# 2ac anarchy

### Politics Good – A2 State Bad (1)

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### Radical opposition to the state fails—the perm is key to an effective transition

Deleuze & Guattari 87 [Gilles & Felix, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Paris & psychoanalyst @ La Borde, “How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?”, A Thousand Plateaus, pg. 160-1]

You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of signifiance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. Mimic the strata. You don’t reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying. That is why we encountered the paradox of those emptied and dreary bodies at the very beginning: they had emptied themselves of their organs instead of looking for the point at which they could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the BwO: either one fails to produce it, or one produces it more or less, but because the BwO is always swinging between the surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free. If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged toward catastrophe. Staying stratified – organized, signified, subjected – is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flwos to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a BwO. Connect, conjugate, continue: a while “diagram”, as opposed to still signifying and subjective programs. We are in a social formation; first see how it is stratified for us and in us and at the place where we are; then descend from the strata to the deeper assemblage within which we are held; gently tip the assemblage, making it pass over to the side of the plane of consistency. It is only there that the BwO reveals itself for what it is: connection of desires, conjunction of flows, continuum of intensities. You have constructed your own little machine, ready when needed to be plugged into other collective machines. Castaneda describes a long process of experimentation (it makes little difference whether it is with peyote or other things): let us recall for the moment how the Indian forces him first to find a “place,” already a difficult operation, then to find “allies,” and then gradually to give up interpretation, to construct flow by flow and segment by segment lines of experimentation, becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, etc. For the BwO is all of that: necessarily a Place, necessarily a Plane, necessarily a Collectivity (assembling elements, things, plants, animals, tools, people, powers and fragments of all of these; for it is not “my” body without organs, instead the “me” (moi) is on it, or what remains of me, unalterable and changing in form, crossing thresholds.

#### The 1AC is a timeframe disad to the alternative—we’ve proven nuclear war is inevitable in the status quo—even if the alt solves, it doesn’t solve fast enough

#### No link and no internal link to their impacts—the plan doesn’t collapse capitalism…—it allows for an increase of private involvement and a decrease of government ownership

#### State-centric discourse doesn’t legitimize the state

**Frost 96** – IR Professor, King’s College (Mervyn, Ethics in International Relations, p 89-90, AG)

We are not condemned to critical impotence if we accept that the answer to the pressing normative issues in international relations must necessarily be found within the modern state domain of discourse. Neither does it commit us to the maintenance of the status quo. Accepting the centrality of this domain of discourse does not imply that there can be no non native political theory of world politics. That there has been little normative theorizing in international relations is true enough, but the reasons for this lack are not because working out the "implications of the theory of the state" is a trivial thing to do. The reasons for the lack of normative theorizing have already been covered in chapters 1 and 2. In this section I want to argue that seeking answers within the state centric domain of discourse to the list of pressing questions is a worth-while activity and that far from being a trivial residue of state theory it is of primary importance. What I take to be involved in this endeavour will be elucidated in some detail in the following two chapters. It involves constructing a coherent back- ground theory justifying the settled norms in the modern state domain of discourse. It is necessary to be quite clear about what is, and what is not involved in having recourse to the modern state domain of discourse. The language of this domain is the ordinary language of international relations. This language is a functioning whole - not a completely coherent one - which includes within it a mix of the following terms: state, sovereignty, self-determination, citizen, democracy, human rights (individual rights and group rights), and a set of terms connected to the notion of modernization. Asserting the primacy of the modern state domain of discourse for my purposes does not commit me to holding that people will always live in states as we know them or that life in states, as we know them, is the only proper life for human beings, or that the way states are organized at present is the best way of organizing them. I simply contend that any discussion about what ought to be done in world politics (be the proposed action a small one or a large one such as, for example, the wholesale reor- ganization of the global political system) must be conducted in the language of the modern state system. No other suitable language is available. Viewed in this way, it will become clear that the various objections against the modern state domain of discourse as the ground of normative theory in international relations fall away as misconceived. There are several such objections which must be confronted.

#### Reinforcing the state is strategic—your alternative will either get violently crushed or cause private tyranny

**Chomsky 98** – Prof Linguistics, MIT (Noam, The Common Good, p 84-5, AG)

So Argentina is "minimizing the state"—cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, when you minimize the state, you maximize something else—and it isn't popular control. What gets maximized is private power, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state—even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious: When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent—namely the government—you're simply handing over power to unaccountable private tyrannies that are much worse. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is "expanding the floor of the cage." They understand that they're trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it's under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they're so vulnerable, they'll get murdered. That's something anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so rigid and doctrinaire that they don't understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we're not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

#### The State is inevitable

**Holcombe 5** – Economics Professor, Florida State (Randall, Is Government Inevitable?, http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_09\_4\_5\_controversy.pdf, AG)

Even if the ideological shift for which Stringham and Leeson are hoping were to happen and government were somehow eliminated, the arguments in my original article still apply. Predators would remain and probably grow in strength, just as the Russian mafia has gained strength following the weakening of the government in Russia after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Organizations such as the auto-theft rings now operating in the United States are the predatory building blocks from which more predatory organizations can be built. Unless people had a strong ideological commit- ment to libertarian anarchy—and the rational-ignorance argument shows why they do not—they would offer little resistance and might even welcome the offer when gangs of thieves evolved into mafias proceed to establish themselves as new governments and claim that they will protect citizens from the gangs of predators that will exist with or without government. Thus, as my 2004 article described, if orderly anarchy existed, it would be displaced by government, just as it has been in all the places that Leeson and Stringham describe as historical examples of anarchy (except Somalia, their only current example of anarchy). People believe that government serves a useful function, whether it actually does or not, and that status quo bias, coupled with the reasonably prosperous, peaceful—and even free—conditions that people in developed nations now enjoy, will prevent them from embracing anarchy.

**States are key to preventing genocide**

**Campbell 2001** (Kenneth J.; Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations – University of Delaware)Genocide and the Global Village p. 16

**The preservation and growth of the present liberal international order is a vital interest for all of its members** – states as well as non-states – **whether or not those members recognize and accept the reality of that objective interest**. **Nation-states, as the principle members of the present international order, are the only authoritative holders of violent enforcement powers**. **Non-state actors, though increasing in power relative to states, still do not possess the military force, or the democratic authority, to use military force, which is necessary to stop determined perpetuators of mass murder**. Consequently, nation-states have a special responsibility to prevent, suppress, and punish all malicious assaults on the fundamental integrity of the prevailing international order.

