### 2nc direct restrictions overview

#### 1nc Veeraswami distinguishes between restrictions and indirect limitations—the latter expands the term to every variable constraining production, which includes amorphous party platforms as well as the entire lit base for trade, tax, and liability policy, plus minor changes to accelerate any facet licensing and approval and zoning.

#### 2 impacts—

#### 1. Limits—restrictions affs already sidestep core incentive DAs and mechanism-based counterplans with an automatic fed key warrant—the worst possible way to restore strategic balance from there is assuming any policy discouraging production is a de facto restriction. Only our standard has a manageable prep burden, because if restrictions are only policies that necessarily prevent production increases then we at least have a thematically consistent subject with a check on bad faith readings to explode the topic early. Answers their overlimiting arguments

#### 2. Precision—“restrictions” is a term of art chosen deliberately over many available synonyms, that's Heinze. Blurring the line generates legal confusion and communication breakdowns which co-opt their offense and create divergent understandings of core topic controversies. It mixes burdens, because the only way to define restrictions in their standard is to assess the impact of every energy policy on production levels which is an independent voter.

### xt restrictions = direct

#### Interpretation – ‘restrictions’ are direct governmental limitations

Todd Tucker (esearch director with Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. His work focuses on the legal, economic and political implications of the WTO, NAFTA, CAFTA and other trade agreements, and also on U.S. foreign policy issues. Former policy analyst at the Center for Economic and Policy Research) March 2010 “That’s All They’ve Got?”: What Latest WTO Secretariat Paper on Financial Crisis Does and Does Not Say About GATS Disciplines on Financial Regulation” http://www.citizen.org/documents/That%27sAllTheyGot.pdf

Here, the Secretariat confirms a very serious concern: that the GATS creates obligations to simply eliminate whole categories of non-discriminatory regulations. The Secretariat states that, “The GATS does not define terms such as ‘payments and transfers for current transactions,’ ‘current transactions,’ ‘capital transactions,’ ‘movement of capital,’ or indeed ‘restrictions,’” even though definitions exist through the International Monetary Fund and other bodies. The lack of definition of the term “restriction” is especially troublesome, since it could encompass reregulatory measures that are being widely discussed at the moment, such as financial transaction taxes (FTT).9 An FTT, by contrast, would explicitly not be considered a prohibited “restriction” under the IMF Articles of Agreement, since the IMF defines “restriction” as “a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such.”10

#### Limiting the meaning of ‘restriction’ to only DIRECT governmental limitations is necessary – Otherwise the topic become un-managable

TWN (Third World Network) February 2010 “WTO claims financial crisis not due to GATS” http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100204.htm

Permissible measures depend on the definition to be given to the term "restriction" contained in GATS Article XI, which, however, is not further specified in the Agreement. In that regard, it is worth noting that the IMF distinguishes between restrictions on payments and transfers - including exchange restrictions - from the underlying transaction on the basis of a technical criterion: "The guiding principle in ascertaining whether a measure is a restriction on payments and transfers for current transactions under Article VIII, Section 2 [of the Fund's Articles of Agreement], is whether it involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such." The Fund therefore identifies these restrictions by this technical criterion, rather than by the purposes or economic effects of the restrictions, which would be the way to identify trade restrictions only. If no such technical criterion were used, it would be almost impossible to distinguish between trade and exchange restrictions, as both may be used to achieve the same purposes and have the same economic effect.

# 1nr elections da

**Massive public opposition to nuclear power --**

#### --Support is at an all-time low

Pew Research Center, 2011 (Center of research for the people and the press, March 21, 2011, “Opposition to Nuclear Power Rises Amid Japanese Crisis” The survey was conducted by interviewers at Princeton Data Source under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. <http://www.people-press.org/2011/03/21/opposition-to-nuclear-power-rises-amid-japanese-crisis/2/>)

Not surprisingly, public support for the increased use of nuclear power has declined amid the ongoing nuclear emergency in Japan. Currently, 39% say they favor promoting the increased use of nuclear power while 52% are opposed. Last October, 47% favored promoting the increased use of nuclear power and the same percentage (47%) was opposed. Opinion about expanding the use of nuclear power has fluctuated in recent years. However, the current measure matches a previous low in support for increased nuclear power recorded in September 2005 (39% favor, 53% oppose).

