## 1nc

### Stupidism

**The search for a meaningful critical reflection and deep metaphysical profundity is stupid -- vote neg**

**ten Bos '7** Rene, *Social Epistemology* Vol 21 No 2 "The Vitality of Stupidity" professor of philosophy and organizational theory at Radboud University, The Netherlands. He is the author of 13 or so books and more than 100 articles which merely suggest a wisdom where there is not. Currently, he is writing a book on animals and the various ways human beings organize, domesticate and copy them. A central thought in this book is that animals cannot be stupid. [jstor]

**Contemplating the heavenly bodies, Thales of Milete, one of the Seven Sages in ancient Greece, fell into a well. The moral of this famous story is straightforward:** hobbies can be dangerous and **sagacity can be stupid. An understanding that wisdom does not rule out stupidity thus marks the beginning of the history of philosophy**. On the contrary, both are hopelessly entwined. The more philosophy delves into the mysteries of the universe, the more it runs the risk of becoming otherworldly, impractical, in a word, stupid. This is exactly why philosophers can only *aspire* to be wise. In the end, they will find out that true wisdom is not for mortals. One wonders how this philosophical sense for paradox fares in the contemporary debate about wisdom in organizations. As we will see, management literature contains all sorts of claims about wisdom. A philosopher is immediately tempted to ask for the stupidity that should be lurking somewhere. **To be sure, we all experience a lot of stupidity in the organizations we are working for. In spite of all emphasis on knowledge, sound management practices or improved methods of communication, people often find themselves overwhelmed by feelings of stupidity**. This is hardly ever discussed in the literature of organization theory. As Sims (2005, 1629) recently pointed out, negative emotions are generally still anathema in organization studies (see also: Fineman and Gabriel 1996). To illustrate what Sims might be hinting at, I will share with the reader a rather personal experience. **This morning, I opened my mailbox and found out that, since yesterday, 85 letters had arrived. Having dealt with them more or less properly, I attended an endlessly boring meeting about department politics**. Then I had to fill in a few forms that were related, among other things, to holidays and to my publications record. Many more trivialities have haunted me today, but I prefer to be silent about phone calls, budgetary issues, appraisals and evaluations, or my inept efforts to become familiar with new software. I will be doing this later this week. Suddenly, I became aware that I did not read one single line of theory today. Will I be able to do that tomorrow? Normally, I am writing or reading at home. Nevertheless, the organization I work for —and not my family—considers me to be a knowledge worker and a serious professional. It is not always like this, of course, and neither do I simply want to suggest that the more managerial aspects of work are indeed too trivial for a serious professional. Yet, **experiences like this make me wonder how much reality there is behind the all pervasive rhetoric of wisdom, knowledge and intelligence**. A long time ago, **the American political scientist Lewis Anthony Dexter (1962) referred to this as the “glorification of intellectual aptitudes”, a tendency he diagnosed was typical for the Western social fabric at large. Anticipating later organizational obsessions with excellence, he writes: A society which increasingly focuses on “excellence”, meaning thereby intellectual excellence, as does ours, tends more and more to discriminate against stupidity. This is not logically defensible. Because intellectual excellence is required of atomic physicists or for students of sociologists is no reason to require intellectual prowess from people in most occupations and activities.** (Dexter 1962, 225) In other words, **striving for intelligence can be very stupid.** The question I want to ask in this paper is quite simple: if work can be so indelibly stupid or, to catch Adam Smith’s famous phrase, “debilitating”, how are we then to understand the ever increasing veneration of smartness, intelligence or wisdom in organizational settings?

### Darkness

#### The affirmative is a map for a postsustainable future that relishes in the starting point of the sun rising and falling

Ruckh 04 ( Eric W. Prof. Southern Illinois University Ph.D., University of California) "Theorizing Globalization: at the intersection of Bataille 's Solar Economy , DeLillo 's Underworld, and Hardt 's and Negri 's Empire "pg. 117 - 132

 He also challenges us to make manifold new ways in which to waste. We **must waste in a glorious, splendid fashion**, according to Bataille. In other words, Bataille forces us to see the problem of globalization in a new way: **we must resist and struggle against servile, unconscious manners of wasting energy and attempt to reactivate communal, conscious and sovereign operations of waste**. "Essentially," Bataille claims. "**Human being is charged here to expend in glory that which the earth accumulated, what the sun produced'** (Bataille VII. 16). **While our attention is diverted to questions of production and labor, work and necessity**. Bataille's gaze shifts to "**practices of glorious expenditure**, for there, tragically**, lay the grandeur and the sense of human being**" (Bataille VII. 16). **Such a "Copernican revolution" in viewing and talking about globalization will have consequences across a domain of registers: from the philosophical through the historical and political and on to the pedagogic.** Bataille can help us develop some of those consequences, particularly as it concerns the political and historical consequences of globalization.

#### This couldn’t be a worse read of politics: the 1AC’s demand for solar is inundated with the fear of the dark. We used to cry for our parents to illuminate the darkness and make those shadows more certain. Now we cry for the state to protect us from evil using whatever means necessary

**Pfau** asst prof comm @ Minnesota, Deluth 2k**7** (Michael William, “Who’s Afraid of Fear Appeals? Contingency, Courage, and Deliberation in Rhetorical Theory and Practice” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 40, No. 2, Muse)

Fear is an influential emotion whose history reveals its impacts not only on individuals, but on entire communities, economies, and political systems. Fear has been particularly important politically, and the history of republics reveals a political discourse rife with appeals to fear. But the discourse of fear has animated a great deal of controversy and debate that reveals a recurring uneasiness and uncertainty among scholars, citizens, and policymakers about the compatibility of this emotional state with effective political deliberation and policy making. Especially among scholars in the humanities, one finds frequent expressions of concern about the effects of fear and its role within communities and discourses. At least since Plato, philosophers have often condemned emotions in general, and fear in particular. Such states of mind, many have suggested, run counter to the reason and logic that ought to guide the rational human being. Accordingly, from the perspective of the philosopher and informal logician, appeals to fear have been regarded as fallacious, as attempts by immoral rhetors to sidestep the standards of logic and reason in order to manipulate their audiences.[1](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT1) Alongside philosophers and rhetorical scholars, political theorists too have long debated the political role of this emotion. Although occasional political thinkers are associated with theories that posit a constructive political role for fear, most political theorists have expressed an extreme skepticism regarding the relationship of fear to a healthy political system. Too often, they suggest, fear has a corrosive effect on citizens' freedoms, and is used as a means to stifle dissent and to maintain the potentially repressive power of the state.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT2) However long academics have debated the desirability of fear appeals, and however forceful their denunciations of such base rhetorical tactics, at the dawn of the twenty-first century fear appeals nevertheless have reached a new peak of intensity. Writing in 1999, Barry Glassner spoke of a pervasive "culture of fear," promoted by various political and economic interests, that had resulted in a political community whose fears were both excessive and often misplaced.[3](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT3) **[End Page 216]** In the wake of the September 11 attacks, appeals to fear have come to dominate U.S. political discourse to an extent that is unprecedented in recent history. Legislators, government officials, political candidates, interest groups, lobbyists, and numerous elements of the private sector have sought to use the fear of terrorism as a means to pursue a variety of agendas. As one might imagine, this recent upswing in terrorism-related fear appeals has been especially disturbing to those scholars and citizens already predisposed against fear appeals. These critics cite numerous examples of instances in which fear appeals have been utilized in order to stifle healthy democratic dissent or crack down on civil liberties, and they bemoan the ease with which political leaders have arguably abused fear appeals in order to gain public support for allegedly unnecessary and counterproductive military actions.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) Particularly troubling to these critics are events like the passage of the USA-PATRIOT Act—a controversial piece of legislation that was passed, almost without deliberation, largely on the basis of fear appeals directed at Congress and the general public. Corresponding with this culture of fear has been an embrace, or at least acceptance, of fear appeals by some members of the academic community. Within the larger communication discipline that has been the outgrowth of rhetorical studies, the rise of the social scientific paradigm brought a renewed interest in how to maximize the persuasive influence of fear and fear appeals. Informed by the rhetorical tradition and the work of psychology scholars, a number of persuasion scholars have taken a more detached view to fear appeals that has asked questions about how they work, rather than about their ethical status. These social scientists have been concerned, in particular, to understand how fear functions within the persuasive process, and how such appeals might be most effectively linked to gaining the compliance of audiences.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT5) Consistent with the social scientific norm of objectivity, most such studies are silent regarding the ethics of fear appeals. But insofar as they provide instruction about how to successfully carry out fear appeals—instruction that, through the agency of public relations, advertising, and communication professionals, has a high probability of seeping into public discourse[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT6) —this perspective may also be said implicitly to give ethical endorsement to fear appeals. Even among humanists, some scholars of informal logic have tentatively endorsed fear appeals, at least under certain conditions.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v040/40.2pfau.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT7) The pervasiveness of contemporary fear appeals, the vital importance of the issues with which fear appeals have become associated, and the disagreement regarding fear appeals found among scholars of rhetoric, philosophy, political theory, and persuasive communication, underline the importance of critically reevaluating the civic status of this emotion.

#### In response to the affirmative’s attempt to light up the world, we propose the exact opposite: Speculate United States federal government removes all restrictions for zero point energy production in the United States

#### Zero point energy is scientifically unable to produce electricity, using it will only result in darkness.

Pal, 2005

Noted Indian scientist and educator, PhD in physics from MIT, visiting professor at the Niels Bohr Institute and Caltech (Yash, “This Universe”, <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050225/science.htm#3>, REQ)

What is the concept behind Zero Point Energy? Can it be used to propel a spacecraft to the speed of light? A. I find some of your questions come from the science fiction movies you see or books you read. These movies or books borrow a lot of terminology from the present day science and then embark upon their own flights of fancy. This is enjoyable and often very useful. But all the romance depicted there cannot be taken seriously. Let me see if I can make the basic ideas behind the term Zero Point Energy somewhat comprehensible. Some basic concepts and ideas are involved here. When you take some material, say a simple gas and cool it down, you would progressively reduce the thermal energy of its molecules. The energy content would go on reducing while the gas turns into liquid and then perhaps a solid. You go on cooling till you approach a temperature close to zero degrees Kelvin. You cannot go below that temperature. This temperature is defined as Absolute Zero because all thermal motion comes to a stop. The fact that you cannot cool the sample any further inversely implies that you cannot extract any more energy from it. It is another matter that Absolute Zero may never be obtained. Here other considerations come into play. These derive from quantum statistics and the uncertainty principle. If the particles of the material under consideration are identical bosons (in other words they have integral spins), they can all be in the same state. The same state implies that they can have the same position and momentum and there is a possibility of forming a new state of matter known as a Bose-Einstein condensate. Such a state has been realised during last few years by using sophisticated cooling and confinement techniques. Of course, we still have to honour the uncertainty principle — this manifests itself in intriguing and interesting ways that we cannot consider in this brief and rudimentary discussion. But let us now move to the exact question that had been raised. For bosons, there is no zero point energy. But now consider identical particles with half-integral spin. Such particles are subject to different statistics. This is controlled by the Pauli Exclusion Principle that states that only one particle can occupy a well-defined quantum state. If one particle is sitting in the lowest energy state, there is no room in that state for another one coming in with the same spin and angular momentum. It will be asked to go to the next higher energy state, no matter how low the temperature of the system. For example, an electron in an orbit of zero angular momentum around a nucleus will welcome another one of its kind only if it has the opposite spin direction. After that there is no more room in that energy state. If we were to think of a gas of neutrinos cooled to a temperature of absolute zero, they will not all lie in the lowest zero energy state because of this “untouchability” principle! Many of them will have to remain in higher energy states. Depending on the density of the neutrino gas, the Fermi energies of some of these particles could be significant. This is the energy we call the Zero Point Energy. I do not see how this energy can be used in any significant way, let alone accomplish the feat of accelerating a spacecraft to high velocity and energy. That imaginary concept is best left to the domain of juvenile science fiction stories.

