### 2ac – framework

#### 

#### The world doesn’t conform to a model – they need to win that to be an artist you can only color within the lines – you should ask the question of how do they make debate better? Debate should be about knowledge advancement over accumulation – the ballot should be used to situate the educational value of debate within the larger societal knowledge-building effort, rather than tracing out the debates that have already happened in the literature

#### Tinnell, 11 – Department of English, University of Florida (John, The Fibreculture Journal, issue 18 2011, *FCJ-121 Transversalising the Ecological Turn: Four Components of Felix Guattari’s Ecosophical Perspective*, http://eighteen.fibreculturejournal.org/2011/10/09/fcj-121-transversalising-the-ecological-turn-four-components-of-felix-guattari%E2%80%99s-ecosophical-perspective/)

Guattari stipulates that his ecosophical perspective is ‘at once applied and theoretical, ethicopolitical and aesthetic’ (Guattari, 2008: 44). Nowhere is this blend more evident than in his discussions of machines, which are informed by numerous disciplines from second-order cybernetics to modernist art, as well as concepts set forth by Lacan and Deleuze. [9] Guattari uses the term “machine” to refer at once to actual and virtual properties. (He is not simply pointing to the technical appliances that the term often refers to in everyday conversation.) Machines are actual in that the word denotes existing institutions, groups, and practices, but machines also address the virtual possibilities of collectivity and thus function as a theoretical metamodel. In his assessment of the contemporary psychological landscape, Guattari (1995: 58) claims that ‘individual and collective subjectivity lack modelization’ and, further, that this lack explains the stasis of many social movements, including environmentalism. For this reason, Guattari insists that the development of alternative diagrams for the production of subjectivity (in contrast to Oedipal model, for example) must become ‘an immense site’ of theoretical work and lead to ‘the invention of new practices’ (Guattari, 1995: 58). 21 Without the existential recomposition (e.g., the subject to components of subjectification) that theoretical metamodels engender, the ecosophical project of nascent subjectivity becomes lost to itself. Nascent subjectivity is entirely dependent on the capacity to install one’s thinking into ‘a constantly mutating socius’ (Guattari, 2008: 45). In this sense, the ‘effects of the machinic phylum on subjectivity’ detailed in Chaosmosis should be read right alongside of the challenges and tasks Guattari proposes at the conclusion of The Three Ecologies (Genosko, 2009: 70). Ultimately, Guattari’s machines (be they desiring, celibate, abstract, aesthetic, etc.) have two crucial, praxis-oriented objectives: (1) to help “the individual” install himself into collective dimensions (becoming-machine); (2) to help institutions and groups evolve autopoietically through processual encounters with—and complex articulations of—disparate sources of alterity (nascent subjectivity at the collective level). 22 In many ways, Guattari’s version of the machine could be regarded as an appropriate figure or emblem for poststructuralism. Breaking with the (dogmatic) sign systems of structuralism, Guattari’s focus on machines also performs an important inversion of phenomenology’s tendency to ‘reduce the objects under consideration to a pure intentional transparency’ (Guattari, 2008: 25). And yet, though he explicitly distances his thought from structuralism and phenomenology, Guattari does retain important traces of each these intellectual movements. His writing on machines incorporates a preference for studying contextualised structural objects, but the methods he advocates (schizoanalysis, transversality, etc.) clearly emphasise the need for “spontaneous receptivity”, a quality esteemed by many phenomenologists, which encourages us to encounter each phenomenon in its heterogeneity **rather than overwrite its expression according to the structure of our own interpretative frameworks**. In grasping Guattari’s important theoretical distinctions between machine and structure, one should acknowledge, as Watson aptly notes, that the two terms are ‘inseparable’ and ‘dependent on one another’ as a conceptual pair, in much the same way as we might say of poststructuralism and structuralism (Watson, 2009: 39). Thus, the notion of structure must play a crucial role in discussions of the machine, even though Guattari writes about structures with evident distain. 23 For Guattari, machines pose at least three qualitative differences to “structures” (the obvious emblem of structuralism). First of all, machines express an affective logic of intensities (or “pathic logic”), while structures operate according to the logic of discursive sets. Discursive sets presuppose a separation between subject and object, and for this reason, ‘The truth of a proposition answers to the law of the excluded middle: each object appears in a relationship of binary opposition with a ‘foundation’’ (Guattari, 1995: 28). With the logic of intensities, the relationship between subject and object remains open or in question; therefore, the machine ‘extracts complex forms from chaotic materials’ because ‘there is no extrinsic global reference’ (Guattari, 1995: 28). Indeed, the logic of intensities is the flow quintessential to ethico-aesthetic paradigms. Structures, however, smack of scientific paradigms in that they slow down or bracket chaos and alterity in order to erect a referent (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 118). To combine the terms of What is Philosophy? with Chaosmosis (published in consecutive years), machines-as-philosophy seek to articulate a ‘consistency specific to’ chaos or alterity, whereas structures-as-science use the referent to ‘actualize the virtual,’ and, by extension, to define sources of alterity through reference to known variables (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 118). [10] 24 From the polarity above, we can clearly distinguish machines and structures in terms of their opposing attitudes towards alterity or difference. A structure defines difference only in relation to itself, while machines ‘direct us towards a more collective machinism without delimited unity, whose autonomy accommodates diverse mediums of alterity’ (Guattari, 1995: 42). The machinic drive for autopoiesis necessitates a process of undergoing all the heterogeneous elements operative in the event, which “heterogenises” the machine clean of any dominant, unifying, or universal trait (Guattari, 1995: 39). Machines initiate processes of resingularisation precisely by allowing themselves to breakdown as they disjoin and rejoin to form new configurations immanent to the singularity of the event. As such, machines offer strong metamodels for negotiating refrain-intersections through the invention of ‘new ecological practices’, upon which Guattari comments in The Three Ecologies, ‘their objective being to processually activate isolated and repressed singularities that are just turning in circles’ (Guattari, 2008: 34). In fact, as Watson reminds us, the rationale and language Guattari employs to describe eco-praxes hold much in common with his writing on schizoanalysis, and we may see them as intricately related projects (Watson, 2009: 184). 25 Moreover, as a consequence of these two prior distinctions, machines embody an awareness of their own fluidly and finitude, whereas structures, like Guattari’s diagnosis of ‘capitalist subjectivity’, are ‘intoxicated with and anaesthetized by a collective feeling of pseudo-eternity’ (Guattari, 2008: 34). In addition to dividing human experience of the socius into rigid categories (e.g., nature vs. culture), structures naturalise the divisions they construct by ‘stabilizing the maximum number of existential refrains’ (Guattari, 2008: 34). Given our knowledge of machines and structures in Chaosmosis, we can (re)approach The Three Ecologies to gain an even greater command of this crucial opposition: 26 The principal common to the three ecologies is this: each of the existential Territories with which they confront us is not given as an in-itself [en-soi], closed in on itself, but instead as a for-itself [pour-soi] that is precarious, finite, finitized, singular, singularized, capable of bifurcating into stratified and deathly repetitions or of opening up processually from a praxis that enables it to be made ‘habitable’ by a human project. (Guattari, 2008: 35) 27 This passage in particular—its language of ‘in-itself’ (structure) and ‘for-itself’ (machine)—speaks to the important role of Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of groups in Guattari’s thinking on disjunctive collectivity, which his machines diagram. 28 Gary Genosko has already demonstrated the degree to which Guattari’s early distinction between subjugated groups and subject groups is an appropriation of Sartre’s writings on seriality and fusion. For our purposes, it is also useful to consider machines and structures in this context. Guattari inherits Sartre’s passion for thinking about group behavior precisely because he shares Sartre’s hatred of seriality, which Fredric Jameson defines as ‘the mode of human interaction which corresponds to the domination of the practico-inert’ (Jameson, 1974:147). [11] In other words, a population is subjugated by seriality whenever they relate to one another automatically via behavior that is mass-proscribed by an elite, seemingly invisible authority. On the other hand, according to Genosko, a subject group ‘has liquidated its seriality and come together in “the flash of a common praxis”’ (Genosko, 2008: 60). Subject groups connect in response to an event rather than the mandates of a leader or doctrine. Subject groups illustrate a disjunctive mode of collectivity in their priority for a processual engagement in dynamic encounters with sources of alterity, rather than the stability and dominion of a self-asserted structure. For Guattari, this mode of group subjectivity—like the machine—signifies a solidarity that occurs without the dogmatic influence of any leaders. Furthermore, the subject group measures its collectivity not by the amount of people participating in the group, but rather on the quality of difference articulated among group members, as well as the group’s capacity to register the enunciations of (non)human assemblages outside of the group. [5] Consequently, a subject group attentive to its own ecology—the diversity of its (ephemeral) constituency and the broader institutions and environment with which it interacts—is quick to (re)shape itself in response to a wide spectrum of mental-social-environmental forces. When “isolated” structures are brought into working proximity, structure breaks apart, and this disjunction is necessary for true collectivity. Again, this is a monumental insight of Guattari’s ecosophy: relationships of mutual constructivism and acts of co-creation are predicated upon commitments to disjunction—the processual breakdown of structures into machines. 29 Genosko makes a critical point that Guattari’s distinctions between machine and structure, subject group and subjugated group, are “non-absolute” (Genosko, 2008: 60). For instance, an institution or group that operates à la the machine is not necessarily machinic by nature—it could devolve at any moment into the seriality of a structure. But the same holds true of the inverse (i.e., structure to machine), and this conviction is the cause of Guattari’s optimism regarding the potential impacts of remaking social practices. In critiquing what he calls “Integrated World Capitalism” (IWC), Guattari simultaneously sets up a contrast against which to invent eco-praxes and he specifies a target discourse at which to direct ecosophical interventions. Throughout The Three Ecologies, Guattari suggests a generative opposition between the ecosophical goal of nascent subjectivity and the limits of IWC’s “capitalist subjectivity”: 30 A capitalist subjectivity is engendered through operators of all types and sizes, and is manufactured to protect existence from any intrusion of events that might disturb or disrupt public opinion. It demands that all singularity must be either evaded or crushed in specialist apparatuses and frames of reference. Therefore, it endeavors to manage the worlds of childhood, love, art, as well as everything associated with anxiety, madness, pain, death, or a feeling of being lost in the Cosmos…IWC forms massive subjective aggregates. (Guattari, 2008: 33)