#### --The opposition vastly outweighs the support

**ABC News, 11**

(April20, “Nuclear Power: Po Nuclear Power: Opposition Spikes After Japan Earthquake,” <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/nuclear-power-opposition-grows-japan-earthquake-abc-news/story?id=13412262#.UAnUlWHZATY>, d/a 7-20-12, ads)

Most Americans do not flatly say that nuclear power is unsafe; indeed, 53 percent say it's safe overall, 11 points above the immediate post-Chernobyl level. But just 23 percent see it as "very safe," which apparently is what's needed to sustain public support. Perceptions of safety dramatically affect support for new nuclear plants. Among people who think nuclear power plants are very safe, 84 percent favor building new ones. But that falls to 33 percent of those who just think it's only somewhat safe. And those who think it's unsafe are nearly unanimous (93 percent) in their opposition. In another measure, 42 percent say the crisis in Japan has made them less confident in the safety of nuclear power overall; 51 percent say it's had no effect. This, too, ties in closely with support for construction: Among those who are less confident now, 84 percent oppose building new plants. Among those whose opinions haven't changed, opposition falls to 48 percent.

#### --Viewed as too risky, even if it’s irrational – reframing the debate hasn’t changed opposition

**Ramana, 11 -** Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security Physicist

(M.V. August 3, “Nuclear power and the public,” <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-power-and-the-public>, d/a 7-20-12

Japan is by no means alone. Around the world, nuclear energy has declined in popularity. In the United States, for example, a Washington Post-ABC poll conducted in April 2011 found that 64 percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors. Another poll, conducted by CBS News in March 2011, soon after the Fukushima crisis began, found that only 43 percent of those polled would approve of building new reactors, down from a 57 percent approval rating in 2008. Support for nuclear power was similar or lower in countries as varied as Chile (12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent), Australia (34 percent), and the United Kingdom (35 percent). Even in France, which relies on nuclear power for about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57 percent) were in favor of abandoning nuclear energy. These approval ratings are not strictly comparable because the polls were conducted by different agencies, asking different questions and providing different kinds of information prior to asking the questions. Nevertheless, there is little doubt among those who study public opinion on nuclear power that, by and large, it does not command much support. Nuclear power wasn't always so unpopular. For example, in the United States in 1977, when CBS News conducted its first poll on nuclear power, 69 percent of those surveyed expressed support for building more nuclear plants. Just two years later, after the Three Mile Island accident, public support had plummeted to 46 percent, and it dropped further to 34 percent after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Since the 1980s, a majority of the US population has consistently opposed the construction of new nuclear reactors. Not coincidentally, there has been practically no nuclear construction in the United States since Three Mile Island. The public perceives nuclear power as a very risky technology. In some cases, association with nuclear facilities is even subject to stigma. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power, but they haven't worked well. With growing public concern about global warming, the industry is experimenting with a new strategy -- playing up the climate mitigation potential of nuclear power. While this has increased the benefit side of the equation for nuclear power, it hasn't decreased the risk perception associated with the technology, and nuclear power remains a reluctant choice at best. Renewable energy technologies offer the same benefits, making it unlikely that a large-scale "nuclear renaissance" will materialize.

# 1nr predictions

Prefer root causes, cross apply from case – proximate causes are key to addressing actual issues

#### Extinction outweighs ontology

**Jonas 96** [Hans, Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. At the New School for Social Research & Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. at U. Munich, \*do not agree with gendered language, Mortality and Morality: A Search for the Good after Auschwitz, pg 111-2

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind? By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man’s being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of the Earth’s entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical “grounding.” Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith’s aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay ontology.