#### Only the state can restrain violent domination—the alt will get crushed by elites and make the problems worse

**Taylor 2k –** Professor of Environmental Ethics, Florida (Bron, Beneath the Surface, p 282-4, AG)

A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who influenced their most influential theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by life in unnatural, hierarchical, centralized, in­dustrial societies) to cooperative behavior. This debatable assumption ap­pears to depend more on radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or anthropology. Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species survival; so also, at times, does aggressive competitiveness. Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for human altruism, it is doubt­ful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of power by selfish and well-entrenched elites. It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments will not vol­untarily cede authority. Any political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely require **"widespread violence** and dislocation." Few bioregional­ists seem to recognize this likelihood, or how devastating to nature such a transi­tional struggle would probably be. Moreover, making an important but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist Daniel Deudney warns: The sizes of the bioregionally based states would vary greatly because bioregions vary greatly. This would mean that some states would be much more powerful than others [and] it is not inevitable that balances of power would emerge to constrain the possible imperial pretensions of the larger and stronger states." Andrew Bard Schmookler, in his critique of utopian anarchism, has raised a kindred concern. In The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution, he criticized anarchists (and their relatively moderate bioregional progeny) for ignoring a specific problem of power. He asked: How can good people prevent being dominated by a ruthless few, and what will prevent hier­archies from emerging if decentralized political self-rule is ever achieved? One does not have to believe all people are bad to recognize that not all people will be good, he argued; and unless bad people all become good, there is no solution to violence other than some kind of government to restrain the evil few. Schmookler elsewhere noted that those who exploit nature gather more power to themselves. How, then, can we restrain such power? There must be a gov­ernment able to control the free exercise of power, Schmookler concluded. Once when debating Green anarchists and bioregionalists in a radical envi­ronmental journal, Schmookler agreed that political decentralization is a good idea. But if we move in this direction, he warned, "There should be at the same time a world order sufficient [to thwart] would-be conquerors." Moreover, "Since the biosphere is a globally interdependent web, that world order should be able to constrain any of the actors from fouling the earth. This requires laws and means of enforcement." Schmookler concluded, "Government is a para­dox, but there is no escaping it. This is because power is a paradox: our emer­gence out of the natural order makes power an inevitable problem for human affairs, and only power can control power." Bioregionalism generally fails to grapple adequately with the problem of power. Consequently, it has little "answer to specifically global environmental problems," such as atmospheric depletion and the disruption of ocean ecosys­tems by pollution and overfishing. Political scientist Paul Wapner argues that this is because bioregionalism assumes "that all global threats stem from local instances of environmental abuse and that by confronting them at the local level they will disappear." Nor does bioregionalism have much of a response to the "globalization" of corporate capitalism and consumerist market society, apart from advocating local resistance or long-odds campaigns to revoke the corporate charters of the worst environmental offenders. These efforts do little to hinder the inertia of this process. And little is ever said about how to restrain the voracious appetite of a global-corporate-consumer culture for the resources in every corner of the planet. Even for the devout, promoting deep ecological spirituality and ecocentric values seems pitifully inadequate in the face of such forces. Perhaps it is because they have little if any theory of social change, and thus cannot re­ally envision a path toward a sustainable society, that many bioregional deep ecologists revert to apocalyptic scenarios. Many of them see the collapse of ecosystems and industrial civilization as the only possible means toward the envisioned changes. Others decide that political activism is hopeless, and prior­itize instead spiritual strategies for evoking deep ecological spirituality, hoping, self-consciously, for a miracle. Certainly the resistance of civil society to globalization and its destructive in­ertia is honorable and important, even a part of a wider sustainability strategy. But there will be no victories over globalization and corporate capitalism, and no significant progress toward sustainability, without new forms of international, enforceable, global environmental governance." Indeed, without new restraints on power, both within nations and internationally, the most beautiful bioregional experiments and models will be overwhelmed and futile.

### Politics Good – A2 State Bad (2)

#### Even if the State is imperfect of *academically* obsolete, we can’t underestimate its centrality. Normative refusal to discuss or work with it is naïve and counter-productive

Dr. Inis Claude is a Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Emeritus, at the University of Virginia. During his teaching career, Professor Claude held positions at the University of Michigan, Harvard University, Columbia University, University of Wales, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague. States and the Global System – 1988

Finally, let us take note of the view that the state is obsolete, or is rapidly becoming so. This is the view of the discouraged student of international relations, who finds states always too small, too big, too weak and too powerful, who fears for the future of a world so divided. It is, however it may be put, primarily a prescriptive or **normative** position, an assertion that the state ***ought*** to be superseded, a plea for the abandonment of international relations. **It does not correspond with what is actually going on in the world,** namely the proliferation and the flourishing of states. The state has its difficulties, but it clearly has not yet gone, or begun to go, out of fashion. The state is a dangerous and troublesome institution; **it is also a valuable and indispensable one. There is no substitute in sight.** For the foreseeable future, man will live in a world of states. We very much need to work at developing a balanced view of states, one that is not distorted by a tendency toward either uncritical adoration or cynical denunciation. We will do well to concentrate on learning to understand and to manage the problems of a multistate system, rather than to rail against the system and to dream of abolishing it.

#### State-based macro-politics can succeed. Even if it can’t, the alternatives are worse.

Bronner 2004 – Stephen Eric, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature and German Studies at Rutgers University, 2004 (Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, Published by Columbia University Press, ISBN 9780231126090, p. 151-153)

Enlightenment thinkers wished neither to abolish the state nor to bring about some utopian alternative. Seeking to constrain the institutional use of arbitrary power, they sought to protect the free exercise of subjectivity and promote the free pursuit of scientific knowledge. The state became the anchor for that enterprise; it was seen as the best institution for securing civil [end page 151] liberties and for furthering social justice. That remains the case. Transnational organizations are, to be sure, required in order to contest emerging transnational economic structures. New ways of establishing and expressing the common interest and a more cosmopolitan outlook will also prove necessary not just in the United States or Europe but also in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Solidarity must surely be reconceived to meet new conditions. But this still does not justify simply dismissing the state or fantasizing about its future disappearance. Confronting an increasingly global society is impossible when indulging in a misplaced romantic nostalgia for the traditional, the organic, and the parochial. The left must overcome its more naïve populist inclinations. This means looking beyond the polis, the town meeting, and even the workers' council.1 Their partisans actually share much in common with the religious and traditional advocates of the organic community. Both seem blind to the dangers involved in dismissing "mechanical" notions of representative democracy with its mass parties, interest group pluralism, separation of powers, and checks and balances. Neither seems willing to confront practical questions of economic coordination, the disappearance of a homogenous citizenry or proletariat, and the implications of an increasingly complex division of labor. Rarely does either consider how local politics fosters patronage, provincialism, and corruption. Bureaucracy is despised for the routine and hierarchy it generates; the importance of an independent judiciary for the preservation of civil liberties is ignored, and little time is wasted on how to maintain acceptable investment or reproduce the conditions for participation in the modern world. Much easier then to condemn the Enlightenment for "severing the organic links that bind humans to their social nature," maintain that all communities should be "left alone," and insist that freedom is not the insight into but rather "the rejection of necessity."2 Arguments of this sort, of course, retreat from engaging the actual conflicts between real movements that continue to shape our world. They are instead content to rest on the belief that "the whole is false," and that the true pursuit of freedom requires an [end page 152] anti-political politics. It is the same with even with more serious radicals who insist that socialism can be conceived only as a utopian "other" in which alienation has been abolished and a world of direct democracy has been achieved.

#### Ignoring the state doesn’t make it go away --- their framework cements the power of the right

Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor – Georgetown Law, New England LR, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751)

The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and vision, creates a political and spiritual void into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered and dispossessed.  [\*762]  To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power.

#### just cause its bad doesn’t mean anything

**KRAUSE AND WILLIAMS 1997** (Keith and Michael, Critical Security Studies, p. xvi)

First, to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion. Second, to move toward alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily reopen the question subsumed under the modern conception of sovereignty and the scope of the political. To do this, one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.

