### **2nc cp**

**Obama’s new trade enforcement unit is a step in the right direction – failure to increase trade policy coordination precludes a level playing field that creates sufficient innovation to solve the case**

**Hart, 12** [Melanie Hart is a Policy Analyst on China Energy and Climate Policy at the Center for American Progress, “Shining a Light on U.S.-China¶ Clean Energy Cooperation¶ New Approaches Needed to Ensure China’s Global¶ Technology Ambitions Do Not Erode U.S. Clean¶ Energy Competitiveness”<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/china_trade.pdf>]

Over time tacit accommodation can erode U.S. competitiveness. To avoid that we need¶ to find ways to lower the costs of monitoring this bilateral relationship to make sure¶ Chinese enterprises and officials play by the rules and compete with U.S. companies on¶ an even playing field. Doing so will require a shift from the current strategy that places¶ our primary enforcement efforts on the backs of individual U.S. companies, some of which—like many renewable energy companies—are in emerging industries that lack the political leverage to do battle with the Chinese.¶ The best way to address this problem is to improve trade policy coordination at home.¶ Beijing is very adept at “divide-and-conquer” tactics. In the foreign policy realm,¶ Chinese leaders are well aware that if they can maneuver other countries to deal with¶ them bilaterally, China will have more negotiating leverage than it would against a¶ united multilateral group. China wants to use the same tactics against U.S. companies—¶ maneuvering them to square off one by one against the massive Chinese state.¶ The U.S. government needs to do a better job making sure that this approach is not effective. In 2010 the USTR took a critical step in that direction with a year-long¶ program to monitor Chinese government support for Chinese companies competing¶ against the United States in clean energy. USTR also surveyed China’s subsidy programs¶ across the board, uncovering around 200 different programs that violated WTO rules.¶ USTR notified the Chinese government of these alleged violations and also submitted¶ a list of Chinese subsidies to the WTO. That step does not automatically trigger a WTO¶ investigation, but it does require China to provide more information about the USTRcontested¶ subsidy programs. It also makes the USTR findings available to other countries,¶ which can help increase multilateral pressure against this type of rule breaking. If¶ the Chinese government fails to respond to USTR notification by providing detailed¶ information on their subsidy programs, then USTR may escalate by submitting a complaint¶ to the WTO Subsidies Committee.¶ These information-gathering and notification procedures call international and¶ domestic political attention to Chinese rule breaking. They also lay the groundwork for the United States to file additional trade complaints and levy additional tariffs¶ against Chinese imports, which should give the Chinese government stronger incentivesto comply with the rules.¶ It is important to note that the USTR subsidy survey did not require specific U.S.¶ companies to file formal petitions and act as intermediaries, a role that can often¶ 11 Center for American Progress | Shining a Light on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation¶ turn them into sacrificial lambs. Instead the Obama administration kicked off¶ this investigation proactively when it launched the National Export Initiative in¶ early 2010. That initiative ordered USTR and the Commerce Department to pay¶ closer attention to foreign government subsidies that erode U.S. competitiveness,¶ particularly vis-à-vis Chinese manufacturers.¶ Then there is the new Trade Enforcement Unit announced by President Barack Obama¶ in his recent State of the Union speech. The president said the new unit will bring together key U.S. trade officials from the departments of the Treasury, Commerce,¶ Energy, and USTR (under Michael Froman, deputy national security adviser for¶ International Economic Affairs) to better coordinate U.S. trade actions against China.¶ That unit will reportedly also consider asking the Commerce Department to initiate countervailing duty and antidumping cases itself on behalf of U.S. industries rather than waiting for companies to file individual petitions.¶ In theory this approach should go a long way toward balancing the interests of U.S. companies against Chinese government involvement in these disputes, thereby eliminating¶ the burden on U.S. companies for initiating these actions and reducing the possibility¶ of retaliation by the Chinese against individual U.S. companies. If this unit also directs¶ more federal government time and resources toward monitoring Chinese government¶ behavior—flagging apparent trade violations and raising formal complaints with the¶ WTO—then this approach may also enable the United States to better enforce Chinese¶compliance with basic WTO rules.¶ We also need to make sure we are investing in the foundations of innovation here in the¶ United States to give our companies the policy environment they need to remain competitive¶ against a rising China. It is inevitable that there will be some global economic¶ reshuffling as China moves up the economic ladder, but we can gain a lot of benefits¶ from that process if handled well. China’s growing domestic market, for example, can be¶ a major new source of consumers for U.S. products, but we have to make sure that we do¶ not cede critical American jobs to the Chinese—in solar manufacturing as in other U.S.¶ industries—just because we were lax on the policy side.¶ Conclusion China’s focus on renewable energy and high technology is here to stay. That can be a¶ great thing for the United States. Chinese competition can give U.S. companies stronger¶ incentives for innovation and can help bring down renewable energy prices to better¶ compete with traditional fossil fuels. Combining our two markets can also increase¶ demand for U.S. clean energy products and provide exactly the types of higher-paying¶ jobs that we need to restore our economy to sustainable, broad-based economic growth.¶ 12 Center for American Progress | Shining a Light on U.S.-China Clean Energy Cooperation¶ This relationship is only a win-win, however, if our companies have a level playing field,¶ and more work is needed to achieve that goal. The Obama administration’s new trade¶ enforcement initiative is a great start in the right direction. Other steps may be identified¶ once the new Trade Enforcement Unit is up and running—steps both bilateral and¶ international in scope that can help the United States and China better manage this critical¶ bilateral trade relationship for the benefit of the global economy.

