## 1nc

**We agree with the 1AC except for their decision to describe their tactics as “revolutionary”**

**Use of the term “revolution” uniquely asserts a claim over its meaning, which is bound up with past historical revolutions and signifies a radical break with the prior edifices of power**

**Coombs ’11** Nathan, PhD candidate in Political Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London “Political Semantics of the Arab Revolts/Uprisings/Riots/ Insurrections/Revolutions” Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies , Issue 4 (2011) http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue4/138\_146\_POLITICAL\_SEMANTICS\_JCGS4.pdf

But **why exactly is the term ‘revolution’ so politically-charged in comparison to others such as ‘revolt’, ‘uprising’, ‘riot’ or ‘insurrection’?** Let us propose that it is because of all the above terms, ‘revolution’ is the one that implies the deepest content . **It does not simply describe mass political actions, crowds on the street, or governments falling. Instead, it announces an affirmation of the systematic overhaul of existing socio-economic conditions, within which the popular mobilisation plays an essential role even while it remains insufficient to represent the overhaul itself** (this, at least, is the French revolutionary and Marxist conception—and even non-Marxist revolutionaries would like to maintain its potency of implication). **Thus, the question moves. Once the innocuous language of ‘revolts/uprisings/riots/insurrections’ is delineated from the more affective term ‘revolution’, the ideological divide between the two vocabularies becomes an expression of the hermeneutic claim over ‘revolution’**, which is necessarily bound up with the continuities and ruptures of the 20th century’s revolutionary and anti-revolutionary sequences.

**This claim as it occurs neutrally is simply a re-assertion of change for its own sake, which ideologically underpins the consolidations of hegemonic apparatuses of economic power -- establishing a covert vehicle of neoliberal domination**

**Coombs ’11** Nathan, PhD candidate in Political Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London “Political Semantics of the Arab Revolts/Uprisings/Riots/ Insurrections/Revolutions” Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies , Issue 4 (2011) http://www.criticalglobalisation.com/Issue4/138\_146\_POLITICAL\_SEMANTICS\_JCGS4.pdf

**What does this formal theorisation of ‘revolution’ reveal?** It demonstrates that if revolution is perceived to have reached an end, we need to take that not literally to mean that there are no longer any revolutions, as in the phenomena of an act of a revolutionary uprising, or the toppling of a government. It is rather that **once revolutions no longer take place within the sequence of Marxism, or in the context of any new sequence, the term collapses to its non-subjective definien**. As Lazarus (2007, pp. 262-263) concludes: **“Revolution… belongs as a category to the historicism that is fuelled by both defunct socialism and parliamentarianism,” because, “historicism keeps a place for the word ‘revolution’ ... in post-socialist parliamentarianism following the fall of the Berlin Wall.” We are now in a position to understand the relation of ‘Marxism’ to ‘revolution’ and to ‘event’.** If Marxism was the sequence which created an event horizon dividing subjects and non-subjects across the 20th century, it is only from a position subjectively inside that event horizon that we can talk of a ‘last revolution’—as Badiou, a Maoist, considers the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Only as part of that sequence does his theory of the event make any sense. Take away revolution, and all your are left with is the idea of the event in its subtracted purity: Rx’ = {Rx, ex} Thus we have to repudiate Nicolapoulos and Vassilacopolous’ charge of Badiou’s infidelity to the retreat of the revolutionary event; on the contrary, on the event horizon of the Marxist sequence, Badiou’s theory of the event can only make sense within the retreat of that revolutionary sequence. As Badiou (2005, p.483) puts it**: “the word itself lies at the heart of the saturation.” The idea of the event is hermeneutically situated in the context of the contemporary retreat of revolutions containing novelty, and hence for those subjectivated to the 20th century’s sequence, the events, for instance, in the Eastern and Central European anti-Soviet uprisings of the late 1980s, are not revolutions insofar as all they did was end up affirming a pre-existing global, capitalist status quo and normalising their political and economic regimes within it.**

## 1nc

**Prioritizing personal knowledge that engages in resistance against white supremacy erects a new hierarchy of truth. The system only need make its next argument for oppression with black voices in order to successfully refashion the 1AC as a tool for immiseration**

Gur-ze-ev, 98 - Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education at Haifa, (Ilan, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy,” Educational Theory, Fall 48, <http://haifa.academia.edu/IlanGurZeev/Papers/117665/Toward_a_Nonreperssive_Critical_Pedagogy>)

From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of "feelings", "experience", and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully". However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth", "the facts", or ''the real interests of the group" - even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

**The 1ac’s use of one group to represent everything that is wrong with the energy industry asserts the tyranny of the individual. It is a mimicry of the liberal politics of the powerful that demand minority groups submit a single entity to speak on their behalf in order to foreclose a discussion of broader edifices of power. This guarantees that the political potential of the 1AC will simply become another alibi to turn politics into policing**

**Scott, 92** – professor of sociology at Princeton (Joan, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity,” The Identity in Question (Summer, 1992), pp. 12-19, JSTOR)

There is nothing wrong, on the face of it, with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra Mohanty puts it this way:

There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is political" has been recraftedin the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle.5

Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This individualizing, personalizing conception has also been behind some of the recent identity politics of minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its internal critics, "political correctness."

It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this operating. In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression re-places analysis, and this testimony comes to stand for the experience of the whole group. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-becomes the only test of true knowledge.

The exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics into a policing operation: the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity; the test of membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to endorse certain principles and engage in specific political actions, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently "of" the group. That all of this isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group.

**Voting negative means refusing a politics of representation. Reject the 1AC for their claims to represent oppressed peoples in the debate space in favor of a disidentification with the apparatuses of power/knowledge that police identity. Our alternative begs the question of how real political change begins and is a prior question to the 1AC method**

**Tsianos et al. ‘8** Vassilis, teaches sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany, Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches social theory at Cardiff University, Niamh Stephenson teaches social science at the University of New South Wales. “Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century” Pluto Press

