### Everything else

Can be found in the doubles speech docs

### 1nc fairy tales

**Our rewriting of the 1ac overcomes their infantile fantasy of central control – mutually exclusive and solves the case better**

**Forshee, ‘06** [“Psychoanalysis, Multiple Intelligences, and Fairy Tales in the Kindergarten Classroom”, Mark Forshee, International TEYL Journal, 2006]

Bettelheim teaches us that traditional fairy tales are metaphorical/allegorical guides for the psyche. Fairy tales allow the child to make his/her own decisions within the framework of healthy (and buoyant) narrative structure. The child becomes a proactive reader who can assimilate the healthy aspects of the narrative while styling those lessons to his/her own idiosyncratic understandings. The rich metaphors/allegories and fantasy material of traditional fairy tale literature provides the young child with a perfect psychological environment for self discovery/creation. Young children are natural scientists and philosophers. Young children seek answers to life's "big" questions. The young child needs access to age appropriate philosophical and spiritual "answers." The fairy tale allows the child the magical ability to "play" inside of the text. The child is free to identify with any or all of the characters in the fairy tale narrative. In accordance with the Traditional-Oral and Postmodern-literary styles, the children are free proactively to modify details and dynamics in the story. The young child receives comforting and encouraging psychological "possible-answers" in the face of urgent and troubling existential riddles/questions, presented such that the child is implicitly empowered to massage and/or redirect the various character tropes in the narrative (i.e., gender of parent and/or child, specific causal and ethical conclusions, etc.). Bettelheim writes: The fairy tale provides what the child needs most: it begins exactly where the child is emotionally, shows him where he has to go, and how to do it. But the fairy tale does this by implication, in the form of fantasy material which the child can draw on as seems best to him, and by means of images which make it easy for him to comprehend what he must understand ... The fairy story communicates to the child an intuitive, subconscious understanding of his own nature and of what his future may hold if he develops his positive potentials. He senses from fairy tales that to be a human being in this world of ours means having to accept difficult challenges, but also encountering wondrous adventures. (ibid.) The fairy tale provides a psychic map and compass for the child, allowing him/her to see/anticipate the developmental/maturation challenges/crises that he/she will inevitable experience. [Fershee Continues]We experience the total narrative power of the "Hansel and Gretel" fairy tale. We are presented with the image/vignette of a happy and self-sufficient family. This is the harmonious family paradise before the inevitable onset of difficulties which require ego development and progressive "reality testing". The idyllic family symbiosis is inevitable disrupted by the "death" (absence) of the "good mother." This is an objectification of the child's experience of the (sudden) absence of the all-giving, all-providing, all-generous, symbiotic mother. The absolutely "good mother" must "die" so that the child may (gradually/abruptly) learn the requirements, tasks, and forethought necessary for successful functioning according to the "reality principle." The child learns that thought (infantile "primary process thinking") does/can not, all by itself, create reality. (Just thinking of the breast no longer magically "creates" or provides the breast for the child.) The child must begin to use an understanding/consciousness of causality to manipulate his/her environment, in order to eventually satisfy the "pleasure principle" in constructive, sublimated, goal-directed, and socially acceptable ways. This is initially a frightening experience for the young child, at least on the unconscious level. The "original" all-giving, all-pleasure producing mother is "dead" and the new mother figure is an evil substitute (perceived as "evil" by the developing children at the moment/time). The evil stepmother takes on various behavioral manifestations in different fairy tales. In Hansel and Gretel, the new step mother no longer provides enough food (the breast or breast- substitutes, the pleasure totems, no longer magically appear on thought-demands) and somehow blames the children for the sudden failure. All food comes from the "mother" and if food fails to come as expected, the food/pleasure producing Mother is experienced as "dead." The children fear abandonment. This is the very real fear a child demonstrates when he/she clings to his/her mother at the school gate. 7 The child's fears are realized in the tale as the parents lead Hansel and Gretel deep in to the forest. The parents return home and a bird eats Hansel s bread-trail. The children are lost/abandoned. Another bird guides the children to the gingerbread house. A third bird leads them back to their Father after they steal the witch's gold and jewels. The birds signify the necessary and destined pattern/dynamics of development. The brother and sister in the narrative help each other to overcome the life/developmental challenges: The brother exhibits the necessary bravery to venture an emergency survival strategy (albeit it a faulty one, the bread trail). The sister comes up with the clever idea to present the poor-sighted witch with a chicken bone "finger." The sister tricks the witch into climbing into the oven. Both sister and brother carry the witch's gold and jewels out of the gingerbread house. The children must return to their father by crossing a body of water. This is a new, extra task that he/she must fulfill. The symbiotic/unified siblings must cross the river individually, on the back of a magic duck. More psychological distinctions/patterns are recognized. The children return to their father with their newly-found, newly "earned" riches. These riches will mean the survival and salvation of the family/self. This event satisfies the child's need to feel that he/she is contributing to the well-being of the family. The family is a projection to be incorporated and thus helping the family to survive and prosper amounts to helping the self survive and prosper: more independence and more feelings of competence and what psychologist Bandura calls "self-efficacy". The children "graduate" from total dependency toward increased independence and self-sufficiency. The children overcome their fear and struggles with loss and newly encountered self-sufficiency requirements; the children earned rewards that provided sustenance for the family unity and the integrated self. The "good mother" figure is physically absent but her image/imago is eternally/psychically present, because the child has successfully incorporated her psychologically (Uroborus: the snake eating its tail/tale). Freud reminded us of the mysterious powers of the body and the subconscious/metaphorical forces that move through the body (oral, anal, phallic, latency: "taking in", "holding on", and "letting go", "going inside in preparation to demonstrate outside"). Erikson expanded psychoanalytic thought to explain the effects of social dynamics on the development of the Self and the varieties of identity/personality construction. Jung went beyond the psychoanalytic framework/paradigm to postulate multiple personality types, which virtually amount to different empirical means of experiencing being/reality/life/existence (Introversion, Extraversion, Thinking types, feeling types, intuitive types etc.: the Meyers Briggs personality test is an application of this concept). Gardner's Multiple Intelligence theory identifies different intelligences (different styles of learning and of exhibiting understandings).8

