# AFF EVIDENCE ROUND 1

## 2ac Topicality

##### Restriction’ should not be defined narrowly – should include regulations, conditions, and limitations on action

Mexican Ministry of Economy March 2012 “Other Appellant Submission of Mexico” UNITED STATES – CERTAIN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN LABELLING REQUIREMENTS http://www.economia.gob.mx/files/comunidad\_negocios/comercio\_exterior/solucion\_controversias/EDO.EDO/ORGANIZACION%20MUNDIAL%20DE%20COMERCIO/Participaci%C3%B3n%20de%20M%C3%A9xico%20como%20reclamante/EU\_COOL/20COMUNICACIONDELOTROAPELANTEDEMEXICO.pdf

52. The ordinary meaning of “restrictive” is “imposing restrictions”63 “[i]mplying, conveying or expressing restriction or limitation” and “[h]aving the nature or effect of a restriction; imposing a restriction.”64 The term “restriction” is defined as “the act or an instance of restricting; the state of being restricted”65 and as “[a] thing which restricts someone or something, a limitation on action, a limiting condition or regulation.”66 The term “restrict” is defined as “confine, bound, limit”.67 53. The meaning of “restriction” has been elaborated upon in jurisprudence concerning other WTO provisions. The term “restriction” should not be given a narrow meaning.68 A “disguised restriction” in the context of Article XX of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted to include “disguised discrimination in international trade”.69 In the context of Article XI and other non-discrimination provisions of the GATT 1994, it has been found that GATT disciplines on the use of restrictions are not meant to protect “trade flows”, but rather the “competitive opportunities of imported products”.70 In Argentina – Hides and Leather, the Panel found that in determining whether a measure makes effective a restriction in the context of Article I, II, III and XI:1 of the GATT 1994 the focus is on the competitive opportunities of imported products, not the trade effects. That panel considered that the complaining party claiming the existence of a restriction need not prove actual trade effects

## 2ac Counterplan

##### Loan guarantees institutionalize inefficiency and doom their project

**Spencer 10** [Domestic Policy Subcommittee Of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee Tuesday, April 20, 2010 Jack Spencer, Senior Research Fellow, Nuclear Energy Policy, Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, khirn]

Limited loan guarantees can help overcome some near-term financing obstacles, but they are subsidies. If not used prudently, **they will only act to prop up non-competitive industries.** Furthermore, **if they are not accompanied by policy reforms, they would simply magnify the uncertainty**, and thus the risk to taxpayers, caused by the underlying policies that make private financing difficult to attain in the first place. Tolerable to a Degree The clean energy loan guarantee program, under which the nuclear program resides, was created in 2005 to help move new clean energy sources toward market viability. A limited loan guarantee program that allowed industry and government to share risk while working through some remaining issues (such as waste disposal and unpredictable regulation) is appropriate. Expansive loan guarantee programs, however, are fraught with problems. At a minimum, they create taxpayer liabilities, give recipients preferential treatment, and distort capital markets. Further, depending on how they are structured, they can remove incentives to decrease costs, stifle innovation, suppress private-sector financing solutions, perpetuate regulatory inefficiency, and encourage government dependence. President Obama's expansion would transform the limited program into a much broader one that threatens to **institutionalize the inefficiencies** that subsidies create. Most basically, the program diminishes the incentive to reform problematic regulations and policies, such as the prolonged and unpredictable permitting process, because the loan guarantee protects investors against the risk posed by those policies. Instead of providing a near-term transition from an unstable past to a viable future during which policy reforms would take place, the expanded loan guarantee program would simply perpetuate the systemic inefficiencies and risk that gave rise to the need for the subsidy in the first place.

##### Loan guarantees distort capital markets - undermine the economy overall by distorting private investment. Government loans incentivize investors not to evaluate projects because of the government’s backing – this undermines higher quality projects and is exactly what Flyvbjerg describes

**de Rugy, 12** – senior fellow of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University (Veronique, “A Guarantee for Failure: Government Lending Under Sec. 1705”, 7/18, [http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/de-Rugy-Testimony.pdf)//DH](http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/de-Rugy-Testimony.pdf%29/DH)

Loan guarantee programs can also have an impact on the economy beyond their cost to taxpayers because malinvestment—the misallocation of capital and labor—may result. In theory, banks lend money to the projects that represent the greatest likelihood of success, in terms of loan repayment, profits, and economic growth. However, since there isn’t an infinite amount of capital available at a given interest rate, loan guarantee programs could redirect resources from politically neutral projects to politically motivated ones. Think about it this way: When the government reduces a lender’s exposure to fund a project it wouldn’t have funded otherwise, it reduces the amount of money available for projects that would have been viable without subsidies.

This government involvement can distort the market’s signals further. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, regardless of the merits of the projects. This takes capital away from unsubsidized projects that have a more viable business plan and a better probability of success without subsidies. As the GAO noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will siphon private capital away.” 26

## 2ac Disad

##### Romney will win because Obama’s approval ratings are too low – makes their impacts inevitable

**Talgo, 9/16/12 –** commentator for Neon Tommy, a Los Angeles-based news source sponsored by the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism covering breaking news (Tyler, “Why Romney Will Win The Election” <http://www.neontommy.com/news/2012/09/why-romney-will-win-election>)

Given the post-convention polling bounces, some may give Obama the advantage at this stage of the race, although the bounces are subsiding. For example, new NBC/WSJ polls of three swing states have Obama leading Romney by 49 to 44 percent in Florida and Virginia, and by 50 to 43 percent in Ohio. However, when we take a closer look at the numbers, a different story is revealed. In the Florida and Virginia polls, Democrats were oversampled by 5 percent, and in Ohio they were oversampled by 10 percent. Not convinced? Here’s another fact: recent CBS/NYT/Quinnipiac polls oversampled Democrats by nine percent in Florida and by eight percent in Ohio. The Florida poll had Obama at 51 percent and Romney at 45 percent, and the Ohio poll had Obama at 50 percent and Romney at 44 percent; so, both leads were smaller than the oversampling gap. If you ask me, the advantage here clearly goes to Romney; and, believe me, these are not the only examples.

All of this is revealed in the context of a time in which Republicans are much more enthusiastic than Democrats. Last month the number of Americans who consider themselves Republicans was the highest ever recorded since 2002 at 37.6 percent, compared to only 33.3 percent who consider themselves Democrats.

