# 1nc

#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation requires a predetermined subject—they over-determine the rez more than us by assuming debates are the ultimate arbiter of its value as opposed to a means to facilitate clash

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

#### Competition through fair play is a dialogical process that encourages argumentative testing and mutual recognition of personhood

**Rawls 58** – a leading figure in moral and political philosophy (John, Justice as Fairness, Philosophical Review, April, JSTOR)

Similarly, the acceptance of the duty of fair play by participants in a common practice is a reflection in each person of the recognition of the aspirations and interests of the others to be realized by their joint activity. Failing a special explanation, their acceptance of it is a necessary part of the criterion for their recognizing one another as persons with similar interests and capacities, as the conception of their relations in the general position supposes them to be. Otherwise they would show no recognition of one another as persons with similar capacities and interests, and indeed, in some cases perhaps hypothetical, they would not recognize one another as persons at all, but as complicated objects involved in a complicated activity. To recognize another as a person one must respond to him and act towards him in certain ways; and these ways are intimately connected with the various prima facie duties. Acknowledging these duties in some degree, and so having the elements of morality, is not a matter of choice, or of intuiting moral qualities, or a matter of the expression of feelings or attitudes (the three interpretations between which philosophical opinion frequently oscillates); it is simply the possession of one of the forms of conduct in which the recognition of others as persons is manifested. These remarks are unhappily obscure. Their main purpose here, however, is to forestall, together with the remarks in Section 4, the misinterpretation that, on the view presented, the acceptance of justice and the acknowledgment of the duty of fair play depends in every day life solely on there being a de facto balance of forces between the parties. It would indeed be foolish to underestimate the importance of such a balance in securing justice; but it is not the only basis thereof. The recognition of one another as persons with similar interests and capacities engaged in a common practice must, failing a special explanation, show itself in the acceptance of the principles of justice and the acknowledgment of the duty of fair play.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

**Galloway 7** – professor of communications at Samford University (Ryan, “Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the moral high ground and creates a de facto monologue

**Hanghoj 2008** – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which **the teacher never learns anything new** from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth **instructs someone** who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

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Advocating on behalf of wind farms papers over their intrinsic status as devices, concealing their essence and perpetuating humanity’s attempt to control

Brittain, 2 (Gordon G. Jr., professor of philosophy, “Fitting Wind Power to landscape: a place-based wind turbine”)

Borgmann’s interpretation of technology and the character of contemporary life can be criticized in a number of ways. Still, the distinction between “things” and “devices” reveals, I think, the essence of our inability to develop a landscape aesthetic on which contemporary wind turbines are or might be beautiful and thereby explains the widespread resistance to placing them where they might be seen. The fact of the matter is that contemporary wind turbines are for most of us merely *devices*. There is therefore no way to go beyond or beneath their conventionally uncomfortable appearance to the discovery of a latent mechanical or organic or what-have-you beauty. The attempt to do so is blocked from the outset by the character of the machine. Think about it for a moment: Except for the blades, virtually everything is shielded, including the towers of many turbines, hidden from view behind the same sort of stainless steel that sheathes many electronic devices. Moreover, the machinery is located a great distance away from anyone, save the mechanic who must first don climbing gear to access it and often, for liability reasons, behind chain-link fences and locked gates. The lack of disclosure goes together with the fact that the turbines are merely producers of a commodity, electrical energy, and interchangeable in this respect with any other technology that produces the same commodity at least as cheaply and reliably. The only important differences between wind turbines and other energy generating technologies are not intrinsic to what might be called their “design philosophies.” That is, while they differ with respect to their inputs, their “fuels,” and with respect to their environmental impacts, the same sort of description can be given of each. There is, as a result, but a single standard on the basis of which wind turbines are to be evaluated—**efficiency**. It is not to be wondered that they are, with only small modifications among them, so uniform. In terms of this uniformity, wind turbines are very much unlike other architectural arrivals—for example, houses and traditional windmills. Different styles of architecture developed in different parts of the world in response to local geological and climatic conditions, to the availability of local materials, to the spiritual and philosophical patterns of the local culture. As a result, these buildings create a context. In Heidegger’s wonderful, dark expression, these buildings “gather.” But there is nothing “local” or “gathering” about contemporary wind turbines. They are everywhere and anonymously the same, whether produced in Denmark or Japan, placed in India or Spain—alien objects impressed on a region and in no deeper way connected to it. They have nothing to say to us, nothing to express, no “inside.” They “conceal” rather than “reveal.” The sense of place that they might eventually engender cannot, therefore, be unique. In addition, wind turbines are quintessential “devices” in that they preclude engagement. Or rather, the only way in which the vast majority of people can engage with them is visually (and occasionally by ear). People cannot climb over and around them, they cannot get inside them, they cannot tinker with them. They cannot even get close to them. There is no larger and non-trivial physical or biological way in which they can be appropriated or their beauty grasped. The irony, of course, is that, precluded from any other sort of engagement with wind turbines, most people find them visually objectionable, though they might be willing to countenance their existence as the lesser of evils.

**This inevitably reproduces the ecological catastrophes that kill billions. Vote neg to break the confines of technological thought in an act of doing nothing.**

Ladelle **McWhorter**. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University. “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection.” *Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy.* **1992**. pp. 1-3

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverish­ing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution — consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chloro­fluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."' Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human. What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers — of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies — so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays — in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" — Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness — a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery' is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing.

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**Eco-feminism relies on essentialist beliefs in feminity—its ignorance towards class relations guarntees increased patriarchal violence under a different name**

**Rudy, Asst Prof of Sociology at MSU, Dec 2006**

[Alan, ***On the Ecofeminist Editorial: "Moving to an Embodied Materialism"*, Capitalism, Nature, Socialism Vol 17 Iss 4, Proquest]**

On the other hand, and somewhat differently from most critical and antiessentializing feminist trajectories over the last quarter century,6 many ecofeminist texts-Salleh's editorial among them-continue to focus on women's mediations of biological processes, whether ecological, agricultural, or reproductive labor within families. While it is imperative that we acknowledge and resist the historically inaccurate re-inscription of "traditional" naturalized gender roles by neoconservative and reactionary movements around the world, to argue that these relations are predominantly about women's mediations of biological processes represents a failure of relational materialist imagination quite similar to ecosocialist naturalization of the environment and scientization of politics. Here, the regular appeal to women's subordinate mediation of biological processes for men homogenizes both the historically and spatially-specific kinds of biological mediation women practice, as well as the forms of patriarchy and relational dynamics of materially gendering ecologies, bodies and spaces. Furthermore, from an ecosocialist perspective, capitalist commodification of the conditions of life means that markets, money and wages mediate biological processes under modernist and developmentalist conditions at least as much as men and women mediate different aspects of biological processes for and with one another. Not only do men mediate biological processes for women, but that which is "biological" is wildly diverse. Here, it seems to me, much of the problem is the transliteration of reproduction with the biological. Salleh suggests that ecofeminists focus on women and women's oppression as "reproductive labor in the sexual, economic, cultural, and ecological senses of that word. They are associated with-but are certainly much more than-conditions of production." Such an approach at least appears to replicate the production-reproduction binary against which Marx and so many feminists-particularly feminists from the global South and subaltern feminists of the North-have argued. In short, there seems to be a danger in this approach of limiting ecofeminist analysis to relations reified by patriarchy-of reproducing the patriarchal equation of nature, women, and the nature of women's role in reproduction.

**Capitalism causes extinction**

**Brown**, Charles [Professor of Economics and Research Scientist at the University of Michigan] May 13th 20**05** (http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/pen-l/2005w15/msg00062.htm)

The capitalist class owns the factories, the banks, and transportation-the means of production and distribution. Workers sell their ability to work in order to acquire the necessities of life. Capitalists buy the workers' labor, but only pay them back a portion of the wealth they create. Because the capitalists own the means of production, they are able to keep the surplus wealth created by workers above and beyond the cost of paying worker's wages and other costs of production. This surplus is called "profit" and consists of unpaid labor that the capitalists appropriate and use to achieve ever-greater profits. These profits are turned into capital which capitalists use to further exploit the producers of all wealth-the working class. Capitalists are compelled by competition to seek to maximize profits. The capitalist class as a whole can do that only by extracting a greater surplus from the unpaid labor of workers by increasing exploitation. Under capitalism, economic development happens only if it is profitable to the individual capitalists, not for any social need or good. The profit drive is inherent in capitalism, and underlies or exacerbates all major social ills of our times. With the rapid advance of technology and productivity, new forms of capitalist ownership have developed to maximize profit. The working people of our country confront serious, chronic problems because of capitalism. These chronic problems become part of the objective conditions that confront each new generation of working people. The threat of nuclear war, which can destroy all humanity, grows with the spread of nuclear weapons, space-based weaponry, and a military doctrine that justifies their use in preemptive wars and wars without end. Ever since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been constantly involved in aggressive military actions big and small. These wars have cost millions of lives and casualties, huge material losses, as well as trillions of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Threats to the environment continue to spiral, threatening all life on our planet. Millions of workers are unemployed or insecure in their jobs, even during economic upswings and periods of "recovery" from recessions. Most workers experience long years of stagnant real wages, while health and education costs soar. Many workers are forced to work second and third jobs to make ends meet. Most workers now average four different occupations during their lifetime, being involuntarily moved from job to job and career to career. Often, retirement-age workers are forced to continue working just to provide health care for themselves. With capitalist globalization, jobs move as capitalists export factories and even entire industries to other countries. Millions of people continuously live below the poverty level; many suffer homelessness and hunger. Public and private programs to alleviate poverty and hunger do not reach everyone, and are inadequate even for those they do reach. Racism remains the most potent weapon to divide working people. Institutionalized racism provides billions in extra profits for the capitalists every year due to the unequal pay racially oppressed workers receive for work of comparable value. All workers receive lower wages when racism succeeds in dividing and disorganizing them. In every aspect of economic and social life, African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asian a nd Pacific Islanders, Arabs and Middle Eastern peoples, and other nationally and racially oppressed people experience conditions inferior to that of whites. Racist violence and the poison of racist ideas victimize all people of color no matter which economic class they belong to. The attempts to suppress and undercount the vote of the African American and other racially oppressed people are part of racism in the electoral process. Racism permeates the police, judicial and prison systems, perpetuating unequal sentencing, racial profiling, discriminatory enforcement, and police brutality. The democratic, civil and human rights of all working people are continually under attack. These attacks range from increasingly difficult procedures for union recognition and attempts to prevent full union participation in elections, to the absence of the right to strike for many public workers. They range from undercounting minority communities in the census to making it difficult for working people to run for office because of the domination of corporate campaign funding and the high cost of advertising. These attacks also include growing censorship and domination of the media by the ultra-right; growing restrictions and surveillance of activist social movements and the Left; open denial of basic rights to immigrants; and, violations of the Geneva Conventions up to and including torture for prisoners. These abuses all serve to maintain the grip of the capitalists on government power. They use this power to ensure the economic and political dominance of their class. Women still face a considerable differential in wages for work of equal or comparable value. They also confront barriers to promotion, physical and sexual abuse, continuing unequal workload in home and family life, and male supremacist ideology perpetuating unequal and often unsafe conditions. The constant attacks on social welfare programs severely impact single women, single mothers, nationally and racially oppressed women, and all working class women. The reproductive rights of all women are continually under attack ideologically and politically. Violence against women in the home and in society at large remains a shameful fact of life in the U.S.