#### This darkness we are cast into by the counterplan is a starting point for understanding the world as a constant state of flux in which humans are but a minor and inessential part. The universe will go on fine without us, and our attempts to illuminate the world do not somehow make it more valuable or complete, but only serve to plasticize our own arbitrary ideologies of stasis onto changing material chaos. Our confrontation with the darkness of uncertainty allows us to move away from the violent ontologies of knowability that lie at the root of war

Mazis Glen is Professor of Philosophy and Humanities @ Penn State 1999 (Glen, “Chaos Theory and Merleau-Ponty's Ontology: Beyond the Dead Father's Paralysis toward a Dynamic and Fragile Materiality” <http://www.glenmazis.com/images/Merleau-Ponty_and_Chaos_Theory.doc>)

 If, for the moment, we accept that in articulating an ontology and epistemology that places humans in an interplaying flow with the rest of the planet--as a dynamic, material being--then we must also face the conclusion that we are facing the inherent instability of human existence, its contingency within the vectors of this open system, and our inevitable dissipation. For many contemporary thinkers, this means facing the overflow from the masculine-heroic ideal of overcoming or denying the power of death that has shaped our philosophical and scientific tradition. In her work, Woman and Nature: The Roaring Within, Griffin details patriarchy's march of classical rationalistic philosophy and science as a war of denial against matter in its enveloping, cyclic nature, in its promise of interaction with the world and others. If in a warrior mentality, a vulnerability to death, the devourer, meant defeat, then matter itself becomes an enemy, and something from which one must separate--even though this presents an impossible project. The war against matter which was also a war against whatever was identified with women, since woman was identified by this same tradition with nature and matter:

 He says that woman speaks with nature. That she hears

 voices from under the earth. That wind blows in her ears

 and trees whisper to her. That the dead sing through her

 mouth and the cries of the infants are clear to her. But

 for him this dialogue is over. He says he is not part of

 this world, that he was set on this world as a stranger.

 He sets himself apart from woman and nature (Griffin, 1978,

 p. 1).

To see matter as distinct from mind and then to identify mind as the human essence is a motivated assertion: it serves the purpose of hiding from mortality. Both Merleau-Ponty's ontology and chaos theory not only face the implications of mortality that undoing the dualistic retreat from matter entails, but seeing matter as itself part of a dynamic, unfolding open system of forces reveals for the first time the authentic fragility of both human and non-human existence. Yet, at the same time, it does not consign existence--human and non-human on this planet--to an utter foundationlessness nor to a sense of chaos in its oppositional dualism as mere randomness. Rather, in chaos as we have described it in this essay, there is a self-ordering which promotes both meaning and vitality, but it is precarious.

 As "outcasts" from the insulating power structures of patriarchy, Griffin sees that many women been have consigned by the weight of history to enter what she calls "the room of the undressing." This is a recognition of vulnerabilty and interconnectedness with the rest of the planet--its creatures and material beings. Marked by the dualisms of the scientific and philosophical tradition, women have been targets of exploitation and devaluation in parallel ways to aspects of the material environment. However, like Woolf's passages and those of Merleau-Ponty, Griffin recognizes that in being forced--even coerced--to face the vulnerability of our material being in kin with other entities on the planet, there is also a wisdom gained that had been ignored by the tradition: "Where we go in darkness. Where we embrace darkness. ... The shape of this cave, our bodies, this darkness. This darkness which sits so close to us we cannot see, so close that we move away in fear. We turn into ourselves. But here we find the same darkness, we find we are shaped around an emptiness, that we are a void that we do not know" (Briggs and Peate, 1990, pp. 157-59 ). Although obtained at the cost of oppression, the insight is valuable. The freedom from a substantialist view of reality, the return to indeterminacy and interweavement, betokens a vulnerability that Griffin sees emerging by different avenues in modern science. Ironically, Western science, as one of the systems which helped to devalue both the status of materiality and women has been forced by its own conceptual impasses to move towards insights that closely parallel the journey that women's spirituality has had to make in dealing with its difficult history.

#### Darkness is inevitable— the only question is how we as a society choose to interact with it. Accepting the chaos of life in its entirety is essential to imbuing it with the fullness of meaning that forms the basis of its value – “for I say unto you, one must still chaos in oneself to give birth to a dancing star!”

Harkness 2k5 (Helen, Capitalizing on Career Chaos p 45-6)

We will probably all experience a dark night of the soul. It is important to note that we do have a choice in how to handle it. Realize that this crisis of transformation has opportunity as well as discomfort, like the containment of the caterpillar in the chrysalis before it emerges as a butterfly. If we can see a crisis as the catalyst for a successful change, we won’t waste our time and energy reviling and bewailing. We can put creative energy into digging up what may well have hidden out in our unconscious that is now shooting us in the foot! Successfully navigating the dark night does not mean that life will be a bed of roses after the darkness lifts, but that we will have gained the internal tools to move on with confidence and diminished fear. The dark night is also a spiritual crisis in that we are searching for meaning and purpose in our life and work. Darkness is a vital part of the journey—life is not a travel package, but a pilgrimage. Hardships are part of it—bad weather, facing down losses—but most people don’t talk of their darkness

, only their success. Unfortunately, pain precedes the gain, and we are so frequently caught in the pain phase, grieving the loss of the former model of the way things were supposed to be, that we have great difficulty stepping outside of it to map a strategic route to the gain part of the equation. **Finding Meaning in Crisis** According to John Briggs and F. David Peat (1999), going through painful experience “can bring us to a keen sense of truth beyond Formula for Change **C = P > F** Change happens only when pain is greater than fear. words and a new path in life” (p. 22). They use Viktor Frankl’s life in the Nazi concentration camps to illustrate that “an encounter with the terrible unknown of chaos can bring with it the apparently paradoxical feeling of an intimate, transcending faith or trust in a nurturing cosmos” (p. 164). A sense of solidarity with the entire human race frees us from fear: We know we will survive and thrive. During his captivity in bestial concentration camps, Viktor Frankl was stripped to a naked existence. He discovered, however, that people who find meaning in a crisis, no matter how terrible, have an easier time getting through. People need an alternative to feeling they have been punished by God or pushed into a random hole of chaos. Frankl (1963, p. 9) echoes Nietzsche: “He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how.”

#### The world is chaotic – accepting that darkness is crucial to create value

Paul Saurette, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in 96 "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order •. I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to understand the development of our modem conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this •incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World\* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition *ressentiment*. and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

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**Passion of the Real DA**

**Expenditure devolves into a “passion for the real,” the ever more radical search for extreme experiences**

**Zizek**, Senior Researcher at Ljubljana, **2007** [Slavoj, http://www.lacan.com/zizchemicalbeats. html]

Even Lacan himself, in his Ethics of Psychoanalysis, comes dangerously close to this standard version of the "passion of the Real." [2] Do the unexpected echoes between this seminar and the thought of Georges **Bataille, THE philosopher of the passion of the Real, if there ever was one**, not unambiguously point in this direction? Is Lacan's ethical maxim "do not compromise your desire" (which, one should always bear in mind, was never used again by Lacan in his later work) not a version of Bataille's injunction "to think everything to a point that makes people tremble," [3] **to go as far as possible** – to the point at which the opposite coincide, at which infinite pain turns into the joy of the highest bliss (discernible on the photo of the Chinese submitted to the terrifying torture of being slowly cut to pieces), at which the intensity of erotic enjoyment encounters death, at which sainthood overlaps with extreme dissolution, at which God himself is revealed as a cruel Beast? Is the temporal coincidence of Lacan's seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis and Bataille's Eroticism more than a mere coincidence? Is Bataille's domain of the Sacred, of the "accursed part," not his version of what, apropos Antigone, Lacan deployed as the domain of hate? Does Bataille's opposition of "homogeneity," the order of exchanges, and "heterogeneity," **the order of limitless expenditure**, not point towards Lacan's opposition of the order of symbolic exchanges and the excess of the traumatic encounter of the Real? "Heterogeneous reality is that of a force or shock." [4] And how can Bataille's elevation of the dissolute woman to the status of God not remind us of Lacan's claim that Woman is one of the names of God? Not to mention Bataille's term for the experience of transgression – impossible – which is Lacan's qualification of the Real...

**This passion for the real of experience fuels violence, and traps us in a postpolitics that searches for an authenticity that can never exist**

**Zizek,** Senior Researcher at Ljubljana, **2001** [Slavoj, “‘The one measure of true love is: you can insult the other,'” 15 November, Sabine Reul and Thomas Deichmann]

Virtual reality to me is the climax of this process: you now get reality without reality...or a totally regulated reality. But there is another side to this. Throughout the entire twentieth century, I see a counter-tendency, for which my good philosopher friend Alain Badiou invented a nice name: 'La passion du réel', the passion of the real. That is to say, precisely because the universe in which we live is somehow a universe of dead conventions and artificiality, the only authentic real experience must be some extremely violent, shattering experience. And this we experience as a sense that now we are back in real life.

Do you think that is what we are seeing now?

Slavoj Žižek: I think this may be what **defined the twentieth century, which really began with the First World War**. We all remember the war reports by Ernst Jünger, in which he praises this eye-to-eye combat experience as the authentic one. Or at the level of sex, the archetypal film of the twentieth century would be Nagisa Oshima's Ai No Corrida (In The Realm Of The Senses), where the idea again is that you become truly radical, and go to the end in a sexual encounter, when you practically torture each other to death. **There must be extreme violence for that encounter to be authentic.**

Another emblematic figure in this sense to me is the so-called 'cutter'- a widespread pathological phenomenon in the USA. There are two million of them, mostly women, but also men, who cut themselves with razors. Why? It has nothing to do with masochism or suicide. It's simply that they don't feel real as persons and the idea is: it's only through this pain and when you feel warm blood that you feel reconnected again. So I think that this tension is the background against which one should appreciate the effect of the act.