#### **Framework is a re-education camp; by trying to remap our subjectivity, they create a binary assimilation or failure – this inbreeds knowledge until we see creative thinking and advocacy become regurgitation of tired perspectives.**

Kalantzis, 06 – Ph.D., School of History, Philosophy, & Politics, Macquarie University; B.A., History and Linguistics, Macquarie University; Dean, College of Education, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006--, former teacher (Mary, *Changing Subjectivities, New Learning*, PEDAGOGIES: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 1(1), 7–12, http://newlearningonline.mu.commongroundpublishing.com/learning-by-design/files/2010/10/PedagogiesArticle.pdf)

Whether it be in the realms of civics, work, or everyday cultural life, we are in the midst of enormous change. To remain apt, education must reflect these changes. Maybe, there are even times and places where educators can lead change.

Take civics. For better or worse, the key phenomenon in the realm of civics is that the nation-state is shrinking. Whatever the root causes—small government conservatism, globalisation, or the new dynamics of a post–Cold War world—the realities of this change are felt everywhere.

The society of self-regulating community—civil society—is becoming a more significant locus of action and decision. The Internet is governed, not by any state, but through the community of experts and interested parties that is the World Wide Web Consortium. Diasporic communities are governed, not by home governments, but by highly distributed community organisations whose points of connection are common cultural principles. In education, we are witnessing the rise of community and private schooling and the self-managing public school, as well as the need for teaching **to become an increasingly self-regulated profession**. As the state contracts, there is no alternative to creating governance structures within the communities of practice of civil society.

With the shrinking of the state, a certain kind of society disappears, too. Compare the relationship of state and civil society today with the command societies of the 20th century—the communism of Lenin and Mao, the fascism of Hitler and interwar Japan, and the paternalistic regimentation of the West’s welfare state. When a greater capacity to decide and act is devolved to civil society, a higher level of participation and reflexivity is required of citizens.

So deep is this change that it extends even to the nature of personality. The society of the strong state established relationships of command and compliance at every level, not just in the state itself but in workplaces (the bosses and supervisors whose orders were to be obeyed), in homes (the heads of households who made decisions and disciplined), in schools (the orders of headmasters and teachers, **mandated curricular content and tests of definitively correct answers**).

