# AFF EVIDENCE ROUND 3

## 2ac round 3

**2) Breaks down cooperation –**

**The rise of the rest is inevitable, but absolute US power makes the transition safe---the alt is transition wars**

Walton 7 Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in Reading, England, 07 [Dale C, “geopolitics and the great powers in the twenty-first century”, http://books.google.com/books?id=AQLTD1R-47AC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Although international political conditions will differ enormously in the coming decades from those of the middle 1940’s, it would be grossly irresponsible for the United States to shrug off its burdens of great power status and return to the slumber that it once enjoyed. Almost certainly, if the United States had refused to take an active role in European politics in the middle of the twentieth century, a world would have emerged in which American values would not have flourished and even their survival on the North American continent would have been profoundly threatened. America’s refusal to play a substantial role in the great power struggles of this century would have similarly deleterious effects. Importantly, if the United States withdraws to its hemisphere a third world war is far more likely. In a meta region full of young rising powers the presence of a strategically mature superpower can be expected to have a stabilizing effect; the enormous military resources possessed by America compels would be aggressors to consider carefully before launching a strategic adventure. Even more chillingly, as noted above, it is possible that the multipolar system could become sufficiently unbalanced that it would collapse, with a power such as China building a coalition that would allow it ultimately to emerge as the master of eastern Eurasia and the greatest power in the world. nited States is the “court of last resort” protecting against such an eventuality. The latter possibility does not contradict the above argument that us unipolarity is unsustainable - as an extra Eurasian power lacking the ruthlessness to destroy potential great power competitors preventatively, Washington simply cannot sustain unipolarity indefinitely. Nonetheless, while **the** emerging **multipolar** **system** appears robust it **should receive “care and feeding**” – otherwise it is vulnerable to grossly unbalanced events such as the creation of a very aggressive coalition dedicated to achieving Eurasian hegemony and willing if necessary to fight a third world war t o achieve it. Most likely such a coalition would not be able to simply bully its way to hegemony; it probably would have to fight, the results being a war enormously costly in blood, perhaps even one that would **dwarf World War II** in its price. If the aggressive coalition won, in turn, the multipolar system would be destroyed and the United States would face a competitor far more powerful than itself , and in all likelihood a world in which **democracy and personal liberty would be in eclipse**. In any case it is a geopolitical imperative for the United States that no power or coalition attains hegemony in Eastern Eurasia, much less that an explicitly hostile state or coalition succeeds in doing so. If the United States is to guard its national interests in this century, **it is vital that it ensures** the **transition** from unipolarity **to multipolarity occurs in a**s **gentle** a **manner** as possible. In this capacity, it is important to understand that the United States is in long term relative decline, but, at the same time to acknowledge that it has very great military, financial and diplomatic resources at its disposal. If Washington deploys these resources wisely it can maximize its security over the long term and **minimize the probability of a great power war.**

**We’re on the brink – timeframe outweighs**

**Blechman 9** [Barry M., Co-Founder and a Distinguished Fellow at The Henry L. Stimson Center, “Nuclear Proliferation: Avoiding a Pandemic,” http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=680]