**To escape policing and start doing politics necessitates dis-identi- fication - the refusal of assigned, proper places for participation in society.** As indicated earlier, **escape functions** not as a form of exile, nor as mere opposition or protest, but **as an interval which interrupts everyday policing** (Ranciere, 1998). **Political disputes - as distinct from disputes over policing - are not concerned with rights or repre­sentation or with the construction of a majoritarian position in the political arena. They are not even disputes over the terms of inclusion or the features of a minority. They occur prior to inclusion,** beyond the terms of the double-R axiom, **beyond the majority-minority duality.** They are disputes over the existence of those who have no part (and in this sense they are disputes about justice in a Benjaminian sense of the word, Benjamin, 1996a). **Politics arises from the emergence of the miscounted, the imperceptible, those who have no place within the normalising organisation of the social realm. The refusal of represen­tation is a way of introducing the part which is outside of policing, which is not a part of community, which is neither a minority nor intends to be included within the majority. Outside politics is the way to escape the controlling and repressive force of** contemporary politics (that is of **contemporary policing); or else it is a way to change our senses, our habits, our practices in order to experiment together with those who have no part, instead of attempting to include them into the current regime of control. This emergence fractures normalising, police logic. It refigures the perceptible, not so that others can finally recognise one's proper place in the social order, but to make evident the incommensurability of worlds, the incommensurability of an existing distribution of bodies and subjectivities with the principle of equality.** **Politics is a refusal of representation. Politics happens beyond, before representation.** Outside politics is the materialisation of the attempt to occupy this space outside the controlling force of becoming majoritarian through the process of representation. **If we return to our initial question of how people contest control, then we can say that when regimes of control encounter escape they instigate processes of naming and representation. They attempt to reinsert escaping subjectivities into the subject-form. Outside politics arises as people attempt to evade the imposition of control through their subsumption into the subject-form. This is not an attempt simply to move against or to negate representation.** Nor is it a matter of introducing pure potential and imagination in reaction to the constraining power of control. **Rather, escape is a constructive and creative movement - it is a literal, material, embodied movement towards something which cannot be named, towards something which is fictional.** Escape is simultaneously in the heart of social transformation and outside of it. Escape is always here because it is non-literal, witty and hopeful.

**Environmental racism isn’t a monolithic root cause --- focus on the black experience in urban areas results in endless re-articulation of problems without providing space to discuss meaningful solutions. Not only does the 1AC not solve anything, they make the possibility of any amelioration in the material conditions of real people less likely.**

 **Shelby '7** – Tommie Shelby, Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard, 2007, We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity

Others might challenge the distinction between ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage, on the grounds that we are rarely, if ever, able to so neatly separate these factors, an epistemic situation that is only made worse by the fact that these causes interact in complex ways with behavioral factors. These distinctions, while perhaps straightforward in the abstract, are difficult to employ in practice. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the members of a poor black community to determine with any accuracy whether their impoverished condition is due primarily to institutional racism, the impact of past racial injustice, the increasing technological basis of the economy, shrinking state budgets, the vicissitudes of world trade, the ascendancy of conservative ideology, poorly funded schools, lack of personal initiative, a violent drug trade that deters business investment, some combination of these factors, or some other explanation altogether. Moreover, it is notoriously difficult to determine when the formulation of putatively race-neutral policies has been motivated by racism or when such policies are unfairly applied by racially biased public officials.
There are very real empirical difficulties in determining the specific causal significance of the factors that create and perpetuate black disadvantage; nonetheless, it is clear that these factors exist and that justice will demand different practical remedies according to each factor's relative impact on blacks' life chances. We must acknowledge that our social world is complicated and not immediately transparent to common sense, and thus that systematic empirical inquiry, historical studies, and rigorous social analysis are required to reveal its systemic structure and sociocultural dynamics. There is, moreover, no mechanical or infallible procedure for determining which analyses are the soundest ones. In addition, given the inevitable bias that attends social inquiry, legislators and those they represent cannot simply defer to social-scientific experts. We must instead rely on open public debate—among politicians, scholars, policy makers, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens—with the aim of garnering rationally motivated and informed consensus. And even if our practical decision procedures rest on critical deliberative discourse and thus live up to our highest democratic ideals, some trial and error through actual practice is unavoidable.
These difficulties and complications notwithstanding, a general recognition of the distinctions among the ideological and structural causes of black disadvantage could help blacks refocus their political energies and self-help strategies. Attention to these distinctions might help expose the superficiality of theories that seek to reduce all the social obstacles that blacks face to contemporary forms of racism or white supremacy. A more penetrating, subtle, and empirically grounded analysis is needed to comprehend the causes of racial inequality and black disadvantage. Indeed, these distinctions highlight the necessity to probe deeper to find the causes of contemporary forms of racism, as some racial conflict may be a symptom of broader problems or recent social developments (such as immigration policy or reduced federal funding for higher education).

**Highlighting individual resistance is counter-productive -- it exaggerates the role of discourse in institutional formations of oppression and prevents collective solidarity from developing around organizing goals that would benefit many different communities. Revolution is just an excuse for a total failure in cross-cultural communication**

**Chandler, '7** David, Professor of History, The possibilities of post-territorial political community, Area, Volume 39, Issue 1, pages 116–119, Marc

For radical activists – exemplified in the anti-Globalization/Capitalism/War social protests – it would appear that there has been a profound shift away from the politics of parties and collective movements to a much more atomized and individuated form of protest. This was highlighted in the February 2003 anti-Iraq war protest demonstrations which attracted more people than any previous political protests, but which markedly did not produce an anti-war ‘movement’. There was no attempt to win people engaged to a shared position; people expressed disparate and highly personal protests of disengagement, such as the key slogan of ‘Not in My Name’.

Being ‘anti-war’ is today an expression of personal ethics rather than of political engagement and does not indicate that the individual concerned is engaged in a campaign of social change or is interested in either understanding or debating the causes of war (capitalism, human nature, etc.). These forms of practical and intellectual engagement with a political community are only relevant if the desire to end war is understood as a practical or instrumental one.

Similarly, the anti-Globalization protests and collective comings together in World and European Social Forums are not aimed at producing a collective movement but at sharing the feelings and respecting the identities of various groupings involved (Klein 2002;Kingsnorth 2004). The fact that large numbers of people are engaged in these forms of radical protest is in marked contrast to their political impact. The fact that they appeal to the disengaged is their attractive factor, the inability to challenge this disengagement leads to the lack of political consequences.

One of the most individuated expressions of symbolic politics which puts personal ethics above those of a collective engagement is the desire of radical activists to make individual journeys of self-discovery to the conflict areas of the West Bank, Chiapas, Bosnia or Iraq, as humanitarian or aid workers or as ‘human shields’, where they are willing to expose themselves to death or injury as a personal protest against the perceived injustices of the world.

Here the ethics lie in the action or personal sacrifice, rather than in any instrumental consequences. This is the politics of symbolism of personal statement, a politics of individual ethics which, through the ability to travel, becomes immediately global in form as well as in content. There is no desire to engage with people from their own country of origin, in fact, this activism is often accompanied by a dismissal of the formal political process, and by implication the views of those trapped in the state-based politics of the ‘self-satisfied West’ (O’Keefe 2002; Chandler 2003).

