# 1nr addons

**No shortage of water**

**Radford 8** (Benjamin, Writer for Skeptical Inquirer, “The Water Shortage Myth”, 6-23, <http://www.livescience.com/environment/080623-bad-water-shortage.html>)

Our planet is not running out of water, nor is it losing water. There's about 360 quintillion gallons of water on the planet, and it's not going anywhere except in a circle. Earth's hydrologic cycle is a closed system, and the process is as old as time: evaporation, condensation, precipitation, infiltration, and so on. In fact, there is probably more liquid water on Earth than there was just a few decades *ago*, due in part to global warming and melting polar ice caps.The problemsNo, there is plenty of water. The problem is that the vast majority of Earth's water is contained in the oceans as saltwater, and must be desalinated before it can be used for drinking or farming.Large-scale desalination can be done, but it is expensive. But nor is the world running out of freshwater, either. There's plenty of freshwater on our blue globe; it is not raining any less these days than it did millennia ago. As with any other resource, there are of course regional shortages, and they are getting worse. But the real problems areavailability and transport; moving the freshwater from where it is plentiful (such as Canada, South America, and Russia) to where it is scarce (such as the Middle East, India, and Africa). Water is heavy and costly to transport, and those who can afford it will always have water.Water, not global warming, is likely to be the greatest environmental challenge facing the world in the coming decades and centuries.To find solutions, it's important to understand the problem. Water is never really "wasted." It simply moves from one place to another. If you let your faucet drip all day, that's clean water going back into the system, the water isn't "lost." What is lost is usefulness, money, and energy, because it takes energy to purify and distribute the water.

**No water wars–empirically false for decades**

**Victor, 07 –** professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directed a task force on energy security (David, “What Resource Wars?”, The National Interest, 11/12, http://nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)

While there are many reasons to fear global warming, the risk that such dangers could cause violent conflict ranks extremely low on the list because it is highly unlikely to materialize. Despite decades of warnings about water wars, what is striking is that water wars don’t happen—usually because countries that share water resources have a lot more at stake and armed conflict rarely fixes the problem. Some analysts have pointed to conflicts over resources, including water and valuable land, as a cause in the Rwandan genocide, for example. Recently, the UN secretary-general suggested that climate change was already exacerbating the conflicts in Sudan. But none of these supposed causal chains stay linked under close scrutiny—the conflicts over resources are usually symptomatic of deeper failures in governance and other primal forces for conflicts, such as ethnic tensions, income inequalities and other unsettled grievances. Climate is just one of many factors that contribute to tension. The same is true for scenarios of climate refugees, where the moniker “climate” conveniently obscures the deeper causal forces.

**Second export relies on total transition to SMRs – wouldn’t solve the economy in time**

**No impact to electrification – the economy is resilient**

**Washington Times 2008** – chief political correspondent for The Washington Times (7/28, Donald Lambro, The Washington Times, "Always darkest before dawn", lexis, WEA)

The doom-and-gloomers are still with us, of course, and they will go to their graves forecasting that life as we know it is coming to an end and that we are in for years of economic depression and recession. Last week, the New York Times ran a Page One story maintaining that Americans were saving less than ever, and that their debt burden had risen by an average of $117,951 per household. And the London Telegraph says there are even harder times ahead, comparing today's economy to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Wall Street economist David Malpass thinks that kind of fearmongering is filled with manipulated statistics that ignore long-term wealth creation in our country, as well as globally. Increasingly, people are investing "for the long run - for capital gains (not counted in savings) rather than current income - in preparation for retirement," he told his clients last week. Instead of a coming recession, "we think the U.S. is in gradual recovery after a sharp two-quarter slowdown, with consumer resilience more likely than the decades-old expectation of a consumer slump," Mr. Malpass said. "Fed data shows clearly that household savings of all types - liquid, financial and tangible - are still close to the record levels set in September. IMF data shows U.S. households holding more net financial savings than the rest of the world combined. Consumption has repeatedly outperformed expectations in recent quarters and year," he said. The American economy has been pounded by a lot of factors, including the housing collapse (a needed correction to bring home prices down to earth), the mortgage scandal and the meteoric rise in oil and gas prices. But this $14 trillion economy, though slowing down, continues to grow by about 1 percent on an annualized basis, confounding the pessimists who said we were plunging into a recession, defined by negative growth over two quarters. That has not happened - yet. Call me a cockeyed optimist, but I do not think we are heading into a recession. On the contrary, I'm more bullish than ever on our economy's long-term prospects.