There is serious risk that the international agreements and processes that have kept the number of nations armed with nuclear weapons fairly low are breaking down. Over the past ten years, three nations joined the six previously declared nuclear powers and a tenth is in the offing. Unless strong actions are taken during the first 18 months of the administration, we could see a world of twenty or even thirty nuclear-armed states by the 2020s. Meeting this challenge requires specific, near-term steps to shore up the current regime plus bold actions to move eventually to a world completely free of nuclear weapons. The Context The US and other nations became seriously concerned about nuclear proliferation following China’s test of a nuclear device in 1964. In the years that followed, they erected the existing anti-proliferation regime -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – its backbone; the Nuclear Suppliers Group to restrict trade in nuclear materials and dual-use items; and its regulatory organization – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Today, all three components are in jeopardy. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has never been accepted universally. Three nuclear weapon states -- India, Israel, and Pakistan -- are not signatories. The Treaty also has notable flaws, demonstrated by North Korea’s swift withdrawal from the Treaty, removal of IAEA safeguards on its civilian nuclear facility, and quick building and testing of a nuclear device. Moreover, after 40 years, the NPT’s central tenet, a promise by China, France, UK, US, and the USSR to eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge by all other countries not to seek weapon capabilities, is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. At the 2000 and 2005 Review Conferences and in a preparatory meeting for the 2010 Conference, the tensions between the two classes of countries were difficult to manage and little, if anything, was accomplished. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, meanwhile, is challenged by the US-India Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation. This agreement requires the US to seek an exception to the NSG rule prohibiting non-NPT signatory states from trading in nuclear and dual-use materials. Such an exception was granted in September for the US and India; if accepted by the US Congress, there is little reason to think that additional exceptions might not be granted for, say, Russia and Iran or China and Pakistan.   Finally, the IAEA is relatively weak, poorly resourced, and sometimes ignored. One NPT signatory, Iran, has been cited repeatedly for violating IAEA rules but only after years have sanctions begun to be applied and they appear to be too weak to change Iranian behavior -- demonstrating how countries can attain a virtual nuclear weapon status while remaining a signatory of the NPT. A broader problem is that IAEA inspectors can only visit declared nuclear facilities. As of May 30, 2008, the Additional Protocol, which would permit challenge inspections of sites chosen by the IAEA, had not yet been put into effect for most of the NPT signatories, including the United States. Finally, if proliferation begins to accelerate, countries that are competent in nuclear technologies, but which have refrained from building a weapons program, could well join the bandwagon. These proliferators might include Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Ukraine, and others.   Where to Start Re-state the goal of nuclear disarmament at every opportunity During the campaign, both sides stated their support for the goal of nuclear disarmament. Strongly reaffirming this commitment as president would set the stage for success in various negotiations. Emphasizing the disarmament goal in the State of the Union and at other high-profile opportunities will encourage public support. Bring the Six Nation Talks with North Korea to a successful conclusion The United Staes will need China's help to keep the pressure on Pyongyang to fulfill its commitments and to ease concerns about its uranium enrichment program and nuclear exports. It will also need to work with South Korea, Japan, and the Congress to be sure there are sufficient carots for North Korea to see benefit in continuing to cooperate. Persuade Iran to contain its uranium enrichment program short of a weapons capability Getting Iran to contain its uranium enrichment short of a weapons capability is even more important. It requires the US to become a full participant in the talks, not just an interested by-stander, and a promise of simultaneous concessions on our part - not just a partial lifting of sanctions, but also some movement on one or more of the baskets of goodies mentioned in last year's Paris Agreement. Over the longer term, a serious effort to place all nations' nuclear fuel cycles under multinational controls will be essential (see below.) Organize a meeting with Russia early to discuss nuclear matters In the context of improvements in the US-Russia relationship overall, it may be possible to reach early agreements on extension of the START I verification provisions and on modification of the MOscow Treaty to reduce the number of operationally deloyed nuclear warhead and to define more precisely the rules for counting such weapons. Moscow will demand as a quid-pro-quo that we agree to forego the planned missile defense site in Eastern Europe, which is a good idea in any event for technical reasons. Over the longer term, you should begin discussions of more ambitious steps to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons, combined with steps to incorporate Russia in any missile defense program. Begin talks with China China has resisted a nuclear dialogue for years but perhaps may now be ready to begin informal discussions. The start of talks with China on nuclear issues would ease pressures in Japan to go nuclear. Prepare for the NPT PrepCon (May 2009) and Review Conference (June 2010) These conferences require thinking outside traditional lines to come up with bold initiatives that the US and other nuclear weapon states might embrace.   One issue is how to break the ten-year impass in the Committee on Disaramament on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treay (FMCT). China has linked that issue with discussions of a treaty to prohibit weapons in space. One idea would be to agree to discuss "rules of the road for space operations" in exchange for the beginnings of serious work on FMCT. A second issue is a shift from national fuel cycles to placing all nations' fuel cycles under multi-national organizations, perhaps public/private partnerships that would control the materials from mining through the removal of spent fuel from power reactors and safeguard them from diversion while in reactors. A third and crucial issue is the possibility of beginning discussions with key nuclear weapon states for a treaty to eliminate all nucearl weapons, from all nations, by a date certain. Nothing would strengthen the hands of the nuclear weapon states at the 2010 NPT Review Conferenceas much as the announcement that they were beginning such talks. What’s on the Line   The world has been spared the detonation of a nuclear device in anger for more than 60 years. It’s not clear that this remarkable restraint can be sustained indefinitely, particularly in the event of wide-spread proliferation. The East-West conflict during the Cold War was an abstract, ideological struggle. Even then, we came perilously close to nuclear exchanges during the Berlin Crises in the 1950s, the Cuba Crisis in 1962, and at several other times. If nuclear weapons come into the hands of nations with histories of hatred and warfare and on-going disputes, deterrence becomes a far more risky proposition and the likelihood of nuclear warfare far greater. Just think of nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel and Iran in the context of a war between Israel and Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon. Alternatively, think how unstable Northeast Asia might become if China, Japan, Korea, and Russia all have nuclear weapons. Moreover, every additional nuclear weapon state means a greater risk that nuclear devices come into the hands of terrorist organizations. America’s security depends on the next administration placing the highest priority on reining in the nuclear danger.

##### Prolif collapses alliances

Kroenig, 12 [May 26th, Matthew Kroenig: Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future? Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30>]

Undermines alliances: The spread of nuclear weapons also complicates U.S. alliance relationships. Washington uses the promise of military protection as a way to cement its alliance structures. U.S. allies depend on America’s protection, giving Washington influence over allied states’ foreign policies. Historically, the United States has offered, and threatened to retract, the security guarantee carrot to prevent allied states from acting contrary to its interests. As nuclear weapons spread, however, alliances held together by promises of military protection are undermined in two ways. First, U.S. allies may doubt the credibility of Washington’s commitments to provide a military defense against nuclear-armed states, leading them to weaken ties with their patron. As Charles de Gaulle famously asked about the U.S. commitment to defend France from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, would Washington be willing to trade New York for Paris? Similarly, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, U.S. partners in the Middle East, such as Israel and Gulf States, will question Washington’s resolve to defend them from Iran. After all, if the United States proves unwilling to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, would it really be willing to fight a war against a nuclear-armed Iran? Qatar, for example, already appears to be hedging its bets, loosening ties to Washington and warming to Tehran. Second, nuclear proliferation could encourage client states to acquire nuclear weapons themselves, giving them greater security independence and making them less dependable allies. According to many scholars, the acquisition of the force de frappe was instrumental in permitting the French Fifth Republic under President Charles de Gualle to pursue a foreign policy path independent from Washington at NATO.[[1]](#footnote-1)[68] Similarly, it is possible that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states will acquire independent nuclear capabilities to counter Iran’s nuclear arsenal, greatly destabilizing an already unstable region and threatening Washington’s ability to influence regional dynamics.

##### Only scenario for nuclear war

**Ross**, **1999** (Winter 1998/1999, Douglas – professor of political science at Simon Fraser University, Canada’s functional isolationism and the future of weapons of mass destruction, International Journal, p. lexis)

Thus, an easily accessible tax base has long been available for spending much more on international security than recent governments have been willing to contemplate. Negotiating the landmines ban, discouraging trade in small arms, promoting the United Nations arms register are all worthwhile, popular activities that polish the national self-image. But they should all be supplements to, not substitutes for, a proportionately equitable commitment of resources to the management and prevention of international conflict – and thus the containment of the WMD threat. Future American governments will not ‘police the world’ alone. For almost fifty years the Soviet threat compelled disproportionate military expenditures and sacrifice by the United States. That world is gone. Only by enmeshing the capabilities of the United States and other leading powers in a co-operative security management regime where the burdens are widely shared does the world community have any plausible hope of avoiding warfare involving nuclear or other WMD.

