# 1nr birds

#### Pure aesthetics are outdated – the problem with perspectivism is that if nothing is True than everything is permitted and it is metaphysically impossible to affirm the equal value of all perspectives without saying “thou shalt not” – nature is already beautiful and we should affirm that perspective while ethically rejecting the aff

#### Addressing the separation of humanity and nature is a primary ethical concern

Mary Midgley, retired Senior Lecturer in [Philosophy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) at [Newcastle University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newcastle_University), 5[*The Essential Mary Midgley* p 373-378, NOTE: this card is from a UTNIF camp file and appears to be gender-edited – instances of the word “Humyn” likely replace the word “man”, and “herself” and “her” replace “himself” and “him” respectively]

’ To deal with this, we  need to understand adaptation. Evidence about it must be found in  other species. And the same question, in the same sense, can be asked  about them too. People obsessed with the cost–beneﬁt analysis pattern  see no alternative to their own way of thinking, even though often they,  like the rest of us, have a sense of chill, of oppression, of loneliness, as  human life grows steadily narrower. The dungeon encloses us, the lid of the ego presses down. Under what compulsion? Why look at things this  way? In The Sovereignty of Good Iris Murdoch writes,  I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of  mind, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige.  Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment every-  thing is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disap-  peared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to  thinking of the other matter it seems less important.  (p. 84)  Certainly we could (she goes on) think of this as a measure of mental  hygiene, regard the kestrel as a device for regaining balance. But there is  something perverse about doing so; ‘More naturally, as well as more  properly, we take a self-forgetful pleasure in the sheer, alien pointless  independent existence of animals, birds, stones and trees.’ This has to be  right, because the release itself depends on the kestrel’s not being such a  device. If we found that we were in Disneyland, with plastic kestrels  going up at carefully randomized intervals, the entire point would be lost.  What we need here is to get rid of the language of means and ends,  and use instead that of part and whole. Humyn needs to form part of a  whole much greater than herself, one in which other members excel  her in innumerable ways. He is adapted to live in one. Without it, he  feels imprisoned; the lid of the ego presses down on him.  The world in which the kestrel moves, the world that it sees, is, and  will always be, entirely beyond us. That there are such worlds all around  us is an essential feature of our world. Calling the bird’s existence  ‘pointless’ means only that it is not a device for any human end. It does  not need that external point. It is in some sense – a sense that can  certainly do with study – an end in itself.3 We may throw some light on  the difﬁculties here by looking at the same problem where it crops up  at the heart of Kant’s aesthetic. Kant was much occupied with the Sub-  lime, which was the (quite convenient) eighteenth-century name for  things that impress us, not by being what we already want (like the  Beautiful), but by their vastness and total disregard of our needs – in a  word, by their absolute Otherness. The sea is sublime; so are mountains  and deserts. So even, sometimes, are very small things, if they are  exceedingly strange and unaccountable.4  Kant’s careful analysis of this element in experience, and the  seriousness with which he treats it, are admirable. It is plain that he was  a man genuinely disposed to be bowled over by such things. But he  ﬁnds a real difﬁculty in understanding this concept. What is actually  sublime? Here the rules of his Rationalist framework hamper him. It  can hardly, he says, be the actual sea and mountains, for they are just  dead matter, so many tons of basalt or H2O. How can one revere that?  He sees that sheer size is often central to the experience. Yet size  impresses us only by contrast to the size of our own body, which  seems to him a contingent matter. So he concludes that what is sub-  lime is not the objects themselves, but what they stand for, that is, the  vastness of the human task. ‘The feeling of the Sublime in nature is  respect for our own vocation.’5 In part this is right. The vast does stand  for the difﬁcult, the not-yet-attempted. But it has to be more than just  a symbol. It has to matter in itself, or it cannot symbolize effectively.  