**Thus, we demand rejection of the plan in favor of communal relations of solidarity outside the state to shelter the oppressed from global capitalism**

**Only by rejecting capitalism's drive to commodify can we lead to an alternative to capitalism.**

Marcuse, German Philosopher and Professor at Columbia and Harvard, in ’69 [Herbert, member of the Frankfurt School, An Essay on Liberation, p. 85-91]

More recently, the break in the unity of the communist orbit, the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Vietnam, and the "cultural revolution" in China have changed this picture. The possibility of constructing socialism on a truly popular base, without the Stalinist bureaucratization and the danger of a nuclear war as the imperialist answer to the emergence of this kind of socialist power, has led to some sort of common interest between the Soviet Union on the one side and the United States on the other. In a sense, this is indeed the community of interests of the "haves" against the "have nots," of the Old against the New. The "collaborationist" policy of the Soviet Union necessitates the pursuance of power politics which increasingly reduces the prospect that Soviet society, by virtue of its basic institutions alone (abolition of private ownership and control of the means of production: planned economy) is still capable of making the transition to a free society. And yet, the very dynamic of imperialist expansion places the Soviet Union in the other camp: would the effective resistance in Vietnam, and the protection of Cuba be possible without Soviet aid? However, while we reject the unqualified convergence thesis, according to which -at least at present -the assimilation of interests prevails UPOIl the conflict between capitalism and Soviet Socialism, we cannot minimize the essential difference between the latter and the new historical efforts to construct socialism by developing and creating a genuine solidarity between the leadership and the liberated victims of exploitation. The actual may considerably deviate from the ideal, the fact remains that, for a whole generation, "freedom," "socialism," and "liberation" are inseparable from Fidel and Che and the guerrillas -not because their revolutionary struggle could furnish the model for the struggle in the metropoles, but because they have recaptured the truth of these ideas, in the dayto- day fight of men and women for a life as human beings: for a new life. What kind of life? We are still confronted with the demand to state the "concrete alternative." The demand is meaningless if it asks for a blueprint of the specific institutions and relationships which would be those of the new society: they cannot be determined a priori; they will develop, in trial and error, as the new society develops. If we could form a concrete concept of the alternative today, it would not be that of an alternative; the possibilities of the new society are sufficiently "abstract," i.e., removed from and incongruous with the established universe to defy any attempt to identify them in terms of this universe. However, the question cannot be brushed aside by saying that what matters today is the destruction of the old, of the powers that be, making way for the emergence of the new. Such an answer neglects the essential fact that the old is not simply bad, that it delivers the goods, and that people have a real stake in it. There can be societies which are much worse – there are such societies today. The system of corporate capitalism has the right to insist that those who work for its replacement justify their action. But the demand to state the concrete alternatives is justified for yet another reason. Negative thinking draws whatever force it may have from its empirical basis: the actual human condition in the given society, and the "given" possibilities to transcend this condition, to enlarge the realm of freedom. In this sense, negative thinking is by virtue of its own internal concepts "positive": oriented toward, and comprehending a future which is "contained" in the present. And in this containment (which is an important aspect of the general containment policy pursued by the established societies), the future appears as possible liberation. It is not the only alternative: the advent of a long period of "civilized" barbarism, with or without the nuclear destruction, is equally contained in the present. Negative thinking, and the praxis guided by it, is the positive and positing effort to prevent this utter negativity. The concept of the primary, initial institutions of liberation is familiar enough and concrete enough: collective ownership, collective control and planning of the means of production and distribution. This is the foundation, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the alternative: it would make possible the usage of all available resources for the abolition of poverty, which is the prerequisite for the turn from quantity into quality: the creation of a reality in accordance with the new sensitivity and the new consciousness. This goal implies rejection of those policies of reconstruction, no matter how revolutionary, which are bound to perpetuate (or to introduce) the pattern of the unfree societies and their needs. Such false policy is perhaps best summed up in the formula "to catch up with, and to overtake the productivity level of the advanced capitalist countries." What is wrong with this formula is not the emphasis on the rapid improvement of the material conditions but on the model guiding their improvement. The model denies the alternative, the qualitative difference. The latter is not, and cannot be, the result of the fastest possible attainment of capitalist productivity, but rather the development of new modes and ends of production "new" not only (and perhaps not at all) with respect to technical innovations and production relations, but with respect to the different human needs and the different human relationships in working for the satisfaction of these needs. These new relationships would be the result of a "biological" *solidarity* in work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free development -the exact opposite of the administered and enforced harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?) countries. It is the image of this solidarity as elemental, instinctual, creative force which the young radicals see in Cuba, in the guerrillas, in the Chinese cultural revolution. Solidarity and cooperation: not all their forms are liberating. Fascism and militarism have developed a deadly efficient solidarity. Socialist solidarity is autonomy: selfdetermination begins at home -and that is with every I, and the We whom the I chooses. And this end must indeed appear in the means to attain it, that is to say, in the strategy of those who, within the existing society, work for the new one. If the socialist relationships of production are to be a new way of life, a new Form of life, then their existential quality must show forth, anticipated and demonstrated, in the fight for their realization. Exploitation in all its forms must have disappeared from this fight: from the work relationships among the fighters as well as from their individual relationships. Understanding, tenderness toward each other, the instinctual consciousness of that which is evil, false, the heritage of oppression, would then testify to the authenticity of the rebellion. In short, the economic, political, and cultural features of a classless society must have become the basic needs of those who fight for it. This ingression of the future into the present, this depth dimension of the rebellion accounts, in the last analysis, for the incompatibility with the traditional forms of the political struggle. The new radicalism militates against the centralized bureaucratic communist as well as against the semi-democratic liberal organization. There is a strong element of spontaneity, even anarchism, in this rebellion, expression of the new sensibility, sensitivity against domination: the feeling, the awareness, that the joy of freedom and the need to be free must precede liberation.Therefore the aversion against preestablished Leaders, apparatchiks of all sorts, politicians no matter how leftist. The initiative shifts to small groups, widely diffused, with a high degree of autonomy, mobility, flexibility. To be sure, within the repressive society, and against its ubiquitous apparatus, spontaneity by itself cannot possibly be a radical and revolutionary force. It can become such a force only as the result of enlightenment, education, political practice -in this sense indeed, as a result of organization. The anarchic element is an essential factor in the struggle against domination: preserved but disciplined in the preparatory political action, it will be freed and aufgehoben in the goals of the struggle. Released for the construction of the initial revolutionary institutions, the antirepressive sensibility, allergic to domination, would militate against the prolongation of the "First Phase," that is, the authoritarian bureaucratic development of the productive forces. The new society could then reach relatively fast the level at which poverty could be abolished (this level could be considerably lower than that of advanced capitalist productivity, which is geared to obscene aflluence and waste). Then the development could tend toward a sensuous culture, tangibly contrasting with the gray-on-gray culture of the socialist societies of Eastern Europe. Production would be redirected in defiance of all the rationality of the Performance Principle; socially necessary labor would be diverted to the construction of an aesthetic rather than repressive environment, to parks and gardens rather than highways and parking lots, to the creation of areas of withdrawal rather than massive fun and relaxation. Such redistribution of socially necessary labor (time), incompatible with any society governed by the Profit and Performance Principle, would gradually alter society in all its dimensions -it would mean the ascent of the Aesthetic Principle as Form of the Reality Principle: a culture of receptivity based on the achievements of industrial civilization and initiating the end of its selfpropelling productivity. Not regression to a previous stage of civilization, but return to an imaginary *temps perdu* in the real life of mankind: progress to a stage of civilization where man has learned to ask for the sake of whom or of what he organizes his society; the stage where he checks and perhaps even halts his incessant struggle for existence on an enlarged scale, surveys what has been achieved through centuries of misery and hecatombs of victims, and decides that it is enough, and that it is time to enjoy what he has and what can be reproduced and refined with a minimum of alienated labor: not the arrest or reduction of technical progress, but the elimination of those of its features which perpetuate man's subjection to the apparatus and the intensification of the struggle for existence -to work harder in order to get more of the merchandise that has to be sold. In other words, electrification indeed, and all technical devices which alleviate and protect life, all the mechanization which frees human energy and time, all the standardization which does away with spurious and parasitarian "personalized" services rather than multiplying them and the gadgets and tokens of exploitative affiuence. In terms of the latter (and only in terms of the latter), this would certainly be a regression -but freedom from the rule of merchandise over man is a precondition of freedom. The construction of a free society would create new incentives for work. In the exploitative societies, the so‐called work instinct is mainly the (more or less effectively) introjected necessity to perform productively in order to earn a living. But the life instincts themselves strive for the unification and enhancement of life; in nonrepressive sublimation they would provide the libidinal energy for work on the development of a reality which no longer demands the exploitative repression of the Pleasure Principle. The "incentives" would then be built into the instinctual structure of men. Their sensibility would register, as biological reactions, the difference between the ugly and the beautiful, between calm and noise, tenderness and brutality, intelligence and stupidity, joy and fun, and it would correlate this distinction with that between freedom and servitude. Freud's last theoretical conception recognizes the erotic instincts as work instincts ‐work for the creation of a sensuous environment. The social expression of the liberated work instinct is cooperation, which, grounded in solidarity, directs the organization of the realm of necessity and the development of the realm of freedom. And there is an answer to the question which troubles the minds of so many men of good will: what are the people in a free society going to do? The answer which, I believe, strikes at the heart of the matter was given by a young black girl. She said: for the first time in our life, we shall be free to think about what we are going to do.

# 1nc

#### Expanding wind power incentivizes overproduction – this will overload the electricity grid, causing blackouts and increasing electricity prices

**Michaels, 08** - professor of economics at California State University and a senior fellow at the Institute for Energy Research. (Robert, “A Federal Renewable Electricity Requirement: What’s Not to Like?,” 11/13, <http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-627.pdf>)

Over the past 20 years, markets for “whole- sale” power have grown in scope and competi-tiveness. Instead of relying only on generation that they own, to varying degrees utilities everywhere can now obtain power by contracts with other generation owners (including non- utilities and industrial cogenerators). Utilities can also often use regional energy markets in which day-ahead and hourly prices equate supply and demand.

The case for competitive contracting and markets in electricity is the same as else- where—competition motivates the efficient use of resources, the efficient planning of investments for the future, and rewards inno- vation. Electricity markets, however, are con-strained by operating considerations. The production of power in an interconnected grid must equal its load at all times. Since a mismatch (in either direction) lasting only a single second can bring regional blackouts, the operator must have reserves available that can be brought on line quickly, and have units operating that can follow second-by- second changes in load.

Further, transmission constraints in elec- tricity differ in important ways from those in other networks. Unlike water or gas, power flows along individual AC lines follow physi-cal laws and cannot be directly controlled by the system operator. Instead the operator (often a computer algorithm) must some- times operate high cost generators in partic-ular locations in order to maintain regional balance and neither overload nor destabilize (underload) individual lines.