The aff controls the only scenario for conflict escalation – the k doesn’t access a war impact

**Kaufman, 09**[Stuart J, professor of political science and international relations at the university of Delaware, “ Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434]

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

##### Every study of credible social theories concludes consequentialism is good---Scientific studies of biology, evolution, and psychology prove

**Greene 2010** – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

##### Positivism is the necessary epistemology for studying IR—the alternative creates epistemological anarchy and destroys empirical analysis

Brown, 2011 (Vernon, Cardiff U, “The Reflectivist Critique of Positivist IR Theory”, http://www.e-

ir.info/?p=7328)

There is a great deal of support for the positivist approach in IR despite the critiques presented above. As the survey by Maliniak et al. showed, seventy percent of American IR scholars still consider themselves as positivists with a number of the rest not yet reflectivist. This is significant as the United States is still considered to be the major force in IR scholarship. There are many reasons for this continued success of positivism in IR, the majority of which have to do with either the continued reliance on empirical methods or the failure of many reflectivists, especially the post-modernists, to offer any suggestions to fill the epistemological void left by their passing. David Houghton (2008, p.118) addresses both of these by writing that despite their critique, reflectivists continue to use empirical, observational methods and that is not possible to be anything but positivist because, as he writes, ‘truth claims about the world have to come from somewhere’. He also suggests that reflectivists are essentially engaging in what can only be perceived as a negative exercise since by continually deconstructing theories one will eventually be left with nothing that is considered a legitimate theory. Another issue raised in response to the reflectivist critique focuses on the pluralism which scholars have called for in the face of epistemological relativism. Lapid (1989, p.249) warns that such pluralism, ‘If adopted uncritically or taken to its logical conclusion, [can] deteriorate into a condition of epistemological anarchy under which almost any position can legitimately claim equal hearing’, and that in such a state it would become nearly impossible to distinguish theoretical proliferation from theoretical growth. Positivism defends itself by claiming that scholarship is inherently observational, therefore empirical, and that if reflectivism is followed to its logical endpoint there would be no legitimate theories left because they would have been either deconstructed or created without a means of testing their legitimacy. Conclusion: The critique of positivism by the reflectivists is fundamentally an epistemological one. Each side can and does make compelling arguments showing the strength of their position. While it is important to acknowledge the positivists’ attempts to ground the discipline in a naturalist, scientific area there is still the obvious fact that the assumptions on which their epistemology is based are too easily deconstructed when they attempt to explain phenomena and make predictions in the socially constructed world which IR purports to study. As Milja Kurki (2009, p.442) suggests, positivism fails to acknowledge the possibility that all theories are at some level ‘politically and socially contextualized’. This creates the possibility for positivist theories to create predictions that are fundamentally flawed as they have failed to take into account the context within which their facts are constructed. This in turn allows the reflectivist theorists to deconstruct the predictions due to misunderstandings that arise from the lack of context in the positivists’ predictions. The question of what positivism has to say in a socially constructed and interpreted world is still an important one, however, since the study of IR is still in many ways observational and therefore empirical. There is also the valid claim that in the face of the possible anarchical pluralism or lack of legitimate theories left by reflectivist critiques there needs to be some sense of scientific and theoretical grounding, and that positivism provides that very thing. In the end, reflectivism performs a valuable service in widening the range of legitimate research that is possible by IR scholars and allowing such research to take into account the understanding that the issues studied are birthed by social conventions. There still must be, however, some framework within this study to prevent the anarchy that could follow in the wake of reflectivism and while positivism is in no ways perfect, or even close to it, it still provides such a framework that if made to be self-reflective and continually evolving, could provide the stability needed.

Thorium is necessarily a reversal of an authoritarian nuclear power regime and an embrace of a non-weaponized regime – thorium was rejected in 1939 due to its benign nature – the plan is a key to access their alternative

Puplava, 11 [President, Chief Investment Strategist at PFS Group,” Kirk Sorensen States Thorium a Million Times More Energy Dense than Fossil Fuels“ <http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/james-j-puplava/kirk-sorensen-thorium-a-million-times-more-energy-dense-than-fossil-fuels>]

Kirk: (2:14) Yeah, I’d be happy to talk about that, and forgive me for maybe getting into a little bit of history, I love history, but it helps tounderstand why these things happened**.** You know, thorium and uranium were both discovered as elements in the late 1800s. And nobody really thought there was anything special out them until Marie Curie discovered that they were radioactive. And again, nobody understood what that meant. But in 1939, as you mentioned, the process of nuclear fission was first discovered by a chemist named Otto Hahn in Germany. And it was a totally new idea that you could actually split an atom release all this energy. And because this was discovered right at the beginning of World War II the obvious question was, can we use this to make an explosive? And that was the origin of the Manhattan project. They looked at uranium and uranium has two isotopes. One of which is uranium 235 and that is naturally fissile, you don’t have to do anything to it to make it fission. So that was the beginning of one kind of effort in the Manhattan project to manufacture a weapon. And then uranium 238, which was much more common, they found that they could bombarded it with neutrons and create a new element, plutonium, that was also fissile, and you could potentially use it for a nuclear explosive. So that was another line that was taken. And then they looked to thorium and said well could we try the same technique with thorium, and found that, yes, you could bombard thorium with a neutron and create uranium 233 and it was also fissile and could potentially form explosives. But there were certain severe drawbacks in the practicality of trying to use uranium 233 as a weapon. And so the attention focused overwhelmingly on separating the uranium isotopes and on converting some of that uranium into plutonium. Those were two directions that were taken during the Manhattan Project. And they resulted in the Hiroshima bomb, which was a uranium 235 bomb and the Nagasaki bomb, which was a plutonium bomb. After the war was over, the overwhelming concern of the US Atomic Energy Commission was to replenish our stockpile of nuclear weapons, which after Nagasaki, was depleted. We didn't have any more weapons, and that was one of the biggest security secrets in the United States at that time. We had to replenish that supply and so all the effort was put into creating materials intended for weapons. And because uranium and plutonium had shown themselves to be more amenable to that type of work than thorium, the work on thorium was neglected. It was only as we moved into the ‘50s that the idea of making electrical power from nuclear energy began to take prominence, and so because the uranium plutonium technologies were more understood, and considered a safer bet, that was where the bulk of the effort in the earlier atomic power program went, was to uranium and plutonium. Although at that time there was a small and beginning effort to investigate thorium, which as in turns out, has some very superior properties when your goal is to make nuclear power rather than to make nuclear weapons.

