## 1NC

### 1

#### Procurement is not a financial incentive

Czinkota et al, 9- Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Voter for limits and ground—procurement dodges core market controversies and guarantees a market while making us account for every facet of government operations—creates an unmanageable prep burden

#### And, precision—compensation for service might give reason for action but is not an actual incentive

**Grant 2002** – professor of political science at Duke University (Ruth, Economics and Philosophy, 18:2002, “THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES: HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS”, WEA)

The use of `incentives' to speak of market forces is also problematic,¶ though it is easy to see the logic of this development within the language¶ of economics. If one company lowers the price of its product, we might¶ readily say that other companies now have an incentive to lower theirs.¶ But we would not say that the first company offered all other companies¶ an incentive to lower their prices.55 Market forces are not conscious and¶ intentional, and their rationale is intrinsic to the economic process itself.¶ We might just as well say in this situation that the first company's lower¶ price is a good reason for other companies to lower theirs given that they¶ need to remain competitive. The term `incentive' says nothing that¶ `reason' cannot say as well in this case. A similar logic applies to¶ speaking of loan conditions as incentives. The International Monetary¶ Fund may make a loan to a nation only on condition that it alter its¶ inflationary policies. If the reason for the condition is intrinsic to the¶ IMF's own financial aims, `incentive' may be a misnomer. The situation¶ is like that of requiring a certain training as a condition for the practice of¶ medicine; we would be unlikely to refer to this as an `incentive' to go to¶ medical school for people who wish to become doctors.56 When the IMF¶ is criticized for using financial incentives unethically to control the¶ internal policies of borrowing nations, it is because the critics suspect¶ that its real purposes are political rather than strictly limited to the¶ legitimate concern to secure the financial health of the Fund.

The distinction between market forces and incentives can be¶ illustrated further by considering the difference between wages as¶ compensation and incentives as bonuses in employment. Compensation¶ means `rendering equal', a `recompense or equivalent', `payment for¶ value received or service rendered', or something which `makes up for a¶ loss' ± as in the term `unemployment compensation'. Compensation¶ equalizes or redresses a balance, and so, to speak of `fair compensation'¶ is entirely sensible. But to speak of a `fair incentive' is not. An incentive¶ is a bonus, which is defined as something more than usually expected,¶ that is, something that exceeds normal compensation. It is an amount¶ intentionally added to the amount that would be set by the automatic¶ and unintentional forces of the market. An incentive is also a motive or¶ incitement to action, and so an economic incentive offered to an¶ employee is a bonus designed to motivate the employee to produce¶ beyond the usual expectation. It should be obvious then, that compensation¶ and incentives are by no means identical. The per diem received for¶ jury service, for example, is a clear case of compensation which is not an¶ incentive in any sense.

It is not difficult to see how it might have happened that the¶ boundaries were blurred between the specific conception of incentives¶ and conceptions of the automatic price and wage-setting forces of the¶ market. Both can be subsumed under very general notions of the factors¶ that influence our choices or motivate action, and `incentives' carries this¶ general meaning as well. Nonetheless, the blurring of that boundary¶ creates a great deal of confusion. Incentives, in fact, are understood¶ better in contradistinction to market forces than as identical to them. It is¶ only by maintaining a clear view of their distinctive character that the¶ ethical and political dimensions of their use are brought to light.¶ Moreover, conceptual clarity and historical understanding go hand¶ in hand in this case. It should no longer be surprising to find that the¶ term `incentives' is not used by Adam Smith in first describing the¶ operation of the market, but appears instead at a time when the market¶ seemed inadequate in certain respects to the demands presented by¶ changing economic circumstances. Other eighteenth and nineteenthcentury¶ ideas, often taken as simple precursors of contemporary analyses¶ of incentives, can now be seen in their distinctive character as well. For¶ example, Hume and Madison offer an analysis of institutional design¶ which differs significantly from `institutional incentives', though the two¶ are often confused. These thinkers were concerned with preventing¶ abuses of power. They sought to tie interest to duty through institutional¶ mechanisms to thwart destructive, self-serving passions and to secure¶ the public good. Contemporary institutional analyses, by contrast,¶ proceed without the vocabulary of duty or public good and without the¶ exclusively preventive aim. Institutional incentives are viewed as a¶ means of harnessing individual interests in pursuit of positive goals.57¶ Similarly, early utilitarian discussions, Bentham's in particular, differ¶ markedly from twentieth century discussions of incentives despite what¶ might appear to be a shared interest in problems of social control. Again,¶ Bentham is interested entirely in prevention of abuses or infractions of¶ the rules. The rationale for his panopticon is based on the observation¶ that prevention of infractions depends upon a combination of the¶ severity of punishment and the likelihood of detection.58 If the latter¶ could be increased to one hundred per cent, through constant supervision¶ and inspection, punishment would become virtually unnecessary.¶ This is a logic that has nothing whatever to do with the logic of¶ incentives as a means of motivating positive choices or of encouraging¶ adaptive behavior.

### 2

#### Immigration reform package moving smoothly through congress now – Obama pressure and engagement is key to maintain momentum and prevent the GOP from smothering the bill

 I-Hsien Sherwood (writer for the Latino Post) March 21, 2013 “Immigration Reform 2013 News: Delays Could Hinder Reform Bill, So Speed is Necessary” http://www.latinospost.com/articles/14995/20130321/immigration-reform-2013-news-delays-hinder-bill-speed-necessary.htm

Lately, proponents of immigration reform have been optimistic about the progress of bipartisan bills in both the Senate and House of Representatives. But many pitfalls still remain, and the sooner an immigration reform bill emerges from Congress, the greater its chances of eventually passing.¶ In general, the longer a piece of legislation remains before Congress, with its partisan bickering, disparate constituencies and army of lobbyists each pursuing targeted ends, the more easily it is torn apart, poked through with exceptions and slandered in the press. A bill unsheltered is a bill likely doomed.¶ So while some conservatives opposed to immigration reform are raising policy objections, other are attempting a procedural flank.¶ Six Republican senators, led by Jeff Sessions of Alabama, sent a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) demanding that the process move more slowly and senators be given several months to review the bill.¶ In addition, the GOP is still reeling from its resounding loss in last year's presidential election, when 71 percent of Latinos voted to reelect their opponent, President Obama. That sent the Republicans into a bout of soul searching, prompting the latest openness to reform.¶ But that willingness may be short-lived, especially as the lessons of November fade and Congress gears up for primary battles from the conservative right and the Tea Party.¶ The window for reform is short, and the stakes are high, so the potential for heated arguments and tense standoffs increases, further endangering any kind of compromise bill.¶ For now, the Senate's "Gang of Eight" seems to be moving quickly and relatively smoothly toward a proposal, despite delays. They admit they'll miss their first self-imposed deadline at the end of the month, but the White House, which has been keeping the pressure on, says it is still confident they will present a worthwhile bill.¶ "The good news is that the Gang of Eight seems to be making progress. We are engaged with them. We are encouraged by their progress," Cecilia Muñoz, head of the White House Domestic Policy Council, which is spearheading the immigration initiative, said.¶ Whether Congress can maintain momentum on the issue remains to be seen.

**Kyle – insert link**

#### Links to politics

Ebinger, 11 [brookings, Charles Ebinger has more than 35 years of experience specializing in international and domestic energy markets (oil, gas, coal and nuclear) and the geopolitics of energy, with a particular focus on the Middle East, South Asia, Africa., the Arctic and Antarctic. Ebinger has served as an energy policy advisor to over 50 governments on restructuring their state-owned energy sectors, privatization and the creation of regulatory regimes. He is an adjunct professor of electricity economics at Johns Hopkins Nitze School and is one of the Nuclear Energy Institute’s "Nuclear Energy Experts." <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/06/24-petroleum-policy-ebinger>]

One approach that merits detailed examination for the future is whether the SPR might be strengthened by establishing an industrial petroleum reserve (IPR) as called for in the original SPRO legislation. Some countries, such as Japan, Germany and the Netherlands, have joint public-private arrangements for strategic reserves, while in other countries national oil companies manage oil strategic stocks. There are many good arguments for diversifying our oil reserve system either through financial support for commercial stockpiles or by mandating certain reserve inventories to be held by the private sector. Clearly, the private sector might be able to manage the SPR more efficiently and at a lower cost. Likewise because private sector stocks would be dispersed around the country, unique crisis situations hitting some regions more than others could be better managed. Private firms could also be encouraged to hold petroleum products thereby reducing the lead time in drawing down the SPR, getting the crude refined and into the marketplace. The higher costs of storage could be passed onto the consumer; while this would probably be politically unpopular, higher prices might induce more conservation than the current arrangements in which the SPR is funded by the taxpayer in the federal budget. The chief disadvantage of an IPR would be the diversion of capital away from other productive enterprises and concern that in a competitive marketplace the industry might not be able to recover its costs since each firm would have a different marginal cost curve.

#### **Top priority—PC stewardship key**

Shifter 12/27 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?” 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3186

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. ¶ Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear.

#### **Obama’s reform is key to all aspect of heg---[competitiveness, hard and soft power]**

Nye 12 Joseph S. Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s—nye

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the decline of American power.¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to economic power: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**,** skilled immigrants can be important to particular sectors – and to long-term growth. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s soft power. The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. The US is a magnet, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting hard and soft power, immigration enhances both.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely because the US attracts the best and brightestfrom the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting immigration reform in his second term, he will have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to maintain the strength of the US.

#### Global war

**Zhang and Shi, 2011** – \*Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C. (America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/)

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

### 3

**The United States Congress should establish an independent commission empowered to submit to Congress recommendations regarding energy production restrictions and financial incentives. Congress will allow 60 days to pass legislation overriding recommendations by a two-thirds majority. If Congress doesn’t vote within the specified period, those recommendations will become law. The Commission should recommend to Congress that they offer a purchase agreement for crude oil produced in the United States in order to fill the reserve.**

#### Solves the case and avoids politics

**Mayer ’07** (Kenneth,- professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison “THE BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE PROCESS: IS IT POSSIBLE TO MAKE RATIONAL POLICY?”)

**The conventional wisdom was that legislators, facing increasing deficits and** budget rules that were **about to force the question of spending cuts, were searching for a solution** to the collective dilemma framed by the base structure. **There was broad consensus that something had to be done**, and fewer and fewer members were willing to defend the roadblocks that in practice made it impossible to close anything. **The solution** -- given shape by Representative Richard Armey (R-Texas) – **was to *separate the process*** into two parts: the first was the a decision to ratify the principle of base closing **and establish a mechanism by which specific choices would be made**. The second was the binding nature of that process, **in which legislators *gave up their power to amend*** the final list of closures. **Breaking up the process into two separate decisions created *substantial political cover*, insulating** the affected **members from the consequences** of a local base closing, **and insuring that no legislator was *directly connected* to a *specific vote*** to close a base. A few legislators criticized the proposal, with some making half-hearted defenses of old-school logrolling, others objecting to the refusal to consider closing foreign bases, and others because they foresaw that their own installations would probably be on the list. The binding character of the recommended closures was key. Once the president had approved the commission recommendations, Congress had 45 days to reject the list by a Joint Resolution, **under expedited procedures** designed to **minimize obstructionist tactics** (Davis 2005). **In practice, the process was *unstoppable*** after this stage, since **it would take 2/3 majorities** in both the House and Senate **to** actually **block the closures from going into effect** (assuming that resolution of disapproval would have to overcome a presidential veto). Resolutions of disapproval were duly introduced, but the floor debates all had the same character: members representing districts where a major closure occurred would rail against the process, insisting that the methodologies were flawed, that their bases made a critical contribution to national defense, that it was all about politics, that the closures disrespected military personnel, that the law was violated.8 **Members** knew that their **efforts were futile**, but the chance to object played a crucial symbolic function, providing members with vital position taking opportunities. **No**ne of the **disapproval resolutions came *anywhere close* to passing**.

### 4

#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and unsustainable practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The **financialisation**¶ **of “energy**”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ **jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just**¶ **transition** to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies **marginalise the role of communities** and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over **how society might be differently organised** to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

**Holleman 2012** – assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1, WEA)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ belies the notion that “there is no alternative.” They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our ¶ environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ planetary boundaries will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### 5

#### Text: The United States Federal Government Should raise taxes on all petroleum products, designating a trajectory that signals a rising cost of petroleum products and create a “lockbox” for the aforementioned taxes in the event of supply disruptions or other national security related problems.

#### The CP solves the case – allows a fungible reserve of money, which prevents a supply disruption

Munk, 08 [Time to Change our Oil Policy by Bernard Munk December 2008 [Bernard Munk](http://www.fpri.org/about/people/munk.html), FPRI Senior Fellow, is the Principal of Munk Advisory Services, an investment advisory service for professional investment managers and private investors. Dr. Munk founded and operated six different companies in international and domestic business active in Europe, the Far East, Central and South America and Africa, including Penndel Energy, Bemico Corporation, Protimex Corporation, and Western Hemisphere Industries. He has served as the Chief Economist at Bowman Capital Management, Visiting Professor of Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, a Fellow at The Brookings Institute, Adjunct Professor of Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and Senior Fellow in the SEI Center for Advanced Studies in Management. <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200812.munk.changeoilpolicy.html>]

 The first rule is to keep the price of oil high to the users of oil products! This goal is too often absent from the policy debate. In fact, Obama seems to have it the wrong way around as an advocate of low prices to consumers. The reason for this rule is simple: higher prices deter consumption, both presently and in the future. If there was only one single measure that the new Administration could pass that would be effective, it would be not only to raise taxes on all petroleum products, but also to designate a tax trajectory for the future that signals a rising cost of petroleum products over the next several decades. Such a measure could easily be termed a “national security tax” to indicate that our domestic and foreign security is a cost and that it takes a great deal of resources to fund our security needs. We could even go so far as to create a “lockbox” for these additional taxes to be spent solely on national security needs (broadly defined), including not only the military costs of protecting valued sources of supply in the Middle East but also encouraging alternative energy sources that are less polluting and perhaps helpful on the global warming front. In some ways, a national energy lockbox that is purely a financial reserve would complement the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) that is there as a temporary source of supply in the event of a physical blockage on our imported crude oil supplies. The SPR is limited—it just holds oil. A national energy lockbox has a totally fungible resource: money, which can be used for a wide variety of purposes. Yes, such funds can be wasted, but that is true of all government tax proceeds. Importantly, this tax must be variable. It must rise when the crude oil price falls and perhaps fall when petroleum prices rise to very high levels. It is a variable tax wedge that will keep the price at the pump, or the airfield or diesel truck stop, from falling (and inducing more consumption) when crude oil prices fall. It will indicate a permanently higher price of petroleum products that will induce needed substitution away from petroleum-based energy use for the future. A higher price on petroleum-based energy will be a general subsidy for all producers of alternative, non-petroleum-based energy.