Take that archetypical command personality Howard Roark, modern architect and towering individual in Ayn Rand’s procapitalist novel The Fountainhead (1952/1996). At the vanguard of unadorned modernism, he stands alone against the world, unwilling to compromise his designs, and for his singularity of purpose, he triumphs. At almost the same moment, anticapitalist Mexican artist Diego Rivera was painting the heroes of modernity on the murals of the Rockefeller Centre in New York. Overlooking the mighty works of modern man—the cities, the bridges, the industrial landscapes whose horizons are punctured by smokestacks— were the heroic engineer, the heroic architect, the heroic intellectual, the heroic political leader, the heroic gang-supervisor, and (his Rockefeller patrons also hoped) the heroic capitalist. Rivera was removed from the job when it became obvious that among the faces of the heroes was a likeness of Lenin. Notwithstanding 20th-century sensitivities to their ideological differences, Roark and Lenin were equally command personalities and in that sense substitutable in the tableau of modernism. Both left and right, in their time, lionised command personalities.

For every command personality, there had to be a multitude of unquestioning functionaries, and upon their compliance the system depended. The ideal citizen of the strong state was compliant; the ideal worker of the capitalist or communist industrial enterprise was compliant; the ideal learner in the classroom of disciplined knowledge was compliant.

Today, the command personality is an anachronism. At work, for instance, crude command structures are replaced by a more sophisticated cultural co-option—the co-option of teamwork, vision and mission, and corporate culture, in which everyone is supposed to personify the enterprise, to think and will and act the enterprise. Roark’s aesthetic insistence has become an archaism—he would let his business fail before compromising on the rigorous modernism of his designs. “Any colour you like, so long as it’s black,” said another heroic command personality, Henry Ford. Today, there can be no entrepreneurial heroism because the customer is always right and products and services need to be customised to mesh with the multiple subjectivities of niche markets—the big SUVs, the smart sports cars, the spacious family cars, the microcars for crowded cities, cars of any hue and trim—so many permutations, in fact, that sometimes an individual order has to be placed before a vehicle is manufactured. Fordist mass production is displaced by today’s mass customisation.

In our lives as cultural beings as well, there has been a profound shift in the intersubjective balance of power. Take something as fundamental as narrative. In everyday family and community life, the narratives of gaming have become a bigger business than the narratives of Hollywood. From the most impressionable of ages, children of the Nintendo, PlayStation, and X-Box generation have become inured to the idea that they can be characters in narratives, capable of determining or at least influencing the story’s end. They are content with being no less than actors rather than audiences, players rather than spectators, agents rather than voyeurs, users rather than readers of narrative. Not content with programmed radio, they build their own playlists on their iPods. Not content with programmed television, they read the narratives of DVD and Internet-streamed video at varying depth (the movie, the documentary about the making of the movie) and dip into “chapters” at will. Not content with the singular vision of sports telecasting of mass television, they choose their own angles, replays, and statistical analyses on interactive digital television. Meanwhile, the autocreative potentials of the digital media and the “semantic web” have only begun, with phenomena such as blogging. These potentials create new economies of cultural scale, geographies of distribution, and balances of cultural power. The costs of owning the means of producing widely communicable meaning have been hugely reduced, and with this, the small and the different have become as viable as the large and the generic (Cope & Kalantzis, 2004).

Whether it be in the domains of governance, work, or cultural life, the command society is giving way to the society of reflexivity. Or so we might say in moments of strategic optimism. In moments of pessimism we might experience these same phenomena as fragmentation, egocentrism, randomness, ambiguity, and anarchy. And when this pessimism turns to fear, we might want to return to earlier, simpler command structures—in nations, workplaces, households, and schools.

Pessimists and optimists alike can agree that we are in the midst of a transformation that is creating new forms of subjectivity and new kinds of personality. These transformations can be viewed from within a systemic perspective and beyond it. From a systemic point of view, these are the kinds of governance structures, the kinds of organisations, and the kinds of people required today for the most conservative, small government, and proenterprise points of view. We hear these points of view ex pressed in the public rhetoric of innovation and creativity, the knowledge economy, and individual autonomy and responsibility. Notwithstanding the high-sounding rhetoric, these transformations when left to run their course may only legitimate and even exacerbate systemic inequities—iniquities, indeed.

History, however, is more open-ended than that. Inevitably, human systems are so complex that they allow possibilities outside the scope anticipated by their progenitors and apologists. For every moment when the ideologues of small government succeed in shrinking the state, there is another moment in which people learn the civilities of self-government in their various communities of practice; for every moment when command structures in workplaces are replaced by collaborationist structures, there is another moment in which people acquire the collaborative competencies of socially directed work; for every moment when compliant personalities are replaced by the egocentrism of individualism, there is another moment in which new relationships of codependence and mutual reliance are created and the bonds of sociability are extended and deepened. Whatever the domain, there is a shift in the balance of power and in the moral economy of agency that favours egalitarianism and liberty—and this, despite and beyond prevailing systems and structures of power. **From this, something genuinely new could emerge**.

Whether one’s agenda is to support today’s systems of governance, work, and culture or to create new and more equitable ones, subjectivity and agency loom larger than they did in the era of the command society. Yet, all too often, our institutions and practices of schooling reflect the epistemological frames of reference and personality types of the command society, in the communication patterns of classroom discourse, for instance, or the information architectures of curriculum, or the rigid expectations of “right” and “wrong” answers in testing regimes.

We educators have been struggling to develop a new dynamics of agency for a century now, starting with the progressivisms of John Dewey and Maria Montessori. One of the solutions to the problem of agency in learning has been a “constructivism” derived from a 20th-century psychological canon in which Piaget’s theories dominate. In the context of a command society, however, their emphasis was on the level and extent of receptivity at a particular age or at a particular cognitive stage. The raw materials of “intelligence” were biologised, and variations were accounted for **in terms of individualised “capability**” and the increments of what was supposed to be innate, universal development. Today, the cognitive sciences do a similar psychological job. Their agenda is to account for the mechanisms of receptivity more than for the mechanisms in which learned knowledge is genuinely made by conscious agency.

If, however, one follows and extends a line of thought begun by Vygotsky, other possibilities for pedagogy emerge. If knowledge is a psychological construct that is more social than individual, if learning is the stuff of active appropriation of the world in a social context, if educability amounts to more than equation of external transmission with individual receptivity, what then are the bases of a theory of pedagogy?