These technological requirements mean that the scope of power markets and the behav-ior of their participants must be constrained to maintain reliability. If there are no transmis- sion constraints and generators may be started and stopped on a moment’s notice, the least- cost production mix will ensure that those units with the lowest marginal costs will oper- ate before those with higher costs, a phenome- non known in the field as “dispatch by merit order.” A single utility that owned and operat- ed all of the generation in a control area would dispatch by merit order, and a competitive market where generators bid in their power at marginal cost would behave similarly. Security constraints, however, mean that strict merit order dispatch is impossible in both cases. Dispatch is also complicated by different “ramp rates” at which the outputs of different types of generators can be changed. Nuclear and coal units have low operating costs, but their output can not be altered quickly enough to match unexpected changes in load. Gas- fired units have higher operating costs, but the need to “follow” unexpected load changes will mean that some must operate even if lower marginal cost coal units are available. Hydro- electric power burns no fuel and renews itself with the seasons, but it does have a marginal opportunity cost—using part of a limited reser- voir at one date means that less will be available on others when it might be more valuable. In practice, hydro in the west is valuable for “shaping” power over the day to minimize the costs of bringing gas-fired units up to meet peaks and turning them down as demand falls in the evening.

Whether the system is centrally dispatched or market-based, a renewable—like hydro—can improve reliability and reduce operating costs. Renewables like biomass and geothermal may be base-loaded and integrated into either a market or a centralized system like conven-tional plants. Intermittent renewables, as we have seen, can bring operating problems to centralized systems if they are a large enough component of resources. They also, however, can constrain the use of markets.

The simple fact that wind units have a seeming marginal cost of zero (and that their output is not storable) does not unambigu- ously imply that they are beneficial.129 As not-ed above, for efficient operation, the net income to the producer of a wind-generated energy must equal the difference between the cost of the power it replaces and the increased costs of maintaining reliability that its inter- mittency imposes. As also noted above, this figure can become negative when wind looms large enough, meaning that the system’s avoidable costs would be minimized if the units were disconnected. In the absence of some method for assessing the wind’s actual contribution in real time, wind units will always bid into the market (at a zero price) while operating costs are higher than other- wise. The ancillary services will be priced at their scarcity value, but if wind is not, market prices will induce overinvestment in wind and require that more, rather than less, fuel be burned. Adding a production tax credit increases the distortion.

#### It could overload the entire grid

**Rutgers News, 08** (“Sustainable Energy Must Be Integrated Into Existing Power Grid, Says Rutgers–Camden Finance Scholar,” 11/18, <http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/news-releases/2008/11/sustainable-energy-m-20081118/>)

CAMDEN --  Engineers and entrepreneurs are rushing to explore alternative sources of efficient and renewable energy in New Jersey and elsewhere in the country. A Rutgers School of Business—Camden professor has strong words of caution as projects involving wind farms and photovoltaic cells proliferate.

With the electric-power industry poised for its most dramatic changes in decades, too little thought is being devoted to coordinating these piecemeal initiatives, warns [Richard Michelfelder](http://business.camden.rutgers.edu/FacultyStaff/Directory/michelfelder.htm) in a recent edition of The Electricity Journal, the leading policy journal for the electric industry.

The consequence, he fears, might well be a disastrous overload of the nation’s electrical grid.

An assistant professor of finance at the Rutgers School of Business—Camden and former president and CEO of Quantum Consulting Inc., a national public utilities consulting firm based in Berkeley, Cal., Michelfelder comes to his assessment after a quarter-century in the energy-technology industry.

“When you start adding random assets to the grid, you also add the possibility of disruptions in the coordination of the flow of electricity,” says Michelfelder.

#### The collapse of the electricity grid will send us back to the stone age – the economy would be destroyed

**Rifkin, 2** - the founder and president of the Foundation on Economic Trends, Fellow at the Wharton School’s Executive Education Program (Jeremy, The Hydrogen Economy: The Creation of the World-Wide Energy Web and the Redistribution of Power on Earth, p.163-164 ) // SM

It is understandable that we would be unmindful of the critical role that oil plays in feeding our families, because the process of growing food is so removed in time and place from our urban lives. The same holds true for the electricity that we have come to rely on to maintain our daily routines. The electrical grid is the central nervous system that coordinates a densely populated urban existence. Without electrical power, urban life would cease to exist, the information age would become a faded memory, and industrial production would grind to a halt. The fastest way to ensure the collapse of the modern era would be to pull the plug and turn off the flow of electricity. Light, heat, and power would all stop. Civilization as we know it would come to an end.

# 1nc case

**There’s no spillover**

Ferguson 2009 (Niall, American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=335&MId=16)

So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!” Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

**Patriarchy’s inevitable**

**Fukuyama 98**—Professor of International Political Economy and Director of the International Development Program at Johns Hopkins. BA in classics from Cornell. PhD in government from Harvard (Francis, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” September, http://www.evoyage.com/Evolutionary%20Feminism/ForAffairWomen&Evolution.htm)

It is clear that this violence was largely perpetrated by men. While small minorities of human societies have been matrilineal, evidence of a primordial matriarchy in which women dominated men, or were even relatively equal to men, has been hard to find. There was no age of innocence. The line from chimp to modern man is continuous.

It would seem, then, that there is something to the contention of many feminists that phenomena like aggression, violence, war, and intense competition for dominance in a status hierarchy are more closely associated with men than women. Theories of international relations like realism that see international politics as a remorseless struggle for power are in fact what feminist call a gendered perspective, describing the behavior of states controlled by men rather than states per se. A world run by women would follow different rules, it would appear, and it is toward that sort of world that all postindustrial or Western societies are moving. As women gain power in these countries, the latter should become less aggressive, adventurous, competitive and violent.

The problem with the feminist view is that is sees these attitudes toward violence, power, status as wholly the products of a patriarchal culture, whereas in fact it appears they are rooted in biology. This makes these attitudes harder to change in men and consequently in societies. Despite the rise of women, men will continue to play a major, if not dominant, part in the governance of postindustrial countries, not to mention less-developed ones. The realms of war and international politics in particular will remain controlled by men for longer than many feminists would like. Most important, the task of resocializing men to be more like women - that is, less violent - will run into limits. What is bred in the bone cannot be altered easily by changes in culture and ideology.

**Most science is not biased and wouldn’t count as science if it were**

**Short 1988** (Thomas, Associate Prof. Philosophy – Kenyon College, Academic Questions, “”Diversity” and “Breaking the Disciplines”: Two New Assaults on the Curriculum”, 1(3), September, Ebsco)

Third, as soon as the second error has been dispatched, we are told that we have missed the real point, which is that the liberal arts, because they have been created by white men, embody a white and male and (as is often added) heterosexual point of view. This is a point of view, the argument continues, from which white patriarchy is seen as inevitable and as right. To impose that point of view on women, blacks, Hispanic Americans homosexuals, etc., is to make them internalize the rationale for their own domination by white male heterosexuals. The black man who is “white” inside willingly cooperates in his own exploitation by white society, just as women have been taught, and therefore sincerely believe, that their rightful role is subordinate to men. And so on. It is a remarkable symptom of the present extraordinary situation in higher education that one segment of the academic community regards such views, so far as they are acquainted with them at all, as sheerest nonsense, and refuses to believe that anyone, least of all their colleagues, could take that nonsense seriously or that it will be taken seriously long enough or by enough people to pose a real threat, while another rapidly growing segment is busily elaborating these ideas and teaching them to their students. Those in the former camp are urged to glance through the assigned readings in the women’s studies courses on their campuses or read through some of the treatises written on black studies pedagogy. The views just summarized—and, if anything, understated—are “supported” by the recent flood of politicized and shoddy scholarship which serious scholars do not want to dignify by reasoned reply. Unfortunately, reply is now urgently needed. For this “scholarship” has been given spurious legitimacy by the creation of academic journals that print it and academic specialties that teach it, by the book lists of reputable publishers, and by page-counting administrators who grant tenure on the basis of such publications. There is no room here for critical examination of that literature. However, even a quick review reveals that its pretensions are not borne out by its accomplishments. It pretends to show that white patriarchy is a deeply buried presupposition of all the sciences and all the various departments of traditional scholarship. To establish this, it relies sometimes on abstract argument and sometimes on examples of racist or sexist bias. The abstract argument is inevitably circular; it consists of restating the conclusion in one or another of the trendy and obfuscatory jargons of the present day, e.g., the writings of the French feminists relying on Lacanian psychoanalysis and deconstruction. As for the examples of bias that have been cited, they are few in number, though endlessly repeated, and fall into three classes. First, there are those are just as dubious as the generalizations they are supposed to support. Second, there are utterly trivial examples. That Virgil mistook the queen bee for a king may indicate his proclivity for patriarchy, but it does not show any blinding prejudice anywhere: even male apiarists can identify eggs. Third, there are serious examples of bias, but they are just where one might expect them—in areas of research that impinge directly on social policy, such as theories and measurements of intelligence. Biased conclusions of those types are identified and corrected by the usual methods of science and scholarship, and have been identified and corrected mostly by white males. Hence, no prejudices built into the very nature of scholarship are demonstrated. The theories these shoddy arguments are supposed to support are in any case implausible. It is their implausibility that makes them seem to some people to be exciting, sophisticated, or profound. However, this same implausibility puts the burden of proof on those who subscribe to these doctrines, and that burden, as we have just seen, has not been borne. Excitement is not enough reason to justify the view that there is a racist or sexist bias in subjects having nothing to do with either sex or race. And where we could plausibly expect a racially or sexually conditioned perspective to make a difference, in the parts of literature that probe social relations, there are contributions of blacks and women have been particularly noted. Finally, the history of the liberal arts is inconsistent with the idea that they front for white patriarchy (much less, as is often suggested, capitalist “exploitation”). The liberal arts have been the creation of people of all sorts of complexions, including many women and a relatively high percentage of homosexuals, working and writing under the greatest possible variety of political regimes, and, in the case of political theorists, poets, and philosophers, often writing against political oppression. If there is one theme underlying the liberal arts, it is liberation.