AI Qaeda

The desire to take part in martyrdom operations in the cause of the global jihad is representative of the unmediated political action which immediately makes the personal act a global political one. The jihad is a break from the politics of Islamic fundamentalism, in the same way as radical global activism breaks from the traditional politics of the Left and is founded on its historical defeat. The jihad is not concerned with political parties, revolutions or the founding of ideological states (Roy 2004). Al Qaeda's politics are those of the imaginary global space of the ummah making the personal act global in its effects. It is the marginalization and limited means of Al Qaeda that makes its struggle an immediately global one, similar to the marginal and limited struggle of, for example, the Mumbai slum dwellers or the Zapatistas. This marginalization means that their actions lack any instrumentality – i.e. the consequences or responses to their actions are entirely out of their control (Devji 2005).

Where intentionality and instrumentality were central to collective political projects aimed at political ends, martyrdom operations in the West are purely ethical acts – this is gesture politics or the politics of symbolism at its most pure. Al Qaeda has no coherent political programme, shared religious faith or formal organizational framework. The act of martyrdom is the only action for which Al Qaeda claims full responsibility, the autonomy of the self in self-destruction makes the most fully individual act also the most immediately global, in its indiscriminate claim on the viewing public of the global sphere. Martyrdom also reflects other new political trends of the politics of global ethics mentioned above. Those involved need no engagement with political or religious learning, nor any engagement with an external audience, nor relationship with any external reality. The act of martyrdom is in-itself evidence of the highest ethical commitment, the act serves as its own proof and justification, its own final end.

To what extent can we speak of post-territorial political communities?

This disjunction between the human/ethical/global causes of post-territorial political activism and the capacity to ‘make a difference’ is what makes these individuated claims immediately abstract and metaphysical – there is no specific demand or programme or attempt to build a collective project. This is the politics of symbolism. The rise of symbolic activism is highlighted in the increasingly popular framework of ‘raising awareness’– here there is no longer even a formal connection between ethical activity and intended outcomes (Pupavac 2006). Raising awareness about issues has replaced even the pretence of taking responsibility for engaging with the world – the act is ethical in-itself. Probably the most high profile example of awareness raising is the shift from Live Aid, which at least attempted to measure its consequences in fund-raising terms, to Live 8 whose goal was solely that of raising an ‘awareness of poverty’. The struggle for ‘awareness’ makes it clear that the focus of symbolic politics is the individual and their desire to elaborate upon their identity – to make us aware of their ‘awareness’, rather than to engage us in an instrumental project of changing or engaging with the outside world.

It would appear that in freeing politics from the constraints of territorial political community there is a danger that political activity is freed from any constraints of social mediation (see further, Chandler 2004a). **Without being forced to test and hone our arguments, or even to clearly articulate them, we can rest on the radical ‘incommunicability’ of our personal identities and claims – you are ‘either with us or against us’; engaging with those who disagree is no longer possible or even desirable.**

**It is this lack of desire to engage which most distinguishes the unmediated activism of post-territorial political actors from the old politics of territorial communities**, founded on struggles of collective interests (Chandler 2004b). The clearest example is old representational politics – this forced engagement in order to win the votes of people necessary for political parties to assume political power. Individuals with a belief in a collective programme knocked on strangers’ doors and were willing to engage with them, not on the basis of personal feelings but on what they understood were their potential shared interests. Few people would engage in this type of campaigning today; engaging with people who do not share our views, in an attempt to change their minds, is increasingly anathema and most people would rather share their individual vulnerabilities or express their identities in protest than attempt to argue with a peer.

This paper is not intended to be a nostalgic paean to the old world of collective subjects and national interests or a call for a revival of territorial state-based politics or even to reject global aspirations: quite the reverse. Today, politics has been ‘freed’ from the constraints of territorial political community – governments without coherent policy programmes do not face the constraints of failure or the constraints of the electorate in any meaningful way; activists, without any collective opposition to relate to, are free to choose their causes and ethical identities; protest, from Al Qaeda, to anti-war demonstrations, to the riots in France, is inchoate and atomized. When attempts are made to formally organize opposition, the ephemeral and incoherent character of protest is immediately apparent.

The decline of territorial political community does not appear to have led to new forms of political community (in territorial or post-territorial forms), but rather to the individuation of ‘being’ political. Therefore ‘being political’ today takes the form of individuated ethical activity in the same way as ‘being religious’ takes a highly personal form with the rejection of organized churches. Being religious and being political are both statements of individual differentiation rather than reflections of social practices and ways of life. One can not ‘be’ political (anymore than one can ‘be’ religious) except by elaborating a personal creed or identity – being political or religious today is more likely to distance one from one's community, or at least to reflect that perception of distance. **The elaboration of our individual ‘being’, of our identity, signifies the breakdown of community and the organic ties of the traditional social/political sphere.**

## 1nc equipment

### 1nc interpretation/links

#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation requires a predetermined subject—they over-determine the rez more than us by assuming debates are the ultimate arbiter of its value as opposed to a means to facilitate clash

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

### 1nc dialogue

#### Competition through fair play is a dialogical process that encourages argumentative testing and mutual recognition of personhood

**Rawls 58** – a leading figure in moral and political philosophy (John, Justice as Fairness, Philosophical Review, April, JSTOR)

Similarly, the acceptance of the duty of fair play by participants in a common practice is a reflection in each person of the recognition of the aspirations and interests of the others to be realized by their joint activity. Failing a special explanation, their acceptance of it is a necessary part of the criterion for their recognizing one another as persons with similar interests and capacities, as the conception of their relations in the general position supposes them to be. Otherwise they would show no recognition of one another as persons with similar capacities and interests, and indeed, in some cases perhaps hypothetical, they would not recognize one another as persons at all, but as complicated objects involved in a complicated activity. To recognize another as a person one must respond to him and act towards him in certain ways; and these ways are intimately connected with the various prima facie duties. Acknowledging these duties in some degree, and so having the elements of morality, is not a matter of choice, or of intuiting moral qualities, or a matter of the expression of feelings or attitudes (the three interpretations between which philosophical opinion frequently oscillates); it is simply the possession of one of the forms of conduct in which the recognition of others as persons is manifested. These remarks are unhappily obscure. Their main purpose here, however, is to forestall, together with the remarks in Section 4, the misinterpretation that, on the view presented, the acceptance of justice and the acknowledgment of the duty of fair play depends in every day life solely on there being a de facto balance of forces between the parties. It would indeed be foolish to underestimate the importance of such a balance in securing justice; but it is not the only basis thereof. The recognition of one another as persons with similar interests and capacities engaged in a common practice must, failing a special explanation, show itself in the acceptance of the principles of justice and the acknowledgment of the duty of fair play.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

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Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the moral high ground and creates a de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which **the teacher never learns anything new** from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth **instructs someone** who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

### 1nc deliberation

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Deliberation is the best alternative to activism because it requires continual testing that bolsters advocacy and inclusion—refusal of side switching leads to group polarization and isolation

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals.