Building on Vygotsky, Bill Cope and I have been proposing a theory of learning that is grounded epistemologically rather than psychologically. By “epistemological,” we mean what we do to know (Kalantzis & Cope, 2004, 2005). As humans, we might be driven by the mystery of human consciousness, but the critical question is what we do with its drives. Here are some acts of knowing that we have been considering of late as a part of our Learning by Design research and development project: we experience (by immersion, making tacit connections in familiar or new contexts); we conceptualise (by abstracting, naming things, and developing explicit generalisations); we analyse (inferring and interpreting cause, effect, and human interest);we apply (by making an intervention in the world of use able things and meanings, be that intervention predictable and appropriate or innovative). In every one of these acts of knowing, we learn the world by doing something in the world.

The command society could never trust learners to be agents of knowing. Instead, they were the receptors of knowledge—although even this was a conceit of power, because now we understand the perennial role of the reader, the listener, or the viewer. We thought that they were receptors because this illusion also drove our politics, our workplaces, our public culture, and our pedagogy. In hindsight there was resistance as often as there was compliance, even if that resistance was branded subversion, laziness, or failure at school.

Today, we can remain under no such illusion. The increasingly critical self-governing structures of civil society, the tricks and tropes of the self-managing work team, the user-driven narratives of popular culture make any such illusions impossible. The children of Nintendo will simply walk away if the pedagogy served up to them by institutionalised schooling does not engage every fibre of their subjectivity. The workplace of the near future will simply be uncompetitive if its workers do not contribute their all, from their creative potential to their ability to maintain relationships of supple reflexivity across the myriad niche customers and affiliates. **The cultures of the near future will ossify if they fail to leave space for the “readers” to follow their own proclivities and shape their own cultural ends**.

The minute that one allows so much scope for agency, one finds oneself facing layers upon layers of difference. One discovers actually existing agencies in the massively plural and not the fabrications and falsifications of the command society with its one-people–one-state nationalism, of the regime of mass production and mass consumption, and of the pretensions to cultural homogeneity of the society of mass media and mass culture. The differences are material (class, locale), corporeal (race, gender, sexuality, ability/disability) and circumstantial (culture, life experience, interest, affinity). We can acknowledge these differences, perform neat demographic metrics, and, in the name of diversity, build programmes to suit group by group. Or we may think that we can, at least until we encounter a deeper difference that, in the interstices of these demographics or even solidly in the middle of each demographic, defies neat categorisation and prediction. These differences are manifest in the profoundly variable dispositions and sensibilities that one encounters from person to person. This is the stuff of the lifeworld, not individualised personality. Such difference is accountable in terms of the infinitely variable and therefore always uniquely complex range of sociocultural influences that come to bear on any one individual. The more we take agency for real, the more multifarious its manifestations become.

And to face all these agencies in one classroom! The solution of the command society was that of one teacher talking at the middle of the class, one textbook telling one narrative one chapter at a time, one test evaluating one way of knowing. **The result was assimilation** to the middle way **or failure**.

Constructivism blandly suggests that we bring agency into this picture. It is as if we can give all learners the same dose of agency, commensurate with their stage of the template of human developmentalism. But it is not just agency in the abstract that we have to harness. The complexity is such that the simple nostrums of constructivism serve us poorly indeed.

If it is to be at all relevant, the classroom of the reflexive society must allow alternative starting points for learning (what the learners perceive to be worth learning, what engages the particularities of their identities). It must allow for alternative forms of engagement (the varied experiences that need to be brought to bear on the learning; the different conceptual bents of learners; the different analytical perspectives that the learners may have on the nature of cause, effect, and human interest; and the different settings in which they may apply or enact their knowledge). It must allow for different learning styles (preferences, for instance, for particular emphases in knowledge making and patterns of engagement—experiential, conceptual, analytical, or applied). It must allow for different modalities in meaning making, embracing alternative expressive potentials for different learners. And it must allow for alternative pathways and destination points in learning.

#### Separation of perspectives is an inadequate foundation for thinking – every topic begins with a problem area – by isolating and separating questions of philosophy, ecology, and policy within that problem area, the explanations we use to craft strategies are limited by the scope of inquiry.

**Webb and Gulson, 12 –** University of British Columbia, Canada AND University of New South Wales, Australia (P. Taylor and Kalervo, *Policy prolepsis in education: Encounters, becomings, and phantasm*, Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 33:1, 87-99)

Up until the 1980s, it was commonly assumed that education policy represented the implementation of solutions to educational problems, and that educational research should and could contribute to policy effectiveness (Simons, Olssen, & Peters, 2009). While in the 1990s and 2000s, critical policy studies in education challenged this view, it is the case that a techno-rational characterization of education policy still has a stranglehold on education policy makers and educational researchers. Technorationality in the development and implementation of policy is paralleled in educational policy research which is increasingly required to be for policy and the expected ‘solutions’ to indetermi+nate problems, and eventually, to be aimed at evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of reforms (Rizvi & Lingard, 2009). Debates about policy have become claims and counterclaims about methodology and related issues of rigour and what counts as legitimate evidence (Wiseman, 2010). Techno-rational approaches to policy development and research imply that variations in policy meaning, implementations, and outcomes are attributable to actor’s incorrect interpretations, or imply a certain set of literacy skills in reading or decoding policy have atrophied (Cohen, 1990). As such, these approaches suggest that actors have **misinterpreted a ‘fixed meaning’ of policy**, thus **assuming these meanings are objective, accessible, and complete**. In this paper when we talk about policy interpreters we are referring to actors, or crudely, end-users of policy, in what Bowe, Ball, and Gold (1992) identify as the context of practice, or the realm of ‘policy enactments’ (Ball, Hoskins, Maguire, & Braun, 2010). We argue, in refrain of Ball (1994) and (Ball et al., 2010), that various levels of policy, including the complexities, ambiguities and ambivalences associated with making, delivering, receiving, resisting and/or transforming policy, require analyses of policy that **acknowledge and work with problematizations** 1 **rather than reductions of complexities**. This is to work with and within, what (Youdell 2011), following Deleuze and Guattari has termed the education assemblage. Furthermore, and against the above backdrop, our departure point for this paper is to work from a critical policy studies orientation (Simons et al., 2009), to rethink and reorient a key claim made consistently in critical policy studies over the last 20 years. This contention is that **policy is not a seamless process** from development to implementation. 2 Like Ball (1994), we agree that policy is **characterized by incompleteness**, ad hocery and ‘the ‘‘wild profusion’’ of local practice’ (p. 10). Policy is always and only a contingent and provisional fixing. Part of these claims of the provisional lie in the idea of interpretation, that educational policy is involved with semiotics (Ball, 1990), including teachers as semioticians of curriculum policy (Rizvi & Lingard, 2009). In refuting ideas of techno-rationality in analyses of (neoliberal) policy implementation, we **do not relinquish politics**. Like Youdell (2011), we believe that various forms of post-structural analyses of education . . . and the practices they espouse have received varying degrees of recognition and takeup in the mainstream of education theory and practice, and while for the most part they have been remained marginal, they have been legitimate, recognizable and speakable. (2011, p. 10) What is of interest for us in this paper is that in the midst of this turbulence surrounding education policy, the concept policy **remains untouched**. It is the **legitimacy of evidence**, for example, that is contested, not what policy is (Cf., Ball, 1994), not whether policy **can actually do the work for which it is claimed**, and **what effects are** **produced** and continually produced in the name of policy. In this paper our understanding of education policy is informed from Ball’s (1994) idea that ‘policy is both text and action, words and deeds, it is what is enacted as well as what is intended’ (p. 10). Throughout, we refer to policy documents, including: press releases, government decisions, legislation, formal authorizations, mandates, laws, speeches, white papers, reports, and curricula. We also refer to policy intentions that attempt to construct, prevent, and/or solve a ‘problem’ (Miller & Rose, 2008); send a (symbolic) message; resolve political tensions; and maintain the status quo (e.g., regulate, standardize, cement).