**And, incomplete information about Chinese policies independently takes out solvency – market competition and tariff imposition sustain innovation that is critical to industry expansion**

**Hart, 12** [Melanie Hart is a Policy Analyst on China Energy and Climate Policy at the Center for American Progress, “Shining a Light on U.S.-China¶ Clean Energy Cooperation¶ New Approaches Needed to Ensure China’s Global¶ Technology Ambitions Do Not Erode U.S. Clean¶ Energy Competitiveness”<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/china_trade.pdf>]

China’s technology ambitions can be a good thing for the United States, particularly in renewable energy. Our two countries are the world’s biggest energy consumers, and open competition between our massive energy markets can fuel innovation, bring clean energy prices down, and speed both of our country’s transitions toward a more sustainable energy economy.¶ But here’s the rub. China is a nonmarket economy with a less-than-transparent energy planning process. This makes it very hard to identify when the Chinese cross the line from market competition (which we want to encourage) to anticompetitive behavior (which weshould fight back against).¶ We already know that the Chinese government sometimes tries to skirt trade rules. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the government pledged¶ to submit required reports on specific national and regional subsidy programs every¶ two years, but it has not abided by that pledge. Over the past 10 years it has only¶ issued two reports. The first, in April 2006, covered some subsidies from 2001 to¶ 2004, and that report was incomplete because it only included national subsidies not¶ subnational programs. The Chinese government submitted a second notification in¶ October 2011, but again did not include subnational programs—even though China¶ has clear obligations to do so.¶ Because China has not submitted these reports as promised, it makes it more difficult¶ for U.S. companies to examine Chinese policy programs and determine whether they¶ are rule-abiding or anticompetitive. Furthermore, since government transparency is a major problem in China across the board, even when U.S. companies are willing to¶ spend their own resources to collect that data, it is extremely hard to do. This gives¶ China a lot of maneuvering room to enact programs that erode U.S. competitiveness. Clearly the Chinese government needs to do more to comply with these trade rules, and the U.S. government—and the global community as a whole—needs to do more to enforce that compliance.

### 2nc net benefit

**Their argument is based on faulty social science – humans use resources effectively which breaks resource barrier challenges**

Allouche 11 – Institute of Development Studies, UK (Jeremy, January 2011, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global tradestar, open," Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272>)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Even if water conflicts do occur – they are over allocation – scarcity only fosters cooperation

Allouche 11 – Institute of Development Studies, UK (Jeremy, January 2011, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global tradestar, open," Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272>) Jacome

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [[Allouche, 2005]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0015), [[Allouche, 2007]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0020) and [[Rouyer, 2000]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0290)). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment ([Ohlsson, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0250)). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([[Dinar and Dinar, 2005]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0090) and [[Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272" \l "b0055)).