So, assuming that all else is equal, what does it mean when a national poll says something like 47 percent for Obama and 44 percent for Romney, or vise versa? The nature of the missing 10 percent is one of the most important factors that come to play in all presidential reelection campaigns. Historically, the final results in an election are almost always worse than polling suggests for an incumbent president. If you took the undecided vote, according to Gallup, from every general election since 1964 that featured an incumbent president seeking reelection, 89 percent of it went to the president’s challenger. You can bet that the Obama camp understands that a 47-44 poll in its favor is not good news at all. This is why it’s virtually unheard-of for an incumbent president to win reelection when he's polling below 50 percent.

##### The debates and labor statistics will determine the election

**Lombardo, 9/12**/12 - Global CEO, StrategyOne (Steve, “Why This Election Comes Down to Two Days in October,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-lombardo/election-monitor-why-this\_b\_1877815.html)

Several national polls released this week show that President Obama received a small but meaningful bounce after the conventions. The bounce -- in the 3-5 point range -- is within the median for convention bounces since 1964. The problem for Republicans is that Romney got no bounce from his convention. In fact, his vote share likely shrunk a point or two in the last two weeks. While the Republican convention may have strengthened Romney's position with the base, it did little to expand his coalition. The momentum from "You didn't build that" has been halted. ¶ However, we see nothing in the data yet to suggest this is anything but a dead heat. For all the hand wringing over the GOP convention and the Romney campaign they are in a dead heat with an incumbent President with 55 days to go. When you look at likely voters in key swing states, this thing is truly 50/50. ¶ Here is our take as of 12 a.m. EST: ¶ The murder of Ambassador Stevens and the unrest in Libya will thrust both candidates into the foreign policy fray. It will be very interesting to see how each handles the coming hours and days and how much the media -- and ultimately voters -- focuses on the issue.¶ Look for a higher level of advertising spend from the Romney campaign in key battleground states over the next two weeks. History has shown that the candidate who is clearly in the lead by mid to late September will likely be the winner in November. That doesn't mean things can't change in October -- they can. But sentiment will start to firm up in the next two weeks. The Romney campaign has a $60 million cash-on-hand advantage, and they should use it now. Team Obama defined Romney in the spring using their cash advantage; the Romney campaign should not wait until October. They need to change the dynamic before October 1.¶ The two biggest dates of the campaign are October 3rd and October 5th. The first debate will be held on Wednesday, October 3rd at the University of Denver at 9 p.m. EST. For three reasons this will be far and away the most important debate:¶ It is the first and therefore, unless there is a major blunder, is likely to be the one that sets the image of Romney in stone.¶ We really do not believe that the other two will matter if Romney has a poor debate performance here. Romney has to win this debate pure and simple.¶ This one is purely on domestic policy, i.e. the economy. If Romney can't win this one, he is unlikely to win the other two, barring a miscue by the President.¶ On October 5th at 8:30 a.m. EST the Bureau of Labor Statistics will release the September unemployment numbers. This will be the most impactful announcement of the campaign. If the unemployment rate goes up it could be devastating for the president's reelection chances. Similarly, if it goes down -- especially if it goes below 8 percent -- it may pretty much secure an Obama victory in November.¶

##### Gridlock inevitable with any election outcome

Curry, 9/11/12 - NBC News national affairs writer (Tom, NBC Politics, “Romney election could create new scenario for EPA and coal,” <http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/11/13807749-romney-election-could-create-new-scenario-for-epa-and-coal?lite>)

Whether Mitt Romney or Barack Obama wins the presidential election, a congressional impasse in 2013 seems likely. That’s because under most conceivable election scenarios – with Romney or Obama in the White House, and with either Democrats maintaining their Senate majority, or the Republicans taking it – the minority party could use the filibuster threat to block proposals it opposed.

##### No matter who wins the election congress will stay deadlocked and business as usual will prevent any major policy change

McManus 8/23/12 (Doyle – Columnist for the LA Times, “The political forecast? Grim”, The Los Angeles Times, August 23 2012, Lexis) AC

There are plenty of things not to like about this year's presidential campaign, including how nasty and negative a mud fight it's become, with both sides engaging in shameless distortion.¶ But here's the worst thing about this presidential campaign: No matter what happens on election day, there's little hope of a good outcome.¶ For most of the last four years, Washington has been mired in political gridlock, deadlocked between Republicans who want to slash government and keep taxes low and Democrats who are willing to trim government a bit but also want to raise taxes on the affluent.¶ That deadlock has sent us careening toward one fiscal cliff after another. It's made it virtually impossible for Congress to do anything more ambitious than writing short-term spending bills that merely kick the can down the road.¶ One purpose of elections is to break that kind of deadlock and send politicians a message about what direction voters want them to go. That's what happened in 2008, when President Obama won a mandate to pursue his vision of an activist government -- and again in 2010, when voters decided that Obama had gone too far and handed the House of Representatives to Republicans.¶ But this year? It's unlikely voters will deliver a clear message.¶ The presidential polls have been balanced around the 50% mark for months. Strategists in both parties say the outcome is likely to be a squeaker. The morning after election day, the winner, whoever he is, will declare that voters have given him a ringing mandate to do whatever he promised -- but it won't be true. Polls show that on most of the major issues the candidates are arguing about -- tax rates, the size of government, the repeal of Obama's healthcare plan -- the public is divided.¶ Even worse, Congress is likely to remain deadlocked as well. The most recent forecast by Charlie Cook, the dean of congressional election soothsayers, suggests that the Senate will end up around 50-50, too close for either party to control with ease. In the House of Representatives, Cook projects that Democrats could gain as many as eight seats, but that's far short of the 25 they need to take control away from Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio).¶ In the absence of a clear-cut victory for either side, we face two possible scenarios.¶ In one outcome, Obama narrowly wins reelection and spends at least two years wrestling with truculent conservatives in the House, who will be determined to stand in his way as never before.¶ In the other, Romney narrowly wins election and spends at least two years wrestling with truculent conservatives in the House, who will interpret his election as a popular mandate for a tea party program whether it is or not. He could have a Democratic Senate to wrestle with as well.¶ The almost inevitable result? More gridlock. Neither Obama nor Romney has much of a track record negotiating with wily legislators. Obama tried to work out a fiscal "grand bargain" with Boehner last year, but the effort collapsed in a flurry of finger-pointing that made both men look weak. Romney's single term as governor of Massachusetts produced one major piece of legislation, his 2006 healthcare law, but he has since renounced that kind of bipartisanship. Many of his other proposals went nowhere because he had a CEO's aversion to bargaining with the state Legislature, according to "The Real Romney," a biography by Boston Globe reporters Michael Kranish and Scott Helman.¶ Could anything change these doleful projections?¶ If either party wins a landslide and a genuine mandate, sure. Or if Obama emerges from the campaign with a new set of Clintonesque negotiating skills. Or if the militants of the tea party are chastened by a narrow Republican presidential win and a loss in the Senate. But none of those things seems likely -- especially a chastened tea party.¶ Polls show that most voters don't want a rigidly ideological government of either left or right; they want practical problem-solving somewhere in the center, even if they aren't sure where that center should be. When the Pew Research Center asked voters this year if they wanted "political leaders who are willing to make compromises in order to get the job done," a whopping 80% said yes -- including 68% of Republicans.¶ But the rules of American politics are stacked against centrists and compromisers these days. Obama won in 2008 partly by promising a post-partisan agenda, but his own liberal instincts and the opposition of Republicans got in the way; he's not making that promise anymore. And Romney never made it.¶ In a discussion among voters sponsored by the Annenberg Public Policy Center this month, a group of suburban Milwaukee women -- one of the potential swing groups in this election -- sounded disappointed in both presidential candidates and in the political system as a whole.¶ "In 2008 ... I was real into it, but this year I'm not really into it," said Michelle Wilke, 38, an electrical assembly worker who was laid off from her job at Harley-Davidson in 2009. "I just have a feeling that no matter what happens, it's not going to change."¶ She's probably right.