##### laws are on the books now that ensure the preservation of status quo technology – USFG deployment of Thorium catalyzes a tech transition across the country

MIT, 10 [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap: Report to Congress”, April 2010, http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-033-nuclear-systems-design-project-fall-2011/readings/MIT22\_033F11\_read\_core\_doe.pdf]

In the United States, it is the responsibility of industry to design, construct, and operate commercial nuclear power plants. However, DOE has statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act to promote and support nuclear energy technologies for commercial applications. In general, appropriate government roles include researching high-potential technologies beyond the investment horizon of industry and also reducing the technical risks of new technologies. In the case of new commercial reactor designs, potential areas of NE involvement could include: Enabling new technologies to be inserted into emerging and future designs by providing access to unique laboratory resources for new technology development and, where appropriate, demonstration. • Working through the laboratories and universities to provide unique expertise and facilities to industry for R&D in the areas of: o Innovative concepts and advanced technologies. o Fundamental phenomena and performance data. o Advanced modeling and simulation capabilities. APRIL 2010 22 34 NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP o New technology testing and, if appropriate, demonstration. o Advanced manufacturing methods. Representative R&D activities that support each of the roles stated above are presented below. The level of DOE investment relative to industry investment will vary across the spectrum of these activities, with a generally increasing trend in DOE investment for longer-term activities. Finally, there is potential to leverage and amplify effective U.S. R&D through collaborations with other nations through multilateral and bilateral agreements including the Generation IV International Forum, which is investigating multiple advanced reactor concepts. DOE is also a participant in OECD/NEA and IAEA initiatives that bear directly on the development and deployment of new reactor systems.

##### Prolif threats real

**Harvey 01** (Frank P., a member of a the Canadian International Council, “National Missile Defence Revisited, Again a Reply to David Mutimer,” International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), pp. 347-360, Canadian International Council)

**'Before any argument** supporting NMD **can be taken seriously**, there-fore, **we must accept that a "rogue** state **threat" exists'** (p 340). I couldn't agree more. But this is perhaps the most fascinating of all of Mutimer s assertions because he himself acknowledges the 'facts' of the rogue state threat - and I thought only proponents shared the burden of proving the case for NMD. Consider the following quotes: • The rogue state needs, therefore, to be seen for what it was: the creation of the United States military to justify its claim on resources ... The rogue state, however, is a myth. [It] is not mythical in the sense that it is not real, but rather in the sense that it has been vested with a totemic importance by the United States' (p 344) (emphasis added). • 'Rogues are the enemies that make high levels of military spending legitimate. They are not a lie told by knowing capitalists in an instrumental fashion to hoodwink Congress into passing over-inflated budgets (p 345, n 24) (emphasis added). I am not arguing that the United States fabricated evidence, but rather that it produced a particular frame within which to interpret that evidence' (p 345) (emphasis added). • 'The imagined nature of threats does not mean that there is no real danger or that nothing need ever be done about risks' (p 345). • 'The issue, therefore, is not the evidence but rather how the "facts" are "evidence" of a particular form of threat labelled "proliferation" by actors labelled "rogue"' (p 344, n22). • 'There is, therefore, no need for me to engage in a discussion of the evidence of proliferation assembled, for example, in the Rumsfeld Report to bolster the case for NMD. At issue are not "the facts" but the ways in which those facts are assembled and the interpretation that is given to them' (p 344, n 22). Mutimer s honesty is refreshing but not surprising. **Ballistic missile** proliferation is difficult to deny. **It is a 'real' security threat**, driven by technological progress, the spread of scientific knowledge related to these weapons systems, diminishing costs, ongoing regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, and, most importantly, time.

Alt doens’t solve prolif - means case is a DA to the alt  
Huntley – Program Director at the Liu Institute for Global Studies – ‘7 Wade, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Time for New Thinking?, March

Despite its rejection of these premises, the Bush Administration’s alternative nonproliferation paradigm can play a role in helping the material and normative dimensions of the NPT regime adapt effectively to the second nuclear era. In its current articulation, the alternative paradigm is too messianic and self-serving to function as an effective nonproliferation foundation. But its generic recognition of the political dimension of nuclear proliferation is overdue. In a more rigorously developed form, this perspective can function as an essential adjunct to the prevailing paradigm’s narrower focus on limiting material capabilities and upholding technical non- discrimination. Drawing on more nuanced understandings of the political and social dimensions of the causes and consequences of proliferation is particularly vital in responding to the emerging conditions of the second nuclear age, in which **abstract strategy matters less** and the broader **threat-making** and symbolic values of nuclear weapons possession **matter more**. Increasing acceptance of and reliance on nuclear threat-making deepens the insinuation of nuclear capabilities into the fabric of international relations in each of the material/security, domestic politics and normative/symbolic domains. Arms control, nonproliferation and the ideal of eventual disarmament require reversing this permeation, which in turn requires elevating conditions of global governance – at both national and international levels – above the mean dictates of anarchy. The prerequisite is both material and normative: good governance means good institutions, but the necessity of consensual acceptance means good institutions cannot be imposed by fiat. The task is necessarily a long one; there are no crusading quick fixes. The United States, as the globe’s preeminent power, can lead this task. But this must be leadership through broad and genuine consensus, not convenient and coerced “coalitions of the willing.” The Bush Administration is not wrong to orient US policy around a vision for a better world. But America’s global friends – and even its adversaries – have vital and necessary roles to play in directing that vision toward more consensual and normatively satisfying aspirations. Then they must join in its quest as well. That would not be a bad measure of “responsibility.