**No Impact – Water disputes happen within countries, and is more likely to lead to cooperation – empirics**

Brooks and Linton 2K – Senior Advisor in the Program and Partnership Branch of the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, and \* freelance writer who specializes in water issues (David B. and Jamie, July 2000, Globe and Mail “Drinking (Water) With Your Enemy”, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/18677/1/116118.pdf)

As Israelis and Palestinians approach final status talks, water is high on the agenda. As Israelis and Syrians jockey for negotiating room the waters of the Golan and of the Sea of Galilee are points of contention. Yet, tough as these issues are, there is little danger that inter-state conflict will erupt over water. Even in the Middle East, where water is scarcer than anywhere else in the world, water has served as a greater cause for cooperation than for conflict. Cooperation not conflict The notion of cooperation over international water resources will strike most readers as anomalous. Have we not all heard that "the wars of the 21 st century will be about water," as World Bank vice president Ismail Serageldin stated a few years ago. Or that water was the only conceivable reason for Jordan to go to war with Israel, as the late King Hussein is alleged to have said. There is, however, very little evidence that disputes over water have led or are about to lead to international conflict. (Nor has anyone been able to document King Hussein's remarks about going to war with Israel over water.) Though some have asserted that Arab-Israeli warfare has been motivated in part by the desire to assert control over water resources, historical evidence shows that water was not a factor in strategic planning by either side during the hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. Water problems If water wars are unlikely, does this mean that we need not be concerned about conflict over water? Not at all. Worldwide water use went up more than six fold in the 20th century and it continues to grow twice as fast as the increase in population. Problems associated with water scarcity and control over water resources are all too common. However, they are much more likely to occur within countries — such as the competition for water between urban dwellers seeking drinking water and farmers seeking water for irrigation — than between countries. The violence that erupted earlier this year in Cochabamba, Bolivia, following tariff increases for municipal water illustrates the kind of water conflict that we can expect to see. (see Globe and Mail, May 9 and 18, 2000) Experience shows that the presence of water on an international border is more likely to provide a catalyst for cooperation than conflict between the countries that depend on it. Researchers at the University of Oregon have compiled a Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. In examining the cases generally considered to be examples of international water conflict, they have arrived at a surprising conclusion: Instead of fighting, countries that share water resources tend to maintain dialogue and negotiation leading to treaties for joint management of water. Jordan River The Jordan River forms much of the boundary between Israel and Jordan and is one of the world's most hotly contested waterways. Even while these two countries were legally at war, they maintained informal contacts on managing the river. As a result, when the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, it was possible to include a well-developed annex devoted "to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between [Israel and Jordan]." What has been true for surface water on an international border also seems to be true for aquifers underlying a border. Prior to the signing of their historic agreement in 1993, Israeli and Palestinian academics and officials began holding discussions on joint management of the Mountain Aquifer, an extremely important source of groundwater underlying both Israel and the West Bank. The success of these discussions has helped forge a climate within which the broader peace process can take place. India-Pakistan collaboration Examples of collaboration over water are not restricted to the Middle East. Despite three wars and numerous skirmishes since 1948, India and Pakistan have managed to negotiate and implement a complex treaty on sharing the waters of the Indus River system. During periods of hostility, neither side has targeted the water facilities of the other nor attempted to disrupt the negotiated arrangements for water management. In Africa too, where eleven countries share the basin of the Nile, cooperation over water is more evident than conflict. "Perhaps the weight of history lies too heavy in the silt of the Nile valley," writes historian Robert Collins, "but man will always need water; and in the end this may drive him to drink with his enemies." Closer to home, the International Joint Commission, which manages waters shared by Canada and the United States, is considered such a model of success that it is being emulated by other nations. Minor skirmishes Approximately 40% of the world's population lives in the 264 river basins shared by more than one country. Put another way, almost half the world's land area is found in international water basins. And yet there have been only seven minor skirmishes over international waters in modern history, and even these involved factors in addition to water. Meanwhile, hundreds of international treaties have been negotiated to deal with water management, about 150 in the past century alone. There is no doubt that humanity faces a worldwide water crisis. Growing demand for drinking water and the much higher demand for irrigation water are placing enormous pressures on available fresh water supplies. At the same time, increasing pollution is reducing the usefulness of available water. The threats that these conditions pose for the poor and for the environment can not be overstated. Nevertheless, it is far more useful to consider the role of water in promoting cooperation rather than conflict, particularly in international relations. As the opening quote suggests, those who are inclined to belligerence may look to water as a reason for fighting. But for most of us, water's greatest value may be the way it brings people together.