##### Doesn’t matter – jobs outweigh

Mike Shedlock, 7-31-2012; registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management, “Is global trade about to collapse? Where are oil prices headed? A chat with Mish Shedlock by James Stafford” http://energybulletin.net/stories/2012-07-31/global-trade-about-collapse-where-are-oil-prices-headed-chat-mish-shedlock

Oilprice.com: You just mentioned that we don’t know who the next president is going to be and sticking to this topic how big an impact do you see energy prices having on this year's presidential elections? Mish: I don’t think energy prices are what's on people's minds. What's on people's minds right now are jobs. Oil prices have kind of stabilized and in the very short-term they are likely to stay stable unless there are some dramatic results in the Mid-East or a dramatic slowdown in the US economy. Both are possible, but a major US slowdown is arguably more likely. Regardless, I think energy prices are going to be a minor election issue.

**No extinction**

**O’Neill 4** O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport*,* professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

##### The plan is key to self-sufficient forward operating bases

Ackerman, 11 [Spencer, February 18th, Latest Pentagon Brainstorm: Nuke-Powered War Bases, Wired. Com. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/nuke-bases/]

Buried within Darpa’s 2012 budget request under the innocuous name of “Small Rugged Reactor Technologies” is a $10 million proposal to fuel wartime Forward Operating Bases with nuclear power. It springs from an admirable impulse: to reduce the need for troops or contractors to truck down roads littered with bombs to get power onto the base. It’s time, Darpa figures, for a “self-sufficient” FOB.¶ Only one problem. “The only known technology that has potential to address the power needs of the envisioned self-sufficient FOB,” the pitch reads, “is a nuclear-fuel reactor.” Now, bases could mitigate their energy consumption, like the [solar-powered Marine company](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/afghanistans-green-marines-cut-fuel-use-by-90-percent/) in Helmand Province, but that’s not enough of a game-changer for Darpa. Being self-sufficient is the goal; and that requires going nuclear; and that requires … other things.¶ To fit on a FOB, which can be anywhere from Bagram Air Field’s [eight square miles](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/u-s-afghan-mega-base/) to dusty collections of wooden shacks and concertina wire, the reactor would have to be “well below the scale of the smallest reactors that are being developed for domestic energy production,” Darpa acknowledges.¶ That’s not impossible, says Christine Parthemore, an energy expert at the Center for a New American Security. The Japanese and the South Africans have been working on miniature nuclear power plants for the better part of a decade; Bill Gates has [partnered with Toshiba](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8582692.stm) to build mini-nuke sites. (Although it’s not the most auspicious sign that one prominent startup for modular reactors [suspended its operations](http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nuclear-startup-nuscale-suspends-operation/) after growing cash-light last month.) Those small sites typically use uranium enriched to about 2 percent. “It would be really, really difficult to divert the fuel” for a bomb “unless you really knew what you were doing,” Parthemore says.¶ But Darpa doesn’t want to take that chance. Only “non-proliferable fuels (i.e., fuels other than enriched uranium or plutonium) and reactor designs that are fundamentally safe will be required of reactors that may be deployed to regions where hos tile acts may compromise operations.”¶ Sensible, sure. But it limits your options: outside of uranium or plutonium, [thorium](http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/12/ff_new_nukes/) is the only remaining source for generating nuclear fuel. The Indians and now the Chinese have experimented with thorium for their nuclear programs, but, alas, “no one has ever successfully found a way” to build a functioning thorium reactor, Parthemore says, “in a safe and economical manner.”

Solves effective peacekeeping

Mosher et al., 8 (David E., Senior Policy Analyst @ RAND, Green Warriors: Army Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations from Planning Through Post-Conflict, RAND)