### 2ac – cede the political

#### Everything is political – generalized models of politics fail to capture the multitude of subjectivities existing within it – beginning from the micro-level is a better form of political engagement

**Read 8 –** Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine

(Jason, “The Full Body: Micro-Politics and Macro-Entities”, review of DeLanda, Manuel (2006) A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, Deleuze Studies. Volume 2, Page 220-228, dml)

In response to this tendency, DeLanda makes the focus of his project an attempt to either dispense with such totalities as ‘the state’ or ‘capitalism’ altogether, or to at least radically reconﬁgure our understanding of them such that we grasp them as nothing other than the more or less transient intersections of speciﬁc and local processes. In doing so, DeLanda follows the spirit of Deleuze’s famous assertion regarding the nature of abstraction, ‘the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: vii). Rather than posit something like capital, or the state, behind every transformation of society, every manifestation of power, DeLanda endeavours to show how these entities emerge form a particular series of assemblages and relations. As he writes, ‘Avoiding the use of concepts like “the state” is important [ . . . ] because such reiﬁed generalities are not monolithic, that is, they fail to capture the relations of exteriority that exist among the heterogeneous organisations forming a government hierarchy’ (DeLanda 2006: 85). DeLanda’s method on this point is similar to Foucault’s, speciﬁcally his methodological argument that ‘universals’ such as the market and the state do not exist, or at least must be treated as they do not exist in order to grasp the concrete processes of power that structure political life and in effect give rise to such entities (Foucault 2004: 5). DeLanda’s speciﬁc point of reference, though, is Fernand Braudel, for whom such entities as the ‘market’ and the ‘state’ have to be understood in primarily relative terms, as a ‘set of sets’ with complex intersections in which each institution, market, state, etc., has its relative autonomy and effectivity (DeLanda 2006: 118). There is not one split between the individual and society, the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’, rather such distinctions are relative as various assemblages are ‘macro’ in relation to some, but ‘micro’ in relation to others (DeLanda 2006: 17). A local market or city organisation is ‘macro’ in relation to the individuals that make it up, but ‘micro’ in comparison to larger government structures, for which it functions as an element. This is true even of individuals, which must be seen as composed of sub-personal components (e.g., percepts, affects, and habits), while simultaneously being situated in larger assemblages (e.g., communities, networks, markets, and states) (DeLanda 2006: 33). DeLanda is not primarily concerned with determining the actual nature of these subpersonal elements, rather his goal is to relativise the micro macro distinction and replace the singular rift between the individual and society with a series of interlinking assemblages of various scales, from those that constitute the individual to global networks.

#### Key issue – none of their evidence is very good on how macropolitics works – political engagement is not the issue, politics is infinitely more complex than their reductionist representation

**CLAUDE 1988** (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of *policy* and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the *Genesis* theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

### 2ac oil prices da

#### Making energy debates solely a question of price causes tunnel vision that blinds us to ongoing catastrophes and potential alternatives

**Scheer 7 –** Member of the German Parliament, President of the European Association for Renewable Energy EUROSOLAR, Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy WCRE

(Hermann, *Energy Autonomy: The economic, social, and technological case for renewable energy* pg 150-151, dml)

Reducing all questions exclusively to price (taken in isolation from everything else), a simplification that is unrealistic even when we are dealing only with the behaviour of individual participants in the market, is an attitude that acquires even more unreal qualities when it comes to basic questions about society’s overall use of energy. It is an attitude that leads to a cost-cutting extremism celebrated as the highest form of rationality even when the consequences turn out to be extremely irrational: obsession with the present, coupled with forgetfulness about the future. This one-dimensionality has, however, become the hallmark of modern economic thinking – promoted by a ‘science’ of economics which, in its aspiration towards greater exactitude, attempts to monetize all problems and insists on abstract mathematical models, with a message to both society and economy that they should please be so kind as to make this their own orientation; the result is models without any reference to their subjects. For every political goal an artificial attempt is made to define a price so that the goal can be exchanged or bargained on the market. This results in numerous assumptions and concepts that are remote from reality and mock common sense. One attempts to force upon reality isolated ‘parameters’ that lend their concepts a certain theoretical elegance. Even environmental economics, anxious about obtaining ‘scientific’ recognition, has (as we shall discuss in the section after the next one) adopted constructs like this as their own.

An energy discussion is bound to be disastrous if, in ignorance of all existing and foreseeable energy problems, it hammers home the point that nothing is more important than the current price of energy. Daily fluctuations in the price of oil testify to that price’s incalculability, as well as to the irrationality of a discussion fixed on price. In such a discussion, all the decisive questions about all the other political, social, industrial, and especially ecological costs or advantages of different energy options are turned into secondary questions, or else they are avoided altogether. And this is happening at a time when the question of energy security and the environmental compatibility of energy use becomes more relevant with each passing day. Even investments meant to create something new are turned into ‘costs’ to be avoided wherever possible. The more long term such investments are conceived, the more they are regarded as inimical to competition. Because their economic impact cannot be precisely calculated, these investments are dropped if there is doubt. As a result, the idea of the market economy degenerates from an economic ordering principle into organized social irresponsibility.