**Fairy tales exist with in a different ontological plane than policymaking, in a discontinuous past without reliance on the “rules” of reality – this ontological method of understanding the world is the foundation of authentic and empathetic interpersonal relations**

**Agosta 10** [“Empathy in the Context of Philosophy”, chapter 1, Lou, 2010]

A simple, though not necessarily obvious, next step is to amplify “taking a stand” into an empathic taking a stand for another, i.e., literally being there for the other. This is precisely taking a stand for the other—in empathy an individual human being takes a stand for the other. Such a stand can look like “tough love” as in intervening with an addict. Or the stand may well be to let the other struggle to come to grips with his or her possibilities rather than leaping in and taking them away from the other. Or it may be that the other is reminded in a released (gelassen) way about living up to what is possible for it, but of which it is temporarily unaware. All these possibilities—and more—occur. The final step is straightforward. Human beings are the beings for whom their being is an issue. The structure of that issue is designated by “care.” Dasein – both the word and the phenomenon of human being - does not distinguish between one human being or many human beings. This is a fine point that is usually not relevant. Here it is crucial, and one of the reasons that Heidegger chose it. “Dasein” as a form of life – a way that a human being engages in being human. This includes the distinction between oneself and the other. Therefore, the structure of care maps directly to empathy as being an entity for whom being is an issue for oneself and for the other. The stand by which the issue is engaged is informed by the respect for the other. It is informed by empathic receptivity, the interpreted possibilities of empathic understanding, and the committed falling silent and rich stillness of empathic listening. Only if I listen, can I hear the call of the self, the other’s self calling the other one back to its own authentic possibilities. If I listen, then I can release the other into hearing his own call to himself. In unpacking affectedness in possibilities of understanding as an interpretation that articulates possibilities of the other, taking a stand as listening is precisely the kind of distinction that is required by a full, rich way of being with human being that is empathy. Empathy: Brought to Language as Narrative However, a full, rich silence in which listening is in the foreground is not the only way in which empathy is brought to language. As Heidegger notes, assertion (statement) is a derivative modes of interpretation. Our affectedness is storied and empathy is required and useful to distinguish the narrative with which human beings surround their affectedness from what actually happened. A wealth of narrative is constellated around affectedness—or emotions, moods, sensation, affects, feelings—and it will exhaust all the narrative that we humans bring to affectedness and take as a source for narrative elaboration and still have more to say (as in the above quote about the one who “is never short for words”). Thus, a wonderful example of empathy and its absence is documented in one of the fairy tales (Märchen) of the collection edited by the Grimm brothers. “The Story of the Youth Who Set Out to Learn Fear” is about someone – the classic simpleton of the folktale - who tries to learn what shuddering is (i.e., fear in the sense of “goose flesh”). He tries so hard to feel fear that he is effectively defended against all feelings. Thus he lacks empathy and the corresponding aspects of his humanness. He has no feelings, not even fear. He is (ontically) insensitive. He is (ontologically) cut off from the community of fellow travelers who share feelings empathically and on the basis of which life matters to them. This deficiency occasions a misunderstanding with the sacristan at the local church, and the youth throws the latter down the stairs, resulting in the youth’s disgrace and banishment. He is now a traveler on the road of life, which is the beginning of his (ontological) adventures to recover his feelings. The Märchen is in fact a ghost story, to be told on dark, windy October nights. The empathy of the audience is aroused by constellating fearful images of the living dead. This makes for a series of humorous encounters with ghouls and haunted castles