**Reject their truth claims. Failure to base arguments on logic and empiricism devolves into prejudice and destroys the left**

**Sokal, 97** (Alan, professor of physics at New York University, “A Plea for Reason, Evidence and Logic”,

http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/nyu\_forum.html)

This affair has brought up an incredible number of issues, and I can't dream of addressing them all in 10 minutes, so let me start by circumscribing my talk. I don't want to belabor Social Text's failings either before or after the publication of my parody: Social Text is not my enemy, nor is it my main intellectual target. I won't go here into the ethical issues related to the propriety of hoaxing (although in the question period I'd be glad to defend my ethics). I won't address the obscurantist prose and the uncritical celebrity-worship that have infected certain trendy sectors of the American academic humanities (though these are important questions that I hope other panelists will address). I won't enter into technical issues of the philosophy of science (although again I'd be glad to do that in the question period). I won't discuss the social role of science and technology (though these are important issues). Indeed, I want to emphasize that this affair is in my view not primarily about science -- though that was the excuse that I used in constructing my parody -- nor is it a disciplinary conflict between scientists and humanists, who are in fact represented on all sides of the debate. What I believe this debate is principally about -- and what I want to focus on tonight -- is the nature of truth, reason and objectivity: issues that I believe are crucial to the future of left politics. I didn't write the parody for the reasons you might at first think. My aim wasn't to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit or sociology. I know perfectly well that the main threats to science nowadays come from budget-cutting politicians and corporate executives, not from a handful of postmodernist academics. Rather, my goal is to defend what one might call a scientific worldview -- defined broadly as a respect for evidence and logic, and for the incessant confrontation of theories with the real world; in short, for reasoned argument over wishful thinking, superstition and demagoguery. And my motives for trying to defend these old-fashioned ideas are basically political. I'm worried about trends in the American Left -- particularly here in academia -- that at a minimum divert us from the task of formulating a progressive social critique, by leading smart and committed people into trendy but ultimately empty intellectual fashions, and that can in fact undermine the prospects for such a critique, by promoting subjectivist and relativist philosophies that in my view are inconsistent with producing a realistic analysis of society that we and our fellow citizens will find compelling. David Whiteis, in a recent article, said it well: Too many academics, secure in their ivory towers and insulated from the real-world consequences of the ideas they espouse, seem blind to the fact that non-rationality has historically been among the most powerful weapons in the ideological arsenals of oppressors. The hypersubjectivity that characterizes postmodernism is a perfect case in point: far from being a legacy of leftist iconoclasm, as some of its advocates so disingenuously claim, it in fact ... plays perfectly into the anti-rationalist -- really, anti-thinking -- bias that currently infects "mainstream" U.S. culture. Along similar lines, the philosopher of science Larry Laudan observed caustically that the displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. (And these days, being nearly as anti-intellectual as American political campaigns is really quite a feat.) Now of course, no one will admit to being against reason, evidence and logic -- that's like being against Motherhood and Apple Pie. Rather, our postmodernist and poststructuralist friends will claim to be in favor of some new and deeper kind of reason, such as the celebration of "local knowledges" and "alternative ways of knowing" as an antidote to the so-called "Eurocentric scientific methodology" (you know, things like systematic experiment, controls, replication, and so forth). You find this magic phrase "local knowledges" in, for example, the articles of Andrew Ross and Sandra Harding in the "Science Wars" issue of Social Text. But are "local knowledges" all that great? And when local knowledges conflict, which local knowledges should we believe? In many parts of the Midwest, the "local knowledges" say that you should spray more herbicides to get bigger crops. It's old-fashioned objective science that can tell us which herbicides are poisonous to farm workers and to people downstream. Here in New York City, lots of "local knowledges" hold that there's a wave of teenage motherhood that's destroying our moral fiber. It's those boring data that show that the birth rate to teenage mothers has been essentially constant since 1975, and is about half of what it was in the good old 1950's. Another word for "local knowledges" is prejudice. I'm sorry to say it, but under the influence of postmodernism some very smart people can fall into some incredibly sloppy thinking, and I want to give two examples. The first comes from a front-page article in last Tuesday's New York Times (10/22/96) about the conflict between archaeologists and some Native American creationists. I don't want to address here the ethical and legal aspects of this controversy -- who should control the use of 10,000-year-old human remains -- but only the epistemic issue. There are at least two competing views on where Native American populations come from. The scientific consensus, based on extensive archaeological evidence, is that humans first entered the Americas from Asia about 10-20,000 years ago, crossing the Bering Strait. Many Native American creation accounts hold, on the other hand, that native peoples have always lived in the Americas, ever since their ancestors emerged onto the surface of the earth from a subterranean world of spirits. And the Times article observed that many archaeologists, "pulled between their scientific temperaments and their appreciation for native culture, ... have been driven close to a postmodern relativism in which science is just one more belief system." For example, Roger Anyon, a British archaeologist who has worked for the Zuni people, was quoted as saying that "Science is just one of many ways of knowing the world. ... [The Zunis' world view is] just as valid as the archeological viewpoint of what prehistory is about." Now, perhaps Dr. Anyon was misquoted, but we all have repeatedly heard assertions of this kind, and I'd like to ask what such assertions could possibly mean. We have here two mutually incompatible theories. They can't both be right; they can't both even be approximately right. They could, of course, both be wrong, but I don't imagine that that's what Dr. Anyon means by "just as valid". It seems to me that Anyon has quite simply allowed his political and cultural sympathies to cloud his reasoning. And there's no justification for that: We can perfectly well remember the victims of a horrible genocide, and support their descendants' valid political goals, without endorsing uncritically (or hypocritically) their societies' traditional creation myths. Moreover, the relativists' stance is extremely condescending: it treats a complex society as a monolith, obscures the conflicts within it, and takes its most obscurantist factions as spokespeople for the whole. My second example of sloppy thinking comes from Social Text co-editor Bruce Robbins' article in the September/October 1996 Tikkun magazine, in which he tries to defend -- albeit half-heartedly -- the postmodernist/poststructuralist subversion of conventional notions of truth. "Is it in the interests of women, African Americans, and other super-exploited people," Robbins asks, "to insist that truth and identity are social constructions? Yes and no," he asserts. "No, you can't talk about exploitation without respect for empirical evidence" -- exactly my point. "But yes," Robbins continues, "truth can be another source of oppression." Huh??? How can truth oppress anyone? Well, Robbins' very next sentence explains what he means: "It was not so long ago," he says, "that scientists gave their full authority to explanations of why women and African Americans ... were inherently inferior." But is Robbins claiming that that is truth? I should hope not! Sure, lots of people say things about women and African-Americans that are not true; and yes, those falsehoods have sometimes been asserted in the name of "science", "reason" and all the rest. But claiming something doesn't make it true, and the fact that people -- including scientists -- sometimes make false claims doesn't mean that we should reject or revise the concept of truth. Quite the contrary: it means that we should examine with the utmost care the evidence underlying people's truth claims, and we should reject assertions that in our best rational judgment are false. This error is, unfortunately, repeated throughout Robbins' essay: he systematically confuses truth with claims of truth, fact with assertions of fact, and knowledge with pretensions to knowledge. These elisions underlie much of the sloppy thinking about "social construction" that is prevalent nowadays in the academy, and it's something that progressives ought to resist. Sure, let's show which economic, political and ideological interests are served by our opponents' accounts of "reality"; but first let's demonstrate, by marshalling evidence and logic, why those accounts are objectively false (or in some cases true but incomplete). A bit later in his article, Robbins admits candidly that "those of us who do cultural politics sometimes act as if ... truth were always and everywhere a weapon of the right." Now, that's an astoundingly self-defeating attitude for an avowed leftist. If truth were on the side of the right, shouldn't we all -- at least the honest ones among us -- become right-wingers? For my own part, I'm a leftist and a feminist because of evidence and logic (combined with elementary ethics), not in spite of it. This plea of mine for reason, evidence and logic is hardly original; dozens of progressive humanists, social scientists and natural scientists have been saying the same thing for years. But if my parody in Social Text has helped just a little bit to amplify their voices and to provoke a much-needed debate on the American Left, then it will have served its purpose.

**Patriarchy isn’t the root cause – the 1ac’s presentation ignores and undermines the cause of feminism – turns case. This is a method K of the presentation of the 1ac**

**\*\*\*READING THE BOXED PORTION**

**Crenshaw 2002** – PhD, former CEDA president (Carrie, Perspectives In Controversy: Selected Articles from Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, p. 119-126)