### Solvency

#### ALT causes ---

#### Location

Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379>]

Location Initially locating all of the SPR storage in salt caverns concentrated along the Texas and Louisiana Gulf Coast seemed to make sense, both economically because of pre-existing salt caverns which were initially used for storage and the relatively low cost of further salt dome development compared to construction and storage of oil in above ground tanks, and strategically because of the huge amount of United States refining capacity and oil movement infrastructure that exists in this region. However, locating all of the SPR’s stocks of crude oil in this region has two major drawbacks which leave the United States extremely vulnerable to major disruption of crude oil supply. One is in the crude oil pipeline system which is relied on to transport SPR crude oil to refineries when released in an emergency. This pipeline system provides crude oil distribution to refineries throughout the Gulf Coast region and the Midwest. However, it does not provide access to any refineries in the Northeast or on the West Coast, 16 two of the most heavily populated and economically important regions in the United States. In the event of a disruption in crude oil supply where a release of SPR oil would be needed in these regions, it would have to be shipped to these areas of the country by sea via tankers, and both regions have only a couple main ports which can receive tankers and distribute oil to refineries via local pipeline or smaller ships and barges. California, which almost exclusively relies on its own refineries to supply its refined fuel needs, relies on oil imports through Long Beach for 25 percent of its crude oil requirements, 17 and the New Jersey, Delaware, and Philadelphia area refineries, which account for the large majority of refining capacity on the East Coast, rely on imported oil or domestically produced oil shipped via tanker for almost all of their crude oil needs. 18 This makes both regions very vulnerable to disruptions in port activities which could easily eliminate their ability to access SPR oil in the event of a national or global supply disruption requiring SPR release. The concentrated location of the SPR and its ability to be moved via pipeline only to the Gulf Coast and the Midwest strategically puts all of the SPR’s “eggs in one basket,” and assumes that in the event SPR oil is needed to offset a nationwide supply disruption, that it will be able to be loaded onto tankers and be delivered via ports on the West and Northeast Coasts, and also that it will be accessible to all the refinery capacity in the Gulf Coast and Midwest regions through the pipeline distribution network. The other main drawback to locating all of the United States’ SPR storage only in the Gulf Coast region is the 9 vulnerability of this area to severe disruption due to extreme weather (Hurricanes), the frequency and strength of which have previously been discussed

#### Speed of distribution and other countries like Canada solve

Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379>]

Size and Speed of Distribution Another pair of glaring vulnerabilities in the SPR are the speed at which its oil can be pumped out of storage and into pipelines for distribution to refineries or port transfer into tankers, and the current size of the SPR compared to the United States’ overall requirement for and reliance on imported crude oil. The administrative timeline which occurs prior to a release of SPR oil is as quick and efficient as could be expected. Releasing oil from the SPR requires a Presidential order. Once the President has given an emergency order to offer SPR oil for sale, it takes about 13 days for the Department of Energy to solicit bids, select offers, and award contracts before oil can begin being pumped from the storage caverns into the distribution system for delivery. 19 This response time appears adequate for pre-planned draw downs of the SPR, like the release of SPR oil President George H.W. Bush ordered prior to the first Gulf War in order to decrease the impact of the war on oil prices and supply. The Secretary of Energy can also order emergency loans of SPR oil to refiners contingent on later replacement, and this process can allow oil to be released from the SPR within about 24 hours. This process occurred recently, as part of the government response to the severe interruption in Gulf Coast oil production during and immediately following Hurricane Katrina in August and September 2005. 20 However, once authorization for SPR oil release has been given, the speed at which the oil can be delivered to refineries and the maximum quantity which can be pumped during a given amount of time limits the strategic effectiveness of the SPR. It can’t provide oil fast enough to adequately respond to a rapidly occurring catastrophic event which would result in a significantly limited ability of the nation to receive and/or transport imported oil to refineries for processing. Once crude oil enters the pipeline system, it moves at between 3 and 8 miles per hour. 21 Delivery to refineries in the upper Midwest could take a week or more, and tanker deliveries to the Northeast and West Coasts even longer. Also, the maximum rate at which oil can be extracted from SPR storage is 4.4 million barrels per day for the first 90 days after which the drawdown rate begins to steadily decline until the storage caverns are empty. This rate is restricted by a combination of the process- saltwater displacement- that is used to remove oil from the SPR salt caverns and the limited number of sites (four) that SPR oil is stored. 22 Any disruption in oil supply larger than the SPR’s discharge limit would limit the supply of oil available for refining. 10 Additionally, current demand in the United States for crude oil is about 15.2 million barrels per day. Of that amount, about 10.1 million barrels are imported. 23 Imported oil is brought into the United States either via pipeline from Canada, its biggest supplier of imported oil at about 1.7 million b/d, or it is brought from all other countries via tankers through its seaports. 24 The International Energy Agency, which has 26 member nations including the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Korea, and almost all European countries, requires its members to hold oil reserves equal to 90 days of net imports averaged from the previous year, either in government owned stocks or a combination of government and private company inventory. 25 European countries maintain a combined reserve of approximately one billion barrels of crude oil, roughly equivalent to 90 days of total consumption, vice just imports. Japan maintains a combination of government and private company reserves for over 150 days of total consumption. And South Korea, the most recent member of the IEA, has built a 90-day stockpile of government and private reserves. 26 The SPR currently contains about 684 million barrels of oil. 27 At today’s import requirements, it provides the United States with about 65 days of import protection, and the nation relies on industry held stocks to make up the difference in order to meet the 90 day IEA requirement. Even when filled to its current capacity of 727 million barrels, which President Bush has directed the Energy Secretary to do, 28 the SPR would only provide about 70 days of import protection. And United States oil import requirements are expected to increase to about 13.5 million b/d by 2030, 29 significantly decreasing the level of import protection provided by the SPR if it is maintained at its current capacity. The SPR is now not sufficiently large enough to protect the United States from a long term disruption in crude oil supply, and without an increase in capacity will be even less able to do so in the future

#### Product composition – this card means you should assign zero risk to the AFF and vote neg on presumption because of the utter idiocy of their solvency claim

Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379>]

 Composition of Products The third, and potentially most significant weakness of the SPR, particularly in its ability to protect the United States from short-term but large disruptions in crude oil supply, delivery, and refining capacity, is the SPR’s absence of stocks of refined fuels, which are the products really necessary to allow the nation’s critical air and ground transportation and energy sectors to continue to run during a crisis. The SPR currently consists of just the crude oil stocks mentioned previously, and also consists of the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve, a two million barrel supply of fuel oil located at storage facilities in Woodbridge, New Jersey, Newhaven, Connecticut, and Providence, Rhode Island. These stocks are held as an emergency source of fuel oil to supplement commercial supplies in the fuel oil heat-dependent northeast United States. The SPR does not currently contain stocks of aviation jet fuel, 11 gasoline, or diesel fuel, leaving the United States strategically vulnerable to a disruption in the supply of these products. This vulnerability is made more extreme by two issues: the location of a large portion of the refinery capacity in the United States along the Gulf Coast and the overall lack of refining capacity in the United States compared to demand for fuels. About half of the gasoline consumed in the United States is produced in refineries located along a stretch of the Gulf Coast from Corpus Christi, Texas, to New Orleans. 30 Refinery production in this region was tremendously impacted in 2005 by hurricanes, with 91 percent of the region’s crude oil production and 1.8 million bbl/d of its refining capacity (75.6 million gallons of gasoline a day) taken offline during and immediately following Hurricane Katrina in late August and September. 31 Because the SPR is also located in this same region along the Gulf Coast and consists of only crude oil, it is vulnerable to the same severe weather and does not help the United States with shortages in refined products when refinery capacityis so suddenly and significantly decreased**.** Also, refineries in the Midwest region, which have the next highest capacity to those of the Gulf Coast region, 32 depend on oil from Gulf Coast oil production and oil imports from the LOOP and other Gulf Coast ports to come through the pipeline system to meet their supply needs. 33 The bottom line is that 68 percent of the United States’ refinery capacity depends on oil production and imported oil movement through a fairly small section of the Gulf Coast, and 61 percent of that refinery capacity is physically located along the coastal area itself. In addition to the vulnerability of a large portion of United States refining capacity because of its location, the actual overall refining capacity itself of the United States is a strategic weakness which is not supported by strategic stocks of refined fuels contained in a strategic reserve. The United States’ refining capacity cannot meet its demand and requires it to import refined fuels from foreign nations to meet our daily needs. There have been no new refineries built in the United States since 1976. In fact, as of the beginning of 2004 there were 149 operating refineries in the United States, 104 fewer than in 1982. 34 However, even with the fairly drastic reduction in the number of operating refineries, total national refining capacity has not decreased. It has actually increased, because of technical improvements to the refining process, improvements in management and production efficiency, and upgrades to equipment that have allowed fewer and more efficient maintenance procedures to be implemented. 35 But the demand for gasoline and other fuels in the United States has outpaced the increase in production capacity, with refining capacity only increasing by .6 percent a year since 2000 while demand for gasoline has increased about 2 percent a year during the same period. 36 The net result of this disparity between refining capacity and demand is the need to now import about 10 percent of its gasoline needs from foreign sources, mainly Europe, Venezuela, and the 12 Caribbean. However, each of these sources has issues that could potentially reduce or eliminate the availability of their fuel. The Caribbean is susceptible to the same severe weather trends which have recently impacted Gulf Coast refining capacity. Venezuela has political issues with the United States previously mentioned. And European gasoline imports, although probably not in danger of threats from weather or government action, may not be available in the future in the quantities they presently are. European refineries currently have excess gasoline refining capacity, mostly as a result of the trend in Europe away from gasoline powered autos to those powered by diesel. However, European refineries are currently converting refining technologies in order to produce more diesel fuel in the future, which will decrease the amount of surplus gasoline they produce for the import market. 37 And many experts doubt the ability of United States refineries to continue to increase production without building or re- activating new or pre-existing refineries, both of which would take many years even if started today. Efficiency increases in existing refineries have almost been maximized and new environmental requirements – mainly air quality mandates for custom “blended” fuels and low- sulfur diesel and gasoline – will divert the necessary investment in money and time from efficiency improvements to required modifications made in order to meet government standards. 38 Even with strategic stocks of crude oil, the lack of strategic stocks of refined fuels leaves the United States strategically vulnerable to a severe disruption in its ability to normally function. This is a result of the concentrated location of a large portion of its refining capacity in a single vulnerable geographic location and the reliance on refined fuel imports to meet demand because of a lack of domestic refining capacity. With the lack of speed in which crude oil stocks can get from the SPR to refiners, strategic stocks of refined fuels would provide a greater protection against a large disruption in crude oil supply or refining capacity that occurs rapidly and without any prior indicators that allow for advance preparation.

#### Physical limitations

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Physical Limitations Given the vulnerabilities to maintaining a steady, reliable, and sufficient source of oil and refined petroleum products, the United States’ SPR has several physical characteristics that create limitations which must be addressed or fixed in order to make it strategically relevant for the future and maintain its ability to act as that primary hedge against disruptions to the nation’s supply of oil. These include its concentrated location along the Gulf Coast, its inability to directly 8 distribute crude oil to all refining areas in the United States, its size and limited pumping capacity, and the absence of refined fuels as part of the SPR

#### Jones act blocks

Clayton, 12 [September, Blake Clayton is fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. His current research focuses on energy security and policy, global commodities markets, and natural resource economics. WORKING P A P E R Lessons Learned From the 2011 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release Blake Clayton September 2012, CFR, p. online]

The Jones Act requires that all shipping vessels traveling between U.S. ports sail under the U.S. flag, be built in the United States, and be crewed by mostly U.S. citizens. Conventional wisdom holds that the Jones Act impedes the efficient release of oil from the U.S. SPR to maritime trade, but granting waivers to the act is politically fraught. The experience of 2011 confirmed this view. Exporting crude oil from the SPR is effectively prohibited by U.S. law unless there is a “compelling national interest.”59 As a result, oil released from the SPR must flow to U.S. refiners in one of several directions: within the Gulf of Mexico, where the storage facilities that hold SPR oil are located; to inland refineries via pipelines; and to other coastal refineries reachable by sea.