as the youth sets about trying to learn shuddering – compulsively saying “I wish I could shudder,” having no idea what it means. He accomplishes many brave deeds instead - since he is literally not sensible enough to know that he should be afraid. The ghost story provides a framework for images of the disintegration and fragmentation of the self, including literal ghoulish images of bowling with detached heads and a corpse that rise from the dead because the youth gets into bed with it to warm it up – that one was creepy! – all of which the youth is defended against by his utter and complete lack of feeling. None of these images and events matter to him in the way they would matter to an affectively whole person. He is surrounded by ghouls and living corpses, but, ontologically speaking, he is the one who is an emotional zombie, emotionally dead. The subtext of the story is that the individual cannot recover his humanity on his own. He requires the participation of another – and a relationship with the other – to restore the humanness of his feelings – and to teach him how to shudder. Having raised the curse on the haunted castle and won the hand of the fair princess, the hero finally stops trying to shudder. Only then is he overcome by shuddering at the first opportune occasion. On the morning after his wedding night – his new wife teaches him shuddering – no, this is not going where you think – teaches him shuddering in a pun that cleverly masks the physical and sexual innuendo – she throws a basin of cold water on him – he wakes up exclaiming that “Ach, yaw, now finally I know shuddering!” Now he is finally a whole, complete person. People bring meaning to both the reactive (“imperative”) emotions such as fear, anger, happiness, sadness as well as our “narrativized” emotions such as pride, love, envy, shame, guilt, hate, jealousy, humility. In the latter case, complete assertions, including subjects and predicates, enter into the matter, though not in a reductive way. These assertions are in effect narratives – very short ones in some cases – that we bring to our emotions as we elaborate them (our emotions) into narratives. These narratives extend all the way from confabulation – pure invention about the meaning of what happened – through rationalization – spinning motives in a favorable way, though distorted by self-interest – to nuanced articulation of the “reasons of the heart” of which reason is ignorant as expressed in poetry, literature, and authentic conversation. This does not mean that the emotions are assertions (or judgments) or should be expressed as such. In short, that “the emotions are like narratives” means that a wealth of narrative surrounds them. The emotions will exhaust all the narrative we bring to them and continue to motivate story telling. As interpretation, empathy is an openness to affectedness “from below” and a search for empathic redescriptions “from above.” In turn, this empathy opens up innovative interpretations, disclosing possibilities, exposing blind spots, and calling the other back to authentic human relations. Thus, the result of this work is a complete reworking of empathy based on a fundamental analysis of human being as being in the world. Let us summarize. Empathy is the silent listening of the possibilities of the self and other in affectedness as respect, as an interpretation to give the other its own possibilities as an interpretive choosing of authentic selfhood in the face of commitment. Each of the design distinctions of human being as being in the world is implemented as being with human being (i) in its affectedness in respect—as empathic receptivity (ii) in understanding and its interpretive fore-structure—as empathic understanding (iii) as first-, second-, and third-person perspectives as empathic perspective taking and (iv) in silent speech where the one becomes the conscience of the other in taking a stand—as empathic listening. Empathy is where being with human being and being human are authentically disclosed as an authentic form of human relatedness. We live in a forgetfulness of the very possibility, of which this chapter serves as a reminder. Empathy is the foundation of authentic interhuman relations. Thus, if, as Heidegger asserts, being with one another is indeed the ontological bridge between selves; and empathy is an example of authentic being with one another; then empathy is an example of the ontological bridge between selves.