**We outweigh and turn the K—prolif increases international inequality and suffering**

**Lyman 95** – CFR Senior Fellow in Africa Policy Studies (Princeton, The Real Story of the NPT Negotiations, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/news/950427-389021.htm, AG)

The prospect is chilling. There may be many things wrong with the present treaty, and much that should be fixed. But certainly, the problems of "inequality," lack of security for non-nuclear states, and pressures for further disarmament would not be ameliorated by having the number of nuclear states go from five to ten, or twenty, and for international norms and mechanisms to disappear. I am horrified to see the NPT described as an "apartheid treaty," as if the spread of nuclear weapons was some desirable good to be enjoyed by everyone. **It is in fact the poorer (or more responsible) nations, who cannot or will not spend the billions of dollars to acquire nuclear weapons, that are most threatened by neighbors who would.**

**Non-proliferation isn’t discriminatory**

**Graham 94** – former director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Thomas, 9/13, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/speeches/graham/spnp94gr.htm, AG)

Some charge that the NPT is discriminatory, because it recognizes five nuclear powers while prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states. While the NPT reflects the reality that five nuclear-weapon states existed in 1968, it does not legitimize the permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Far from it. Rather, the NPT regime creates a system of shared obligations among its parties: while non-nuclear-weapon states promise not to acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states promise to undertake measures to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In fact, the NPT is the only global treaty that requires all its parties to pursue measures related to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. For the nuclear-weapon states, this provision is clearly aimed at their nuclear arsenals. For its part, the United States has undertaken massive reductions in its nuclear arsenal both as a result of the START I and II treaties as well as unilateral measures and bilateral agreements. In addition, President Clinton called in May of this year for the progressive reduction and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The U.S. is currently destroying approximately 2000 nuclear weapons a year, which is as fast as is technically possible. In addition, I note that yesterday, at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, the IAEA commenced application of safeguards on approximately ten tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby fulfilling the pledge that President Clinton made last September that the U.S. would make available for application of IAEA safeguards HEU and plutonium removed from the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The U.S. anticipates placing additional material under IAEA safeguards, with the initial quantity of plutonium to come under safeguards before the end of the year. All of these initiatives demonstrate unmistakably that the U.S. is serious about its commitments under article VI of the NPT.

##### Discussion of technical nuclear strategy is inevitable - their attempts to silence nuclear discourse doesn't solve the problem, it just makes it invisible - this prevents critical response

Chaloupka '92 William Chaloupka, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom, 1992, p. 9-10

Both Derrida’s insight and Schwenger’s anecdote invite the opening of a whole realm of oppositional activity, of which only a few examples now exist. The premise of this genre (“speaking unspeakables”), as Derrida claims, may have been best realized before the nuclear era, in the literary texts of Mallarmé, Kafka, or Joyce. But there have been contemporary attempts that nuclear criticism could address.26 One could imagine a comparison, for example, of two highly publicized television films of the Reagan era, “The Day After” and the right-wing response to it, “Amer¬ika.” The level and ferocity of the response suggest that “The Day After” broke a taboo. “Amerika” charges weakness, appeasement, and even col¬laboration, but these charges so completely miss their target that we search for a better interpretation. Perhaps “The Day After” transgressed in a special way, and the only available way of responding was the arcane code of anticommunism. The actual taboo it broke, it broke by speaking at all. At the same time, the activity of finding new ways to read (literary or cinematic) texts about nukes must relate to the broader project of empowering responses if such activity is to fit within the antinuclear schema I am discussing. Leaping over hypothetical psychological diagnoses to speak politically, such a development is not so hard to imagine. “Speaking the unspeakable” has never been a happy entry into activism. Nuclear opponents have adopted any number of rhetorical strategies for overcoming this obstacle. They argue that this “unspeakability” denotes an importance so huge that we must dissolve the reticence and disgust that is our “first reaction.” Or, alternatively, they dissolve their political position into a therapeutic one, implying that the contemporary citizen would be healthier and less conflicted if she would admit and confront the nuclear demon. In either case, the political use of unspeakability produces a paradoxical stance at odds with the naturalism of the survivalist, species-interest position. This unacknowledged (unacknowledgeable) taste for paradox goes even a step further. Having bound themselves in multiple, endlessly and effortlessly proliferating dilemmas, nuclear opponents then announce that it is their goal to impose the condition of “unspeakability” on nuclear managers. The solution to the paradox of nuclear strategy is to silence strategists, such as Caspar Weinberger, who dare to speak of limited nuclear war. This enforced silence has long since ceased to be uncomfortable for nuclear managers, who now clearly understand that their control will proceed more satisfactorily when it is invisible. Opponents, then, have undertaken the odd project of enforcing unspeakability, on the one hand, while also seeking to make nukes visible, thus making them controversial—a topic of conversation.27 Such strategies have a validity, as I will discuss in a later chapter, but it is not necessarily the validity the opponents promote. Just making the artifacts of nuclearism visible isn’t enough; they don’t speak for themselves. These artifacts—whether warheads or power plants—surely offer little help out of the paradox of unspeakability that both veils and unveils them, and all the while also seems to expect a solution. Finding nukes not only “speakable” but “fabulously textual,” nuclear criticism can respond to this odd political situation in part because many more strategic approaches become possible once we move the response to paradox out of an ‘‘unspeakable discourse’’ and into a textual or literary context.

