### 2nc dialogue overview

**Our interpretation is that the affirmative must advocate a topical government action**

**There are multiple impacts**

 **1). Their model destroys dialogue- it subverts the role of the negative by making the topic of the discussion unpredictable. Makes effective debate impossible-that’s galloway**

 **2). The impact to this is education- if one side cannot clash then it just becomes a lecture rather than an in depth discussion of a topic- this turns any of their education arguments- debate is a dialogical process it requires both sides to access education- they prevent that for us and them.**

 **3). There has to be a stable specific point of reference otherwise the debate is broad and results in poor decision making about the topic**

#### Decisionmaking skills gained from debate are key to problem solving in all facets of life—outweighs the case

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp. 9-10

If we assume it to be possible **without** recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14

I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13

Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.

Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.

When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:

A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…

The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…

It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16

John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.

We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

#### It’s not what we learn, it’s the skills in the process that make our framework educational

**Arvai et al 2004** – professor, School of Natural Resources, Ohio State (June, Joseph, Journal of Environmental Education, 36.1, “Teaching Students to Make Better Decisions About the Environment: Lessons From the Decision Sciences”)

How do we achieve this goal of facilitating more thoughtful decisions? One strategy involves improving students’ technical knowledge base (e.g., in biology, ecology, chemistry) as a means of creating favorable attitudes toward the promotion of better environmental quality (Ramsey & Rickson, 1976). As many researchers have pointed out, however, focusing on enhancing technical **knowledge without** also teaching problem-solving skills will lead to substantial shortcomings with respect to promoting thoughtful decisions (e.g., see Hungerford, Peyton, & Wilke, 1980). An obvious solution, therefore, is to include in curricula elements that address the need for knowledge about both natural systems and “action” (i.e., decision-making) skills (Simmons, 1991). Yet, as Hungerford and Volk (1990) point out, focusing on the role of human judgments and behavior (in addition to enhancing technical knowledge) in the context of the environment makes instructional planning extremely difficult. In many cases, the added difficulty acts as a deterrent to these integrated curricula and provides de facto reinforcement for the model that enhanced knowledge leads to better decisions. One suggested strategy for overcoming this difficulty is to teach students the skills to critically analyze environmental issues (e.g., how to articulate research questions, obtain information from primary and secondary sources, and interpret data). At the end of such an exercise, students work on the development of “issue-resolution action plans” and then “decide whether they want to actually implement the plan of action” (Hungerford & Volk, 1990, p. 16). We view such an approach as laudable. We would take this suggestion a step further, however, and add that just as students must learn skills for critical analysis, so too must they learn skills for decision making (which includes developing alternative courses of action and making decisions about implementation). Learning these decision-making skills involves two steps: First, students (and in many cases, teachers) must be taught to recognize common obstacles to thoughtful (or high-quality) decision making. Second, they must acquire skills to overcome them. These obstacles and skills are the focus of this article.

#### Only portable skill—also turns critical thinking and advocacy needed to advance their case

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, young a couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### **a/t: we relate to the topic**

**This isn’t enough that’s our Galloway evidence- tangential discussion is only a distraction from the main point of the affirmative- a discussion of the topic doesn’t provide sufficient ground for dialogue because it doesn’t advocate an actual means for change- the idea that they relate to the topic is purely informative and not a point of deliberation. If we are not able to engage then we don’t actually test arguments which are key to decision making its purely a lecture in which we learn about these issues**

#### a/t: our values/ aesthetic come first

**there isn’t a link to this argument**

#### a/t: our values/ aesthetic come first

**there isn’t a link to this argument- the debate is where we debate these value, you can read this argument on the negative, and there’s nothing mutually exlcusive about government action with determining aesthetics**

#### **a/t: we relate to the topic**

**This isn’t enough that’s our Galloway evidence- tangential discussion is only a distraction from the main point of the affirmative- a discussion of the topic doesn’t provide sufficient ground for dialogue because it doesn’t advocate an actual means for change- the idea that they relate to the topic is purely informative and not a point of deliberation. If we are not able to engage then we don’t actually test arguments which are key to decision making its purely a lecture in which we learn about these issues**

### 2nc creativity link

#### Their position shuts down creative thinking—they are the ones who never have to step outside their comfort zone because the topic of aff debates is what they want it to be instead of the resolution

**Brewer 10** – Joshua Brewer, January 28, 2010, “Constraints Fuel Creativity,” online: http://52weeksofux.com/post/358515571/constraints-fuel-creativity

We are often led to believe that the more freedom we have the more creative we will be. Full creative license? Sweet. Unlimited budget? Awesome! No timetable? Even better.

Yeah, right.

I say embrace your constraints and draw out of them the very solution that sets you apart from the crowd.

The imposition of constraints can lead to great design decisions. Limitations often force you to view things from a perspective you are not accustomed to and, in turn, can stimulate the clarity and purpose of the design, rather than debilitate and hinder your creative process.

#### This is why improv comedians and musicians start with specific topics

**Heath 7** – Dan Heath, Senior Fellow at Duke University's CASE center, which supports social entrepreneurs, December 1, 2007, “Get Back in the Box,” online: http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/121/get-back-in-the-box.html

As we've seen, a well-constructed box can help people generate new ideas. Imagine if, as in the case of the Hotel Vitale team, you could flip through hundreds of pages of Real Simplemagazine for strategic inspiration. Research tells us that brainstorming becomes more productive when it's focused. As jazz great Charles Mingus famously said, "You can't improvise on nothing, man; you've gotta improvise on something."

Keith Sawyer, author of the insightful book Group Genius, spent years studying the work of jazz groups and improvisational theater ensembles. He found that structure doesn't hamper creativity; it enables it. When improv comedians take the stage, they need a concrete stimulus: "What if Romeo had been gay?" The stimulus can't be: "Go on, make me laugh, funnyman."