#### Prediction is possible and accurate even if not perfect-game theory and political modeling can account for complex social systems by aggregating expertism-forecasting can provide an accurate basis for scenario planning

de Mesquita 11 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Silver Professor of Politics at New York University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution B.A. from Queens, M.A. from Michigan, PhD from Michigan, "FOX-HEDGING OR KNOWING: ONE BIG WAY TO KNOW MANY THINGS" July 18 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/07/18/bruce-bueno-de-mesquita/fox-hedging-or-knowing-one-big-way-to-know-many-things/

Given what we know today and given the problems inherent in dealing with human interaction, what is a leading contender for making accurate, discriminating, useful predictions of complex human decisions? In good hedgehog mode I believe one top contender is applied game theory. Of course there are others but I am betting on game theory as the right place to invest effort. Why? Because game theory is the only method of which I am aware that explicitly compels us to address human adaptability. Gardner and Tetlock rightly note that people are “self-aware beings who see, think, talk, and attempt to predict each other’s behavior—and who are continually adapting to each other’s efforts to predict each other’s behavior, adding layer after layer of new calculations and new complexity.” This adaptation is what game theory jargon succinctly calls “endogenous choice.” Predicting human behavior means solving for endogenous choices while assessing uncertainty. It certainly isn’t easy but, as the example of bandwidth auctions helps clarify, game theorists are solving for human adaptability and uncertainty with some success. Indeed, I used game theoretic reasoning on May 5, 2010 to predict to a large investment group’s portfolio committee that Mubarak’s regime faced replacement, especially by the Muslim Brotherhood, in the coming year. That prediction did not rely on in-depth knowledge of Egyptian history and culture or on expert judgment but rather on a game theory model called selectorate theory and its implications for the concurrent occurrence of logically derived revolutionary triggers. Thus, while the desire for revolution had been present in Egypt (and elsewhere) for many years, logic suggested that the odds of success and the expected rewards for revolution were rising swiftly in 2010 in Egypt while the expected costs were not.

This is but one example that highlights what Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, who was quoted by Gardner and Tetlock, has said about game theory and prediction (referring, as it happens, to a specific model I developed for predicting policy decisions): “Bueno de Mesquita has demonstrated the power of using game theory and related assumptions of rational and self-seeking behavior in predicting the outcome of important political and legal processes.” Nice as his statement is for me personally, the broader point is that game theory in the hands of much better game theorists than I am has the potential to transform our ability to anticipate the consequences of alternative choices in many aspects of human interaction.

How can game theory be harnessed to achieve reliable prediction? Acting like a fox, I gather information from a wide variety of experts. They are asked only for specific current information (Who wants to influence a decision? What outcome do they currently advocate? How focused are they on the issue compared to other questions on their plate? How flexible are they about getting the outcome they advocate? And how much clout could they exert?). They are not asked to make judgments about what will happen. Then, acting as a hedgehog, I use that information as data with which to seed a dynamic applied game theory model. The model’s logic then produces not only specific predictions about the issues in question, but also a probability distribution around the predictions. The predictions are detailed and nuanced. They address not only what outcome is likely to arise, but also how each “player” will act, how they are likely to relate to other players over time, what they believe about each other, and much more. Methods like this are credited by the CIA, academic specialists and others, as being accurate about 90 percent of the time based on large-sample assessments. These methods have been subjected to peer review with predictions published well ahead of the outcome being known and with the issues forecast being important questions of their time with much controversy over how they were expected to be resolved. This is not so much a testament to any insight I may have had but rather to the virtue of combining the focus of the hedgehog with the breadth of the fox. When facts are harnessed by logic and evaluated through replicable tests of evidence, we progress toward better prediction.

#### No risk of “endless warfare”- we should embrace pragmatism in

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

# 1nr at court capital da

#### Economics is not socially constructed and acting like it is collapses the economy

**Foss, 11** (Nicolai prof business/strategy @ Copenhagen U “[The Performative Effects of Social Constructionist](http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2011/02/04/the-performative-effects-of-social-constructionist-professors-in-bschools/)Professors in Business School” <http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2011/02/04/the-performative-effects-of-social-constructionist-professors-in-bschools/>)