# 1nr grid

**Terrorist attacks won’t have a major impact on electricity reliability–redundant transmission and generation reserves**

**Michaels, 8** – Adjunct Scholar at CATO and Research Fellow at the Independent Institute (Robert J., Electricity Journal, “A National Renewable Portfolio Standard: Politically Correct, Economically Suspect,” April 2008, vol. 21, no. 3, Lexis-Nexis Academic)

National security and "energy independence." There are few if any important relationships between renewables and energy security for the nation. Security centers on oil, but only 2 percent of the nation's power comes from it and some oil-fired plants can also burn gas. Interruptions of conventional fuel supplies are rare and usually local, but intermittent renewables have their own reliability risks. Some advocates see a national RPS as deterring terrorist attacks on large power plants, but there are surely cheaper ways to achieve this end.59 Security is better addressed directly by facility owners and government formulating a national policy on infrastructure. Electricity requires redundant transmission and generation reserves to maintain reliability, whether outages are caused by lightning or bombs. The destruction of an isolated wind farm achieves less than that of a large generator, but in most scenarios the loss of either will have little effect on reliability.

**Status quo solves a terrorist attack on the grid**

**Fox News, 08** [6/6 “Project Hydra: Keeping Power Out of the Hands of Terrorists http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,364104,00.html]

Fortunately, some groups are stepping in to fill the gap. ConEdison, American Superconductor and the Department of Homeland Security are determined to keep the lights on in New York no matter what terrorists throw at the grid. In less than two years, the three organizations plan to launch a program they’re calling the Resilient Electric Grid, which provides a new superconductor cable that can link up stations and ensure the steady flow of juice to all parts of the city. Right now, if an area like the financial district is targeted and goes down, the grid will not allow any other stations to assist by donating electricity to keep the lights on in that area. But when this superconducting cable is integrated with the existing electrical grid, it will link up substations and allow them to share excess capacity in case of an emergency. In the event of a deliberate attempt to cause a cascading failure similar to the blackout of 2003, it also will be able to limit the current flow between substations during fault conditions.

**Tons of alt causes**

Washington Post 4 [Jay Apt (former NASA astronaut, Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center Executive Director) and Lester Lave (co-director). “Blackouts Are Inevitable: Coping, Not Prevention, Should Be the Primary Goal” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52952-2004Aug9.html WWX]

As we approach the first anniversary of the Blackout of '03, we're reminded of the many times that officials, from New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller in 1977 to Gov. George Pataki now -- along with a host of senators and representatives -- have assured us that they will take steps to prevent future blackouts. Yet roughly every four months, the United States experiences a blackout large enough to darken a half-million homes. Now the pressure is on Congress to enact an energy bill that will protect us from the lights going out. There's just one problem: It can't be done.

In a large, complicated arrangement such as our system for generating, transmitting and distributing electricity, blackouts simply cannot be prevented. Data for the past four decades show that blackouts occur more frequently than theory predicts, and they suggest that it will become increasingly expensive to prevent these low-probability, high-consequence events. The various proposed "fixes" are expensive and could even be counterproductive, causing future failures because of some unanticipated interaction. The state of current engineering is such that we cannot verify that any particular change won't impose problems larger than those it is designed to remedy. Nor can we eliminate all problems. Further, with a bit of "luck" and sufficient resources, an informed, intelligent terrorist organization could get around any protective structures and software to bring down the system.

Fortunately, we do have a model to follow. The problems uncovered by the blackout of August 2003 can be addressed by the kind of changes that transformed the air traffic control system from one that had occasional deadly crashes to one that has provided a relatively crash-free environment, despite enormous growth in daily flights and occasional errors by pilots and controllers.

While making obvious improvements in control and operation of the grid, we should focus the greater part of our effort on fulfilling the mission of the electricity system, not on trying to prevent blackouts. When hurricanes, tornadoes, ice storms or other problems black out the system, backup generators at hospitals, airports and other critical institutions prevent their missions from being interrupted.

The problem in New York, Toronto, Cleveland and Detroit last Aug. 14 was not that the hospitals or television stations were blacked out. The problem was that other critical missions could not be accomplished. Elevators were stuck between floors, trains stopped between stations, traffic lights went dark, cell phones quieted, and, in Cleveland, water ceased to flow and sewers overflowed. Water treatment and pumping the water to reservoirs requires electricity; without power, water would cease to be available to many people after just a few days. If the blackout had persisted for a week, public health and welfare would have suffered from the failure of a rapidly growing number of critical missions.

