### 2nc dialogue overview

**Our interpretation is that the affirmative must advocate a topical government action**

**There are multiple impacts**

 **1). Their model destroys dialogue- it subverts the role of the negative by making the topic of the discussion unpredictable. Makes effective debate impossible-that’s galloway**

 **2). The impact to this is education- if one side cannot clash then it just becomes a lecture rather than an in depth discussion of a topic- this turns any of their education arguments- debate is a dialogical process it requires both sides to access education- they prevent that for us and them.**

 **3). There has to be a stable specific point of reference otherwise the debate is broad and results in poor decision making about the topic**

#### Decisionmaking skills gained from debate are key to problem solving in all facets of life—outweighs the case

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp. 9-10

If we assume it to be possible **without** recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### It’s not what we learn, it’s the skills in the process that make our framework educational

**Arvai et al 2004** – professor, School of Natural Resources, Ohio State (June, Joseph, Journal of Environmental Education, 36.1, “Teaching Students to Make Better Decisions About the Environment: Lessons From the Decision Sciences”)

How do we achieve this goal of facilitating more thoughtful decisions? One strategy involves improving students’ technical knowledge base (e.g., in biology, ecology, chemistry) as a means of creating favorable attitudes toward the promotion of better environmental quality (Ramsey & Rickson, 1976). As many researchers have pointed out, however, focusing on enhancing technical **knowledge without** also teaching problem-solving skills will lead to substantial shortcomings with respect to promoting thoughtful decisions (e.g., see Hungerford, Peyton, & Wilke, 1980). An obvious solution, therefore, is to include in curricula elements that address the need for knowledge about both natural systems and “action” (i.e., decision-making) skills (Simmons, 1991). Yet, as Hungerford and Volk (1990) point out, focusing on the role of human judgments and behavior (in addition to enhancing technical knowledge) in the context of the environment makes instructional planning extremely difficult. In many cases, the added difficulty acts as a deterrent to these integrated curricula and provides de facto reinforcement for the model that enhanced knowledge leads to better decisions. One suggested strategy for overcoming this difficulty is to teach students the skills to critically analyze environmental issues (e.g., how to articulate research questions, obtain information from primary and secondary sources, and interpret data). At the end of such an exercise, students work on the development of “issue-resolution action plans” and then “decide whether they want to actually implement the plan of action” (Hungerford & Volk, 1990, p. 16). We view such an approach as laudable. We would take this suggestion a step further, however, and add that just as students must learn skills for critical analysis, so too must they learn skills for decision making (which includes developing alternative courses of action and making decisions about implementation). Learning these decision-making skills involves two steps: First, students (and in many cases, teachers) must be taught to recognize common obstacles to thoughtful (or high-quality) decision making. Second, they must acquire skills to overcome them. These obstacles and skills are the focus of this article.

#### Only portable skill—also turns critical thinking and advocacy needed to advance their case

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, young a couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### **a/t: we relate to the topic**

**This isn’t enough that’s our Galloway evidence- tangential discussion is only a distraction from the main point of the affirmative- a discussion of the topic doesn’t provide sufficient ground for dialogue because it doesn’t advocate an actual means for change- the idea that they relate to the topic is purely informative and not a point of deliberation. If we are not able to engage then we don’t actually test arguments which are key to decision making its purely a lecture in which we learn about these issues**

#### a/t: our values/ aesthetic come first

**there isn’t a link to this argument- the debate is where we debate these value, you can read this argument on the negative, and there’s nothing mutually exlcusive about government action with determining aesthetics**

#### **a/t: we relate to the topic**

**This isn’t enough that’s our Galloway evidence- tangential discussion is only a distraction from the main point of the affirmative- a discussion of the topic doesn’t provide sufficient ground for dialogue because it doesn’t advocate an actual means for change- the idea that they relate to the topic is purely informative and not a point of deliberation. If we are not able to engage then we don’t actually test arguments which are key to decision making its purely a lecture in which we learn about these issues**

### at: exclusion

#### There's a difference between argumentative exclusion and ontological exclusion—the former is inevitable because of time limits, affs implicitly requiring us to make responsive arguments instead of free expression, or any counter-interpretation of any kind. Our framework deploys minimal argumentative exclusion based on the resolution to enable clash and testing processes that prevent ontological exclusion wrought by one-sided dialogues and monopolized prep and the type of mindsets those things encourage.