Powerful symbols are not just dispensable manmade boxes in which  we deposit ideas for convenience, retrieving them unchanged when we  need them. Kant’s point is that mountains and distances constitute  difﬁculties for us, and that difﬁculties teach us our weakness. But  mountains are not just examples of difﬁculties. They are not just  wastefully extended treadmills. They tell us not only that we are small,  but that they are great. Indeed the ﬁrst point would have no meaning  without the second. If they were merely educational devices to bring  home our weakness to us, we could forget about them once we had  seen the point. Or, if we decided still to use them as a reminder, we  should think of them, I suppose, in a resigned sort of way, as we do  regard purely educational devices, perhaps rather as we think of our alarm clocks and desk calendars. (Did the Romans regard the skeletons  at their feasts in this way?)  The truth is, it is no contingent fact about us that our bodies are the  size they are. We – ourselves – are not, as Descartes suggested, purely  mental creatures. We are not tentatively considering possible incarna-  tions. We – ourselves – are members of a vulnerable species, easily  destroyed in an avalanche, with a place on this particular planet, and  none anywhere else.6 To such beings, there is no way in which x million  gallons of H2O (including saline impurities) does not constitute an  enormous and sublime ocean, nor in which whales and albatrosses,  capable of dealing with it in any state of agitation, are not sublime  creatures. Stunting this response is stunting our highest faculties. For  (what is less often mentioned than the vulnerability) we are receptive,  imaginative beings, adapted to celebrate and rejoice in the existence,  quite independent of ourselves, of the other beings on this planet. Not  only does our natural sympathy reach out easily beyond the barrier of  species but we rejoice in the mere existence of plants and lifeless bodies  – not regarding them them just as furniture provided to stimulate our  pampered imagination.  Literary criticism often does not look at things this way; it tends to  an ofﬁcial doctrine that the physical universe matters only in so far as  we can make poetry out of it. I think this is cockeyed, and that no poetry  of the slightest value could be made on this supposition. The trouble is,  however, a discrepancy between theory and practice on the matter, not  only (as I have suggested) in Kant himself, but in great writers who have  followed him. For instance, Coleridge, explaining his own dejection, his  failure to respond to a splendid sunset, wrote  O Lady, we receive but what we give,  And in our life alone does Nature live,  Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud.7  But this isn’t and couldn’t be true, and the end of that very poem shows  that he didn’t believe it. As Iris Murdoch says in The Sovereignty of Good,  I do not think that any of the great romantics really believed that we  receive but what we give and in our life alone does nature live,  although the lesser ones tended to follow Kant’s lead and use  nature as an occasion for exalted self-feeling. The great romantics,  including the one I have just quoted, transcended ‘romanticism.’  ... Art, and by art from now on I mean good art, not fantasy art,   affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is  excellent.  (p. 85)  Humyn is not adapted to live in a mirror-lined box, generating his own  electric light and sending for selected images from outside when he  happens to need them. Darkness and a bad smell are all that can come of  that. We need the vast world, and it must be a world that does not need  us; a world constantly capable of surprising us, a world we did not  program, since only such a world is the proper object of wonder. Any  kind of Humanism which deprives us of this, which insists on treating  the universe as a mere projection screen for showing off human capacit-  ies, cripples and curtails humanity. ‘Humanists’ often do this, because  where there is wonder they think they smell religion, and they move  hastily in to crush that unclean thing.8 But things much more unclean  than traditional religion will follow the death of wonder. In truth, as I  have suggested, wonder, the sense of otherness, is one of the sources of  religion (not the other way around), but it is also the source of curiosity  and every vigorous use of our faculties, and an essential condition of  sanity.