The environment may also be important during the post-conflict phase of an operation,9 or even before combat operations end. Providing clean water, managing sewage, or providing irrigation water can be important for convincing the local populace to support the U.S. mission **and not an insurgency**, according to some commanders.10 Although these are not traditional Army missions, they can have an important effect on the outcome of an operation, from both a military and a political perspective. Addressing legacy problems can also help **a new government develop legitimacy and can enable U.S. forces to withdraw from the country sooner.** Indeed, many of the goals of stability operations defined in the 2006 edition of JP 3.0, Joint Operations, can have environmental components. Operational effectiveness can be hampered by poor environmental practices or helped by good ones. Logistics requirements and costs can be reduced by good practices, for instance, applying technologies to **reduce operational requirements for petroleum, oil,** and lubricants (POL) or field water treatment systems, or reducing acute threats to soldier health. Good environmental practices can also reduce the resources that must be diverted to address environmental issues. Commanders may also want to reduce or prevent liabilities, either financial or diplomatic. Good environmental awareness and practices during contingency operations can reduce the financial liabilities the Army and the United States may face. On more than one occasion in recent operations, contractors have removed hazardous wastes from base camps and, without Army knowledge, dumped them along the side of a road or in other inappropriate locations, sometimes to avoid disposing of them properly or to sell the drums that hold the wastes. These actions have created cleanup costs for the Army that are many times higher than the original price of the contract. In other cases, the Army has had to spend large sums to remediate serious preexisting environmental contamination at base camps, expenses that could have been avoided if the base camps had been located elsewhere. Financial liabilities can also arise from claims brought by U.S. soldiers who believe they were exposed to hazardous substances, as the Army’s past experiences with Agent Orange and Gulf War Illness illustrate. 11 Members of the local populace may also bring claims against the Army for environmentally related damage, draining funds that could be more effectively used for reconstruction or stabilization activities. Inadequate attention to environmental issues can also create diplomatic liabilities. Illegal dumping by contractors and poor waste management practices by soldiers have caused immediate diplomatic problems with host nations whose support has been critical. Long-term diplomatic problems from environmental problems can also emerge years after an operation is over. Perhaps most important are the environmental issues that can affect U.S. national objectives, those strategic political and economic objectives that U.S. leaders established when they committed forces to the contingency operation in the first place. One such national objective may be winning and maintaining support of the local populace. Although environmental conditions may be poor and national environmental laws may be weak or nonexistent, our research indicates that locals often care deeply about the environment, which can be critical to their survival, livelihood, and well-being. Vital environmental issues can include access to clean drinking water, effective sewage systems, and viable farmland (see Box 1.1). Restoring or building these basic infrastructures is often essential for the economic and social development necessary for stability. To the extent that such projects improve cooperation with locals, they can lower security risks, improve intel- ligence, and speed reconstruction. National objectives that have environmental components also include preserving natural resources that have important economic value (such as oil fields or fisheries) and even preserving cultural resources that are a matter of national, regional, religious, or cultural pride. If long-term stability of a country is a mission objective, sustainability and the long-term health of nbatural systems, including watersheds, forests, ecosystems, biodiversity, and farmlands, are also important. Local customs and practices can take the place of laws, and therefore military leaders, when designing plans and conducting operations, should understand how the local people interact with their environment. The environmental components of national objectives are often seen as falling outside the normal conception of the military mission. Because they have little to do with combat operations or military objectives, they are often not taken into consideration during the Army’s planning, training, or operations. Yet ignoring these broader political objectives **can lead to failure**, as Prussian military writer Carl von Clausewitz warned.12 Thus, the environmental dimensions of national objectives should be carefully considered. The manner in which the military conducts its operations can affect environmental outcomes upon which the success of the overall mission may depend. There is some evidence that national objectives such as stabilizing societies after conflict are now being emphasized at the Army’s combat training centers, but the degree to which environmental considerations are included is unclear.

**Global nuclear war**

Dean 95 [Jonathan, former ambassador to NATO, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, p. google]

IN ANY EVENT, in a world of interconnecting COMMUNICATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL, TRADE, AND FINANCIAL LINKS, the United States, a leading industrial trading country that needs access to raw materials and markets, usually ends up paying in one way or another when a major regional conflict erupts. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, it is impossible for the United States to avoid some degree of involvement when major regional conflicts break out. FOR 200 YEARS, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN URGING LIBERTY, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, FREE MARKET VALUES, VOLUNTARY MUTUAL AID AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY ON THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THE UNITED STATES IS THE SOLE SURVIVING WORLD-CLASS POWER, WITH MILITARY STRENGTH AND GNP FAR LARGER THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY. AS A RESULT, when large-scale conflict erupts, the United States cannot avoid being called on for help, as it was in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Haiti. For the United States to seek to stand aside or to respond only weakly in such cases is to risk damage to its credibility AND WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE. PRESIDENT CLINTON JUSTIFIED THE NATO BOMBING OF SERBIAN POSITIONS IN BOSNIA AND THE U.S. INVASION OF HAITI BY SAYING THAT THE CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. WAS AT STAKE, AS IT WAS. IT IS TRUE THAT PAST ADMINISTRATIONS USED SIMILAR ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM LONG AFTER IT WOULD HAVE BEEN WISE TO WITHDRAW. NONETHELESS, WHEN THE COLLECTIVE DISAPPOINTMENT OF WORLD OPINION OVER THE BEHAVIOR OF THE UNITED STATES (OR OF ANY MAJOR COUNTRY) BECOMES INTENSE AND ENDURING, IT BEGINS TO UNDERMINE THE INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AND STANDING OF THE ENTIRE NATION CONSIDERABLE DIMINUTION OF U.S. STATURE AND INFLUENCE HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST FOUR OR FIVE YEARS IN CONNECTION WITH FALTERING U.S. POLICIES TOWARD BOSNIA, SOMALIA, AND RWANDA. FORTUNATELY, AMERICANS ARE NOT SPARTANS, ROMANS OR PRUSSIANS-SELF-DISCIPLINED MILITARISTIC PEOPLES WHO CONSIDERED IT A MATTER OF NATIONAL PRIDE NOT TO RECOIL FROM CONFLICT BECAUSE OF CASUALTIES AMONG THEIR FORCES. HOWEVER, IF THE TRENDS CONTINUE THAT UNDERLIE THE PUBLIC OUTRAGE THAT FOLLOWED THE DEATH OF U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SOMALIA, AND U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS CONTINUE TO ABSTAIN FROM PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THEY COULD ENTAIL CASUALTIES, THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT LONG REMAIN A WORLD POWER. If U.S. national prestige declines further under conditions like these, the U.S. capacity to constructively influence the course of events without the use of force will decrease. And when force must be used, the United States may have to use more of it to be effective. EXPERTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD EXPECT GROWING POPULATION PRESSURES AND INCREASING ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS TO DEVELOP OVER THE COMING DECADES INTO INTENSE, FAR-REACHING SOCIAL UNREST AND REGIONAL CONFLICT. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS THE SOLUTION, HOWEVER SLOW AND UNCERTAIN IT MAY BE IN COMING. BUT the world also needs effective regional conflict-prevention procedures. Left on its own, regional violence can lead to **confrontation** and even **war between the great powers**, including the United States, AS MIGHT OCCUR, FOR EXAMPLE, in the event of conflict between Ukraine and Russia or between China and its neighbors. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, unchecked regional violence and the fear of further violence will lead **more states to develop nuclear weapons**. IN PAST DECADES, this process occurred in Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, IRAQ, and PRESUMABLY, IN North Korea. A world with 20 or 30 nuclear weapon states would not only make a more effective global security system impossible, it would lead the present nuclear weapon states to modernize and increase their weapons-and it would markedly increase the vulnerability of the United States to direct attack. Instead of SHRUGGING AT HUMAN FALLIBILITY, accepting war as inevitable, AND REACTING AFTER IT HAPPENS, U.S. policy should aim at establishing an international peacekeeping system that can head off an increasing number of conflicts. CONSEQUENCES IF THIS REASONING IS ACCEPTED, THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD DECIDE ON AND PUBLICLY DECLARE AN EXPLICIT LONG-TERM POLICY OF JOINING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN SEEKING A GRADUAL LOWERING OF THE LEVEL OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE WORLD THROUGH PREVENTING A GROWING PROPORTION OF POTENTIAL WARS AND CURTAILING WARS WHEN THEY DO OCCUR. This goal would be achieved by building an increasingly effective worldwide network of regional conflict-prevention and peacekeeping organizations headed by a more effective United Nations.