#### No link: dialectical responsiveness is distinct from exclusion because conversations must be goal-oriented to settle a certain question for the ballot to make sense—their offense doesn’t assume game spaces

**Walton 4** (Douglas, Full Professor of Philosophy – U Winnipeg, Relevance in Argumentation, p. 169-170)

The kind of relevance defined in the new theory can be called dialectical relevance, meaning that an argument, a question, or other type of speech act is judged to be relevant insofar as it plays a part, or has a function, in a **goal-directed** conversation that is a dialogue exchange between two participants who are aware of each other’s moves. The ultimate aim of a system of dialectical relevance is to be useful in judging cases for material relevance, primarily cases where an argument is central. To judge whether a given argument is normatively relevant, basically one has to judge whether, as used in the given case, it meets the normative standards of reasonable argument appropriate for that case. To determine what normative standard is appropriate, one has to ask the basic question, What purpose is the argument supposedly being used for? To answer that question, one has to examine the evidence given in the text and context of dialogue in that case and ask what type of dialogue this case is supposed to be part of. Then the more detailed evaluation can go from there, depending on the goal of that type of dialogue. For example, suppose the dialogue is supposed to be a critical discussion. The purpose of a critical discussion is to resolve a conflict of opinions. Thus, the argument in the given case can be judged to be relevant if it used in such a way as to contribute to the resolution of the conflict of opinions supposedly at issue in the critical discussion. The argument is relevant if it contributes to the goal of the critical discussion at whatever stage it was used. It is irrelevant if it does not. Why should argumentation in a natural conversation be assumed to be goal directed? One might object that a lot of the ordinary conversations we have in everyday life do not appear to be goal directed. Two people may meet in the street and have a casual conversation about whether it is a nice day or not. It would seem to be artificial to describe their conversation as goal directed, implying that the two had agreed in advance to undertake this argument about the weather for some specific purpose. If they switch to talking about something else, is that a bad thing? Should it be criticized as “irrelevant”? If not, the problem is that a criticism of irrelevance seems arbitrary or even unfair. The solution to this problem is to clearly recognize that judgments about the dialectical relevance of an argument confer a stamp of approval of admissibility on the argument as rational or as used correctly in a given case with respect to its serving some purpose. To say that an argument is dialectically relevant or irrelevant is not to say that it is faulty or fallacious in every respect or that it has been incorrectly with respect to every goal that the participants are trying to achieve in a given case. There is a parallel here with applying deductive logic to arguments. To say that an argument is deductively valid is not to say that is good argument in every respect or that it is fallacy free. For a deductively valid argument could be based on false premises, or it could be a circular argument, or it could exhibit many kinds of faults. To say that an argument is deductively valid is only to say that the argument is correct or rational in a conditional sense—it is to say that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must (by logical necessity) be true too. Comparably, to say that an argument is dialectically relevant in a given case is not to say that the argument is perfectly rational, in relation to any goals that might be important the participants. It is only to say that it has the potential to be used correctly or rationally in a conditional or instrumental sense. It is to say that the argument has the potential to be used in such a way as to contribute to the type of discussion the participants are supposed to be engaged in. But you can always raise the question of what type of discussion the participants should really be engaged in. You can ask whether the agenda of that discussion ought to be changed if they are to solve the underlying problem they confront. So if two disputants are arguing about the weather, and one of them suddenly starts to argue about baseball or the price of new cars, the switch of topics is not necessarily a bad thing at all. But from the perspective of the two arguers who hope to resolve their difference of opinions about the weather by using rational argumentation, the switch to baseball may be viewed as dialectically irrelevant. This means that it turns the argumentation away from the direction needed for fulfilling its original purpose. At any rate, we can see that dialectical relevance has its place. Although it is not a requirement of all human communication, it is a useful requirement for reasoned argumentation of various kinds that are quite important in human communication.