Feminism is not dead. It is alive and well in intercollegiate debate. Increasingly, students rely on feminist authors to inform their analysis of resolutions. While I applaud these initial efforts to explore feminist thought, I am concerned that such arguments only exemplify the general absence of sound causal reasoning in debate rounds. Poor causal reasoning results from a debate practice that privileges empirical proof over rhetorical proof, fostering ignorance of the subject matter being debated. To illustrate my point, I claim that debate arguments about feminists suffer from a reductionism that tends to marginalize the voices of significant feminist authors. David Zarefsky made a persuasive case for the value of causal reasoning in intercollegiate debate as far back as 1979. He argued that causal arguments are desirable for four reasons. First, causal analysis increases the control of the arguer over events by promoting understanding of them. Second, the use of causal reasoning increases rigor of analysis and fairness in the decision-making process. Third, causal arguments promote understanding of the philosophical paradox that presumably good people tolerate the existence of evil. Finally, causal reasoning supplies good reasons for “commitments to policy choices or to systems of belief which transcend whim, caprice, or the non-reflexive “claims of immediacy” (117-9). Rhetorical proof plays an important role in the analysis of causal relationships. This is true despite the common assumption that the identification of cause and effect relies solely upon empirical investigation. For Zarefsky, there are three types of causal reasoning. The first type of causal reasoning describes the application of a covering law to account for physical or material conditions that cause a resulting event This type of causal reasoning requires empirical proof prominent in scientific investigation. A second type of causal reasoning requires the assignment of responsibility. Responsible human beings as agents cause certain events to happen; that is, causation resides in human beings (107-08). A third type of causal claim explains the existence of a causal relationship. It functions “to provide reasons to justify a belief that a causal connection exists” (108). The second and third types of causal arguments rely on rhetorical proof, the provision of “good reasons” to substantiate arguments about human responsibility or explanations for the existence of a causal relationship (108). I contend that the practice of intercollegiate debate privileges the first type of causal analysis. It reduces questions of human motivation and explanation to a level of empiricism appropriate only for causal questions concerning physical or material conditions. Arguments about feminism clearly illustrate this phenomenon. Substantive debates about feminism usually take one of two forms. First, on the affirmative, debaters argue that some aspect of the resolution is a manifestation of patriarchy. For example, given the spring 1992 resolution, “[rjesolved: That advertising degrades the quality of life," many affirmatives argued that the portrayal of women as beautiful objects for men's consumption is a manifestation of patriarchy that results in tangible harms to women such as rising rates of eating disorders. The fall 1992 topic, "(resolved: That the welfare system exacerbates the problems of the urban poor in the United States," also had its share of patri- archy cases. Affirmatives typically argued that women's dependence upon a patriarchal welfare system results in increasing rates of women's poverty. In addition to these concrete harms to individual women, most affirmatives on both topics, desiring "big impacts," argued that the effects of patriarchy include nightmarish totalitarianism and/or nuclear annihilation. On the negative, many debaters countered with arguments that the some aspect of the resolution in some way sustains or energizes the feminist movement in resistance to patriarchal harms. For example, some negatives argued that sexist advertising provides an impetus for the reinvigoration of the feminist movement and/or feminist consciousness, ultimately solving the threat of patriarchal nuclear annihilation. likewise, debaters negating the welfare topic argued that the state of the welfare system is the key issue around which the feminist movement is mobilizing or that the consequence of the welfare system - breakup of the patriarchal nuclear family -undermines patriarchy as a whole. Such arguments seem to have two assumptions in common. First, there is a single feminism. As a result, feminists are transformed into feminism. Debaters speak of feminism as a single, monolithic, theoretical and pragmatic entity and feminists as women with identical motivations, methods, and goals. Second, these arguments assume that patriarchy is the single or root cause of all forms of oppression. Patriarchy not only is responsible for sexism and the consequent oppression of women, it also is the cause of totalitarianism, environmental degradation, nuclear war, racism, and capitalist exploitation. These reductionist arguments reflect an unwillingness to debate about the complexities of human motivation and explanation. They betray a reliance upon a framework of proof that can explain only material conditions and physical realities through empirical quantification. The transformation of feminists 'Mo feminism and the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of all oppression is related in part to the current form of intercollegiate debate practice. By "form," I refer to Kenneth Burke's notion of form, defined as the "creation of appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (Counter-Statement 31). Though the framework for this understanding of form is found in literary and artistic criticism, it is appropriate in this context; as Burke notes, literature can be "equipment for living" (Biilosophy 293). He also suggests that form "is an arousing and fulfillment of desires. A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (Counter-Statement 124). Burke observes that there are several aspects to the concept of form. One of these aspects, conventional form, involves to some degree the appeal of form as form. Progressive, repetitive, and minor forms, may be effective even though the reader has no awareness of their formality. But when a form appeals as form, we designate it as conventional form. Any form can become conventional, and be sought for itself - whether it be as complex as the Greek tragedy or as compact as the sonnet (Counter-Statement 126). These concepts help to explain debaters' continuing reluctance to employ rhetorical proof in arguments about causality. Debaters practice the convention of poor causal reasoning as a result of judges' unexamined reliance upon conventional form. Convention is the practice of arguing single-cause links to monolithic impacts that arises out of custom or usage. Conventional form is the expectation of judges that an argument will take this form. Common practice or convention dictates that a case or disadvantage with nefarious impacts causally related to a single link will "outweigh" opposing claims in the mind of the judge. In this sense, debate arguments themselves are conventional. Debaters practice the convention of establishing single-cause relationships to large monolithic impacts in order to conform to audience expectation. Debaters practice poor causal reasoning because they are rewarded for it by judges. The convention of arguing single-cause links leads the judge to anticipate the certainty of the impact and to be gratified by the sequence. I suspect that the sequence is gratifying for judges because it relieves us from the responsibility and difficulties of evaluating rhetorical proofs. We are caught between our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proofs and our reluctance to succumb to complete relativism and subjectivity. To take responsibility for evaluating rhetorical proof is to admit that not every question has an empirical answer. However, when we abandon our responsibility to rhetorical proofs, we sacrifice our students' understanding of causal reasoning. The sacrifice has consequences for our students' knowledge of the subject matter they are debating. For example, when feminism is defined as a single entity, not as a pluralized movement or theory, that single entity results in the identification of patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression. The result is ignorance of the subject position of the particular feminist author, for highlighting his or her subject position might draw attention to the incompleteness of the causal relationship between link and impact Consequently, debaters do not challenge the basic assumptions of such argumentation and ignorance of feminists is perpetuated. Feminists are not feminism. The topics of feminist inquiry are many and varied, as are the philosophical approaches to the study of these topics. Different authors have attempted categorization of various feminists in distinctive ways. For example, Alison Jaggar argues that feminists can be divided into four categories: liberal feminism, marxist feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism. While each of these feminists may share a common commitment to the improvement of women's situations, they differ from each other in very important ways and reflect divergent philosophical assumptions that make them each unique. Linda Alcoff presents an entirely different categorization of feminist theory based upon distinct understandings of the concept "woman," including cultural feminism and post-structural feminism. Karen Offen utilizes a comparative historical approach to examine two distinct modes of historical argumentation or discourse that have been used by women and their male allies on behalf of women's emancipation from male control in Western societies. These include relational feminism and individualist feminism. Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron describe a whole category of French feminists that contain many distinct versions of the feminist project by French authors. Women of color and third-world feminists have argued that even these broad categorizations of the various feminism have neglected the contributions of non-white, non-Western feminists (see, for example, hooks; Hull; Joseph and Lewis; Lorde; Moraga; Omolade; and Smith). In this literature, the very definition of feminism is contested. Some feminists argue that "all feminists are united by a commitment to improving the situation of women" (Jaggar and Rothenberg xii), while others have resisted the notion of a single definition of feminism, bell hooks observes, "a central problem within feminist discourse has been our inability to either arrive at a consensus of opinion about what feminism is (or accept definitions) that could serve as points of unification" (Feminist Theory 17). The controversy over the very definition of feminism has political implications. The power to define is the power both to include and exclude people and ideas in and from that feminism. As a result, [bjourgeois white women interested in women's rights issues have been satisfied with simple definitions for obvious reasons. Rhetorically placing themselves in the same social category as oppressed women, they were not anxious to call attention to race and class privilege (hooks. Feminist Wieory 18). Debate arguments that assume a singular conception of feminism include and empower the voices of race- and class-privileged women while excluding and silencing the voices of feminists marginalized by race and class status. This position becomes clearer when we examine the second assumption of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate - patriarchy is the sole cause of oppression. Important feminist thought has resisted this assumption for good reason. Designating patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows the subjugation of resistance to other forms of oppression like racism and classism to the struggle against sexism. Such subjugation has the effect of denigrating the legitimacy of resistance to racism and classism as struggles of equal importance. "Within feminist movement in the West, this led to the assumption that resisting patriarchal domination is a more legitimate feminist action than resisting racism and other forms of domination" (hooks. Talking Back 19). The relegation of struggles against racism and class exploitation to offspring status is not the only implication of the "sole cause" argument In addition, identifying patriarchy as the single source of oppression obscures women's perpetration of other forms of subjugation and domination, bell hooks argues that we should not obscure the reality that women can and do partici- pate in politics of domination, as perpetrators as well as victims - that we dominate, that we are dominated. If focus on patriarchal domination masks this reality or becomes the means by which women deflect attention from the real conditions and circumstances of our lives, then women cooperate in suppressing and promoting false consciousness, inhibiting our capacity to assume responsibility for transforming ourselves and society (hooks. Talking Back 20). Characterizing patriarchy as the sole cause of oppression allows mainstream feminists to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of class and race privilege. It casts the struggle against class exploitation and racism as secondary concerns. Current debate practice promotes ignorance of these issues because debaters appeal to conventional form, the expectation of judges that they will isolate a single link to a large impact Feminists become feminism and patriarchy becomes the sole cause of all evil. Poor causal arguments arouse and fulfill the expectation of judges by allowing us to surrender our responsibility to evaluate rhetorical proof for complex causal relationships. The result is either the mar-ginalization or colonization of certain feminist voices. Arguing feminism in debate rounds risks trivializing feminists. Privileging the act of speaking about feminism over the content of speech "often turns the voices and beings of non-white women into commodity, spectacle" (hooks, Talking Back 14). Teaching sophisticated causal reasoning enables our students to learn more concerning the subject matter about which they argue. In this case, students would learn more about the multiplicity of feminists instead of reproducing the marginalization of many feminist voices in the debate itself. The content of the speech of feminists must be investigated to subvert the colonization of exploited women. To do so, we must explore alternatives to the formal expectation of single-cause links to enormous impacts for appropriation of the marginal voice threatens the very core of self-determination and free self-expression for exploited and oppressed peoples. If the identified audience, those spoken to, is determined solely by ruling groups who control production and distribution, then it is easy for the marginal voice striving for a hearing to allow what is said to be overdetermined by the needs of that majority group who appears to be listening, to be tuned in (hooks, Talking Back 14). At this point, arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate seem to be overdetermined by the expectation of common practice, the "game" that we play in assuming there is such a thing as a direct and sole causal link to a monolithic impact To play that game, we have gone along with the idea that there is a single feminism and the idea that patriarchal impacts can account for all oppression. In making this critique, I am by no means discounting the importance of arguments about feminism in intercollegiate debate. In fact, feminists contain the possibility of a transformational politic for two reasons. First, feminist concerns affect each individual intimately. We are most likely to encounter patriarchal domination "in an ongoing way in everyday life. Unlike other forms of domination, sexism directly shapes and determines relations of power in our private lives, in familiar social spaces..." (hooks. Talking Back 21). Second, the methodology of feminism, consciousness-raising, contains within it the possibility of real societal transformation. "lE]ducation for critical consciousness can be extended to include politicization of the self that focuses on creating understanding the ways sex, race, and class together determine our individual lot and our collective experience” (hooks, Talking Back 24). Observing the incongruity between advocacy of single-cause relationships and feminism does not discount the importance of feminists to individual or societal consciousness raising.

**No falsifiable proof exists for the existence of a pervasive system of oppression known as patriarchy**

**EPSTEIN ’99** (Richard A.; James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law – Chicago Law School, “Liberty, Patriarchy, and Feminism,” 1999 U Chi Legal F 89, l/n)

The second point about Becker's position, again like so much of feminist theory, is that its major conclusions are nonfalsifiable by any known technique of scientific research. The villain of the piece is patriarchy, for whose sins this patriarch is charged with full responsibility. But the modern use of the term patriarchy in feminist discourse bears only a passing resemblance to its narrower use in traditional discourse. My Funk & Wagnalls dictionary defines a patriarch as "the leader of a family or tribe who rules by paternal right." n7 Patriarchy, then, is defined to cover "a system of government in which the father or the male heir of his choice rules." Even with these definitions under our belt, we are well advised not to overlook the parallel definitions for women. Thus a matriarch is defined as "a woman holding the position corresponding to that of a patriarch in her family or tribe." n8 Matriarchy for its part is defined as "a social organization having the mother as the head of the family, in which descent, kinship, and succession are reckoned through the mother, instead of the father; also government by women." n9 It is noteworthy that it does not speak of "rule by maternal right," so that some social asymmetry is acknowledged in the parallel definitions.

Standing alone, of course, these definitions give us no indication of the relative practical importance of matriarchy and patriarchy. But even with patriarchy as the dominant norm, it remains critical to note the implicit limitations in its classical definition. First, the term is applied much more to family and to tribes than it is to nation states, which have leaders, most of whom have been male. The point matters because it shows the dangers of treating the state as an extension of the family by other means. Patriarchs may obtain their power through inheritance, or even by designation of the past leader. But once we move outside the realm of kings, political power comes through elections, which give the public control over the selection of can [\*94] didates, whose actions, once they assume office, are subject to powerful institutional restraints. To call the President of the United States a patriarch is to confuse him with the older patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (for whom the matriarchs were Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah).

Second, the creation of any patriarchal order does not confer that lofty status on all men. Only those men with the power to rule over others receive that title. Patriarchy therefore contemplates that younger males will occupy a subordinate position within the system. The system also limits the patriarch's freedom of action to prevent him from becoming a despot. Finding out exactly how a patriarchy operates and how one patriarchy differs from another is no simple task. But no matter how great the variations, so long as patriarchal structures are hierarchical, only a tiny fraction of males can occupy the highest positions. The rest must be content to rest, perhaps for life, on lower rungs.

In her Article, as in much of feminist literature, Becker does not use the term patriarch in this literal, dictionary sense of the word. She did not apply it only to family power that passes by inheritance. Nor did she limit it to the power that some men exercise in their governance roles. Rather, in her hands, patriarchy is used, as best I can tell, as a crude synonym for pervasive and unjust male domination of all areas of social life. At this point, her overexaggeration about the pervasive nature of patriarchy reminds me of the nineteenth century arguments about the ineffable status of ether. n10

Patriarchy, I suppose, differs in some important ways from ether. But it is odd to hear complaints about its all-pervasive nature when it is so difficult to observe. Of course, some men behave abusively toward some women. Of course, male strength makes a difference in some interactions between men and women. But it is hardly the case that male dominance has ever generated a static system in which men take the prime cuts of meat, leaving women with only the scraps. Indeed, it seems foolhardy to stress the point because the shift in male and female roles within my own lifetime has been so profound that it seems almost idle to imagine some unyielding form of social organization attributable to this one invisible and invincible source. One obvious measure of the [\*95] change is visual. Let anyone who cares take a walk down the corridors of the old Billings Hospital at the University of Chicago and look at the photographs documenting the composition by sex and race of its graduates from 1954 to the present. The shift from a nearly all white male class to the current mixture of male and female of all races is eyepoppingly clear. The patriarchal forces that generate this enormous transformation operate in ways that are too subtle for this observer to understand. It takes a story of mythic proportions to find in these permanent social changes a strategic retreat by some old guard which will, cunningly in the dark of night, reassert its dominance.