#### First, turns the aff – affirming the perspective that wind turbines are beautiful is in and of itself an act of denial in that it forecloses the perspective that the birds that the wind turbines kill are beautiful or that the land they build the turbines on is valuable – this means they can’t get an internal link into productive perspectivism because in practice they lead to impossibly paradoxical situations causing serial ontological failure

#### Co-existence with nature is key – the 1AC’s conscious choice to not include a discussion of the cultural and environmental situatedness of wind turbines is a reason they link because communication frames how we treat nature – the alt is a better strategy

**Milstein, 08** – Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the University of New Mexico (Tema, “When Whales “Speak for Themselves”: Communication as a Mediating force in Wildlife Tourism”, Environmental Communication Vol. 2, No. 2, July 2008, pp. 173-192, dml)

This research is part of a larger conversation within environmental communication and interdisciplinary circles in which a central objective is to interrogate how communication as a cultural text mediates human relations with nature (Cox, 2007). This approach follows theories that assert humans produce, reproduce, and resist both perceptions and praxis of nature through communication. Such a line of questioning acknowledges the role of power in the human-nature relationship in that humans have the opportunity to frame nature to evoke certain meanings, and these meanings, in turn, mediate environmental understanding and material practices. In addition, the use of the term ‘‘mediate’’ opens exploration to processes extending beyond human discourse. A look at how communication mediates humannature relations can include a study of not only human communicative processes but also communicative aspects of nature (Milburn interview with Donal Carbaugh, 2007). In this way, exploring the mediating role of communication also allows for an exploration of environmental co-presence, of nature as ‘‘speaking’’ and humans and nature in forms of conversation. This nature-inclusive view of mediation addresses concerns in the environmental communication field that a scholarly focus purely on human discourse can sometimes serve to ignore or obfuscate nature’s agency, reproducing views of nature as mute object. While these concerns are voiced in the field, little work has been done within or outside the field to empirically illustrate ways in which humans view nature as participating in the communicative experience. Exceptions include work by Basso (1996), Carbaugh (1999), and Valladolid and Apffel-Marglin (2001). Carbaugh (1999) ethnographically explores members of the Blackfeet tribe’s form of ‘‘listening’’ to nature as a cultural form of communication, and examines how this form of sensing nature supports a highly reflective and revelatory mode of nonverbal communication that opens one to relations between natural and human forms and provides protection, power, and enhanced knowledge of one’s small place in the world. Basso’s (1996) work on landscape and language among members of the Western Apache tribe examines how some tribe members evoke names of natural places to connect present-day personal occurrences to ancestral stories that occurred in and were connected to those places. Valladolid’s and Apffel-Marglin’s (2001) work on Andean cosmovision describes a multi-voiced naturehuman conversation perceived within indigenous campesino culture as both creating and nurturing biodiversity\*such communication assumes all the complication characteristic of the living world and involves the experiences and senses of all human and nonhuman ‘‘persons’’ in a conversation of reciprocal nurturance within the cycles of life. One striking similarity in the above examples is that each emanates from a study of indigenous cultures. I argue it is equally important to investigate how ‘‘the verbal is instrumental in knowing nature’’ and ‘‘how nature ‘speaks’’’ (Milburn interview with Donal Carbaugh, 2007, p. 1) within contemporary Western discourse, as such discourse is largely viewed as perpetuating and propagating not only Western but also often global notions and practices of humans as separate from and superior to a voiceless nature. One way into such an investigation is with attention to the mediating force of everyday communication processes. As Cameron (1998) argues, meaning is not fixed nor handed down by fiat\*rather, meaning is socially constructed, or continually negotiated and modified in everyday interaction. By looking at everyday discourse in a charged and visceral Western site of relations between humans and wild nature, my intention is to ground the investigation in the performance and negotiation of such communication in a culturally situated human-nature intersection and to interrogate the type of communication in which ‘‘the terms, rules, and premises of a culture are inextricably woven’’ (Philipsen, 1992, p. 131).

# 1nr case

#### These rational categories are the least life-affirming things out there – just as Rimbaud described, we must find beauty bitter and abuse it

**Pelevin ‘2** Victor,Leo Kropywiansky, post-Soviet science fiction author, Buddhist scholar, “Victor Pelevin” Interview, BOMB Magazine, Issue 79 Spring 2002, , LITERATURE <http://www.bombsite.com/issues/79/articles/2481>