Does that relate to your observations about the demise of subjectivity in The Ticklish Subject? You say the problem is what you call 'foreclosure'- that the real or the articulation of the subject is foreclosed by the way society has evolved in recent years.

Slavoj Žižek: The starting point of my book on the subject is that almost all philosophical orientations today, even if they strongly oppose each other, agree on some kind of basic anti-subjectivist stance. For example, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida would both agree that the Cartesian subject had to be deconstructed, or, in the case of Habermas, embedded in a larger inter-subjective dialectics. Cognitivists, Hegelians - everybody is in agreement here.

I am tempted to say that we must return to the subject - though not a purely rational Cartesian one. My idea is that the subject is inherently political, in the sense that 'subject', to me, denotes a piece of freedom - where you are no longer rooted in some firm substance, you are in an open situation. Today we can no longer simply apply old rules. We are engaged in paradoxes, which offer no immediate way out. In this sense, subjectivity is political. But this kind of political subjectivity seems to have disappeared. In your books you speak of a post-political world.

Slavoj Žižek: When I say we live in a post-political world, I refer to a wrong ideological impression. We don't really live in such a world, but the existing universe presents itself as post-political in the sense that there is some kind of a basic social pact that elementary social decisions are no longer discussed as political decisions. They are turned into simple decisions of gesture and of administration. And the remaining conflicts are mostly conflicts about different cultures. We have the present form of global capitalism plus some kind of tolerant democracy as the ultimate form of that idea. And, paradoxically, only very few are ready to question this world.

So, what's wrong with that?

Slavoj Žižek: This post-political world still seems to retain the tension between what we usually refer to as tolerant liberalism versus multiculturalism. But for me - though I never liked Friedrich Nietzsche - if there is a definition that really fits, it is Nietzsche's old opposition between active and passive nihilism. Active nihilism, in the sense of wanting nothing itself, is this active self-destruction which would be precisely the passion of the real - **the idea that, in order to live fully and authentically, you must engage in self-destruction**. On the other hand, there is passive nihilism, what Nietzsche called 'The last man' - just living a stupid, self-satisfied life without great passions.

The problem with a post-political universe is that we have these two sides which are engaged in kind of mortal dialectics. My idea is that, **to break out of this vicious cycle, subjectivity must be reinvented.**

**Post-politics forecloses authentic political possibility and traps people within bare life – means they don’t have an ethical framework and their aff has no impact**

**Zizek 98** [Slavoj, Slovenian Superstar and Travelling Professor and Philohopher across America and Europe, February 1998, Journal of Political Ideologies, “For a Leftist Appropriation of the European Legacy”, <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-leftist.htm>] (from 7WM Katrina Neg File)

Ranciere is right to emphasize how it is against this background that one should interpret the fascination of `public opinion' by the unique event of holocaust: the reference to holocaust as the ultimate, unthinkable, apolitical crime, as the Evil so radical that it cannot be politicized (accounted for by a political dynamics), serves as the operator which allows us to depoliticize the social sphere, to warn against the presumption of politicization. Holocaust is the name for the unthinkable apolitical excess of politics itself: it compels us to subordinate politics to some more fundamental ethics. The Otherness excluded from the consensual domain of tolerant/rational post-political negotiation and administration returns in the guise of inexplicable pure Evil. What defines postmodern `post-politics' is thus the secret solidarity between its two opposed Janus faces: on the one hand, the replacement of politics proper by depoliticized 'humanitarian' operations (the humanitarian protection of human and civil rights and aid to Bosnia, Somalia, Ruanda, North Korea ...); on the other hand, the violent emergences of depoliticized `pure Evil' in the guise of 'excessive' ethnic or religious fundamentalist violence. In short, what Ranciere proposes here is a new version of the old Hegelian motto `Evil resides in the gaze itself which perceives the object as Evil': the contemporary figure of Evil, too 'strong' to be accessible to political analysis (holocaust, etc.), appears as such only to the gaze which constitutes it as such (as depoliticized). To put it in Hegel's terms, what is crucial is their speculative identity, i.e. the `infinite judgement', `Humanitarian depoliticized compassion is the excess of Evil over its political forms'.

### 1nc k

Bataille 1928 (Georges, french pervert, “the story of the eye”, supervert.com )

It really was totally out of the question for Simone to lift her dress and place her bare behind in the dish of raw balls. All she could do was hold the dish in her lap. I told her I would like to fuck her again before Granero returned to fight the fourth bull, but she refused, and she sat there, keenly involved, despite everything, in the disembowelments of horses, followed, as she childishly put it, by "death and destruction,” namely the cataract of bowels. Little by little, the sun's radiance sucked us into an unreality that fitted our malaise-the wordless and powerless desire to explode and get up of our behinds. We grimaced, because our eyes were blinded and because we were thirsty, our senses ruffled, and there was no possibility of quenching our desires. We three had managed to share in the morose dissolution that leaves no harmony between the various spasms of the body. We were so far gone that even Granero's return could not pull us out of that stupefying absorption. Besides, the bull opposite him was distrustful and seemed unresponsive; the combat went on just as drearily as before. The events that followed were without transition or connection, not because they weren't actually related, but because my attention was so absent as to remain absolutely dissociated. In just a few seconds: first, Simone bit into one of the raw balls, to my dismay; then Granero advanced towards the bull, waving his scarlet cloth; finally, almost at once, Simone, with a blood-red face and a suffocating lewdness, uncovered her long white thighs up to her moist vulva, into which she slowly and surely fitted the second pale globule-Granero was thrown back by the bull and wedged against the balustrade; the horns struck the balustrade three times at full speed; at the third blow, one horn plunged into the right eye and through the head. A shriek of unmeasured horror coincided with a brief orgasm for Simone, who was lifted up from the stones eat only to be flung back with a bleeding nose, under a blinding sun; men instantly rushed over to haul away Granero's body, the right eye dangling from the head. Thus, two globes of equal size and consistency had suddenly been propelled in opposite directions at once. One, the white ball of the bull, had been thrust into the "pink and dark" cunt that Simone had bared in the crowd; the other, a human eye, had spurted from Granero's head with the same force as a bundle of innards from a belly. This coincidence, tied to death and to a sort of urinary liquefaction of the sky, first brought us back to Marcella in a moment that was so brief and almost insubstantial, yet so uneasily vivid that I stepped forward like a sleepwalker as though about to touch her at eye level.

The story continues a bit later...

"Sir Edmund," she said, rubbing her cheek gently on his shoulder, "I want you to do something.""I shall do anything you like," he replied. She made me come over to the corpse: she knelt down and completely opened the eye that the fly had perched on. "Do you see the eye?" she asked me. "Well?""It's an egg," she concluded in all simplicity. "All right," I urged her, extremely disturbed, “what are you getting at?" "I want to play with this eye." "What do you mean?" "Listen, Sir Edmund," she finally let it out, "you must give me this at once, tear it out at once, I want it!" Sir Edmund was always poker-faced except when he turned purple. Nor did he bat an eyelash now; but the blood did shoot to his face. He removed a pair of fine scissors from his wallet, knelt down, then nimbly inserted the fingers of his left hand into the socket and drew out the eye, while his right hand snipped the obstinate ligaments. Next, he presented the small whitish eyeball in a hand reddened with blood. Simone gazed at the absurdity and finally took it in her hand, completely distraught; yet she had no qualms, and instantly amused herself by fondling the depth of her thighs and inserting this apparently fluid object. The caress of the eye over the skin is so utterly, so extraordinarily gentle, and the sensation is so bizarre that it has something of a rooster's horrible crowing. Simone meanwhile amused herself by slipping the eye into the profound crevice of her ass, and after lying down on her back and raising her legs and bottom, she tried to keep the eye there simply by squeezing her buttocks together. But all at once, it spat out like a stone squeezed from a cherry, and dropped on the thin belly of the corpse, an inch or so from the cock. In the meantime, I had let Sir Edmund undress me, so that I could pounce stark naked on the crouching body of the girl; my entire cock vanished at one lunge into the hairy crevice, and I fucked her hard while Sir Edmund played with the eye, rolling it, in between the contortions of our bodies, on the skin of our bellies and breasts. For an instant, the eye was trapped between our navels." Put it up my ass, Sir Edmund," Simone shouted. And Sir Edmund delicately glided the eye between her buttocks. But finally, Simone left me, grabbed the beautiful eyeball from the hands of the tall Englishman, and with a staid and regular pressure from her hands, she slid it into hers lobbery flesh, in the midst of the fur. And then she promptly drew me over, clutching my neck between her arms and smashing her lips on mine so forcefully that I came without touching her and my come shot all over her fur. Now I stood up and, while Simone lay on her side, I drew her thighs apart, and found myself facing something I imagine I had been waiting for in the same way that a guillotine waits for a neck to slice. I even felt as if my eyes were bulging from my head, erectile with horror; in Simone's hairy vagina, I saw the wan blue eye of Marcelle, gazing at me through tears of urine. Streaks of come in the steaming hair helped give that dreamy vision a disastrous sadness. I held the thighs open while Simone was convulsed by the urinary spasm, and the burning urine streamed out from under the eye down to the thighs below…

**How we say what we say matters—the aff uses the aesthetic conventions of traditional scholarship, which PROMOTE HEGEMONIC SENSIBILITIES and undermine any hope of radical change**

**Shugart, 2002** [An Appropriating Aesthetic: Reproducing Power in the Discourse of Critical Scholarship Communication Theory Thirteen: Three August 2003 Helene A.]