### Econ

**Economic collapse leads to war**

**a.) History**

**Ferguson 06—**prof of history, Harvard and Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution (Niall, “The Next War of the World,” September/October 2006, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/09/the\_next\_war\_of\_the\_world.html)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

b.) Studies

Miller 2k – economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank (Morris, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?”)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the **conventional wisdom** about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

No risk of an impact – stability and cooperation will only increase

Barnett 09, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review, (Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: The Good News on the Global Financial Downturn,” World Politics Review, 5/25/09 <http://dan92024.blogstream.com/v1/date/200905.html>)

When the global financial contagion kicked in last fall, the blogosphere was quick to predict that a sharp uptick in global instability would soon follow. While we're not out of the woods yet, it's interesting to note just how little instability -- and not yet a single war -- has actually resulted from the worst global economic downturn since the Great Depression.

Run a Google search for "global instability" and you'll get 23 million hits. But when it comes to actual conflicts, the world is humming along at a level that reflects the steady decline in wars -- by 60 percent -- that we've seen since the Cold War's end. As George Mason University's Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) notes, that trend applies within the Muslim world, too, so even America's "war on terror" has not quite lived up to the pessimists' expectations.

Wikipedia's page for "ongoing conflicts" cites a whopping seven wars with annual death rates of 1,000-plus. And they're all familiar situations:

Arabs-Israel, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan and Mexico. None have been helped by the financial crisis, but all predate it. Iraq's internal situation has actually improved, despite slumping oil revenue. And as for fears that Mexico might soon become a "failed state," that government's recent response to the swine flu indicates otherwise.

The CSP's database lists only three new conflicts since 2008 -- Russia-Georgia, Kenya and southern Sudan. None can be blamed on the global economy. Meanwhile, Colombia's internal security has improved dramatically, and Sri Lanka's stubborn separatist movement just collapsed.

Yes, we suffer from Somali piracy, and American and Chinese subs continue their cat-and-mouse games off China's otherwise quiet coast. Still, many expected more from a financial panic that, according to the IMF, erased roughly 6 percent of global GDP: Beijing and Washington locking horns, for instance, instead of letting Taiwan negotiate peace with the mainland.

But disappointment abounds for the doom-and-gloomers:

- Instead of coming apart at the seams, China implemented a stimulus package that seems to be working at home and abroad (see America's construction industry exports). Beijing's flagship companies have exploited the crisis for the extraordinary buying opportunities it has created, locking in long-term commodity and energy contracts in exchange for much-needed cash. Meanwhile its central bank has swapped $100 billion worth of currency with major trade partners.

- Asia's big powers should be at each other's throats over sea-based energy deposits, or at least over North Korea. And yet recently we've witnessed the first China-Japan-South Korea summit, followed soon after by the creation of a $120-billion liquidity fund to help out their smaller neighbors.

- India's Congress Party just won a decisive victory in national elections, allowing it to rule without relying on anti-globalizing elements like its native Communist party. Expect another young Gandhi to champion India's next round of reforms.

- The EU definitely regrets its fast integration of all those now-shaky Eastern European economies. And yet, as Washington Post economic columnist Steve Pearlstein recently noted, ". . . the real story in Europe may be how firmly market liberalization seems to have taken hold. Not only have there been few, if any, calls for renationalizations, but some countries are still moving toward privatization and reregulation. Instances of protectionism are outweighed by the examples of cross-border mergers and acquisitions that have been accepted as a matter of course . . ."

- In the Middle East, the Arab world's biggest state, Egypt, remains committed to opening up its state-heavy economy even more, while Arab sovereign wealth funds continue their aggressive investment in Africa, where China and India's portfolios also grow.- In Latin America, market-friendly forces (e.g., Brazil's Lula) are gaining steam, while market-hostile ones (e.g., Venezuela's Chávez) lose traction.

- Even "axis of diesel" Russia has quieted down considerably over the past nine months, with Vladimir Putin's hand-picked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, slowly emerging as a force of level-headed moderation.

Add it all up and it's clear that assessments such as "the world is in chaos" -- a David Rothkopf beauty -- just don't fly. Periodic riots do not an Armageddon make.

Instead, this crisis has elicited unprecedented cooperation among the world's great powers on both coordinated stimulus spending and making intermarket financial flows more transparent (keep an eye on the IMF). It's also triggered awareness of the need for an additional global reserve currency to help the euro balance the dollar (a convertible renminbi would help).

### Protectionism

**No risk of protectionism**

**Stabroek 9** (“Protectionism-the dog that barked but didn’t bite?,” 27 July 2009, http://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/news/world/07/27/protectionism-the-dog-that-barked-but-didn%E2%80%99t-bite/,)

The sharp trade contraction  during the economic crisis, closely matching the trend in the  1930s, has triggered widespread fears that the world could  suffer a re-run of the destructive protectionism of that era.