VP Since it happened a long time before I started to write, there’s no way to determine how it affected my writing. However, the effect of this book was really fantastic. **There’s an expression “out of this world.”** This book was totally out of the Soviet world. **The evil magic of any totalitarian regime is based on its presumed capability to embrace and explain all the phenomena, their entire totality, because explanation is control. Hence the term** totalitarian**. So if there’s a book that takes you out of this totality of things explained and understood, it liberates you because it breaks the continuity of explanation and thus dispels the charms. It allows you to look in a different direction for a moment, but this moment is enough to understand that everything you saw before was a hallucination** (though what you see in this different direction might well be another hallucination). The Master and Margarita was exactly this kind of book and it is very hard to explain its subtle effect to anybody who didn’t live in the USSR. **Solzhenitsyn’s books were very anti-Soviet, but they didn’t liberate you, they only made you more enslaved as they explained to which degree you were a slave.** **The Master and Margarita** didn’t even bother to be anti-Soviet yet reading this book would make you free instantly. **It didn’t liberate you from some particular old ideas, but rather from the hypnotism of the entire order of things.** LK What books have you most enjoyed reading in the last few years? In particular I wonder if there are any American authors among your recent favorites. VP I can’t say I read too much fiction. I liked Pastoralia and CivilWarLand in Bad Decline by George Saunders, but his best story I read so far was “I Can Speak!™” published in The New Yorker. I liked some stories by David Foster Wallace and plan to siege his Infinite Jest one infinite day. Talking of the old guard, I like Robert M. Pirsig. The real heroes in his books are concepts rather than humans, and they change and develop like characters do in more traditional novels: this is incredible. LK The ghost of Che Guevara appears in your most recent book, Homo Zapiens, propounding a theory of television as either (1) switched off, in which case it is like any other object, i.e., not any more or less difficult for the unquiet mind to pay attention to than, say, a rock, or (2) switched on, in which case it guides the attention of the viewer to such an extent that he becomes “possessed,” “techno-modified,” “a virtual subject” and no longer himself. In August of 2000, the Ostankino TV tower in Moscow caught fire, interrupting broadcasts for several days and rendering all television sets as objects of type (1). Was there a perceptible change of mood among Moscow citizens at that time? VP I think so. People were getting nervous and irritated, like drug addicts without a routine injection. But there were a lot of jokes about it nevertheless. As for me, I hadn’t been watching television for a long time by that moment, so I didn’t experience any personal problems. LK A big change over the last decade has been the decline in the influence of Russia’s military, which was called upon to fight a difficult war in Chechnya even as morale was falling and resources available to it were shrinking. Your father, who I understand passed away several years ago, was himself in the military. How did he view this decline in influence? VP My father was a rather strange Soviet military man, and never had any particular influence as such. He wasn’t even a party member, which made him kind of a white crow and impeded his career badly. It wasn’t his choice to join the military: the Soviet Union started its missile program when he was a student in Kiev, and many students from technical institutes were drafted to serve in this new branch of armed force as officers. Your consent wasn’t necessary for this at that time. I never had access to the inner workings of my father’s soul but I think he never totally identified himself with the Red Army’s military might, though he was a good specialist. At the time of the decline he was much more concerned with his own health, which was deteriorating quickly. But I think that, like many people who spent their entire lifetime in the USSR, he was too stunned by its demise to take any ensuing events seriously. LK In Homo Zapiens, the Russian government is portrayed as “virtual”: three-dimensional dummies on TV whose movements are scripted by screenwriters. This device seems particularly apt in describing the Yeltsin government, held together as it was with television coverage, funding from tycoons and the IMF, multiple heart bypasses and so forth. Do you believe it has become any less apt now, under the leadership of Putin? VP Phenomenologically any politician is a TV program, and this doesn’t change from one government to another. But if you want me to compare the government we had under Yeltsin with the one we have under Putin, I won’t be able to do it. Not only because I don’t watch television. For this kind of assessment you need a criterion. I guess the right one would be the way the government handles the economy, because its primary function is to take care of the economy. Politics is usually the function of the latter. To pass a judgment here you need to understand, even approximately, how the economy works. In the Western economy you have a set of instruments that allow you to make this assessment even if you are not a specialist. It is always clear whether it is a bull market or bear market. So you can say: bull market, good government, bear market, bad government (I know it is an oversimplification, but still). But these instruments are not applicable to the Russian economy because its very nature is different. The essence of your business cycle here in Russia is that you always have a pig market, which means that you don’t get whacked as long as you pay the pigs. And sometimes you get whacked even if you pay because it is a real pig market. Russian economy is the dimension where miracle meets subpoena and becomes state secret. How do you compare the numerous different governments that preside over this? The only criterion would be personal appeal of the ministers: a goatee fashion, a necktie color, et cetera. But for this you have to watch television. LK **Reading philosophy is in some ways a disease, like alcohol or drugs or dog racing or any other addiction.** I wonder what Western philosophers you have found most compelling. In particular I wonder if, like the moth Mitya in The Life of Insects, you have a particular affinity for Marcus Aurelius. Here I think of the Marcus Aurelius who insists upon an inner self that can’t be, except by its own assent, corrupted by the outer world. This seems to be a recurring theme in your works: the primacy of the individual mind in the face of a dangerous external world, whether the Soviet one or that of post-Soviet wild capitalism. VP If we put it your way, **the most compelling Western philosophers in my life were Remy Martin and Jack Daniels. They compelled me to do many things I otherwise would never think of. If seriously, I don’t take professional philosophers seriously even when I understand what they say. Philosophy is a self-propelled thinking, and thinking, no matter how refined, only leads to further thinking.** **Uncoerced thinking gives us the best it can when it subsides down and halts, because it is the source of nearly all our problems.** As far as I’m concerned, thoughts are justified in two cases: when they swiftly make us rich and when they fascinate us with their beauty. Philosophy could sometimes fit into the first category—for instance, if you write “The Philosophy That Burns Fat” or something like “The Philosophy of Swimming with Sharks without Being Eaten”—but it would be an exception. Sometimes philosophy fits into the second category (also an exception), and Marcus Aurelius is exactly the case. I read his book many times when I was a kid but I’m not sure I understood his philosophy—I was simply captivated by the noble beauty of his spirit. By the way, I read somewhere that Bill Clinton’s favorite quote came from Marcus Aurelius: “One could lead a decent life even in a palace.” The very notion of Western philosophy as opposed to Eastern seems to me quite dubious and arbitrary, though Bertrand Russell wrote a very good book on its history. This label implies that your mind starts to generalize in a different manner when it is placed in a different geographical location. But how would you classify Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy — as Eastern or Western? As for the self, it is a very tricky notion. We should define it before we use it. I prefer the term mind. I think you are absolutely right when you say that my theme is the primacy of the mind. But the external world is also your mind because the categories external and internal are purely mental. **Mind is the ultimate paradox because when you start to look for it you can’t find it. But when you start to look for something that is not mind you also can’t find it.** Mind is the central issue that interests me as a writer and as a person.