The critiques of the scholarly tradition that I have chronicled and summarized often imply aesthetic considerations, as I have noted, but those considerations tend more often than not to be embedded within larger discussions of logical and methodological constraints on qualitative inquiry in general and on the enterprise of criticism in particular. The ideological function of aesthetics, however, is significant in its own right and, because of its elusive and seemingly inconsequential nature, arguably **more insidious in promoting hegemonic sensibilities than more overt conventions of scholarship**. Hooks (1990) appeared cognizant of this when she stated that cultural critics . . . can produce work that opposes structures of domination, that present possibilities for a transformed future, by willingly interrogating their own work on *aesthetic* and political grounds. This interrogation itself becomes an act of critical intervention, fostering a fundamental attitude of vigilance rather than denial.” (p. 55, emphasis added) Terry Eagleton (1990), in his examination of the ideological function and character of “the aesthetic,” has chronicled the impulse of authority to “**colonize . . . the realm of affective life”** (p. 27). Although he identified the aesthetic as, at least potentially, “a genuinely emancipatory force,” he acknowledged, too, that, in the hands of a dominant order, it could function as well as “‘**internalised repressio**n,’ inserting social power more deeply into the very bodies of those it subjugates, **and so operating as a supremely effective mode of political hegemony”** (p. 28). Eagleton’s characterization of the hegemonic function of the aesthetic informs my approach to this project. **Although** the assumptions of **traditional** scholarship largely have been challenged and, in some cases, even deconstructed, its aesthetic dimensions have been **maintained** in **contemporary critical scholarship**; as Eagleton cautioned, however, “there are meanings and values embedded in the tradition of the aesthetic which **are of vital importance**” (p. 415) and thus warrant analysis. I argue that the aesthetic features of conventional scholarship **subtly** but **profoundly** **undermine the critical project and reproduce oppressive paradigms**—**as such, critical scholarship itself culminates in an appropriation of the critical project.**

**This means that the 1AC is worthless—any possible value it has is locked in a prsion of incoherence. Their theoretical focus both fails and erodes the standing and relevance of critical thinkers and scholars more generally. This is both a reason to vote neg on presumption and a disad to the aff.**

**Bauerlein, 2003** [Mark, Nick’s English professor at emory, kind of an asshole but he gave me an A so he must be smart, *Philosophy and Literature* 28.1 (2004) 180-191, “Bad writing’s back]

We should apply the pragmatic test to today's theorists. **What if in the end nobody abandons common sense and adopts the theory habit?** Butler aims to "provoke new ways of looking" and Culler repeats Emerson's dictum, "Truly speaking, it is not instruction but provocation that I can receive from another soul," but what if nobody is provoked? This is not quite the same verdict that Leftist critics of bad writing such as Katha Pollitt, draw, namely, that the theorists' recondite language cuts them off from real politics. Rather, it recalls the simple truth that, as a matter of historical record, **only certain disruptions thwart common sense and alter the world**. In a word**, the "anti-styles" only work if they create as well as destroy**. If ordinary language is a repository of naturalized values, then the artist/critic's counter-language must supply other values in infectious, admissible ways: **one common sense world collapses only if another takes its place**. If you propose to explode certain attitudes and beliefs, and to do so by disrupting their proper idiom, **then you must compose a language compelling, powerful, memorable, witty, striking, or poignant enough to supplant it. Your language must be an attractive substitute, or else nobody will echo it.** Needless to say, the theorists haven't achieved that and never will. A **[End Page 189]** genuine displacement comes about through an original and stunning expression containing arresting thoughts and feelings, not through the collective idiom of an academic clique smoothly imitated by a throng of aspiring theorists. The writings of Pound, Mallarmé, Faulkner, and H.D. each form a unique signature and inspire theorists to daring interrogations, but few idioms are as conventionalized as 1990s critical theory. In her op-ed, Butler mentions slavery as a common-sense notion that had to go (Warner echoes the self-inflating comparison), **but none of the abolitionists followed the "difficult writing" strategy**. Frederick Douglass was a dazzling rhetorician, and Warner's example, Thoreau, composed epigrams honored for their pithy brilliance. By comparison, **theory prose is a clunker.** Its success in the academy lies not in surprising conversions of common-sense minds, but **in quick and easy replication by AbDs.** If critics assume a duty to undermine common sense, very well, but they need to devise a different counter-speech, not insist on the value of their current one. With this collection, theorists stay with the prevailing manner, and they'll probably continue to do so. Stuck in an attitude that combines the adversarial with the self-congratulatory, they mingle avant-garde visions with a protest conception of the university**, turning crisis, notoriety, and alienation into a triumph and ignoring the diminishing status of the humanitie**s. Here is Cathy Davidson, vice provost for interdisciplinary studies at Duke University, musing in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*(24 October 2003) on current conditions: Even today, some of the best sellers at university presses are the ones that many (not I, by the way) would call "jargon-laden" and "narrow." . . . I find this to be one of the most interesting and vital times in scholarship in my career. I appreciate the melding of the theoretical with the historical, the turn to the genuinely interdisciplinary, the opening up of history to cultural studies and mass culture, and the very lively writing I am finding in so many first books, in particular. So much for Leslie Fiedler, George Orwell, Raymond Aron, and dozens of other cultural theorists who preceded the theory revolution; so much for the hundreds of manuscripts that press readers return every year for developmental editing; and so much for the fact that, **as a Yale Press editor admitted recently in a public lecture, twelve years ago university presses could count on 1000 guaranteed sales—now it's 200.** Until humanities professors acknowledge just how much the enterprise **[End Page 190]** has dwindled, **they won't regain outside respect**. The Bad Writing Contest ran its course, but other undignifying stories will arrive in turn. This is the worst consequence of efforts like *Just Being Difficult?* They defend an endeavor that profits only theorists and that only theorists esteem. In crude terms, **if these theorists win, the humanities lose**. **The more their practices spread among graduate students and junior faculty, the more irreverence creeps in among science faculty, university administrators, the media, and the interested public.** Theorists may preserve their own standing among their colleagues, **but what about tomorrow's needs**? Every spring and fall, practitioners must justify humanities inquiry to people who haven't been acculturated to the theory outlook. **When future professors present to deans their hiring plans, recruit undergraduates to the major, answer questions from journalists, and submit research proposals to foundations and government agencies, will today's theorists have supplied an effective, noble agenda?**

**Our alternative is to REJECT the affirmative’s justification for action and use fiction, instead of theory, to advocate for [INSERT AFF PLAN/advocacy]**

**Fiction is better than philosophy for the purposes of creating contemplation and leading to real thought—stories provide richer detail and enable an actual discussion instead of a cloistered academic one**

**Carroll, 2002** [The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge Author(s): Noël Carroll Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 60, No. 1, 60th Anniversary Issue (Winter, 2002), pp. 3-26]

It is often said that literary examples are **far more effective** in eliciting ethical understanding **than are abstract philosophical arguments**.One reason for this is that, though more simplified and structured than actual cases,97they are **much richer** in detail-about motives, feelings, circumstances, social relations, and interconnected personality traits-than **typical philosophical arguments** and thought experiments. They are, in a word, **more concrete than routine philosophical thought experiments, and this concreteness, in turn, is connected to their effectiveness in stimulating ethical understanding**.9Thus, the elaborateness of literary examples is not grounds for disqualifying them as thought experiments, but rather grounds for **appreciating them as thought experiments that have special cognitive requirements and advantages.**

## 2nc

### Stupidism overview

**The 1AC's intellectual musings leave us at an impasse of indeterminacy -- thinking only gives rise to more thinking, circularity breeds more circularity -- their "prerequisite" arguments endlessly multiply, soon there is no end to the list of things that we must do "before" we act**

**ten Bos '7** Rene, *Social Epistemology* Vol 21 No 2 "The Vitality of Stupidity" professor of philosophy and organizational theory at Radboud University, The Netherlands. He is the author of 13 or so books and more than 100 articles which merely suggest a wisdom where there is not. Currently, he is writing a book on animals and the various ways human beings organize, domesticate and copy them. A central thought in this book is that animals cannot be stupid. [jstor]

The late American historian Richard Hofstadter (1962), a contemporary of Dexter’s, described his country in terms of an “anti-intellectualism” pervading the entire political and organizational landscape. Writing extensively about what he saw as the “omnipotence of incompetence”, he argued that this phenomenon is premised on an understanding that one needs not too much intellectual preparation for carrying out complicated tasks such as managing a business empire or being the president of the United States. This, of course, ties in with age-old understandings that **too much intelligence thwarts anyone’s decision-making capacities. The intelligent person is a doubtful person who never accepts that the world is simply black or white. The grey zone is his or her preferred domain. The price this person has to pay for his or her unmistakable intelligence is practical paralysis: no knot will ever be cut easily. Therefore, one might conclude that in practical affairs it would be very wise not to be too clever. Practice,** so it seems, **always entails mediocrity**. William Whyte (1956), a well-known sociologist and another contemporary of Dexter’s, described how American companies have always thwarted intelligence among the workforce, something which was famously announced by an oil-company who seriously warned their staff not to become too smart by the following unequivocal advertisement which could be read by any member of the organization: NO VIRTUOSOS HERE! Apparently, **there are domains where a certain kind of stupidity is more welcome than one would expect** given the abovementioned emphasis on smartness, intelligence and excellence. Moreover**, if we are to believe early commentators of organizational life such as Hofstadter and Whyte, the very issue of wisdom and stupidity gets bogged down in a conceptual or philosophical quagmire**. What I mean by this is quite simply that these commentators point out that in organizational or political life there is a “zone of transition” between wisdom and stupidity. Apparently**, a well-functioning brain is not a guarantee for organizational or political excellence. In other words, in organizations it can be very stupid to bring in too many wise people**. This insight lies at the heart of Dexter’s musings. He asks us whether a community of human beings with 25% feeble-minded persons would function worse than a city with only smart people (Dexter 1962, 226). There is, of course, no evidence that it would.

**The 1AC makes thought an agglomeration which can only propagate more thinking -- this makes philosophy a disease and becomes the source of our most irritating apparent problems**

**Pelevin ‘2** Victor,Leo Kropywiansky, post-Soviet science fiction author, Buddhist scholar, “Victor Pelevin” Interview, BOMB Magazine, Issue 79 Spring 2002, , LITERATURE http://www.bombsite.com/issues/79/articles/2481