##### Their alt is political grandstanding- no progress towards disarmament will occur until we alter the security calculations that drive weapons development

DR. LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL, 3-13-96 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/speeches/schein/scheiott.htm

The 1995 NPT Conference decisions reflect the strong interest on the part of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states to see greater progress made toward full implementation of NPT Article VI and, in particular, the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Following the 1995 NPT Conference, the small minority of countries (both within and without the NPT regime) that were not satisfied with the NPT Conference outcome began to agitate publicly for those measures not agreed by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. They began selectively to reinterpret the Conference decisions and to demand the establishment of certain arms control measures. In a direct challenge to the agenda set forth at the 1995 NPT Conference, these states have called for creation of linkage between important and internationally agreed initiatives, such as a FMCT, and rhetorical and unagreed initiatives, such as creating a time-bound framework for nuclear disarmament. The actions of these few states, including some not party to the NPT, belie the very real cooperative atmosphere that resulted in the agreement to the 1995 NPT Conference decisions as well as the growing de-emphasis on "bloc politics" in favor of national or regional security perspectives. Their actions have undermined efforts to move forward constructively on important arms control initiatives, including the CTBT and FMCT. It has also run counter to stated interest in continuing the constructive dialogue that flourished during the 1995 NPT Conference process. If continued progress is to be made toward mutually shared arms control objectives, such as those outlined in the "Principles and Objectives" decision, it will be essential for these few states to stand down from the kind of approach that has characterized their participation in the arms control debate over the past eight months. Allow me, if you will, to take this point a bit further. Disarmament on demand or timetable disarmament is not a tenable proposition -- rather, it is political grandstanding that blocks out of consideration whether and to what extent the security environment in which disarmament is to take place is conducive to such measures. We live today, and will for some time to come, in a period of transition between a world anchored on two relatively well disciplined superpower alliances which defined the international security order, and a future that is unknown and difficult to map with confidence and which is more likely than not to be characterized by forms of complex multipolarity in which local, regional and transnationalist forces weigh heavily. Building down one security order requires a commensurate building up of alternative orders if stability is to be safeguarded. The goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons must take this consideration into account. What is critically important at this stage is to engage in a process that moves us inexorably toward that goal but avoids the error of generating expectations that cannot be met, thus feeding the flames of disillusionment and frustration and reinforcing those who would argue against changing the nuclear status quo. This debate over nuclear disarmament presents a continuous challenge, and one that is not easily addressed. The insistence on the part of non-nuclear weapon states for "disarmament on demand" must be reconciled with the reality that achievement of nuclear disarmament will not happen unless and until the international security situation evolves to the point where, in effect, nuclear weapons can be written out of our national security doctrine and strategies. Certainly the international security situation has changed dramatically from the days of the Cold War; U.S. strategic doctrine has evolved in response to this changed security environment and, as we announced in completing our Nuclear Posture Review, nuclear weapons today play a smaller role in U.S. military planning than at any time in the past. The reality, however, is that while much improved, the security situation today continues to present significant threats to the United States and its allies, and to global stability overall.Many states appear unwilling to accept the fact that, in spite of the commitment of the United States and other nuclear weapon states to the elimination of nuclear weapons -- commitments that have been repeatedly reaffirmed and reinforced through the continued progress in nuclear arms reduction -- nuclear disarmament cannot and will not be achieved overnight. Our long experience illustrates the fact that nuclear arms reduction and elimination is a tedious process -- necessarily so. Like it or not, the fact is that the implementation schedule for START I and II -- agreements that already have been negotiated -- will take many years to fulfill. Without getting into a detailed discussion of what this audience already well knows concerning U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, let me just say that now that the U.S. Senate has provided its advice and consent to START II our primary concern is achieving consent to ratification by the Russian Duma. Following this, we intend to work with Russia on the deactivation of START II forces. During their September 1994 summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin committed to consider further reductions of, and limitations on, remaining nuclear forces once START II was ratified. In the meantime, implementation of START I is running several years ahead of schedule.

##### Regional proximity to adversaries- not racism- drives our concern for new proliferants

Grey, Prof. of poli sci Univ. of Reading, The Second Nuclear Age 1999

Active defense in the nuclear era would have had great difficulty working against say, “the Soviet threat” of the 1980-1985 vintage, but that tactical judgment cannot hold vis-à-vis regional missile threats today and tomorrow. Because the United States could not have limited damage usefully in the context of a Soviet missile attack in 1970 or 1980 (if that is true), it does not follow that the (ballistic and cruise) missile threat posed by regional powers, not excluding China, could not be defeated early in the twenty-first century. There is no technically compelling connection between claims from the early `980’s that the (Soviet) missile assault will always get through and parallel claims today that BMD will not work in the future. Although there can never be any absolute guarantees, it is as certain as anything can be in this friction-fraught realm that a multitiered US BMD architecture would defeat militarily any missile menace from regional powers. Nonetheless, there are particular tactical problems posed by regional foes that would stress BMD competencies. Regional nuclear wars will register short times of flight for missiles dispatched to strike targets in theater. Short ranges translate as minimal, potentially even subminimal, reaction times even for optimally alert and well-positioned active defenses. Almost regardless of the degree of technical sophistication of the defense, short-range ballistic missiles and some medium range ballistic missiles could pose a genuinely intractable challenge to the defense. That limiting thought aside, BMD today and tomorrow can pose a politically and militarily lethal menace to the suasive power of missile threats.

**Even if consumerism was the cause of environmental destruction – renouncing it gives up on innovation and causes extinction**

**Land, 10/30**/09 – PhD, philosopher and economist at the Thunen Institute in Bollewick. (Rainer, “A New Paradigm: The New Deal of the 1930s,” http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2009/10/30/18627196.php)

Renouncing on economic development would not be a way out because it would sanction the status quo. The environmental problems existing today and unsolvable without another type of industry will continue and cause the death of today’s humanity. Renouncing on economic development would mean renouncing on the future technologies with which environmental destruction could be avoided and environmental problems at least partly repaired.