Since transmission was a prime contributor to the blackout, one proposal has been to invest $100 billion in upgrading the system. But while transmission investments are required to make deregulated electricity markets work, they will not prevent future blackouts.

Natural hazards produce many local and regional blackouts, and society has learned to cope with them. In fact, August 2003 revealed that many private institutions are far ahead of the public sector in defining their critical missions and taking steps to fulfill them when the lights go out. But it was even more obvious that other facilities, and especially such public functions as traffic lights, water and sewage, were not protected. In the public sector, we need to set priorities among the missions that depend on electricity.

**Their impact is overstated—resilience and adaptation check**

**Farrell et al, 02 -** research engineer in the Department of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University and the executive director of the Carnegie Mellon Electricity Industry Center (Alexander, “Bolstering the Security of the Electric Power System,” Issues in Science and Technology, Spring, http://www.issues.org/18.3/farrell.html)

Turning out the lights

Many terrorism scenarios involve disruption of electric service, or "turning out the lights." Whether this would allow terrorists to create widespread fear and panic is open to question. In the United States, households lose power for an average of 90 minutes per year. For the most part, individuals and society cope with these outages well, and power companies respond rapidly to restore service. Facilities that have special needs for reliability, such as hospitals and airports, typically have backup generators.

The local distribution system is the source of most outages; these affect relatively small numbers of people. The bulk power (generation and transmission) system causes only a few outages each year. In its most recent report on failures in this part of the electric power system, the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) identified 58 "interruptions, unusual occurrences, demand and voltage reductions, and public appeals" in 2000. Of these events, almost half (26) were due to weather, mostly thunderstorms. Operator or maintenance errors accounted for 12 events, another 12 were due to faulty equipment, and 2 (including the largest single event) were due to forest fires. Six outages occurred simply due to failure to have sufficient power to meet demand. Not all of these 58 events caused the lights to go out, but when they did, many customers were affected. Even so, recovery was typically swift. The largest single outage in 2000 affected more than 660,000 customers in New Mexico but lasted for less than four hours.

Natural challenges of even larger scale have been met. For example, in January 1998 an ice storm struck Southern Canada and New York State, felling 1,000 transmission towers and 30,000 distribution poles while sending thousands of tree branches into power lines. This event left 1.6 million people without power, some for more than a month. Almost a quarter-million people were forced to leave their homes. Insurance claims reached about $1 billion (Canadian). This event was disruptive and costly, but it did not create terror or significant loss of life.

# 1nr solvency

#### sabotage and attacks on SMRS are likely -- that shuts down plants and turns the case.

Wong, ‘12

[Kelvin, Associate Research Fellow – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, 5-22, “Beyond Weapons: The Military’s Quest For Nuclear Power – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, http://www.eurasiareview.com/22052012-beyond-weapons-the-militarys-quest-for-nuclear-power-analysis/]

Civilian And Military Nuclear Incidents Despite improvements in nuclear safety, public sentiment on nuclear power is generally unfavourable, particularly after a series of high-profile nuclear incidents over the years. Disasters like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the recent Fukushima episodes have sorely demonstrated the perils of operating nuclear reactors, emanating be it from human error or natural calamities. Military forces have also been stung by peacetime nuclear incidents. In March 2008, the American nuclear submarine USS Houston leaked minute amounts of radiation into Sasebo naval base while on a port call, triggering condemnation from Japanese citizens in the district. In the same year, the British nuclear submarine HMS Trafalgar leaked hundreds of litres of radioactive wastewater into a nearby river while docked at Devonport naval base, raising concerns from nuclear safety experts. Mainstream Nuclear Power In The Military? Yet military scientists have not ceased to be tempted by the potential of nuclear power. In response to increasing oil prices and global supply uncertainties, and well-documented cases of logistical strain on forces operating in the Middle East in recent conflicts, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) issued a proposal for innovative solutions in deployable compact nuclear reactors in 2010. In the proposal, DARPA outlined the need to reduce the logistical burden of supplying forward operating bases and forces without access to reliable fuel supply lines. The proposal also suggested that materials science have advanced to the stage where it might have a positive impact on deployable nuclear reactor research. While recent developments suggest that nuclear power technology can potentially be employed in unmanned aircraft and on the ground, it is unlikely to have mainstream military utility. The Cold War period was an era when general attitudes towards nuclear energy were quite favourable, and military experimentation was only limited by funding and scientific expertise. In contrast, nuclear power today has become a hotly debated issue despite its importance in powering the economies of advanced nations today. For the military, the problem with nuclear power is not just about cost and safety, but also of the nature of its operating environment. Deploying volatile nuclear reactors into harm’s way on the battlefield, where their destruction and sabotage are likely, should give military planners cause to pause

#### Military SMRs create unique risks -- hostile operating environments make disasters likely.

**Smith, ‘11**

[Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy -- CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations]

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage. The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”: 1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.” The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me. The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.