"Improv actors are taught to be specific," Sawyer says. "Rather than say, 'Look out, it's a gun!' you should say, 'Look out, it's the new ZX-23 laser kill device!' Instead of asking, 'What's your problem?' say, 'Don't tell me you're still pissed off about that time I dropped your necklace in the toilet.'" The paradox is that while specificity narrows the number of paths that the improv could take, it makes it easier for the other actors to come up with the next riff.

#### Outweigh cost of discarding affs that “think outside the box”

**Intrator, 10** [David President of The Creative Organization, October 21, “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because **they simply don’t fit into** the **rules** you’re creating as you build your box.

#### Also correlates with productivity

**Slee, 10** [Mark Slee, May 24, 2010, “Are limitless resources or a certain number of constraints more beneficial for creativity?,” online: http://www.quora.com/Art-Creativity/Are-limitless-resources-or-a-certain-number-of-constraints-more-beneficial-for-creativity]

Both anecdotally and from personal experience, I'm inclined to say that constraints are a strong enabler of creative output, and a requirement for most. The degree certainly varies by individual and depends upon the method. With that said, I think the most commonly applied creative approach essentially involves two steps: \* Define a set of parameters to work within (you'll often hear artists/musicians speaking similarly about "setting up a creative space") \* Explore the space as freely and fully as possible (the bulk of creative time tends to be spent in this phase) The obvious pitfalls here are creating either too large or too narrow a space to work in. Intuitively, it may seem that a larger space is better due to the freedom it affords, but I tend to think the opposite is actually the case. Having too many variables or resources to work with can be very paralyzing, especially for highly creative types. Highly creative people may easily overwhelm themselves with an incredible number of exciting new ideas, which can make it very difficult to actually execute on anything (I don't have personal experience with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, but I imagine there's a reasonably strong analogy to be made here). Generating creative output (not just a deluge of ideas) requires finding a way to artificially suppress the firehose of competing new concepts, thereby enabling a more intense focus.

#### Empirical ev

**Slee, 10** [Mark Slee, May 24, 2010, “Are limitless resources or a certain number of constraints more beneficial for creativity?,” online: http://www.quora.com/Art-Creativity/Are-limitless-resources-or-a-certain-number-of-constraints-more-beneficial-for-creativity]

There are countless clear examples of this approach. Pablo Picasso had his Blue Period. Mark Rothko spent a great deal of time exploring compositions of colored rectangles. Most musical composers use highly restricted forms, in both structure and instrumentation, and some composers will write countless variations on a single piece. Brian Eno talks a lot about generative music, which evolves from a fixed set of starting rules. Periods of Frank Lloyd Wright's architecture, or even architectural trends in general, show adherence to clear themes (many constrained by the requirements of structural engineering). I actually think it is more difficult to identify great works of creativity that have not employed constraints, many of which are self-imposed.

#### Using a pre-determined subject increases creativity and causes revolutionary outcomes

**Mayer 6** – Marissa Ann Mayer, vice-president for search products and user experience at Google, February 13, 2006, “Creativity Loves Constraints,” online: http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06\_07/b3971144.htm?chan=gl

When people think about creativity, they think about artistic work -- unbridled, unguided effort that leads to beautiful effect. But if you look deeper, you'll find that some of the most inspiring art forms, such as haikus, sonatas, and religious paintings, are fraught with constraints. They are beautiful because creativity triumphed over the "rules." Constraints shape and focus problems and provide clear challenges to overcome. Creativity thrives best when constrained.
But constraints must be balanced with a healthy disregard for the impossible. Too many curbs can lead to pessimism and despair. Disregarding the bounds of what we know or accept gives rise to ideas that are non-obvious, unconventional, or unexplored. The creativity realized in this balance between constraint and disregard for the impossible is fueled by passion and leads to revolutionary change.
A few years ago, I met Paul Beckett, a talented designer who makes sculptural clocks. When I asked him why not do just sculptures, Paul said he liked the challenge of making something artistically beautiful that also had to perform as a clock. Framing the task in that way freed his creative force. Paul reflected that he also found it easier to paint on a canvas that had a mark on it rather than starting with one that was entirely clean and white. This resonated with me. It is often easier to direct your energy when you start with constrained challenges (a sculpture that must be a clock) or constrained possibilities (a canvas that is marked).

#### Testing data proves

**WP 9** [Washington Post, “Will Depth Replace Breadth in Schools?” http://voices.washingtonpost.com/class-struggle/2009/02/will\_depth\_replace\_breadth\_in.html]

The truth, of course, is that students need both. Teachers try to mix the two in ways that make sense to them and their students. But a surprising study — certain to be a hot topic in teacher lounges and education schools — is providing new data that suggest educators should spend much **more** time **on a few issues** and **let some topics slide**. Based on a sample of 8,310 undergraduates, the national study says that students who spend at least a month on just one topic in a high school science course get better grades in a freshman college course in that subject than students whose high school courses were more balanced. The study, appearing in the July issue of the journal Science Education, is “Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Science Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework.” The authors are Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington, Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and Robert H. Tai of the University of Virginia. This is more rich ore from a goldmine of a survey Sadler and Tai helped organize called “Factors Influencing College Science Success.” It involved 18,000 undergraduates, plus their professors, in 67 colleges in 31 states. The study weighs in on one side of a contentious issue that will be getting national attention this September when the College Board’s Advanced Placement program unveils its major overhaul of its college-level science exams for high school students. AP is following a direction taken by its smaller counterpart, the International Baccalaureate program. IB teachers already are allowed to focus on topics of their choice. Their students can deal with just a few topics on exams, because they have a wide choice of questions. AP’s exact approach is not clear yet, but College Board officials said they too will embrace depth. They have been getting much praise for this from the National Science Foundation, which funded the new study. Sadler and Tai have previously hinted at where this was going. In 2001 they reported that students who did not use a textbook in high school physics—an indication that their teachers disdained hitting every topic — achieved higher college grades than those who used a textbook. Some educators, pundits, parents and students will object, I suspect, to sidelining their favorite subjects and spending more time on what they consider trivial or dangerous topics. Some will fret over the possibility that teachers might abandon breadth altogether and wallow in their specialties. Even non-science courses could be affected. Imagine a U.S. history course that is nothing but lives of generals, or a required English course that assigns only Jane Austen. “Depth Versus Breadth” analyzes undergraduate answers to detailed questions about their high school study of physics, chemistry and biology, and the grades they received in freshman college science courses. The college grades of students who had studied at least one topic for at least a month in a high school science course were compared to those of students who did not experience such depth. The study acknowledges that the pro-breadth forces have been in retreat. Several national commissions have called for more depth in science teaching and other subjects. A 2005 study of 46 countries found that those whose schools had the best science test scores covered far fewer topics than U.S. schools.