In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write:

Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172)

That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed.

The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable.

According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement.

The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects.

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational.

It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists.

Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17

The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### Their critiques of debate miss the mark—defending a topic that involves the state for the sake of deliberation is distinct from accepting it, and limiting out some arguments for the sake of that deliberation is a more productive discourse that solves the aff better

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These two serious activist challenges may be summarized as follows. First, the activist has claimed that political discussion must always take place within the context of existing institutions that due to structural inequality grant to certain individuals the power to set discussion agendas and constrain the kinds of options open for consideration prior to any actual encounter with their deliberative opponents; the deliberative process is in this sense rigged from the start to favor the status quo and disadvantage the agents of change. Second, the activist has argued that political discussion must always take place by means of antecedent ‘discourses’ or vocabularies which establish the conceptual boundaries of the deliberation and hence may themselves be hegemonic or systematically distorting; the deliberative process is hence subject to the distorting influence of ideology at the most fundamental level, and deliberative democrats do not have the resources by which such distortions can be addressed. As they aim to establish that the deliberativist’s program is inconsistent with her own democratic objectives, this pair of charges is, as Young claims, serious (118). However, I contend that the deliberativist has adequate replies to them both.

Part of the response to the first challenge is offered by Young herself. The deliberative democrat does not advocate public political discussion only at the level of state policy, and so does not advocate a program that must accept as given existing institutional settings and contexts for public discussion. Rather, the deliberativist promotes an ideal of democratic politics according to which deliberation occurs at all levels of social association, including households, neighborhoods, local organizations, city boards, and the various institutions of civil society. The longrun aim of the deliberative democrat is to cultivate a more deliberative polity, and the deliberativist claims that this task must begin at more local levels and apart from the state and its policies. We may say that deliberativism promotes a ‘decentered’ (Habermas, 1996: 298) view of public deliberation and a ‘pluralistic’ (Benhabib, 2002: 138) model of the public sphere; in other words, the deliberative democrat envisions a ‘multiple, anonymous, heterogeneous network of many publics and public conversations’ (Benhabib, 1996b: 87). The deliberativist is therefore committed to the creation of ‘an inclusive deliberative setting in which basic social and economic structures can be examined’; these settings ‘for the most part must be outside ongoing settings of official policy discussion’ (115).

Although Young characterizes this decentered view of political discourse as requiring that deliberative democrats ‘withdraw’ (115) from ‘existing structural circumstances’ (118), it is unclear that this follows. There certainly is no reason why the deliberativist must choose between engaging arguments within existing deliberative sites and creating new ones that are removed from established institutions. There is no need to accept Young’s dichotomy; the deliberativist holds that work must be done both within existing structures and within new contexts. As Bohman argues,

Deliberative politics has no single domain; it includes such diverse activities as formulating and achieving collective goals, making policy decisions and means and ends, resolving conflicts of interest and principle, and solving problems as they emerge in ongoing social life. Public deliberation therefore has to take many forms. (1996: 53)

The second challenge requires a detailed response, so let us begin with a closer look at the proposed argument. The activist has moved quickly from the claim that discourses can be systematically distorting to the claim that all political discourse operative in our current contexts is systematically distorting. The conclusion is that properly democratic objectives cannot be pursued by deliberative means. The first thing to note is that, as it stands, the conclusion does not follow from the premises; the argument is enthymematic. What is required is the additional premise that the distorting features of discussion cannot be corrected by further discussion. That discussion cannot rehabilitate itself is a crucial principle in the activist’s case, but is nowhere argued.

Moreover, the activist has given no arguments to support the claim that present modes of discussion are distorting, and has offered no analysis of how one might detect such distortions and discern their nature.20 Rather than providing a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of systematic distortion, Young provides (in her own voice) two examples of discourses that she claims are hegemonic. First she considers discussions of poverty that presume the adequacy of labor market analyses; second she cites discussions of pollution that presume that modern economies must be based on the burning of fossil-fuels. In neither case does she make explicit what constitutes the distortion. At most, her examples show that some debates are framed in ways that render certain types of proposals ‘out of bounds’. But surely this is the case in any discussion, and it is not clear that it is in itself always a bad thing or even ‘distorting’. Not all discursive exclusions are distortions because the term ‘distortion’ implies that something is being excluded that should be included.

Clearly, then, there are some dialectical exclusions that are entirely appropriate. For example, it is a good thing that current discussions of poverty are often cast in terms that render white supremacist ‘solutions’ out of bounds; it is also good that pollution discourses tend to exclude fringe-religious appeals to the cleansing power of mass prayer. This is not to say that opponents of market analyses of poverty are on par with white supremacists or that Greens are comparable to fringe-religious fanatics; it is rather to press for a deeper analysis of the discursive hegemony that the activist claims undermines deliberative democracy. It is not clear that the requested analysis, were it provided, would support the claim that systematic distortions cannot be addressed and remedied within the processes of continuing discourse. There are good reasons to think that continued discussion among persons who are aware of the potentially hegemonic features of discourse can correct the distorting factors that exist and block the generation of new distortions.

As Young notes (116), James Bohman (1996: ch. 3) has proposed a model of deliberation that incorporates concerns about distorted communication and other forms of deliberative inequality within a general theory of deliberative democracy; the recent work of Seyla Benhabib (2002) and Robert Goodin (2003: chs 9–11) aims for similar goals. Hence I conclude that, as it stands, the activist’s second argument is incomplete, and as such the force of the difficulty it raises for deliberative democracy is not yet clear. If the objection is to stick, the activist must first provide a more detailed examination of the hegemonic and distorting properties of discourse; he must then show both that prominent modes of discussion operative in our democracy are distorting in important ways and that further discourse cannot remedy these distortions.