Renouncing on growth urged again and again would also not be a solution. The current path of population growth will lead to a stabilization of the world population at nine to ten billion people by 2050 (currently seven billion). Renouncing on increased production of food, consumer goods and services meant less and less had to be consumed per capital year after year. Thus people of developed countries must lose more and more so people in the third world can win. At the end everyone suffers distress. The only alternative is a new combination of development and growth, an economic development where growing production goes along with declining resource consumption (energy, raw materials and emissions) and environmentally compatible industry arises.

Renouncing on development and renouncing on growth would be fatal like growth without development or development without growth. The alternative is another path of economic development, growth based on another principle of economic development and invention and extension of a new type of industry. If such a change of direction occurs, a greater investment boom and development push would occur than the boom after the Second World War that led to the genesis of Fordist participation capitalism.

**Industrialization is inevitable globally – expanding economic opportunity solves extinction**

**Barker, 2k** – electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the Electric Power Research Institute and former industrial economist and staff author at SRI International and as a commercial research analyst at USX Corporation (Brent, “Technology and the Quest for Sustainability.” EPRI Journal, Summer, infotrac)

From a social standpoint, accelerating productivity is not an option but rather an imperative for the future. It is necessary in order to provide the wealth for environmental sustainability, to support an aging population in the industrialized world, and to provide an economic ladder for developing nations.

The second area of opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help stabilize global population at 10-12 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075. The key is economics. Global communications, from television to movies to the Internet, have brought an image of the comfortable life of the developed world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own aspirations for a better quality of life, either through economic development in their own country or through emigration to other countries. If we in the developed world can make the basic tools of prosperity--infrastructure, health care, education, and law--more accessible and affordable, recent history suggests that the cultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered, relatively quickly and without coercion.

But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and communications. Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened self-interest, we should strive for universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world.

A third, related opportunity for technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and, more broadly, decoupling economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use efficiency, and industrial ecology. Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from 1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born in North America, while in the more crowded and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world, with Europe and North America experiencing the fastest decreases. Both crossed the "zero threshold" in the past few decades, meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land requirements will continue to decrease in the future.

One can postulate that the pattern of returning land to nature will continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and then reversing the current onslaught on the great rain forests. Time is critical if vast tracts are to be saved from being laid bare, and success will largely depend on how rapidly economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in subsistence and frontier farming. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller University calculates that if farmers could lift average grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower, one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared.

If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the continuous drive to produce more from less will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly with shrinking agricultural land requirements, water distribution and use around the world can be greatly altered, since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner, leaner, lighter, and drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively.

Energy intensity, land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to offset the surge in population, but, optimistically, advances in science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are now approaching 65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The creations most in demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than the number of farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in."

Even pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled from population and economic growth. Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of 'capitas' themselves."

The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels of insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course of history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a longstanding problem.

Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was averted by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The great "manure crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil discoveries in Texas and then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and deepened the penetration of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to be discovered.

Technology has also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has extended our voice and our reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light.

But global sustainability is not inevitable. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future, there is the potential for all of this to backfire before the job can be done. There are disturbing indications that people sometimes turn in fear and anger on technologies, industries, and institutions that openly foster an ever-faster pace of change. The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food, the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. Technology has always presented a two-edged sword, serving as both cause and effect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen. We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities with all-electric buildings rising

thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky.

Breaking limits

"Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of

the century. In fact, we have done much better than those predictions, largely because of a factor the book missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in many parts of the world.

Today's perceived limits, however, look and feel different. They are global in nature, multicultural, and larger in scale and complexity than ever before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate sanitation, and nearly as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading rapidly in the regions of the world least able to fight it. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are more than 30% greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves, expected to be tapped by over a billion automobiles worldwide by 2015, may last only another 50-100 years. And without careful preservation efforts, the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as it was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species of large mammals and other vertebrates in North America disappeared (along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia). All these perceived limits require innovation of a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current commitment.

The list of real-world problems that could thwart global sustainability is long and sobering. It includes war, disease, famine, political and religious turmoil, despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and environmental degradation. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental impact, for example--but it offers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have never been brighter, we may come surprisingly close. We should put our technology to work, striving to lift more than 5 billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere and irreversible loss of the earth's natural resources.

##### No risk of “endless warfare”- we should embrace pragmatism in

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

##### Realism is true and inevitable – trying to shift away causes great power war

**Mearsheimer 1** [professor of political science at University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pg. 361]

The optimists' claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true **even if the debates among academic** and policy **elites are dominated by non-realist theories**. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other's expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind greatpower behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries.Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competion among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

##### There is no alternative to capitalism or a clear transition

Kliman, 4 – PhD, Professor of Economics at Pace University

(Andrew, Andrew Kliman’s Writings, “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?” http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/)