#### Prefer it—the gain in depth is twice as valuable

**Science Daily 9** [Science Daily, “Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, In High School Science Courses”, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/03/090305131814.htm]

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each.

Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report.

The study relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes.

"As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States."

The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time.

The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

### at: exclusion

#### There's a difference between argumentative exclusion and ontological exclusion—the former is inevitable because of time limits, affs implicitly requiring us to make responsive arguments instead of free expression, or any counter-interpretation of any kind. Our framework deploys minimal argumentative exclusion based on the resolution to enable clash and testing processes that prevent ontological exclusion wrought by one-sided dialogues and monopolized prep and the type of mindsets those things encourage.

#### No link: dialectical responsiveness is distinct from exclusion because conversations must be goal-oriented to settle a certain question for the ballot to make sense—their offense doesn’t assume game spaces

**Walton 4** (Douglas, Full Professor of Philosophy – U Winnipeg, Relevance in Argumentation, p. 169-170)

The kind of relevance defined in the new theory can be called dialectical relevance, meaning that an argument, a question, or other type of speech act is judged to be relevant insofar as it plays a part, or has a function, in a **goal-directed** conversation that is a dialogue exchange between two participants who are aware of each other’s moves. The ultimate aim of a system of dialectical relevance is to be useful in judging cases for material relevance, primarily cases where an argument is central. To judge whether a given argument is normatively relevant, basically one has to judge whether, as used in the given case, it meets the normative standards of reasonable argument appropriate for that case. To determine what normative standard is appropriate, one has to ask the basic question, What purpose is the argument supposedly being used for? To answer that question, one has to examine the evidence given in the text and context of dialogue in that case and ask what type of dialogue this case is supposed to be part of. Then the more detailed evaluation can go from there, depending on the goal of that type of dialogue. For example, suppose the dialogue is supposed to be a critical discussion. The purpose of a critical discussion is to resolve a conflict of opinions. Thus, the argument in the given case can be judged to be relevant if it used in such a way as to contribute to the resolution of the conflict of opinions supposedly at issue in the critical discussion. The argument is relevant if it contributes to the goal of the critical discussion at whatever stage it was used. It is irrelevant if it does not. Why should argumentation in a natural conversation be assumed to be goal directed? One might object that a lot of the ordinary conversations we have in everyday life do not appear to be goal directed. Two people may meet in the street and have a casual conversation about whether it is a nice day or not. It would seem to be artificial to describe their conversation as goal directed, implying that the two had agreed in advance to undertake this argument about the weather for some specific purpose. If they switch to talking about something else, is that a bad thing? Should it be criticized as “irrelevant”? If not, the problem is that a criticism of irrelevance seems arbitrary or even unfair. The solution to this problem is to clearly recognize that judgments about the dialectical relevance of an argument confer a stamp of approval of admissibility on the argument as rational or as used correctly in a given case with respect to its serving some purpose. To say that an argument is dialectically relevant or irrelevant is not to say that it is faulty or fallacious in every respect or that it has been incorrectly with respect to every goal that the participants are trying to achieve in a given case. There is a parallel here with applying deductive logic to arguments. To say that an argument is deductively valid is not to say that is good argument in every respect or that it is fallacy free. For a deductively valid argument could be based on false premises, or it could be a circular argument, or it could exhibit many kinds of faults. To say that an argument is deductively valid is only to say that the argument is correct or rational in a conditional sense—it is to say that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must (by logical necessity) be true too. Comparably, to say that an argument is dialectically relevant in a given case is not to say that the argument is perfectly rational, in relation to any goals that might be important the participants. It is only to say that it has the potential to be used correctly or rationally in a conditional or instrumental sense. It is to say that the argument has the potential to be used in such a way as to contribute to the type of discussion the participants are supposed to be engaged in. But you can always raise the question of what type of discussion the participants should really be engaged in. You can ask whether the agenda of that discussion ought to be changed if they are to solve the underlying problem they confront. So if two disputants are arguing about the weather, and one of them suddenly starts to argue about baseball or the price of new cars, the switch of topics is not necessarily a bad thing at all. But from the perspective of the two arguers who hope to resolve their difference of opinions about the weather by using rational argumentation, the switch to baseball may be viewed as dialectically irrelevant. This means that it turns the argumentation away from the direction needed for fulfilling its original purpose. At any rate, we can see that dialectical relevance has its place. Although it is not a requirement of all human communication, it is a useful requirement for reasoned argumentation of various kinds that are quite important in human communication.