#### Even SMR advocates concede forward deployed reactors fail -- they’re a key target for attacks and can easily be stolen.

Andres & Breetz, ‘11

[Richard B. Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for

National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, Hanna L., doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February, “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications,” <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20262%20Andres.pdf>]

Using the emerging technology at expeditionary locations carries far greater risks. Besides the concerns outlined above, forward located reactors could be subject to attack. Today, forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan are regularly subjected to mortar attacks, suggesting that reactors at such locations could make these bases prime targets for attack. Since forward bases are also subject to capture, any design proposal that envisions deployment at forward operating bases must incorporate contingency plans in the event that reactors fall into enemy hands.

# 1nr obstacles

#### Still tons of variables to be resolved -- SMRs can’t be operational for at least a decade.

#### King et al., ‘11

[Marcus, Research Analyst and Project Director at CNA Corporation's Center for Naval Analyses, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf]

Designs for small reactors are at various levels of technological readiness and some are about to begin the NRC licensing process, but none have been licensed or constructed yet. Consequently, there are a number of unresolved certification, licensing, and regulatory issues. The size of the emergency planning zone that should surround the reactor is an example of such an issue. Resolving these issues will take time and resources. NRC representatives have indicated that they expect these issues could be resolved by the middle of the decade and that a plant could be built and operating by about 2020.

#### Siting concerns block solvency.

#### King et al., ‘11

[Marcus, Research Analyst and Project Director at CNA Corporation's Center for Naval Analyses, LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, March, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf]

With respect to the requirement to “consider the potential impact on the quality of life of personnel stationed at military installations at which a nuclear power plant is installed and ways to mitigate those impacts,” it is impossible to talk in specific terms without knowing details about which specific power plant is being considered and the specific locations being considered. In general terms, finding an appropriate site will be challenging. Part of the reason finding an appropriate site will be challenging is because the NRC site consideration process will force full consideration of these factors. Describing the NRC site assessment process is the best and most relevant information that can be provided with respect to this aspect of feasibility at this stage in the process. The NRC approval process described in this section will require that any potential impacts on the quality of life of personnel stationed at military installations at which a nuclear power plant is proposed will be fully considered and that ways are planned to mitigate those impacts.

# 1nr prolif

**It’s inevitable—American foreign policy hypocrisy**

**Deen, 07** (Thalif, Inter Press Service News Agency, 5/31, IPS, “Politics: Security Council Called Hypocritical on Nukes”, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=37994)

The political and moral authority of the five veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to sit in judgment over n uclear non-proliferation is being challenged in a new report released Thursday. By virtue of the U.N. charter, says the study, the Security Council has broad powers to enforce disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation requirements, including the imposition of economic sanctions and authorisation of military action. But the five permanent member states (P-5), the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia, all with huge nuclear arsenals, "are showing no operational signs of intending to eliminate" the deadly weapons. "This means that UNSC decisions regarding compliance with nuclear non-proliferation requirements are automatically suspect in the eyes of much of the world," says the study titled "Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security? U.S. Weapons of Terror, the Global Proliferation Crisis and Paths to Peace." The joint study was conducted by three public interest groups: the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) of New York, the Western States Legal Foundation of California and the New York-based Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Dr John Burroughs, executive director of LCNP, said the failure of the P-5 members to take seriously their nuclear disarmament obligations "have sapped their moral and political authority to address non-proliferation situations." This is especially so beginning with the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, and continuing on to the current confrontation with Iran, he added. "It is also the case, however, that countries around the world want an effective political body at the top of the international political structure, to play a role in solving problems that undermine international peace and security," Burroughs told IPS. So there is still a lot of support for the Security Council, despite its defects, he argued. "The P-5 could do a lot to build the authority of the UNSC, by reforming the Council to make it more representative, accountable, and transparent." Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, a senior fellow with the Centre for Peace and Security Studies and an Adjunct Full Professor in the Security Studies Programme at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in Georgetown University, said the UNSC has the legal authority to deal with nuclear weapons and proliferation issues. Unfortunately, the P-5, who are also the five original nuclear powers, have failed to live up to their commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), she added. "This has severely undermined their credibility with respect to would-be nuclear powers," Goldring told IPS. In particular, she said, the pursuit of new nuclear weapons by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush virtually guarantees that other countries will choose similar paths.