Policy-makers have said measures to curtail imports to save  jobs at home could spark a repeat of the Great Depression, and  political leaders have pledged not to restrict trade even as  their governments raise tariffs and subsidies.

The ghosts of U.S. Senator Smoot and Representative Hawley,  whose 1930 Tariff Act prompted a wave of tit-for-tat trade  retaliation that fuelled the tensions leading to World War Two,  stalk many a newspaper article and economic conference.

But economists are increasingly arguing that measures taken  in the crisis do not herald a wave of protectionism.

“I do think that there are a number of countries that have  flirted a bit with protectionism but I don’t see in many  countries anything like what was happening in the 1930s and  certainly not in the United States,” said Craig VanGrasstek, who  teaches trade policy at Harvard and Georgetown universities.

Trade no longer plays a big part in the U.S. public debate  and President Barack Obama did not view it as an election  winner, he told a meeting of the Agency for International Trade  Information and Cooperation (AITIC) in Geneva on July 21.

The number of requests for anti-dumping measures — duties  to compensate for unfairly priced imports — sought by U.S.  businesses is likely to fall to 12 in the 2009 fiscal year  ending Sept. 30, he said. That is half the 24 requests made in  fiscal 2008 and a quarter of the average in the 1980s.

The U.S. Congress has enacted some protectionism measures,  such as a ban on Chinese poultry imports, now the subject of a  dispute at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and reversing  permission for Mexican truckers to transport goods within the  United States.

But this does not represent a big increase in this kind of  activity from Congress, VanGrasstek said.

“If you look at what’s happening in the United States today  we have less evidence for protection now than I have seen in  previous recessions,” he said.

Roberta Piermartini, one of the authors of a WTO report on  trade safety valves like anti-dumping, said further increases in  such measures could be expected.

But so far the number of contingency measures is running at  a far lower rate than in 2000-2002 in the aftermath of the Asia  crisis, she said at the Geneva launch of the report on July 22.

Such measures are on the rise, but the rise is moderate,  said Olivier Cadot, a professor of trade policy at the  University of Lausanne. He noted most measures in the current  crisis had been taken by developing countries against other  developing countries, especially China.

“Even though anti-dumping is clearly open to manipulation by  special interests the avalanche of trade remedy measures that  was announced hasn’t taken place,” he said at the WTO launch. “It is hard to avoid the impression that sometimes  economists are crying wolf when we talk about trade protection.”

One reason economists are more optimistic is that  policy-makers have learnt from the errors of the 1930s, and the  trading system built up after World War Two, embodied in the WTO  and its binding agreements, restricts countries’ ability to  raise tariffs and choke off trade. Another reason is that trade flows, forecast by the WTO to  contract a real 10 percent this year from $15.78 trillion in  2008, are already showing the first signs of recovery.

Exports from Japan, the world’s fourth biggest exporter and  importer last year, rose a seasonally adjusted 1.1 percent in  June over May. The year-on-year fall was still a horrendous 35.7  percent but that was the slowest decline this year.

The World Bank has been one of the loudest voices warning  against the dangers of protectionism. “It’s a potential danger… and one has to watch quite  carefully to make sure things don’t spin out of control,” said  Richard Newfarmer, World Bank representative in Geneva.

The monitoring of trade measures by institutions like the  WTO and World Bank is putting the question of protectionism high  on the international agenda and has restrained countries from  taking more such measures, he told Reuters.

**Protectionism won’t collapse trade**

**Guoqiang 9**—director of foreign economic relations research for China's State Council (Long, “Is Protectionism a Threat to the World Economy?,” 6 March 2009, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance\_investment/2009/03/06/131493.shtml)

I don't think we'll end up with a trade war. Countries mostly adopt protectionist measures within the WTO framework. There are two reasons--the first is that all the countries have something in common in prosting protectionism, second, countries have emphasized corporation at recent top-level meetings. If some country dared to really put up protectionist barriers, it would open up a hornets' nest of criticism against them.

Second, trade retaliation forces parties to weigh the pros and cons before taking protectionist measures. So while protectionism is sure to rise, it would not have a big impact.

Periodic trade disputes will be unavoidable in the near future, but there would be little possibility of trade conflicts. I treat frictional trade rhetoric as a part of the bilateral negotiation process. It just becomes more intense during times of crisis.