#### Point predictions are untrue and bad for policymaking

**Bernstein et al, 2k** (Steven Bernstein.,Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber**,***University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley***. “***God Gave Physics the Easy Problems”*European Journal of International Relations2000; 6; 43.)

Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors**. Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if** an appropriate catalyst **will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing**what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information **reliably** and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one's own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrent policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context isultimately **a set of mental constructs**. We have descriptive terms like 'chain reaction' or 'contagion effect' to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertories of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shifts in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships - even if they existed - could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incentive to learn and adapt their behavior. ***Any*regularities** would be 'soft'; they **would be** the outcome of processes that are embedded *Overcoming Physics Envy*The conception of **causality** on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this - given A, B and C, if X then (not) Y.4 This kind of bounded invariance can be found in **closed** **systems**. Open systems can be influenced by **external** **stimuli**, and their structure and causal mechanisms evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T + 1 or T + 2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant. Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjunctural causation. There is no way to know this *a priori*from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance does not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As**physicists readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible**. The risk in saying that social scientists can 'predict' the value of variables in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives from that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which the theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this 'theorytesting' or 'evaluating' activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time.5

### 2ac word pic

**The 1AC was not merely words and arguments, it was an experience – the counterplan is an attempt to reappropriate the absolute alterity encountered in the 1AC for a specific goal which is a reason it does not solve and makes the 1AC a disad**

**Deleuze and Guattari 80** (Gilles and Felix, philosophers and rhizomes, *A Thousand Plateaus* pg 376-378, dml)

But noology is confronted by counterthoughts, which are violent in their acts and discontinuous in their appearances, and whose existence is mobile in history. These are the acts of a "private thinker," as opposed to the public professor: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or even Shestov. Wherever they dwell, it is the steppe or the desert. They destroy images. Nietzsche's *Schopenhauer as Educator* is perhaps the greatest critique ever directed against the image of thought and its relation to the State. "Private thinker," however, is not a satisfactory expression, because it exaggerates interiority, when it is a question of *outside thought.44* To place thought in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside, in short to make thought a war machine, is a strange undertaking whose precise procedures can be studied in Nietzsche (the aphorism, for example, is very different from the maxim, for a maxim, in the republic of letters, is like an organic State act or sovereign judgment, whereas an aphorism always awaits its meaning from a new external force, a final force that must conquer or subjugate it, utilize it). There is another reason why "private thinker" is not a good expression.

Although it is true that this counterthought attests to an absolute solitude, it is an extremely populous solitude, like the desert itself, a solitude already intertwined with a people to come, one that invokes and awaits that people, existing only through it, though it is not yet here. "We are lacking that final force, in the absence of a people to bear us. We are looking for that popular support." Every thought is already a tribe, the opposite of a State. And this form of exteriority of thought is not at all symmetrical to the form of Anteriority. Strictly speaking, symmetry exists only between different poles or focal points of interiority. But the form of exteriority of thought—the force that is always external to itself, or the final force, the «th power—is not at all *another image* in opposition to the image inspired by the State apparatus. It is, rather, a force that destroys both the image *and* its copies, the model *and* its reproductions, every possibility of subordinating thought to a model of the True, the Just, or the Right (Cartesian truth, Kantian just, Hegelian right, etc.). A "method" is the striated space of the *cogitatio universalis* and draws a path that must be followed from one point to another. But the form of exteriority situates thought in a smooth space that it must occupy without counting, and for which there is no possible method, no conceivable reproduction, but only relays, intermezzos, resurgences. Thought is like the Vampire; it has no image, either to constitute a model of or to copy. In the smooth space of Zen, the arrow does not go from one point to another but is taken up at any point, to be sent to any other point, and tends to permute with the archer and the target. The problem of the war machine is that of relaying, even with modest means, not that of the architectonic model or the monument. An ambulant people of relayers, rather than a model society. "Nature propels the philosopher into mankind like an arrow; it takes no aim but hopes the arrow will stick somewhere. But countless times it misses and is depressed at the fact The artist and the philosopher are evidence against the purposiveness of nature as regards the means it employs, though they are also first-rate evidence as to the wisdom of its purpose. They strike home at only a few, while they ought to strike home at everybody—and even these few are not struck with the force with which the philosopher and artist launch their shot."45

We have in mind in particular two pathetic texts, in the sense that in them thought is truly a *pathos* (an *antilogos* and an *antimythos).* One is a text by Artaud, in his letters to Jacques Riviere, explaining that thought operates on the basis of a *central breakdown,* that it lives solely by its own incapacity to take on form, bringing into relief only traits of expression in a material, developing peripherally, in a pure milieu of exteriority, as a function of singularities impossible to universalize, of circumstances impossible to interiorize. The other is the text by Kleist, "On the Gradual Formation of Ideas in Speech" ("Uber die allmachliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden"), in which Kleist denounces the central interiority of the concept as a means of control—the control of speech, of language, but also of affects, circumstances and even chance. He distinguishes this from thought as a proceeding and a process, a bizarre anti-Platonic dialogue, an antidialogue between brother and sister where one speaks before knowing while the other relays before having understood: this, Kleist says, is the thought of the *Gemut,* which proceeds like a general in a war machine should, or like a body charged with electricity, with pure intensity. "I mix inarticulate sounds, lengthen transitional terms, as well as using appositions when they are unnecessary." Gain some time, and then perhaps renounce, or wait. The necessity of not having control over language, of being a foreigner in one's own tongue, in order to draw speech to oneself and "bring something incomprehensible into the world." Such is the form of exteriority, the relation between brother and sister, the becomingwoman of the thinker, the becoming-thought of the woman: the *Gemut* that refuses to be controlled, that forms a war machine. A thought grappling with exterior forces instead of being gathered up in an interior form, operating by relays instead of forming an image; an event-thought, a haecceity, instead of a subject-thought, a problem-thought instead of an essencethought or theorem; a thought that appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry. Is it by chance that whenever a "thinker" shoots an arrow, there is a man of the State, a shadow or an image of a man of the State, that counsels and admonishes him, and wants to assign him a target or "aim"? Jacques Riviere does not hesitate to respond to Artaud: work at it, keep on working, things will come out all right, you will succeed in finding a method and in learning to express clearly what you think in essence *(cogitatio universalis).* Riviere is not a head of State, but he would not be the last in the *Nouvelle Revue Francaise* to mistake himself for the secret prince in a republic of letters or the gray eminence in a State of right. Lenz and Kleist confronted Goethe, that grandiose genius, of all men of letters a veritable man of the State. But that is not the worst of it: the worst is the way the texts of Kleist and Artaud themselves have ended up becoming monuments, inspiring a model to be copied—a model far more insidious than the others—for the artificial stammerings and innumerable tracings that claim to be their equal.