## 2ac Disad

##### Thorium expansion inevitable – the only relevant question is who will lead the process

**Martin, 12** [May 8th, Richard, A contributing editor for Wired since 2002, he has written about energy, for Time, Fortune, The Atlantic, and the Asian Wall Street Journal, editorial director for Pike Research, the leading cleantech research and analysis firm, former Technology Producer for ABCNews.com, Technology Editor for The Industry Standard (2000-2001), and Editor-at- Large for Information Week (2005-2008), recipient of the “Excellence in Feature Writing" Award from the Society for Professional Journalists and the White Award for Investigative Reporting, Educated at Yale and the University of Hong Kong, , “SuperFuel: Thorium, the Green Energy Source for the Future”, ISBN 978—0»230-116474]

IT IS, OF COURSE, NOT THAT SIMPLE. I came to realize fairly soon that the tone of the Energy from Thorium forum—geeky, high minded, theoretical, and naive—characterized the thorium movement as a whole. It seemed clear that a small band group of advocates, however committed, had little chance of influencing national energy policy or turning the giant battleship of the nuclear industry. “The nuclear industry has zero incentive to shift to a new fuel cycle,” Charlie Hess told me. A long-time executive at the architectural engineering firm Burns & Roe, Hess spent 30 years building and operating nuclear plants. Although he is a prototypical member of the nuclearati, he is an advocate of alternative nuclear power, including thorium-based reactors, and a critic of the nuke-power establishment. Fuel costs for uranium reactors are less than half a cent per kilowatthour. “They spend more on security guards than they do on fuel,” Hess told me. “Frankly they don’t care.” That was made clear to me by John Rowe, the CEO of Exelon, the country’s number one producer of nuclear power, when I pulled him aside after a speech at a National Press Club luncheon in Washington, DC. When I asked about the possibility of shifting to thorium as a primary nuclear fuel, he assured me that there “will be alternatives across the entire fuel cycle.” But inexpensive uranium works just fine for Exelon, which has a market capitalization (the total value of its outstanding shares) of $28 billion and made $18.6 billion in revenue in 2010. If it’s not broke, don’t fix it—and nuclear tycoons like John Rowe have convinced themselves that the nuclear power industry is not broken. From the perspective of his office suite, that’s certainly true: Rowe made $10.3 million in 2010, and between 2006 and 2011, his compensation totaled $153.9 million. Uranium reactors have been good to nuclear power executives. Rowe’s dismissive attitude embodies the obstacles that face the thorium movement, which is composed of outsiders. “Look, the nuclear industry in the U.S. is very conservative,” Ambassador Thomas Graham told me. “I can see interest here in the U.S. gradually developing. But it’s not going to happen here first.” Graham, a longtime diplomat and opponent of nuclear proliferation who served as President Bill Clinton’s special representative for arms control, now chairs the board of Lightbridge, a company based in McLean, Virginia, that is developing solid fuel thorium rods for conventional reactors. While Graham foresees the use of thorium in the American nuclear power industry at some point, “the initial deployments,” he said, “are going to be abroad.” Abroad. In the three years I’ve been covering the thorium movement, almost every conversation has at some point included that stipulation. The United States, which dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan at the conclusion of World War II, pioneered nuclear power, built the first commercial power reactors, and invented the liquid-core reactor and first proved that thorium could be used in power-generating reactors, is, barring some unforeseen and unlikely shift in energy policy, almost certainly destined to be a laggard in the worldwide thorium revolution. France is the world’s largest producer of nuclear power and supplier of uranium for reactors. Eighty percent of its electricity comes from nuclear power, and the energy giant Areva has an active thorium R&D program and is investigating the possibility of building Liquid fluoride thorium reactors by 2032. The Laboratoire de Physique Subatomique et de Cosmologie in Grenoble is the only facility in the world that has the resources and backing needed to actually develop a commercial LFTR by 2022. The Rei nuclear research institute in the Czech Republic is a leader in the development of MSRs and is investigating the possibility of fueling MSRs with thorium, according to the institute’s director.6 Norway, which has an estimated 180,000 tons of thorium reserves, is embarking on an ambitious long-term nuclear power program that includes the construction of thorium-fueled reactors. In Brazil, which has the world’s second-largest thorium reserves and began research into thorium power in the 1960s, R&D efforts have recently begun again to develop thorium-fueled solid fuel reactors. By far the most active thorium power programs, however, are in Asia, particularly in the emerging economic superpowers of India and China. In February 2011, China officially announced that it will start a program to develop a thorium-fueled molten salt nuclear reactor, taking a crucial step toward replacing coal with nuclear power as a primary energy source. The program was announced at the annual conference in Shanghai of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and is headed by Jiang Mianheng, son of the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin and the holder of a Ph.D. in electrical engineering from Drexel University. The People’s Republic has no intention of falling behind in the race for the next great energy source. The world’s most ambitious thorium power program, though, is in India, which has the world’s largest thorium reserves. India exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1974 in defiance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and it has always viewed nuclear energy — in both warheads and power reactors, as a key element of national sovereignty. The country has embarked on a three-phase program to build as many as 60 reactors, converting them to run on thorium before 2032. I will detail the Indian and Chinese programs in chapter 7 and the implications for the United States in the conclusion. Here it is enough to quote the 2011 film The Ides of March, in which the progressive presidential candidate, played by George Clooney, declares, “Either we’re going to lead the world or we’re going to bury our heads in the sand.” The question of thorium is not whether it will become a major source of energy—it will—but when—and where and who will lead the way.