### 1nc simulation

#### Scenario simulation lets students test decisions and strategies without the real stakes of having to implement them—this process is more transformative than the content of the 1ac

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Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### We impact turn their accusations of sophistry—skills unique to our model like constructing 1ACs, simulating policies, and researching positions we disagree with grounds decisions in dialogical, argumentative heuristics instead of decisionistic formulas or speculation. Takes out aff solvency and impacts

**Mitchell 2010** – associate professor and director of graduate studies in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh (Gordon, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 13.1, “SWITCH-SIDE DEBATING MEETS DEMAND-DRIVEN RHETORIC OF SCIENCE”)

The watchwords for the intelligence community’s debating initiative— collaboration, critical thinking, collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people “carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution aft er a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view.”40 Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment.41 Notably, a key theme in much of this literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of deliberation.42 “Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what they’re for or against,” says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle McAfee. “Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a way of reasoning and talking together.”43 Mathews and McAfee’s distrust of the debate process is almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy. One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of “choice work.” In this register, Emily Robertson observes, “unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent’s point of view.”44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown’s Center for Public Deliberation state, “Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue, people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions and people are generally looking to ‘win’ their side.”45 Debate, cast here as the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient, low-water benchmark for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote cooperative “choice work.” The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of the debate process such as vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In contrast, the intelligence community’s debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the ends of deliberation. The presence of such an anomaly would seem to point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation that frames the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms, with the relationship between the categories shift ing along with the various contexts in which they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence community’s debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example, the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural technology manifest in the bridge project’s online debating applications such as Hot Grinds. An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is especially salient to consider when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort. According to Doney, bridge “provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the ‘web of trust’ access control model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.”48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney’s invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an “analytic force multiplier.” In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks’s proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon Winner’s maxim that “technological artifacts have politics.”49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: “[W]hy should this thing (‘bridge’) be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s.”50 A debate scholar need not agree with Lord’s full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the community’s Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about what’s driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the normative political dimensions featured in each case. Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of diff erent kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact,the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,” the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.”51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.”54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.”56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate” differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.”60 As John Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. Th e intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative. Th is dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as weapons”70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community’s eff ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the “argumentative turn” is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation. Conclusion Dilip Gaonkar’s criticism of first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship rests on a key claim regarding what he sees as the inherent “thinness” of the ancient Greek rhetorical lexicon.72 That lexicon, by virtue of the fact that it was invented primarily to teach rhetorical performance, is ill equipped in his view to support the kind of nuanced discriminations required for eff ective interpretation and critique of rhetorical texts. Although Gaonkar isolates rhetoric of science as a main target of this critique, his choice of subject matter Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 111 positions him to toggle back and forth between specific engagement with rhetoric of science scholarship and discussion of broader themes touching on the metatheoretical controversy over rhetoric’s proper scope as a field of inquiry (the so-called big vs. little rhetoric dispute).73 Gaonkar’s familiar refrain in both contexts is a warning about the dangers of “universalizing” or “globalizing” rhetorical inquiry, especially in attempts that “stretch” the classical Greek rhetorical vocabulary into a hermeneutic metadiscourse, one pressed into service as a master key for interpretation of any and all types of communicative artifacts. In other words, Gaonkar warns against the dangers of rhetoricians pursuing what might be called supply-side epistemology, rhetoric’s project of pushing for greater disciplinary relevance by attempting to extend its reach into far-flung areas of inquiry such as the hard sciences. Yet this essay highlights how rhetorical scholarship’s relevance can be credibly established by outsiders, who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek rhetorical lexicon in its native mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical performance. Analysis of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows how this is the case, with government agencies calling for assistance to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi (debating different sides) and synerchesthe (the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds).74 Th is demand-driven epistemology is diff erent in kind from the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather than rhetoric venturing out from its own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not formally trained in the rhetorical tradition articulating how their own deliberative objectives call for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even recruitment of “strategically located allies”75 to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demand-driven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkar’s original critique on its head. In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future. And to his partial credit, Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of science, especially one informed by classical thinkers other than Aristotle.76 In his Ph.D. dissertation on “Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy,” Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists were “the greatest champions” 112 Rhetoric & Public Affairs of “socially useful” science,77 and also how the sophists essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes which anyone could mechanically employ to his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant information obtained from the on-going research in other fields.78 Of course, deep trans-historical diff erences make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fool’s errand. But to gauge from Robert Hariman’s recent reflections on the enduring salience of Isocrates, “timely, suitable, and eloquent appropriations” can help us postmoderns “forge a new political language” suitable for addressing the complex raft of intertwined problems facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman, as “the history, literature, philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or less appreciated.”79 Th is essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition—those dealing with and deliberation—can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our time’s most daunting challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations characterized by an endemic surplus of heterogeneous content.

## 1nc k

**The struggles of the urban communities they isolate are only conceivable against the backdrop of capitalist globalization this system appeases subgroups in order to calculate and control their existence. We must reassert the dimension of the Universal against capitalist globalization**

**Zizek ’99** (Slavoj, Slovenian Critic, The Ticklish Subject, p. 209-211)

Here however one must fully endorse Badiou’s point that these “returns to the Substance” are themselves impotent in the face of the global march of capital: they are its inherent supplement, the limit/conditioning of its functioning, since - as Deleuze emphasized years ago – capitalist “deterritorialization” is always accompanied by re-emerging re-territorializations. More precisely, there is an inherent split in the field of particular identities themselves caused by the onslaught of capitalist globalization: on the one hand, the so-called ‘fundamentalisms’, whose basic formula is that of the Identity of one’s own group, implying the practice of excluding the threatening Other(s): France for the French (against Algerian immigrants), America for the Americans (against the Hispanic invasion), Slovenia for Slovenians (against the excessive presence of “southerners”, immigrants from the ex-Yugoslav provinces); on the other hand there is post-modern culturalist ‘identity politics’ groups, aiming at the tolerant coexisting of ever-shifting, ‘hybrid’ lifestyle groups, divided into endless subgroups (Hispanic women, black gays, white AIDS patients, lesbian mothers…) This ever flowering of groups and subgroups in their hybrid and fluid, shifting identities, each insisting on the right to assert its specific way of life and/or culture, this incessant diversification, is only possible and thinkable only against the background of capitalist globalization: it is the very way capitalist globalization affects our sense of ethnic and other forms of community belonging: the only link connecting these multiple groups is the link of capital itself, always ready to satisfy the demands of each group and subgroup (gay tourism, Hispanic music...). Furthermore the opposition between fundamentalism and postmodern pluralist identity politics is ultimately a fake, concealing a deeper solidarity (or, to put it in Hegelese, speculative identity): a multiculturalist can easily find even the most fundamentalist ethnic identity attractive, but only so much as it is the identity of the supposedly authentic Other (say, in the USA, Native American tribal unity); a fundamentalist group can easily adopt, in its social functioning, the postmodern strategies of identity politics, presenting itself as one of the threatened minorities, simply striving to maintain its specific way of life and cultural identity. The line of separation between postmodern identity politics and fundamentalism is thus purely formal; it often depends merely on the different prospective from which the observer views the movement for maintaining a group identity. Under these conditions, the event in the guise of a “return to the roots” can only be a semblance that fits the capitalist circular movement perfectly or – in the worst case – leads to a catastrophe like Nazism. The sign of today’s ideologico-political constellation is the fact that these kinds of pseudo-events which seem to pop up (it is only right-wing populism which today displays the authentic political passion of accepting the struggle, of openly admitting that, precisely in so far as one proclaims to speak from a universal standpoint, one does not aim to please everybody, but is ready to introduce a division of “us” versus “them”). It has often been remarked that, despite hating the guts of Buchanan in the USA, Le Pen in France or Haider in Australia, even leftists feel a kind of relief in their appearance – finally, there is someone who revives a proper political passion of division and confrontation, a complete belief in political issues, albeit in a deplorably repulsive form. We are thus more and more deeply locked into a claustrophobic space within which we can only oscillate between the non-event of the smooth running of the liberal-democratic capitalist New World Order and fundamentalist Events (the rise of local proto fascisms, etc) which temporarily disturb the calm surface of the capitalist ocean – no wonder that, in these circumstances, Heidegger mistook the Pseudo-event of the Nazi revolution as the Event itself. Today, more than ever, one has to insist that the only way open to the emergence of an Event is that of globalization-with-particularization by (re)asserting the dimension of Universality against capitalist globalization. Badiou draws an interesting parallel here between our time of American global domination and the late Roman Empire, also a ‘multiculturalist’ global state in which multiple ethnic groups were thriving, united (not by capital, but) by the non-substantial link of the Roman legal order – so what we need today is the gesture that would undermine capitalist globalization from the standpoint of universal Truth, just as Pauline Christianity did to the Roman global empire.