#### Net offense—only our agonistic model of competition channels exclusion into productive contestation

**Glover 8**

Glover, Robert. "Scattergories: Towards an Agonistic Critique of the Re-Categorization of American Citizenship in a Globalized Era" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008 <Not Available>. 2011-03-11 http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p278147\_index.html Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, University of Connecticut Primary Fields: Political Theory, International Relations Dissertation Title: Citizenship Unhinged—Exploring the Potential of Agonistic Citizenship, Ph.D. Projected Completion Spring of 2010.

Agonistic pluralism, or agonism, advances a conception of politics in which contestation and conflictual engagement become the goal of our political encounters, rather than seeking harmonious social cooperation. Most variants of agonism do not simply “celebrate a world without points of stabilization”, as we might find in more avowedly postmodern conceptions of politics, yet agonism does recognize the “perpetuity” and enduring nature of contestation (Honig 1993, 15). The exercise of coercive power, exclusion, and hegemonic marginalization are enduring features of modern politics from this perspective. Rather than seeking to eliminate these features, agonism calls upon us to engage and re-engage these moments in the most inclusive and contentious democratic settings possible, allowing a multiplicity of voices to engage in the struggle for hegemony (Goi 2005, 60). The question remains however as to what an agonistic approach can do to resolve the inherent conflict within American citizenship18. Yet this would be to mis-frame the question as agonistic conceptions would not advance a “resolution”, but rather a continuous re-vision and reworking of previous resolutions. I will suggest that agonistic democratic theory offers us three valuable critical insights with regard to contemporary American citizenship. First and foremost, an agonistic approach to citizenship engages the paradoxical and contradictory foundations of citizenship in the U.S. as a constitutive and productive tension, rather than as a “problem” to be transcended or avoided. Second, such an approach would open a space whereby we actively consider the question of extending political voice to non-citizens. Third and lastly, an agonistic framework recognizes that exclusion is an unavoidable element in the constitution of any political community, yet it provides us with a framework of radical pluralism by which to legitimate and continuously renegotiate the terms of that exclusion. An agonistic approach “refus[es] to equate concern for human dignity with a quest for rational consensus” or overarching agreement on the principles driving our political engagement (Connolly 2002, x). Rather, the goal becomes exposure of those moments which are characterized as consensus as the opposite: instances of “originary exclusion” and moments of “hegemony disguised as the reconciliation of two conflicting logics” (Mouffe 2000).19 However, the problem for agonists is not exclusion in and of itself, contrary to what some critics have charged.20 William Connolly notes that boundaries are “indispensable”, providing the “preconditions of identity, individual agency, and collective action” (1994, 19). Yet boundaries always accomplish this at the expense of other possibilities, other modes of order. Thus, while agonists recognize that universal inclusion within the political community is an illusory goal, they critique the treatment of exclusion as apolitical or natural, devoid of a decisionistic moment in which a “we-they” distinction is politically created. To act as if these normative tensions can be transcended is to misconceive of the democratic project. By such accounts, Honig writes, the problem of democratic theory is how to find the right match between a people and its law, a state and its institutions. Obstacles are met and overcome, eventually the right match is made and the newlywed couple is sent on its way to try and live happily ever after (Honig 2001b, 109). The reality, according to an agonistic framework, is that such tensions are never truly “overcome”, or to appropriate Honig’s metaphor, the newlyweds are never completely in a state of marital bliss with one another.

### at: fairness rigged

#### There's a distinction between institutional and competitive fairness—neither team solves the fact that economic inequality, personal obligations, and geography influence success, but their remedy makes it worse. Unlimited topics are more exploitable by teams with large research capacities, and having a limited topic at least means there's an equal burden for both sides of the topic.

#### The argument that our framework is systemically biased is a self-serving assertion to sidestep clash—all of their reasons not to defend the topic can be appropriated by actors with opposite goals

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

My call for a more detailed articulation of the second activist challenge may be met with the radical claim that I have begged the question. It may be said that my analysis of the activist’s challenge and my request for a more rigorous argument presume what the activist denies, namely, that arguments and reasons operate independently of ideology. Here the activist might begin to think that he made a mistake in agreeing to engage in a discussion with a deliberativist – his position throughout the debate being that one should decline to engage in argument with one’s opponents! He may say that of course activism seems lacking to a deliberativist, for the deliberativist measures the strength of a view according to her own standards. But the activist rejects those standards, claiming that they are appropriate only for seminar rooms and faculty meetings, not for real-world politics. Consequently the activist may say that by agreeing to enter into a discussion with the deliberativist, he had unwittingly abandoned a crucial element of his position. He may conclude that the consistent activist avoids arguing altogether, and communicates only with his comrades. Here the discussion ends.

However, the deliberativist has a further consideration to raise as his discursive partner departs for the next rally or street demonstration. The foregoing debate had presumed that there is but one kind of activist and but one set of policy objectives that activists may endorse. Yet Young’s activist is opposed not only by deliberative democrats, but also by persons who also call themselves ‘activists’ and who are committed to a set of policy objectives quite different from those endorsed by this one activist. Once these opponents are introduced into the mix, the stance of Young’s activist becomes more evidently problematic, even by his own standards.

To explain: although Young’s discussion associates the activist always with politically progressive causes, such as the abolition of the World Trade Organization (109), the expansion of healthcare and welfare programs (113), and certain forms of environmentalism (117), not all activists are progressive in this sense. Activists on the extreme and racist Right claim also to be fighting for justice, fairness, and liberation. They contend that existing processes and institutions are ideologically hegemonic and distorting. Accordingly, they reject the deliberative ideal on the same grounds as Young’s activist. They advocate a program of political action that operates outside of prevailing structures, disrupting their operations and challenging their legitimacy. They claim that such action aims to enlighten, inform, provoke, and excite persons they see as complacent, naïve, excluded, and ignorant. Of course, these activists vehemently oppose the policies endorsed by Young’s activist; they argue that justice requires activism that promotes objectives such as national purity, the disenfranchisement of Jews, racial segregation, and white supremacy. More importantly, they see Young’s activist’s vocabulary of ‘inclusion’, ‘structural inequality’, ‘institutionalized power’, as fully in line with what they claim is a hegemonic ideology that currently dominates and systematically distorts our political discourses.21

The point here is not to imply that Young’s activist is no better than the racist activist. The point rather is that Young’s activist’s arguments are, in fact, adopted by activists of different stripes and put in the service of a wide range of policy objectives, each claiming to be just, liberatory, and properly inclusive.22 In light of this, there is a question the activist must confront. How should he deal with those who share his views about the proper means for bringing about a more just society, but promote a set of ends that he opposes?