##### global nuclear power expansion is inevitable and will be based on uranium– the most comprehensive source proves

**Amano, 12** [Yukiyo, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, International Status and Prospects for Nuclear Power 2012, <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC56/GC56InfDocuments/English/gc56inf-6_en.pdf>]

C.2. Prospects in Countries considering the Introduction of Nuclear Power 41. Since the mid-2000s, developing countries have expressed a new or renewed interest in nuclear power. While the Fukushima Daiichi accident caused some countries to change their positions and some to take a ‘wait and see’ approach, interest continued among countries considering or planning for nuclear power introduction. 42. Table C-2 shows the number of countries at different stages of nuclear power consideration or development. Sometimes referred to as ‘nuclear newcomers’, some countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt and Vietnam, have in fact been planning for nuclear power for some time. Others, such as Poland, are reviving the nuclear power option after plans had been curtailed when governments and public opinion changed. Countries such as Jordan and Uruguay are considering or planning for nuclear power for the first time. What they have in common is that they are all considering, planning or starting nuclear power programmes, and have not connected a first nuclear power plant to the grid. TABLE C-1. Positions of countries with operating nuclear power plants plus Lithuania Category Number of countries New unit(s) under construction with more planned/proposed 11 New unit(s) under construction but the policy for more units is not established 2 No units under construction but with plans/proposals for building new unit(s) 10 No units under construction, and currently no plans/policy for building new units 4 Firm policy not to build new units and/or for closure of existing units 4 TABLE C-2. Positions of countries without operating nuclear power plants8 Description of group Number of Countries 2012 Number of Countries 2010 Number of Countries 2008 Considering a nuclear programme to meet identified energy needs with a strong indication of intention to proceed 14 14 14 Active preparation for a possible nuclear power programme with no final decision 6 7 7 Decided to introduce nuclear power and started preparing the appropriate infrastructure 6 10 5 New nuclear power plant ordered 3 2 0 New nuclear power plant under construction 0 1 1 43. Of the 29 countries considering or planning for nuclear power in 2012, 10 are from the Asia and the Pacific region, 10 are from the Africa region, 7 are in Europe (mostly Eastern Europe) and 2 are in Latin America8 Two additional groups were included in previous editions of this publication but not in this edition because they did not add substantially to an understanding of the rising expectations for nuclear power among developing countries. One group included countries that were not planning to introduce nuclear power but were interested in considering the associated issues, but it proved difficult to characterize trends and there were wide fluctuations in the numbers from year to year. A second group included countries where an invitation to bid to supply a nuclear power plant had been prepared, but this proved problematic because of countries that were choosing to order plants through direct bilateral agreements rather than through bids. GOV/INF/2012/12-GC(56)/INF/6 Page 10 44. Even after the Fukushima Daichii accident, some countries have taken concrete steps toward nuclear power introduction. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in 2011, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation invited bids for uranium, conversion and enrichment for the fuel for the UAE’s first reactors. In Turkey, the project company Akkuyu Nukleer Santral Elektrik Uretim filed applications for construction permits and a power generation licence. Belarus signed a contract with the Russian Federation for the construction of two reactors, and Bangladesh signed an intergovernmental agreement with the Russian Federation, also for two reactors. Vietnam signed a loan agreement with the Russian Federation regarding financing of its first nuclear power plant and announced its intention to undertake a similar agreement with Japan. 45. The Islamic Republic of Iran began commissioning of its first nuclear power plant at Bushehr in September 2011, which marked the commissioning of the first nuclear power plant in a ‘newcomer’ country in 15 years. 46. The rate at which new countries joined the list of countries operating nuclear power plants was fairly steady through the early 1980s as shown in Fig. C-1. Until the addition of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2011, only three countries had connected their first nuclear power plants to the grid in the post-Chernobyl era — China, Mexico and Romania. The countries now planning for their first nuclear power plants are doing so after an experience gap of 15 years. Of the countries considering or planning for their first nuclear plant, 9 have explicitly expressed target dates for the first operation before 2030. FIG. C-1. Number of countries operating, or having operated, nuclear power plants. Source IAEA (PRIS) 47. Overall, Tables C-1 and C-2 are consistent with trends reflected in the Agency’s low and high projections described below, i.e. there remains substantial uncertainty in projections about nuclear power, and the growth in the use of nuclear power is projected to be driven more by expansion in established nuclear power countries than by countries starting nuclear power programmes. The 9 countries that have explicitly expressed target dates for the first operation before 2030 lie between the 7 countries in the Agency’s low projection that would connect their first plant by 2030 and the 16 countries that would do so in the high projection. GOV/INF/2012/12-GC(56)/INF/6 Page 11 C.3. Potential Drivers for the Introduction of Nuclear Power 48. The key factors that have driven rising interest in nuclear power since about 2005, and the increase in construction starts shown in Fig. B-1, have not changed with the Fukushima Daiichi accident: growing energy demand, especially for electricity; volatile fossil fuel prices; environmental pressures and energy security concerns.

**Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, economic concerns, and nuclear security**

**Graham 2007** (Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html, WEA)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

**NATO resilient**

**Hendrickson 2007** – political science professor at the University of Eastern Illinois (Ryan, Parameters, 37.1, “The miscalculation of NATO’s death”, EBSCO, WEA)

Besides these three major crises, the NATO allies faced serious political differences during the ColdWar over European defense spending levels, the Vietnam War, Germany’s Ostpolitik foreign policy approach, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, the American military invasions of Grenada and Panama, the deployment of new American cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, and the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative, among a host of issues.24 Many of these differences evolved around how to confront the external enemy and were not tertiary to alliance interests; rather these issues hit at NATO’s political core; its raison d’être. Thus, it is a stretch to be nostalgic about NATO’s “commonly” shared vision during the Cold War. NATO’s history is replete with profound transatlantic differences and internal debates, which the allies overcame. Recent analysts have failed to recognize NATO’s history of discord, and how the alliance adapted to quite profound internal crises, much like it is attempting to do today. While there is no guarantee that NATO will fully overcome its current diplomatic challenges, NATO’s ability to successfully address transatlantic discord suggests a pattern of dispute resolution and effective adaptation.

**NATO impacts outdated—no longer key**

**Schmidt 07** John R. Schmidt is the senior analyst for Europe in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, served as director of the NATO office at the State Department and as director for NATO affairs at the National Security Council, “Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11,” Washington Quarterly, Winter, 2007

The real problem is that the United States does not really know what it wants from NATO. It continues to perceive the alliance through what is essentially a Cold War prism, as the key mechanism through which the United States attempts to project influence in Europe. The successes of the NATO enlargement process, which addressed genuine security concerns among newly freed former Communist states, and of NATO involvement in the Balkans have only helped to sustain this perception. Current U.S. efforts to give NATO a more global reach also reflect the same perception of NATO preeminence, with the alliance moving out from its European core to embrace the wider world. It is undeniably a grand vision, but it is also clearly at odds with reality. The notion of giving pride of place to a military alliance made sense during the Cold War, but it does not make sense today when the most critical threats are more varied and diffuse. NATO is of limited use as a diplomatic actor, which is why the United States has never really used it in this capacity. Other vehicles and partners are preferred for U.S. diplomatic activity, the EU increasingly among them, and this is unlikely to change. Even in the military sphere, NATO is no longer the primary instrument of choice and has at best only a circumscribed, if still important, role to play.