Many European business schools praise disciplinary diversity. Some style themselves as “business universities,” rather than “traditional” business schools. Such schools may have a substantial contingent of faculty from the humanities, including historians, literary theorists, and philosophers, as well as sociologists and political scientists. The probability of such faculty subscribing tosocial constructionism is high. Typically, this perspective is taught to the students in courses on communication, whether intercultural or not, the theory of science, cross-cultural management, and so on. It is pretty much everywhere. Those in sociology who stress “reflexivity” and “performativity” tell us that our theorizing, as mediated through teaching, influences the objects of theorizing. What may be the performative effect of social constructionist professors? My hypothesis is that the students they teach will end up acting like Hayek’s “constructivist rationalists” on the level of society, that is, managers who believe everything in organizations is malleable, and may therefore do substantial damage to the organizations they manage. [The Wiki on social constructionism](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_constructionism) provides a neat summary of [Ian Hacking’s celebrated critique of social constructionism](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Social-Construction-What-Ian-Hacking/dp/0674004124/ref%3Dsr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1296855718&sr=8-1): Ian Hacking, having examined a wide range of books and articles with titles of the form “The social construction of X” or “Constructing X”, argues that when something is said to be “socially constructed”, this is shorthand for at least the following two claims: (0) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be inevitable. (1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. Hacking adds that the following claims are also often, though not always, implied by the use of the phrase “social construction”: (2) X is quite bad as it is. (3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed. If this is foundational for you as a manager, you will likely have little respect for what has evolved inside an organization, because “it is not inevitable.” You will be unimpressed by efficiency arguments from economics and functionalist arguments from sociology that explain the presence of a given feature of an organization. Your urge is to change the organization erratically according to your whims, and nourish ongoing turmoil. Psychological/implicit contracts suffer. Negative implications for productivity and firm-level performance follow.

#### Economics is good – we should act on economic data even if it isn’t totally accurate

Farrands and Worth 2k5 (Christopher, lecturer in IR @ nottingham U and Owen, lecturer in IR @ limerick U “Critical theory in Global Political Economy: Critique? Knowledge? Emancipation?” Capital &• Class #85)

This paper has set out to analyse forms of critical theory that have been applied within the study of Global Political Economy, and to emphasise other avenues of influence along which critical study can go. All of which leads to the following question: has knowledge in the study of Global Political Economy moved on, and has it moved 'forward'? Does a continuous search for critique take us where we want to go? If knowledge is only provisionally so, and if there is no foundational criterion for truth—or even for validity—then there is one possible path, sketched by the Frankfurt School and marked out by Habermas, which enables us to engage with a 'real world'. We could also take a different path, not discussed here: one that moves away from the principles discussed above, and moves more towards engaging with Foucauldian discourse analysis. From here we could, of course, just stay in the garden and play, as a version of post-modernism might encourage. Or we might, more seriously but not more purposively, conclude that we do not yet know enough, and perhaps cannot ever know enough, to found knowledge claims sufliciently firmly that they might constitute grounds for actions which cannot be imperial, oppressive or ineffective. But we have to admit to an assertion here. It seems to us that Global Political Economy does not allow us the luxury of inaction, even if we run the risk of mistake. GPE is still founded, as it always has been, on the questions that Cox raised: knowledge for somebody and for something in a given context. This imposes a responsibility that we cannot shrug off in play, or in a retreat to inward contemplation. It also returns to what we have argued are fundamental questions in critical theory: die attempt to bring together accounts of symbolic and material forms of power and domination; the impact of the interaction of the aesthetic and the political in ordering the economic imagination; and the problem of giving an account of consciousness, and of the sociology of knowledge. This places emphasis, in turn, on the need for refiexive thinking, and for reflexive imagination in research. And it underscores the need for practical and critical knowledge to be grounded in a common project: the two are not separate, nor are they possible if one is securely grounded and the other is tagged on as an afterthought. But it also calls to mind the provisional nature of any critical knowledge that we might claim: critical knowledge is fi-agile, and the conventions which encode it are always, and unavoidably, in danger of being taken away or co-opted back to an orthodoxy. We cannot doubt that critical-practical knowledge is possible, which is to say that we cannot allow ourselves to doubt, although the lived experience of writers such as Gramsci might help us to recognise the struggles involved. But the fact that it is—while possible—always difficult, always provisional, always fragile, is vital to understanding the ways in which we might approach it. Much that claims to be 'critical' is interesting; some of it is repetitive; but relatively little seems to appreciate the commitments involved in the claim to be critical. If we are to take and hold to the three-pronged virtues of critique, knowledge and emancipation, as the signs of a prerequisite for critical theory, then the building of 'schools' developed either to hold to one set construction of historicism (as is the case with the Coxian-inspired neo-Gramscian School), or to promote a certain form of problematic emancipation, needs to be critiqued within the tradition of critical theory. To be properly critical is to engage in a commitment to a certain mode of working, and one in which we cannot expect definite, permanent results. There is no continuous, unfolding telos; but the results that we obtain are significant, not just because they are all we can expect, but because they are sufficient for the grounding of a critical, elaborated radicalism.