### China

**No China war**

**a.) Demographic Reasons**

**Macdonald, 5/11** – US Institute of Peace (11, Bruee W., Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs, pdf)

In the face of this growing Chinese military space challenge, it is easy to assume the worst about Chinese intentions. China seeks to be able to prevail militarily at some point in the future should conflict come, but they see the United States as militarily superior to them and thus would be unlikely to consciously provoke any military conflict. While we should guard against a worst case, we should not treat it as a given. I do not believe China or the PLA is spoiling for a fight with the United States – China has come too far to want to place their substantial economic achievements at risk unless they faced an extraordinary threat to their national security. In addition, China faces serious demographic realities over the next couple of decades, where their ratio of workers to retirees will shrink substantially (the result of their one- child policy), which further underscores China’s need for stability and continued economic growth for years to come. China also has additional needs, and vulnerabilities:

• Growing environmental problems and water shortages with no obvious solutions that are growing

irritants to the public;

• A relentless search for new sources of manufacturing inputs;

• An increasingly restive working class that is making new demands for higher wages and political

freedoms;

• A non-democratic one-party system that leaves its senior leadership constantly looking over its

shoulder at possible challenges to its authority, especially in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring”;

• Growing citizen anger against corruption and cronyism that seems impossible for the CCP to root

out; and many more.

These factors are reasons why China is probably not looking for war with the United States, though they

also could inadvertently become factors in China’s stumbling into a conflict they would ordinarily not want, through miscalculation or distraction.

b.) US Diplomacy

Zhang **11** – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (Baohui, March/April, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,")

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them. 40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.” 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that **the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely**. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.” 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.” 45

c.) 4 more reasons

- Relations/Accepted World Order

- Territorial disputes will not escalate to war

- Economics

- Deterrence

Rosecrance et al 10 (Richard, Political Science Professor @ Cal and Senior Fellow @ Harvard’s Belfer Center and Former Director @ Burkle Center of IR @ UCLA, and Jia Qingguo, PhD Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of School of International Studies @ Peking University, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?” Global Asia 4.4, http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251,)

Will China and the US Go to War? If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why? First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it. Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist. Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity. Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice. A Different World It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do. Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach. Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation. Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

**Wont go nuclear**

**a.) China NFU**

**Zhenqiang 05** (Pan, Professor of International Relations at the Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defence University of the People’s Liberation Army of China , retired Major General of the People’s Liberation Army, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons”, China Security (World Security Institute China Program, <http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=403>]

In my view, No-First Use (NFU) has been a theoretical pillar of China’s nuclear policy. This rationale of NFU of nuclear weapons serves Beijing’s foremost security interests. It also contributes to the maintenance of world strategic stability. There are at least five reasons to explain why China has consistently stuck to that principle, and will continue to do so in the future.  
Underlying Principles  
First, NFU highlights China’s philosophical belief that nuclear weapons can only be used to serve one purpose, that of retaliation against a nuclear attack, pending complete nuclear disarmament. Indeed, their extremely large destructive capabilities render nuclear weapons the only truly inhumane weapon of mass destruction and are of little other use to China. Faced with U.S. nuclear blackmail in the 1950s, China had no alternative to developing its own nuclear capability so as to address the real danger of being a target of a nuclear strike. But even so, Beijing vowed that having a nuclear capability would only serve this single purpose.   
From the very beginning of acquiring a nuclear capability, Beijing announced that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any conditions; it also pledged unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon states. This claim is not merely rhetoric that cannot be verified, as some Western pundits accused. On the contrary, China’s nuclear rationale has determined the defensive nature of its nuclear force, its posture, size and operational doctrine, which have been highly visible and have stood the test of time. It is in this sense that China is NOT a nuclear weapon state in the Western sense. Unlike all the other nuclear weapon states, for example, China has never intended to use its nuclear capability to make up for the in efficiency of conventional capabilities vis-à-vis other world powers nor has China an interest in joining a nuclear arms race with other nuclear states. And thanks to the insistence of this policy based on NFU, China succeeds in reducing the nuclear element to the minimum in its relations with other nuclear nations, avoiding a possible nuclear arms race, and contributing to the global strategic stability at large. If this policy serves well its core security interests, why should Beijing change it?