**Peacekeeping is key to prevent Balkan war**

Crane, 2(Conrad, “Facing the Hydra: Mainiting Strategic Balance While Pursuing a Global War Against Terrorism,” Strategic Studies Institute)

Consequently, one result of the global war on terrorism **will undoubtedly be to increase American involvement in peace operations** such as those in the Balkans. At the same time, there is no sign that current peacekeeping missions can go away without adverse strategic impacts. Understanding this reality, the QDR Report states that “these long-standing commitments will, in effect, become part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.”22 Unless soldiers continue to perform security and nation-building tasks in the Balkans, the recent increases in ethnic violence can **easily escalate again into full-scale war.**23 The Bush administration has reassured NATO allies that the United States will not prematurely pull out of these Balkan missions, although Rumsfeld has proposed reductions of all peacekeepers in Bosnia “because the police work there has begun to strain armies needed to fight terrorism.”24 He would also like to withdraw American troops from the multinational observer force in the Sinai Peninsula.25 These peace operations remain very important for **regional stability**. Even while the Army initiates new operations against terrorism, it should be wary of any calls to endanger these peacekeeping missions to provide resources for the new war. Even before September 11, however, Army force structure was under severe strains from the demands of peace operations. SSCs are particularly hard on certain active duty “high demand/low density” units in the Quartermaster and Transportation branches. Recent deployments have revealed additional significant shortfalls in Civil Affairs personnel and intelligence capabilities. Extensions of the Balkan missions have highlighted more inadequacies in the total available number of a variety of other combat support (CS) and combat service support 7 (CSS) units that are distributed between AC and RC. Excessive deployments for SSCs have also had a severe impact on Reserve and National Guard units not accustomed to such use.26 In addition, their availability for support functions and active duty rotations will be severely curtailed by the demands of force protection and homeland security. Future Army missions like those in Bosnia and Kosovo should not be accepted lightly. However, there will be times—even in the midst of the war against terrorism— when national interests will require humanitarian assistance, nation-building, and secure peace operations that **only American military forces can provide**. Effective and efficient “peace-building” efforts must **remain an important element** of any national security strategy. The current situation in Afghanistan highlights again that post-conflict societies can become breeding grounds for crime and terrorism if some sort of order is not imposed. Influential members of Congress have already called for American peacekeepers there, and major newspapers— irrespective of their political inclinations—are advocating a significant U.S. role in nation-building. One project they have proposed is the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s “ring road,” which is so vital to the restoration of trade. This task, especially in such a precarious security environment, is perfectly suited to the capabilities of the U.S. Army and its engineers.27 To prevent peacekeeping assignments from **dragging on** and tying up scarce assets, the Army and supporting agencies must become better at nation-building. Though the Bush administration, as well as the Army leadership, remain reluctant to accept such a mission, long-term solutions to create a more stable world will require the United States to perform it. Only the Army—not the Air Force, Navy, or Marines—can really do it in an environment of questionable security. Success in stabilization operations and strategic success in the war against terrorism will **be closely linked** because of the cause-effect relationship that 8 exists between them. The Army should be daunted by—and prepare for—the responsibilities it might assume to help stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan and other countries after bin Laden and his supporters are rooted out. This effort should be accompanied by the development of appropriate doctrine for such peace-building missions. Though the U.S. burden in these operations can be lessened by relying as much as possible on allied participation, there is no substitute for the presence of ground forces from the most powerful nation in the world to reassure friends, sustain coalitions, and deter potential adversaries. If stability in a region such as the Balkans is determined to be a vital American interest, then it cannot be allowed to **return to chaos** because of the distractions of the war on terrorism

##### Balkans instability causes world war

Paris, 2 (Rolan, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at University of Colorado, Political Science Quarterly “Kosovo and the metaphor war,” Volume 117)

Since the early part of the twentieth century, when instability in the Balkans drew in the great powers and provided the spark that ignited World War I, the region has been widely known as a powderkeg. In 1947 for instance member of the International Cour of Justice noted that the Balkans had been so often described the “powder-keg of Europe”51 Today, the term continues to be attached to the region’s politics, conuring up memories of the origins of World War I.52 The meaning of the powderkey metaphor is straightforward: The Balkans can explode at any time, and the resulting conflagration can spread to the rest of Europe; preventing such an explosion is vital to the continent’s, and perhaps even American, security. When Clinton described Kosovo as a powderkeg, he warned that the Kosovo conflict might spill over not only to surrounding Balkan states, but to Europe as a whole; and he insinuated that the United States could be compelled to fight in such a pan-European conflict, just as it did in the World Wars I and II. “As we approach the next century,” he stated on 12 October, during a discussion of the Kosovo situation, “we must never forget one of the most indelible lessons of this one we’re about to leave-that America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe before isolated acts of violence turn into large-scale wars.”53 The translation, if you want to make sure American boys will not have to fight another world war, then support me in my efforts to extinguish the smoldering fire in the Balkan powderkeg, before it is too late.

## 2ac COUNTERPLAN

##### Only congressional action solves – 1ac Cannarra says exclusive staturory authority rests with them – they are the only actor that can directly fund the NRC and create certainty necessary for investment

##### Only congressional action solves – overcomes external resistance

Farley, 07 [Peter, “Cleaner Nuclear Power?”, <http://www.technologyreview.com/news/409099/cleaner-nuclear-power/>]

Nuclear watchdogs say that Thorium Power's technology has real potential. Moreover, they say that the legislation is needed. It would force the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates the nuclear industry, to create new offices at the agencies to study thorium-fuel options and promote their use abroad.   "It makes a lot of sense in my view," says Thomas Cochran, director of the nuclear program at the [Natural Resources Defense Council](http://www.nrdc.org/), in Washington. He says that congressional action is needed to overcome resistance within the DOE to exploring thorium.