#### Debate about it doesn’t = slavery – it = change

**Donovan and Larkin ’06** - (Clair and Phil, Australian National University, *Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1)

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified, becoming a 'slave social science' (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide **clear and useful insights** that practitioners can successfully use, making - or perhaps remaking - a political science that 'directs research efforts to good questions and enables incremental improvements to be made' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to make this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

#### Change outside the state fails – state would reinforce status quo which crushes solvency

**Milbrath ’96** (Lester W., Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Sociology – SUNY Buffalo, Building Sustainable Societies, Ed. Pirages, p. 289)

In some respects personal change cannot be separated from societal change. Societal transformation will not be successful without change at the personal level; such change is a necessary but not sufficient step on the route to sustainability. People hoping to live sustainably must adopt new beliefs, new values, new lifestyles, and new worldview. But lasting personal change is unlikely without simultaneous transformation of the socioeconomic/political system in which people function. Persons may solemnly resolve to change, but that resolve is likely to weaken as they perform day-today within a system reinforcing different beliefs and values. Change agents typically are met with denial and great resistance. Reluctance to challenge mainstream society is the major reason most efforts emphasizing education to bring about change are ineffective. If societal transformation must be speedy, and most of us believe it must, pleading with individuals to change is not likely to be effective.

#### Alternative to engagement fails and degenerates in nuclear war for the sake of change

Shaw 1 [Review of International Studies, The unfinished global revolution: intellectuals and the new politics of international relations, <http://nationalism.org/library/science/ir/shaw/shaw-ris-2001-27-04.pdf>]

The new politics of international relations require us**,** therefore**,** to go beyond the anti-imperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognize three fundamental truths. First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non- Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction—despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will become a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact.International institutions are being extended, and (like it or not) they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalized Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave dependsfirst on how well it is consolidated in each national context—but second**,** on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived**.** First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organizations and civil society as ends in themselves.Theymust aim to civilize local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratizing local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war**.**84Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence**.** (To put this another way: the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally**.** We need these power networks, but we need to tame them too,to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held.85 It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. This is not a separate problem:social and economic reform is an essential ingredient of alternatives to warlike and genocidal power; these feed off and reinforce corrupt and criminal political economies. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratize it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop international political interventions, legal institutions and robust peacekeeping as strategic alternatives to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid**.**86 As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon**.** We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western and other governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions**.87** What I have outlined is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into partial defeat, or degenerate into new genocidal wars—perhaps even nuclear conflicts.The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.

#### Alternatives fail and recreate violent exclusion

**Englhart 03** - Neil A., Assistant Professor of Government and Law at Lafayette College, (“In Defense of State Building: States, Rights, and Justice,” *Dissent*, Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite, p. 18)

State failure has become an increasingly important policy concern since 9/11. Strengthening or reconstructing failed states has even become an explicit goal of American foreign policy. Yet many Americans across the political spectrum regard states with deep suspicion and abiding hostility, as instruments of oppression. In truth, states are more likely to protect human rights than any other form of political organization. Acknowledging that potential is today a moral and political imperative. The evil that states do is well known. There are abundant examples: from the brutality of the Thirty Years War to the Stalinist purges, the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, and the Rwandan genocide. Because its repressive capacities are so clear, political theorists seek to protect us from the state (Locke), to divide and limit its power (Madison), to liberate us from it (Marx), or to dissolve it entirely (Foucault). Yet Hobbes’s picture of life without the state— poor, nasty, brutish, and short—still resonates. States can only be called oppressive if there is an alternative available, a more promising political order. States dominate our minds as much as they dominate the globe. The conceptual hegemony of the state is so great that there has been little serious thinking about alternative arrangements. Anarchist visions may sound liberating, but only because they assume that life under anarchy would be much like it is now—only better. In fact, anarchists depend on the very order they seek to abolish, assuming that people will be treated as free and equal, able to make uncoerced choices outside the protection of the state. Their utopian visions set the parameters of critiques of the state, but they seldom recognize that the necessary substructure of their utopia doesn’t exist “nowhere”— it exists only where states have established law and order. In real life, the alternatives to the state are more violent, more coercive social and political orders dominated by warlords and gangs. Not quite the Hobbesian war of all against all, they are rather wars of group against group, dividing society and destroying the possibility of a peaceful public sphere, of civil society, rights, and social justice. The corollary to the oppressiveness of non-state politics is that, contrary to our commonsense understanding, states are relatively liberating and egalitarian. Compared to actually existing alternatives, states have more potential for protecting human rights, human security, and international peace than any other political order. That’s why state building is so important.

#### Grassroots activism fails

Stoker 6– Professor of Politics, University of Manchester (Gerry, “WHY POLITICS MATTERS: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK”, 2006, Pg. 114-115)

There can be little doubt that the democratic world would be less rich and less open without the impact of this activism. However, there are a number of limitations to both its nature and scale. Although there is evidence of activists' influence and capacity to hold governments and business to account, the scale of activists' activities should not be overplayed; they are too few in number and restricted in membership to have the resources to achieve all their objectives. Two criticisms may also be made of the way they bring citizens into the political process. First, as Jan Aart Scholte argues, civil society institutions' often fall short on democratic credentials in their own behaviour' and some 'have been run with top-down managerial authoritarianism that stifles internal debate dissent' :38

Some advocates who have claimed to speak for the grass roots have actu­ally rarely ventured into the field. On the contrary, a number of jet-setting staff have lost touch with their notional beneficiaries as they fly from one global conference to the next.39

Some of the organizations involved are fronts for governments, or corpora­tions, families, political parties and foundations. Even those which are prop­erly autonomous are often not clear about how their leaders emerged and where their policy positions came from: the democratic credentials of these civil society organizations or networks cannot always be taken for granted. Global civil society in particular is often the preserve of professional activists.

Second, these organizations rely on the mass media - TV, radio and the press - to get their message out into the wider political world, and are prone to offer a rather simplistic understanding of political issues. As protest has got more global so the media appears to play a bigger and bigger part in getting the protesters out on the street and keeping the protest going. Protest as such has become as much a part of the world of spin and media manipu­lation as the more traditional practices of politics. The priorities of mobi­lization demand simple, easy messages, not an in-depth understanding of complex issues. As Martin Shaw points out, the argument over the Iraq War in 2003 showed how millions could respond in support of the simple demand to 'Stop the War' , but had little to say about what to do in the aftermath or whether leaving Saddam in power would have been better. We can draw the conclusion that

[A] mass demonstration is a blunt instrument. In an intense crisis, which poses one seemingly simple question above all others, such a movement allows large numbers of people to offer an answer and influence the more conventional political process ... but when issues become more complex ... this kind of movement becomes less relevant.

The mass mobilization runs out of steam, and a more specialized politics takes over once the energy and commitment of protesters can no longer be sustained. The problem with this kind of engagement is that it offers only an 'over-simplified politics':40 the engagement stops precisely at the moment that politics is designed to deal with, when conflicts are not clear cut and solutions are not obvious.

Protest movement politics can degenerate into a form of *identity politics.* People protest as a lifestyle statement because it tells us something about them rather than making any sustained contribution to the political process. Marilyn Taylor is right to argue that 'wearing the "t" shirt and identifying with campaigning organizations can still be an important form of political 'expression and identity' , but it is a limited and constrained form of engage­ment. Protest politics has an important place, and for a small group of activists it can provide an intense and extensive base for engagement. For most citizens, however, it provides just another opportunity to say what they care about and reinforce a sense of identity - one that they can take up or leave as they please.