**b.) We would stop them from using weapons if they wanted to**

**Lieber and Press 06** – Keir A. Leiber, author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. Press, author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania ("The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006)

China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's, entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles. Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always wonder whether U.S. sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones. Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim. China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since the mid-1980s, China has been trying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-range DF-31A) to replace its current ICBM force. The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, although the forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades. Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-31s could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia. Given the history of China's slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or more.

### Bioterror

**No extinction from bioweapons**

**O’Neill 04 –** (Brendan, 8-19 “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm)

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

**Deterrence checks**

Conley 2k3 - chief of the Systems Analysis Branch, Directorate of Requirements, Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC) is Langley AFB, (Lt Col Harry W., Virginia. Air & Space Power Journal) <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html>)

The policy of calculated ambiguity does have one strong feature. The more uncertain an adversary is about US response, the less likely he is to use CBWs. As Paul Bernstein and Lewis Dunn write, “Deliberate ambiguity creates significant uncertainty for an adversary regarding the nature of our response to CBW use.”27 Indeed, ambiguity deters as long as the adversary perceives US willingness and ability to respond forcefully. Since the ambiguity in the current policy incorporates the possibility of nuclear retaliation, one must ask whether or not today’s CB-capable adversaries are deterred by the US threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Even Scott Sagan, an articulate advocate of abandoning the role of nuclear weapons in US reprisal policy, concedes that nuclear weapons contribute “the extra margin of deterrence” against CBW use.28 The inherent deterrent value of nuclear weapons is a strength of the current policy, but policy makers must clarify the conditions under which they might consider using nuclear weapons.

**Prefer our claims – Their evidence is exaggeration**

**Palmquist 08** – (Matt. 5-19, “How and why the threat of bioterrorism has been so greatly exaggerated.” http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/bioterror-in-context-355)

Clark: The more I looked into it, I thought, "Jeez, what are these guys talking about?" What are the odds that a terrorist group, no matter how well financed, would be able to create a bioterror weapon? I [Clark] began looking into what it takes to really make a successful bioterrorism agent, and I just became very skeptical of this whole thing. The (United States ) military gave up bioweapons 30 years ago. They're too undependable; they're too hard to use; they're too hard to make. Then I started checking around, and I found there's a whole literature out there of people who've been screaming for years that this whole bioterrorism thing is really overblown; it's not practical; it's never going to work. Aum Shinrikyo couldn't get it to work; those guys put millions and millions of dollars into it. So you think of a bunch of guys sitting in a cave in Afghanistan — they're sure as hell not going to do it. Is any government going to do it? No. So that made me very skeptical, and I went back to Oxford and said, "This whole thing's a crock." And they said, "But that's even more interesting!" M-M: Thus the question mark at the end of the title, Bracing for Armageddon? Clark: Yeah, exactly. Scientifically, it is a crock. And this really verges into the political, but we've spent $50 billion on it. So Oxford paid for me to take a trip back East and talk to a bunch of these voices that haven't been heard and interview them. M-M: How much research was involved? Clark: A couple of years. The science is pretty straightforward on paper. The kind of an organization you'd have to put together, with the varying expertise that is required to make one of these things and deploy it, takes a whole group of people with all kinds of different skills, from engineers to meteorologists. That's just not going to happen. You can run an airplane into an office tower, and you get instant everything you could ever possibly hope for. So why would anybody sit around for years and years? The Aum Shinrikyo guys tried for six, seven years and couldn't get it to work. And a lot of them had Ph.D.s.

**No impact to bio-weapons – they’re too hard to deploy and countermeasures solve**

**Mueller 06** – John, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Ohio State, , Overblown p. 20-22

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even mil­lions of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: they are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in technology and knowledge, but, notes scientist Russell Seitz, while bioterrorism may look easy on paper, ''the learning curve is lethally steep in practice." The record so far is unlikely to be very encouraging. For example, Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures (by a state, not a terrorist group) may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparently also caused considerable unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have had little military impact.20For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dis­persed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organ­isms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. And their impact is very diffi­cult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties—as an aerosol that can be inhaled—-requires a delivery system whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist." Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteoro­logical conditions.21 After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal pathogens effectively, biological weapons expert Milton Leiten-berg compares Ms conclusions with glib pronouncements in the press about how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and a few glass jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer." He sardonically concludes, ''The less the commenta­tor seems to know about biological warfare the easier he seems to think the task is."