Nor need we rely only on this form of pictorial evidence to make the case. A quick look at the Statistical Abstract of the United States reveals the profound changes that have taken place. n11 The total number of higher education degrees (those beyond high school) has moved up by 365 percent, from 477,000 in 1960 to 2,218,000 in 1995. But what is quite striking is the shift in the proportions of male and female graduates. In bachelor's degrees, male degrees have moved up by 107 percent, from 254,000 to 526,000. Yet at the same time, female degrees have moved up by 359 percent, from 138,000 to about 634,000. Thus in 1960 about 65 percent of the bachelor's degrees were awarded to men. By 1995, only 45 percent of the degrees were awarded to men. The shift in professional and doctoral programs has been every bit as pronounced. As late as 1965, fewer than 5 percent of all professional degrees were awarded to women, who also received just under 12 percent of the doctoral degrees. By 1995, women received about 41 percent of professional degrees and nearly 40 percent of the doctoral degrees. n12

The distribution of degrees across subject matter is not constant, but even here the movement has been palpable. From 1971 to 1995, the percentage of women who earned Ph.D.s in the biological and life sciences moved from 16.3 to 40.1 percent; in mathematics, the move was from 7.6 to 22.1 percent. n13 Indeed, the percentage of female Ph.D.s dropped in only one field over that 24-year period, parks and recreation. But that number should not be taken too seriously since only two Ph.D.s were awarded in that [\*96] field in 1971, one to a man and one to a woman. n14 The movement is a stunning refutation of the invisible hand of patriarchy. Perhaps one could comb these statistics for some hidden evidence of the continued oppression of women, but any fair-minded observer should first acknowledge the enormous changes already made before expressing any reservations about the differences that remain. n15

**Totalizing depictions of patriarchal dominance result in never-ending pessimism and should be rejected**

**EPSTEIN ’99** (Richard A.; James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law – Chicago Law School, “Liberty, Patriarchy, and Feminism,” 1999 U Chi Legal F 89, l/n)

This brings me then to my third source of disagreement. I recoil from the terrible portrait of all men and all women conveyed in Becker's morbid descriptions of patriarchy. It is hard to know what image to deplore more. Should we be depressed at the thought of legions of men beating their wives and daughters into a pulp for the basest of sensual gratification? Or should we recoil from the thought of millions of women who lack the gumption to stand up to the men who have wrecked their lives through abuse and sexual domination? It is a portrait of human kind that is so unrelentingly negative that one wonders why anyone would bother to bring children into the world. No one can deny that some horror stories of this sort do exist. Some men, and some women, have done terrible deeds in their lives: they have killed, they have lied, they have committed treachery. Lawyers are, of course, familiar with these cases because bad news attracts a crowd, whether we speak of a large financial fraud or of a Presidential scandal that ends in impeachment. Yet here again we have to have some balance. For every case of personal betrayal, we can find ten, or a hundred, acts of generosity and good will, from men to women and from women to men. Some marriages end in acrimonious divorces, but in others husbands and wives stay together in love through thick and thin until "death do us part."

To evaluate the overall social position we have to be careful about how we gather and sample our data. It is, in a word, necessary for us to counter Becker's gloom by a succession of happy thoughts about the high points of human life. As a professor for over 30 years, I could act as though all of my students had been jailed or disbarred. I prefer to think of the many students who [\*97] entered the University of Chicago (or earlier at the University of Southern California) ill-formed, young, uncertain, and ambitious. Now ten, fifteen, twenty-five years later, it is a pleasure to see them lead happy and productive lives, and to hope that their education had something to do with their personal and professional success. It is not that everyone has had carefree lives: many have had to juggle career and marriage; many have fallen off the rails more than once; many have had to adjust their expectations to the brutal realities of everyday life; many have suffered personal disappointments, deaths of loved-ones, and debilitating injuries. But even in defeat many have summoned the strength to carry on. Harsh talk about hierarchy and patriarchy demeans their personal achievements; it trivializes their personal setbacks and disappointments. The less said about it the better, and the more quickly we can get on with the ordinary business of life. Any legal theory that presupposes that narrow and pinched vision of human nature, or that substitutes accusations of patriarchy for a more nuanced look at complex socials systems, must fail with the falseness of its morbid presuppositions about human behavior, both within and between the sexes.

Role reversal. By pitting our mindset as the epitome of masculine dominance, they link to their criticism

Whitworth, 94 – professor of political science and female studies @ York U (Feminism and International Relations, pg 20)

Even when not concerned with mothering as such, much of the politics that emerge from radical feminism within IR depend on a ‘re-thinking’ from the perspective of women. What is left unexplained is how simply thinking differently will alter the material realities of relations of domination between men and women. Structural (patriarchal) relations are acknowledged, but not analysed in radical feminism’s reliance on the experiences, behaviours and perceptions of ‘women’. As Sandra Harding notes, the essential and universal ‘man’, long the focus of feminist critiques, has merely been replaced here with the essential and universal ‘woman’. And indeed, that notion of ‘woman’ not only ignores important differences amongst women, but it also reproduces exactly the stereotypical vision of women and men, masculine and feminine, that has been produced under patriarchy. Those women who do not fit the mould – who, for example, take up arms in military struggle – are quickly dismissed as expressing ‘negative’ or ‘inauthentic’ feminine values (the same accusation is more rarely made against men). In this way, it comes as no surprise when mainstream IR theorists such as Robert Reohane happily embrace the tenets of radical feminism. It requires little in the way of re-thinking or movement from accepted and comfortable assumptions about stereotypes. Radical feminists find themselves defending the same account of women as nurturing, pacifist, submissive mothers as men do under patriarchy, anti-feminists and the New Right. As some writers suggest, this in itself should give feminists pause to reconsider this position.

Focus on gender alone fails

Bacigalupa 3. Ana Mariella Bacigalupo. “Rethinking Identity and Feminism” Contributions of Mapuche Women and Machi from Southern Chile”. Hypatia. Vol 18, Num 2. Spring 2003. Pp 32-57

The voices of native women have often been misrepresented by “first world” feminists who hold the idea that there is a unifi ed feminist subjectivity, a “shared consciousness” through gender (Alarcon 1990, 364, Teresa de Lauretis 1986, 8, 9), neglecting the way in which diverse identities may be theorized or analyzed. Dominant feminist theory requires gender consciousness as its basis, yet calls for the elimination of gender roles (Cott 1986, 49). It insists that women need to be the subjects of knowledge in order to eliminate male biases and privilege in the access to knowledge. But by privileging white women’s ways of knowing in opposition to white men’s ways of knowing (Alarcon 1990, 360) or native women’s ways of knowing, it sustains the very binarism and oppression that feminism would like to change. “First world” feminist writings about the “third world” are still grounded in assumptions of privilege and the global hegemony of Western scholarship both at the ideological, discursive level that addresses questions of representation (womanhood/femininity) and at an experiential level that focuses on the mic- ropolitics of work, home, family, and sexuality. Dominant feminism also has had an investment in the marginalization of colonized women, at times instrumen- talizing them as the Other in order to consolidate itself (Spivak 1985, 262–80). The effects of Western scholarship on the “third world” has yet to be considered self-consciously by “fi rst world” feminists (Mohanty 1994, 197, 199). Native women have often been homogenized by “fi rst world” feminists as poor, uneducated victims of oppression preoccupied only with immediate issues of survival and therefore uninterested in theoretical abstract thought or women’s issues. It is only recently that native women are being acknowledged as thinking politically active subjectsand theoreticians with particular ways of intervening in their historical situations. “Third world” and native women’s engagement with feminism is historically specifi c and dynamic. They are creating their own space to express their agency and discourses of resistance. Feminism must allow diversity within the movement where different groups have their own agendas, priorities, and interests. Native women “must be enabled to participate as both subjects and objects of feminist theorizing” (Cott 1986, 49) and to question the agendas behind the appearance of difference in intellectual discourse. As Bell Hooks points out, we must ask ourselves who controls the discourse and the means of representation? Who is paid to teach it? And who gets paid to write about it? (1990, 54). “Third world” feminists have draw attention to the social and personal effects of gender as a system of difference and called attention to the way in which gender is bound up with race, class, eth

nic and regional modalities, and interconnected with global processes unevenly at work. “Third world” women anthropologists have also participated in the dialogical creation of culture and rethinking of the discipline from a feminist perspective (Behar and Gordon 1995). But colonialism and discrimination also exist among women in “third world” contexts. In Chile, Mapuche women often work for upper-class wingka women who look down on them for being indian and poor and become their oppressors. The paradox is that an increasing number of wingka women also go to see women machi for healing and spiritual help. Those wingka women who have become involved in Chilean feminist movements often exclude indigenous women as subjects, participants, and intellectuals, and participate in the privi- leges of the structure of power they criticize. Native women have often viewed feminist and postcolonial knowledge as perpetrating their dependency by containing the subjectivity of native people in the images, stereotypes, and representations deployed in colonial discourse. Most native women do not want to use the preordained terms of an academic master text or “fi rst world” feminist model (Irigaray 1985) in order to legitimize themselves in a genre that has little to say about their own experiences.