VP Since it happened a long time before I started to write, there’s no way to determine how it affected my writing. However, the effect of this book was really fantastic. **There’s an expression “out of this world.”** This book was totally out of the Soviet world. **The evil magic of any totalitarian regime is based on its presumed capability to embrace and explain all the phenomena, their entire totality, because explanation is control. Hence the term** totalitarian**. So if there’s a book that takes you out of this totality of things explained and understood, it liberates you because it breaks the continuity of explanation and thus dispels the charms. It allows you to look in a different direction for a moment, but this moment is enough to understand that everything you saw before was a hallucination** (though what you see in this different direction might well be another hallucination). The Master and Margarita was exactly this kind of book and it is very hard to explain its subtle effect to anybody who didn’t live in the USSR. **Solzhenitsyn’s books were very anti-Soviet, but they didn’t liberate you, they only made you more enslaved as they explained to which degree you were a slave.** **The Master and Margarita** didn’t even bother to be anti-Soviet yet reading this book would make you free instantly. **It didn’t liberate you from some particular old ideas, but rather from the hypnotism of the entire order of things.** LK What books have you most enjoyed reading in the last few years? In particular I wonder if there are any American authors among your recent favorites. VP I can’t say I read too much fiction. I liked Pastoralia and CivilWarLand in Bad Decline by George Saunders, but his best story I read so far was “I Can Speak!™” published in The New Yorker. I liked some stories by David Foster Wallace and plan to siege his Infinite Jest one infinite day. Talking of the old guard, I like Robert M. Pirsig. The real heroes in his books are concepts rather than humans, and they change and develop like characters do in more traditional novels: this is incredible. LK The ghost of Che Guevara appears in your most recent book, Homo Zapiens, propounding a theory of television as either (1) switched off, in which case it is like any other object, i.e., not any more or less difficult for the unquiet mind to pay attention to than, say, a rock, or (2) switched on, in which case it guides the attention of the viewer to such an extent that he becomes “possessed,” “techno-modified,” “a virtual subject” and no longer himself. In August of 2000, the Ostankino TV tower in Moscow caught fire, interrupting broadcasts for several days and rendering all television sets as objects of type (1). Was there a perceptible change of mood among Moscow citizens at that time? VP I think so. People were getting nervous and irritated, like drug addicts without a routine injection. But there were a lot of jokes about it nevertheless. As for me, I hadn’t been watching television for a long time by that moment, so I didn’t experience any personal problems. LK A big change over the last decade has been the decline in the influence of Russia’s military, which was called upon to fight a difficult war in Chechnya even as morale was falling and resources available to it were shrinking. Your father, who I understand passed away several years ago, was himself in the military. How did he view this decline in influence? VP My father was a rather strange Soviet military man, and never had any particular influence as such. He wasn’t even a party member, which made him kind of a white crow and impeded his career badly. It wasn’t his choice to join the military: the Soviet Union started its missile program when he was a student in Kiev, and many students from technical institutes were drafted to serve in this new branch of armed force as officers. Your consent wasn’t necessary for this at that time. I never had access to the inner workings of my father’s soul but I think he never totally identified himself with the Red Army’s military might, though he was a good specialist. At the time of the decline he was much more concerned with his own health, which was deteriorating quickly. But I think that, like many people who spent their entire lifetime in the USSR, he was too stunned by its demise to take any ensuing events seriously. LK In Homo Zapiens, the Russian government is portrayed as “virtual”: three-dimensional dummies on TV whose movements are scripted by screenwriters. This device seems particularly apt in describing the Yeltsin government, held together as it was with television coverage, funding from tycoons and the IMF, multiple heart bypasses and so forth. Do you believe it has become any less apt now, under the leadership of Putin? VP **Phenomenologically any politician is a TV program, and this doesn’t change from one government to another.** But if you want me to compare the government we had under Yeltsin with the one we have under Putin, I won’t be able to do it. Not only because I don’t watch television. For this kind of assessment you need a criterion. I guess the right one would be the way the government handles the economy, because its primary function is to take care of the economy. Politics is usually the function of the latter. To pass a judgment here you need to understand, even approximately, how the economy works. In the Western economy you have a set of instruments that allow you to make this assessment even if you are not a specialist. It is always clear whether it is a bull market or bear market. So you can say: bull market, good government, bear market, bad government (I know it is an oversimplification, but still). But these instruments are not applicable to the Russian economy because its very nature is different. The essence of your business cycle here in Russia is that you always have a pig market, which means that you don’t get whacked as long as you pay the pigs. And sometimes you get whacked even if you pay because it is a real pig market. Russian economy is the dimension where miracle meets subpoena and becomes state secret. How do you compare the numerous different governments that preside over this? The only criterion would be personal appeal of the ministers: a goatee fashion, a necktie color, et cetera. But for this you have to watch television. LK **Reading philosophy is in some ways a disease, like alcohol or drugs or dog racing or any other addiction.** I wonder what Western philosophers you have found most compelling. In particular I wonder if, like the moth Mitya in The Life of Insects, you have a particular affinity for Marcus Aurelius. Here I think of the Marcus Aurelius who insists upon an inner self that can’t be, except by its own assent, corrupted by the outer world. This seems to be a recurring theme in your works: the primacy of the individual mind in the face of a dangerous external world, whether the Soviet one or that of post-Soviet wild capitalism. VP If we put it your way, **the most compelling Western philosophers in my life were Remy Martin and Jack Daniels. They compelled me to do many things I otherwise would never think of. If seriously, I don’t take professional philosophers seriously even when I understand what they say. Philosophy is a self-propelled thinking, and thinking, no matter how refined, only leads to further thinking.** **Uncoerced thinking gives us the best it can when it subsides down and halts, because it is the source of nearly all our problems.** As far as I’m concerned, **thoughts are justified in two cases: when they swiftly make us rich and when they fascinate us with their beauty. Philosophy could sometimes fit into the first category—for instance, if you write “The Philosophy That Burns Fat” or something like “The Philosophy of Swimming with Sharks without Being Eaten”—but it would be an exception.** Sometimes philosophy fits into the second category (also an exception), and Marcus Aurelius is exactly the case. I read his book many times when I was a kid but I’m not sure I understood his philosophy—I was simply captivated by the noble beauty of his spirit. By the way, I read somewhere that Bill Clinton’s favorite quote came from Marcus Aurelius: “One could lead a decent life even in a palace.” The very notion of Western philosophy as opposed to Eastern seems to me quite dubious and arbitrary, though Bertrand Russell wrote a very good book on its history. This label implies that your mind starts to generalize in a different manner when it is placed in a different geographical location. But how would you classify Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy — as Eastern or Western? As for the self, it is a very tricky notion. We should define it before we use it. I prefer the term mind. I think you are absolutely right when you say that my theme is the primacy of the mind. But the external world is also your mind because the categories external and internal are purely mental. **Mind is the ultimate paradox because when you start to look for it you can’t find it. But when you start to look for something that is not mind you also can’t find it.** Mind is the central issue that interests me as a writer and as a person.

**The rejection of critical analysis of language and/or policy issues allows us to lead better lives -- incessant self-doubt and impotence characterized by a cloud of speculation and criticism**

**ten Bos '7** Rene, *Social Epistemology* Vol 21 No 2 "The Vitality of Stupidity" professor of philosophy and organizational theory at Radboud University, The Netherlands. He is the author of 13 or so books and more than 100 articles which merely suggest a wisdom where there is not. Currently, he is writing a book on animals and the various ways human beings organize, domesticate and copy them. A central thought in this book is that animals cannot be stupid. [jstor]

As suggested above, **philosophers have been very aware of this. For all their intelligence, they might easily fall into a well. This theme was elaborated by, among others, the Stoics, who wondered whether wisdom or intelligence would make a person happy. To live in “a nation of nitwits”,** as Bob Herbert wrote in his article in the *New York Times* (1 March 1995), **is what is probably good enough for most of us**. Stupidity and happiness have a profound relationship. The Stoics wondered why it was that apparently stupid animals or stupid children could be so happy. The good and happy life is, from the Stoic perspective at least, the kind of life that proceeds “according to nature”. **Since animals and children seem to live more according to nature than adult people, one might be wondering how stupidity rather than wisdom fosters happiness**. To solve this conundrum, the Stoics made a distinction between a kind of happiness that can only be attained by appealing to reason (*logos*) on the one hand and a spontaneous and instinctive kind of happiness on the other. At face value, such a distinction seems artificial and not entirely plausible but Perniola (2003, 54) points out that, according to the Stoics, the human constitution is much more complex than the animal or infant one. Human reason, the Stoics argued, is to be blamed for this state of affairs. It completely lacks the coherence and stability that is characteristic of natural instinct (*orme*). Contrary to this instinct, reason can only function by means of delusion, distortion or even perversion. All of these traits prevent it from taking a straightforward or constant path in life. In other words, reason’s stupidity lies in its lack of capacity to maintain, in any meaningful sense of the word, an understandable connection between different stages and moments of one’s life, a problem that is simply not present in animals or children. **Human reason, so the Stoics maintained, always represents a lack or excess with whatever is there. The way it operates is therefore always characterized by impatience, greed or fear. An animal, Perniola (2003, 55) points out, never disagrees with itself while intelligent men constantly do. Indeed, the capacity for doubt is one of their major characteristics**. A “zapping life”, Perniola wants us to believe, is the logical outcome of a life clouded by reason. Above, we saw that the organizations described by Hofstadter and Whyte have taken this lesson to heart. They take sides with the Stoic understanding that too much reason is dangerous. There is, indeed, a long-standing debate on the affinity between bureaucratic organization and what has been refereed to as “honest stoicism” (Anderson 2004, 26).

### At: perm

**Voting negative is an act of indifference to the 1AC's critical work**

**ten Bos '7** Rene, *Social Epistemology* Vol 21 No 2 "The Vitality of Stupidity" professor of philosophy and organizational theory at Radboud University, The Netherlands. He is the author of 13 or so books and more than 100 articles which merely suggest a wisdom where there is not. Currently, he is writing a book on animals and the various ways human beings organize, domesticate and copy them. A central thought in this book is that animals cannot be stupid. [jstor]

To recap, **there is no right way to approach stupidity but**, provided that there is a sensible approach at all, **one should probably accept a certain** tolerance, **indifference** or mildness. But is this piece of advice acceptable in the up-beat world of management and organization? To be sure, “the brotherhood of dunces has planted itself firmly in a pragmatic world that undermines the fragile nobility of intelligence” (Ronell 2002, 18). A case in point might be the business ethicist or the CEO who insists on the importance of responsibility or, perhaps more accurately, corporate social responsibility. But how much responsibility can one take? **Only idiots**, Ronell (2002, 216) suggests, **never dodge any responsibility. This is why they lack irony, a sense of humour and all the other hallmarks of genuine intelligence. Following Deleuze (1968) and Perniola (2003), one might refer to those who are unable to dodge responsibility as “beautiful souls”. They are always pleasing, friendly, serious but, at the same time, stolid, insensitive and invulnerable. They manifest a “perennial readiness” to help others for there is nothing for which they are not responsible. They also unconditionally believe in the goodness of their fellow human beings and are as such absolutely insensible to any criticism whatsoever. There is a thin line between the perennial smile of a customer-friendly salesman and the fierce devotion of mother Theresa. In their vicinity, there is no shadow of a doubt.**

**The focus on indeterminacy and/or responsibility proves that they are idiots masquerading as do-gooder geniuses**

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**Ronell** reminds us of the necessary limitations that we should bear in mind if we are discussing responsibility. She **takes issue with the hubris or arrogance that tends to permeate debates about responsibility. An example would be the claim by some scientists that, in order to cope with environmental disaster and climatic change, we need to take responsibility for nothing less than the entire planet and to manage it as if such were possible. Now, my suggestion is not that these ethicists or scientists—these beautiful souls—are simply idiots. The problem may be worse than that. The veritable idiot, after all, at least knows he is an idiot whereas “the stupid subject… does not have this knowledge about himself” (Ronell 2002, 218–219). Beautiful souls never experience any hesitation. They are never caught up in the “idiocy of undecidability”.**

### At: links to itself

**If you announce that you are stupid, then you have become wise, but it is the pretense of knowledge that makes their position so objectionably idiotic**