**This fracture movements – the aff’s insistence on specific application of policy as a precondition for inclusion in the ‘struggle against oppression’ ignores the commonality of oppression makes Empire’s divide and conquer tactics more effective**

**Smith ’95** (Sharon, columnist for Socialist Worker and author of Women’s Liberation and Socialism, Mistaken Identity: or Can Identity Politics Liberate the Oppressed, http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj62/smith.htm)

Among many people on the left today the Marxist emphasis on the centrality of class and class struggle – as key both to understanding and to transforming society – is widely disparaged. Many who once looked to the working class movement as key to social change have shifted their focus toward the 'new social movements'. This term covers a broad range of movements which originated in the 1960s and 1970s, including those against the oppression of women, blacks and lesbians and gays, as well as those organized around ecology, disarmament and a variety of other issues. Key to this strategy for social change, which has been carried to its logical extreme more recently through the development of 'identity politics,' is the idea that only those experiencing a particular form of oppression can either define it or fight against it. For people newly active on the left, this way of organizing may seem like common sense: it should go without saying that those who are oppressed should fight against their own oppression. Moreover, the prevalence of sexist, racist and anti-gay ideas in society at large makes it sometimes appear as if the bigotry which divides people can never be fully overcome. This pessimistic notion forms the theoretical basis for identity politics. It is assumed that a particular movement must include only those who face a specific form of oppression. To one degree or another, all the other people in society are part of the problem – in some way they benefit from oppression and have an interest in maintaining it. For this same reason it follows that each oppressed group should have its own distinct and separate movement. Such movements therefore tend to be organized on the basis of 'autonomy' or independence – from each other and from the socialist movement. They tend also to be organized independent of any class basis. But this logic is flawed. It would be disastrous, for example, if the fight against fascism in Europe today were limited to only members of those racial groups who are immediately targeted by fascists. The advance of the fascist movement is not only a threat to 'foreign born' workers, but to all workers. To most effectively counter the recent rise of fascists in Europe, all those who oppose the far right, whatever race they happen to be, should be encouraged to join the anti-fascist movement. Any fight against oppression, if it is to succeed, must be based upon building the strongest possible movement. And that can only happen when a movement unites different groups of activists into a common struggle. It is not, as is widely assumed within these political milieu, necessary to face a particular oppression in order to fight against that oppression, any more than it is necessary to be destitute in order to fight against poverty. Many people who do not experience a particular form of oppression can learn to identify with those who do, and can be enlisted as allies in a common struggle. The politics of identity cannot point the way towards building the kind of movement which can actually end oppression. In fact, among existing organizations founded on the basis of identity politics, the tendency has been towards fragmentation and disintegration, rather than growth. More often than not among movements organized on the basis of identity politics the enemy includes 'everyone else' – perceived as an amorphous, backward blob which makes up the rest of society. Instead of seeing the class struggle as a way to overcome oppression, the working class is seen as a barrier to this process. At its heart, identity politics is a rejection of the notion that the working class can be the agent for social change, and a pessimism about the possibility for significant, never mind revolutionary, social transformation. As Stanley Aronowitz argued in his book, The Politics of Identity: *Class, Culture, Social Movements*: ...the historically exclusive focus of class-based movements on a narrow definition of the issues of economic justice has frequently excluded gender, race, and qualitative issues, questions of workers' control over production, and similar problems. The almost exclusive emphasis on narrow quantitative issues has narrowed the political base of labor and socialist movements and made all but inevitable the emergence of social movements which, as often as not, perceived class politics as inimical to their aims.1

**Thus, we demand rejection of the plan in favor of communal relations of solidarity outside the state to shelter the oppressed from global capitalism**

**Only by rejecting capitalism's drive to commodify can we lead to an alternative to capitalism.**

Marcuse, German Philosopher and Professor at Columbia and Harvard, in ’69 [Herbert, member of the Frankfurt School, An Essay on Liberation, p. 85-91]