# 1nr trauma comes first

#### No answer to root cause claims – prefer proximate causes – Greene and Sharpe evidence

#### Positivism is the necessary epistemology for studying IR—the alternative creates epistemological anarchy and destroys empirical analysis

Brown, 2011 (Vernon, Cardiff U, “The Reflectivist Critique of Positivist IR Theory”, http://www.e-

ir.info/?p=7328)

There is a great deal of support for the positivist approach in IR despite the critiques presented above. As the survey by Maliniak et al. showed, seventy percent of American IR scholars still consider themselves as positivists with a number of the rest not yet reflectivist. This is significant as the United States is still considered to be the major force in IR scholarship. There are many reasons for this continued success of positivism in IR, the majority of which have to do with either the continued reliance on empirical methods or the failure of many reflectivists, especially the post-modernists, to offer any suggestions to fill the epistemological void left by their passing. David Houghton (2008, p.118) addresses both of these by writing that despite their critique, reflectivists continue to use empirical, observational methods and that is not possible to be anything but positivist because, as he writes, ‘truth claims about the world have to come from somewhere’. He also suggests that reflectivists are essentially engaging in what can only be perceived as a negative exercise since by continually deconstructing theories one will eventually be left with nothing that is considered a legitimate theory. Another issue raised in response to the reflectivist critique focuses on the pluralism which scholars have called for in the face of epistemological relativism. Lapid (1989, p.249) warns that such pluralism, ‘If adopted uncritically or taken to its logical conclusion, [can] deteriorate into a condition of epistemological anarchy under which almost any position can legitimately claim equal hearing’, and that in such a state it would become nearly impossible to distinguish theoretical proliferation from theoretical growth. Positivism defends itself by claiming that scholarship is inherently observational, therefore empirical, and that if reflectivism is followed to its logical endpoint there would be no legitimate theories left because they would have been either deconstructed or created without a means of testing their legitimacy. Conclusion: The critique of positivism by the reflectivists is fundamentally an epistemological one. Each side can and does make compelling arguments showing the strength of their position. While it is important to acknowledge the positivists’ attempts to ground the discipline in a naturalist, scientific area there is still the obvious fact that the assumptions on which their epistemology is based are too easily deconstructed when they attempt to explain phenomena and make predictions in the socially constructed world which IR purports to study. As Milja Kurki (2009, p.442) suggests, positivism fails to acknowledge the possibility that all theories are at some level ‘politically and socially contextualized’. This creates the possibility for positivist theories to create predictions that are fundamentally flawed as they have failed to take into account the context within which their facts are constructed. This in turn allows the reflectivist theorists to deconstruct the predictions due to misunderstandings that arise from the lack of context in the positivists’ predictions. The question of what positivism has to say in a socially constructed and interpreted world is still an important one, however, since the study of IR is still in many ways observational and therefore empirical. There is also the valid claim that in the face of the possible anarchical pluralism or lack of legitimate theories left by reflectivist critiques there needs to be some sense of scientific and theoretical grounding, and that positivism provides that very thing. In the end, reflectivism performs a valuable service in widening the range of legitimate research that is possible by IR scholars and allowing such research to take into account the understanding that the issues studied are birthed by social conventions. There still must be, however, some framework within this study to prevent the anarchy that could follow in the wake of reflectivism and while positivism is in no ways perfect, or even close to it, it still provides such a framework that if made to be self-reflective and continually evolving, could provide the stability needed.