#### Lack of adequate infrastructure is a problem

Clayton, 12 [September, Blake Clayton is fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. His current research focuses on energy security and policy, global commodities markets, and natural resource economics. WORKING P A P E R Lessons Learned From the 2011 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release Blake Clayton September 2012, CFR, p. online]

 The U.S. SPR release ignited a debate about whether recent changes in North American oil flows and pipeline configurations have greatly reduced the rate at which these stockpiles can be released to the market. If true, the SPR may be far less able to combat a sudden, major oil shortage than it was in past eras. Edward Morse, a former U.S. State Department official who is now head of commodities research at Citigroup, has argued that the release suggested that the U.S. SPR is “significantly less usable than advertised.”72

**<MARKED>**

He notes that the U.S. SPR was designed to transport oil from Gulf Coast storage facilities inland on pipelines, rather than outward via seaborne trade. But most of the pipelines that once brought crude oil from the Gulf of Mexico northward had to be reversed—a process that can take months—in order to funnel oil southward to the Gulf (see Figure 18). The pipeline reversals were the result of surging oil production in the midwestern United States in addition to increasing imports from Canada (see Figure 19). These changes in the U.S. logistical system, Morse argues, have vastly reduced the speed at which oil can be distributed to industry from the U.S. SPR. Oil can still be loaded onto tankers, but not nearly as quickly it once could into pipelines, due to port congestion in the Gulf of Mexico. In his estimation, the rate at which oil flowed out of the U.S. SPR in the summer of 2011 (around 500,000 barrels per day) was likely closer to the peak evacuation rate than the 4.4 mb/d that the Department of Energy claims.73

#### Global stockpiles solve

Gholz et al 08 [Eugene Gholz is an associate professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of

Texas at Austin. Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College. All the Oil We Need

By EUGENE GHOLZ and DARYL G. PRESS http://www.dartmouth.edu/~dpress/docs/All\_the\_Oil\_We\_Need\_NYT.pdf]

WHILE oil prices have declined somewhat of late, the volatility of the market and the political and religious unrest in major oil-producing countries has Americans worrying more than ever about energy security. But they have little to fear— contrary to common understanding, there are robust stockpiles of oil around the globe that could see us through any foreseeable calamities on the world market.

#### The plan causes price rises – markets are fearful about a lack of spare capacity

Clayton, 12 [September, Blake Clayton is fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. His current research focuses on energy security and policy, global commodities markets, and natural resource economics. WORKING P A P E R Lessons Learned From the 2011 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release Blake Clayton September 2012, CFR, p. online]

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RELEAS ING STRATEGIC STOCKS Policymakers should remember that releasing oil from strategic stocks is hardly a free lunch. Tapping emergency inventories may dampen prices in the short term (though even that effect can be highly transient), but it can cause prices to rise soon thereafter. There are two likely reasons why. First, market participants know that national governments will probably buy oil in the future to replace what they just released. Second, an emergency release alsotends to increase the market’s skepticism that oil producers are well equipped to satisfy global demand.As Lawrence Eagles of JPMorgan explained, a release can “send the message that consumer governments have little faith that there is any spare capacity within the producer group, and/or there are concerns over OPEC’s short and long term price aspirations.”9 Market participants tend to be highly skeptical of official estimates of countries’ spare production capacity. Any signal from IEA countries that appears to reinforce those doubts can send prices higher. As analysts at Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO) later wrote, a “temporary release aimed at influencing shortterm prices could actually send an unintended bullish signal to the market that long-term spare capacity in OPEC producers is insufficient to meet supply losses.” Because oil prices are a “function of both near-term supply and demand and perceived long-term balances,” concern among market participants that the market may tighten up later can immediately feed back into higher prices.10 Thus, a release can make markets more anxious, not less, about future conditions in the oil market. Market expectations about higher prices tomorrow can spark higher prices today**.**

### Adv 1

#### Countries won’t escalate – high level reports prove

**Focus Taiwan News Channel 3/9**

(“Military conflict in East, South China seas unlikely: defense ministry,” pg online @ <http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303090011> //um-ef)

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense said Saturday that military conflict over territorial disputes in the East and South China seas was unlikely at present but suggested that accidental clashes were possible. The ministry said in a report that regional stability has been challenged by North Korea's threat to cancel its 1953 cease-fire agreement with South Korea, its nuclear test last month and a rocket launch in December. **The possibility of a military conflict at the present stage was low,** the report said, but the military would not rule out the risk of accidental clashes. Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu is scheduled to present the report to legislators Monday. **Sovereignty disputes continue to simmer in the East and South China seas, but the countries involved in the disputes, while fully committed to stances backing their claims, have also voiced their wish to resolve the issues through diplomatic means**, the report said.

#### Asian energy crisis causes cooperation, not war

Hyun Jin **Choi** 200**9**; research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he conducted research on the ROK-U.S. alliance, crisis management, and civil-military relations, Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science at Michigan State University; “Fueling Crisis or Cooperation? The Geopolitics of Energy Security in Northeast Asia” Asian Affairs: An American Review Volume 36, Issue 1, 2009, Wilson Online

The Possibility of Multilateral Cooperation Although energy geopolitics in Northeast Asia has the potential to become a major source of conflict, it also creates new opportunities for multilateral cooperation. China, Japan, and South Korea's common interests in securing a sustainable energy flow will force them to interact indefinitely, **which is a strong promoter of cooperation** because it increases their expected future profits from energy cooperation. In neoliberal institutionalist terms, the countries would think twice before choosing to defect in one issue area (e.g., offshore oil production) because the other country is likely to defect the next round in the same or another area. To maintain cooperation for long time periods, however, there must be an enduring regional institution that makes it easier for governments to share information. If China, Japan, and South Korea build such institutions, energy can serve as a catalyst in regional integration and cooperation. From this viewpoint, four areas allow for potential energy cooperation in Northeast Asia: joint exploration of offshore resources, clean energy technologies, oil stockpiling, and joint operations for protecting sea lanes of communication.(FN93)

#### Alt causes – territory disputes in East Asia

Hyun Jin **Choi** 200**9**; research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he conducted research on the ROK-U.S. alliance, crisis management, and civil-military relations, Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science at Michigan State University; “Fueling Crisis or Cooperation? The Geopolitics of Energy Security in Northeast Asia” Asian Affairs: An American Review Volume 36, Issue 1, 2009, Wilson Online

Territorial Disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands China and Japan have had disputes over offshore oil and natural gas fields that lie near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the southern part of the East China Sea. The estimates of potential petroleum reserves in the East China Sea that Chinese and foreign authorities advanced were 175-210 trillion cubic feet of gas and as much as 100 billion barrels of oil.(FN58) Although some specialists are skeptical of the actual amount of oil and gas, China and Japan are competing for these resources by proclaiming Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the disputed water. According to the United Nations International Law of the Sea, each nation has special rights over the exploration of ocean resources in a 200-nautical-mile zone from that nation's coastal baselines. However, the East China Sea is only 360 nautical miles at its widest point. Thus, Japan claims the median line as its jurisdictional boundary, whereas China claims EEZ based on its continental shelf, which extends to the Okinawa Trough.(FN59) The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are located in the middle of the disputed area. There already have been a number of skirmishes in the East China Sea. In December 1995, for example, a Chinese drilling ship searched for oil in areas claimed by Japan as part of its EEZ.(FN60) In May 1996, five Chinese ships conducted sonar exploration of the Japanese-claimed seabed.(FN61) Japan also attempted to strengthen its territorial claims by scrambling its jet fighters against Chinese warplanes and by erecting a lighthouse on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. More recently, in August 2003, China set up natural gas production platforms at Chun Xiao, with one of them located less than a mile from the median line between China and Japan. Worrying that these structures could suck up natural gas that lies on the Japanese side, Japan repeatedly protested China's action and sent its seismic survey ships into the east-side of the median line near the Chun Xiao field. The situation escalated to the point at which China dispatched submarines and destroyers to the vicinity of survey operations to harass Japanese vessels.(FN62) In April 2005, Japan responded by granting its private oil companies the right to test drill for oil and gas on the Japanese side, which China again criticized as "a serious provocation to China's rights."(FN63) Disputes between China and Japan regarding offshore resources represent, as neorealists believe, a real example of the tragedy of the commons, in which each nation is locked into a system that forces it to increase its share of the resources without restraint because "what each gets belongs to [whoever took it] and what [is left] is up for grabs."(FN64) The end result is that the aggregate benefits are reduced by the excessive competition. At present, no one expects a full-scale war in the East China Sea. However, in the long term, the disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands can potentially become a major source of military conflict. Tensions over the Yellow Sea Seabed Another particularly critical dimension is the way that petroleum deposits in the Yellow Sea seabed could affect relations among China, South Korea, and possibly North Korea. Compared with the huge potential of the East China Sea, the reserves so far explored in the Yellow Sea are less spectacular, although their impact on China and the two Koreas could be significant. According to the 1968 United Nations survey mission report, for example, the Yellow Sea seabed had "great potential as oil and gas reservoirs."(FN65) South Korean estimates of potential oil and gas in two blocks in the southern Yellow Sea range from 100 million to 1 billion barrels.(FN66) Foreign estimates of potential oil reserves in the seabed west of Anju, a city northwest of Pyongyang, are as high as 12 billion barrels.(FN67) The richest petroleum deposits in the Yellow Sea are believed to be concentrated in the Kunsan Basin and the West Korea Bay Basin, both located on the hypothetical median line between China and the two Koreas. Because the three countries have never agreed on a maritime border, the seabed under these two basins is in the middle of the dispute. Tensions over the Yellow Sea developed when South Korea authorized the Gulf, Shell, and Texaco oil companies to explore for oil in contested areas in 1969 and 1970.(FN68) In 1971, China protested by sending "lightly-armed fishing vessels" to the exploration fields.(FN69) When Gulf conducted experimental drilling in 1973, China dispatched gunboats to force drilling ships away from the area.(FN70) The Chinese Foreign Ministry then criticized this drilling activity as "the latest step taken by international oil monopolies in their attempt to grab China's coastal seabed resources."(FN71) Recently, a researcher reported that North Korea granted the Malaysian state oil company the right to conduct exploration in the West Korea Bay Basin, although it was quietly discouraged by indications of Chinese displeasure.(FN72). Seabed petroleum development in the Yellow Sea is currently stalled because of the North Korean nuclear crisis and uncertainty over maritime boundaries. Until the nuclear crisis is completely settled, it would be difficult to invite any foreign investments for resource development on the North Korean side. Nevertheless, there is still a possibility that settlement of the nuclear crisis, combined with reconciliation of the two Koreas, could lead to resumed competition over disputed Yellow Sea resources in the future.

#### No internal link to solving warming – Japan can’t spill over in time to solve warming

#### Long timeframe means intervening actors and tech solve

**Michaels 7** – Cato senior fellow (Patrick, 2/2, Live with Climate Change, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=7502)

Consequently, the best policy is to live with some modest climate change now and encourage economic development, which will generate the capital necessary for investment in the more efficient technologies of the future.

Fortunately, we have more time than the alarmists suggest. The warming path of the planet falls at the lowest end of today's U.N. projections. In aggregate, our computer models tell us that once warming is established, it tends to take place at a constant, not an increasing, rate. Reassuringly, the rate has been remarkably constant, at 0.324 degrees F per decade, since warming began around 1975. The notion that we must do "something in 10 years," repeated by a small but vocal band of extremists, enjoys virtually no support in the truly peer reviewed scientific literature.

Rather than burning our capital now for no environmental gain (did someone say "ethanol?"), let's encourage economic development so people can invest and profit in our more efficient future.

People who invested in automobile companies that developed hybrid technology have been rewarded handsomely in the past few years, and there's no reason to think environmental speculators won't be rewarded in the future, too.

#### China can’t cut off rare earth – Japan just hit the jackpot

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 3-24-2013; International Business Editor of The Daily Telegraph. He has covered world politics and economics for 30 years, based in Europe, the US, and Latin America. He joined the Telegraph in 1991, serving as Washington correspondent and later Europe correspondent in Brussels. “Japan breaks China's stranglehold on rare metals with sea-mud bonanza” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans\_pritchard/9951299/Japan-breaks-Chinas-stranglehold-on-rare-metals-with-sea-mud-bonanza.html

Japanese scientists have found vast reserves of rare earth metals on the Pacific seabed that can be mined cheaply, a discovery that may break the Chinese monopoly on a crucial raw material needed in hi-tech industries and advanced weapons systems. "We have found deposits that are just two to four metres from the seabed surface at higher concentrations than anybody ever thought existed, and it won't cost much at all to extract," said professor Yasuhiro Kato from Tokyo University, the leader of the team. While America, Australia, and other countries have begun to crank up production of the seventeen rare earth elements, they have yet to find viable amounts of the heavier metals such as dysprosium, terbium, europium, and ytterbium that are most important. China has a near total monopoly in the heavier end of the spectrum, though it is also the dominant supplier of the whole rare earth complex after driving rivals out of business in the 1990s. It still accounts for 97pc of global supply. Beijing shocked the world when it suddenly began to restrict exports in 2009, prompting furious protests and legal complaints by both the US and the EU at the World Trade Organisation. China claimed that it was clamping down on smuggling and environmental abuse. "Their real intention is to force foreign companies to locate plant in China. They're saying `if you want our rare earth metals, you must build your factory here, and we can then steal your technology," said professor Kato. Yasuhiro Kato, an associate professor of earth science at the University of Tokyo, displays a mud sample extracted from the depths of about 4,000 metres (13,123 ft) below the Pacific ocean surface where rare earth elements were found. – Reuters The team of scientists from Japan's Agency for Marine-Earth Science and the University of Tokyo first discovered huge reserves in the mid-Pacific two years ago. These are now thought to be 1000 times all land-based deposits, some of it in French waters around Tahiti. The latest discovery is in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone in deep-sea mud around the island of Minami-Torishima at 5,700 meters below sea level. Although it is very deep, the deposits are in highly-concentrated nodules that can be extracted using pressurised air with minimal disturbance off the seafloor and no need for the leaching. Professor Kato said exploration will continue for another two years before scaling up towards production. Over 50pc of the metal in the deposit is the heavier end of the spectrum, twice the level of China's key mines and without the radioactive by-product thorium that makes the metals so hard to mine. Japan consumes half the world's rare earth metals in its cars, electronics, and environmental industries, and has accused China of withholding supplies as a pressure tool. The country has been scrambling to find other sources under its "Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supplies of Rare Metals", but a joint venture in Vietnam that once looked promising has so far yielded only lighter rare earths. Professor Kato said a single ship drilling in the target zone at Minami-Torishima could supply Japan's needs for a year, breaking strategic dependence at minimal cost. "We don't need to mine it intensively. All we need is enough to force China to lower its prices."