#### Net offense—only our agonistic model of competition channels exclusion into productive contestation

**Glover 8**

Glover, Robert. "Scattergories: Towards an Agonistic Critique of the Re-Categorization of American Citizenship in a Globalized Era" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008 <Not Available>. 2011-03-11 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p278147\_index.html Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, University of Connecticut Primary Fields: Political Theory, International Relations Dissertation Title: Citizenship Unhinged—Exploring the Potential of Agonistic Citizenship, Ph.D. Projected Completion Spring of 2010.

Agonistic pluralism, or agonism, advances a conception of politics in which contestation and conflictual engagement become the goal of our political encounters, rather than seeking harmonious social cooperation. Most variants of agonism do not simply “celebrate a world without points of stabilization”, as we might find in more avowedly postmodern conceptions of politics, yet agonism does recognize the “perpetuity” and enduring nature of contestation (Honig 1993, 15). The exercise of coercive power, exclusion, and hegemonic marginalization are enduring features of modern politics from this perspective. Rather than seeking to eliminate these features, agonism calls upon us to engage and re-engage these moments in the most inclusive and contentious democratic settings possible, allowing a multiplicity of voices to engage in the struggle for hegemony (Goi 2005, 60). The question remains however as to what an agonistic approach can do to resolve the inherent conflict within American citizenship18. Yet this would be to mis-frame the question as agonistic conceptions would not advance a “resolution”, but rather a continuous re-vision and reworking of previous resolutions. I will suggest that agonistic democratic theory offers us three valuable critical insights with regard to contemporary American citizenship. First and foremost, an agonistic approach to citizenship engages the paradoxical and contradictory foundations of citizenship in the U.S. as a constitutive and productive tension, rather than as a “problem” to be transcended or avoided. Second, such an approach would open a space whereby we actively consider the question of extending political voice to non-citizens. Third and lastly, an agonistic framework recognizes that exclusion is an unavoidable element in the constitution of any political community, yet it provides us with a framework of radical pluralism by which to legitimate and continuously renegotiate the terms of that exclusion. An agonistic approach “refus[es] to equate concern for human dignity with a quest for rational consensus” or overarching agreement on the principles driving our political engagement (Connolly 2002, x). Rather, the goal becomes exposure of those moments which are characterized as consensus as the opposite: instances of “originary exclusion” and moments of “hegemony disguised as the reconciliation of two conflicting logics” (Mouffe 2000).19 However, the problem for agonists is not exclusion in and of itself, contrary to what some critics have charged.20 William Connolly notes that boundaries are “indispensable”, providing the “preconditions of identity, individual agency, and collective action” (1994, 19). Yet boundaries always accomplish this at the expense of other possibilities, other modes of order. Thus, while agonists recognize that universal inclusion within the political community is an illusory goal, they critique the treatment of exclusion as apolitical or natural, devoid of a decisionistic moment in which a “we-they” distinction is politically created. To act as if these normative tensions can be transcended is to misconceive of the democratic project. By such accounts, Honig writes, the problem of democratic theory is how to find the right match between a people and its law, a state and its institutions. Obstacles are met and overcome, eventually the right match is made and the newlywed couple is sent on its way to try and live happily ever after (Honig 2001b, 109). The reality, according to an agonistic framework, is that such tensions are never truly “overcome”, or to appropriate Honig’s metaphor, the newlyweds are never completely in a state of marital bliss with one another.

### at: research opponent solves switch side

#### Just researching the other side doesn’t access the empathic learning and epistemic modesty unique to defending something you disagree with

**Bile 2000** – PhD candidate in the School of Interpersonal Communication at Ohio University (Jeffrey Thomas, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, “REASONING TOGETHER AS DIALECTICAL PARTNERS! "BEYOND PERSUASION" TOWARD "COOPERATIVE ARGUMENTATION"”, http://www.cedadebate.org/CAD/index.php/CAD/article/viewFile/254/238)