**ten Bos '7** Rene, *Social Epistemology* Vol 21 No 2 "The Vitality of Stupidity" professor of philosophy and organizational theory at Radboud University, The Netherlands. He is the author of 13 or so books and more than 100 articles which merely suggest a wisdom where there is not. Currently, he is writing a book on animals and the various ways human beings organize, domesticate and copy them. A central thought in this book is that animals cannot be stupid. [jstor]

Another aspect of stupidity is its unfathomable relationship to knowledge. **There is, as we have seen, a kind of knowledge that is very stupid. Stupidity does not necessarily stand in an adverse relationship to knowledge.** Ronell suggests, perhaps in the footsteps of the Stoics discussed earlier, **that there is a dignity about stupidity that knowledge and reason seem to have lost.** A philosopher like Rousseau argued that it is only by means of stupidity and laziness that one gains a rapport to being as such. **Clever people—for example, intellectuals and academics—do not know anymore how to relate to being for they have forgotten how to become enthused or inspired by it. Here is another puzzling lesson about stupidity: intellectualism and enthusiasm are, so it seems, antithetical whereas wisdom and enthusiasm are not.**

### Darkness overview

**The affirmative posits THEMSELVES as able to create a new reality which more closely resembles the ideal form which makes their plan defensible. this drive towards purification and explanation, this will to truth, is an attempt to escape suffering and creative potential which negates life.**

**TURANLI 2K3**

[aydan, “nietzsche and the later wittgenstein”, journal of nietzsche studies, issue 26, p. 61-2, muse]

The craving for absolutely general specifications results in doing metaphysics. Unlike Wittgenstein, Nietzsche provides an account of how this craving arises. The creation of the two worlds such as apparent and real world, conditioned and unconditioned world, being and becoming is the creation of the ressentiment of metaphysicians. Nietzsche says, "to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative" (WP III 579). Escaping from this world because there is grief in it results in asceticism. Paying respect to the ascetic ideal is longing for the world that is pure and denaturalized. Craving for frictionless surfaces, for a transcendental, pure, true, ideal, perfect world, is the result of the ressentiment of metaphysicans who suffer in this world. Metaphysicians do not affirm this world as it is, and this paves the way for many explanatory theories in philosophy. In criticizing a philosopher who pays homage to the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche says, "he wants to escape from torture" (GM III 6). The traditional philosopher or the ascetic priest continues to repeat, "'My kingdom is not of this world'" (GM III 10). This is a longing for another world in which one does not suffer. It is to escape from this world; to create another illusory, fictitious, false world. This longing for "the truth" of a world in which one does not suffer is the desire for a world of constancy. It is supposed that contradiction, change, and deception are the causes of suffering; in other words, the senses deceive; it is from the senses that all misfortunes come; reason corrects the errors; therefore reason is the road to the constant. In sum, this world is an error; the world as it ought to be exists. This will to truth, this quest for another world, this desire for the world as it ought to be, is the result of unproductive thinking. It is unproductive because it is the result of avoiding the creation of the world as it ought to be. According to Nietzsche, the will to truth is "the impotence of the will to create" (WP III 585). Metaphysicians end up with the creation of the "true" world in contrast to the actual, changeable, deceptive, self-contradictory world. They try to discover the true, transcendental world that is already there rather than creating a world for themselves. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the transcendental world is the "denaturalized world" (WP III 586). The way out of the circle created by the ressentiment of metaphysicians is the will to life rather than the will to truth. The will to truth can be overcome only through a Dionysian relationship to existence. This is the way to a new philosophy, which in Wittgenstein's terms aims "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (PI §309).

**They make death desirable**.

**Kaufman 74**. Walter Kaufman, professor of philosophy at Princeton University, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Princeton Press, 1974, pg. 394-395

In fact, Nietzsche asks explicitly: “Perhaps art is even a necessary corollary and supplement of science?” (GT 14). In the next sentence, he replies: “…it must now be said how the influence of Socrates…again and again prompts a regeneration of art” (15). Far from merely presaging a solution, Nietzsche then tries systematically to show how the “sublime metaphysical delusion” of Socrates is that very instinct which leads science ever again to its own limits—at which it must necessarily give way to art. Socratism—i.e., the rationalistic tendency—was not arbitrarily injected into the Greek mind by Socrates; it was “already effective before Socrates” and “only gained in him an indescribably magnificent expression” (14). What—Nietzsche asks in the end—would have happened to mankind without Socrates? He finds in Socrates the only turning point…of world history. For if one were to think of this whole incalculable sum of energy…as not employed in the service of knowledge, …then the instinctive lust for life would probably have been so weakened in general wars of annihilation…that suicide would have become a general custom, and individuals might have experienced the final remnant of a sense of duty when…strangling their parents and friends:…[15]. This is the final vision of the *Birth of Tragedy*—except for the appended application to Wagnerian opera. Unrestrained pessimism would not only fail to produce a great art, but it would lead to race suicide. The Socratic heritage, the elemental passion for knowledge, must “by virtue of its own infinity guarantee the infinity” and continuation of art (15). In the picture of the “theoretical man” who dedicates his life to the pursuit of truth, Nietzsche pays homage to the “dignity” of Socrates. At the same time his own features mingle with those of his ideal (15). Socratism is the antithesis of tragedy, but Nietzsche asks “whether the birth of an artistic Socrates is altogether a contradiction in terms” (14), and nobody has ever found a better characterization of Nietzsche himself. At the end of section 15, we must find another self-portrait: “the *Socrates who practices music*.” In Nietzsche’s first book as in his last, Socrates is criticized but still *aufgehoben* in—still part of­­­­—the type Nietzsche most admires. Here is Nietzsche’s own estimate of *The Birth of Tragedy*: It smells offensively Hegelian, and the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer sticks out to a few formulas. An “idea”—the antithesis of the Dionysian and the Apollinian—translated into the realm of metaphysics; history itself as the deployment of this “idea”; in tragedy this antithesis is *aufgehoben* [still part of] into a unity; and in this perspective, things that had never before faced each other are suddenly juxtaposed, used to illuminate each other, and comprehended [begriffen] [EH-GT 1].

### Link

**The combination of starting points forecloses authentic engagement with either – they become tourists of either which forecloses authentic ontological openness with either**

**Sawicki, 2003**- Ph.D. Columbia University, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, Chair of Women's And Gender Studies, Williams College (Jana, “Foucault and Heidegger Critical Encounters”, Heidegger and Foucault:Escaping Technological Nihilism, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London, Questia, REQ)

Who accomplishes the challenging setting upon through which what we call the real is revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To what extent is man capable of such a revealing? Man can, indeed, conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another … but man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or withdraws … the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, anymore than is the realm man traverses every time he as a subject relates to an object. *(QT,* 18) Here Heidegger asserts that the idea that the mark of the human is the rational ordering and controlling of reality is itself not something that anyone or any group has consciously chosen. The ideas that reality is an object for human control and technology merely a human instrument are themselves examples of the technological thinking that dominates the modern age. Although we do decide whether any given representation of reality is true or false, or how any particular thing is to be used, which representations come up as candidates for truth or falsity, which questions are taken seriously, and the very fact that beings are revealed as things for use, are not themselves up for choice. [9](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194) The background against which objects appear is neither wholly graspable nor intentionally constituted. It is, instead, a forgotten horizon of historically transmitted practices and beliefs that we take for granted. In the *Discourse on* Thinking Heidegger addresses this unchosen, autonomous feature of technology when he says: “Whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon with conditions that are given.” In “The Question Concerning Technology” he uses the term “enframing” *(Gestell)* to describe the essence of modern technology; it is “the way in which the real reveals itself as standing reserve” (QT, 2, 3). Moreover, “enframing” represents a “destining” of revealing insofar as it “pushes” us in a certain direction. Heidegger does not regard destining as determination (he says it is not a “fate which compels”), but rather as the implicit project within the field of modern practices to subject all aspects of reality to the principles of order and efficiency, and to pursue reality down to the finest detail. Thus, insofar as modern technology aims to order and render calculable, the objectification of reality tends to take the form of an increasing classification, differentiation, and fragmentation of reality. The possibilities for how things appear are increasingly reduced to those that enhance calculative activities. Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. *(QT,* 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194) It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194)

## 1nr

### fiction

#### The role of the ballot should be to determine who has the best praxis for public persuasion—this is a PRIOR QUESTION—all arguments are mediated by language, and that mediation subsequently shapes thought. Criticism of writing and praxis is a prerequisite to any political thought

**Orwell, 1946** [George, Politcal theorist, Author, far more influential than any of the aff’s authors,"Politics and the English Language," <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwell46.htm>]