#### Creativity stems not from the old but from radical newness – if it’s true that you should prioritize aesthetics then vote neg because they merely described not acted – the 1AC was not art, it was art criticism which everyone knows is boring – they were a solvency contention, we are solvency – surrealism is a method of drawing that ineffable mystery of life into unbearable realness

**Thistlewood, 2002** [David, “HERBERT READ”, *PROSPECTS: the quarterly review of comparative education*

*(Paris, UNESCO: International Bureau of Education), vol. 24, no.1/2, 1994, p. 375–90]*

By this means Read constructed a co-ordinate system that would account for the characteristics of all apparent tendencies in child art. Moreover, this categoric division related directly to tendencies perceptible in the works of mature avant-gardes. The pursuit of authentic avant-garde creativity, Read had long maintained, **was so emotionally and nervously demanding that it was the conscious choice of very few**. In the adult’s realm it was an ‘obsessional’ activity, while paradoxically in the child’s realm it manifested the effortlessness of inherited reflex behaviour. This suggested a normality of creative identification shared between all children and those adults who would strive to regain pre-logical sensibility. It also suggested a fundamental abnormality in what had been considered normal in conventional education, **namely the intervention of logical, intellect-dependent education at around the age of 10**. **If education were to go with the grain of the biological imperative, ways needed to be found of encouraging the perfection and protraction of pre-logical creative states.** Read did not offer a curriculum but a theoretical defence of the genuine and true. His claims for genuineness and truth were based on the overwhelming evidence of characteristics revealed in his study of child art. But they were founded also in speculative extrapolation of a kind that was most welcome during the Second World War (when his ideas received first publication), in the period of reconstruction (when they were recognized in the 1944 Education Act), and in succeeding decades dominated by Cold War politics. This extrapolation focused on the apparent fact that authentic creativity was an inherent human necessity. The question was why was it so necessary as to be universally present (though in eight complementary modes) in all children, and potentially present in the citizens they were to become? Read discovered the answer in social psychology, at the same time confirming his predilection for anarchism and his recognition of profundity in Jungs conception of the archetype. **The biological necessity has two aspects—to call up imagery from the subconscious and to externalize it in communicable form**—the second of which is served by the originating activity and is therefore the more important. He argued that this is not an outpouring for its own sake, nor is it evidence of children conversing with, and confirming, their own individual subconscious experience: it is essentially ‘an overture demanding response from others’ (Read, 1943, p. 164, quoting Suttie, 1935). It is thus to be regarded as an **integrating** **activity**, a ‘spontaneous reachingout to the external world, at first tentative, but capable of becoming the main factor in the adjustment of the individual to society’ (Read, 1943, p. 164–65). This not only establishes art—an **authentic, non-intellectualized art**—**as of profound significance in education, it downgrades all other subjects in the curriculum that are intended to develop ‘individuation**’, or rather maintains that they too may serve ‘integration’ if taught with artistic focus. **Impact and influence** When published, Read’s philosophy gave new meaning to the work of many thousands of art teachers. Instead of merely assisting technical expertise, recreational skill and consumer discrimination**, their role would be to take command of the larger curriculum, and help innate creative abilities survive in an uncongenial world for the sake of individual well-being and also for the health of a collective social harmony**. The potential for success was evident in Read’s observation that children quite naturally give forth imagery which maintains contact with the deepest levels of social experience, and with times when social cohesion was the normal order. A corollary, which armed the art teachers and explains the enormous, immediate and continued, success of his book was that **defects of modern life—injustice, immorality, harsh competition, even war, had roots in prevailing systems of education and, specifically, in an emphasizing of intellectual development to the exclusion of everything else, visited upon children from around the age of 10**. Because of this, **the infant with inborn access to ancient, collective experience became a rootless 10-year-old and a centre of self-interest**. What the authorities considered to be liberal education was nothing more than **systematic repression,** the elimination of which would give rise to recovery of individual creative fulfilment, mutual communication, and collective social health. These combined objectives and ambitions disseminated rapidly, but outside Read’s direct control. While this took place, he readdressed his other great purpose, encouragement of the avantgarde, which he could engage directly because of its finer focus. It was of temporary, but no less vital, importance as he saw that avant-garde enterprise had to retain its effectiveness until such times as its forms of creativity would cease to be exceptional. This was the objective which, as its first president, he projected into the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), when it was established in London in 1947. The ICA’s founding purpose was both propagandist and educational. It brought accomplished artists into contact with those who, as a result, became the next generation of accomplished artists. Ordinary members could tap current creative research at source and effect its dissemination throughout the wider community. It was not a place where art was made, but where **the most tentative beginnings of its translation into other forms of thought and action—by exposition, argument and debate—took place.