### Politics good – A2 Security Studies

#### Engagement is better

**WALT 91** (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A third reason for decline was the Vietnam War. Not only did the debacle in Indochina cast doubt on some of the early work in the field (such as the techniques of “systems analysis” and the application of bargaining theory to international conflict), it also made the study of security affairs unfashionable in many universities. The latter effect was both ironic and unfortunate, because the debate on the war was first and foremost a debate about basic security issues. Was the “domino theory” accurate? Was U.S. credibility really at stake? Would using military force in Indochina in fact make the U.S. more secure? By neglecting the serious study of security affairs, opponents of the war could not effectively challenge the official rationales for U.S. involvement. The persistent belief that opponents of war should not study national security is like trying to find a cure for cancer by refusing to study medicine while allowing research on the disease to be conducted solely by tobacco companies.

#### Engagement with state policy is critical to influence the government and prevent war

**Walt ’91** (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are **more likely to blunder into disaster,** because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well place to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations that produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence. Assuming they perform these tasks responsibly, academics will have a positive-albeit gradual-impact on how states deal with the problem of war in the future.

#### Their framework wrecks education and you shouldn’t believe any of their arguments related to the alternative – it ignores empirical realities

**Jentleson, 02** (Bruce, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, International Security 26.4 (2002) 169-183, projectmuse)

To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance—too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it. [1](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/international_security/v026/26.4jentleson.html#FOOT1) The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap." [2](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/international_security/v026/26.4jentleson.html#FOOT2) The [End Page 169] events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conversations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'être. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum." [3](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/international_security/v026/26.4jentleson.html#FOOT3) Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the academic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self-servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued.

# 2ac top level

#### Every study of credible social theories concludes consequentialism is good---Scientific studies of biology, evolution, and psychology prove that deontological proclivities are only illogical layovers from evolution

**Greene 2010** – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### We get to weigh the 1ac against the critique- key to wrestle energy policy out of the hands of the technocratic elite

**Kuzemko 12** [Caroline Kuzemko, CSGR University of Warwick, Security, the State and Political Agency: Putting ‘Politics’ back into UK Energy, <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2012/381_61.pdf>]

Both Hay (2007) and Flinders and Buller (2006) suggest that there are other forms that depoliticisation can take, or in the terminology of Flinders and Buller ‘tactics’ which politicians can pursue in order to move a policy field to a more indirect governing relationship (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). For the purposes of understanding the depoliticisation of UK energy policy, however, two of Colin Hay’s forms of depoliticisation are most useful: the ‘… offloading of areas of formal political responsibility to the market…’ and the passing of policymaking responsibility to quasipublic, or independent, authorities (Hay 2007: 82-3). 1 What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which they can serve, over time, to reduce political capacity by removing processes of deliberation and contestation, thereby reducing the ability for informed agency and choice. In that politics can be understood as being inclusive of processes of deliberation, contestation, informed agency and collective choice the lack of deliberation and capacity for informed agency would result in sub-optimal politics (Hay 2007: 67; cf. Gamble 2000; Wood 2011; Jenkins 2011). There seems little doubt that, with regard to energy as a policy area, the principal of establishing a more indirect governing system had become accepted by UK political elites. One of the very few close observers of UK energy policy from the 1980s to early 2000s claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity market. Competition and 1 "These"forms"are"referred"to"elsewhere"by"the"author"as"‘marketised’"and"‘technocratic’"depoliticisation"(Kuzemko" 2012b:").liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the political agenda…. (Helm 2003: 386) 2 As already suggested this paper considers the intention to depoliticise energy to have been reasonably successful. By the early 2000s the Energy Ministry had been disbanded, there was little or no formal Parliamentary debate, energy was not represented at Cabinet level, responsibility for the supply of energy had been passed to the markets, it was regulated by an independent body, and the (cf. Kuzemko 2012b). Furthermore, the newly formed Energy Directorate within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which now had responsibility for energy policy, had no specific energy mandates but instead mandates regarding encouraging the right conditions for business with an emphasis on competition (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 107). As feared by various analysts who write about depoliticisation as a sub-optimal form of politics, these processes of depoliticisation had arguably resulted in a lack of deliberation about energy and its governance outside of narrow technocratic elite circles. Within these circles energy systems were modelled, language was specific and often unintelligible to others, including generalist politicians or wider publics, and this did, indeed, further encourage a high degree of disengagement with the subject (cf. Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2012b; Stern 1987). Technical language and hiring practices that emphasised certain forms of economic education further isolated elite technocratic circles from political contestation and other forms of knowledge about energy. Arguably, by placing those actors who have been elected to represent the national collective interest at one remove from processes of energy governance the result was a lack of formal political capacity in this policy field. It is worth, briefly, at this point reiterating the paradoxical nature of depoliticisation. Whilst decisions to depoliticise are deeply political, political capacity to deliberate, contest and act in an issue area can be reduced through these processes. Depoliticisation has been an ongoing form of governing throughout the 20 th century it may (Burnham 2001: 464), however, be particularly powerful and more difficult to reverse when underpinned by increasingly dominant ideas about how best to govern. For example Hay, in looking for the domestic sources of depoliticisation in the 1980s and 1990s, suggests that these processes were firmly underpinned by neoliberal and public choice ideas not only about the role of the state but also about the ability for political actors to make sound decisions relating, in particular, to economic governance (Hay 2007: 95-99). Given the degree to which such ideas were held increasingly to be legitimate over this time period depoliticisation was, arguably, genuinely understood by many as a process that would result in better governance (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15 cf. Hay 2007: 94; Kern 2010). This to a certain extent makes decisions to depoliticise appear both less instrumental but also harder to reverse given the degree to which such ideas become further entrenched via processes of depoliticisation (cf. Kuzemko 2012b: 61-66; Wood 2011: 7).

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship

**Sharpe**, **10** [Matthew, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University,, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233]

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies.

In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also always in danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology.

We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a **multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory** that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

# 2ac Cuomo

Alt doesn’t solve

### 2ac a2 positive peace

#### Nuke war outweighs structural violence – prioritizing structural violence makes preventing war impossible

Boulding 78 [Ken, is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354]

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most dangerous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, advancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peace

#### War turns structural violence

Bulloch 8

Millennium - Journal of International Studies *May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595*

Douglas Bulloch, IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science.

He is currently completing his PhD in International Relations at the London School of Economics, during which time he spent a year editing Millennium: Journal of International Studies

But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

**War turns structural violence not vice versa**

**Goldstein 2001** – IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

**Preventing nuclear war is the absolute prerequisite to positive peace**

Folk, 78 Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College [Jerry, “Peace Educations – Peace Studies : Towards an Integrated Approach,” Peace & Change, volume V, number 1, Spring, p. 58]

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### No link—massive negative peace focus now, they have to prove we make it uniquely worse

#### No link—we don’t say that structural violence isn’t bad or important—the perm also resolves this

#### No link—preventing direct conflicts doesn’t define peace as the absence of war

**Cuomo 96 –** professor of philosophy and women’s studies, Cincinnati (Chris, War Is Not Just an Event, Women and Violence, Hypatia 11.4, http://www.ccuomo.org/War23.htm, AG)

I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, tech­nocratic states.' Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the impor­tance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts.