#### No Asia war—multiple safeguards and reversible tensions

**Feng 10 –** professor at the Peking University International Studies [Zhu, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia?utm\_source=feed]

As such, the surge of defense expenditures in East Asia does not add up to an arms race. No country in East Asia wants to see a new geopolitical divide and spiraling tensions in the region. The growing defense expenditures powerfully illuminate the deepening of a regional “security dilemma,” whereby the “defensive” actions taken by one country are perceived as “offensive” by another country, which in turn takes its own “defensive” actions that the first country deems “offensive.” As long as the region doesn’t split into rival blocs, however, an arms race will not ensue. What is happening in East Asia is the extension of what Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job call “competitive arms processes.” The history of the cold war is telling in this regard. Arm races occur between great-power rivals only if the rivalry is doomed to intensify. The perceived tensions in the region do not automatically translate into consistent and lasting increases in military spending. Even declared budget increases are reversible. Taiwan’s defense budget for fiscal year 2010, for instance, will fall 9 percent. This is a convincing case of how domestic constraints can reverse a government decision to increase the defense budget. Australia’s twenty-year plan to increase the defense budget could change with a domestic economic contraction or if a new party comes to power. China’s two-digit increase in its military budget might vanish one day if the type of regime changes or the high rate of economic growth slows. Without a geopolitical split or a significant great-power rivalry, military budget increases will not likely evolve into “arms races.” The security dilemma alone is not a leading variable in determining the curve of military expenditures. Nor will trends in weapon development and procurement inevitably induce “risk-taking” behavior. Given the stability of the regional security architecture—the combination of U.S.-centered alliance politics and regional, cooperation-based security networking—any power shift in East Asia will hardly upset the overall status quo. China’s military modernization, its determination to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best,” hasn’t yet led to a regional response in military budget increases. In contrast, countries in the region continue to emphasize political and economic engagement with China, though “balancing China” strategies can be found in almost every corner of the region as part of an overall balance-of-power logic. In the last few years, China has taken big strides toward building up asymmetric war capabilities against Taiwan. Beijing also holds to the formula of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue except in the case of the island’s de jure declaration of independence. Despite its nascent capability of power projection, China shows no sign that it would coerce Taiwan or become **militarily assertive** over contentious territorial claims ranging from the Senkaku Islands to the Spratly Islands to the India-China border dispute.

#### No China war

Robert J. **Art**, Fall 20**10** Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall 2010): p359(33)

The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an **all-out war is** nearly **impossible** to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability vis-a-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition **changes dramatically**. These three benchmarks--China's ambitions will grow as its power grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising-dominant power dyads--are the starting points from which to analyze America's interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.

### Adv 2

#### No impact—IMF studies agree

Tobias N. **Rasmussen and** Agustín **Roitman** August 20**11** Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

VII. CONCLUSION Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the U.S. economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. In this paper, we offer a global perspective on the macroeconomic impact of oil prices. In doing so, we are filling a void of research on the effects of oil prices on developing economies. Our findings indicate that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy. Indeed, we find that the United States has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies, but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25 percent increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of one percent, spread over 2–3 years. One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies. We provide a model illustrating this effect and find supporting empirical evidence.

#### No risk of short term oil shocks – market adaptability

**Boston Globe** 2-13-20**11**; (Jeremy Kahn) “Crude reality” http://articles.boston.com/2011-02-13/news/29336191\_1\_crude-oil-shocks-major-oil-producers

But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.

#### No impact—last recession proves econ doesn’t determine conflict or instability

**Barnett 2009** – senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine, columnist for World Politics Review (8/25, Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” World Politics Review, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>, WEA)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.

None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.

Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.

And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

So, to sum up:

No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?);

The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places);

Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered);

No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy);

A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and

No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.)

Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis.

Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis?

Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed.

Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis?

If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism.

At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please!

Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon?

Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

#### The economy is resilient

**Washington Times 2008** – chief political correspondent for The Washington Times (7/28, Donald Lambro, The Washington Times, "Always darkest before dawn", lexis, WEA)

The doom-and-gloomers are still with us, of course, and they will go to their graves forecasting that life as we know it is coming to an end and that we are in for years of economic depression and recession. Last week, the New York Times ran a Page One story maintaining that Americans were saving less than ever, and that their debt burden had risen by an average of $117,951 per household. And the London Telegraph says there are even harder times ahead, comparing today's economy to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Wall Street economist David Malpass thinks that kind of fearmongering is filled with manipulated statistics that ignore long-term wealth creation in our country, as well as globally. Increasingly, people are investing "for the long run - for capital gains (not counted in savings) rather than current income - in preparation for retirement," he told his clients last week. Instead of a coming recession, "we think the U.S. is in gradual recovery after a sharp two-quarter slowdown, with consumer resilience more likely than the decades-old expectation of a consumer slump," Mr. Malpass said. "Fed data shows clearly that household savings of all types - liquid, financial and tangible - are still close to the record levels set in September. IMF data shows U.S. households holding more net financial savings than the rest of the world combined. Consumption has repeatedly outperformed expectations in recent quarters and year," he said. The American economy has been pounded by a lot of factors, including the housing collapse (a needed correction to bring home prices down to earth), the mortgage scandal and the meteoric rise in oil and gas prices. But this $14 trillion economy, though slowing down, continues to grow by about 1 percent on an annualized basis, confounding the pessimists who said we were plunging into a recession, defined by negative growth over two quarters. That has not happened - yet. Call me a cockeyed optimist, but I do not think we are heading into a recession. On the contrary, I'm more bullish than ever on our economy's long-term prospects.

## 2nc Cp

### 1NC Oil

#### CP solves drilling production

Gold, 06 – Philip, president of Aretea, a Seattle-based writers' group (“Turn on hit highlighting for speaking browsers,” Christian Science Monitor, 5/30/06, ProQuest)Red

Facts are stubborn things. So are cherished beliefs - especially when they're shared by adversaries who, for reasons of their own, find them too convenient to shed. And among the greatest of our shared delusions is the belief that high oil prices accomplish something. They don't. Fortunately, there is a way to ease the crisis: BRAC it. However, before explaining what the Pentagon's Base Closure and Realignment Act has to do with the price of gas, it's necessary to define, then shred, the wrong idea that "the market" has much to do with fixing this mess. According to common belief, high prices inevitably call forth both consumer conservation and increased supply. The political left, broadly defined, favors the former; the right extols the latter. But it doesn't work that way. Demand for oil, especially gasoline, is inelastic for three reasons. First, too much stuff and too many people simply have to move too far. Second, those who can afford those SUVs can generally also afford higher gas prices. Finally, for several score million Americans, from teenagers to the working poor to the elderly, automobiles offer freedom. Americans will cut back on food before they give up their cars. Nothing short of a price that would wreak economic havoc will induce serious conservation. Nor do higher prices elicit increased supply. Oil is an extractive industry. You pump the easy pools first. Costs of production increase with volume. Then there's the paradox of the market. At $150 a barrel, say, there's plenty of oil, but few could afford it, so prices drop to the point where it doesn't pay to pump. Big Oil learned about this in the 1980s and doesn't care to repeat the experience. Then there's what happens when price mixes with politics. The world's major foreign producers do not wish us well. But it's domestic politics that has us stymied. A de facto alliance of left and right, of environmentalists and Big Oil, prevents development of American resources and capacity. The environmentalists and their political backers want no new development, period. As for Big Oil, you don't need to be a sprocket scientist to know that it's economically better to sell the same gallon of gas for $3 (or $4) than for $2. Such left/right alliances are nothing new. Over the past few decades, they've emptied America's mental hospitals, blocked missile defense, and made illegal immigration a growth industry. Over and over, these alliances, and the convenient political stalemates they generate, trump the market. Now, about BRAC. As the cold war ended, the Pentagon found itself with hundreds of excess or obsolete domestic bases and facilities. However, every installation is in someone's state and district; Congress was notoriously averse to shutting down anything. So in 1990 Congress passed the Base Closure and Realignment Act, turning the whole process over to an independent commission that would provide lists of places to be closed or (in some cases) expanded. The key provision: Congress had to accept or reject each list as a whole, thereby providing political cover for legislators whose turf took the hits. It worked. Not perfectly, of course. But the process of intensive hearings and studies, followed by firm recommendations and consideration of civilian alternatives, has now entered its fifth round. In similar manner, Congress should appoint an independent commission, composed of government, energy industry, and public interest and environmental representatives to study which areas, now off limits, can be opened for exploration, extraction, and refining with maximum economic benefit and minimal environmental disruption. As with BRAC, lists would be presented to Congress for an up-or- down vote. As with BRAC, there should be several rounds, depending on need.

### 2NC AT: Perm Do Both

3. Including a Congressional vote means the perm doesn’t solve

Brito, 10 – Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University (“RUNNING FOR COVER: THE BRAC COMMISSION AS A MODEL FOR FEDERAL SPENDING REFORM,” 8/2/10)Red

Next, while the Conrad-Gregg bill includes an expedited legislative process, it is not a silent approval process as we see in BRAC. Under Conrad-Gregg, once the commission develops its recommendations, it transmits them to Congress as legislation. This legislation must be reported out of committee within seven days of introduction, after which the bill receives fast track consideration, which includes a limit on debate and a prohibition on amendments and filibuster. This is similar to the fast track provisions available to a joint resolution of disapproval to overturn a BRAC Commission’s recommendations. We must therefore remember that it is not the fast-track provision that contributes to BRAC’s success; it is the silent approval process. Under the BRAC approach, Congress votes to approve the general policy of closing surplus bases. The BRAC Commission then chooses which bases to close, and its recommendations are operative unless Congress takes action—through an expedited process—to undo them. We saw in Part I.C, supra, why this matters, but chief among the reasons is that members of Congress are able to avoid voting to close any particular base. Instead they vote first to cut bases in the abstract, and then they vote to not save a few clearly surplus bases. The Conrad-Gregg bill does the opposite. It charges a commission with developing legislation to fix the federal fiscal imbalance, and then requires members of Congress to affirmatively vote to enact that legislation without amendment. Members would have to state their approval on the record for every budget cut and tax increase in the legislation. This disregards the lesson of BRAC, which is that to overcome the special interest pressure that members of Congress feel, you must allow them to vote to cut spending in the abstract, and then simply abstain from repealing a commission’s recommendations. It is silent approval—the fact that a commission’s recommendations are immediately active without further action—that provides members of Congress with the political cover they need. If a member’s literal or special interest constituencies are affected by a commission’s recommendations, the member can express shock at the commission’s decisions, can point out that she did not and would not have voted as the commission did, and can act to be seen as working to overturn what is already a done deal. The Conrad-Gregg bill not only eschews this device, it requires that the Task Force bill be passed by a three-fifths vote in each house.

### 2NC AT: Perm Do The CP

**A) Should means must and requires immediate legal effect**

Summers ‘94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, <http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13>)

**The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"**[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order **connotes futurity or** **may** be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16) [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. **Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as** more **than merely indicating** preference or **desirability**. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) **("should" would mean the same as** "shall" or **"must"** when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) ***In praesenti* means literally "at the present time."** BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance **the phrase denotes** that which in **law is** *presently* or *immediately effective*, **as opposed to something that** ***will*** or *would* **become effective *in the future*** *[in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

**B. Resolved means a firm course of action**

**Merriam-Webster’s, 11** (“Resolved,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved>)**Red**

5: **to reach a firm decision about** <resolve to get more sleep> <resolve disputed points in a text>

**C. Severs substantially**

**Words and Phrases** 19**64** (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

### 2NC This CP Is Awesome

**5. It’s vital to understanding how policies are formulated --- also proves it’s predictable**

Schwalbe ’03 (Steve,- PhD Public Policy from Auburn, former professor at the Air War College and Col. in the USAF “Independent Commissions: Their History, Utilization and Effectiveness”)