In our contentious culture, we surely need better ways to begin to discuss the issues without one side being against another” (Griffin 101). If we took this approach, we could have discussions that center on the complexity of issues, what their implications are, who might be affected and in what ways, and on how one choice over another changes the issue itself. So, I think the issue of the "resolution" needs to be reconsidered from an invitational framework as well. (Griffin 101). l agree completely that these are worthwhile goals. Certainly, contemporary social problems are not as simple as our dualistic debates often imply. Before discarding binary topics too quickly, however, we should consider their contextual effects. When combined with the requirement of switching sides, two-sided topics expand the possibilities for discovering that those with whom we disagree might have tenable positions after all. Empathic learning is encouraged, then, when students agree to disagree in the context of debate tournaments. A related issue, deserving much further exploration, is the problematic of counter-attitudinal advocacy created by mandatory side switching. l sympathize with the view that students should not be "forced" to advocate a position that they do not believe. As a practical matter, I believe that most topics are ambiguous enough to allow considerable opportunity to find positional comfort. But, more fundamentally, I'm not sure that l ultimately accept the contention that academic counter-attitudinal advocacy is undesirable. The counter-attitudinal switch-sides structure of intercollegiate debate asks the student to imaginatively enter into another's world and to try to understand why they might see it as they do. This convention may yield invitational dividends. Foss and Griffin recognize value in asking communicators to seriously consider "˜perspectives other than those they presently hold and they encourage them to try to "validate those perspectives even if they differ dramatically from the rhetor's own" (5). It seems to me that counter-attitudinal advocacy might be an excellent technique for encouraging just that. Debate tournaments ask students to agree to model open-mindedness, empathy, and personal validation of multiple views. No one should be forced to debate, but for those making the choice, agreeing to disagree encourages a consideration of the fallibility of one's own constructions of the world as well as empathy for other ways of seeing things.

#### You have to inhabit the other perspective or else you filter their arguments through the logic of something you presuppose by not switching sides

**Andrews 2005** (Peter, Consulting Faculty Member at the IBM Executive Business Institute in Palisades, New York, Executive Technology Report, July, www-935.ibm.com/services/us/imc/pdf/gt510-6190-red-teams.pdf)

Disaster can force you to imagine the unimaginable. Unfortunately, the price is high, which is why Red Teams have come into vogue. While some Red Teams are merely review panels, the more ambitious ones are all about challenging assumptions, finding vulnerabilities and actively finding unconventional means to get a jump on mainstream (or Blue) planning teams. One key element is assuming an adversarial posture, taking the perspective of the enemy or competitor. The U.S. military has been using Red Teams to test their planning for over 30 years (and longer, by other names). They have received new attention as a critical tool for fighting terrorism, but for businesses, they can help provide competitive advantage, especially as a means to expand exploration of innovations. The key benefits of a Red Team are: • Identifying significant vulnerabilities • Discovering new uses for innovations • Challenging taboos and assumptions • Providing a minority report on a new concept or idea • Revealing the consequences of different perspectives; in particular, the perspectives of those with different goals and risk profiles. Red Teams can work at different levels – strategic, operational and tactical. They can goad a Blue Team to be more creative. They can help to anticipate and explain “irrational” actions and choices by adversaries. In addition, they can help to identify, train and tap talent for the organization, talent that is vital in a fast-changing environment. The success of a Red Team depends on its composition, its support from management, its relationship with the Blue Team, the goals, the available information and the rules of the game: Composition – Putting together an effective Red Team is as much an art as a science. There is a need to include experts, but there also must be room for people who ask naïve questions. Red Team members need to be able to inhabit the roles of adversaries and risk delivering bad news, but they also must stay on good terms with all parties. They need to understand the mindset and cultures of both their own organizations and the real-world adversaries. They need to be capable of detailed critical analysis, but they also need to be imaginative and iconoclastic. Most of all, they need to have the capability to communicate surprising concepts in clear, compelling language. Management support – The Red Team must have the authority and standing to get a fair hearing for its ideas and concepts. For most organizations, this means someone high up in management, but generally not the direct manager of the Blue Team. In addition to enabling a fair hearing, the management must also provide material support, proper staffing and access to information/experts. And, they must provide continuity and stability or the Red Team may find itself blocked and ignored. Relationship with Blue Team – The Red Team must have the trust of the Blue Team. Without trust, the Blue Team will hide key data and be reluctant to incorporate the views and insights of the Red Team. At the same time, the Red Team must not be co-opted by the Blue Team. It must maintain a level of independence and a willingness to make unpopular statements. Goals – Ultimately, the required deliverables of the Red Team must be defined and there must be some measures of success. This does not mean that the Red Team cannot cross boundaries and provide more than was agreed to, but there must be a level of accountability. The Red Team needs to know what is promised and deliver on those promises. Available information – There are times when the information the Red Team has available is restricted. It makes good sense that a Blue Team, creating a computer security system, would not need to reveal every aspect to a Red Team that is assuming the roles of black hat hackers (those people who would attempt to compromise system security without authorization). On the other hand, providing the Red Team with an open book on innovation plans makes sense. In fact, regularly meeting with and working with the Blue Team can benefit both teams, especially if a healthy competition develops. A sure sign that things are working well is if the Blue Team begins to incorporate and anticipate Red Team approaches as it pursues its own work. Rules of the game – Given the competitive nature of the teams, the rules of engagement must be clear with regard to information, judgment of success, what comprises proof and when/how opinions and insights are offered. In addition, the consequences – especially with regard to rewards and career advancement – must be stated up front. Creative Red Teams will look at a variety of aspects that affect success in the real world – culture, technologies, needs, rewards, laws, market research, risk factors and available resources. Their biggest payoffs will probably come from identifying assumptions and digging into the roles of adversaries. Unexamined assumptions are usually the biggest culprits in narrowing investigation and leading to tunnel vision: things that could never happen, logical chains that can’t be circumvented, values, taboos, false definitions and rules, to name a few. By researching the adversaries – perhaps including people who are not even on the radar screen – motivations, connections, different contexts, different values and risk factors can be explored in new ways. In fact, the best Red Teams are able to inhabit the roles of adversaries in ways that approach good acting.