** In effect, it was an echo of Read’s own formative experience when, as a young man, the shock of unprecedented abstract images had sent him rushing to philosophy. But now the philosophical context had considerably altered: Jung and D.W. Thompson had influenced the present *Zeitgeist* (Thistlewood, 1982), and theories of collective mind and organic formation were in the air. Artists, by whose efforts the organization of society was to be incrementally changed, needed to be alive to such philosophy, the full range of aesthetic principles which had nurtured it, and its ramifications for a cross-section of human understanding. Thus, the ICA embraced a comprehensive spectrum of avant-garde art, including Abstraction, Surrealism, and every shade or tendency between them (Thistlewood, 1989); and it also provided a forum for advanced scientific philosophy, as well as the latest researches in sociology, anthropology and other disciplines. It was in Read’s special sense an ‘anarchist’ cell, an organic community dedicated to the constant revision and reinvigoration of its essential values, and to the integration of diverse interests meeting in the common sphere of art. But while Read took direct action in relation to the avant-garde, his general educational philosophy—spread by means of his lecture tours but principally through his writings—affected practices throughout the world. *Education through Art* was translated into over thirty languages and is still regarded as a seminal text in countries as diverse as Egypt, Brazil and Japan. Dissemination relied upon remote conviction, but in the United Kingdom was assisted by the popularization of Read’s ideas through cheap pamphlets. In one of these (Read, 1944), he acknowledged his belonging to a tradition first given authoritative shape by Plato, simplified Platonic theory for popular consumption, sketched out a strategy for building an authentic communal culture by perfecting parent/child, teacher/child and individual/group relationships, and argued against the curbing of schools freedom to determine curricula appropriate to localized circumstances. Yet there was also within Read’s scope a form of direct influence on national and supranational institutions. From 1946until his death in 1968 he was president of the Society for Education in Art (SEA), the renamed ATG, in which capacity he had a platform for addressing UNESCO. He was extremely welcoming of policies expressed at UNESCO’s launching conference in 1946 policies devoted to the cultivation of worldwide understanding through education, and the elimination of international conflict at the point of its normal origination, mutual ignorance—but he was nevertheless critical of an automatic reliance on conventional modes of education, and a perceived confusion of culture with learning, education with propaganda. In a lecture at the Museum of Modern Art, New York (timed to coincide with a sitting of the United Nations), he delivered a devastating critique of attempts to prevent war with card indexes and documentary films (Read, 1948). He argued that UNESCO’s **desired moral revolution could not be secured by arguments addressed to minds corrupted with individuated intellectualization: a moral revolution required the total reorientation of the human personality, which could only be secured by integrative education**. On the basis of such representation Read, with others, succeeded in establishing the International Society for Education through Art (INSEA) as an executive arm of UNESCO in 1954. No doubt the most compelling argument he proposed to UNESCO was that **art provides the best prospect of an international medium of cultural exchange and understanding, for the comparable internationalism of science is always to be confounded by national interests**. While almost all other enterprises are intended to address the removal of barriers—of sovereignty, custom, language or trade—**the visual arts know no such barriers**. They constitute ‘a language of symbols that communicates a meaning without hindrance from country to country across the centuries’ (Read, 1970, pp. 233–54). This posthumously published assertion has continued to be the cornerstone of INSEA philosophy until the present day. But it has required of officialdom a remarkable investment in faith, for what Read proposed was not a means of transforming states of mind by propaganda. Education through art is in effect a **reverse** **propaganda**, for it begins with the felt truth which is then expressed as symbol the feeling finds its equivalent in a plastic image (Read, 1955, pp. 88–89). Images originate in collective experience and create correspondences in shared realities: the social bond is rehearsed and reinforced. That a virtual metaphysics should frame a supra-national programme is evidence of its conviction and sincerity. **So we must begin with small things**, in diverse ways, helping one another, discovering one’s own peace of mind, waiting for the understanding that flashes from one peaceful mind to another. In that way the separate cells will take shape, will be joined to one another, will manifest new forms of social organization and new types of art**. From that multiplicity and diversity, that dynamic interplay and emulation, a new culture may arise, and mankind be united as never before in the consciousness of a common destiny** (Read, 1948. p. 15).