**You should evaluate the ontological strategy of the 1AC prior to the discourse it uses – language does not represent an idea, it expresses a fluid strategy – the distinction is between what language means vs what it does – even if they win the language we use has adverse meanings, its effect on the world serves to liberate dualisms means we solve the net benefit**

**Strathausen 10 (**Carsten Strathausen is Associate Professor of German and English at the University of Missouri. His first book was *The Look of Things: Poetry and Vision around 1900* (University of North Carolina Press, 2003). Carsten is the editor of *A Leftist Ontology* (University of Minnesota Press, 2009), and the translator of Boris Groys' *Under Suspicion: A Phenomenology of the Media* (forthcoming 2011, Columbia University Press). He has also published numerous essays on culture, philosophy, and intellectual history and is currently completing a book project on *The Aesthetics of New Media*, “Epistemological Reflections on Minor Points in Deleuze”, Theory and Event Volume 13, Issue 4, dml)

For Deleuze, language does not represent or signify ideas or things, but expresses them. Expression works by creating ever-new lines and new divisions through the use of medial terms (like sense or event) that split up already existing connections (like that between language and things). Since these mediators are "indifferent to all opposites" (LS 35), they serve to liberate the movement that was arrested in-between a given binary. Mediators enable Deleuze not only to break up his terms, but also to fold one into another or to cross any one of them with any (or all) of the others. This process literally enlivens the space of the extended middle: it yields two (or three, as DeLanda argues) ontological dimensions of Being traversed by three different lines of flight (primary, molecular, and molar line); it produces three orders of language (the primary order of "affections of the body," the secondary order of "the event of sense," and, finally, "the tertiary order of the proposition," the third of which—the proposition—again subdivides into "three distinct relations" (denotation, manifestation, and signification) to which Deleuze then adds a fourth relation (sense); there are, furthermore, two basic kinds of cinematic images (movement-image and time-image), the former of which sub-divides into three distinct varieties (perception-image, action-image, affection-image), etc.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f13) This quasi-infinite addition and division of medial terms is most obvious in Deleuze's concept of "double articulation," which denotes the two-fold process that constitutes the different strata of the actual (that is, the existing world of qualified and extended individuals). Deleuze famously argues that each stratum or assemblage is defined by its "substance" (i.e., that which occupies space or is extended in space) and by the "form" or "structure" of this substance (i.e., that which endows substance with specific qualities). So, the substance of a given stratum is some actualized and formed matter as opposed to the pure matter-energy that constitutes the plane of consistency (that is, the virtual). But Deleuze then introduces yet another distinction between two more terms—content and expression—and argues that each of them comprises a full set of the previous two (form and substance). In other words, "each articulation is already… double" (ATP 44). This means that expression comprises not only form, but also substance, and that content comprises not only substance, but also form. The duplication of content and expression allows Deleuze to distinguish between the "form of expression" and the "substance of expression"; conversely, he refers to the "substance of content" and to the "form of content." As Deleuze himself points out, this process of differentiation is infinite. It gives rise to an endless nexus of interrelating substances and forms, contents and expressions at numerous intermediate levels within and in between strata. "Content and expression," Deleuze writes, "not only vary from one stratum to another, but intermingle, and within the same stratum multiply and divide ad infinitum" (ATP 44). This leads to a "multiplicity of double articulations affecting both expression and content" (ATP 45), because "each stratum serves as a substratum for another stratum" (ATP 72), and because "forms of expression and regimes of signs are still *strata* (even considered in themselves, after abstracting forms of content)" (ATP 134). Every articulation, in other words, unfolds and multiplies across, above, and below the stratum. It is by means of this infinite movement of augmentation and differentiation—by means of this "*extra-Being*" that *is*univocal Being itself (LS 180)—that Deleuze thinks through and beyond the dualisms inherent in language. Faced with the perennial critique that his philosophy merely replaces traditional binaries (organic/non-organic; mind/body; signifier/signified) with new binaries (virtual/actual; smooth/striated; minor/major, etc), and that his entire ontology juxtaposes "good" processes of deterritorialization with "bad" processes of re-territorialization,[14](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f14) Deleuze responds: "We must speak like everyone else, we must pass through dualisms, 1-2, or even 1-2-3…. We must pass through [passer par] dualisms because they are in language, it's not a question of getting rid of them, but we must fight against them, invent stammering…." (D 34).[15](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f15) To stammer is to interrupt the flow of words; it is to add and insert new elements (words, syllables, sounds) in between the "right" ones. Stammering delays the construction of meaning, and one might well say that Deleuze's entire philosophy stutters: it stretches each line of thought by inserting new terms and adding new lines *ad infinitum*. As he thinks along these lines of infinite relations and twisting singularities, Deleuze does more than just map the world. He actualizes it. His thought creates the assemblages through which it thinks. By contrast, signification—and, above all, linguistic signification—falsely assumes that some points and lines are only meant to "signify" others. The lines that form words, or the airwaves that carry sound, are said to "represent" a certain content and "symbolize" a certain referent—as if their sole purpose were to dissolve themselves within and through this signifying function, as if lines and points themselves did not matter *as such*—namely *precisely as* the lines and points they actually are. This view, Deleuze argues, not only disregards the numerous folds and multiplicities that intervene betweencontent and expression, but also overlooks the double articulation that inheres *within* them. As demonstrated above, linguistic expression, like all other things, has its own unique substance—"fundamentally vocal substance, which brings into play various organic elements: not only the larynx, but the mouth and lips, and the overall motoricity of the face" (ATP 61). Once we realize that the (assemblage of the) face is the substance of expression, the linguistic/semiotic model of signification ceases to function. For how could this substance—our mouth, lips, saliva, enzymes, nerves—ever "signify" or "represent" a particular form of content like "prison"?