It seems that Young’s activist has no way to deal with opposing activist programs except to fight them or, if fighting is strategically unsound or otherwise problematic, to accept a Hobbesian truce. This might not seem an unacceptable response in the case of racists; however, the question can be raised in the case of any less extreme but nonetheless opposed activist program, including different styles of politically progressive activism. Hence the deliberativist raises her earlier suspicions that, in practice, activism entails a politics based upon interestbased power struggles amongst adversarial factions.

### at: predictability/rules bad

#### No link to rules or predictability bad—our argument isn't rules-based in the sense they identify, it’s a set of contestable guidelines for evaluating competitions. Rejecting the topic because rules are oppressive doesn’t solve and only a standard like the resolution is limited enough to enable preparation and testing but has enough internal complexity to solve their impact

**Armstrong 2K** – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

\*aleatory = depending on luck, i.e. the throw of a die

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking.8 Iser shares Lyotard’s concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard’s endorsement of the “sublime”—the pursuit of the “unpresentable” by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms—is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser’s explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser’s sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries **depends on** and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. ¶ The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play. ¶ Iser’s notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and openended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

#### Adjusting criteria to make the game playable is not the imposition their ev describes

Robert Tally, English – Texas State University, 2007, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2

Mouffe's image of a we/they politics in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony looks a bit like organized sports. Consider the football game: rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle for dominance, with a clear winner and loser, yet agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself (i.e., the political association) in order to achieve the side's particular goals. Football teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus, but victory. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured. ¶ If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. Responding to the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association), Mouffe answers that it requires ¶ distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52) ¶ Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all. ¶ A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair ("you get a head start"), more safe ("no hitting"), more interesting ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, but the specifics of how the game is played can vary. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But this model at least provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide? ¶ These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

#### Predictability for enabling debate maintains meaningfulness and empathy—and their alternative of broad loopholes leads to exploitation

**Massaro 1989** – law professor at U Florida (Toni, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, lexis)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.¶ My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.¶ Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55¶ As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.¶ Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.¶ A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

### 2nc limits good

#### Argument by definition requires limits—the existence of clash in this round doesn’t mean there’s an appropriate frame of reference. This proves ground is key—not because we’d have nothing to say, but because setting the agenda makes us negate descriptive facts or moral truisms instead of collectively reason

**Rowland 1987** – professor of communication at the University of Kansas (Robert, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 20.3, “On defining argument”, p. 155-6, EBSCO)

The final two characteristics identified by Brockriede--a willingness to risk confrontation and a shared frame of reference--also are not necessary attributes of argument. People often support their claims with reasons and evidence although they don't share a frame of reference or risk confrontation. When the Soviet and United States ambassadors to the United Nations engage in debate, they support their claims, but there is no risk of self and no shared frame of reference. Thus, characteristics (5) and (6) are not essential to the definition of argument. Rather, they are essential to the successful resolution of argument. Without a shared frame of reference and a willingness to risk the self, there is little chance of rationally resolving a dispute.

Conclusion

The functional approach to the study of argumentation is valuable because it provides a clear definition of the scope of argumentation. It recognizes that **while all argument is rhetorical, not all rhetoric is argument**. One danger associated with some recent work on argument is that the term argument itself becomes so broad that it loses all meaning. **If argument is** defined to include **all disagreement**, all comparison of construct systems, and all instances in which an individual believes that he or she is arguing then essentially all communication is argument.

A more useful definitional move is to treat argument as the symbolic form(s) we use to solve problems rationally. This implies that argument is the method of reason. Such a definition sets the limits of argumentation and defines the form of argument in relation to the function of arguing. Moreover, so to define argument recognizes the role of evaluation in the study of argument. Merely to describe an argument or set of arguments leaves their human significance out of consideration. Once the arguments of a speech, essay, or other verbal interaction have been described with accuracy, the next point of critical interest is naturally the arguments' relative quality as efforts to induce closure. The value of examining arguments is undercut if description becomes the only aim of criticism of argumentation. A socially satisfying definition of argument and a useful theory of argumentation must provide at least trained theorists with grounds for distinguishing between weak and strong arguments, as the functional definition does.

Some will perhaps object that the functional definition of argument for which I have contended restricts a student of argumentation to study of propositional discourse. This is true in the sense that my definition identifies reason-giving as a fundamental characteristic of argument, and reason-giving is propositional. On the other hand, an issue that needs clarification in theory of argument, as I have shown, is whether "argumentation" and "rhetoric" are to be considered synonymous. If so, the concept of "argument" becomes unnecessary; the concept of "rhetoric" is sufficient. My contention is that arguments occur in rhetoric and need to be recognized, described, and evaluated in light of their unique functional and formal features. Arguments cannot be understood by applying the same kinds of analysis as we would apply if, say, rhythm were our point of interest. Arguments are formally and functionally different from rhythmic patterns, situational constraints, levels of vocabulary, and the like-all features of rhetoric. If argument is taken to be the means by which humans rationally solve problems-or try to, arguments can be identified , described, and evaluated critically as part of the broader enterprise of identifying, describing, and evaluating rhetoric. Across centuries, people have believed there is such a process as trying to arrive at preferred conclusions by rational means, rather than by non-rational means. That process, I have argued, entails distinctive verbal forms appropriate to the function of the process. It is at least useful to give such purposeful forms and function a name. Traditionally and contemporaneously "argument" is philosophically and etymologically the appropriate name.