#### No solvency—structural violence is inevitable—the alt has no mechanism to solve

#### Turn—the case is a gateway to the alt

**Folk 78** – Peace Studies Professor, Bethany College (Jerry, Peace Education-Peace Studies Programs, Peace Change 5.1, AG)

Those proponents of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and educators coming to the field from the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided there will be no world left in which to build positive peace. Moreover, the blanket condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution, disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts to change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

#### All forms of violence are bad

**Kent 93** – PolSci Professor, Hawaii (George, Analyzing Conflict and Violence, http://www2.hawaii.edu/~kent/ANALYZ3.html, AG)

Some analysts reserve the term violence only for direct, physical violence. The view advocated here, however, is that defining violence broadly (as doing harm to others in the pursuit of one's own preferences), creates space for drawing the distinction between direct and structural violence, for comparing them, and for exploring their interrelationships. At the conceptual level, there is no reason to suggest that one type of inflicting of harm is more important than another. The question of which is more important in practice is an empirical question, one whose answer depends on the criteria used.

#### Nuke war threat is real and o/w structural and invisible violence---their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive omnipresence makes preventing war impossible

Ken Boulding 78 is professor of economics and director, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1978), pp. 342-354

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of **wor**ld poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by **downgrading the study of inter- national peace**, labeling it "**negative peace**" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "**structural violence**," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, **the concept of structural violence was broadened**, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that **the problem of nuclear war had receded** into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and **diverted conflict and peace research** for ten years or more **away from problems of disarmament and stable peace** toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It **has not been able to prevent an arms race**, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that **war, the breakdown of** Galtung's "**negative peace,"** remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore **if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong**. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peace.

## 2ac war inev/militarism

#### No risk of “endless warfare”- we should embrace pragmatism in security

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### The aff controls the only scenario for conflict escalation – the k doesn’t access a war impact

**Kaufman, 09**[Stuart J, professor of political science and international relations at the university of Delaware, “ Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434]

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

# 2ac prolif orientalism

Thinking in terms of the other is good and not racist

Bulley 4 (Dan, PhD Candidate @ Department of Politics and International Studies--University of Warwick, "Ethics and Negotiation," [www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/politics/events/aber/ethics%20and%20negotiation%20-%20bulley.doc](http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/politics/events/aber/ethics%20and%20negotiation%20-%20bulley.doc))

 Crucially an openness to justice cannot be an a priori good thing. Indeed, like the future, one can say it can only be “anticipated in the form of an absolute danger.” As incalculable and unknowable, an unconditional openness to the future-to-come of justice risks the coming of what he calls the “worst.” The most obvious figures of this “worst,” or, “perverse calculation,” are atrocities such as genocide, Nazism, xenophobia, so-called ‘ethnic cleansing.’ These we can and must oppose or prevent. But why? Why only these? Derrida states that what we can oppose is only those “events that we think obstruct the future or bring death,” those that close the future to the coming of the other. We can oppose this future-present (a future that will be present) coming then on the basis of the future-to-come (a future with no expectation of presence). Or to put it in terms of the other, **we can oppose those others who prevent our openness to other others**. Such was the ideology of National Socialism in its desire to entirely negate the Jews. We have a duty to guard against the coming of such a theory or idea. Why? Because such an other closes us to the other; a future that closes the future. However, if, as Derrida says there is no ultimate way of judging between our responsibility for others, as “Every other (one) is every (bit) other,” whose calculation can we say is perverse, or the ‘worst’? Why are we responsible to victims rather than the perpetrators of atrocities if both are equally ‘other’? Who makes this decision and how can it be justified? Levinas suggests that our “being-in-the-world” our being-as-we-are, is **only conceivable in relation to, and because of, the other**. **Thus the death of the other calls our very being into question**. **Ethics in this sense precedes ontology as our responsibility to the other precedes our own being**. We may say then that our commitment is to those that accept the other as other, that allow the other to be. There is a danger though that this becomes foundational, treated as a grounding principle outside traditional modernist ethics on which we can build a new ‘theory of ethics’. This is not the value of Derridean and Levinasian thinking however. What makes their different ways of thinking the other interesting is not that they are absolutely right or ‘true,’ but rather that they take traditional ethical thinking to its limit. Whether or not a Jewish tradition is privileged over Greek, they remain within the bounds of Western metaphysics. Derrida’s “responsibility [to the Other] without limits,” does not escape this, establishing itself unproblematically as a ‘ground’ outside traditional thinking. Rather, his thinking of the ethical shows that we can think these things differently, while still accepting the exigency to prevent the ‘worst’. There can be no ultimate foundation for what we think is the worst. And such a foundation cannot come from outside Western metaphysics. Limit thinking is not an immovable basis for judgement of the worst, and this is why it is so dangerous and troubling. The non-basis of judgement is rather the desire to stay as open as possible, while recognising that a judgement necessarily closes. The goal is for our closure to have the character of an opening (closing the future-present to allow the future-to-come), but it nevertheless remains a closure. And every closure is problematic.

Thorium is a step away from US militarism – link turns the K

Puplava, 11 [President, Chief Investment Strategist at PFS Group,” Kirk Sorensen States Thorium a Million Times More Energy Dense than Fossil Fuels“ <http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/james-j-puplava/kirk-sorensen-thorium-a-million-times-more-energy-dense-than-fossil-fuels>]

Kirk: (2:14) Yeah, I’d be happy to talk about that, and forgive me for maybe getting into a little bit of history, I love history, but it helps tounderstand why these things happened**.** You know, thorium and uranium were both discovered as elements in the late 1800s. And nobody really thought there was anything special out them until Marie Curie discovered that they were radioactive. And again, nobody understood what that meant. But in 1939, as you mentioned, the process of nuclear fission was first discovered by a chemist named Otto Hahn in Germany. And it was a totally new idea that you could actually split an atom release all this energy. And because this was discovered right at the beginning of World War II the obvious question was, can we use this to make an explosive? And that was the origin of the Manhattan project. They looked at uranium and uranium has two isotopes. One of which is uranium 235 and that is naturally fissile, you don’t have to do anything to it to make it fission. So that was the beginning of one kind of effort in the Manhattan project to manufacture a weapon. And then uranium 238, which was much more common, they found that they could bombarded it with neutrons and create a new element, plutonium, that was also fissile, and you could potentially use it for a nuclear explosive. So that was another line that was taken. And then they looked to thorium and said well could we try the same technique with thorium, and found that, yes, you could bombard thorium with a neutron and create uranium 233 and it was also fissile and could potentially form explosives. But there were certain severe drawbacks in the practicality of trying to use uranium 233 as a weapon. And so the attention focused overwhelmingly on separating the uranium isotopes and on converting some of that uranium into plutonium. Those were two directions that were taken during the Manhattan Project. And they resulted in the Hiroshima bomb, which was a uranium 235 bomb and the Nagasaki bomb, which was a plutonium bomb. After the war was over, the overwhelming concern of the US Atomic Energy Commission was to replenish our stockpile of nuclear weapons, which after Nagasaki, was depleted. We didn't have any more weapons, and that was one of the biggest security secrets in the United States at that time. We had to replenish that supply and so all the effort was put into creating materials intended for weapons. And because uranium and plutonium had shown themselves to be more amenable to that type of work than thorium, the work on thorium was neglected. It was only as we moved into the ‘50s that the idea of making electrical power from nuclear energy began to take prominence, and so because the uranium plutonium technologies were more understood, and considered a safer bet, that was where the bulk of the effort in the earlier atomic power program went, was to uranium and plutonium. Although at that time there was a small and beginning effort to investigate thorium, which as in turns out, has some very superior properties when your goal is to make nuclear power rather than to make nuclear weapons.