**Their framework offense reflects a psychic retreat from immediate political exigencies and a paranoid despair about reality that they try to alleviate through dogmatic attachment to theory**

**Bird, 6 –** University of the West of England, Bristol, UK (John, Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society, “On the Poverty of Theory”, December, proquest)

We could now think about theory and the attachment to theory as a form of psychic retreat, especially where this attachment avoids contact with reality and gives us a feeling of being locked in, such that theory becomes an end-in-itself. This allows the free flow of phantasy and omnipotence in which the community of theorists avidly colludes. Theory allows protection - from external and internal anxieties, "[but] at the expense of [the] development and evolution of meaning" (Armstrong, 1998, p 7). Thus, Lacan and Zizek have the answer for everything - even the answer to which is the real Freud - and the community of Lacanians and Zizekians colludes with this and excludes those who are not in the community.

If theory is a form of psychic retreat then what are the anxieties that this retreat is addressing? With reference to depressive affects, the helplessness and despair of the theorist in the face of terrible social and political events - 9/11, global warming, famine, the Asian Tsunami, 7/7 in London - make theory an attractive retreat, an alternative to engagement with the realities of despair. With reference to paranoid-schizoid anxieties, the persecution of the theorist when faced with the call to certainty and a return to fundamental truths may lead to a paranoid attachment to theory through retreat from both a real and a phantasied persecution. These forms of retreat may be exacerbated in three ways: first, through the paranoid style in much contemporary political and social action and thought, a paranoid style exacerbated by the fear engendered by the war on terror; second, through the peculiar and particular conditions of the social production of knowledge in the academy (Sibley, 2004), with its attachment to systems of quality control and assessment, of tenure and promotion, of user engagement and so on; and third, through what seem to be the structural conditions of post-modernity, in which the fragmentation of the self and of identity become, as it were, normal conditions. The structural insecurities of flexible labour markets, and the constant pressure to change and cultivate identities, feed into forms of defensive attachment to theory (Bauman, 2005).

False self-relationships to theories

The idea that theory may be a form of psychic retreat implies that we often use theory for defensive purposes, both as individuals and as members of social organizations. As Belger suggests (2002), we can approach the difficulties and dangers of theory in another, but related way, that is, with reference to Winnicott's idea of the False Self:
*...this False Self functions as the reactive protector of the true core of the individual in an environmental context in which impingements [infantile and contemporary] and neglect, rather than attunements, have dominated the developmental field... . The False Self is reactive instead of proactive. (Belger, 2002, p 51)*

In the context of theory - in this case, the role of theory in the training of analysts - Belger postulates false self-relationships to theory which "foreclose potential space and inhibit the healthy development of the therapist-as-subject" (Belger, 2002, p 51). As such, there is "an elaboration of the intellectual at the expense of the real" (p 55). These defensive, false self-relationships to theory are further analysed by Ogden:
*The illusion of knowing is achieved through the creation of a wide range of substitute formations that fill the "potential space" in which desire and fear, appetite and fullness, love and hate might otherwise come into being... . In the absence of the capacity to generate potential space, one relies on defensive substitutes for the experience of being alive... . (Ogden, 1989, cited in Belger, 2002, p 55).*

Theory becomes defensive and delusional and provides us with a phantasy of being all-knowing and omnipotent. For Belger and Ogden, the problem becomes one of releasing omnipotent control in much the same way that the infant may find it difficult to release its control in its relationships with carers. As Belger suggests, following Wheelis (1958), theory becomes a way in which we foreclose creativity, such that it is not experience which dictates what might be called truth, but dogma. As we will see later, this release of control and this withdrawal from theoretical dogma is part of the development of what could be called a healthy relationship to theory.