### 2nc simulation good

#### Simulating government action is key to our skills offense—breaks out of traditional pedagogy and enhances active learning—even if we aren’t in positions of power

**Esberg & Sagan 12** \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imaginationand the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7

By university age, students often have a **pre-defined view** of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to **challenge** their **assumptions** about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 **Role-playing exercises** certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a **more active style**. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Case studies prove—policy simulations make students re-examine assumptions and use critical theory to affect change

**Kupperman et al 2005** – associate professor of education at UM Flint, core member of Michigan's Interactive Communications & Simulations group, \*\*head of the Oakland Early College (4/4, Jeff, Gary Weisserman, “Curriculum games: An online character-playing project as "ironist curriculum"”, http://blog.jkupp.com/files/curriculum\_games.pdf)

This paper is a mixture of narrative and theory. The narratives were collected from a project called Conflix, in which we aimed to create a new kind of social studies course for high school and college students, through the use of character-play, the web, and a game-like system for making decisions and wielding power. The theory grew out of our reflections on these narratives, as we realized that while our students overwhelmingly indicated that their experiences in the project were engaging and educative, the way that students learn in Conflix contrasts sharply with commonly held assumptions about learning goals and curriculum. Mirroring the way that Conflix has developed through cycles of theory, practice, and reflection, our paper blends narratives from the development and enactment of the project with explorations of the idea of "ironist curriculum." We use the term "ironist curriculum" to describe an approach to educational goals that embraces the contingent and context-dependent nature of those goals. We believe that a narrative format is particularly appropriate to the idea of ironist curriculum because, in contrast to the traditional research paper format, narrative is friendly to surprise, ambiguity, and individual interpretation: things that are eschewed by traditional research methods and traditional curricula (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; Jackson, 1995; Sawyer, 2004), but which are at the heart of an ironist approach to curriculum. The scene: Gary's classroom in a suburban high school. It is 7:40 on a blustery October morning, and the bell hasn't rung yet for first hour. Students began to stagger in twenty minutes ago, some in pairs, many yawning or carrying paper cups from the nearby Starbucks, which does a brisk business just before school. "Need my caffeine fix," explains a boy wearing a football practice jersey. Barry's not much of a Starbucks guy, but today he walks in with a double latte, looking happy but a bit more worn than usual. "You should have seen me last night. My legs were killing me by halfway through," he says, and you might think, what does he play? Fullback? Wideout? Actually, neither: he plays a conservative southern senator, a middle-of-the-road western governor and a liberal midwestern mayor in a web-based political simulation game called Conflix. Last night, you learn, was a LiveWired! session, a live-chat talk show hosted by the project directors (including Jeff and Gary – the authors of this paper) and older "mentors," playing Matt Drudge, Tom Brokaw, and Connie Chung. Two of Barry's characters were featured guests. "I couldn't log in as two of my guys at once for the interview," he says. "So I logged in as one guy on my parents' computer upstairs, and as the other in the den downstairs. It was tough, especially when I had to argue with myself." He rolls up his pants leg. "I scraped the crap out of my shin, too. I rammed it into the desk by the stairway when I tried to jump the last few steps to get to the downstairs keyboard." Briefly, you imagine him limping as an old man, thanks to an old internet injury. Peter walks in. His mayor has been embroiled in controversy, having been accused of embezzlement. (Asked about it, he explained proudly, "I found a bug in the software that allowed me to transfer negative money to my own account.") Financial anarchy ensued, as other characters caught on. On LiveWired!, though, he had been blindsided by Drudge, who presented him with a soon-to-be-published account that he had masterminded the fund-transferring scheme. Now, his character was likely to be subpoenaed, perhaps impeached. At the very least, his power ranking was certain to suffer. "Did you hear that?" Peter asks wryly. "That was the sound of the other shoe dropping." Barry, 17, and Peter, 16, are enrolled in two of Gary's classes: AP American History and a course simply called "Conflix." In many ways, Conflix is the antithesis of the AP course. There are no exams, no textbook or long research papers. Certain kinds of cheating and deception are not only tolerated but actively encouraged. Most importantly, there is no curriculum in the traditional sense of the term, which means no two cohorts (or students) are likely to wind up with exactly the same experience. Which isn't to say that it's thoughtless, or that activity isn't well considered. Quite the opposite, in fact: we care a great deal about what Barry, Peter, and their classmates learn, and expend enormous energy towards making their learning valuable. We expect them to work hard, communicate clearly, gain knowledge about relevant issues, support their positions with evidence, learn research skills, employ clever strategies, and, in general, think deeply about government and the American political system. It's just that we don't know exactly what those thoughts will be, or when and how they will come upon them. In fact, we hope they learn something that is very different from what the standards and benchmarks say Barry and Peter should learn. We want them, in short, to think ironically about what school (and society) says they need to know. We would not argue that games like Conflix should replace all traditional curricula. Rather, we would like to hold up Conflix as a form of what we have come to call "ironist social studies curriculum." We use the term "irony" (along with the terms "ironic" and "ironist") in the sense of "incongruity between what might be expected and what actually occurs" (The American heritage dictionary of the English language, 2000). While the word "irony" is often associated with humor, we are not implying that social studies curriculum should be treated as a joke. Rather, we use the term to mean a curriculum that embraces surprise and contrast with what is expected. In schools, however, curriculum is most often oriented toward the expected, in what Pinar terms a "traditionalist" approach. Objectives are taken for granted and therefore seldom questioned. Curricular improvement is a technical matter, much like "adjusting an automobile engine part in order to make it function more effectively" (Pinar, 1978). This approach can also be called an "essentialist" approach (Rorty, 1989), in that truth is understood to be stable, definable, and acceptable on the basis of "common sense." In social studies terms, that often means emphasizing the transmission of a specific cultural canon (e.g., "America stands for liberty"). A somewhat more nuanced approach could be called "metaphysical inquiry": an approach that says, "right now we may not necessarily know what the truth is, but it exists and we can search for it." Applied to curriculum design, this is similar to what Pinar (1978) calls the "conceptual-empiricist" approach, where social science methods are used to determine which models are most effective. In terms of social studies, this approach often involves the process of "searching" for a final definition of public concepts such as justice, liberty, and democratic citizenship; or an ultimately defensible prioritization of competing values. In practice, however, a metaphysical inquiry approach can easily end up being essentialism in disguise: just as a chemistry teacher may know exactly what her students will "discover" from their "experiments," social studies teachers often decide well in advance what kinds of "truth" we are willing to accept as valid. These approaches have not gone unchallenged. For several decades, critical theorists and other curriculum "reconceptualists" (Pinar, 1978) have advocated an approach that attempts to see through "conventional wisdom" and reveal the power structures and interests which have given rise to currently accepted "truths." The problem with critical theory, some have pointed out, is that it doesn't help teachers figure out what to do, once the prevailing orthodoxies have been cut down (Hlebowitsh, 1993). Furthermore**,** rejection of the status quo can itself become an orthodoxy*.* Most importantly, in our view, critical theory fails to emphasizethe fundamental powerthe act of redescription**,** of creating new vocabularies, can have in creating a more just distribution of power.