Now that I have made this catalogue of swindles and perversions, let me give another example of the kind of writing that they lead to. This time it must of its nature be an imaginary one. I am going to translate a passage of good English into modern English of the worst sort. Here is a well-known verse from *Ecclesiastes*: I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. Here it is in modern English: Objective considerations of contemporary phenomena compel the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably be taken into account. This is a parody, but not a very gross one. Exhibit (3) above, for instance, contains several patches of the same kind of English. It will be seen that I have not made a full translation. The beginning and ending of the sentence follow the original meaning fairly closely, but in the middle the concrete illustrations -- race, battle, bread -- dissolve into the vague phrases "success or failure in competitive activities." This had to be so, because no modern writer of the kind I am discussing -- no one capable of using phrases like "objective considerations of contemporary phenomena" -- would ever tabulate his thoughts in that precise and detailed way. The whole tendency of modern prose is away from concreteness. Now analyze these two sentences a little more closely. The first contains forty-nine words but only sixty syllables, and all its words are those of everyday life. The second contains thirty-eight words of ninety syllables: eighteen of those words are from Latin roots, and one from Greek. The first sentence contains six vivid images, and only one phrase ("time and chance") that could be called vague. The second contains not a single fresh, arresting phrase, and in spite of its ninety syllables it gives only a shortened version of the meaning contained in the first. Yet without a doubt it is the second kind of sentence that is gaining ground in modern English. I do not want to exaggerate. This kind of writing is not yet universal, and outcrops of simplicity will occur here and there in the worst-written page. Still, if you or I were told to write a few lines on the uncertainty of human fortunes, we should probably come much nearer to my imaginary sentence than to the one from *Ecclesiastes*. As I have tried to show, modern writing at its worst does not consist in picking out words for the sake of their meaning and inventing images in order to make the meaning clearer. **It consists in gumming together long strips of words which have already been set in order by someone else**, and making the results presentable by sheer humbug. The attraction of this way of writing is that it is easy. It is easier -- even quicker, once you have the habit -- to say *In my opinion it is not an unjustifiable assumption that* than to say *I think*. If you use ready-made phrases, you not only don't have to hunt about for the words; you also don't have to bother with the rhythms of your sentences since these phrases are generally so arranged as to be more or less euphonious. When you are composing in a hurry -- when you are dictating to a stenographer, for instance, or making a public speech -- it is natural to fall into a pretentious, Latinized style. Tags like *a consideration which we should do well to bear in mind* or *a conclusion to which all of us would readily assent* will save many a sentence from coming down with a bump. By using stale metaphors, similes, and idioms, you save much mental effort, at the cost of leaving your meaning vague, not only for your reader but for yourself. This is the significance of mixed metaphors. The sole aim of a metaphor is to call up a visual image. When these images clash -- as in *The Fascist octopus has sung its swan song, the jackboot is thrown into the melting pot* -- it can be taken as certain that the writer is not seeing a mental image of the objects he is naming; in other words he is not really thinking. Look again at the examples I gave at the beginning of this essay. Professor Laski (1) uses five negatives in fifty three words. One of these is superfluous, making nonsense of the whole passage, and in addition there is the slip -- alien for akin -- making further nonsense, and several avoidable pieces of clumsiness which increase the general vagueness. Professor Hogben (2) plays ducks and drakes with a battery which is able to write prescriptions, and, while disapproving of the everyday phrase *put up with*, is unwilling to look *egregious* up in the dictionary and see what it means; (3), if one takes an uncharitable attitude towards it, is simply meaningless: probably one could work out its intended meaning by reading the whole of the article in which it occurs. In (4), the writer knows more or less what he wants to say, but an accumulation of stale phrases chokes him like tea leaves blocking a sink. In (5), words and meaning have almost parted company. People who write in this manner usually have a general emotional meaning -- they dislike one thing and want to express solidarity with another -- but they are not interested in the detail of what they are saying. **A scrupulous writer**, in every sentence that he writes, will ask himself at least four questions, thus: 1. What am I trying to say? 2. What words will express it? 3. What image or idiom will make it clearer? 4. Is this image fresh enough to have an effect? And he will probably ask himself two more: 1. Could I put it more shortly? 2. Have I said anything that is avoidably ugly? But you are not obliged to go to all this trouble. You can shirk it by simply throwing your mind open and letting the ready-made phrases come crowding in. They will construct your sentences for you -- even think your thoughts for you, to a certain extent -- and at need they will perform the important service of partially concealing your meaning even from yourself. It is at this point that the special connection between politics and the debasement of language becomes clear. In our time **it is broadly true that political writing is bad writing**. Where it is not true, it will generally be found that the writer is some kind of rebel, expressing his private opinions and not a "party line." Orthodoxy, of whatever color, seems to demand a lifeless, imitative style. The political dialects to be found in pamphlets, leading articles, manifestoes, White papers and the speeches of undersecretaries do, of course, vary from party to party, but they are all alike in that one almost never finds in them a fresh, vivid, homemade turn of speech. When one watches some tired hack on the platform mechanically repeating the familiar phrases -- *bestial atrocities, iron heel, bloodstained tyranny, free peoples of the world, stand shoulder to shoulder* -- one often has a curious feeling that one is not watching a live human being but some kind of dummy: a feeling which suddenly becomes stronger at moments when the light catches the speaker's spectacles and turns them into blank discs which seem to have no eyes behind them. And this is not altogether fanciful. A speaker who uses that kind of phraseology **has gone some distance toward turning himself into a machine**. The appropriate noises are coming out of his larynx, but his brain is not involved as it would be if he were choosing his words for himself. If the speech he is making is one that he is accustomed to make over and over again, he may be almost unconscious of what he is saying, as one is when one utters the responses in church. And **this reduced state of consciousness, if not indispensable, is at any rate favorable to political conformity.** In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of the political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism., question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called *pacification*. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called *transfer of population* or *rectification of frontiers*. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called *elimination of unreliable elements*. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them. Consider for instance some comfortable English professor defending Russian totalitarianism. He cannot say outright, "I believe in killing off your opponents when you can get good results by doing so." Probably, therefore, he will say something like this: "While freely conceding that the Soviet regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the right to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the Russian people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement." **The inflated style itself is a kind of euphemism.** **A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outline and covering up all the details**. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one's real and one's declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, **like a cuttlefish spurting out ink**. **In our age there is no such thing as "keeping out of politics." All issues are political issues, and politics itself is a mass of lies, evasions, folly, hatred, and schizophrenia**. When the general atmosphere is bad, language must suffer. I should expect to find -- this is a guess which I have not sufficient knowledge to verify -- that the German, Russian and Italian languages have all deteriorated in the last ten or fifteen years, as a result of dictatorship. But if thought corrupts language, **language can** also **corrupt thought**. A bad usage can spread by **tradition** and **imitation** even among people who should and do know better. The debased language that I have been discussing is in some ways very convenient. Phrases like *a not unjustifiable assumption, leaves much to be desired, would serve no good purpose, a consideration which we should do well to bear in mind*, are a continuous temptation, a packet of aspirins always at one's elbow. Look back through this essay, and for certain you will find that I have again and again committed the very faults I am protesting against. By this morning's post I have received a pamphlet dealing with conditions in Germany. The author tells me that he "felt impelled" to write it. I open it at random, and here is almost the first sentence I see: "[The Allies] have an opportunity not only of achieving a radical transformation of Germany's social and political structure in such a way as to avoid a nationalistic reaction in Germany itself, but at the same time of laying the foundations of a co-operative and unified Europe." You see, he "feels impelled" to write -- feels, presumably, that he has something new to say -- and yet **his words, like cavalry horses answering the bugle, group themselves automatically into the familiar dreary pattern**. This invasion of one's mind by ready-made phrases (***lay the foundations, achieve a radical transformation***) can only be prevented if one is **constantly on guard against them**, and **every such phrase anaesthetizes a portion of one's brain**. I said earlier that the decadence of our language is probably curable. Those who deny this would argue, if they produced an argument at all, that language merely reflects existing social conditions, and that we cannot influence its development by any direct tinkering with words and constructions. So far as the general tone or spirit of a language goes, this may be true, but it is not true in detail. Silly words and expressions have often disappeared, not through any evolutionary process but owing to **the conscious action of a minority.** Two recent examples were *explore every avenue* and *leave no stone unturned*, which were killed by the jeers of a few journalists. There is a long list of flyblown metaphors which could similarly be got rid of if enough people would interest themselves in the job; and it should also be possible to laugh the *not un-* formation out of existence\*, to reduce the amount of Latin and Greek in the average sentence, to drive out foreign phrases and strayed scientific words, and, in general, to make pretentiousness unfashionable. But all these are minor points. The defense of the English language implies more than this, and perhaps it is best to start by saying what it does *not* imply. To begin with it has nothing to do with archaism, with the salvaging of obsolete words and turns of speech, or with the setting up of a "standard English" which must never be departed from. On the contrary, it is especially concerned with the **scrapping of every word or idiom which has outworn its usefulness**. It has nothing to do with correct grammar and syntax, which are of no importance so long as one makes one's meaning clear, or with the avoidance of Americanisms, or with having what is called a "good prose style." On the other hand, it is not concerned with fake simplicity and the attempt to make written English colloquial. Nor does it even imply in every case preferring the Saxon word to the Latin one, though it does imply using the fewest and shortest words that will cover one's meaning. What is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the word, and not the other way around. In prose, **the worst thing one can do with words is surrender to them**. When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have been visualizing you probably hunt about until you find the exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning. Probably it is better to put off using words as long as possible and get one's meaning as clear as one can through pictures and sensations. Afterward one can choose -- not simply *accept* -- the phrases that will best cover the meaning, and then switch round and decide what impressions one's words are likely to make on another person. This last effort of the mind cuts out all stale or mixed images, all prefabricated phrases, needless repetitions, and humbug and vagueness generally. But one can often be in doubt about the effect of a word or a phrase, and one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails. I think the following rules will cover most cases: (i) Never use a metaphor, simile, or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print. (ii) Never us a long word where a short one will do. (iii) If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out. (iv) Never use the passive where you can use the active. (v) Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent. (vi) Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous. These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in the style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad English, but one could not write the kind of stuff that I quoted in those five specimens at the beginning of this article. I have not here been considering the literary use of language, but merely language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought. Stuart Chase and others have come near to claiming that all abstract words are meaningless, and have used this as a pretext for advocating a kind of political quietism. Since you don't know what Fascism is, how can you struggle against Fascism? One need not swallow such absurdities as this, but one ought to recognize that the present political chaos is connected with the decay of language, and that one can probably bring about some improvement by starting at the verbal end. **If you simplify your English, you are freed from the worst follies of orthodoxy**. **You cannot speak any of the necessary dialects, and when you make a stupid remark its stupidity will be obvious, even to yourself.** Political language -- and with variations this is true of **all** political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists -- is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. One cannot change this all in a moment, but one can at least change one's own habits, and from time to time one can even, if one jeers loudly enough, send some worn-out and useless phrase -- some *jackboot, Achilles' heel, hotbed, melting pot, acid test, veritable inferno*, **or other lump of verbal refuse -- into the dustbin, where it belongs.**

**Yeah, your aff is radical in what it SAYS. Sadly, the WAY YOU SAY IT adheres closely to the hegemonic conventions you hope to change—because of the fidelity all the aff does is insulate the very structures it hopes to change**

**Shugart, 2002** [An Appropriating Aesthetic: Reproducing Power in the Discourse of Critical Scholarship Communication Theory Thirteen: Three August 2003 Helene A.]

Ono and Sloop’s reservations coincided with the standards of conventional scholarship that Nothstine et al. identified—a distancing of the critic from the conditions and consequences of the text. The apparent allegiance to theory—albeit poststructuralist—that Ono and Sloop noted also reflected the “scientization” that Nothstine et al. described as central to the professionalization (and thus **homogenization**) that characterized the scholarly tradition. Echoing this sentiment, in her critique of critical scholarship— what she referred to as “**canon-busting ‘new scholarship’”** (p. 64)— Barbara Foley (1990) apparently **observed a continuance of traditional scholarship’s standard of highly specialized, balkanized, and insulated academic expertise:** The logic of the new scholarship ***ought***to extend to a critique of those institutions that help to maintain hegemony. But **it can actually end up legitimating the hegemonic view that campuses are apolitical centers where disinterested** research and pedagogy take place. (p. 75) Clearly, these critics all were cognizant of the fact that **simply shifting the focus of the critic is not sufficient to realize a critical scholarship**; **this must occur in tandem with radical conceptual changes regarding what con stitutes knowledge** **and**, accordingly, **qualifies as scholarship**. As controversial as this idea was and, to some extent, continues to be, many contemporary outlets for scholarship in the field of rhetorical criticism have proved themselves relatively amenable to it, if sometimes grudgingly. It is no longer unusual to read a piece of rhetorical criticism in which the critic overtly situates herself/himself in relation to the text or describes her/his political investment in the telos of the critical project. As McKerrow (1989) and Ono and Sloop (1995) predicted, this has changed the face of criticism dramatically. However, in this essay, I argue that the conceptual changes reflected in the contemporary scholarship of critical rhetoric are to some extent limited in their capacity to undo the dialectic of control peculiar to traditional scholarship—a dialectic that is largely inherent in the aesthetic conventions of that scholarship.