FIFTH BRANCH Many analysts characterize commissions as an unofficial, separate branch of government, much like the news media. Campbell referred to commissions as the “fifth arm of government,” after the media, the often-referred-to fourth arm.17 However, the media and independent commissions have as many similarities as differences. They are similar in that neither is mentioned in the Constitution. Both conduct oversight functions. Both serve to educate and inform the public. Both allow elites to participate in shaping government policy. On the other hand, the media and independent commissions are dissimilar in many ways. Where the news media responds to market forces, and hence will likely operate in perpetuity, independent commissions respond to a federal requirement to resolve a difficult problem. Therefore, they exist for a relatively short period of time, expiring once a final report is published and disseminated. Where the media’s primary functions are reporting and analyzing the news, a commission’s primary responsibilities can range from developing a recommended solution to a difficult problem to regulating an entire department of the executive branch. The media receives its funding primarily from advertisers, where commissions receive their funding from Congress, the President, or from private sources. The news media deal with issues foreign and domestic, while independent commissions generally focus on domestic issues. PURPOSE Commissions serve numerous purposes in the U.S. Government. Campbell cited three primary reasons for the establishment of federal independent commissions. First, they are established to provide expertise the Congress does not have among its own elected officials or their staffs. Next, he noted that the second most frequently cited reason by members of Congress for establishing a commission was to reduce the workload in Congress. Finally, they are formed to provide a convenient scapegoat to deflect the wrath of the electorate; i.e., “blame avoidance.”18 Fisher found three advantages of regulatory commissions. First, commission members bring essential expert insights to a commission because the regulated industries are normally “complex and highly technical.” Second, appointing commissioners for extended terms of full-time work allows commissioners to become very familiar with the technical aspects of an industry, through periodic contacts that Congress would not be able to accomplish. As a result of their tenure, varied membership, and shared responsibility, commissioners would be resistant to external pressures. Finally, regulatory commissions provide policy continuity essential to the stability of a regulated industry.19 What the taxpayers are primarily looking for from independent commissions are non- partisan solutions to current problems. A good example of establishing a commission to find non-partisan solutions is Congress regulating its own ethical behavior. University of Florida Professor Beth Rosenson researched this issue and concluded that authorizing an ethics commission may be “based on the fear of electoral retaliation if legislators do not take aggressive action to regulate their own ethics.”20 Campbell noted that commissions perform several other functions besides providing recommendations to the President and Congress. The most common reason provided by analysts is that members of Congress generally want to avoid making difficult decisions that may adversely affect their chances for reelection. As he noted, “Incentives to avoid blame lead members of Congress to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, such as ‘passing the buck’ or ‘deflection’….”21 Another technique legislators use to avoid incurring the wrath of the voters is to schedule any controversial independent commissions for after the next election. Establish- ing a commission to research the issue and come up with recommendations after a preset period of time is an effective way to do that. The most clear-cut example demonstrating this technique is the timing of the BRAC commissions in the 1990s — all three made their base closure recommendations in non-election years (1991, 1993, and 1995). Even the next BRAC commission, established by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, is not required to submit its base closure recommendations until 2005. Congress certainly is not the most efficient organization in the U.S.; hence, there are times when an independent commission is the more efficient and effective way to go. Law- makers are almost always short on time and information, which makes the option of delegating authority to a commission very appealing. Oftentimes, the expertise and necessary information is very costly for Congress to acquire. Commissions are generally the most inexpensive way for Congress to solve complex problems. From 1993-1997, Campbell found that 92 congressional offices introduced legislation that included proposals to establish ad hoc commissions.22 There are numerous other reasons for establishing independent commissions. They are created as a symbolic response to a crisis or to satisfy the electorate at home. They have served as trial balloons to test the political waters, or to make political gains with the voters. They can be created to gain public or political consensus. Often, when Congress has exhausted all its other options, a commission serves as an option of last resort.23 Commissions are a relatively impartial way to help resolve problems between the executive and legislative branches of government, especially during periods of congressional gridlock. Wolanin also noted that commissions are “particularly useful for problems and in circumstances marked by federal executive branch incapacity.” Federal bureaucracies suffer from many of the same shortcomings attributed to Congress when considering commissions. They often lack the expertise, information, and time to conduct the research and make recommendations to resolve internal problems. They can be afflicted by groupthink, not being able to think outside the box, or by not being able to see the big picture. Commissions offer a non-partisan, neutral option to address bureaucratic policy problems.24 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has decided to implement the recommendations of the congressionally- chartered Commission on Space, which he chaired prior to being appointed Secretary of Defense!25 One of the more important functions of independent commissions is educating and persuading. Due to the high visibility of most appointed commissioners, a policy issue will automatically tend to gain public attention. According to Wolanin, the prestige and visibility of commissions give them the capability to focus attention on a problem, and to see that thinking about it permeates more rapidly. A recent example of a high-visibility commission chair appointment was Henry Kissinger, selected to chair the commission to look into the perceived intelligence failure regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S. .26 Wolanin cited four educational impacts of commissions: 1) educating the general public; 2) educating government officials; 3) serving as intellectual milestones; and, 4) educating the commission members themselves. Regarding education of the general public, he stated that, “Commissions have helped to place broad new issues on the national agenda, to elevate them to a level of legitimate and pressing matters about which government should take affirmative action.” Regarding educating government officials, he noted that, “The educational impact of commissions within government…make it safer for congressmen and federal executives to openly discuss or advocate a proposal that has been sanctioned by such an ‘august group’.” Commission reports have often been so influential that they serve as milestones in affected fields. Such reports have become source material for analysts, commentators, and even students, particularly when commission reports are widely published and disseminated. Finally, by serving on a commission, members also learn much about the issue, and about the process of analyzing a problem and coming up with viable recommendations. Commissioners also learn from one another.27

## 2nc case

### solvency

#### Empirical evidence documents our offense – prefer 1nc Clayton – he is the foremost scholar on SPR usage and has written extensively about the shortage caused in Libya and its effect on global oil prices

Clayton, 12 [September, Blake Clayton is fellow for energy and national security at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. His current research focuses on energy security and policy, global commodities markets, and natural resource economics. WORKING P A P E R Lessons Learned From the 2011 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release Blake Clayton September 2012, CFR, p. online]

Fluctuations in the forward curve for Brent crude oil around the time of the IEA’s June 23 announcement provides support for these views (see Figure 12). Prices all along the curve fell sharply during trading on June 23, the day of the announcement. But by June 27, just two trading days later (June 25–26 was a weekend), long-term prices had already rebounded to their preannouncement lev8 els. Three days later, the price of oil for delivery after January 2012 was higher than it had been prior to the IEA’s announcement. This jump in prices, though driven in part by a bounce in economic sentiment, suggests that the market may have indeed interpreted the IEA release as putting upward pressure on longer-term prices.It is also broadly consistent with the notion that market fears about longterm conditions are liable to feed back into near-term prices.

#### SPR stock manipulations can’t solve – creates diminished incentives for new supply and encourages consumption- turns the case because it makes the US MORE vulnerable

Considine and Dowd, 05 [A Superfluous Petroleum Reserve?, Timothy J. Considine is professor of natural resource economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He may be contacted by e-mail at cpw@psu.edu. Kevin M. Dowd is an undergraduate honors student in economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He may be contacted by e-mail at kmd267@psu.edu., http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2005/6/v28n2-3.pdf]

CONCLUSION No amount of spr stock manipulations will offset the price pressures created by demand growth of more than 2 million barrels per day. Even offsetting half this growth would require more than 350 million barrels from the spr. Moreover, the reserve was established to alleviate the effects of “a severe energy interruption,” not to regulate higher-than-average oil prices. Even if market stabilization were a legitimate policy goal, it is a quixotic dream. Crude oil prices are inherently volatile because the demand for crude oil is extremely price inelastic in the short run and supply is also very price inelastic if the industry is operating at or near capacity. The existence of the F IGURE 4 U.S. Refiners’ Acquisition Cost (Crude Oil in nominal and constant 2004 dollars) 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 Real Oil Prices Nominal Oil Prices Dollars per barrel Thousand barrels per day 9/01 11/01 1/02 3/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 11/02 1/03 3/03 5/03 7/03 9/03 11/03 1/04 3/04 5/04 7/04 9/04 11/04 -1,500 -1,000 -500 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 Iraq Venezuela Nigeria Other OPEC Incremental Supply F IGURE 5 Crude Oil Production Iraq, Venezuela, Nigeria and other OPEC Countries TABLE 2 Petroleum Product Demand (Incremental; in thousand barrels per day) Region 2001 2002 2003 2004 North America -60 104 474 589 Western Europe 154 -11 174 258 Pacific -73 -38 145 -138 China 69 253 650 899 Former Soviet Union 230 32 430 -164 Eastern Europe 526 207 152 74 OPEC 288 207 127 395 Rest of World 111 153 549 230 Total 1,245 908 2,701 2,144 ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES 24 REGULATION SUMMER 2005REGULATION SUMMER 2005 25 sprdoes not release us from dependence on foreign sources of oil. Rather, the reserve may give us some slight breathing room if foreign production were to be disrupted. While the benefits of holding the sprare uncertain and difficult to quantify, they critically depend upon how the reserve is used in a crisis. The responsiveness of the spr sales during a crisis is crucial. If, by the time the necessary actions are implemented and oil has found its way onto the market, the crisis is over, then it is seemingly fruitless to tie up the billions of dollars required to hold the reserve. If the spr’s desired effects take place too slowly and the market corrects in the meantime, then its entire reason for being is suspect. Currently, the authority to decide what constitutes an oil cri- R F IGURE 6 Crude Prices and OPEC Capacity Utilization Capacity utilization Dollars per barrel 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 NYMEX WTI Price OPEC Capacity Utilization sis, how much sprshould be released in the event of a crisis, and the timing of the release rests with the president of the United States. At first glance, granting the authority to the president seems appropriate given the importance of oil to our economy. But our limited experience with emergency releases of the spr is checkered at best. The “too-little, too-late” release during the 1990–1991 Gulf Was illustrates the difficulty of deciding what constitutes a crisis and the timing of the release. In addition, Al Gore’s flagging poll numbers hardly constituted a national crisis. The Bush administration’s decision to increase the spr over a period of more than three years did very little to affect world oil prices. Rising world demand and years of low investment in new production capacity are the principal factors contributing to higher recent prices. Withdrawing oil from the spr will do nothing to alleviate those fundamental challenges and indeed could be counterproductive by encouraging consumption and diminishing incentives for new supply**.** While a larger sprmay make some people feel better, it has done nothing to eliminate the Achilles heal of the program— how to decide when to use it. Political institutions, even august ones like the presidency, have not inspired a great deal of confidence in their ability to handle such difficult tasks. Market based solutions to privatize this function, such as selling options on the spr, provide an intriguing possibility that warrant additional study

#### Political realities ensure incorrect usage - takes out ALL OF Their offense because sufficiently large SPR won’t be effective, but maintain the current system distorts market fundamentals that make the impact worse

Taylor and Van Doren, 05 [The Case against the Strategic Petroleum Reserve by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, CATO, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa555.pdf>]

Self-Liquidating Reserves “Whatever one believes about the effects of oil prices on the economy,” says Prof. Timothy Considine of Pennsylvania State University, “the effectiveness of the SPR depends critically on how it is actually used in a crisis.”70 Oil economist Philip Verleger concurs, “These stockpiles are of no use unless the oil is accessible quickly at the start of a disruption.”71 All of the published studies that quantify the net benefits of the SPR or optimal stockpile size assume that it will be used robustly and immediately at the onset of disruption. If it is not, then it is of very limited value. Our experience with the SPR suggests that politicians are unlikely to order inventory releases as quickly and as robustly as economists would recommend. The first major release of SPR crude oil was on January 16, 1991, in response to the onset of military hostilities between the United States and Iraq. The release was quite modest in size (21 million barrels) and occurred five months after global markets lost access to Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil supplies. The SPR was deployed too late to reduce prices and any economic damage that those prices caused. The second major release was in September 2000, but it was not in response to a global supply disruption. On that occasion, President Clinton loaned 30 million barrels to private oil traders with the understanding that the borrowed oil plus a bonus percentage of like crude would be returned to the reserve in October 2001. That release was hotly controversial even within the Clinton administration and faced substantial political criticism. The third major release was in response to Hurricane Katrina, when the federal government sold 11 million barrels and loaned an additional 12.6 million barrels to oil traders.72 None of those three releases were particularly large, and it’s unclear what effect, if any, those releases had on oil prices.73 The government’s reluctance to employ the SPR in the robust manner advised by economists is understandable. First, there is a value to delaying release until it’s clear whether those reserves might be more beneficially used in response to some future shock.74Second, given that most politicians and the general public view the SPR as a means to combat actual physical shortages rather than high prices, it’s unlikely that the executive branch will ever feel free to use the SPR in the uninhibited manner supported by most economists to combat oil price increases.75 Third, because EPCA states that no draw down can be authorized absent a presidential declaration that a “severe supply interruption” exists, any decision to release will likely be delayed to avoid alarming allies, foreign oil suppliers, the general public, and other market actors. The implication is that the damage from any price increase will occur long before the SPR can be used to address it.76Thus, Timothy Considine concludes: “Part of the problem stems from the legislation governing the use of the SPR in an emergency. A more fundamental problem arises from vesting a political entity with the inherently complex task of allocating oil across time and space—a task that is probably best left to market forces.”77 Although many economists who have long supported the existence of the SPR are today frustrated by the government’s reluctance to release the oil, that reluctance should not have come as a surprise. Historically, government stockpiles have been hoarded during emergencies rather than used.78 Jeffrey Williams and Brian Wright put it succinctly: “If the U.S. government’s management of inventories of metals is any guide, the oil [in the SPR] may never be released.”79

#### Independently, the plan decreases foreign and private inventories – since oil is traded on a global market, those solve just as well - the scope of them is bigger so the tradeoff is a massive opportunity cost

Taylor and Van Doren, 05 [The Case against the Strategic Petroleum Reserve by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, CATO, <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa555.pdf>]

Static Versus Dynamic Market Responses The studies of the costs and benefits of an SPR assume minimal response from market actors in the face of a supply disruption or subsequent SPR releases. For example, few of the published studies consider the possibility that private inventories (which, as previously noted, are today approximately three times larger than public inventories) will release significant quantities of oil into the market as a response to a supply disruption. Likewise, most of the published studies assume a very minimal response of supply to high prices during a crisis. For example, if supply interruptions were to occur during a time of excess production capacity, the benefits of an SPR release would be minimal. If market actors believe that a disruption will outlast the SPR, a release from the SPR would have little effect on price because inventory holders would outbid consumers for access to SPR oil.80 In fact, the market response to the supply disruption of 1979 was an inventory increase as a hedge against even greater future disruptions rather than an inventory release as a response to the disruption.81 Finally, economists acknowledge that maintaining public stockpiles discourages the accumulation of private inventories and perhaps even public inventories abroad because foreign governments have an incentive to “free ride” off U.S. inventories given that a U.S. release would reduce oil prices everywhere in the world. How much oil is displaced by the SPR is unknown,82 but most of the SPR benefits studies assume that a barrel of oil in the SPR equals one additional barrel of oil in the sum of (private and public) oil inventories. But, as Brian Wright and Jeffrey Williams argue:

#### The plan exacerbates the market impact of supply disruptions

Carafano, 11 [James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. , is Deputy Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Davis Institute, and Nicolas D. Loris is a Research Associate in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/not-the-time-to-tap-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve>]

Let Supply and Demand Work The global oil market can adjust to supply disruptions. Releasing reserves now simply allows the Administration to avoid addressing the underlying problem with U.S. energy policy that exacerbates the market impact of global supply disruptions. The problem is that the Obama Administration is artificially constraining supply to the market by denying Americans access to domestic oil. In the short term, increased production by global suppliers (particularly Saudi Arabia) will likely have a more significant impact on prices worldwide. As the President’s own Secretary of Energy, Steven Chu, rightly stated to reporters last week, “That’s going to mitigate prices. … Market forces will take care of this.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/not-the-time-to-tap-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1)” Over the longer term, the Administration can best assure affordable energy by dumping its strategy of subsidizing and promoting alternatives that are not cost-effective and will not have a significant impact on fuel supplies in the transportation sector. Rather, the Administration should be removing obstacles and regulatory barriers that prevent the private sector from accessing natural resources.