**Hypocrisy is inevitable – prevents solvency**

**AFP, 08** [6/28Agence France-Presse, June 28 2008, “40 years on, NPT in urgent need of overhaul : experts”, <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jYtI8aBDz9zoEK8A40NI9J8JO7nQ>]

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, which celebrates its 40th birthday this week, may have succeeded in keeping the number countries in possession of nuclear weapons down to a mere handful. But the treaty, drawn up during the Cold War period, is now in urgent need of an overhaul if it is to meet present-day challenges such as the proliferation crises in North Korea, Iran and most recently Syria, experts said. Furthermore, the United States should take the lead in bolstering the legitimacy of the NPT and the entire non-proliferation regime by **dismantling its nuclear arsenal**, the experts said. Opened for signature on July 1, 1968 and put into effect on March 5, 1970, the NPT is the most universal arms control treaty in force. Its stated goal is to stop the nuclear arms race and seek nuclear disarmament. Five countries that had tested nuclear weapons before the treaty's completion -- China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States -- were recognised as nuclear-weapon states and obligated to pursue "effective measures" toward nuclear disarmament. All others were designated non-nuclear-weapon states and prohibited from acquiring nuclear arms at all. A major problem was that no specific target date was laid down for disarmament. And with the nuclear states apparently reluctant to dismantle and destroy their nuclear arsenals, the non-nuclear weapon states **see little incentive to keep their part of the bargain.** It had created a world of "nuclear haves and have-nots ... which **cannot be sustained** indefinitely," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. "Nuclear weapons are dangerous no matter who possesses them," he told AFP. K. Subrahmanyam, a former director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies, agreed. "It cannot be legal for some countries to possess a category of weapons while it is illegal for others to do so. A regime that is based on such inequity **cannot be expected to be stable or secure against further proliferation**," Subrahmanyam wrote in a recent article for the Arms Control Association. Perhaps one of the NPT's biggest flaws is the limited power there is to enforce it. Inspections, carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, are voluntary and countries largely control inspectors' movements. Furthermore, there are **no penalties for breaking the NPT**, apart from being reported to the UN Security Council. Experts acknowledge the NPT's success in curbing the number of states in possession of nuclear weapons. "In 1960, (US President) John F. Kennedy warned as many as 20 nations could acquire a nuclear weapon in less that decade. They didn't," said Joe Cirincione, President of the Washington-based Ploughshares Fund. "There are only nine countries with nuclear weapons today. Why? A big part of the reason is the bipartisan, multinational effort that lead to the NPT," Cirincione told AFP. Thanks to the NPT, "there are now far fewer countries that have nuclear weapons or weapon programmes than there were in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s," the expert said. Nevertheless, the non-proliferation regime had suffered important setbacks, notably the cases of North Korea and Iran, and more recently Syria. North Korea developed an illicit nuclear weapons programme, which it is only now in the long and slow process of dismantling. Iran is accused of pursuing a weapons programme under the guise of peaceful nuclear power and Syria has recently come under fire for allegedly building a covert nuclear facility. "These recent setbacks are not the fault of the NPT structure, but rather a problem of enforcement and international support," said Cirincione. "Too often 'realpolitik' will influence decisions like the Indian Nuclear Deal that **undermine the treaty**. The NPT is very clear. All proliferation is bad, not just proliferation among potential enemies." Kimball similarly believes the **United States is undermining the NPT**, not only by repudiating its disarmament commitments, but by seeking to carve out special exemptions from the rules for allies such India.

**Prolif is completely inevitable**

**Cha, 2001** [Victor, Associate Prof. Gov. and School of Foreign Service – Georgetown U., Journal of Strategic Studies, “The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, 24:4, InformaWorld]

This contribution makes two arguments with regard to the causes and consequences of the second nuclear age in Asia. Regarding causes of proliferation, I argue that these are overdetermined in Asia. As was the case in the first nuclear age, proliferation derives largely from the intersection of security-scarcity and resource constraints. However, in addition to these basic security drivers, there are a plethora of secondary drivers ranging from domestic forces, political currency (insurance and bargaining), prestige, and a healthy dose of skepticism regarding first world hypocrisy that explain the region's proliferation. The combination of these primary and secondary drivers not only ensures that proliferation is overdetermined in Asia, but also means that rollback of these capabilities, though desirable, is not likely.