**Including the aff along with our story destroys all the potential benefits of fiction and shoehorns a plethora of possible interpretations into its own particular schema. The perm is like watching a movie with some guy standing over your shoulder and shouting “THAT SCENE WITH THE DOG IS A METAPHOR FOR OUR NEED TO TRANSVERSE THE POLITICAL AND REINSTANTIATE OUR ONTOLOGICAL BEING-NESS”—it makes it impossible to enjoy, or garner any value, from the fiction. It is BETTER to read in a completely “naïve” manner than to combine reading with the aff’s jargon-laden scholarship.**

**Pippin, 2010** (Robert, Robert Pippin is the Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor of Social Thought, Philosophy, and in the College at the University of Chicago. “In defense of Naïve Reading,” New York Times, October 10th,)

Most students study some literature in college, and most of those are aware that they are being taught a lot of theory along with the literature. They understand that the latest theory is a broad social-science-like approach called “cultural studies,” or a particular version is called “post-colonialism” or “new historicism.” And there are still plenty of gender-theoretical approaches that are prominent. But what often goes unremarked upon in the continuing (though less public) debate about such approaches is that, taking in the longue durée, this instability is in itself completely unremarkable. The ’80s debaters tended to forget that the teaching of vernacular literature is quite a recent development in the long history of the university. (The same could be said about the relatively recent invention of art history or music as an academic research discipline.) So it is not surprising that, in such a short time, we have not yet settled on the right or commonly agreed upon way to go about it. The fact that the backgrounds and expectations of the student population have changed so dramatically so many times in the last 100 years has made the problem even more difficult. In the case of vernacular literature, there was from the beginning some tension between the reader’s point of view and what “**professional scholarship**” required. Naturally enough, the first models were borrowed from the way “research” was done on the classical texts in Greek and Latin that made up most of a student’s exposure to literature until the end of the 19th century. Philology, with its central focus on language, was once the master model for all the sciences and it was natural for teachers to try to train students to make good texts, track down sources, learn about conflicting editions and adjudicate such controversies. Then, as a kind of natural extension of these practices, came historical criticism, national language categorization, work on tracing influences and patronage, all contributing to the worry about classifying various schools, movements or periods. Then came biographical criticism and the flood gates were soon open wide: **psychoanalytic** **criticism**, new or formal criticism, **semiotics**, **structuralism, post-structuralism, discourse analysis, reader response criticism or “reception aesthetics,” systems theory, hermeneutics, deconstruction, feminist criticism, cultural studies. And so on.** Clearly, poems and novels and paintings were **not** **produced** as objects for future academic study; there is no a priori reason to think that they could be suitable objects of “research.” By and large they were produced for the pleasure and enlightenment of those who enjoyed them. But just as clearly, the teaching of literature in universities ─ especially after the 19th-century research model of Humboldt University of Berlin was widely copied ─ needed a justification consistent with the aims of that academic setting: that fact alone has always shaped the way vernacular literature has been taught. The main aim was research: the creating and accumulation and transmission of knowledge. And the main model was the natural science model of collaborative research: define problems, break them down into manageable parts, create sub-disciplines and sub-sub-disciplines for the study of these, train students for such research specialties and share everything. With that model, what literature and all the arts needed was something like a general “science of meaning” that could eventually fit that sort of aspiration. Texts or art works could be analyzed as exemplifying and so helping establish such a science. Results could be published in scholarly journals, disputed by others, consensus would eventually emerge and so on. And if it proved impossible to establish anything like a pure science of exclusively literary or artistic or musical meaning, then collaboration with psychoanalysis or anthropology or linguistics would be welcomed. Will the sciences eventually provide the actual theory of meaning that researchers in literature and the arts will need? Finally, complicating the situation is the fact that literature study in a university education requires some method of evaluation of whether the student has done well or poorly. Students’ papers must be graded and no faculty member wants to face the inevitable “that’s just your opinion” unarmed, as it were. Learning how to use a research methodology, providing evidence that one has understood and can apply such a method, is understandably an appealing pedagogy. None of this is in itself wrong-headed or misguided, and the absence of any consensus about this at this still early stage is not surprising. But there are two main dangers created by the inevitable pressures that the research paradigm for the study of literature and the arts within a modern research university brings with it. First, while it is important and quite natural for literary specialists to try to arrive at a theory of what they do (something that conservatives in the culture wars often refused to concede), there is no particular reason to think that every aspect of the teaching of literature or film or art or all significant writing about the subject should be either an exemplification of how such a theory works or an introduction to what needs to be known in order to become a professor of such an enterprise. This is so for two **all-important reasons**. **Literature and the arts have a dimension unique** in the academy, not shared by the objects studied, or “researched” by our scientific brethren. **They** **invite** or invoke, at a kind of **“first level**,” an **aesthetic experience that is** by its nature **resistant to restatement in more formalized, theoretical** or generalizing **language**. This response can certainly be enriched by knowledge of context and history, but the objects express a first-person or subjective view of human concerns **that is falsified if wholly transposed to a more “sideways on” or third person view. Indeed that is in a way the whole point of having the “arts.”** Likewise ─ and this is a much more controversial thesis ─ such works also can directly deliver a kind of practical knowledge and self-understanding not available from a third person or more general formulation of such knowledge. There is no reason to think that such knowledge — exemplified in what Aristotle said about the practically wise man (the phronimos)or in what Pascal meant by the difference between l’esprit géometriqueand l’esprit de finesse— is any less knowledge because it cannot be so formalized or even taught as such. **Call this a plea for a place for “naïve” reading, teaching and writing — an appreciation and discussion not mediated by a theoretical research question** recognizable as such by the modern academy. This is not all that literary study should be: we certainly need a theory about how artistic works mean anything at all, why or in what sense, reading a novel, say, is different from reading a detailed case history. But there is also no reason to dismiss the “naïve” approach as mere amateurish “belle lettrism.” Naïve reading can be very hard; it can be done well or poorly; people can get better at it. And it doesn’t have to be “formalist” or purely textual criticism. Knowing as much as possible about the social world it was written for, about the author’s other works, his or her contemporaries, and so forth, can be very helpful. Secondly, the “research model” pressures described are beginning to have another poorly thought out influence. It is quite natural (to some, anyway) to assume that eventually not just the model of the sciences, but the sciences themselves will provide the actual theory of meaning that researchers in such fields will need. One already sees the “application” of “results” from the neurosciences and evolutionary biology to questions about why characters in novels act as they do or what might be responsible for the moods characteristic of certain poets. People seem to be unusually interested in what area of the brain is active when Rilke is read to a subject. The great problem here is not so much a new sort of culture clash (or the victory of one of C.P. Snow’s “two cultures”) but that such applications are spectacular examples of bad literary criticism, not good examples of some revolutionary approach. If one wants to explain why Dr. Sloper in Henry James’s novel, “Washington Square,” seems so protective yet so cold about his daughter Catherine’s dalliance with a suitor, **one has to begin by entertaining the good evidence provided in the novel** ─ that he enjoys the power he has over her and wants to keep it; that he fears the loneliness that would result if she leaves; that he knows the suitor is a fortune hunter; that Catherine has become a kind of surrogate wife for him and he regards her as “his” in that sense; that he hates the youth of the suitor; that he hates his daughter for being less accomplished than he would have liked; and that only some of this is available to his awareness, even though all true and playing some role. And one would only be getting started in fashioning an account of what his various actions mean, what he intended, what others understood him to be doing, all before we could even begin looking for anything like “the adaptive fitness” of “what he does.” **If being happy to remain engrossed in the richness of such interpretive possibilities is “naïve,” then so be it.**

**Fiction is the only way to engage the dramatic imagination which is key to solve—they force us all to follow the map of the 1AC, which eliminates this ability to act imaginatively by forcing us to follow along with the theory.**

**Mullin, 2004** [Amy, Moral Defects, Aesthetic Defects, and the ImaginationAuthor(s): Amy MullinSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), pp. 249-261Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559090]

I. THE IMAGINATION When we speak of the imagination, we may be speaking of the manipulation of mental images, the consideration of counterfactual propositions and situations, or simulation (either of belief in propositions, or of the experiences of others). 1 Some distinguish between fantasy and imagination such that the latter, and not the former, envisages “a world that is interestingly different from our own, but also interestingly accessible from it.” 2 My own use of the term owes much to Roger Scruton and Mark Johnson. Scruton writes: “Doing something imaginatively means doing it thoughtfully, where one’s thought is **not guided by the normal processes of theoretical reasoning**, but instead goes beyond the obvious in some more or less creative way.” 3 Johnson defines imagination as a “creative reflective activity.” 4 A “process is imaginative insofar as it involves ordering or structuring representations in a new manner.” 5 Some of these representations may be mental images. In narrative works, many of them are. However, they can also be representations of emotions, propositions, and judgments. In his recent essay “The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge,” Noël Carroll suggests that one way works of art can be imaginative is by producing what we would call, should they appear in philosophical texts, thought experiments. Many thought experiments in philosophical texts are drawn from narrative works, and narrative works are full of detailed imaginings of particular characters, events, and situations that cause us to put particular judgments, emotions, and thoughts into new patterns. Carroll argues that these imaginings can give us opportunities to engage in detailed conceptual analysis, often by “imagining eminently possible cases that contradict conventional wisdom.” 6 Sometimes artworks may simply stimulate our imaginative reflection by causing us to think about a topic or situation that we have previously never thought much about, and they may do this without providing much in the way of guidance as to how that imagining proceeds. Sometimes, by contrast, they may have more in common with a philosophical text, which typically not only introduces an imaginative thought experiment, but also seeks to guide the nature of our reflection upon it. 7 In the latter case, the artwork, just like the philosophical text, may or may not succeed in shaping the nature of our response to what we are encouraged to imagine. However, **the artwork, unlike** most **philosophical** **arguments**, **will** typically **affect our response to what we imagine by encouraging us to simultaneously imagine that the world** is different from what we have acknowledged or thought it to be like, and to temporarily adopt a particular perspective or point of view on what we imagine. Because Carroll seeks to defend the claim that art can provide moral knowledge, he focuses in particular upon ways in which acts of imagination encourage us to rethink or recall connections between concepts. As a result, he concentrates on what Richard Moran calls the hypothetical imagination, in which we entertain hypotheses and ask what consequences would follow from their truth. 8 However, Carroll clearly does not mean to suggest that our typical responses to artistic imaginings are so emotionally neutral. Instead, narrative artworks usually call upon us to exercise what Moran calls the **dramatic imagination**, in which we try on a particular point of view, seeking to feign not only beliefs but also feelings. 9 In the process, as he observes, we sometimes **“lose track of the difference between supposition and conclusion, between fantasy and acting out**.”