## china

### Rare Earth

#### China can’t cut off rare earth – Japan just hit the jackpot

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 3-24-2013; International Business Editor of The Daily Telegraph. He has covered world politics and economics for 30 years, based in Europe, the US, and Latin America. He joined the Telegraph in 1991, serving as Washington correspondent and later Europe correspondent in Brussels. “Japan breaks China's stranglehold on rare metals with sea-mud bonanza” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans\_pritchard/9951299/Japan-breaks-Chinas-stranglehold-on-rare-metals-with-sea-mud-bonanza.html

Japanese scientists have found vast reserves of rare earth metals on the Pacific seabed that can be mined cheaply, a discovery that may break the Chinese monopoly on a crucial raw material needed in hi-tech industries and advanced weapons systems. "We have found deposits that are just two to four metres from the seabed surface at higher concentrations than anybody ever thought existed, and it won't cost much at all to extract," said professor Yasuhiro Kato from Tokyo University, the leader of the team. While America, Australia, and other countries have begun to crank up production of the seventeen rare earth elements, they have yet to find viable amounts of the heavier metals such as dysprosium, terbium, europium, and ytterbium that are most important. China has a near total monopoly in the heavier end of the spectrum, though it is also the dominant supplier of the whole rare earth complex after driving rivals out of business in the 1990s. It still accounts for 97pc of global supply. Beijing shocked the world when it suddenly began to restrict exports in 2009, prompting furious protests and legal complaints by both the US and the EU at the World Trade Organisation. China claimed that it was clamping down on smuggling and environmental abuse. "Their real intention is to force foreign companies to locate plant in China. They're saying `if you want our rare earth metals, you must build your factory here, and we can then steal your technology," said professor Kato. Yasuhiro Kato, an associate professor of earth science at the University of Tokyo, displays a mud sample extracted from the depths of about 4,000 metres (13,123 ft) below the Pacific ocean surface where rare earth elements were found. – Reuters The team of scientists from Japan's Agency for Marine-Earth Science and the University of Tokyo first discovered huge reserves in the mid-Pacific two years ago. These are now thought to be 1000 times all land-based deposits, some of it in French waters around Tahiti. The latest discovery is in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone in deep-sea mud around the island of Minami-Torishima at 5,700 meters below sea level. Although it is very deep, the deposits are in highly-concentrated nodules that can be extracted using pressurised air with minimal disturbance off the seafloor and no need for the leaching. Professor Kato said exploration will continue for another two years before scaling up towards production. Over 50pc of the metal in the deposit is the heavier end of the spectrum, twice the level of China's key mines and without the radioactive by-product thorium that makes the metals so hard to mine. Japan consumes half the world's rare earth metals in its cars, electronics, and environmental industries, and has accused China of withholding supplies as a pressure tool. The country has been scrambling to find other sources under its "Strategy for Ensuring Stable Supplies of Rare Metals", but a joint venture in Vietnam that once looked promising has so far yielded only lighter rare earths. Professor Kato said a single ship drilling in the target zone at Minami-Torishima could supply Japan's needs for a year, breaking strategic dependence at minimal cost. "We don't need to mine it intensively. All we need is enough to force China to lower its prices."

### A2 Shocks = East Asia War

#### Oil stockpiling and energy sharing checks the impact of shocks

Hyun Jin Choi 2009; research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he conducted research on the ROK-U.S. alliance, crisis management, and civil-military relations, Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science at Michigan State University; “Fueling Crisis or Cooperation? The Geopolitics of Energy Security in Northeast Asia” Asian Affairs: An American Review Volume 36, Issue 1, 2009, Wilson Online

Oil Stockpiling Joint oil stockpiling is another area for cooperation among Northeast Asian states. A common oil stockpile could be an effective means of not only coping with short-term oil supply disruptions and price shocks, but also increasing the region's bargaining power with the Middle East.(FN109) Japan and South Korea, as IEA members, have already held national oil stocks equal to at least ninety days of net crude imports. China established its first emergency oil stocks in 2006 with a goal of securing ninety days of net imports by 2015. In the short term, Japan and South Korea can provide China with financial and technical assistance to facilitate the process of establishing efficient stocks of oil reserves. Then, in the long term, the three countries can jointly invest and build an "Asian network of oil stockpiles" with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states.(FN110) Recently the ASEAN Plus Three Energy Ministers Meeting participants had discussions concerning the development of a regional oil stockpile system.(FN111) At the August 2008 meeting, the ministers endorsed Japan's initiative to jointly prepare the "Oil Stockpiling Roadmap" over the next two years based on the principles of voluntary participation and mutual benefits.(FN112) The ministers also set up an expert working group, which has its first meeting in late November 2008, as a means to work on the details of the roadmap.

## econ

### shox

#### Trade solves the impact

Tobias N. Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman August 2011 Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

F. Lessons Learned The main lesson to be drawn from this model is that negative terms of trade shocks can be associated with positive and offsetting effects that help mitigate the direct impact on the domestic economy. The intuition is simple: a loss in the terms of trade is a gain to someone else and, depending on the degree of interlinkages, some of that gain will be shared. The net wealth effect is in principle ambiguous; it depends on the relative strength of the negative and positive effects.

### XT Historical/Statistical Evidence

#### Propensity of evidence shows high prices are historically strongly correlated with economic growth

Tobias N. Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman August 2011 Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

We analyze the co-movements of oil prices with our core macro variables by looking at correlations of the cyclical component of real series.4 The results are summarized in Table 2 and the following regularities emerge: Stylized fact #1: Oil prices and GDP tend to move in the same direction. In each of the four groups, correlations are positive on average. This reflects that for a majority of countries, periods of above-trend oil prices have generally coincided with above-trend output. Moreover, with correlations in all cases substantially higher in the second half of the sample than in the first half, this positive association has increased over time. Among individual countries, oil exporters clearly exhibit the highest correlations. Still, it is striking that the correlations are also positive for a large majority of oil importers. Indeed, the U.S. and Japan stand out as being the only OECD countries displaying a negative correlation over 1970–2010 (Figure 1).5 Stylized fact #2: Oil prices and imports tend to move in the same direction. Correlations for all three groups of oil importers are substantially higher than those between oil prices and GDP. Only a handful of countries display a negative correlation (Figure 2). Stylized fact #3: Oil prices and exports tend to move in the same direction. The correlations are strongest among oil exporters where they for all variables are the highest among all the country groups. For oil importers, in contrast, the correlations are somewhat smaller than for imports. Nevertheless, for all groups and sub-periods, the correlations are higher than for GDP, and negative for less than 1 in 10 countries (Figure 3).6 From these three stylized facts we conclude that oil prices tend to be positively associated with economic activity and also that the degree of co-movement has strengthened over time.7 The relationship is strongest for oil exporters, as one would expect, but is also clearly present among the majority of OECD countries and—somewhat less strongly—in oil-importing developing economies. This suggests that, especially in the second half of our sample period, variation in oil prices has been driven more by variation in demand than by variation in supply. Accordingly, oil price increases during the past two decades appear to a large extent a reflection of good times for the global economy.

## 1NR

### AT: CCP Instability

#### No CCP collapse

**Yuan, 12/20/2011** – associate professor and acting director of the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney (Jingdong, “The Arab Spring and China's Evolving Middle East Policy,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10992/the-arab-spring-and-chinas-evolving-middle-east-policy?page=1)

While Beijing has its concerns over the Arab Spring and its potentially infectious impacts on social and economic stability in China, there are strong reasons to believe that any imminent threat to Communist Party rule remains minimal and manageable. First, in most Middle Eastern countries, the autocratic ruler has personally reigned for decades and has instilled a political order that is typically repressive and nonrepresentative. The lack of any meaningful political participation provides ample frustration and is one of the principal reasons behind the various uprisings. By contrast, although China remains under one-party rule, managed term limits and an institutionalized leadership succession have been put in place. Second, there is a major difference between the Chinese economy and those of the Arab world. Chinese reforms over the past three decades have opened the country’s economy to the world, lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty and creating a sizable middle class that is more interested in gains in personal welfare than in politics. By contrast, the stagnation in many Middle Eastern economies, despite plentiful resources and oil revenues, has infuriated ordinary citizens, especially the restless young, who find employment elusive. However, perhaps the most critical difference is that Beijing retains **total control over the military**, the paramilitary and the police forces, on whose loyalty it can count. Having learned the lessons of the 1989 Tiananmen student uprising, the Chinese authorities quickly introduced and enforced censorship of social media after the initial Arab unrest and were resolute in stopping any organized protests from growing into massive social movements. These actions contrast sharply with the militaries and security forces in countries such as Egypt and Libya, which either split or abandoned the regimes they were supposed to protect, leading to the fall of Mubarak and Gadhafi.

### AT: Trade Add-on

#### China’s mercantilism is not threatening – no military power to even be able to conquer resources by other states

**Gelb 2010** – Leslie, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993. (GDP Now Matters More Than Force: A U. S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power. Foreign Affairs v. 89 no. 6 (November/December 2010) p. 35-43 )

The modern world has experienced two periods of globalization, both of which brought about new highs in trade and investment. Both sparked hopes that the common pursuit of riches would overshadow traditional military rivalries and sustain peace. The dreams of the first era, which lasted from 188o to 1914, drowned in the blood of World War I, then World War II, and finally the Cold War--close to a century of war. Many expect that the current era of globalization, which began as the Cold War faded, will also end unhappily. Yet the current era differs from the past in three crucial ways: unlike the German empire of yesteryear, today's surging power, **China, is unlikely to act as a spoiler**; major powers and emerging powers today are less likely than ever to fight one another; and, consequently, nations can pursue their economic interests without the traditional overriding military worries. In the pre-World War I era, Germany had the world's most dynamic economy, and the ambitions of German leaders greatly exceeded creating domestic wealth. They aimed to dominate the European landmass and beyond. The same was largely true of the Japanese empire before World War II, as it sought to rule Asia and much of the Pacific. Whereas most nations preferred to increase their wealth, Germany and Japan fixated on world domination and did not flinch from using force to achieve it. They were the world's most dynamic economies and also its spoilers. Skeptics today argue that China could be the second coming of those old and strategically greedy empires, but that argument is a stretch. The argument goes that contemporary China, like the Germany and Japan of old, will seek to dominate by money and trade if possible, and by force if not. To begin with, **China** **today is far behind the former Germany and Japan in possessing the military wherewithal necessary to conquer, occupy, and command the resources of other states**. Germany and Japan were able to fight most of the rest of the world for years. China is still decades away from having the capacity to project force--and sustain it--beyond its borders. In any event, worried nations, such as India, Japan, and the United States would have plenty of time to react to and counter an aggressive China. Germany and Japan placed their industrialized economies at the disposal of their military ambitions. For them, the military domination of others was a cost-effective way to control resources, and it did not strain their internal control. China could not afford such an aggressive military strategy, as Beijing has to subordinate almost everything to upgrading its economy. Because half of China's population is still poverty-stricken--a reality with explosive, revolutionary possibilities--the Communist Party feels that it must produce economic growth to stay in power.

#### China’s model does not lead to war – no military might

**Gelb 2010** – Leslie, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was a senior official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from 1977 to 1979, and he was a Columnist and Editor at The New York Times from 1981 to 1993. (GDP Now Matters More Than Force: A U. S. Foreign Policy for the Age of Economic Power. Foreign Affairs v. 89 no. 6 (November/December 2010) p. 35-43 )

China makes perhaps the best case for the primacy of economics. Although it might emerge as a spoiler decades hence, **Beijing currently promotes the existing economic order and does not threaten war.** Because Beijing has been playing the new economic game at a maestro level--staying out of wars and political confrontations and zeroing in on business--its global influence far exceeds its existing economic strength. China gains extra power from others' expectations of its future growth. **The country has become a global economic giant without becoming a global military power**. Nations do not fear China's military might; they fear its ability to give or withhold trade and investments.

#### Trade doesn’t solve war

**Goldstone 2007** (P.R., PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, AlterNet, September 25, http://www.alternet.org/audits/62848/?page=entire)

Many hope trade will constrain or perhaps pacify a rising China, resurgent Russia, and proliferation-minded Iran, as it well may. Nonetheless, any prudent analysis must incorporate caveats drawn from states' particular political economy of security policy. In non-democratic states, however important global markets may be to the economy in aggregate, elites will be most sensitive to sectoral interests of their specific power base. This mismatch can cause systematic distortions in their ability to interpret other states' strategic signals correctly when genuine conflicts of interest emerge with a nation more domestically constrained. Leadership elites drawn from domestic-oriented, uncompetitive, or non-tradable constituencies will tend to discount deterrent signals sent by trading partners whose own domestic institutions favor those commerce-oriented interests, believing such interests make partners less likely to fulfill their threats. For example, one reason the BJP government of India decided to achieve an open nuclear weapons capability was that its small-business, domestic-oriented heart constituency was both less vulnerable to trade sanctions and less willing to believe that the US would either impose or long sustain such sanctions, given its own increased economic interests in India. Sometimes, deterrent signals may not be sent at all, since one nation's governing coalition may include commerce-dependent groups whose interests prevent state leaders from actually undertaking necessary balancing responses or issuing potent signals of resolve in the first place; the result can be fatally muddled strategy and even war -- as witness the series of weak attempts before the First World War by finance-dominated Britain to deter "Iron and Rye"-dominated Germany. The emergence of truly global markets makes it all the less plausible under most circumstances that a revisionist state will be unable to find some alternative source of resources or outlet for its goods. Ironically, the more the international economy resembles a true global marketplace rather than an oligopolistic economic forum, the less likely it would appear that aggressors must inevitably suffer lasting retaliatory cut-offs in trade. There will always be someone else with the capability to buy and sell.