#### Prolif impacts outweigh the K and flip ethics

Ford 11 [Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," [www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658](http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658)]

First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “Have nots” have surely always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them. It seems pretty unusual, however, for non-possessors to articulate such understandable envy and resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon.¶ One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.”¶ The argument that nuclear weapons are “special,” however, is a two-edged sword. Perhaps they are indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “unfair” to compel sharing or disarmament. Such an argument, however, sits only awkwardly – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time. (If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless, however, it may be appropriately hard to abolish them.)¶ More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique” in that it is this very specialness that seems to rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, nuclear weapons have introduced **existential questions** about the future of human civilization which **utterly swamp** the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition**.** No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity**,** making nuclear weapons – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.¶III. Implications¶ Let me be clear about this. The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession may yet speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness” per se – and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is essentially irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed – and it is certainly no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them. (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma. It isn’t really about “fairness” at all.¶ Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with quasi-existential questions potentially affecting the survival of millions or perhaps even billions of people, moreover, it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a **perfectly good solution**. On this scale, one might say, non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution.¶ This, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession. We forget this at our collective peril.¶ Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is so obvious and so compelling if such imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. Skraelings, one imagines, did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal iron weapons; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment.¶ “Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “fairness” is an overrated destination. At least where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play. Let us not forget this.

#### Objective truth is possible – their k isn’t falsifiable

Gary Kamiya, Executive Editor, MA From UC Berkley, actual bio from Salon webpage “Kamiya lives on a street with cable cars with his wife, Kate Moses, and her son Zachary. He likes big cities, '50s paperbacks with gratuitous cleavage on their covers, Steve Young, backpacking, Italy and people who like to talk.” Salon.com 12-6-06

Against Said, who insisted that Orientalism remained frozen in place, Irwin shows that the **field progressed, that knowledge increased.** He believes in the possibility (not always attained, of course) **of objective scholarship**. He argues that academic inquiry is not merely a handmaiden of power, but has its own logic and internal development, and that successive generations of Orientalists criticized, built on and transformed the work of those who came before. "There are such things as pure scholars," Irwin writes. "I have even had tea with a few of them." This view is regarded as sentimental, naive and retrograde in certain circles, but **at least you can argue for or against it on the basis of evidence**. We really do know more about the textual history of the Koran than we did before, for example. Said's radically skeptical position, by contrast, **was so abstract and chameleonic that it was impossible to disprove it**, since it constantly dissolved (and hid behind) a multitude of deconstructive readings. The eminent Middle East expert Fred Halladay made a telling point when he argued that the close literary analysis of texts, Said's specialty and his primary analytic technique in " **Orientalism,** " **may not be applicable to social science.**

#### Even if everything they say is true their K still blows- This card will smoke them

Muhammed A. Al-Da'mi is Professor of English and Linguistics in the College of Languages, Baghdad University.ASQ 9-22-98

Said's "essentialist" framework which traces an omnipresent imperial awareness in every piece of Western writing on the Orient is largely not baseless. But his final accusation is also unfortunate for Oriental cultures at large, and for Oriental histories in particular. The ultimate meaning of Said's and, of course, Meyer's polemic is: every Orientalist is a participant in an Occidental imperial and culturalcampaign to control and exploit the East. I believe, however, that as an intellectual movement, and as a cultural phenomenon, Orientalism - especially literary  **Orientalism** - has been of a considerable meritfor the Orientals. It is useful not because it serves imperial interests, but because it envelops a complex of cultural, personal and hereditary compulsions which are productive and significant for the intelligentsia of the Eastern countries. In spite of their conscious/unconscious **prejudice, Orientalists have offered us foreign perspectives and coercive challenges which have enriched our approaches to our culture and history.** Many examples of clever Eastern writings on Oriental history can be traced to the prejudiced and "suggestive" Orientalist writings. Said's generalization, **no matter how true it is,** could lead to depriving Eastern cultures of this useful (aggressive, impulsive, suggestive) Orientalist challenge. My point is: Said's accusation,that Orientalism supplies agents and expertise to empire,(9) **endangers the uses which the Orientals can make of Orientalist literature.** The accusation could lead to a termination of  **Orientalism** through specifying the imperial motive, and through overlooking the other motivesand compulsions which contributed to the making of the Orientalist effort. His association between Orientalism and imperialism has already led some Orientalists to be embarrassed and hesitant to write on our cultures. This is an undesired result. Nowhere is this fear of " **Orientalism** " more clearly stated than in an American Orientalist's letter to the writer of the present words. Bernard Weiss uncovers a truantfear of the label "Orientalist":

#### Perm solves the K best:

#### Prolif exacerbates inequality—turns the K

Biswas 1 [Shampa Biswas, Whitman College Politics Professor, December 2001, “Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource?, Alternatives 26.4]

At one level, as Partha Chatterjee has pointed out, the concept of apartheid relates to a discourse about "democracy." (49) To use apartheid to designate the unequal distribution of nuclear resources then is also simultaneously to draw attention to the undemocratic character of international relations--or, more literally, the exclusion of a group of people from some kind of legitimate and just entitlement. More specifically, to talk in terms of nuclear haves and have-nots is to talk in terms of a concept of democratic justice based on the "possession" (or lack thereof) of something. "Apartheid," as Sumit Sarkar points out, "implies as its valorised Other a notion of equal rights." (50) But that this something is "nuclear weapons" complicates the issue a great deal. If the vision of democracy that is implicit in the concept of nuclear apartheid implies a world of "equal possession" of nuclear weapons, a position implied in the Indian decision to test, that is a frightening thought indeed. Yet surely even India does not subscribe to that vision of democracy. "Would India," asks Sarkar, "welcome a nuclearised Nepal or Bangladesh?" (51) If Jaswant Singh is serious that "the country"s national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all," (52) then it should indeed support the "equal and legitimate" nuclearization of its neighbors, which is extremely unlikely given its own demonstrated hegemonic aspirations in the South Asian region. (53) Further, if India does indeed now sign the NPT and the CTBT, and sign them in the garb of a nuclear power as it wants to do, what does that say about its commitment to nuclear democracy? Even if India and Pakistan were to be included in the treaties as NWSs, all that would do is expand the size of the categories, not delegitimize the unequal privileges and burdens written into the categories themselves. ¶ Indian military scientists claim that India has now accumulated enough data for reliable future weaponization without explosive testing, and Indian leaders have, since the tests, indicated more willingness to sign the CTBT. India has already voluntarily accepted restraints on the exports of nuclear-related materials, as required by the NPT. According to an Indian strategic analyst with respect to negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the next major arms-control treaty to be discussed in the Conference on Disarmament, "The key question in relation to the FMCT is not if it is global and nondiscriminatory. It is whether India has sufficient nuclear material at hand to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent." (54) If all India ever wanted was to move from the side of the discriminated to the side of the discriminators, so much for speaking for democratic ideals through the symbol of nuclear apartheid. (55) ¶ There are several troublesome issues here with respect to the concept of "nuclear democracy." On the one hand, it seems clear that the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons sits ill at ease with any notion of democratic entitlement. It seems that rather than equalizing the possession of nuclear weapons, **it would be equalizing the dispossession of nuclear weapons that entails a more compelling democratic logic.** (56) On the other hand, there is also the question of the fundamentally undemocratic nature of nuclear weapons themselves. At one level, the sheer scope of such weapons to kill and destroy indiscriminately (a democratic logic here?) renders any laws of 'just war" moot. As Braful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik point out, the very use of nuclear weapons would be to break the principle of proportionate use of force, and such weapons clearly cannot be made to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants as required in the just conduct of war. (57) ¶ In this context, it might be worth pointing to the 1996 ruling by the International Court of Justice at the Hague that stipulated that the "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and, in particular, the principles and rules of humanitarian law." (58) If the regulation of war can be considered a democratic exercise, then nuclear weapons by their very nature make that exercise futile. At another level is the secrecy that has historically and perhaps necessarily accompanied the development of nuclear-weapons programs, relegated to an aspect of the national-security state that is immunized from democratic scrutiny. Chatterjee argues that nuclear weapons involve a technology that is intrinsically undemocratic -- both domestically and internationally -- since the enormous destructive potential that they embody requires a great deal of secrecy and inaccessibility. (59) Itty Abraham's excellent analysis shows how the intertwined emergence of the independent Indian state and the atomic-energy establishment legally foreclosed the democratic and institutional oversight of the entire atomic-energy enterprise because of its proximity to national security. In other words, the state sponsorship and control of nuclear science, and indeed its constitution in and through nuclear science, makes both science and the state susceptible to undemocratic governance. (60)