**Claims of root cause obscure theories of difference – reinforce other forms of oppression**

**Barlett, Professor of Law, 90**

Katharine T, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829

Despite the valuable insights offered by **feminist** standpoint **epistemology**, however, it **does not offer an adequate account of feminist knowing**. First, **in isolating gender as a source of oppression, feminist legal thinkers tend to** concentrate on the identification of woman's true identity beneath the oppression and thereby **essentialize her characteristics.** Catharine MacKinnon, for example, in exposing what she finds to be the total system of male hegemony, repeatedly speaks of "women's point of view," [186](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n186#n186" \t "_self) of "woman's voice," [187](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n187#n187" \t "_self) of empowering women "on our own terms," [188](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n188#n188" \t "_self) of what women "really want," [189](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n189#n189" \t "_self) and of standards that are "not ours." [190](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n190#n190" \t "_self) Ruth Colker sees the discovery of women's "authentic self" [191](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n191#n191" \t "_self) as a difficult job given the social constructions  [\*874]  imposed upon women, but nonetheless, like MacKinnon, insists upon it as a central goal of feminism. Robin West, too, assumes that woman has a "true nature" upon which to base a feminist jurisprudence. [192](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n192#n192" \t "_self) Although the essentialist positions taken by these feminists often have strategic or rhetorical value, [193](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d" \l "n193#n193" \t "_self) **these positions obscure the importance of differences among women and the fact that factors other than gender victimize women. A theory that purports to isolate gender as a basis for oppression obscures these factors and even reinforces other forms of oppression**. [194](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=96839354e6e5b6298dae2a338f8afac1&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkVb&_md5=c8f484cfda1cd7b1565412684c22a26d#n194#n194) **This error duplicates the error of other legal theories that project the meaning speakers give to their own experiences onto the experiences of others.**

## reps

#### Discourse doesn’t come first and don’t cause violence

**Rodwell, 5** [PhD candidate, Manchester, Jonathan, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm]

In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position. However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

#### Discourse doesn’t affect reality – material structure are more important

**Tuathail 96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Focus on language disables meaningful political dialogue and action

**Churchill 96** (Ward, Professor, Indigenous Studies, University of Colorado Boulder From A Native Son, p. 460)

There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious and legitimate concern. By the same token, however, it must be conceded that such preoccupations arrive at a point of diminishing return. After that, they degenerate rapidly into liabilities rather than benefits to comprehension. By now, it should be evident that much of what is mentioned in this article falls under the latter category; it is, by and large, inept, esoteric, and semantically silly, bearing no more relevance in the real world than the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Ultimately, it is a means to stultify and divide people rather than stimulate and unite them. Nonetheless, such “issues” of word choice have come to dominate dialogue in a significant and apparently growing segment of the Left. Speakers, writers, and organizers or persuasions are drawn, with increasing vociferousness and persistence, into heated confrontations, not about what they’ve said, but about how they’ve said it. Decisions on whether to enter into alliances, or even to work with other parties, seem more and more contingent not upon the prospect of a common agenda, but upon mutual adherence to certain elements of a prescribed vernacular. Mounting quantities of a progressive time, energy, and attention are squandered in perversions of Mao’s principle of criticism/self-criticism – now variously called “process,” “line sharpening,” or even ‘struggle” – in which there occurs a virtually endless stream of talk about how to talk about “the issues.” All of this happens at the direct expense of actually understanding the issues themselves, much less doing something about them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dynamic at hand adds up to a pronounced avoidance syndrome, a masturbatory ritual through which an opposition nearly paralyzed by its own deeply felt sense of impotence pretends to be engaged in something “meaningful.” In the end, it reduces to a tragic delusion at best, cynical game playing or intentional disruption at worst. With this said, it is only fair to observe that it’s high time to get off this nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

#### A focus on representations destroys social change by ignoring political and material constraints

**Taft-Kaufman, 95** (Jill, professor, Department of Speech Communication And Dramatic Arts, at Central Michigan University, Southern Communication Journal, Spring, proquest)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. **Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure**. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

#### Reps focus ditches the suffering. Challenging discursive practice is insular wheel spinning

**Jarvis, 2k** (Darryl, lecturer in IR at the University of Sydney, International relations and the challenge of postmodernism, 2000, p. 128-130)

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recom-mends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to malce such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod-ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy-vocal, pub-lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo-retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev-olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu-ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the-ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our lmowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des-titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary-or is in some way bad-is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help-ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti-cally excited by abstract and recondite debate.38 Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana-lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "emphasis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwarranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality. "39 All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use? Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar-ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not malce its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with-out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con-structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real-ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec-ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representation. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse- quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long talcen care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley.40

#### Reps focus is a bad focus for IR. It reduces real world political dilemmas to textual analysis and lacks academic substantiation

**Jarvis, 2k** (Darryl, lecturer in IR at the University of Sydney, “International relations and the challenge of postmodernism”, p. 196-203)

Like many others, Hoffman seems to accept without reservation the idea that textuality, ambiguity, uncertainty, decentering, relativism, irregu-larity, and countless other instruments that detract fom the Enlightenment enterprise are reasons for celebration, that they somehow represent intel-lectual breakthroughs and a form of theoretical progress, and that theory in International Relations needs to be restructured along lines proscribed by the humanities. Hoffman represents one of a growing number of scholars who is fervent in his desire to import and apply deconstructive postmodern theory to the sphere of international politics, both to unearth "hidden meanings" encrusted in the disciplines texts and to arrive at new meanings inferred from the discovery of "hidden practices." There is an almost blind faith that these new creeds hold answers which, under neopositivism, rationality, modernity, and the Enlightenment project have remained hidden from us. Like a great archeological excavation, treasures in the form of new wisdom, new prophecies, and a new politics await discovery for those willing to make the jump and convert to the postmodern cause. The 1990s have thus become a decade of rereadings and textual reinterpretations where the encrusted texts of realists have been reread and their "true" meaning exposed. Ashley reread Waltz and discovered his positivism, economism, and structuralism; Jim George reread realism and discovered its "silences" and "omissions"; Ann Tickner reread Hans Morgenthau and discovered his gender blindness; and Christine Sylvester reread the reinter-pretations of rereadings undertaken by male dissidents and discovered their own misogyny and sexism. For students of international politics who aspire to know, the answer(s) thus reside in textuality, in a life of rereading rereadings in order that hid-den practices, silences, omissions, and new meaning can be discovered. The world, as such, can be safely ignored; writings about the world are what must occupy research, for in these writings are the constitutive essences that make up the "real" world. Nothing is given, there is "no there there," nothing is real until named. Women do not exist, Sylvester reminds us, much as for Ashley nation-states do not really exist until inscribed in writ- ings and with names that give them ontological meaning. Meaning is thus in the text, the language, the word, not the thing or the object or the fact. Let us for a moment, however, reflect on this "research program," on the importations of textual analysis and deconstructive theory, and what they might do to theoretical endeavor and the discipline of International Relations. Let us, for example, pose a few rudimentary questions that, despite their simplicity, go to the very essence of subversive postmod-ernism's relevance and utility to the study of international politics. What, for example, is "ambiguous" about war or "ironic" about peace? How does the admission of uncertainty change the face of theory, or how does textuality alter our experiences of the realities of international politics, of death squads, civil war, or autocratic rule? Why, suddenly, are irony, uncertainty, ambiguity, and textuality the prized attributes of theoretical endeavor? Are these to be our new epistemological motifs by which we judge the quality and usefulness of theory and research programs in Inter- national Relations? Are the problems of international politics and the answers to them hidden amid literary devices like paradox or the textual chicanery of double entendre? Will the practices of regional aggression displayed by Saddam Hussein, for example, be thwarted through textual rereadings of security texts, or the acrimonious diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Iraq? Can we change the course of political outcomes, avert the use of force, or persuade others to disavow aggression though textual reinterpretation? If we believe Ashley, Hoffman, Walker, Sylvester, or James Der Derian, for example, then the answer is yes, in which case international theory must transpose itself into a form of literary criticism and employ the tools of textual deconstruction, parody, and the style of discontinuous narratives as a means of pondering the depths of interpretation. In doing so, how- ever, we would approach the writings of Richard Ashley, who, utilizing such methods, can apprise students of international politics only of the fact that "there are neither right interpretations nor wrong," there are just "interpretations imposed upon interpretations. "36 In what sense, however, can this approach be at all adequate for the subject of International Relations. What, for example, do the literary devices of irony and textuality say to Somalian refugees who flee from famine and warlords or to Ethiopian rebels who fight in the desert plains against a government in Addis Abbaba? How does the notion of textual deconstruction speak to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who fight one an-other among the ruins of the former Yugoslavia? How do totalitarian narratives or logocentric binary logic feature in the deliberations of policy bureaucrats or in the negotiations over international trade or the formulations of international law? Should those concerned with human rights or those who take it upon themselves to study relationships between nation-states begin by contemplating epistemological fiats and ontological disputes? How does the reification of interpretivism and relativism assist such people in their understandings, problems, judgments, negotiations, and disputes? Is Ashley, for example, suggesting that we simply announce to those in the fray of international politics that there are neither right interpretations nor wrong, there are just interpretations imposed upon interpretations. Is this to be the epiphany of subversive postmodern inter-national theory, its penultimate contribution to those who suffer on the margins for whom they professes great concern? I am, of course, being flippant. Yet we do have a right to ask such questions of subversive postmodernists if only because they portend to a moral highground, to insights otherwise denied realists, modernists, positivists, and mainstream international relations scholars. We have every right to ask, for example, how subversive postmodern theory spealcs to the practi-cal problems endemic to international relations, to the actors and players who constitute the practices of world politics, or how literary devices and deconstructive readings help us better picture world society. My point, of course, is much the same as Robin Brown's, that textual analysis and deconstruction does not, and cannot, speak to such problems other than to detect the limits of a particular "text by identifying origins, assumptions and silences." What it cannot do, however, "is deal with the practical problem of international relations."37 Similarly, Hoffman too gives no answers to these questions save this justification for the turn to interpretivism. "This move," he writes, "connects international relations, both as a practice and a discipline, with similar developments within social and political theory and within the humanities."38 But what justification or rationale is this? So we are now doing what literary theorists do: ruminat-ing over international theory as if such were the verses of lyricists written for the pleasures of reading and consumed only for their wit and romance. But there is a difference between the concerns and interests of, say, Eng-lish departments and those of departments of Political Science or Interna-tional Relations. Where literary criticism delights in the ethereal play of words and has as its epistemic basis the belief that "one reads for pleasure," politics dabbles in the material, distributive, punitive play of power whose consequences effect much more than a sensibility committed to reading fiction.39 Why should we assume that tools developed in English depart-ments are useful to theorists of international relations? Why should we take heed of the writings of Jacques Derrida who never once addressed issues of international relations, but from whom postmodernists now claim a wis- dom which they insist is reason enough to dispense with past theory and begin anew our theoretical and disciplinary enterprise? But all this aside, let us contemplate for a moment how subversive- deconstructive postmodernism would constitute our disciplinary enter-prise. Consider, for example, what Ashley would have us do, focus on, analyze, and concern ourselves with. Here Ashley is most emphatic: "Eschewing any claim to secure grounds, the appropriate posture would aspire to an overview of international history in the maldng, a view from afar, a view up high." The appropriate posture is disposed to a view very much like that of Michel Foucault's genealogical attitude: "a form of his- tory which accounts for the constitution of lmowledge, discourses, domains of knowledge, etc. . ." And to emphasize what is important and what it is that we should focus on, Ashley notes, "From a distant genealog- ical standpoint, what catches the eye is motion, discontinuities, clashes, and the ceaseless play of plural forces and plural interpretations on the sur- face of the human experience. Nothing is finally stable. There are no con-stants, no fixed meanings, no secure grounds, no profound secrets, no final structures or limits of history. Seen from afar, there is only interpretation, and interpretation itself is comprehended as a practice of domination occur-ring on the surface of history. History itself is grasped as a series of interpre-tations imposed upon interpretations-none primary, all arbitrary. "40 As scholars reconstituted under this "appropriate posture," or in later writings a "critical posture of estrangement," we would be condemned to read, to play with words, to interpret without purpose, and to sit amid a solipsistic intertext where words, meanings, referents, signifiers, authors, and subjects have no meaning or reality other than those we would con-struct individually.41 With the knowledge that there is no true knowledge because of the absence of secure ground upon which to build knowledge, we would abandon the Enlightenment project and squander away our time in linguistic play as "floating signifiers" vied for our attention among the simulacra of images that each of us consumed. Knowing that we could not know, the task at hand would devolve into one of repudiating the entire stock of knowledge, understanding, and practices that constitute Interna-tional Relations and developing instead an historical amnesia that favored "a view from afar, from up high."42 Even interpretation, Ashley insists, a method permissible to most postmodernists, would eventually have to be abandoned along with theory.43 Since "there is no there there" to be explained, and since interpretation would be but another method of affix- ing intrinsic meaning to a metaphysical nonreality, it too would have to be abandoned. In this newly constituted enterprise, nothing would await dis- covery, nothing would have intrinsic meaning, nothing would actually be present other than "absence," and hence nothing could be named. The state would not really exist, subjects would be transcendental fabrications who chase their empty identity throughout history, and history would be a mere interpretation, yet another "practice of domination."44 Within this nihilistic chasm, subversive postmodernists would have us devolve our disci-plinary enterprise into a form of philosophical mentalism, an attempt "to resist the metaphysical temptation in our culture, to assume that something so important must be namable and that the name must indicate a definite referent, an already differentiated identity and source of meaning that just awaits to be named. "45 Only minds situated amid their various contexts would exist and reality would be constituted not through the "realm of immediate sense experience" or "by direct observation of an independently existing world of 'facts,''' but through the thoughts of the mind.46 What, then, would we be left with and what could this newly consti-tuted enterprise offer? As Ashley freely admits, it could offer little. It could not "claim to offer an alternative position or perspective" since there would be no secure ontological ground upon which these could be estab-lished.47 Nor could it offer alternative interpretations save it would attempt to impose "interpretation upon interpretation" and capture history by imposing fixed meanings and understandings. Least of all could it offer theory, the very tyranny of modernist narratives that tends to "privilege" and "marginalize." Absent any theoretical legacy or factual knowledge, we would be forced into an endless intertextual discourse predicated on the consumption of words and the individual thoughts they evoke: a kind of purified anarchism albeit in a perpetual state of self-dispersal.48 We would live in a world of relativistic knowledge claims, each "true" to those that think it, but its truthfulness unobtainable to those who would read it or wish to communicate it. Above all, we would be left without theory-knowledge as a basis for decision, judgment, prescription, and action, sur-rendering us to "a view from afar, from up high." But as Nicholas Onuf asks, "What does this leave for dealing with those close at hand?"49 In the end, however, the intellectual rift that separates these counter- poised disciplines is not so much a theoretical chasm as a political one. The attacks by Ashley and subversive postmodernists stem as much from a deep political suspicion not only toward the discipline, but the implicit project they think it harbors and the political-sectional elite interests they accuse it of representing. Robert Keohane's desire for theoretical synthesis of these contending approaches thus proves naive, not least for the fact that subversive postmodernism is likely best appreciated as a neotheoretical tool for inflicting damage upon a discipline that subversive postmodernists would see done away with-a spanner in the works, as it were, which, much like sabotage threatens to clog the wheels of theoretical endeavor and reconstitute this machine in partisan terms defined by their respective political agendas. 50 Hence the need for vigilance, or more precisely, stan-dards, in the evaluation of theory and of the various theoretical importa- tions that are frequently attempted in International Relations. If only because of a liberal tolerance for intellectual dissonance, International Relations has been welcoming of all schools of thought and all perspec-tives. I, for one, support this, believing it to be the embodiment of intel-lectual discourse and progress. Yet this has to be reconciled amid a notion of discipline, one that demands some degree of conformity in terms of subject matter, aims, approach, and theory, save the very essence of our discipline dissipates into an intellectual free-far-all where anything goes, anything counts as theory, and where everything is assumed to fall within the purview of International Relations. This is not the case and is most def-initely inappropriate. To be sure, intellectual innovations are nearly always controversial, the seeding of new ideas frequently derided as obtuse or unrelated, often requiring time to germinate and thereby to grow and mature. But never are intellectual innovations attempts at dismantling the basis of intellectuality by suggesting theoretical closure through decon-struction, or by initiating witch hunts that threaten to hunt down those implicated in the so-called modernist project. Such approaches fail the test of theory, falling short of the aims, ambitions, and purpose of a discipline that strives to understand, not to reproach. Questions thus persist about Ashley's project and about those who have attempted to replicate his subversive agenda, about the elemental basis and usefulness of this exercise, its stock terms, phrases, and claims. The notion of postmodernity itself, for example, upon closer examination proves to be as hollow and empty as that of modernity. What precisely are these megahistorical divisions meant to imply or accomplish? As Fred Hal-liday notes, "Beyond the assertion of some large-scale, but pretty obvious changes in the world, it is dubious what empirical or ethical force can be attached to the concept 'post-modernity' at all."51 Nor can these theorists refer to the real world for evidence of the correctness of their thesis. "Most of those who have used [the term postmodernism] . . . have **precious little qualifications**, or inclination, to talk about the real." In fact, postmodernists have become altogether too inebriated, Halliday suggests, with their own catchy phrases and run "the risk of becoming the new banality, **a set of assertions** as unlocated and useless as the vacuous generalities, be they balance of power or progressivist teleology, that they seek to dis- place."52 "Witty incantations about alterity, dissolution and freeze-frames, and exaggerated claims about what has indeed changed in the world, are no substitute for a substantive engagement with history or a plausible con- ceptualisation of the alternatives for political and theoretical change."53 As Michael Wallack observes of another self-declared dissident, Rob Walker: "However innocent of the complexities of the philosophical tradition. . . we may be, few of us expect the upward curve of deaths in war to be reversed by textual analysis and fewer still are apt to regard the untangling of puzzles in a very narrow band of international relations theory as a route to a better future." Postmodernism in its subversive varieties thus turns out to be less an attempt to clarify the philosophical puzzles of our times or the issues of international relations than a rather pernicious attempt to change the sub-ject itself. 54 And even where deconstructive postmodernists have attempted to grapple with epistemology puzzles, such has been the paucity of these attempts, so bland have been the generalities about the imminent closure and collapse of Western metaphysics, hermeneutics, and dialectics that they have "neither resolve[d] questions of [the] philosophy of science in general, nor contribute[d] to the theorization of IR [in particular]."55 Cer-tainly orthodox practitioners too have been far from successful in explain-ing and understanding international relations, in achieving peace, and avoiding war. Yet at least among those who disavow deconstructionism and postmodernist subversion, there is a desire for theory, a wish to bet-ter understand and explain international phenomena and, within this ambit, to manipulate and control certain aspects of international relations and thereby improve them. This is not control for its own sake, as post-modernists falsely accuse with Orwellian insinuations, but control and manipulation in order to improve, enhance, and better international rela-tions such that world politics is not an anarchical realm populated by war-prone states. Our professional preoccupations were founded on such laudable objectives. More is the pity that these have now been turned against us as subversive postmodernists paint a grim and unfounded pic-ture of modernist obsession with the technical manipulation of history for the sake of control. Beyond this legacy it is hard to discern how subversive postmodernism might have any future relevance to International Relations other than as a footnote in historiographical essays of the evolution of the discipline. Beyond the very narrow concerns of subversive-deconstructive postmod-ernists, there exists a much richer, more vibrant, and informative tradition of scholarship that attempts to understand and explain international rela- tions and perhaps even offers hope that in the future better pictures of world society and better understandings might yet lead to better and more peaceful worlds. That we get on with this project, refocus our attentions on these real issues, and return to the subject of international politics seems long overdue. Unlike Hoffinan, then, it is time that we resist the urge to reinscribe,