[16](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f16) This becomes possible only if we confuse articulation with signification, which cuts off both "content" and "signification" from their constitutive multiplicities and reductively equates them with "signified" and "signifier" respectively. It is this inherent reductionism of (Saussurian) linguistics that Deleuze rejects as imperialist and "despotic" (ATP 68). This is not to deny that language "exists" and "functions" as a form of expression (i.e., as a regime of signs or a semiotic system) in a given stratum. Rather, the crucial question is how it functions and what effects it is able to achieve. In this sense, Deleuze's understanding and use of language could not be more different not only from traditional hermeneutics and analytical philosophy, but also from deconstruction. Deleuze's philosophy, unlike Derrida's, is really *not* about language or about signification. It is about what happens above and beneath language—outside of it, yet still related to it. Deleuze's highest praise is reserved for authors like Kafka or Artaud who invent a foreign language within their own. The goal of the writer, according to Deleuze, is to make language "stutter" and effect "a straining of one's whole language toward something outside it" (N 140). Likewise, Deleuze encourages all readers "to break open words and sentences… and find what's uttered in them" (N 96). For Deleuze, expression is ultimately a matter of pressure, for what "strains" language beyond its limits of stratification is the interplay of creative forces language must seek—and fail—to express. Deleuze thus removes language from its philosophical pedestal as the privileged "ground" or "horizon" or "medium" of both knowledge and being. At a time when the "linguistic turn" was in full swing throughout the humanities, Deleuze bluntly declared: "I don't personally think th[at] linguistics is fundamental" (N 28). He realized that philosophers' obsessive focus on language cuts short the infinite potentiality of non-linguistic forms of expression such as dance, gestures, rituals etc., all of which are *significant* even though they are not *signifying*.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f17) For Deleuze, the significance of language, like that of other things, resides in its function, which, in turn depends upon the interaction of words with the unrepresentable forces of the virtual and the innumerous strata it actualizes. While it would be misleading to say that Deleuze materializes language, because the sense of language remains immaterial, it is nonetheless true that Deleuze *ontologizes* language: he literally bloats the process of signification until it bursts and spills over to the outside. When that happens, language becomes different from itself: it changes from major to minor, begins to stutter or simply falls silent. It no longer signifies, but matters all the more. Deleuze's ontologization of language means that all statements, even meaningless ones, affect the state of affairs surrounding them. It also means that the meaning and function of sentences, propositions, and words necessarily changes with every new assemblage they encounter. To read Deleuze is to confront a plethora of interrelated and idiosyncractic concepts whose meaning shifts and slides depending on the (philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, socio-political…) context in which they are made to function. Put differently, Deleuze's ontology cannot and will not operate with a strictly defined nomenclatura comprised of stable, identifiable, scientific-analytical terms. Rather, Deleuzian concepts (percepts, affects) are themselves assemblages or multiplicities. "Concepts are events" (WIP 36); they are "the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come" (WIP 32f.). The Deleuzian concept is a "*linking*" (WIP 91), and although this linking exists independently from the points it connects and the relations it actualizes, it nonetheless functions differently with respect to each and every link it establishes. Given Deleuze's ontologizing view of language, it is hardly surprising to find that all of his major texts create a specific terminology. As Deleuze thinks through another philosopher, he literally engenders a different being of the virtual—as substance (Spinoza), as fold (Leibniz), as élan vital (Bergson), as the will to power (Nietzsche)—and each of his books calls the virtual by a different name: the body without organs (AO), the plane of immanence, (WIP), the plane of consistency (ATP), a life (Immanence), etc. In DeLanda's view, however, all these terms are "near synonyms" ([DeLanda 2002, 203](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html#b29)), because what really matters to Deleuze are "the referents of these labels, not the labels themselves" ([DeLanda 1997, 330](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html#b28)), Hence, the "label itself is immaterial and insignificant," DeLanda claims ([1997, 260](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "b28)), because Deleuze's various concepts for the virtual all express the same Being, the same One-All. What *matters*, DeLanda argues, are not "Deleuze's words" but "Deleuze's world" ([2002, 5](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "b29)). Yet this strict separation of word and referent hardly coincides with Deleuze's own view of things. "Being is the same for everything about which it is said" precisely because "Being cannot be said without also occurring" (LS 179). Deleuzian concepts, in other words, are not just arbitrary labels that function referentially, as DeLanda suggests. For if this were so, language would fall back upon the traditional plane of linguistic signification and thus effectively reinstate the very Saussurian theory of referential meaning Deleuze so vehemently rejected. Rather than mere labels, Deleuzian concepts are real entities in their own right. They literally create the object of which they speak. The Deleuzian concept "poses itself in itself—it is a self-positing" (WIP 11).[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f18) Nobody, I think, has expressed the self-positing power of Deleuzian cocepts more eloquently than Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy refers to Deleuze's concepts neither as concepts nor as labels, but as the power of naming. Deleuze's philosophy, Nancy claims, "is a philosophy of naming and not of discourse" (111). Nancy's use of the gerund makes a crucial point: the concept is not just a name, but a process of naming; it is not just an index, but a device for *indexing* and for "effectuating [being] differently" (111): For him, to create a concept is not to draw the empirical under a category: but to construct a universe of its own, an autonomous universe, an *ordo et connexio* which does not imitate the other, which does not represent it or signify it, but which effectuates it in its own way. The Deleuzian concept is a grapping machine, a machine that directs your thoughts—as if they were hands—over the flow of the virtual so it can swoop down and pull out this or that thing into a newly formed assemblage. Concepts create this or that by actualizing new entities from the stream of the virtual into the extended world of stratification: "It is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the same" (WIP 38). Language, for Deleuze, does not represent the world, but acts upon it.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f19) How exactly does this work? How can we think this relationship between language and things, word and world in Deleuze's cosmology? Deleuze explores a number of different possibilities throughout his oeuvre, all based on his categorical rejection of the linguistic/semiotic model of signification. His first model pertains to what he calls "order-words"—words that effect and shape the particular situation in which they happen to occur. Order-words function on the actual level of stratification, because they serve to limit, retrain, and arrest movement. Yet language, like all other forms of expression, is also able to connect to the virtual plane of consistency. Language gives rise to events, articulates new sense and develops new forms of expression—precisely by becoming minor, by stuttering, or by falling silent. Order-words alone cannot account for this potentiality of language.