#### Turns orientalism

Biswas 1 [Shampa Biswas, Whitman College Politics Professor, December 2001, “Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource?, Alternatives 26.4]

Where does that leave us with the question of "nuclear apartheid"? As persuasive as the nuclear-apartheid argument may be at pointing to one set of global exclusions, its complicity in the production of boundaries that help sustain a whole other set of exclusions also makes it suspect. It is precisely the resonances of the concept of apartheid, and the strong visceral response it generates, that gives it the ability to bound and erase much more effectively. In one bold move, the nuclear-apartheid argument announces the place of nuclear weaponry as the arbiter of global power and status, and how its inaccessibility or unavailability to a racialized Third World relegates it forever to the dustheap of history. It thus makes it possible for "Indians" to imagine themselves as a "community of resistance." However, with that same stroke, the nuclear-apartheid position creates and sustains yet another racialized hierarchy, bringing into being an India that is exclusionary and oppressive. And it is precisely the boldness of this racial signifier that carries with it the ability to erase, mask, and exclude much more effectively. In the hands of the BJP, the "nuclear apartheid" position becomes dangerous--because the very boldness of this racial signifier makes it possible for the BJP to effect closure on its hegemonic vision of the Hindu/Indian nation. Hence, this article has argued, in taking seriously the racialized exclusions revealed by the use of the "nuclear apartheid" position at the international level, one must simultaneously reveal another set of racialized exclusions effected by the BJP in consolidating its hold on state power. I have argued that comprehending the force and effect of the invocation of "race" through the nuclear-apartheid position means to understand this mutually constitutive co-construction of racialized domestic and international hierarchical orders.

**We outweigh and turn the K—prolif increases international inequality and suffering**

**Lyman 95** – CFR Senior Fellow in Africa Policy Studies (Princeton, The Real Story of the NPT Negotiations, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/news/950427-389021.htm, AG)

The prospect is chilling. There may be many things wrong with the present treaty, and much that should be fixed. But certainly, the problems of "inequality," lack of security for non-nuclear states, and pressures for further disarmament would not be ameliorated by having the number of nuclear states go from five to ten, or twenty, and for international norms and mechanisms to disappear. I am horrified to see the NPT described as an "apartheid treaty," as if the spread of nuclear weapons was some desirable good to be enjoyed by everyone. **It is in fact the poorer (or more responsible) nations, who cannot or will not spend the billions of dollars to acquire nuclear weapons, that are most threatened by neighbors who would.**

**Non-proliferation isn’t discriminatory**

**Graham 94** – former director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Thomas, 9/13, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/speeches/graham/spnp94gr.htm, AG)

Some charge that the NPT is discriminatory, because it recognizes five nuclear powers while prohibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states. While the NPT reflects the reality that five nuclear-weapon states existed in 1968, it does not legitimize the permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Far from it. Rather, the NPT regime creates a system of shared obligations among its parties: while non-nuclear-weapon states promise not to acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states promise to undertake measures to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In fact, the NPT is the only global treaty that requires all its parties to pursue measures related to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. For the nuclear-weapon states, this provision is clearly aimed at their nuclear arsenals. For its part, the United States has undertaken massive reductions in its nuclear arsenal both as a result of the START I and II treaties as well as unilateral measures and bilateral agreements. In addition, President Clinton called in May of this year for the progressive reduction and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The U.S. is currently destroying approximately 2000 nuclear weapons a year, which is as fast as is technically possible. In addition, I note that yesterday, at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, the IAEA commenced application of safeguards on approximately ten tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby fulfilling the pledge that President Clinton made last September that the U.S. would make available for application of IAEA safeguards HEU and plutonium removed from the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The U.S. anticipates placing additional material under IAEA safeguards, with the initial quantity of plutonium to come under safeguards before the end of the year. All of these initiatives demonstrate unmistakably that the U.S. is serious about its commitments under article VI of the NPT.

**Proliferation is a true threat**

**Harvey 1** (Frank P., a member of a the Canadian International Council, “National Missile Defence Revisited, Again a Reply to David Mutimer,” International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), pp. 347-360, Canadian International Council)

**'Before any argument** supporting NMD **can be taken seriously**, there-fore, **we must accept that a "rogue** state **threat" exists'** (p 340). I couldn't agree more. But this is perhaps the most fascinating of all of Mutimer s assertions because he himself acknowledges the 'facts' of the rogue state threat - and I thought only proponents shared the burden of proving the case for NMD. Consider the following quotes: • The rogue state needs, therefore, to be seen for what it was: the creation of the United States military to justify its claim on resources ... The rogue state, however, is a myth. [It] is not mythical in the sense that it is not real, but rather in the sense that it has been vested with a totemic importance by the United States' (p 344) (emphasis added). • 'Rogues are the enemies that make high levels of military spending legitimate. They are not a lie told by knowing capitalists in an instrumental fashion to hoodwink Congress into passing over-inflated budgets (p 345, n 24) (emphasis added). I am not arguing that the United States fabricated evidence, but rather that it produced a particular frame within which to interpret that evidence' (p 345) (emphasis added). • 'The imagined nature of threats does not mean that there is no real danger or that nothing need ever be done about risks' (p 345). • 'The issue, therefore, is not the evidence but rather how the "facts" are "evidence" of a particular form of threat labelled "proliferation" by actors labelled "rogue"' (p 344, n22). • 'There is, therefore, no need for me to engage in a discussion of the evidence of proliferation assembled, for example, in the Rumsfeld Report to bolster the case for NMD. At issue are not "the facts" but the ways in which those facts are assembled and the interpretation that is given to them' (p 344, n 22). Mutimer s honesty is refreshing but not surprising. **Ballistic missile** proliferation is difficult to deny. **It is a 'real' security threat**, driven by technological progress, the spread of scientific knowledge related to these weapons systems, diminishing costs, ongoing regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, and, most importantly, time.