Have we faced the harsh reality that, unless th[e] inseparability between the dialectics of thought and of revolution does exist, any country that does succeed in its revolution may retrogress, since the world revolution cannot occur at one stroke everywhere and world capitalism continues to exist? … [Lenin’s] *practice* of the dialectic of thought as well as of revolution underlined his call for a Third International. Raya Dunayevskaya, “Marxist-Humanist Perspectives, 1985-86” I. Concretizing the Vision of a New Human Society We live at a moment in which it is harder than ever to articulate a liberatory alternative to capitalism. As we all know, the collapse of state-capitalist regimes that called themselves “Communist,” as well as the widespread failures of social democracy to remake society, have given rise to a widespread acceptance of Margaret Thatcher’s TINA – the belief that “there is no alternative.” Yet the difficulty in articulating a liberatory alternative is not mostly the product of these events. It is an inheritance from the past. To what extent has such an alternative ever been articulated? There has been a lot of progress – in theory and especially in practice – on the problem of forms of organization – but new organizational forms by themselves are not yet an alternative. A great many leftists, even revolutionaries, did of course regard nationalized property and the State Plan, under the control of the “vanguard” Party, as socialism, or at least as the basis for a transition to socialism. But even before events refuted this notion, it represented, at best, an evasion of the problem. It was largely a matter of leftists with authoritarian personalities subordinating themselves and others to institutions and power with a blind faith that substituted for thought. How such institutions and such power would result in human liberation was never made clear. Vague references to “transition” were used to wave the problem away. Yet as Marxist-Humanism has stressed for more than a decade, the anti-Stalinist left is also partly responsible for the crisis in thought. It, too, failed to articulate a liberatory alternative, offering in place of private- and state-capitalism little more than what Hegel (*Science of Logic*, Miller trans., pp. 841-42) called “the empty negative … a *presumed* absolute”: The impatience that insists *merely* on getting beyond the *determinate* … and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a *presumed* absolute, that is presumed because it is not *posited*, not *grasped*; grasped it can only be through the *mediation* of cognition … . The question that confronts us nowadays is whether we can do better. Is it possible to make the vision of a new human society more concrete and determinate than it now is, through the mediation of cognition? According to a long-standing view in the movement, it is not possible. The character of the new society can only be concretized by practice alone, in the course of trying to remake society. Yet if this is true, we are faced with a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape, because acceptance of TINA is creating barriers in practice. In the perceived absence of an alternative, practical struggles have proven to be self-limiting at best. They stop short of even tryingto remake society totally – and for good reason. As Bertell Ollman has noted (Introduction to *Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists*, Routledge, 1998, p. 1), “People who believe [that there is no alternative] will put up with almost any degree of suffering. Why bother to struggle for a change that cannot be? … people [need to] have a good reason for choosing one path into the future rather than another.”

##### Centuries of capitalism and recent space programs empirically deny the impact—they have to prove why the plan makes it worse

##### Vagueness means the alt doesn’t solve

Grossberg 92 – Communication Studies Professor, UNC (Lawrence, We Gotta Get Out of This Place, p 388-90)

If it is capitalism that is at stake, our moral opposition to it has to be tempered by the realities of the world and the possibilities of political change. Taking a simple negative relation to it, as if the moral condemnation of the evil of capitalism were sufficient (granting that it does establish grotesque systems of inequality and oppression), is not likely to establish a viable political agenda. First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to overthrow capitalism in the current situation. Unfortunately, despite our desires, "the masses" are **not waiting to be led into revolution**, and it is not simply a case of their failure to recognize their own best interests, as if we did. Are we to decide-rather undemocratically, I might add-to overthrow capitalism in spite of their legitimate desires? Second, as much as capitalism is the cause of many of the major threats facing the world, at the moment it may also be one of the few forces of stability, unity and even, within limits, a certain "civility" in the world. The world system is, unfortunately, simply too precarious and the alternative options not all that promising. Finally, the appeal of an as yet unarticulated and even unimagined future, while perhaps powerful as a moral imperative, is simply too weak in the current context to effectively organize people, and **too vague to provide** **any** **direction**.

##### Alternative/movements fail- "last place aversion" sabotages redistribution efforts

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If ever Americans were up for a bit of class warfare, now would seem to be the time. The current financial downturn has led to a $700 billion tax-payer-financed bank bailout and an unemployment rate stuck stubbornly above nine percent. Onto this scene has stepped the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement, which seeks to bring together a disparate group of protesters united in their belief that the current income distribution is unfair. “The one thing we all have in common is that We are the 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%,” says their website. In an era of bank bailouts and rising poverty – and where recent data show that the top 1 percent control as much as 35 percent of the total wealth in America – it would appear that the timing of this movement to reconsider the allocation of wealth could not be more perfect. Or, maybe not. Support for redistribution, surprisingly enough, has plummeted during the recession. For years, the General Social Survey has asked individuals whether “government should reduce income differences between the rich and the poor.” Agreement with this statement dropped dramatically between 2008 and 2010, the two most recent years of data available. Other surveys have shown similar results. What might explain this trend? First, the change is not driven by wealthy white Republicans reacting against President Obama’s agenda: the drop is if anything slightly larger among minorities, and Americans who self-identify as having below average income show the same decrease in support for redistribution as wealthier Americans. Our recent research suggests that, far from being surprised that many working-class individuals would oppose redistribution, we might actually expect their opposition to rise during times of turmoil – despite the fact that redistribution appears to be in their economic interest. Our work suggests that people exhibit a fundamental loathing for being near or in last place – what we call “last place aversion.” This fear can lead people near the bottom of the income distribution to oppose redistribution because it might allow people at the very bottom to catch up with them or even leapfrog past them. How does last-place aversion play out with regard to redistribution? In our surveys, we asked Americans whether they supported an increase to the minimum wage, currently $7.25 per hour. Those making $7.25 or below were very likely to support the increase – after all, they would be immediate beneficiaries. In addition, people making substantially more than $7.25 were also fairly positive towards the increase. Which group was the most opposed? Those making just above the minimum wage, between $7.26 and $8.25. We might expect people who make just below and just above $7.25 to have similar lifestyles and policy attitudes – but in this case, while those making below $7.25 would benefit if the minimum wage were raised to, say, $8.25, those making just above $7.25 would run the risk of falling into a tie for last place. We’ve also found evidence of last place aversion in laboratory experiments. In one, we created an artificial income distribution by endowing individuals with different sums of money and showing them their “rank”– with each rank separated by $1. We then gave them an additional $2, which they had to give to either the person directly below or directly above them in the distribution. In this income distribution, of course, giving $2 to the person below you means he will jump ahead of you in rank. In our experiments, most people still give to the person below them – after all, the alternative is to give $2 to a person who already has more money than you. People in second-to-last place, however, who would fall to last place when giving the money to the person below them, are the least likely to do so: so strong is their desire to avoid last place that they choose to give the money to a wealthier person (the person above them) nearly half the time. If Americans behave like people in our experiments, then it could be challenging to unite those in the bottom of the income distribution to support redistribution.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)