### AT: discourse outweighs framework

**Framework is a prior question—if we win the form of debate that makes the 1ac a reason to vote aff is a bad one, then the content of the aff itself is irrelevant. This isn't even a theory arg—our claim is that the form of how we model discussion is more important than the content of any single case.**

**2. This proves our offense—their aff is structured to have the exact amount of ambiguity and reactiveness needed to make framework the only viable neg option because anything else is unresponsive or offense for them. Every internal link turn**

**or cross-app or specific ev here is proof of the bias this creates.**

### a/t: pre req to policy

#### Their critiques of debate miss the mark—defending a topic that involves the state for the sake of deliberation is distinct from accepting it, and limiting out some arguments for the sake of that deliberation is a more productive discourse that solves the aff better

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

These two serious activist challenges may be summarized as follows. First, the activist has claimed that political discussion must always take place within the context of existing institutions that due to structural inequality grant to certain individuals the power to set discussion agendas and constrain the kinds of options open for consideration prior to any actual encounter with their deliberative opponents; the deliberative process is in this sense rigged from the start to favor the status quo and disadvantage the agents of change. Second, the activist has argued that political discussion must always take place by means of antecedent ‘discourses’ or vocabularies which establish the conceptual boundaries of the deliberation and hence may themselves be hegemonic or systematically distorting; the deliberative process is hence subject to the distorting influence of ideology at the most fundamental level, and deliberative democrats do not have the resources by which such distortions can be addressed. As they aim to establish that the deliberativist’s program is inconsistent with her own democratic objectives, this pair of charges is, as Young claims, serious (118). However, I contend that the deliberativist has adequate replies to them both.

Part of the response to the first challenge is offered by Young herself. The deliberative democrat does not advocate public political discussion only at the level of state policy, and so does not advocate a program that must accept as given existing institutional settings and contexts for public discussion. Rather, the deliberativist promotes an ideal of democratic politics according to which deliberation occurs at all levels of social association, including households, neighborhoods, local organizations, city boards, and the various institutions of civil society. The longrun aim of the deliberative democrat is to cultivate a more deliberative polity, and the deliberativist claims that this task must begin at more local levels and apart from the state and its policies. We may say that deliberativism promotes a ‘decentered’ (Habermas, 1996: 298) view of public deliberation and a ‘pluralistic’ (Benhabib, 2002: 138) model of the public sphere; in other words, the deliberative democrat envisions a ‘multiple, anonymous, heterogeneous network of many publics and public conversations’ (Benhabib, 1996b: 87). The deliberativist is therefore committed to the creation of ‘an inclusive deliberative setting in which basic social and economic structures can be examined’; these settings ‘for the most part must be outside ongoing settings of official policy discussion’ (115).