More recently, the break in the unity of the communist orbit, the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Vietnam, and the "cultural revolution" in China have changed this picture. The possibility of constructing socialism on a truly popular base, without the Stalinist bureaucratization and the danger of a nuclear war as the imperialist answer to the emergence of this kind of socialist power, has led to some sort of common interest between the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States on the other. In a sense, this is indeed the community of interests of the "haves" against the "have nots," of the Old against the New. The "collaborationist" policy of the Soviet Union necessitates the pursuance of power politics which increasingly reduces the prospect that Soviet society, by virtue of its basic institutions alone (abolition of private ownership and control of the means of production: planned economy) is still capable of making the transition to a free society. And yet, the very dynamic of imperialist expansion places the Soviet Union in the other camp: would the effective resistance in Vietnam, and the protection of Cuba be possible without Soviet aid? However, while we reject the unqualified convergence thesis, according to which -at least at present -the assimilation of interests prevails UPOIl the conflict between capitalism and Soviet Socialism, we cannot minimize the essential difference between the latter and the new historical efforts to construct socialism by developing and creating a genuine solidarity between the leadership and the liberated victims of exploitation. The actual may considerably deviate from the ideal, the fact remains that, for a whole generation, "freedom," "socialism," and "liberation" are inseparable from Fidel and Che and the guerrillas -not because their revolutionary struggle could furnish the model for the struggle in the metropoles, but because they have recaptured the truth of these ideas, in the dayto- day fight of men and women for a life as human beings: for a new life. What kind of life? We are still confronted with the demand to state the "concrete alternative." The demand is meaningless if it asks for a blueprint of the specific institutions and relationships which would be those of the new society: they cannot be determined a priori; they will develop, in trial and error, as the new society develops. If we could form a concrete concept of the alternative today, it would not be that of an alternative; the possibilities of the new society are sufficiently "abstract," i.e., removed from and incongruous with the established universe to defy any attempt to identify them in terms of this universe. However, the question cannot be brushed aside by saying that what matters today is the destruction of the old, of the powers that be, making way for the emergence of the new. Such an answer neglects the essential fact that the old is not simply bad, that it delivers the goods, and that people have a real stake in it. There can be societies which are much worse – there are such societies today. The system of corporate capitalism has the right to insist that those who work for its replacement justify their action. But the demand to state the concrete alternatives is justified for yet another reason. Negative thinking draws whatever force it may have from its empirical basis: the actual human condition in the given society, and the "given" possibilities to transcend this condition, to enlarge the realm of freedom. In this sense, negative thinking is by virtue of its own internal concepts "positive": oriented toward, and comprehending a future which is "contained" in the present. And in this containment (which is an important aspect of the general containment policy pursued by the established societies), the future appears as possible liberation. It is not the only alternative: the advent of a long period of "civilized" barbarism, with or without the nuclear destruction, is equally contained in the present. Negative thinking, and the praxis guided by it, is the positive and positing effort to prevent this utter negativity. The concept of the primary, initial institutions of liberation is familiar enough and concrete enough: collective ownership, collective control and planning of the means of production and distribution. This is the foundation, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the alternative: it would make possible the usage of all available resources for the abolition of poverty, which is the prerequisite for the turn from quantity into quality: the creation of a reality in accordance with the new sensitivity and the new consciousness. This goal implies rejection of those policies of reconstruction, no matter how revolutionary, which are bound to perpetuate (or to introduce) the pattern of the unfree societies and their needs. Such false policy is perhaps best summed up in the formula "to catch up with, and to overtake the productivity level of the advanced capitalist countries." What is wrong with this formula is not the emphasis on the rapid improvement of the material conditions but on the model guiding their improvement. The model denies the alternative, the qualitative difference. The latter is not, and cannot be, the result of the fastest possible attainment of capitalist productivity, but rather the development of new modes and ends of production "new" not only (and perhaps not at all) with respect to technical innovations and production relations, but with respect to the different human needs and the different human relationships in working for the satisfaction of these needs. These new relationships would be the result of a "biological" *solidarity* in work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free development -the exact opposite of the administered and enforced harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?) countries. It is the image of this solidarity as elemental, instinctual, creative force which the young radicals see in Cuba, in the guerrillas, in the Chinese cultural revolution. Solidarity and cooperation: not all their forms are liberating. Fascism and militarism have developed a deadly efficient solidarity. Socialist solidarity is autonomy: selfdetermination begins at home -and that is with every I, and the We whom the I chooses. And this end must indeed appear in the means to attain it, that is to say, in the strategy of those who, within the existing society, work for the new one. If the socialist relationships of production are to be a new way of life, a new Form of life, then their existential quality must show forth, anticipated and demonstrated, in the fight for their realization. Exploitation in all its forms must have disappeared from this fight: from the work relationships among the fighters as well as from their individual relationships. Understanding, tenderness toward each other, the instinctual consciousness of that which is evil, false, the heritage of oppression, would then testify to the authenticity of the rebellion. In short, the economic, political, and cultural features of a classless society must have become the basic needs of those who fight for it. This ingression of the future into the present, this depth dimension of the rebellion accounts, in the last analysis, for the incompatibility with the traditional forms of the political struggle. The new radicalism militates against the centralized bureaucratic communist as well as against the semi-democratic liberal organization. There is a strong element of spontaneity, even anarchism, in this rebellion, expression of the new sensibility, sensitivity against domination: the feeling, the awareness, that the joy of freedom and the need to be free must precede liberation.Therefore the aversion against preestablished Leaders, apparatchiks of all sorts, politicians no matter how leftist. The initiative shifts to small groups, widely diffused, with a high degree of autonomy, mobility, flexibility. To be sure, within the repressive society, and against its ubiquitous apparatus, spontaneity by itself cannot possibly be a radical and revolutionary force. It can become such a force only as the result of enlightenment, education, political practice -in this sense indeed, as a result of organization. The anarchic element is an essential factor in the struggle against domination: preserved but disciplined in the preparatory political action, it will be freed and aufgehoben in the goals of the struggle. Released for the construction of the initial revolutionary institutions, the antirepressive sensibility, allergic to domination, would militate against the prolongation of the "First Phase," that is, the authoritarian bureaucratic development of the productive forces. The new society could then reach relatively fast the level at which poverty could be abolished (this level could be considerably lower than that of advanced capitalist productivity, which is geared to obscene aflluence and waste). Then the development could tend toward a sensuous culture, tangibly contrasting with the gray-on-gray culture of the socialist societies of Eastern Europe. Production would be redirected in defiance of all the rationality of the Performance Principle; socially necessary labor would be diverted to the construction of an aesthetic rather than repressive environment, to parks and gardens rather than highways and parking lots, to the creation of areas of withdrawal rather than massive fun and relaxation. Such redistribution of socially necessary labor (time), incompatible with any society governed by the Profit and Performance Principle, would gradually alter society in all its dimensions -it would mean the ascent of the Aesthetic Principle as Form of the Reality Principle: a culture of receptivity based on the achievements of industrial civilization and initiating the end of its selfpropelling productivity. Not regression to a previous stage of civilization, but return to an imaginary *temps perdu* in the real life of mankind: progress to a stage of civilization where man has learned to ask for the sake of whom or of what he organizes his society; the stage where he checks and perhaps even halts his incessant struggle for existence on an enlarged scale, surveys what has been achieved through centuries of misery and hecatombs of victims, and decides that it is enough, and that it is time to enjoy what he has and what can be reproduced and refined with a minimum of alienated labor: not the arrest or reduction of technical progress, but the elimination of those of its features which perpetuate man's subjection to the apparatus and the intensification of the struggle for existence -to work harder in order to get more of the merchandise that has to be sold. In other words, electrification indeed, and all technical devices which alleviate and protect life, all the mechanization which frees human energy and time, all the standardization which does away with spurious and parasitarian "personalized" services rather than multiplying them and the gadgets and tokens of exploitative affiuence. In terms of the latter (and only in terms of the latter), this would certainly be a regression -but freedom from the rule of merchandise over man is a precondition of freedom. The construction of a free society would create new incentives for work. In the exploitative societies, the so‐called work instinct is mainly the (more or less effectively) introjected necessity to perform productively in order to earn a living. But the life instincts themselves strive for the unification and enhancement of life; in nonrepressive sublimation they would provide the libidinal energy for work on the development of a reality which no longer demands the exploitative repression of the Pleasure Principle. The "incentives" would then be built into the instinctual structure of men. Their sensibility would register, as biological reactions, the difference between the ugly and the beautiful, between calm and noise, tenderness and brutality, intelligence and stupidity, joy and fun, and it would correlate this distinction with that between freedom and servitude. Freud's last theoretical conception recognizes the erotic instincts as work instincts ‐work for the creation of a sensuous environment. The social expression of the liberated work instinct is cooperation, which, grounded in solidarity, directs the organization of the realm of necessity and the development of the realm of freedom. And there is an answer to the question which troubles the minds of so many men of good will: what are the people in a free society going to do? The answer which, I believe, strikes at the heart of the matter was given by a young black girl. She said: for the first time in our life, we shall be free to think about what we are going to do.