### Diseases

**Science means extinction is impossible**

**a.) Any disease that kills its host too fast will die off**

**Understanding evolution 07 –** Website on Evolution from UC Berkeley (December, "Evolution from a virus's view," http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/news/071201\_adenovirus)

Since transmission is a matter of life or death for pathogen lineages, some evolutionary biologists have focused on this as the key to understanding why some have evolved into killers and others cause no worse than the sniffles. The idea is that there may be an evolutionary trade-off between virulence and transmission. Consider a virus that exploits its human host more than most and so produces more offspring than most. This virus does a lot of damage to the host — in other words, is highly virulent. From the virus's perspective, this would, at first, seem like a good thing; extra resources mean extra offspring, which generally means high evolutionary [fitness](http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/glossary/glossary_popup.php?word=fitness). However, if the viral reproduction completely incapacitates the host, the whole strategy could backfire: the illness might prevent the host from going out and coming into contact with new hosts that the virus could jump to. A victim of its own success, the viral lineage could go extinct and become an evolutionary dead end. This level of virulence is clearly not a good thing from the virus's perspective.

**b.) Natural Immunities**

**Sowell 01 –** Fellow at Hoover Institution (Thomas, March 5, Jewish World Review, “The Dangers of “Equality”, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell030501.asp)

People have different vulnerabilities and resistances to a variety of diseases. That is why one disease is unlikely to wipe out the human species, even in one place. An epidemic that sweeps through an area may leave some people dying like flies while others remain as healthy as horses.

### Food wars

**Innovation solves**

**Chang 11 –** Graduated Cornell Law School (Gordon G., Feb 21**, “**Global Food Wars” http://blogs.forbes.com/gordonchang/2011/02/21/global-food-wars/)

In any event, food-price increases have apparently been factors in the unrest now sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The poor spend up to half their disposable income on edibles, making rapid food inflation a cause of concern for dictators, strongmen, and assorted autocrats everywhere. So even if humankind does not go to war over bad harvests, Paskal may be right when she contends that climate change may end up altering the global map. This is not the first time in human history that food shortages looked like they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing agronomic advances, especially Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution in the middle of the 20th century, have consistently proved the pessimists wrong. In these days when capitalism is being blamed for most everything, it’s important to remember the power of human innovation in free societies—and the efficiency of free markets.

**There is no threat and at worst it will only mean cooperation**

**Burger et al. 10** – Kees Burger Development Economics, Corresponding author, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg, Jeroen Warner AND Eefje Derix Disaster Studies, Wageningen Universit “Governance of the world food system and crisis prevention” http://www.stuurgroepta.nl/rapporten/Foodshock-web.pdf

Both European water and agricultural policies are based on the belief that there will always be cheap food aplenty on the world market. A recent British report 23 reflects this optimism. Although production is now more prone to world market price shocks, their effects on farm incomes are softened by extensive income supports (van Eickhout et al. 2007). Earlier, in a 2003 report, a European group of agricultural economists wrote: Food security is no longer a prime objective of European food and agricultural policy. There is no credible threat to the availability of the basic ingredients of human nutrition from domestic and foreign sources. If there is a food security threat it is the possible disruption of supplies by natural disasters or catastrophic terrorist action. The main response necessary for such possibilities is the appropriate contingency planning and co-ordination between the Commission and Member States (Anania et al. 2003). Europe, it appears, feels rather sure of itself, and does not worry about a potential food crisis. We are also not aware of any special measures on standby. Nevertheless a fledgling European internal security has been called into being that can be deployed should (food) crises strike. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) created a quasi-decision-making platform to respond to transboundary threats. Since 9/11 the definition of what constitutes a threat has been broadened and the protection capacity reinforced. In the Solidarity Declaration of 2003 member states promised to stand by each other in the event of a terrorist attack, natural disaster or human-made calamity (the European Security Strategy of 2003). Experimental forms of cooperation are tried that leave member-state sovereignty intact, such as pooling of resources. The EU co-operates in the area of health and food safety but its mechanisms remain decentrslised by dint of the principle of subsidiarity. The silo mentality between the European directorates is also unhelpful, leading to Babylonian confusion. Thus, in the context of forest fires and floods the Environment DG refers to ‘civil protection’. The European Security and Defence Policy( ESDP) of 2006, which is hoped to build a bridge between internal and external security policy, on the other hand refers to ‘crisis management’, while the ‘security’ concept mainly pertains to pandemics (Rhinard et al. 2008: 512, Boin et al. 2008: 406).