The human hand may also have involved a destrafication, a complete detachment from locomotive functions and a new coupling with the external environment, itself further destratified when the hand began converting pieces of it (rocks, bones, branches) into tools.18 Thus, despite all the cautionary tales about simplistic calls for anarchic liberation, there is in these new theories a positive, even joyful conception of reality. And while these views do indeed invoke the "death of man," it is only the death of the "man" of the old "manifest destinies," not the death of humanity and its potential for destratifications.19