# 1nr terrorism

**The 1ac lacks evidence for its assertions and lacks a coherent method for generating its own truth claims – their authors are blinded by their anti-Western ideology and unconcerned with showing supporting data – this prevents generating any useful alternative – Jones and Smith, 9**

**Discourse on terrorism is inevitable and focusing on it detracts from analysis of proximate causes – means that their analysis or 1ac is not at all political**

**Their criticism is based on a poorly researched caricature of terrorism studies, orthodox analysis includes a self-reflexive element that makes the permutation more likely to succeed than the alternative. Pure rejection of the Western social order won’t replace terrorism discourse and is likely to reinforce the totalitarian impulse of al Qaeda**

**Schmid, 9** - Chair in International Relations; the Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University(Alex, Perspectives on Terrorism, v.3, issue 4, Book Review of “Critical Terrorism Studies. A new research agenda. by Richard Jackson”, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=96>

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman they set up to shoot - ”orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and blind on one eye.

**The discourse of historical events such as 9/11 as “ruptures” that “change everything” is a form of historical bracketing that facilitates colonial amnesia and legitimizes violent power relations**

Hecht ‘2 Gabriel, Professor of Anthropology @ University of Michigan, “Rupture-Talk in the Nuclear Age:

Conjugating Colonial Power in Africa”

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~hechtg/articles/rupture-talk.pdf

This paper explores two areas usually left off the nuclear map: Madagascar and Gabon, where the French mined and processed uranium ore, starting in the 1950s. I analyse how the twin rupture-talks of nuclearity and decolonization became intertwined, first by examining the production of these rupture-talks by French expatriates, then by exploring how sociotechnical practices at each site both belied and performed claims to rupture for African mineworkers. I thus aim to go beyond the ritual debunking of rupture-talk, in which scholars demonstrate that the sharp breaks proclaimed by ´elites masked profound continuities. Tracing continuity *is* important: uranium mining in Africa *was* strongly shaped by colonialism, and any changes it wrought were neither big nor sudden. At the same time, nuclear and **postcolonial rupture-talk were far more than mere rhetoric. Rupture-talk had material effects. It was inscribed in sociotechnical practice, it staked claims to power, and it created expectations among both ´elites and non-´elites.** The tensions between rupture-talk and colonial continuities created spaces within which nuclearity and decolonization confronted and shaped one another. *Via* the sociotechnical practices produced by these tensions, Malagasy and Gabonese negotiated the realities of decolonization, and the local meanings of the nuclear age. One source of tension between rupture-talk and colonial continuity, I argue, was the mapping of sociotechnical practices on to racial and ethnic hierarchies, and on to ideas about citizenship and the state. French engineers and geologists helped to mutate the ‘civilizing mission’ into developmentalist discourse by proclaiming the end of racial divisions and the triumph of technological skill as the foundation of social relations.4 I show that technological knowledge did offer some Malagasy and Gabonese a mechanism for economic and social mobility, but race never dropped out of the equation. A second source of tension concerned mobility itself, both physical and social. Geological necessity demanded ongoing prospecting, both locally and globally.5 Uranium mining was thus an inherently mobile practice, and geographical motion provided opportunities for social mobility. Malagasy and Gabonese who acquired the sociotechnical skills needed for prospecting (and a few other domains) had good career prospects. For French experts, meanwhile, a stint overseas offered a fast track up. As we will see, mobility as a sociotechnical practice could involve moving up, moving away, or even staying put. Throughout my analysis, I argue that **sociotechnical practices ‘conjugated’ colonial power relations.** This metaphor requires explanation.6 Conjugating a verb preserves its root while changing either its tense, its subject (person), or both. Conjugation transforms the meaning of a sentence by shifting its time frame or by changing who performs the action. Sometimes these are radical transformations, sometimes not. Conjugation thus enacts continuity and change simultaneously. When I say that sociotechnical practices conjugated colonial power relations, therefore, I am both highlighting the dynamics between rupture-talk and continuity and emphasizing their inseparability. **I aim to call attention not simply to a *disjunction* between real and imagined technological futures (the time-shift produced by conjugation), but also to the *relationship* between these futures.** I hope to show not just *that* Africans shaped both nuclearity and decolonization (the subject-shift produced by conjugation), but also *how* their involvement mattered.