**Danto 2** – Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Columbia, originally from Ann Arbor (go blue)

(Arthur, “The abuse of beauty”, Daedalus, Vol. 131, No. 4, On Beauty (Fall, 2002), pp. 35-56, dml)

Beauty's place is not in the definition or - to use the somewhat discredited idiom - the essence of art, from which the avant-garde has rightly removed it. That removal, however, was not merely the result of a conceptual but, as I shall argue, a political determination. And it is the residue of aesthetic politics that lingers on in the negativity we find in attitudes toward beauty in art today. The idea of beauty, the poet Bill Berkson wrote me recently, is a "mangled sodden thing." But the fact of beauty is quite another matter. In a passage near the beginning of Proust's Within a Budding Grove, Marcel (the Narrator), traveling by train to Balbec, sees a peasant girl approaching the station in the early morning, offering coffee and milk. "I felt on seeing her that desire to live which is reborn in us whenever we become conscious anew of beauty and of happiness. " I believe Proust's psychology profound in connecting the consciousness of beauty with happiness - providing we are not conflicted because of a negativity that had yet to inflect the idea of beauty in the generation of Proust, Moore, and Santayana. I would like to press this further. It was the moral weight that was assigned to beauty that helps us understand why the first generation of the twentieth-century avant-garde found it so urgent to dis lodge beauty from its mistaken place in the philosophy of art. It occupied that place in virtue of a conceptual error. The abuse Once we are in a position to perceive that mistake, we should be able to re deem beauty for artistic use once again. But conceptual analysis by itself, without the reinforcement of a kind of Foucauldian archeology, is insufficiently powerful to help us in this task. Had it not, for example, been for the artistic avant-garde in the twentieth century, philosophers almost certainly would continue to teach that the connection between art and beauty is conceptually tight.