#### Reps 1st is bad – reps only matter because of their pragmatic effect on policy

Dewsbury 03 (John-David Dewsbury -- School of Geographical Studies, University of Bristol -- Environment and Planning A 2003, volume 35, pages 1907-1932 -- http://www.sages.unimelb.edu.au/news/mhgr/dewsbury.pdf)

That someone includes usöthe social scientists, the researchers, and the writers. In some way we are all false witnesses to what is there.(2) So, even though the philosophical drive moves against the apparently sterile setup of totalizing representations, the presentation of ideas is trapped within the structure it is trying to critique. In my opinion, this sterility is only apparent. Significantly, this appearance is valid from both sides: from the side of representational theory because of the belief in the representational structure as being able to give an account of everything; and from the side of nonrepresentational theory because of the danger of getting carried away with an absolute critique of representations. The apparent sterility comes from this last point: that in getting carried away with critique you fail to appreciate that the building blocks of representation are not sterile in themselvesöonly when they are used as part of a system. The representational system, its structure and regulation of meaning, is not complete it needs constant maintenance, loyalty, and faith from those who practice it. In this regard, its power is in its pragmatic functions: easy communication of ideas (that restricts their potential extension), and sustainable, defensible, and consensual agreement on understanding (a certain kind of understanding, and hence a certain type of knowledge). The nonrepresentational argument comes into its own in asking us to revisit the performative space of representation in a manner that is more attuned to its fragile constitution. The point being that representation left critically unattended only allows for conceptual difference and not for a concept of difference as such. The former maintains existing ideological markers whilst the latter challenges us to invent new ones. For me, the project of nonrepresentational theory then, is to excavate the empty space between the lines of representational meaning in order to see what is also possible. The representational system is not wrong: rather, it is the belief that it offers complete understanding and that only it offers any sensible understanding at all that is critically flawed.

#### Reps don’t shape reality – it’s objective

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The human senses seem remarkably able to discern a consistent and lawful reality. In the normal human being, mind and perception become so intimately connected as to produce a sense of unity with the world around us. This connection and sense of unity can be psychologically broken or regressed to primitive non-integrated levels through psychological trauma or regression, or through organic physical malfunction. For those who are in a normal functioning condition, behold, reality is all around you if you have courage to face it. Can I prove proof exists? No, I cannot. Not in the purely verbal world. Can I prove reality exists? No, not in the purely verbal world. Some things are too basic to be proven and must be accepted in day to day life. But in the purely verbal world, all things become philosophically doubtful when traced down to their primary premise, and that premise is then questioned. The World of Words While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of human experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Philosophy is much like particle physics. Earlier in the 20th century the fundamental components of physical existence were considered to be the proton, the neutron, and the electron. As science developed atom smashers, and then more powerful atom smashers, these particles could be hit together and broken pieces of these components were found which might be assumed to be possible building blocks of the three primary particles. Well then, what are those building blocks made of? As more elaborate smashers are built and more discerning detection equipment is developed, perhaps still more kind of fragments or subparticles will be found. At some point in the process we will conclude that there is a material of some kind making up matter that just IS. It simply exists. Suppose the ultimate particle is found. The conclusion will be that it simply exists. There is no other conclusion possible or available. All systems of philosophy, of science, of religious theology, eventually can be traced down to one ultimate premise. There is something that exists. It exists, and that's all we know. Existence and reality exist. If an ultimate subparticulate material is found, in the world of chemistry, medicine, biology, engineering, and climbing stepladders; electrons, protons, and neutrons will still probably turn out to be the primary determining factors to be concerned about. That ignores some types of stuff like subparticle based propulsion system for future space ships or something similar in a highly specialized area. Philosophical questioning has long-since reached that parallel point of the ultimate particle or building material that just IS. There is something existent that just IS and will need to be accepted as being and following a consistent pattern of lawfulness. The fact is, the questions about proving whether reality exists, and proving proof exists are, or should be, meaningless to me beyond some degree of curiosity. I go on about my life without being able to prove proof or life exists. I can go on about my life without proving reality exists. The arguments asserted one way or another do not change how I need to live my life. Reality; A is A; what is, is; are equivalent to the protons, neutrons, and electrons of chemistry that must be accepted. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality or proof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in an alternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences.