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#### Obama’s energy policies reflect a balance that will maximize Democratic turnout – deviations in either direction risk alienating key supporters

**Schnur, 4/9/**12 - director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California (Dan, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline”,

<http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>)

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline.

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling.

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline.

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

Even in deep-blue California, where Obama wins hypothetical general election match ups against the Republican candidates by margins approaching voice vote, this is an issue that points to potential difficulties for the president’s re-election campaign. Californians who swooned for Obama in 2008, and who seem poised for a re-swoon this fall, told a recent USC Dornsife/LA Times statewide poll that they were dissatisfied with the president’s handling of the issue of the cost of gasoline by a 29-62 margin. California’s unemployment rate remains around 11 percent, but the state’s residents still give Obama positive marks on his work on job creation, the economy and taxes. They approve of his work on health care and by even larger margins on women’s health issues. But highway-dependent West Coasters, even while they advocate for broader use of solar, wind and other alternative energies, don’t like $4 per gallon gasoline and they will like paying $5 per gallon even less.

Obama won’t actually lose California in November, of course. Gas prices would have to hit $10 a gallon for Mitt Romney to win the state this fall. And the same poll shows that voters blame oil companies, rather than either the president or Congress, for those high prices. However, the dissatisfaction that emanates from even a heavily Democratic patch of electoral turf such as California carries much more significant consequences in Ohio, Florida and other swing states. For the time being, Obama is gambling that directing popular anger toward the oil companies — a convenient villain if there ever was one — will allow him to keep the price of gasoline from becoming a roadblock for his campaign.

But if gas prices keep rising and voter unhappiness continues to build, look for the administration to find a way to accelerate the review process that would allow the northern leg of Keystone to move forward more quickly. Obama has been careful not to come out in absolute opposition to the pipeline, but only to call for a more meticulous examination of its possible environmental impact. A more closely competitive election than what is now expected, though, could easily lead the president to decide that his administration’s review has been quite thorough enough and that the time for additional drilling has arrived.

An energy strategy that Obama now refers to as an “all of the above” approach is unlikely to turn into a “drill, baby drill” refrain between now and November. But maintaining a balance between dissatisfied but docile environmentalists on one hand and drivers whose unhappiness stops just short of violence on the other will be a key to his re-election. If his poll margins begin to narrow, a somewhat longer pipeline than the one he has already endorsed could become a very tempting insurance policy.

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#### Romney will label China a currency manipulator – causes trade wars

Mike Shedlock, 7-31-2012; registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management, “Is global trade about to collapse? Where are oil prices headed? A chat with Mish Shedlock by James Stafford” http://energybulletin.net/stories/2012-07-31/global-trade-about-collapse-where-are-oil-prices-headed-chat-mish-shedlock

Oilprice.com: In regards to presidential elections, how do you think energy will fare under Obama and under Romney? Which sectors will benefit, and which will suffer? Mish: Mitt Romney has declared that if he’s elected he is going to label China a currency manipulator and increase tariffs on China across the board. That's something that I believe he might be able to do by mandate. If he's elected and he does follow through, I think the result will be a global trade war the likes of which we have not seen since the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act compounded problems during the Great Depression. Simply put, I think that global trade will collapse if Romney wins and he follows through on his campaign promises.

#### Sustainable cooperation with China key to solve several scenarios for extinction

**China Daily, 8** (Rikki N. Massand and Gazelle Emami, “U.S.-China relations at the world's fingertips,” 4-20-2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-04/20/content\_6629700.htm, JMP)

To frame the importance of this discussion and the topics that must be met, Siegal used the analogy of “the U.S. and China having their hands around each other’s necks and we’re both going over the waterfall.” After that comment a man in the audience then suggested that in that case both countries would have to look to the other for help and teamwork would be the only way to survive.

That theme resonated from coast to coast. At the University of California-Berkeley, speaker Sidney Rittenberg took a more intimate approach to U.S.-China relations. A man who lived in China for 35 years, Rittenberg has worked for the past two decades as an advisor to major corporations doing business in China such as AIG, Intel, Hughes Aircraft, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, and Ford. At the Bay Area gathering he emphasized respect and dignity through his own stories, and instead of categorizing the issues into right and wrong Rittenberg advocates looking at the bigger picture. For him the imperative for Americans is to learn to get along with the Chinese.

“We must -- we don't have a choice. **The crises that threaten the human race**, like weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups, global warming, **none of the issues will get resolved unless we work with China**, Brazil, India and of course Europe and other countries. Really the central axis that holds the whole thing together is the U.S. and China," Rittenberg said.

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#### The resolution indicates affs should advocate topical government change

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Specific, limited resolutions ensure mutual ground which is key to sustainable controversy without sacrificing creativity or openness

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Deliberation requires a predetermined subject—they over-determine the rez more than us by assuming debates are the ultimate arbiter of its value as opposed to a means to facilitate clash

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.

#### Competition through fair play is a dialogical process that encourages argumentative testing and mutual recognition of personhood

**Rawls 58** – a leading figure in moral and political philosophy (John, Justice as Fairness, Philosophical Review, April, JSTOR)

Similarly, the acceptance of the duty of fair play by participants in a common practice is a reflection in each person of the recognition of the aspirations and interests of the others to be realized by their joint activity. Failing a special explanation, their acceptance of it is a necessary part of the criterion for their recognizing one another as persons with similar interests and capacities, as the conception of their relations in the general position supposes them to be. Otherwise they would show no recognition of one another as persons with similar capacities and interests, and indeed, in some cases perhaps hypothetical, they would not recognize one another as persons at all, but as complicated objects involved in a complicated activity. To recognize another as a person one must respond to him and act towards him in certain ways; and these ways are intimately connected with the various prima facie duties. Acknowledging these duties in some degree, and so having the elements of morality, is not a matter of choice, or of intuiting moral qualities, or a matter of the expression of feelings or attitudes (the three interpretations between which philosophical opinion frequently oscillates); it is simply the possession of one of the forms of conduct in which the recognition of others as persons is manifested. These remarks are unhappily obscure. Their main purpose here, however, is to forestall, together with the remarks in Section 4, the misinterpretation that, on the view presented, the acceptance of justice and the acknowledgment of the duty of fair play depends in every day life solely on there being a de facto balance of forces between the parties. It would indeed be foolish to underestimate the importance of such a balance in securing justice; but it is not the only basis thereof. The recognition of one another as persons with similar interests and capacities engaged in a common practice must, failing a special explanation, show itself in the acceptance of the principles of justice and the acknowledgment of the duty of fair play.

#### Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

**Galloway 7** – professor of communications at Samford University (Ryan, “Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

#### Game spaces like debate are distinct from other forms of education and public speaking. There has to be a balance of ground or else one side claims the moral high ground and creates a de facto monologue

**Hanghoj 2008** – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which **the teacher never learns anything new** from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth **instructs someone** who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

# 1nc

Wind turbines conceal to us their essence and only serve to perpetuate humanity’s attempt to control

Brittain, 2 (Gordon G. Jr., professor of philosophy, “Fitting Wind Power to landscape: a place-based wind turbine”)

Borgmann’s interpretation of technology and the character of contemporary life can be criticized in a number of ways. Still, the distinction between “things” and “devices” reveals, I think, the essence of our inability to develop a landscape aesthetic on which contemporary wind turbines are or might be beautiful and thereby explains the widespread resistance to placing them where they might be seen. The fact of the matter is that contemporary wind turbines are for most of us merely *devices*. There is therefore no way to go beyond or beneath their conventionally uncomfortable appearance to the discovery of a latent mechanical or organic or what-have-you beauty. The attempt to do so is blocked from the outset by the character of the machine. Think about it for a moment: Except for the blades, virtually everything is shielded, including the towers of many turbines, hidden from view behind the same sort of stainless steel that sheathes many electronic devices. Moreover, the machinery is located a great distance away from anyone, save the mechanic who must first don climbing gear to access it and often, for liability reasons, behind chain-link fences and locked gates. The lack of disclosure goes together with the fact that the turbines are merely producers of a commodity, electrical energy, and interchangeable in this respect with any other technology that produces the same commodity at least as cheaply and reliably. The only important differences between wind turbines and other energy generating technologies are not intrinsic to what might be called their “design philosophies.” That is, while they differ with respect to their inputs, their “fuels,” and with respect to their environmental impacts, the same sort of description can be given of each. There is, as a result, but a single standard on the basis of which wind turbines are to be evaluated—**efficiency**. It is not to be wondered that they are, with only small modifications among them, so uniform. In terms of this uniformity, wind turbines are very much unlike other architectural arrivals—for example, houses and traditional windmills. Different styles of architecture developed in different parts of the world in response to local geological and climatic conditions, to the availability of local materials, to the spiritual and philosophical patterns of the local culture. As a result, these buildings create a context. In Heidegger’s wonderful, dark expression, these buildings “gather.” But there is nothing “local” or “gathering” about contemporary wind turbines. They are everywhere and anonymously the same, whether produced in Denmark or Japan, placed in India or Spain—alien objects impressed on a region and in no deeper way connected to it. They have nothing to say to us, nothing to express, no “inside.” They “conceal” rather than “reveal.” The sense of place that they might eventually engender cannot, therefore, be unique. In addition, wind turbines are quintessential “devices” in that they preclude engagement. Or rather, the only way in which the vast majority of people can engage with them is visually (and occasionally by ear). People cannot climb over and around them, they cannot get inside them, they cannot tinker with them. They cannot even get close to them. There is no larger and non-trivial physical or biological way in which they can be appropriated or their beauty grasped. The irony, of course, is that, precluded from any other sort of engagement with wind turbines, most people find them visually objectionable, though they might be willing to countenance their existence as the lesser of evils.

**The affs technological solutions inevitably reproduce the ecological catastrophes that kill billions. Vote neg to break the confines of technological thought in an act of doing nothing.**

Ladelle **McWhorter**. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University. “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection.” *Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy.* **1992**. pp. 1-3

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverish­ing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution — consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chloro­fluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."' Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human. What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers — of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies — so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays — in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" — Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness — a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery' is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing.

# 1NC

#### Text – put wind turbines in art museums designed for beautiful things.

#### Windmills kill birds – that’s unethical

**Toke 98 –** University of Birmingham

(Dave, “Environmental Movements: Competing Interpretations”, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1998/toke.pdf>, dml)

The main opposition to the large bulk of windfarm proposals has been on the humancentred grounds that windfarms destroy landscape values. Sometimes, noise problems have been a complaint. It is extremely difficult to argue that animals and plants are worried about changes in the view brought by windfarms Moreover, the landscape upon which windfarms tend to be deployed has already been artificially created by humans through the felling of trees which used to cover most of countries like the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the problems caused by fossil fuels, including acid rain and global warming will damage wild life. So there are ways in which the A/E divide can be used to analyse the argument over wind power. However, there are several factors which fall outside the A/E model. The first is that environmental groups campaigning on the global warming issue have tended to place most stress on human-related problems such as the threat of small island states and coastal areas being inundated, agricultural patterns being disrupted, more storms and changes in the distribution of problems like malaria. A second problem for the ecocentric interpretation of the pro-wind power argument is that, while wind turbines may often have a limited impact on wildlife, this impact still exists given that foundations have to be sunk, roads built for access and some birds will inevitably be at risk from the turning blades. A deep green analysis might put sole emphasis on the conservation of energy as an alternative to grid supplied electricity, so that people could live with sustainable energy sources garnered from the immediate locality. Deep ecologists might question the industrial organisation of windfarms through large wind turbines. Indeed, Irvine & Ponton (1988, pp.54-55) said as much when they doubted the ability of renewable energy sources to power the lifestyles of industrialised countries.

# 1nc

**Apocalypse of Nature is an obverse envisioning of humanity’s pure Eden -- we were cast out for the sin of our impurity. Their hysterical call to retreat from environmentally destructive practices foregrounds an artificially pure environmental state presided over by a moral narrative.**

**Their morality play of environmental doom perversely casts us as fallen angels who have angered our god-Mother Nature and demand apocalyptic punishment to expiate our sins.**

**CRONON ‘96** [William; Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; Uncommon Ground; 1996; p. 47-51]

But theme parks and shopping malls are by no means the only ways in which the virtual and the natural are converging in our time. It is well worth remembering that **some of the most dramatic environmental problems** we appear to be facing as we enter the twenty-first century **exist mainly as simulated representations in complex computer models** of natural systems. **Our awareness of the ozone hole** over the Antarctic, for instance, **depends** very much **on the ability of machines to process** large amounts of **data to produce maps of atmospheric phenomena that we ourselves could never witness at first hand.** No one has ever seen the ozone hole.However real the problem may be, our knowledge of it cannot help being virtual. **The same is** **even more** **true of** the phenomenon called **global warming, which many** people now **take to be an absolute fact of nature.** Like the ozone hole, **it too is probably real, but our knowledge** of it **could hardly be more simulated**. The computer models on which we base our **predictions** of what will happen as concentrations of greenhouse gases rise **are** in fact still **so unsophisticated that they cannot even do an accurate job of predicting past climatic change, let alone** change in **the future. Load** into them the **data for 1900, and the weather they will predict** for our present time **bears little resemblance to what we are now experiencing**. Given this rather awkward weakness in their software, the modelers have had to resort to a less trouble-some forecasting technique. They run their programs forward in time, once using the data for today's mixture of atmospheric gases, and once with doubled levels of carbon dioxide. After the computer has done its job, they compare the two runs and describe what will happen when we double the carbon dioxide. The only trouble is that this description is of the simulated doubling of a modeled gas in a virtual atmosphere, all of which bears only the most hypothetical relationship to the future world, for which we of course have no empirical data whatsoever. The model's ability to predict the future is no more assured than its proven inability to predict the past.18 But <48> because the phenomenon being predicted is so complex, because its consequences could be so catastrophic, and because we have no better way to investigate it, we have no choice but to rely on these flawed tools. In a very real sense, **global warming is the ultimate example of a virtual crisis in virtual nature—which is far from saying that it is unreal.** Instead, it is proof that **the virtual and the natural can converge in surprising ways**. None of this is very reassuring for environmentalists and others who look to nature as the ultimate foundation for their moral vision. In the face of culturally constructed landscapes and increasingly virtual experiences of the world, **many** of us **would not be at all unhappy if nature would reassert its own authority over all this** human **unreality. This may be** one reason **why environmentalists so often seem drawn to prophecies of ecological doom that offer elaborate descriptions of the disasters that will soon occur because of our misdeeds against the earth.** The genre is familiar enough to constitute yet another nature for our list. **It is the nightmare inversion of Eden** to which that eloquent U-Haul sign bore witness**: nature as demonic other**, nature as **avenging angel,** nature as **the return of the repressed. It can range from something as trivial as** those uncooperative **snails in our** Irvine **garden,** to natural disasters like earthquakes or floods, **to the hypothetical horrors of global warming.** At whatever scale we experience them, these things represent a nonhuman world that despite our best efforts **we** never quite succeed in fully controlling. Often we come close enough that we congratulate ourselves prematurely for our own triumph—and then **are surprised when** the long-silent fault or **the hundred-year flood suddenly reveals our hubris. As one man wrote to Time magazine** following the Northridge quake, "**If Mother Nature has proved one thing, it is that she can be a real ~~bitch."~~**19 Even beyond the earthquake and the fires, **California offered numerous examples of nature in apparent rebellion during our stay.** Early in the year reports surfaced of a high school in nearby Westminster where 292 **students** had been **infected with tuberculosis by a single classmate,** twelve of them with drug-resistant forms that would respond slowly to treatment if they responded at all. A little later the newspapers announced that the first **killer bees** had finally **made it to California, and** offered dire predictions of what this would mean for people who would now have to worry about being stung by them.20 More dramatically, **in April a young woman jogging near her home** in the Sierra Nevada foothills **was stalked and pulled from the trail by a female mountain lion and** then quickly **mauled to death. The lioness was hunted down and shot**, lest she kill again. **The woman left behind two small children; the lion, a seven-week-old cub. It undoubtedly says something about** people's **ideas of nature,** perhaps even their ideas of human nature, **that public appeals on behalf of these young orphans** soon **yielded $9,000 for the two children ... and $21,000 for the cub.**21**What is interesting about such events is** not that they occur. After all, what could be more natural than a mountain lion killing its prey or a great fault relieving its pent-up strain? What is really intriguing is **the meaning we** <50> **assign to them,** for we have an inveterate habit of **turning them into moral fables.** The snails in my Irvine garden become small gruesome symbols of the limits to human control. The earthquakes exemplify nature's terrifying randomness—and also people's hubris in pretending that rare, irregular events can safely be ignored simply because they cannot be predicted. **The mountain lion can serve as** a token of nature's savagery—or as the **innocent victim of human beings who** in their efforts to live closer to nature unthinkingly **invade the lion's home. Every environmental disaster,** all the way up to global warming**, stands as a potential indictment of the ignorant or culpable human actions that contributed to it. The human inclination is to transform all such events into**

stories that carry **a moral lesson.** Nature as demonic other is Job's whirlwind, the horror of random suffering that is all the more terrifying because it offers no discernible justification for the pain it inflicts on the innocent and the guilty alike. **Nature as the avenging angel is the dark side of the Eden story, the punishment** that follows **in the wake of** our having listened to **Satan's seductive advice.** It is this story that makes us shake our heads so knowingly even as we sympathize with the families that lost their homes in the Laguna Can-yon fire. It's too bad, we say, but they brought it on themselves by building there. What did they expect? After all, the fires are only natural. We do this even though we ourselves have almost surely made similar bargains with nature, whether we live in the fault zone or the floodplain or the path of great storms. When we become victims, these things are never our fault, though it is easy enough for us to see how others have foolishly placed themselves in harm's way. **People are drawn to nature as avenging angel for much the same reason that they are drawn to nature as Eden**. It should by now be clear that **the two are** in fact **opposite sides of the same moral coin. The one represents** our vision of **paradise:** the good that is so utterly compelling that we feel no hesitation in claiming nature as our authority for embracing it. **The other is our vision of hell: the place where those who transgress against nature will finally endure the pain and retribution they so justly deserve.** There is a wonderfully attractive clarity in this way of thinking about nature, for **it turns the non-human world into a moral universe** whose parables and teachings are strikingly **similar to those of a religion. We need such teachings, for they give meaning and value to our lives.** To the extent that **environmentalism serves as a kind of secular religion for many people in the modern world,** it is capable of doing great good if **it can teach us the stories**, as religions often try to do, **that will help us to live better, more responsible lives.** **And yet:** we must never forget that **these stories are ours, not nature's.** The natural world does not organize itself into parables. Only people do that, because **this is our peculiarly human method for making the world make sense.** And because people differ in their beliefs, because their visions of the true, the good, and the beautiful are not always the same, they <51> inevitably differ as well in their understanding of what nature means and how it should be used—because nature is so often the place where we go searching for the fulfillment of our desires. This points to one final vision of nature that recurs everywhere in this book: nature as contested terrain. Over and over again in these essays, we encounter the central paradox of this complex cultural construct. On the one hand, **people in Western cultures use the word "nature" to describe a universal reality, thereby implying that it is and must be common to all people. On the other hand, they also pour into that word all their most personal and culturally specific values: the essence of who they think they are, how and where they should live, what they believe to be good and beautiful, why people should act in certain ways. All these things are described as natural, even though everything we know about human history and culture flies in the face of that description. The result is a human world in which these many human visions of nature are always jostling against each other, each claiming to be universal and each soon making the unhappy discovery that even its nearest neighbors refuse to acknowledge that claim.**

**This understanding of the environment as pristine abstracts our own role in consumptive practices- divorcing political solutions from personal economic choices and re-entrenching destructive practices at the level of everyday social practices, turning case**

**SMITH ‘1** [Daniel Somers; Assistant Professor at Ramapo College, Carnegie Council Fellow; Place-Based Environmentalism and Global Warming: Conceptual Contradictions of American Environmentalism;*Ethics & International Affairs*; Volume 15, No. 2; 2001; http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108]

Given the long and continuing migration of political and economic power to urban and corporate centers, these views have had serious implications for people living in economically and politically marginal rural areas. If the best nature is pristine and endangered, then it must be "protected," which often means excluding materially productive land uses. In some cases, as in the Northern Forest, protection may also involve allowing certain prescribed land uses (usually those that are aesthetically pleasing) to continue in a similarly idealized vision of "traditional" working landscapes. Either way, the process of objectification is a form of conceptual power that helps to make this assertion of control over the places where others live politically feasible and morally palatable. This situation is by no means restricted to the United States or other developed countries. In places like the rainforests of Amazonia and Indonesia, or the Himalayas of Nepal, indigenous and other rural inhabitants who have little political clout are frequently overwhelmed by internationally funded conservation initiatives that, fueled by well-meaning desires to protect forests, mountains, and biodiversity, can be ignorant of or even hostile toward local subsistence needs and cultures[15](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote15#footnote15). Equally important is how these popular views of nature shape the awareness and definition of environmental problems. **Infatuation with wild**, **pristine nature tends to steer our attention away from our own impacts on the larger "nature" that surrounds us, especially where these impacts are indirect or subtle, as is the case with climate change.** As William Cronon points out, **"To the extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but** at the same time **pretend** to ourselves **that our *real* home is in the wilderness,** to just that extent **we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead"** [2](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote2#footnote2). Thus, we "get back to nature" by driving on the interstate or flying in a plane and then using the latest high-tech outdoor gear. **We "get away from it all" by making a flurry of commercial transactions with travel agents, adventure outfitters, and ecotourism guides. Meanwhile, we define as "problems" those activities**, like development and clear-cutting, **that have obvious effects and can be attributed to others.** If our principal goal is to keep roads out of wilderness or protect scenery from rapacious timber corporations, **it becomes much easier to ignore the implications of our own personal and seemingly insignificant actions. Instead of emphasizing the role of consumer demand in driving the** degradation of wilderness, resource extraction in more mundane landscapes, and the **buildup of greenhouse gases that threaten rare and common places alike, we can point at the proximate destroyers of pristine nature** and confirm our personal sense of virtue by supporting environmental groups that seek to stop them. **Lost is consideration of the extraordinary amount of resources used and waste generated by Americans per capita.** Mathis **Wackernagel and** William **Rees** have developed a method for calculating the "ecological footprint" of individuals and communities based on the land area required to produce various goods, and including the estimated forest land that would be required to sequester carbon emitted from burning fossil fuels. They **estimate that there are approximately 1.5 hectares of productive land available for each human, and that the average North American uses the equivalent of between four and five hectares. "If everyone** on Earth **lived like the average** Canadian or **American, we would need** at least **three** such **planets to live sustainably"** [17](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote17#footnote17). Moreover, there is little reason to expect that middle- and upper-class environmentalists contribute any less to the problem than do others. Those who live in large homes on biologically impoverished suburban plots of land and travel to the mountains on weekends or to exotic "ecotourism" destinations for vacation, undoubtedly have a greater negative impact on the environment than do average citizens.

**Our criticism is the alternative -- our argument is that the 1AC's flawed approach to the aesthetics of ecology makes their speech act a step in the wrong direction. Voting negative entails an acknowledgement of the hybrid quality of ecology as interlocking form within cultural politics rather than separate from it -- their idealized mythos of nature is wholly incompatible with making cultural analysis a starting point for ecology**

**Proctor and Pincetl '96** James D Proctor, Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Stephanie Pincetl, independent conservation researcher. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1996, volume 14, pages 683-708 "Nature and the reproduction of endangered space: the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest and southern California" <http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~jproctor/pdf/E&P1996.pdf>

Our intent in this paper is to examine how **nature is being literally and figuratively constructed in the context of the nationally significant biodiversity-conservation efforts** taking place in the Far West of the USA. **These efforts are largely built on a crude realist premise that nature is some biophysical entity under siege by humans**. Yet the threads of nature and culture are somewhat more entangled than many conservationists are willing to admit; as Raymond Williams observed, "The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history" (1980, page 67). In the last decade scholars from geography and other fields have explored the notion of nature as a social construct (Bennett and Chaloupka, 1993; Burgess, 1990; Cosgrove, 1984; Cronon, 1995; Demeritt, 1994; Evernden, 1993; FitzSimmons, 1989; Harrison and Burgess, 1994; Lynch, 1993; Milton, 1993; Oeschlaeger, 1991; Olwig, 1984; Simmons, 1993; Smith, 1990). Throughout this literature, emphasis has generally been placed on a **postempiricist epistemology, on nature as more than a set of plainly evident facts**. This position has become so diffuse in contemporary critical inquiry into questions of nature and environment that the epistemological gap between the literature of social constructivism and that of conservationism appears impossible to bridge. **Without further development the postempiricist position of social constructivism becomes problematic in its flirtation with epistemological relativism as well as in its ontological silence**. In its strong (and patently self-contradictory) form, relativism asserts that all truth is a matter of context, and that context is sufficiently heterogeneous to mitigate against any possibility of intersubjectively approved truth claims (Krausz, 1989; Margolis, 1986). Though not always explicitly addressed, **epistemological relativism is operationally denied in part, or at least cordoned off to less troublesome territory, by virtually all social theoretical accounts (save perhaps those advancing nihilist platforms).** Yet the social construction of nature literature is rarely clear in this regard. An epistemological position that is a refinement of the social construction of nature argument is Katherine Hayles's (1995) constrained constructivism. Hayles accepts social constructivism, but argues that constructivism occurs within a bounded set of possibilities, where the bounds are comprised of biophysical constraints: "No matter how gravity is conceived, no viable model could predict that when someone steps off a cliff on earth, she will remain spontaneously suspended in midair. Although the constraints that lead to this result are interpreted differently in different paradigms, they operate universally to eliminate certain configurations from the realm of possible answers" (page 52). Hayles's position provides a means to consider biophysical processes as actors in shaping knowledges of nature, and in responding to schemes of human practice based on these knowledges. Nonhuman species, for example, cannot adapt to all biodiversity-management schemes with equal success-though any judgment of success is also mediated through particular knowledges, which may highlight or obscure the status of certain species. **Biological science thus plays the paradoxical role in biodiversity conservation of interpreting the realities of threatened species and their habitats via an epistemological language of thoroughly human origin. The social construction of nature is more than an epistemological project**, of course. Differentiated human forces have transformed the earth (Turner et ai, 1990) with biophysical impacts that are increasingly becoming a focus of concern, leading to widespread conservation efforts. Yet again, **these impacts are not understood outside of socially constructed knowledges of nature**. The ontological (realitytransforming) and epistemological (knowledge-creating) dimensions of the social construction of nature are linked in complex ways. Bruno Latour (1993) weaves together these dimensions of the social construction of nature through his position that the mixing of the human and the nonhuman in reality-a process he terms 'translation'-has resulted not merely in altered 'natures' but in nature -culture hybrids, joint biophysical- human networks. **Latour cites ozone depletion as an example; this is typically considered a biophysical phenomenon of anthropogenic origin**. **His account**, however, **of the discourse surrounding ozone depletion suggests that the ontological elements of culture and nature are more inalienably interwoven**: "On page four of my daily newspaper, I learn that **the measurements taken above the Antarctic are not good this year**: the hole in the ozone layer is growing ominously larger. Reading on, I turn from upper-atmosphere chemists to Chief Executive Officers of Atochem and Monsanto, **companies** that **are modifying their assembly lines in order to replace the innocent chlorofluorocarbons, accused of crimes against the ecosphere**. A few paragraphs later, I come across **heads of state of major industrialized countries who are getting involved with chemistry, refrigerators**, aerosols and inert gases ... Toward the bottom of the page, **Third World countries and ecologies add their grain of salt and talk about international treaties, moratoriums, the rights of future generations**, and the right to development. **The same article mixes together chemical reactions and political reactions. A single thread links the most esoteric sciences and the most sordid politics, the most distant sky and some factory in the Lyon suburbs, danger on a global scale and the impending local elections or the next board meeting"** (1993, page 1). Latour argues that modernity is characterized not only by the proliferation of nature - culture hybrids, but by the contradictory epistemological practices of purification, of radical distancing of objects from subjects, of 'nature' from 'culture', thus hyperpolarizing the discourses between, for instance, the natural sciences and cultural studies: "Our intellectual life is out of kilter. Epistemology, the social sciences, the sciences of texts-all have their privileged vantage point, provided that they remain separate. If the creatures we are pursuing cross all three spaces, we are no longer understood. Offer the established disciplines some fine sociotechnological network, some lovely translations, and the first group will extract our concepts and pull out all the roots that might connect them to society or to rhetoric; the second group will erase the social the political dimensions, and purify our network of any object; the third group, finally, will retain our discourse and rhetoric but purge our work of any undue references to reality*horresco referens*-or to power play. In the eyes of our critics the ozone hole above our heads, the moral law in our hearts, the autonomous text, may each be of interest, but only separately" (1993, page 5). It is thus not surprising, following Latour's argument, that there has been so little engagement of the social-construction-of-nature thesis by natural scientists, as both sides have each attempted to stake their contrary epistemological claims on the same reality. In recent times, in fact, natural-**science-based conservationists have strongly rejected social constructivism because of what they perceive to be its nihilist leanings** (Soule and Lease, 1995). **The irony of this rejection, by some natural scientists and others, is that it is predicated on a particular social construction of nature-one which is purified of its embeddedness in cultural schemes of knowledge and transformative practices, and hence stakes out this pure nature as worthy of protection from adverse human influence**. The close association of biodiversity-protection efforts with applied natural science (for example, conservation biology), coupled with the predominant objective of these efforts in the preservation of more quintessentially natural places, is thus understandable in this light.

# 1nc case

**Not first – other factors influence reason, prioritizing aesthetics ignores ideology as a source of reason**

**Conaghan 3** (Joanne, Professor – Kent Law School, “Beyond Right And Reason: Pierre Schlag, The Critique Of Normativity, And The Enchantment Of Reason: Schlag In Wonderland”, University of Miami Law Review, April, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 543, Lexis)

A final concern emerging from the confines of Schlag's selective mimicry of the mainstream lies in its resolutely legal character. American legal scholars do not, by and large, like to stray too far beyond the boundaries of what is acceptably "legal" n65 and interestingly, neither does Schlag. He/they prefer the snug confines of traditional legal discourse and its discontents, modestly professing ignorance and lack of expertise beyond the terrain of law, narrowly understood as judicial decisions and the doctrines and theories legal scholars derive from them. Schlag bemoans this narrowness repeatedly but seems in no great hurry to escape it. Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether or not his insistence on so limited an enquiry masks a fear of his moving beyond what he has experienced as safe and steady ground. By his own admission, this is the critique of "an insider," n66 but does it simultaneously affirm the attractions of remaining "inside"? This dogged determination to steer clear of the complexities that an extra-legal dimension might introduce is also manifest in Schlag's **exclusive preoccupation** with reason's aesthetic appeal. While I applaud his efforts to draw attention to the coercive power of particular aesthetic forms--in the context of law, the compelling effects of grid-like manifestations of reason--his neglect of, indeed total silence in relation to, other features of law's coerciveness puts him at risk of overstating his case. This is particularly so when **what is neglected is so closely bound up** with what he addresses at such length. Here, I am thinking in particular of the ideological context within which law operates and upon which reason seeks to make her mark. In my view, there is an ideological dimension to the effective deployment of reason that **is not**, or is only secondarily, **dependent upon** its **aesthetic** form. There is a detectable distinction (not always but sometimes) between invocations of reason that are dependent upon the political and ideological landscape for their validity and deployments of reason that [\*557] draw upon (or seek to develop) our aesthetic inclinations, particularly our attraction to order and coherence. n67 Often, what seems reasonable is inextricably related to our understanding of what is possible, and yet, it is not always the case that what is possible is determined by the boundaries of reason. The ideological landscape abounds with all of the "sources of belief" making an appearance in Schlag's critique. The point is that reason as a particular aesthetic does not always work to disqualify reason as a repository for widely held ideological beliefs. Although the former may contribute to understandings of the latter, it may not wholly determine (or be determined by) them. A failure to acknowledge this explicitly arguably serves to weaken the power of Schlag's critique. There are times when he invokes a primarily ideological concept of reason--one that relies on notions of truth, self-evidence, and righteousness--and then proceeds to critique it for its failure to adhere to an aesthetic form. Sometimes, this is effective, and it is almost always amusing. n68 At other times, one has a sense that the boot does not fit, that he is over-emphasizing the importance of the schematic structure of the argument in circumstances where its success has little to do with its schematic structure and everything to do with its correspondence to the ideological status quo. Put bluntly, if reason's appeal to self-evidence (Sunstein) or virtue (Nussbaum) is dependent upon factors beyond its internal logic, it is not thereby significantly diminished by demonstrating that that logic has reached its limits. Schlag's account of the wonderland of American legal scholarship is undoubtedly perceptive; his dissection of the stances adopted by those who typify it both masterly and liberating, and his representation of his own alienation intensely resonant of the experiences of many who occupy the margins of the legal academy. Indeed, therein lies its appeal. But by the same token, it is at times injudicious in its forays into "hostile" terrain. It fails adequately to guard against the dangers of importation, co-option, domestication, and reproduction. It constitutes even as it deconstructs. In Schlagean terms, the power of his critique is diminished by neglect of aspects of the "rhetorical economy" with which he is engaging. n69 In simpler terms, there appear to be dimensions to his enchantment of which he is unaware.

**Rational calculation should be good enough to act**

Loewy 91 – Erich, associate professor of medicine at the University of Illinois and associate professor of humanities, “Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism,” p. 17-21

All of our judgments and decisions ultimately must be grounded in nonverifiable assumptions. The fundamentalist may deny this; but the fundamentalist grounds her judgments and decisions either in a religious belief based on revealed truth or, at least, on the assumption that “somewhere out there” truth exists and that we, in the human condition, can know it. Ultimately, or at least up to this point in time, absolute verification eludes man. At the extreme of this point of view, there are those who claim that truth is not only knowable, but is in fact, known and only the stubborn recalcitrance of the uninitiated prevents it from being generally accepted. This point of view claims not only that morality exists as a discoverable truth, an absolute not fashioned by men but unchanging and immutable, but also that truth has in fact been discovered. Rights and wrongs exist quite apart from the stage on which their application is played out. Situations may differ but, at most, such differences force us to reinterpret old and forever valid principles in a new light. Those who believe themselves to know the truth, furthermore, oftentimes feel compelled not only to persuade others to their point of view but feel morally justified in using considerable force to do so. On the other hand, some of us would deny the existence of immutable truth or, what is not quite the same thing, deny at least that it is knowable in the human condition. Those who flatly deny the existence of unalterable truth find themselves in much the same pickle as do those who flatly assert it: Both lack a standard of truth to which their affirmations can be appealed. Those who concede the possibility that truth exists but not the possibility that man in the human condition can be privy to it, have modified the position without greatly improving it. Their affirmation that man in the human condition can never know absolute truth seems more reasonable but is, once again, not verifiable. Who can know with certainty that tomorrow someone will not discover a way of “getting at” absolute truth and, in addition, be able to provide a simple and brilliant proof which other mortals to date have missed? Only an absolutist could deny such a possibility! That leaves us with a more pragmatic answer: Holding that, in the human condition, truth is not—or at least is not currently—accessible to us leaves more options open and does not fly in the face of the undeniable fact that, unlikely as it seems, our knowing absolute truth may be just around the corner. Outside the religious sphere, no one has ever convinced most thinking people that they are the possessors of absolute truth. Truth, whenever accepted at least for daily use, is invariably hedged. If we accept the fact that absolute truth (at least so far) is unknown to us and accept as an axiom that it may well be unknowable, we are left with a truth which for everyday use is fashioned rather than discovered. What is and what is not true or what is and what is not morally acceptable, therefore, varies with the culture in which we live. This claim (the claim on which, as we shall see, cultural relativism relies) rests on the assertion that there are many ways of looking at truths and that such truths are fashioned by people. Depending on our vantage point, there are many visions of reality,1 a fact which the defenders of this doctrine hold to be valid in dealing with the concrete, scientific reality of chemistry and physics.2 Such a claim, it would seem, is even more forceful when dealing with morals. As Engelhardt puts it so very well: “Our construals of reality exist within the embrace of cultural expectations.”3 And our “construals of reality” include our vision of the moral life. Furthermore, not only do our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations,” the limits of what we as humans can and what we cannot culturally (or otherwise) expect are biologically framed by the totality of our bodies and their capacities as well as (and inseparable from the rest of the body of which it is a part) by our minds. **All human judgments and decisions**, then, **are inevitably grounded to prior assumptions which we accept and do not question for now**. There is a story about William James which illustrates the point. James was giving a lecture dealing with the universe at a Chattauqua: one of those events so popular at the turn of the century, which has, regrettably, been replaced by talk shows. At the end of his well-received lecture, a little old lady came up to him and said: “I enjoyed your talk, Mr. James, but you know you are making an error: The universe rests on the back of a tortoise!” “Very well,” James said, “I can accept that. But tell me, what in turn does that other tortoise rest upon?” “It’s no use, Mr. James, it’s tortoises all the way down.” And so it goes: **Every assumption rests on the back of another assumption and if we are to examine all before proceeding with our everyday judgments and decisions we would get hopelessly mired** in mud. **The quest is necessarily endless. Ethical theories, like all other human activities, inevitably rest on prior assumptions**. Indeed, one cannot reason without a framework of reasoning, and similarly, one cannot reason about reasoning without such a prior framework. The question, it seems, is not the necessary acceptance of an assumption, for that is inevitable, but the depth and universality of the assumption taken. One needs steer between Scylla and Charybdis: on one side too-easy acceptance of a superficial assumption, on the other an endless and almost neurotic quest for ever more basic assumptions. Crashing on the other condemns one to eternal philosophical backpedaling, inactivity, and to leaving the original problem, whose immediate resolution may be critically needed, entirely unresolved. That some framework of reasoning is necessary was recognized by Kant when he claimed that, thanks to the “common structure of our mind,” thought processes inevitably divided the sensible world into categories which we then use to deal with it.4 Rationality requires ways of dealing with the world and reasoning without categories is evidently not possible. The reason why there is no disagreement among persons about some logical propositions is that the common structure of our mind compels us to see certain things in certain ways and to reason along certain lines made inevitable by the very way in which our minds are structured. Even if, later on, we may discover that our universally agreed-upon proposition was wrong, we make this discovery using the same tools. We merely discover that some crucial fact was missing, some critical point not considered. The same basic method of reasoning and the same biological substrate for reasoning (the common structure of our mind) has been used to discover our error. I do not claim that our common biology and the common structure of our minds constitutes a way of discovering absolute truth. What such a common biology and such a common structure imply is that we inevitably will approach problems, see truth, and derive our judgments within such a bodily framework. **We are condemned** (or blessed) **to know the sensible world and to reason from the data presented to us and organized by us in certain and not in other ways. That does not reveal truth to us, but it presents us with a working model to be used, adapted, and learned from.** **The belief that there are no absolutes** (or that, at the very least, they are inaccessible to us in the human condition) **can lead to a moral nihilism in which no firm judgments can be made and no decisions or actions can be undertaken**. Such a moral nihilism claims that truths are fashioned by people and however a person may choose to fashion his truths serves no better than does any other way of constructing truths. The fashioning of truths, in that point of view, lacks its own frame of reference. It does not necessarily follow from this, however, that since our “construals of reality” occur purely within the “embrace of cultural expectations,” all visions of reality that are necessarily of equal worth, or that there are no generally useful standards that we can employ in judging either what we conceive to be physical or ethical reality. One can, for example, claim that some visions of reality are clearly and demonstrably wrong, and support such a claim by empirical observation or by showing that certain visions of reality simply do not work That is the stronger claim. In rejoinder, it can be said that empirical observations and “what works” are themselves part of the framework and that, therefore, such a claim lacks validity. On the other hand, one can make the somewhat weaker claim that certain visions, in the context of a given society and historical epoch, seem less valid than others because they confound careful observation or because they simply fail to work when applied to real situations occurring in real current societies.5 This leaves room for a form of modified cultural relativism. Such a move does not deny that our “visions of reality occur within the embrace of cultural expectations.” But while such a move affirms that there are many realities of similar worth, it also suggests that within the context of such cultural expectations some realities have little, and others have much, validity. **Some realities work (have explanatory power translatable into action and are, therefore, usable) in the context of our experience and community, while some do not, and some work better than do others**. **Such a view neither throws up its hands and grants automatic equal worth nor rigidly enforces one view: It looks upon the problem as one of learning and growth in which realities (both empirical and ethical) are neither rigidly fixed nor entirely subject to ad hoc interpretation**. Ethical certitude, no more than certitude about anything else, is not possible in the human condition. The “ut in pluribus,” the generally and for the most part true of which St. Thomas Aquinas speaks, is the best we can hope for in science as well as in ethics. Since, however, we must inevitably act (nonaction being as much action as action itself), we must be prepared to act on less than complete certitude. Truth cannot, in a Cartesian sense, be expected to be apodictic; rather truth (whether it is scientific or moral truth) is to be worked with, shaped and developed as we experience, learn, and grow.

**Even if they are first, Disad is a reason to vote neg – bad content shapes aesthetics**

**Lazarewicz 08** (Ela Lazarewicz-Wyrzykowska, University of Manchester, “Mikhail Bakhtin’s ‘Logic of Form’ and the ‘Logic of the Exodus’ in the Book of Amos”, http://home.nwciowa.edu/wacome/ELW.pdf)

However, if we continue to look at the relationship between God and Israel in Amos through the lens of Bakhtin's categories, a different reading is possible. In the poetics of the Formalists, criticised by Bakhtin, “content is understood as something replaceable from the point of view of form - form is not concerned with the cognitive-ethical validity of content and this validity is completely fortuitous in the aesthetic object.” (PCMF 283) Bakhtin argues that in such approach ‘content’ is something accidental, secondary in relation to ‘form.’ Any ‘**content’ can “fill” the same ‘form**.’ Or, any ‘content’ can be taken over by a new ‘form’ and become a “secondary content,” like in the literary works which take up as its ‘content’ previous artistic works, rather than “the world of cognition” and “the ethical reality of performed action” (pastiche, parody, etc). (PCMF 284) Such approaches are perceived by Bakhtin as an aberration of the true relationship between ‘form’ and ‘content.’ His goal in writing PCMF was to provide a theory in which ‘content’ and ‘form’ would be clearly separated but at the same time ‘form’ would be analysed in its correlation to ‘content’ (rather than material). Therefore in his aesthetics, ‘form,’ in spite of its association with the author, is also shown as **inseparable from ‘content**.’ The two components of ‘aesthetic object,’ even though they are not fused, “interpenetrate” (PCMF 283): It is necessary to understand the aesthetic object synthetically, in its wholeness, to understand form and content in their essential and necessary interrelationship: form as the form of content, and content as the content of form - to understand the distinctiveness and law of their interrelationship. (PCMF 317) Content is an indispensable constitutive moment in the aesthetic object, and artistic form is correlative to it, **outside this correlation, artistic form has no meaning at all**. Outside its relationship to content (...) form cannot be aesthetically valid and cannot fulfill its basic functions. (PCMF 281) Thus, ‘form’ is at the same time an expression of the author's creative relationship toward the ‘content’ and remains in tight and unique interrelationship with the ‘content;’ it does not exist independently of the ‘content:’ Aesthetic form is founded and validated from within the other - the author, as the author's creative reaction to the hero and his life. As a reaction, that is, which produces values that are transgredient in principle to the hero and his life and yet are essentially related to the latter. (AH 89-90)

**Don’t mix politics and aesthetics**

**1.) Turn Violence –**

**Intertwining the two sanctions mass violence in the name of aesthetics**

Castronovo 03 – (Russ, Jean Wall Bennett Professor of English and American Studies – University of Wisconsin–Madison, boundary 2, 30(3))

When aesthetic criteria determine the course of political action, violence often ensues. Yet violence can be reshaped into beautiful forms: the freedom that seemed so threatening in revolutionary France is channeled into art, where it acquires order and predictability. As Lutz Koepnick argues, "Aesthetics are meant to give a differentiated apparatus of domination the look of unified and resolute action." 23 But not only does art clean up the traces of domination; it also acts as domination. Coherence, unity, and beauty contribute to an artwork's perfection, but these same qualities invite authoritarian control when translated to a political register. Schiller uses the analogy of a sculptor and a block of stone to suggest the dangers of conducting politics with an eye toward the overarching unity of form. To lend form to the "formless block," the sculptor resorts to violence, splintering and chipping away at parts of the stone deemed incongruent with the ideal design housed in the artist's brain (AE, 32). At a governmental level, this concern with form **sacrifices the citizen to the ideal of the State.** In order to achieve perfect functionality and unity, the State "must ruthlessly trample underfoot any such hostile individuality" (AE, 33). The annihilation of particularity is the trade-off for political unity. Once the final product—either in the form of artwork or the State—is unveiled, all traces of violence disappear. The sculptor who chisels the [End Page 166] block "only forbears to show" his attack upon formlessness (AE, 32). Gentle lines and polished curves erase memory of the fragments cut away from the marble, shards swept up as so much trash. The State, in turn, forgets its trampling of individuality by celebrating the aftereffects of the struggle for social order, taking pleasure in the sight of a regulated and coordinated citizenry. The State behaves as ruthlessly as the sculptor insofar as each metonymically represents the whole at the expense of the part. Unlike Schiller's mechanical artist who labors without an idea of the total artwork and cannot see beyond the individual parts, the fine artist ignores the broken parts scattered on the floor and instead concentrates on the whole. So, too, the State is "able to produce unity only by suppressing variety": aesthetics and politics are incommensurate, and permitting them to appear as equivalent expressions is to court violence and then to destroy all evidence of that trespass (AE, 32)

**Aesthetics focus fails to recognize seriousness of death**

Abramson 03 (Kara, JD – Harvard Law School, “"Art for a Better Life:"\* A New Image of American Legal Education”, Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal, 2006 BYU Educ. & L. J. 227, Lexis)

Some legal scholars have aimed to find aesthetic value in the work of lawyers. This effort sometimes results in wholly positive assessments of the creative role of lawyers. Under this paradigm, law is not merely a technical craft but an artistic venture, and the lawyers' craft embodies the aesthetic principles that define beauty in art. Scholars who adhere to this outlook include Indiana University School of Law Dean Alfred C. Aman, Jr. - who sees law students as "aspiring artists" n153 and some legal problems as "high art" n154 - and, to a certain extent, James Boyd White, who writes his book on the legal imagination, sees the student "as an artist" n155 who is "as free" as the sculptor or painter in what she or he does as a lawyer. n156 These positive portrayals rightly challenge the notion of law as an enterprise of "plugging and chugging" rules into a specific legal case. [\*253] Yet as an enterprise that includes space for creativity, law also creates a space for dangerous manipulation inherent in the creative process. Aesthetic outlooks on law can overestimate the positive attributes of the creative process, n157 and efforts to achieve aesthetic excellence in law have been criticized as inappropriate "in a field of pain and death." [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] n157. Jerome Frank lambasted judges who focused their career on the aesthetic attributes of their decisions at the expense of the lives their decisions affected. Frank, supra n. 39, at 1310 ("But such a decision often means death or imprisonment or poverty or a ruined life to some mere mortal who, in his benighted ignorance, has more regard for his own welfare than for the aesthetic delights of pure "jurisprudence.'"). See also infra n. 251 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Riss). n158. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1047, 1050 (2002) (quoting Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)).

**2.) Coercion**

**Aesthetic force is equivalent to Coercion**

**Biskowski 95** Lawrence J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia, 19,Politics Versus Aesthetics: Arendt’s Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1995, pg 64-66

Style, however, is not beauty. Even aesthetics insofar as it was formerly concerned with supposedly objective, public, or at least widely shared standards of beauty is undermined among contemporary intellectuals by the same radical histo ricism which, by undermining other logics, institutions, understandings, and so forth, provided the conditions for its expansion and elevation. Standards of beauty are no more objective and universal than standards of justice, virtue, and truth; their adoption is always an imposition underwritten by some manifestation of power . With all such public standards discredited, individuals are thrown back on themselves or, rather, on their will and , more typically, on their impulses , as their only grounds for practical choices . Coupled with a n incr ea sing re cognition of how ide ntity is formed and stabilized, this experience leads to a diminished sense of the unity and consistency of the self, " whic h in turn leads to the enormo us surge in interest amo ng contemp orary theorists in the politics of identity, the nature of the self, and the political and moral implications of a de-centered subjectivity. Thus in at least some significant respects, and for good or for ill, the aestheticism being proffered in somewhat different ways in both public and intellectual life is an aestheticism of self fascination and self- absorption. The self, understood as a multiplicity, must be at the center of all authentic choices and values (which ma y, of course, be contradicted at any time), or the criteria for such choices at least should come f r o m within. Moral or aesthetic or political criteria imposed upon the individual from the outside cannot be legitimate. Of paramount concern, therefore, are the forces of external coercion , including, especially, the surreptitious and intrusive socialization technologies by which the self and its various understandings and values have heretofore been shaped, and the means by which these technologies may be overcome so that one may finally be free to be what one authentically is, if indeed one believes this goal remains within the realm of the possible.