#### Normative scenario planning is a key part of communicative decisionmaking—imagining consequences supercharges the deliberative process

**Larsen et al 2009 –** Royal Institute of Technology, Department of Philosophy and History of Technology, Division of History of Science and Technology, Stockholm, Sweden (July, Habitat International, 33.3, “Climatechange scenarios and citizen-participation: Mitigation and adaptation perspectives in constructing sustainable futures”,

In constructing normative scenarios a set of images are generated illustrating future ways of living, travelling and consuming products and services where certain goal such as a reduced climate impact is fulfilled. These are not predictions of the future, but can be used as a way to act in accordance to achieving a desired future development. They can also be a contribution to the general debate or foundations for policy decisions**.** These scenarios also often include an account of changes in terms of consumption patterns and behavioural change. In this sense, these scenarios are extended beyond socio-economic predictions and relations to environmental load dealt within other field, such as climatechange predictions in the work of IPCC. The scenarios in focus here build on some predictive elements, but in addition the sustainability focus when including behavioural change also includes some normative elements as how to achieve a sustainable society in the future. In essence, this also means that images of behavioural change are included, but not necessary including explanations on how these changes came about (Larsen & Höjer, 2007). The behavioural change is there formulated by describing level of acceptance (of introducing a new environmental tax) or new behaviour in daily travel patterns (new modes of transport). However, even though scenario construction is often a creative process including a range of participants demanding change, trust is built and ideas exchanged, these processes are seldom analyzed as deliberative processes. Deliberation takes places in communicative processes where participants with diverse opinions, but open to preference shifts, are seen as equal (see Hendriks, Dryzek, & Hunold, 2007). Process values such as learning and mutual understanding are created in addition to outputs such as policies. Experiences from exploring transition pathways towards sustainability distinguish between process management aspects of learning (learns how?), learning about policy options and the context in which decisions take place (learns what?), the subjects of learning (who learns?), and the results of learning (Van de Kerkhof & Wieczorek, 2005: 735). Especially questions such as who takes part in the process and whom these participants are to represent become important since the scenarios often expect great behavioural changes. Is it legitimate to expect all people to change even if they did not feel as they were represented? It is important to keep in mind that scenario making processes are not set up only to share ideas and create mutual understanding, they aim at solving specific targets such as minimizing climate change. Some writers (e.g. Hendriks et al., 2007) underline the importance of deliberative processes being open and diverse and do not put as much attention to the outcome. Understanding the importance of legitimacy we see the process as crucial, but aiming for goals such as minimized climate change both the content and the impact of the output are also critical. Thus, we agree with Connelly and Richardson (in press) seeing effective deliberation as a process where stakeholders are engaged and the primary assessment should be regarding the process' “effectiveness in delivering an intended policy”. They also underline that governance as a whole should be assessed regarding its possibilities to take action and achieve legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as “the recognised right to make policy**”** (Connelly & Richardson, in press). There are thus three dimensions Connelly and Richardson (in press) find important: content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy. We believe those dimensions are also important for participatory processes generating scenarios aiming at mitigation as well as adaptation to climatechange, otherwise they will not have any strong (and legitimate) impact on development. Hendriks et al. (2007) make an important distinction between partisan and non-partisan forums. We believe this distinction is important also when analysing scenario generating processes since it affects the legitimacy of the outcome. Partisans can be activists or belong to interest groups, organisations or associations, which strive for particular matters. Partisans are thus committed to certain agendas and are therefore often seen as poor deliberators (Hendriks et al., 2007: 362). However, from a democracy perspective they are seen as important since they legitimate processes by making sure that particular stakes are represented. While partisan forums are made up to represent interest groups in society, non-partisan forums consist of randomly selected citizens, which ideally have rather open preferences. When exploring one partisan and one non-partisan process Hendriks et al. (2007) found that contrary to common expectations, partisan forums can have substantial legitimacy and impact problems. They also found that non-partisan forums might be favourable in deliberative capacity but they might fall short in external legitimacy and policy impact. The fact was that partisan participants accepted that deliberation means that you must be willing to adjust preferences, but they failed to do so (Hendriks et al., 2007: 370). Both the partisan and non-partisan forums included participants who stuck to their positions, but non-partisan participants had greater autonomy “so their deliberative capacity can be judged superior to that of partisan forums” (Hendriks et al., 2007: 371). In the study by Hendriks et al. (2007: 372) legitimacy is defined and operationalized as: “the extent to which key-actors, decision-makers and the media accept and support the procedure and its outcomes.” In other words, the legitimacy (as defined in that study) is grounded on actors largely outside the forums active in the deliberation processes. This study also showed (by interviews of experts themselves) that the deliberation by citizens and capacity of lay people was questioned by some experts (Hendriks et al., 2007: 373–374). In addition to this distinction of external legitimacy, the concept of legitimacy is in the literature largely divided in strategic and institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995: 572). The strategic tradition stresses the managerial standpoint in how organisations making legitimate strategies resulting in manipulating to gain societal support. Hence, rather than emphasising participatory processes (and the inherent process values), these values and the participatory process can be by-passed by e.g. “astroturfing”1 or other strategic options adopted. The branch of institutional studies of legitimacy, instead, emphasizes the “normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct, and empower the organizational actors” as described in Suchman (1995: 571) examining the two approaches. The conclusion of this examination of the two parallel domains of research on legitimacy concludes three categories: pragmatic (based on audience self-interest), moral (based on normative approval) and cognitive (based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness). In practical cases one of these categories can be more protruding or legitimacy being a blend of these three. The external legitimacy category, discussed previously, share some common traits with the audience self-interest category (labelled pragmatic) in the sense that actors external to the deliberative process (the audience consisting of experts and media) has a strong saying in the legitimate value of the outcome. The constellations of forums and involvement of stakeholders in governance processes is also featured in studies recognised as communicative planning theory (Healey, 1996) and the question also becomes relevant when implementing future-oriented development in European metropolitan regions (Healey, 2000). Campbell (2006) underlines that conceptualization of justice in contemporary planning theory is much about procedural concerns. However, individual liberties may be in conflict or as Campbell (2006: 95) puts it: “In relation to planning matters, the nature of interests is often complex and problematic; for example, individuals generally both desire clean air and to be able to drive their car(s) freely. Our preferences are therefore often inconsistent and overlapping.” Also the previous work with Swedish futures studies construction in the 1960–1970s having aims at democratic scenario construction by proposing a “particular responsibility to society's weakest groups” (Andersson, 2006: 288). At that time these groups were discussed in terms of the “weakest groups” (including the poor, elderly, unemployed and the disabled). Other examples of relevance when discussing communication among actors can be found in game theory (Sally, 1995). Conditions where reciprocity and trust can help overcome self-interests are built by “cheap talk”. As we will see, content sustainability, capacity to act and legitimacy are intimately connected. Findings from studies of collective actions frequently find that “when the users of a common-pool resource organize themselves to devise and enforce some of their own basic rules, they tend to manage local resources more sustainably than when rules are externally imposed on them” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). Common-pool resources are in this case understood as “natural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person's consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others” (Ostrom, 2000: 148). The explanation from game theory is that individuals obtain results that are “better than rational” when they are allowed to communicate, or do “cheap talk” as some economists call it (see e.g. Ostrom, 1998). In other words, communicative approaches can make collaboration work better since people have the possibility to bond with each other. From this reasoning we conclude that in a process where participants are active, open to preference shifts and are allowed to actually influence the result, both the content sustainability and the capacity to act might increase.