## 1nc case

#### 1. The reductiveness and intersectionality of the environmental justice movement cause it to deny the agency of distinct minority groups and threaten their survival.

Yamamoto and Lyman 1 (Eric K, Hawaii Law School law prof., and Jen-L W, UC Berkeley visiting law prof., University of Colorado Law Review, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 311, Spring, p. 311-313)

"Racial communities are not all created equal." 1 Yet, the established environmental justice framework tends to treat racial minorities as interchangeable and to assume for all communities of color that health and distribution of environmental burdens are main concerns. For some racialized communities, 2 however, environmental justice is not only, or even primarily, about immediate health concerns or burden distribution. Rather, for them, and particularly for some indigenous peoples, environmental justice is mainly about cultural and economic self-determination and belief systems that connect their history, spirituality, and livelihood to the natural environment. 3 This article explores the meaning of "environmental justice," focusing on race as it merges with the environment. The word "environment" triggers images of the physical surroundings - water, [\*312] trees, ecosystems. 4 Society tends to separate physical environment from social environment - the latter including people, culture, and social structures. 5 But the "race" in "environmental racism" suggests that the physical and the social are integrally connected. Indeed, understanding "our environment" is impossible without understanding both its physical and social aspects, and their interplay. 6 Much of the scholarly writing on environmental justice does not address with adequate complexity or depth the interplay between the natural and the racial. Rather, many articles make unexplored assumptions about racialized environments, failing to inquire into distinct cultural and power differences among communities of color and their relationships to "the environment." For instance, while some might describe the siting of a waste disposal plan near an indigenous American community as environmental racism, that community might say that the wrong is not racial discrimination or unequal treatment; it is the denial of group sovereignty - the control over land and resources for the cultural and spiritual well-being of a people. Alternatively, the community might say that the siting is, on balance, desirable because it provides needed jobs in the area and is an aspect of group economic survival.

#### 2. The race-based politics of the environmental justice movement reconstitutes racism and precludes unity.

Shellenberger 8 (Michael, environmental strategist, March/April, Utne Reader, “Complete Interview: The Temperature Transcends Race”, p. 6, http://www.utne.com/2008-03-01/Environment/Complete-Interview-The-Temperature-Transcends-Race.aspx)

Ever since we wrote “Death of Environmentalism” we’ve been in various debates about environmental justice. We decided to do the chapter in part because so many people said, Well, environmental justice is the expansive environmentalism. And we went and looked at it and read a huge amount and interviewed many dozens of people, and what you find is a movement that looks at the intersection of race, class, and pollution, which actually makes that movement smaller not larger. And frankly, you didn’t ask it, but I’ll say it anyway: We think that a race-based politics is toxic, and completely outmoded, and that we should not be organizing as different races. Race is itself a very dubious concept and construct. We’re a single human race and we’ll do far better organizing across race lines than within them. If you look at where the environmental justice movement has gotten into trouble, it’s where you find a lot of infighting often between different “races,” different ethnic groups. It hasn’t actually served to be a unifying movement. To say race is itself a very dubious concept and construct is one thing, but to say that it doesn’t play a role in how communities suffer is another. Well of course. Of course there’s racism. And of course there are racial disparities, but that’s different from organizing as Latinos or as African Americans or as whites. I just don’t believe that that’s a positive expansive politics. It’s important to organize outside of racial and environmental categories. The fact that pollution is a problem does not necessarily lead you to creating a pollution-based politics. And the fact that racism is a problem does not mean that you should have a race-based politics. The goal of the original civil rights movement was to put an end to race-based politics not to reconstitute it.

#### 3. Environmental justice advocates ignore the economic complexities of life for indigenous peoples, threating their survival while transforming them into environmental mascots.

Yamamoto and Lyman 1 (Eric K, Hawaii Law School law prof., and Jen-L W, UC Berkeley visiting law prof., University of Colorado Law Review, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 311, Spring, p. 320-322)

The framework, however, at times also undercuts environmental justice struggles by racial and indigenous communities because it tends to foster misassumptions about race, culture, sovereignty, and the importance of distributive justice. Those misassumptions sometimes lead environmental justice scholars and activists to miss what is of central importance to affected communities. The first misassumption is that for all racialized groups in all situations, a hazard-free physical environment is their main, if not only, concern. 47 Environmental justice advocates foster this notion by placing emphasis on "high quality environments" 48 and the adverse health effects caused by exposure to air pollutants and hazardous waste materials. [\*321] Not all facility sitings that pose health risks, however, warrant full-scale opposition by host communities. Some communities, on balance, are willing to tolerate these facilities for the economic benefits they confer or in lieu of the cultural or social disruption that might accompany large-scale remedial efforts. Other communities, struggling to deal with joblessness, inadequate education, and housing discrimination, indeed with daily survival, prefer to devote most of their limited time and political capital to those challenges. In these situations, racial and indigenous communities may have pressing needs and long-range goals beyond the re-siting of polluting facilities. 49 For example, as Native communities endeavor to ameliorate conditions of poverty and social dislocation by encouraging the economic development of tribal lands, some increasingly find themselves in conflict with environmentalists, who are sometimes but not always environmental justice advocates. In the mining industry, several Native American tribes are attempting to tap mineral resources on their reservations. 50 Urged by the increased emphasis on economic self-determination in federal Native American policy in the 1970s, the tribes formed the Council of Energy Resource Tribes to deal [\*322] with both the siting of new mines on Native American lands and the environmental and the cultural problems that might result. 51 Those efforts met stiff opposition from some environmental groups concerned mainly with land degradation and pollution. The environmentalists' seeming lack of understanding of the economic and cultural complexity of the Native American groups' decisions have led some Native Americans to express cynicism about environmentalists who sometimes treat them as mascots for the environmental cause.