##### Congress is key to nuclear power leeadership

Fertel, 05 - Senior Vice President And Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute (Marvin, CQ Congressional Testimony, “NUCLEAR POWER'S PLACE IN A NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY,” 4/28, lexis) //DH

Industry and government will be prepared to meet the demand for new emission-free baseload nuclear plants in the 2010 to 2020 time frame only through a sustained focus on the necessary programs and policies between now and then. As it has in the past, strong Congressional oversight will be necessary to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the federal government's nuclear energy programs, and to maintain America's leadership in nuclear technology development and its influence over important diplomatic initiatives like nonproliferation. Such efforts have provided a dramatic contribution to global security, as evidenced by the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation agreement to recycle weapons-grade material from Russia for use in American reactors. Currently, more than 50 percent of U.S. nuclear power plant fuel depends on converted Russian warhead material. Nowhere is continued congressional oversight more important than with DOE's program to manage the used nuclear fuel from our nuclear power plants. Continued progress toward a federal used nuclear fuel repository is necessary to support nuclear energy's vital role in a comprehensive national energy policy and to support the remediation of DOE defense sites. Since enactment of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE's federal repository program has repeatedly overcome challenges, and challenges remain before the Yucca Mountain facility can begin operation. But as we address these issues, it is important to keep the overall progress of the program in context. There is international scientific consensus that a deep geologic repository is the best solution for long-term disposition of used military and commercial nuclear power plant fuel and high-level radioactive byproducts. The Bush administration and Congress, with bipartisan support, affirmed the suitability of Yucca Mountain for a repository in 2002. Over the past three years, the Energy Department and its contractors have made considerable progress providing yet greater confirmation that this is the correct course of action and that Yucca Mountain is an appropriate site for a national repository. --During the past year, federal courts have rejected significant legal challenges by the state of Nevada and others to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the 2002 Yucca Mountain site suitability determination. These challenges questioned the constitutionality of the Yucca Mountain Development Act and DOE's repository system, which incorporates both natural and engineered barriers to contain radioactive material safely. In the coming year, Congress will play an essential role in keeping this program on schedule, by taking the steps necessary to provide increased funding for the project in fiscal 2006 and in future years. Meeting DOE's schedule for initial repository operation requires certainty in funding for the program. This is particularly critical in view of projected annual expenditures that will exceed $1 billion beginning in fiscal 2007. Meeting these budget requirements calls for a change in how Congress provides funds to the project from monies collected for the Nuclear Waste Fund. The history of Yucca Mountain funding is evidence that the current funding approach must be modified. Consumer fees (including interest) committed to the Nuclear Waste Fund since its f6rmation in 1983 total more than $24 billion. Consumers are projected to pay between $750 million to $800 million to the fund each year, based on electricity generated at the nation's 103 reactors. This is more than $2 million per day. Although about $8 billion has been used for the program, the balance in the fund is nearly $17 billion. In each of the past several years, there has been a gap between the annual fees paid by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants and disbursements from the fund for use by DOE at Yucca Mountain. Since the fund was first established, billions of dollars paid by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants to the Nuclear Waste Fund-intended solely for the federal government's used fuel program-in effect have been used to decrease budget deficits or increase surpluses. The industry believes that Congress should change the funding mechanism for Yucca Mountain so that payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund can be used only for the project and be excluded from traditional congressional budget caps. Although the program should remain subject to congressional oversight, Yucca Mountain appropriations should not compete each year for funding with unrelated programs when Congress directed a dedicated funding stream for the project. The industry also believes that it is appropriate and necessary to consider an alternative perspective on the Yucca Mountain project. This alternative would include an extended period for monitoring operation of the repository for up to 300 years after spent fuel is first placed underground. The industry believes that this approach would provide ongoing assurance and greater confidence that the repository is performing as designed, that public safety is assured, and that the environment is protected. It would also permit DOE to apply evolving innovative technologies at the repository. Through this approach, a scientific monitoring program would identify additional scientific information that can be used in repository performance models. The project then could update the models, and make modifications in design and operations as appropriate. Congressional committees like this one can help ensure that DOE does not lose sight of its responsibility for used nuclear fuel management and disposal, as stated by Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The industry fully supports the fundamental need for a repository so that used nuclear fuel and the byproducts of the nation's nuclear weapons program are securely managed in an underground, specially designed facility. World-class science has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain is the best site for that facility. A public works project of this magnitude will inevitably face challenges. Yet, none is insurmountable. DOE and its contractors have made significant progress on the project and will continue to do so as the project enters the licensing phase. Congressional oversight also can play a key role in maintaining and encouraging the stability of the NRC's regulatory process. Such stability is essential for our 103 operating nuclear plants and equally critical in licensing new nuclear power plants. Congress played a key role several years ago in encouraging the NRC to move toward a new oversight process for the nation's nuclear plants, based on quantitative performance indicators and safety significance. Today's reactor oversight process is designed to focus industry and NRC resources on equipment, components and operational issues that have the greatest importance to, and impact on, safety. The NRC and the industry have worked hard to identify and implement realistic security requirements at nuclear power plants. In the three-and-a-half years since 9/11, the NRC has issued a series of requirements to increase security and enhance training for security programs. The industry complied-fully and rapidly. In the days and months following Sept. 11, quick action was required. Orders that implemented needed changes quickly were necessary. Now, we should return to the orderly process of regulating through regulations. The industry has spent more than $1 billion enhancing security since September 2001. We've identified and fixed vulnerabilities. Today, the industry is at the practical limit of what private industry can do to secure our facilities against the terrorist threat. NRC Chairman Nils Diaz and other commissioners have said that the industry has achieved just about everything that can be reasonably achieved by a civilian force. The industry now needs a transition period to stabilize the new security requirements. We need time to incorporate these dramatic changes into our operations and emergency planning programs and to train our employees to the high standards of our industry-and to the appropriately high expectations of the NRC. Both industry and the NRC need congressional oversight to support and encourage this kind of stability. CONCLUSION Electricity generated by America's nuclear power plants over the past half-century has played a key part in our nation's growth and prosperity. Nuclear power produces over 20 percent of the electricity used in the United States today without producing air pollution. As our energy demands continue to grow in years to come, nuclear power should play an even greater role in meeting our energy and environmental needs. The nuclear energy industry is operating its reactors safely and efficiently. The industry is striving to produce more electricity from existing plants. The industry is also developing more efficient, next-generation reactors and exploring ways to build them more cost-effectively. The public sector, including the oversight committees of the U.S. Congress, can help maintain the conditions that ensure Americans will continue to reap the benefits of our operating plants, and create the conditions that will spur investment in America's energy infrastructure, including new nuclear power plants. One important step is passage of comprehensive energy legislation that recognizes nuclear energy's contributions to meeting our growing energy demands, ensuring our nation's energy security and protecting our environment. Equally important, however, is the need to ensure effective and efficient implementation of existing laws, like the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and to provide federal agencies with the resources and oversight necessary to discharge their statutory responsibilities in the most efficient way possible. The commercial nuclear power sector was born in the United States, and nations around the world continue to look to this nation for leadership in this technology and in the issues associated with nuclear power. Our ability to influence critical international policies in areas like nuclear nonproliferation, for example, depends on our ability to maintain a leadership role in prudent deployment, use and regulation of nuclear energy technologies here at home, in the United States, and on our ability to manage the technological and policy challenges-like waste management-that arise with all advanced technologies.