### Soft Power Impact Cards

**Soft power accesses all their impacts and averts nuclear war.**

**Nye and Armitage, 2007** − Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and President of Armitage International

(Joseph & Richard, \*Note: Report was in collaboration with about 50 other congressmen, “CCIS Commission of Smart Power – A Smarter, more Secure America”, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106\_csissmartpowerreport.pdf) MP

Today’s Challenges The twenty-first century presents a number of unique foreign policy challenges for today’s decisionmakers. These challenges exist at an international, transnational, and global level. Despite America’s status as the lone global power, the **durability of the current international order** is uncertain. America must help find a way for today’s norms and institutions to accommodate rising powers that may hold a different set of principles and values. Furthermore, countries invested in the current order may waiver in their commitment to take action to minimize the threats posed by violent non-state actors and regional powers who challenge this order. The information age has heightened political consciousness, but also made political groupings less cohesive. Small, adaptable, transnational networks have access to tools of destruction that are increasingly cheap, easy to conceal, and more readily available. Although the integration of the global economy has brought tremendous benefits, vectors of prosperity have also become vectors of **instability**. Threats such as **pandemic disease** and the **collapse of financial markets** are more distributed and more likely to arise without warning. The threat of widespread physical harm to the planet posed by **nuclear catastrophe** has existed for half a century, though the realization of the threat will become more likely as the number of nuclear weapons states increases. The potential security challenges posed by **climate change** raise the possibility of an entirely new set of threats for the United States to consider. The next administration will need a strategy that speaks to each of these challenges. Whatever specific approach it decides to take, two principles will be certain: First, an extra dollar spent on hard power will not necessarily bring an extra dollar’s worth of security. It is difficult to know how to invest wisely when there is not a budget based on a strategy that specifies trade-offs among instruments. Moreover, hard power capabilities are a necessary but insufficient guarantee of security in today’s context. Second, success and failure will turn on the ability to win new allies and strengthen old ones both in government and civil society. The key is not how many enemies the United States kills, but how many allies it grows. States and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw in allies will gain competitive advantages in today’s environment. Those who alienate potential friends will stand at greater risk. Terrorists, for instance, depend on their ability to attract support from the crowd at least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight. Exporting Optimism, Not Fear Since its founding, the United States has been willing to fight for universal ideals of liberty, equality, and justice. This higher purpose, sustained by military and economic might, attracted people and governments to our side through two world wars and five decades of the Cold War. Allies accepted that American interests may not always align entirely with their own, but U.S. leadership was still critical to realizing a more peaceful and prosperous world. There have been times, however, when America’s sense of purpose has fallen out of step with the world. Since 9/11, the United States has been exporting fear and anger rather than more traditional values of hope and optimism. Suspicions of American power have run deep. Even traditional allies have questioned whether America is hiding behind the righteousness of its ideals to pursue some other motive. At the core of the problem is that America has made the war on terror the central component of its global engagement. This is not a partisan critique, nor a Pollyannaish appraisal of the threats facing America today. The threat from terrorists with global reach and ambition is real. It is likely to be with us for decades. Thwarting their hateful intentions is of fundamental importance and must be met with the sharp tip of America’s sword. On this there can be **no serious debate**. But excessive use of force can actually abet terrorist recruitment among local populations. We must strike a balance between

**Airborne viruses mean extinction**

More 93 (Gannett News Service, January 11, p. l/n)

Preston asks an author of the report whether “an emerging virus could wipeout our species.” The virologist replies that HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, could do the job, especially if it were to mutate into an airborne diseases like influenza. “There is no reason in principle why HIV couldn’t spread by the respitory route,” he notes.

### Heg Impact Cards

#### Global nuclear war

Brooks, et al, 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment [Stephen G. Brooks](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/results?section1=author&search1=Stephen%20G.%20Brooks) [(bio)](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#back), [G. John Ikenberry](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/results?section1=author&search1=G.%20John%20Ikenberry) [(bio)](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#back) and [William C. Wohlforth](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/results?section1=author&search1=William%20C.%20Wohlforth) [(bio)](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#back), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, [International Security](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security) ¶ [Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins.37.3.html), p. Project Muse]

Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if deep engagement's costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars.¶ A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence **of a far** [End Page 33] **more dangerous global security environment**. For one thing, as noted above, the United States' overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.[72](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f72)

#### Fettweis is wrong

**Beede 11** (Librarian Emeritus at Rutgers University, Princeton University graduate and author of The Small Wars of the United States, 1899-2009: An Annotated Bibliography (Routledge Research Guides to American Military Studies) , Military and Strategic Policy: An Annotated Bibliography (Bibliographies and Indexes in Military Studies) , Index to Contemporary Military Articles of the World War II Era, 1939-1949 (Bibliographies and Indexes in Military Studies), Independence Documents of the World, The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898T1934: An Encyclopedia (Military History of the United States), The legal sources of public policy. October 2011, “Losing Hurts Twice as Bad: The Four States to Moving Beyond Iraq – By Christopher J. Fettweis,” http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00321.x/pdf)

Fettweis uses Iraq to argue for a strategy of restraint based on his sanguine view that “we [the United States and, indeed, the entire world] are living in a golden age” (31, emphasis in the original), and that “[g]reat power conﬂict today is all but unthinkable; therefore, calculations surrounding the dangers posed by a united Eurasia should change, since the threats it once posed no longer exist” (208). With the end of the Cold War, the ability of the enemies of the United States to harm this country is quite limited. Hostile acts can be perpetrated, but such attacks cannot overthrow the United States (31). This strategy is hardly new. Years ago, it was summarized in these words, “Instead of preserving obsolete Cold War alliances and embarking on an expensive and dangerous campaign for global stability, the United States should view the collapse of Soviet power as an opportunity to adopt a less interventionist policy” (Carpenter 1992, 167). Despite the optimistic picture painted by some national security theorists, the world does contain some dangerous elements. David E. Sanger (2009), for example, presents a chilling picture of nuclear weapons in very possibly unsteady hands.

Much is said in the book concerning national “credibility,” that is, the ability of a country to maintain its prestige and its reputation for decisive action based on its past performance. Fettweis argues that many governmental leaders, academic commentators, and journalists have been obsessed with this element of national power and have wanted the United States to deal with virtually any political crisis that occurs (161-75). Fettweis states that “[f]or some reason, U.S. policymakers seem to be especially prone to overestimate the threats they face” (116). **There is no explanation of why this should be the case**, nor is there any comparison with the propensity of **leaders in other countries** to **make similar inaccurate projections.**

#### Heg solves china war

Thayer, 6 [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]

They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. **But China may not be confident those strategies would work**, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.

#### US power de-escalates and flips your economy impact

Mandelbaum, 5 (Michael, Christian A. Herter professor of American foreign policy at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, *The Case For Goliath*, p.192-195)

Although the spread of nuclear weapons, with the corresponding increase in the likelihood that a nuclear shot would be fired in anger somewhere in the world, counted as the most serious potential consequence of the abandonment by the United States of its role as the world's government, it was not the only one. In the previous period of American international reticence, the 1920s and 1930s, the global economy suffered serious damage that a more active American role might have mitigated. A twenty-first-century American retreat could have similarly adverse international economic consequences. The economic collapse of the 1930s caused extensive hardship throughout the world and led indirectly to World War II by paving the way for the people who started it to gain power in Germany and Japan. In retrospect, the Great Depression is widely believed to have been caused by a series of errors in public policy that made an economic downturn far worse than it would have been had governments responded to it in appropriate fashion. Since the 1930s, acting on the lessons drawn from that experience by professional economists, governments have taken steps that have helped to prevent a recurrence of the disasters of that decade.5 In the face of reduced demand, for example, governments have increased rather than cut spending. Fiscal and monetary crises have evoked rescue efforts rather than a studied indifference based on the assumption that market forces will readily reestablish a desirable economic equilibrium. In contrast to the widespread practice of the 1930s, political authorities now understand that putting up barriers to imports in an attempt to revive domestic production will in fact worsen economic conditions everywhere. Still, a serious, prolonged failure of the international economy, inflicting the kind of hardship the world experienced in the 1930s (which some Asian countries also suffered as a result of their fiscal crises in the 1990s) does not lie beyond the realm of possibility. Market economies remain subject to cyclical downturns, which public policy can limit but has not found a way to eliminate entirely. Markets also have an inherent tendency to form bubbles, excessive values for particular assets, whether seventeenth century Dutch tulips or twentieth century Japanese real estate and Thai currency, that cause economic harm when the bubble bursts and prices plunge. In responding to these events, governments can make errors. They can act too slowly, or fail to implement the proper policies, or implement improper ones. Moreover, the global economy and the national economies that comprise it, like a living organism, change constantly and sometimes rapidly: Capital flows across sovereign borders, for instance, far more rapidly and in much greater volume in the early twenty-first century than ever before. This means that measures that successfully address economic malfunctions at one time may have less effect at another, just as medical science must cope with the appearance of new strains of influenza against which existing vaccines are not effective. Most importantly, since the Great Depression, an active American international economic role has been crucial both in fortifying the conditions for global economic well-being and in coping with the problems that have occurred, especially periodic recessions and currency crises, by applying the lessons of the past. The absence of such a role could weaken those conditions and aggravate those problems. The overall American role in the world since World War II therefore has something in common with the theme of the Frank Capra film It's a Wonderful Life, in which the angel Clarence, played by Henry Travers, shows James Stewart, playing the bank clerk George Bailey, who believes his existence to have been worthless, how life in his small town of Bedford Falls would have unfolded had he never been born. George Bailey learns that people he knows and loves turn out to be far worse off without him. So it is with the United States and its role as the world's government. Without that role, the world very likely would have been in the past, and would become a less secure and less prosperous place. The abdication by the United States of some or all of the responsibilities for international security that it had come to bear in the first decade of the twenty-first century would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, which keeps countries from smashing into each other, as they are historically prone to do. In this sense, a world without America would be the equivalent of a freeway full of cars without brakes. Similarly, should the American government abandon some or all of the ways in which it had, at the dawn of the new century, come to support global economic activity, the world economy would function less effectively and might even suffer a severe and costly breakdown. A world without the United States would in this way resemble a fleet of cars without gasoline.

### 2nc uniqueness wall

#### Will pass now – new momentum – legislation on the 8th of April

Associated Press March 29, 2013 “Possible breakthrough on immigration reform” http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2013/03/possible\_breakthrough\_on\_immig.html

- Big business and major labor unions appeared ready Friday to end a fight over a new low-skilled worker program that had threatened to upend negotiations on a sweeping immigration bill in the Senate providing a pathway to citizenship for 11 million immigrants already in the U.S.¶ Sen. Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York, who's been brokering talks between the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce, said in a statement that negotiators are "very close, closer than we have ever been, and we are very optimistic." He said there were still a few issues remaining.¶ The talks stalled late last week amid a dispute over wages for workers in the new program, and senators left town for a two-week recess with the issue in limbo. Finger-pointing erupted between the AFL-CIO and the chamber, with each side accusing the other of trying to sink immigration reform, leaving prospects for a resolution unclear.¶ But talks resumed this week, and now officials from both sides indicate the wage issue has been largely resolved. An agreement would likely clear the way for a bipartisan group of senators to unveil legislation the week of April 8 to dramatically overhaul the U.S. immigration system, strengthening the border and cracking down on employers as well as remaking the legal immigration system while providing a path to citizenship for 11 million illegal immigrants already in the U.S.

#### Immigration reform will pass now insiders cite substantial progress and consensus now

Meghashyam Mali (writer for The Hill) March 25, 2013 “Obama to host new citizens, push for action on immigration reform” http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/290053-obama-to-host-new-citizens-press-congress-on-immigration-reform

The move comes as the president continues to press lawmakers to pass comprehensive immigration reform, one of his second-term priorities.¶ Obama will be joined by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Director Alejandro Mayorkas in the East Room. The president will deliver remarks at the ceremony, the White House announced.¶ “The event underscores the contributions made to the United States by immigrants from all walks of life, including the foreign-born members of the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as our shared history as a nation of immigrants,” said a White House official. “While the President remains pleased that Congress continues to make progress towards commonsense immigration reform, he believes Congress needs to act quickly, and he expects a bill to be introduced as soon as possible.”¶ Bipartisan groups in both the House and Senate are moving closer to unveiling separate immigration reform proposals.¶ The Senate’s “Gang of Eight” introduced their framework in January, calling for a pathway to citizenship, heightened border security, increased high-skilled immigration and a guest worker program. ¶ But since then, senators have been tied down in negotiations over the details of the plan, with many key issues still unresolved. Reports last week, though, said that sources close to the talks said they hoped to have a bill by the end of April.¶ The bipartisan House group has yet to share details of their proposals, but their work has already received general support from leaders in both parties. ¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) last week praised their work as a “pretty responsible solution.”¶ House Minority Whip Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) said the group was “very close to an agreement,” and that lawmakers had made “real progress.”¶ Advocates for immigration reform see a real chance that a bill could pass Congress this year, with growing momentum on both sides. But any immigration deal would need to pass muster with House GOP lawmakers, many of whom have said they will oppose measures that grant “amnesty” to illegal immigrants and have questioned proposed protections for gay or lesbian couples.¶ But after the strong showing President Obama made among Hispanic voters in the 2012 election, a growing number of conservative lawmakers have signaled they would back immigration reform, including measures to provide a pathway to citizenship.

#### GOP caving now on immigration reform

The National Journal March 20, 2013 “The Edge: Can Anything Move Congress on Gun Control?” http://www.nationaljournal.com/the-edge-newsletter/the-edge-can-anything-move-congress-on-gun-control-20130320

GOP RESISTANCE TO IMMIGRATION REFORM CRUMBLES. Many are talking about the New York Times story today that begins as follows: “Republican opposition to legalizing the status of millions of illegal immigrants is crumbling in the nation’s capital as leading lawmakers in the party scramble to halt eroding support among Hispanic voters—a shift that is providing strong momentum for an overhaul of immigration laws.” The story goes on to note recent comments from Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., and Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., urging a new way forward, but points out that lawmakers like Paul are being careful to avoid the perception that they support amnesty.