#### FIAT allows for the creation of contingent meaning which is key to education

**Hanghoj 2008** – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

4.2.1. Play and imagination

Among educational theorists, John Dewey is well-known for stressing the learning potential of play and game activities within education (Makedon, 1993; Vaage, 2000). Thus, Dewey devotes an entire chapter in Democracy and Education to “Play and Work in the Curriculum”. In tune with the main argument presented throughout the book, he begins the chapter by noting that it is “desirable” that education, as such, starts “from and with the experience and capacities of learners” (Dewey, 1916: 202). This can be done through the “the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar to those in which children and youth engage outside of school” (Dewey, 1916: 202). Dewey makes no fundamental distinction between play and work activities, as they “both involve ends consciously entertained and the selection and adaptation of materials and processes designed to affect the desired ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). Thus, play and work mostly differ in terms of “timespans”, which “influence the directness of means and ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). In this sense, play and work activities simply represent two different aspects on a continuum of meaningful relations between ends and means. This assertion also goes against the commonsensical notion that play is goal-free or is an end in itself. In summary, Dewey views play as being meaningful, goal-oriented, and interestbased. Moreover, play is free and plastic as it is both directed toward present and future (projected) activities (cf. chapter 2). However, in order to realise the educational value of play it is necessary to understand play as an imaginative activity (Dewey, 1916: 245). Play activities are too important to be reduced to a purely developmental phenomenon among children: It is still usual to regard this [imaginative] activity as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied (Dewey, 1916: 245). In this way, play is closely linked with the imagination, which is “the medium of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Put differently, Dewey’s conception of imagination represents “the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could be” (Fesmire, 2003: 65). Thus, the educational value of play activities must be based on the understanding that: The imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of what is going on. In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations. Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it (Dewey, 1916: 245-6; my emphasis added). Play activity as such is no guarantee for avoiding “mechanical methods in teaching” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Thus, the value of educational gaming is entirely dependent upon whether the imaginative aspects of play are able to support students understanding of “what is going on”. In this way, imaginative play allows meaning to be created through “dramatizations” of particular aspects of knowledge. Consequently, the presumably distinct categories of imagination and reality represent a subtle continuum of finely graded experience as human beings do not experience reality directly but always through symbols, language, and social interaction (Waskul & Lust, 2004