**3.) Politics –**

**Conflation cedes the political**

**Biskowski 95 –** Lawrence J., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Georgia, 19,Politics Versus Aesthetics: Arendt’s Critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, The Review of Politics, Vol. 57, No. 1, Winter 1995, pg 64-66

Arendt believed that one of the chief problems facing the modern world was its growing inability to make sense of, experience, and talk about what once was considered to be freedom. This incapacity, she feared, might eventually result in the loss of what has distinctively human about human beings. Such a loss would mean the complete subjection of human beings to the logics of economic, biological, and other types of processes, and consequently their transformation from potentially acting, choosing, and willing subjects into merely passive objects of manipulation, administration, and various forces beyond their conscious control. A very similar concern is, of course, an integral part of the contemporary appeal of aestheticized politics, and Arendt herself has recourse to Kantian aesthetics in formulating her theory of political judgment, but only as an illustration of an alternative to customary or traditional thinking about judgment. Political judgment resembles aesthetic judgment in several regards, most importantly in that it often is not determinate or subsumptive, but the former, Arendt makes abundantly clear, cannot simply be reduced to the latter. 14 Thus it is no t Arendt's claim (nor mine on her behalf) that aesthetics is irrelevant to politics." The problem , rather, resides in the collapsing of one category into the other. From Arendt's perspective, the conflation of aesthetics and politics is only the latest manifestation of a growing modern alienation from what she considered to be authentic politics, another indication of our increasing incapacity even to recognize the vital and distinctive ontological elements and possibilities present in political action and freedom . Postmodern aestheticism is an alternative to modern ways of thinking about politics and freedom, 16 but an alternative that would be unacceptable to Arendt , insofar as this way of thinking is based at best on o n l y a dim s e mi -awareness of the authentically political relationship between self, others, and world. As such, it also brings with it a host of dangers.

#### Demanding beauty turns the aff – beauty is a judgment of what aesthetic qualities should and should not be desired – this is the kind of transcendent logic they try to resist

**Shamos 8** – MA in Communication from OSU (we don’t endorse this author’s affiliations)

(Josselyn, “Beauty and the New Aesthetics”, <http://josselyncrane.com/written/samples/Final%20Rhetoric%20and%20Hermeneutics.pdf>, dml)

In sum, beauty has come to matter in non-traditional ways. The new aesthetics, if there was such a movement, must release the hold of beauty in the art world. Art, due to its autonomy can be whatever it wants, but it is still expected by the average person to possess some aesthetic value. The new aesthetics must account for the ways in which art teaches us about ourselves that are not beautiful. The new aesthetics may also try to account for our finding beautiful things which do not produce pleasure. The new aesthetics must account for the everyday person’s experiences of the beautiful, which would bring in a distinctly non-philosophical element. It must also account for the harm that beauty can do, remembering that beauty is a judgment. Eaton believes that there is a type of beauty that requires health. And Brand argues for an aesthetic that moves beyond the purely aesthetic to incorporate the implications of the political, social, and moral. The old aesthetic is being challenged every day. It is time for a new aesthetic.

#### You know what’s really boring? Their aesthetics. Fidelity to the old is the least life-affirming thing you can do.

**Shugart, 2002** [An Appropriating Aesthetic: Reproducing Power in the Discourse of Critical Scholarship Communication Theory Thirteen: Three August 2003 Helene A.]

The critiques of the scholarly tradition that I have chronicled and summarized often imply aesthetic considerations, as I have noted, but those considerations tend more often than not to be embedded within larger discussions of logical and methodological constraints on qualitative inquiry in general and on the enterprise of criticism in particular. The ideological function of aesthetics, however, is significant in its own right and, because of its elusive and seemingly inconsequential nature, arguably **more insidious in promoting hegemonic sensibilities than more overt conventions of scholarship**. Hooks (1990) appeared cognizant of this when she stated that cultural critics . . . can produce work that opposes structures of domination, that present possibilities for a transformed future, by willingly interrogating their own work on *aesthetic* and political grounds. This interrogation itself becomes an act of critical intervention, fostering a fundamental attitude of vigilance rather than denial.” (p. 55, emphasis added) Terry Eagleton (1990), in his examination of the ideological function and character of “the aesthetic,” has chronicled the impulse of authority to “**colonize . . . the realm of affective life”** (p. 27). Although he identified the aesthetic as, at least potentially, “a genuinely emancipatory force,” he acknowledged, too, that, in the hands of a dominant order, it could function as well as “‘**internalised repressio**n,’ inserting social power more deeply into the very bodies of those it subjugates, **and so operating as a supremely effective mode of political hegemony”** (p. 28). Eagleton’s characterization of the hegemonic function of the aesthetic informs my approach to this project. **Although** the assumptions of **traditional** scholarship largely have been challenged and, in some cases, even deconstructed, its aesthetic dimensions have been **maintained** in **contemporary critical scholarship**; as Eagleton cautioned, however, “there are meanings and values embedded in the tradition of the aesthetic which **are of vital importance**” (p. 415) and thus warrant analysis. I argue that the aesthetic features of conventional scholarship **subtly** but **profoundly** **undermine the critical project and reproduce oppressive paradigms**—**as such, critical scholarship itself culminates in an appropriation of the critical project.**

#### using beauty as a standard is intensely problematic

**Danto 2** – Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Columbia, originally from Ann Arbor (go blue)

(Arthur, “The abuse of beauty”, Daedalus, Vol. 131, No. 4, On Beauty (Fall, 2002), pp. 35-56, dml)

With qualification, I accept Fry's point, as well as the spirit of Hume's marvelous observation. What I want to deny, however, is that the history of appreciation always culminates in the appreciation of beauty. That, as I see it, is the assumption of Edwardian aesthetics, which the kind of art selected for the Grafton Gallery exhibitions ought to have called into question. The Edwar dians, for example, were entirely right to begin to appreciate African art. They were even right in thinking that, on for mal grounds, it could be seen as beautiful. The Victorians had thought that 'primitive peoples' were, in making art, trying to make beautiful objects, only they did not know exactly how - hence their 'primitivity.' The Edwardians thought themselves advanced because formalism enabled them to see what Fry called "Negro sculpture" as beautiful. But they were wrong in thinking that they had learned through formalism to see the beauty that was the point of African art. That was never its point, nor was the point of most of the world's beauty great art. It is very rarely the point of art today. Having lived through the Sensation exhibition at the Brooklyn Museum in 1999, with its crude exploitation of what might shock or offend, I can sympathize with Fry. The critics, pretty much to a person, condemned the art, and were certain they were being put upon. But some of us were ready to see it as a First Amendment rather than aesthetic matter, and in this we were perhaps more right than someone would have been who hoped that through argument they would see the beauty it was in some measure the object of the art to injure. This is not to say that beauty does not have a role to play in the art of our own day. But in order to find out what that role might be, we shall have to free our selves from the Edwardian axiom that all good art is categorically beautiful, if only we have learned to recognize how. We will have to find ways of justifying art other than those with which my narra tive of the decline of beauty began. It is an achievement of the conceptual history of art in the twentieth century that we have a much more complex idea of artistic appreciation than the early modern ists - or modernism in general, down to its formulation in the writing of Clement Greenberg as late as the 1960s.