Although Young characterizes this decentered view of political discourse as requiring that deliberative democrats ‘withdraw’ (115) from ‘existing structural circumstances’ (118), it is unclear that this follows. There certainly is no reason why the deliberativist must choose between engaging arguments within existing deliberative sites and creating new ones that are removed from established institutions. There is no need to accept Young’s dichotomy; the deliberativist holds that work must be done both within existing structures and within new contexts. As Bohman argues,

Deliberative politics has no single domain; it includes such diverse activities as formulating and achieving collective goals, making policy decisions and means and ends, resolving conflicts of interest and principle, and solving problems as they emerge in ongoing social life. Public deliberation therefore has to take many forms. (1996: 53)

The second challenge requires a detailed response, so let us begin with a closer look at the proposed argument. The activist has moved quickly from the claim that discourses can be systematically distorting to the claim that all political discourse operative in our current contexts is systematically distorting. The conclusion is that properly democratic objectives cannot be pursued by deliberative means. The first thing to note is that, as it stands, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; the argument is enthymematic. What is required is the additional premise that the distorting features of discussion cannot be corrected by further discussion. That discussion cannot rehabilitate itself is a crucial principle in the activist’s case, but is nowhere argued.

Moreover, the activist has given no arguments to support the claim that present modes of discussion are distorting, and has offered no analysis of how one might detect such distortions and discern their nature.20 Rather than providing a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of systematic distortion, Young provides (in her own voice) two examples of discourses that she claims are hegemonic. First she considers discussions of poverty that presume the adequacy of labor market analyses; second she cites discussions of pollution that presume that modern economies must be based on the burning of fossil-fuels. In neither case does she make explicit what constitutes the distortion. At most, her examples show that some debates are framed in ways that render certain types of proposals ‘out of bounds’. But surely this is the case in any discussion, and it is not clear that it is in itself always a bad thing or even ‘distorting’. Not all discursive exclusions are distortions because the term ‘distortion’ implies that something is being excluded that should be included.

Clearly, then, there are some dialectical exclusions that are entirely appropriate. For example, it is a good thing that current discussions of poverty are often cast in terms that render white supremacist ‘solutions’ out of bounds; it is also good that pollution discourses tend to exclude fringe-religious appeals to the cleansing power of mass prayer. This is not to say that opponents of market analyses of poverty are on par with white supremacists or that Greens are comparable to fringe-religious fanatics; it is rather to press for a deeper analysis of the discursive hegemony that the activist claims undermines deliberative democracy. It is not clear that the requested analysis, were it provided, would support the claim that systematic distortions cannot be addressed and remedied within the processes of continuing discourse. There are good reasons to think that continued discussion among persons who are aware of the potentially hegemonic features of discourse can correct the distorting factors that exist and block the generation of new distortions.

As Young notes (116), James Bohman (1996: ch. 3) has proposed a model of deliberation that incorporates concerns about distorted communication and other forms of deliberative inequality within a general theory of deliberative democracy; the recent work of Seyla Benhabib (2002) and Robert Goodin (2003: chs 9–11) aims for similar goals. Hence I conclude that, as it stands, the activist’s second argument is incomplete, and as such the force of the difficulty it raises for deliberative democracy is not yet clear. If the objection is to stick, the activist must first provide a more detailed examination of the hegemonic and distorting properties of discourse; he must then show both that prominent modes of discussion operative in our democracy are distorting in important ways and that further discourse cannot remedy these distortions.

### at: consensus bad

#### Critiques of consensus miss the mark—our model requires clash and provisional judgments but there’s no final liberal telos to impact turn. This also proves they have no alt because their argument is a critique of the structures that make their critique possible

**Gürsözlü 9** (Fuat, Dept. Phil. – Binghamton U., Journal of Political Philosophy, “Debate: Agonism and Deliberation— Recognizing the Difference\*”, 17:3)

In the second and third sections of his article, Knops tries to refute Mouffe's claim that the rational consensus achieved within a sphere free of power is not only a practical impossibility but also a conceptual impossibility. He does this by arguing how the sources Mouffe utilizes to make her point, in this case Wittgenstein and Derrida, do not necessarily preclude rational consensus. After explaining how Habermas' version of a deliberative theory of reasoning that models communicative reasoning is compatible to Wittgensteinian theory of language, he makes the claim that "deliberation, and rational consensus, can be seen as agonistic", since the understandings reached through deliberation or a Wittgensteinian process of explanation and language learning "are partial and defeasible, formed from an encounter with difference."25 At this point I turn to Patchen Markell's "Contesting Consensus: Rereading Habermas On the Public Sphere". In this article, Markell advances a similar claim to that of Knops. He points out that Habermas' model of the public sphere and discursive politics does not only tolerate agonistic political action but also requires it.26 In doing so, Markell repeats the same hegemonic pattern that Knops does by treating agonistic politics as a corrective to the deliberative approach that helps him reveal the full potential of deliberative politics. However, unlike knops' attempt to assimilate agonistic politics to the deliberative approach, markell takes a more reconciliatory approach by first reinterpreting one of the core elements of Habermas's theory, and second by illustrating how his interpretation of habermas can accommodate agonistic political action. Markell points out that the highly criticized aspect of habermas' public sphere theory—its emphasis on consensus—applies **only if** the public sphere is "conceived as a space of dialogue among citizens in which all speech is governed by the ultimate **telos of arriving at consensus**." For critics of Habermas, Markell indicates, this understanding of politics—since it aims at consensus—delegitimizes and discourages disruptive speech which challenges agreements and aims to "reintroduce a plurality of opinions, or to give voice to perspectives that cannot be acknowledged within the rules of discourse that govern a given public." however, Markell argues, habermas' communicative action makes it clear that what is important within the practical discourse is not achieving consensus, rather orientation towards agreement refers to "foreswearing of the mechanisms of coercion and influence—a foreswearing of perlocution—in the pursuit of one's goals and a corresponding **commitment to provide reasons for one's claims** if they are challenged." So, Markell claims, although Habermas makes a strong normative claim about the shape the process of discussion is supposed to take, he does not make a strong phenomenological claim about the possibility of agreement itself. On this reading of Habermas, agreement may or may not be reached, but what is important is the condition under which the discourse takes place. As such, Markell concludes, Habermas' theory of the public sphere does not lead to "the suppression of agonistic and contestatory speech and action in the name of consensus."27

Religious tolerationhas played a crucial role inthe emergence of modern citizenship. It became the basis for a distinctly universal identity within the political community of a modern nation-state that united citizens across social and cultural differences. Both multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism challenge the adequacy of this particular interpretation of universal identity. Deliberative tolerationlooks at the problem of inclusionfrom the other way around. Precisely because of the successful inclusion of ever more citizens in a nonnaturalistic, nonculturally-based community of judgment, the conflicts inherent in deep pluralism recursively challenge the same institutional **framework that made this inclusion possible**. The emerging challenges to the liberal regime of toleratione veninits expanded multicultural form are increasingly transnational, given the fact that global migration has spurred new levels of pluralism in liberal democratic societies. This migration will call into question the requirements of citizenship, as people no longer live their lives within the boundaries of a particular nation-state. Here we might consider the extent to which traditional liberal and republican conceptions can still provide the basis for mutual toleration among diverse citizens. As Rawls put it, liberal toleration applied in the international sphere “asks of other societies only what they can reasonably grant without submitting to a position of inferiority or domination.”42 Giventhe fact of deep pluralism, cosmopolitanism nowbegins at home. It may well be that the deliberative framework insocieties characterized by migrationan d deep pluralism will have to incorporate interactions among many different inclusive communities. The revival of the debate about religious identities in the public sphere is one more indication of the fact that democracies are no longer the expression of a single political subjectivity. In such an emerging multiperspectival polity, intolerance is evidenced in the inability of citizens to raise vital and significant concerns in deliberation, in the exclusion of relevant reasons, and in the illicit and unspoken generalization of the dominant or majority perspective. Deliberative toleration does not merely aim at mutually granted rights and immunities from interference, but at the ideal of a democratic community of deliberation and judgment. Guided by its practical orientation to successful public communication and the regulative ideal of an inclusive community, toleration becomes reflexive and thus both a means and an end for furthering democratization in a situation of undiminished pluralism. Toleration is thus the attitude of perspective taking that makes such disagreements fruitful for deliberation, in that they are necessary to promote a richly complex ideal of democracy in large, diverse, and increasingly porous polities.