#### Discussion of technical nuclear strategy is inevitable - their attempts to silence nuclear discourse doesn't solve the problem, it just makes it invisible - this prevents critical response

Chaloupka '92 William Chaloupka, Professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom, 1992, p. 9-10

Both Derrida’s insight and Schwenger’s anecdote invite the opening of a whole realm of oppositional activity, of which only a few examples now exist. The premise of this genre (“speaking unspeakables”), as Derrida claims, may have been best realized before the nuclear era, in the literary texts of Mallarmé, Kafka, or Joyce. But there have been contemporary attempts that nuclear criticism could address.26 One could imagine a comparison, for example, of two highly publicized television films of the Reagan era, “The Day After” and the right-wing response to it, “Amer¬ika.” The level and ferocity of the response suggest that “The Day After” broke a taboo. “Amerika” charges weakness, appeasement, and even col¬laboration, but these charges so completely miss their target that we search for a better interpretation. Perhaps “The Day After” transgressed in a special way, and the only available way of responding was the arcane code of anticommunism. The actual taboo it broke, it broke by speaking at all. At the same time, the activity of finding new ways to read (literary or cinematic) texts about nukes must relate to the broader project of empowering responses if such activity is to fit within the antinuclear schema I am discussing. Leaping over hypothetical psychological diagnoses to speak politically, such a development is not so hard to imagine. “Speaking the unspeakable” has never been a happy entry into activism. Nuclear opponents have adopted any number of rhetorical strategies for overcoming this obstacle. They argue that this “unspeakability” denotes an importance so huge that we must dissolve the reticence and disgust that is our “first reaction.” Or, alternatively, they dissolve their political position into a therapeutic one, implying that the contemporary citizen would be healthier and less conflicted if she would admit and confront the nuclear demon. In either case, the political use of unspeakability produces a paradoxical stance at odds with the naturalism of the survivalist, species-interest position. This unacknowledged (unacknowledgeable) taste for paradox goes even a step further. Having bound themselves in multiple, endlessly and effortlessly proliferating dilemmas, nuclear opponents then announce that it is their goal to impose the condition of “unspeakability” on nuclear managers. The solution to the paradox of nuclear strategy is to silence strategists, such as Caspar Weinberger, who dare to speak of limited nuclear war. This enforced silence has long since ceased to be uncomfortable for nuclear managers, who now clearly understand that their control will proceed more satisfactorily when it is invisible. Opponents, then, have undertaken the odd project of enforcing unspeakability, on the one hand, while also seeking to make nukes visible, thus making them controversial—a topic of conversation.27 Such strategies have a validity, as I will discuss in a later chapter, but it is not necessarily the validity the opponents promote. Just making the artifacts of nuclearism visible isn’t enough; they don’t speak for themselves. These artifacts—whether warheads or power plants—surely offer little help out of the paradox of unspeakability that both veils and unveils them, and all the while also seems to expect a solution. Finding nukes not only “speakable” but “fabulously textual,” nuclear criticism can respond to this odd political situation in part because many more strategic approaches become possible once we move the response to paradox out of an ‘‘unspeakable discourse’’ and into a textual or literary context.

#### Prolif threats real

**Harvey 01** (Frank P., a member of a the Canadian International Council, “National Missile Defence Revisited, Again a Reply to David Mutimer,” International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), pp. 347-360, Canadian International Council)

**'Before any argument** supporting NMD **can be taken seriously**, there-fore, **we must accept that a "rogue** state **threat" exists'** (p 340). I couldn't agree more. But this is perhaps the most fascinating of all of Mutimer s assertions because he himself acknowledges the 'facts' of the rogue state threat - and I thought only proponents shared the burden of proving the case for NMD. Consider the following quotes: • The rogue state needs, therefore, to be seen for what it was: the creation of the United States military to justify its claim on resources ... The rogue state, however, is a myth. [It] is not mythical in the sense that it is not real, but rather in the sense that it has been vested with a totemic importance by the United States' (p 344) (emphasis added). • 'Rogues are the enemies that make high levels of military spending legitimate. They are not a lie told by knowing capitalists in an instrumental fashion to hoodwink Congress into passing over-inflated budgets (p 345, n 24) (emphasis added). I am not arguing that the United States fabricated evidence, but rather that it produced a particular frame within which to interpret that evidence' (p 345) (emphasis added). • 'The imagined nature of threats does not mean that there is no real danger or that nothing need ever be done about risks' (p 345). • 'The issue, therefore, is not the evidence but rather how the "facts" are "evidence" of a particular form of threat labelled "proliferation" by actors labelled "rogue"' (p 344, n22). • 'There is, therefore, no need for me to engage in a discussion of the evidence of proliferation assembled, for example, in the Rumsfeld Report to bolster the case for NMD. At issue are not "the facts" but the ways in which those facts are assembled and the interpretation that is given to them' (p 344, n 22). Mutimer s honesty is refreshing but not surprising. **Ballistic missile** proliferation is difficult to deny. **It is a 'real' security threat**, driven by technological progress, the spread of scientific knowledge related to these weapons systems, diminishing costs, ongoing regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, and, most importantly, time.

Alt doens’t solve prolif   
Huntley – Program Director at the Liu Institute for Global Studies – ‘7 Wade, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Time for New Thinking?, March

Despite its rejection of these premises, the Bush Administration’s alternative nonproliferation paradigm can play a role in helping the material and normative dimensions of the NPT regime adapt effectively to the second nuclear era. In its current articulation, the alternative paradigm is too messianic and self-serving to function as an effective nonproliferation foundation. But its generic recognition of **the political dimension of nuclear proliferation** is overdue. In a more rigorously developed form, this perspective can function as an essential adjunct to the prevailing paradigm’s narrower focus on limiting material capabilities and upholding technical non- discrimination. Drawing on more nuanced understandings of the political and social dimensions of the causes and consequences of proliferation is particularly vital in responding to the emerging conditions of the second nuclear age, in which **abstract strategy matters less** and the broader **threat-making** and symbolic values of nuclear weapons possession **matter more**. Increasing acceptance of and reliance on nuclear threat-making deepens the insinuation of nuclear capabilities into the fabric of international relations in each of the material/security, domestic politics and normative/symbolic domains. Arms control, nonproliferation and the ideal of eventual disarmament require reversing this permeation, which in turn requires elevating conditions of global governance – at both national and international levels – above the mean dictates of anarchy. The prerequisite is both material and normative: good governance means good institutions, but the necessity of consensual acceptance means good institutions cannot be imposed by fiat. The task is necessarily a long one; there are no crusading quick fixes. The United States, as the globe’s preeminent power, can lead this task. But this must be leadership through broad and genuine consensus, not convenient and coerced “coalitions of the willing.” The Bush Administration is not wrong to orient US policy around a vision for a better world. But America’s global friends – and even its adversaries – have vital and necessary roles to play in directing that vision toward more consensual and normatively satisfying aspirations. Then they must join in its quest as well. That would not be a bad measure of “responsibility.