### at: gun control thumper

#### Gun control won’t prevent action on immigration reform

**Kayyem 1-21**

[Juliette Kayyem, The Boston Globe, JANUARY 21, 2013, “Action on guns and immigration needed” http://bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/01/21/president-obama-has-opportunities-guns-immigration/uRCngtyVOuJ51De55A8HyK/story.html]

Neither immigration nor gun control had a significant place in Obama’s first-term agenda. Indeed, at their core, both are public safety programs — messy and dark and generally removed from the “hope” that got him to the White House. But in the span of a few weeks, the 2012 presidential election and the massacre at Newtown, Conn., provided the impetus for a renewed push for both comprehensive immigration reform and comprehensive gun controls. The question now is whether the White House can do both, and that has proponents of immigration reform very anxious. Pro-immigration forces had the president’s ear in November. Hispanics are now over 10 percent of the total electorate, twice as big a portion as just 20 years ago, and they gave Obama over 70 percent of their votes. But then all those children were killed in Newtown, and immigration reform became a lesser priority. The moral obligation to address gun violence fell quickly on Obama and Vice President Joe Biden. Their announcement last week of sweeping legislative and administrative changes was driven by a near-universal revulsion at what happened in Connecticut. A CBS News/New York Times poll released last Thursday showed that, among Democrats, 93 percent support background check for gun purchasers; among Republicans, it’s 89 percent. These numbers are more than a mandate; they make some kind of change a foregone conclusion. The political reality today is that immigration reform and gun control can occur simultaneously, because they are being driven by different forces. This is hopeful news for those who believe we should be judged as a nation both by how we treat our newest citizens and protect our youngest ones. With Republicans now eager to engage in a discussion on immigration reform, to undo some of the damage of their past resistance, Obama can leave much of the impetus for immigration to the red states and promote gun control via the blue ones. The last part is already happening: Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, and New York Governor Andrew Cuomo either are pushing, or have already passed, state legislation in tandem with the White House’s gun-control effort. Democrats in conservative states, like Senator Mary Landrieu of Louisiana and Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, will need the White House to stay engaged on gun control, if only to provide them with cover. Meanwhile, as Republicans become more recalcitrant on gun control — and the lunacy of the NRA’s media campaign continues — they will need to find an issue that makes them seem kinder and gentler. Enter immigration reform. The Republicans know that their future rests on embracing a more diverse electorate. They need immigration reform as much as it needs them. This pressure is felt most acutely by state-level Republican leaders aiming for 2016, such as Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal. Hints of this strategy were apparent last week, when the White House complimented Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio for conceding, in a Wall Street Journal interview, that he would support a path for citizenship for 11 million illegal immigrants. The Obama administration can afford to be gracious to Rubio, the GOP’s rising star and a likely 2016 presidential candidate. They had stolen his thunder last summer when they stopped deportations of young, illegal immigrants (the DREAMers) before Rubio could get a similar proposal out. Republican governors in swing states, such as New Mexico’s Susana Martinez and Nevada’s Brian Sandoval, are showing a particular receptiveness to immigration reform (as they are to Obamacare). They can see the future of their electorate, and it is neither red, blue, nor white.

#### Obama PC puts immigration at the top of the docket

Jennifer Epstein (writer for Politico) March 27, 2013 “Obama renews push on immigration reform” http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/03/obama-renews-push-on-immigration-reform-160372.html?hp=r3

President Obama sought to refocus the political conversation on immigration reform Wednesday in interviews with two Spanish-language networks that come after weeks of news cycles dominated by discussions of guns, sequestration and same-sex marriage.¶ In interviews with Telemundo and Univision conducted Wednesday at the White House, the president stayed firm on the immigration reform timeline he set earlier this year and voiced confidence in the bipartisan group of eight senators who are negotiating a bill.¶ “I think we’ve seen enormous progress over the last month and a half,” Obama said in an interview with Telemundo. “I think both sides, Democrats and Republicans, have been very serious about the negotiations. I’m actually very optimistic that when they return in early April … we’ll see a bill ready to move through the process.”¶ "We're seeing right now a good, bipartisan spirit. I want to encourage that," he added on Univision. "Hopefully we'll be able to get it done."

### AT: Link Turn

#### Plan controversial – empirics prove – especially with dems

WaPo, 08 [Stop Filling U.S. Oil Reserves?, Reprinted,

http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/energywire/2008/05/stop\_filling\_us\_oil\_reserves.html

Stop Filling U.S. Oil Reserves?¶ Today members of Congress will press President Bush to halt purchases of crude oil by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in a bid to do something – anything – to tamp down crude oil prices, which have doubled in the last year. The reserve, created in the aftermath of the 1973-1974 oil embargo, has been quietly stockpiling oil in the Louisiana Salt Caverns for three decades, with only a handful of pauses. Bush says the amount of oil being purchased by the strategic reserve – about 70,000 barrels a day – is too tiny to make any difference in oil prices. But members of Congress, including 16 Senate Republicans, say it’s worth a try.¶ How did a suspension in purchases by the Strategic Petroleum Reserve become a cause célèbre in Congress?¶ The idea has originated in large part with the Aspen, Col.-based oil consultant Philip K. Verleger. An economist, Verleger was director of the Office of Domestic Energy Policy at the U.S. Treasury under President Carter and later a lecturer at Yale University. He has been an independent consultant for some time and a provocative analyst of oil markets. For months, he has been advocating a halt in the strategic reserve purchases, which he said take the most desirable, easy-to-refine light crude oil off the market at a sensitive time for supplies. The purchases directly affect demand for the oil used as a benchmark by the closely-watched New York Mercantile Exchange. Verleger has also suggested that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve could sell some of its light crude oil and buy the same amount of cheaper, lower quality heavy crude oil, which can be used by some but not all U.S. refineries.¶ How much a suspension of strategic reserve purchases would sway price is a matter of dispute. Though the Strategic Petroleum Reserve purchases account for 0.3 percent of demand for that grade of petroleum, Verleger testified that it could add 10 percent to the price of light sweet crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Today House Speaker Nancy Pelosi put out a press release noting that Bush did in fact halt additions to the SPR in 2006 to blunt the rise in prices. But Bush now says that the oil bought by the reserve amounts to less than 0.1 percent of world oil demand.¶ If the purchases seem like a drop in the bucket of world demand, they also represent a drop in the bucket of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which currently has 701.3 million barrels, equal to 52 days of all U.S. petroleum imports. On Jan. 23, 2007, Bush announced plans to expand the reserve to 1.5 billion barrels.¶ Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.) has been rallying lawmakers’ support since March. “All of us feel very strongly that it makes no sense at all for the administration to be taking action to put upward pressure on prices when the SPRO is 90 percent filled,” Dorgan told me.¶ \*\*\* UPDATE: May 13th, 1:58pm: The Senate voted this afternoon to suspend oil deliveries to the country’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve until crude prices fall below $75 a barrel. The measure cleared the Senate in a 97-to-1 vote as part of a flood insurance reform bill.

#### Dems key to immigration reform

Shikha Dalmia (Columnist for The Examiner) March 14, 2013 “Shikha Dalmia: Democratic obstacles to immigration reform” http://washingtonexaminer.com/shikha-dalmia-democratic-obstacles-to-immigration-reform/article/2524332

On immigration reform, Republicans are supposed to be the bad guys and Democrats the good guys. Republicans think only about their own political interests, Democrats only about poor immigrants and the country.¶ The part about Republicans is certainly true. But the part about Democrats? Not quite.¶ Democrats could likely pass comprehensive immigration reform today without sacrificing any immigrant -- legal or illegal, high-tech or low-skilled -- if they'd simply give up their quest for a new vote bank.¶ Every aspect of our immigration system is broken, especially the employment-based part.¶ A majority of foreign techies can't get a work permit or H1-B because of the insanely low annual cap on these visas. And if they do get one, they have to wait decades for their green cards because those, too, have an insanely low cap. During this time, these workers can't switch jobs and their spouses can't work. In effect, they and their families are in indentured servitude to their sponsoring company. Every sensible lawmaker aside from a small band of ultra-restrictionists -- largely though not exclusively in the GOP -- agrees that removing these quotas upon quotas is a noble goal.¶ Sign Up for the Opinion Digest newsletter!¶ But Democrats want "comprehensive" -- as opposed to piecemeal -- immigration reform that simultaneously tackles not just the issues of high-skilled workers, but also low-skilled ones, including amnesty for a very large and mostly Latino unauthorized population. Republicans claim that unless the border is sealed, an amnesty deal would only encourage more border jumping.¶ This is backward thinking. Latinos come to the country illegally not because they like breaking the law, but because they have no choice. If landing H1-Bs is hard, landing H2-Bs -- temporary work permits that nonagricultural low-skilled foreigners need -- is nearly impossible. Latinos who get them have to leave immediately after their job is done. They can't stay on and apply for green cards. The upshot is that they are forced to either enter illegally or stay illegally. Or both.¶ It is not fair to penalize Latinos who responded to such perverse incentives by denying them amnesty. And fixing these incentives for future Latinos would require creating a usable guest worker program complete with a green card option, just like skilled workers have.¶ Republicans understand the importance of incentives, so the real reason they are resisting is that they fear that amnesty will hand Democrats millions of new voters -- which is precisely why Democrats won't give an inch on the issue.¶ Democrats' insistence on comprehensive reform makes sense to the extent that fixing the high-skilled component piecemeal would leave Republicans little incentive to return to the table to tackle the problem of unauthorized Latinos. However, this doesn't mean that citizenship for illegals can't be deferred if they are given a path to legalization now.¶ It would be far preferable from the standpoint of the American polity to extend full citizenship to the unauthorized population sooner rather than later. It is simply not healthy for a country founded on equality to have in its midst a permanent underclass that is taxed but can't vote.¶ But from the standpoint of the illegals themselves, "green-cards-now-citizenship-later" would be an acceptable compromise. They want to come out of the shadows and build a life in broad daylight. They really want to be able to drive cars legally, and not necessarily to hit the polling booths. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of the 5.4 million Mexicans in the United States who are eligible for naturalization haven't applied for it.¶ Rush Limbaugh, a fierce critic of amnesty, recently said he would be willing to go along if its beneficiaries weren't able to vote for some years. This isn't exactly noble, but it is progress.¶ But instead of building on such openings, Democrats seem determined to hold out for the full enchilada. Last week, they even excoriated poor Gov. Jeb Bush, an ardent advocate for regularizing immigrants' status, just because his latest book flirts with the idea of legalization short of full citizenship. For his labors, Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev., even called him a "fool."¶ In short, to garner more Latino votes, Democrats seem willing to hold hostage a reform package that might: fix the existing guest worker and permanent residency program for high-skilled workers; create a new guest worker and a permanent residency program for future low-skilled workers; and hand green cards to unauthorized immigrants.¶ Six years ago, Republican stupidity torpedoed a Republican president's reform efforts. Now Democratic cupidity might derail a Democratic president's reform efforts. The victims then as now will be immigrants of all stripes and hues -- not to mention the U.S. economy. It'll be interesting to see what President Obama does about it.

#### Energy is an irredeemable fight-disrupts his push on immigration

**Harder, National Journal, 2-6-13**

(Amy, “In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet”, [www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206](http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206), DOA: 2-9-13, ldg)

At a news conference where TV cameras in the back were nearly stacked on top of each other, an influential bipartisan group of five senators introduced legislation late last month to overhaul the nation’s immigration system. The room was so crowded that no open seats or standing room could be found. A week later, one senator, Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, was standing at the podium in the same room to unveil her energy-policy blueprint. There were several open seats and just a few cameras. At least one reporter was there to ask the senator about her position on President Obama’s choice for Defense secretary, former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel. “I’m doing energy right now,” Murkowski responded. “I’m focused on that.” Almost everyone else on Capitol Hill is focused on something else. Aside from the broad fiscal issues, Congress and the president are galvanizing around immigration reform. Four years ago, the White House prioritized health care reform above comprehensive climate-change legislation. The former will go down in history as one of Obama’s most significant accomplishments. The latter is in the perpetual position of second fiddle. “To everything,” Murkowski interjected fervently when asked by National Journal Daily whether energy and climate policy was second to other policies in Washington’s pecking order. Murkowski, ranking member of the Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said she hoped the Super Bowl blackout would help the public understand the importance of energy policy. “This issue of immigration: Why are we all focused on that? Well, it’s because the Republicans lost the election because in part we did not have the Hispanic community behind us,” Murkowski said this week. “What is it that brings about that motivation? Maybe it could be something like a gap in the Super Bowl causes the focus on energy that we need to have. I can only hope.” It will take more than hope. Elections have consequences, but so far the only kind of electoral consequence climate and energy policy has instigated is one that helped some lawmakers who supported cap-and-trade legislation to lose their seats in the 2010 midterm elections. For the pendulum to swing the other way—for lawmakers to lose their seats over not acting on climate and energy policy—seems almost unfathomable right now. Billions of dollars are invested in the fossil-fuel power plants, refineries, and pipelines that the country depends on today. The companies that own this infrastructure have a business interest in keeping things the way they are. Immigration reform doesn’t face such formidable interests invested in the status quo. “They [businesses] have employees—real, visible people—who they value and who they want to make legal as soon as possible,” said Chris Miller, who until earlier this year was the top energy and environment adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev. On energy and climate-change policy, Miller added, “You’re probably never going to have anything like the fence in the Southwest or the border-control issue that **push**es action and debate **on immigration**, because climate-change impacts will likely continue to be more abstract in the public's mind until those impacts are so crystal-clear it’s too late for us to do anything.” Another, tactical reason helps build momentum on immigration and not on other issues. **Obama can capitalize on immigration** as it becomes more of a wedge issue within the GOP. On energy and climate policy, Obama faces a unified Republican Party. “**The president has cracked the code on how to push his agenda items through**. He learned from his victories on the payroll tax and the fiscal cliff that the key is to stake out the political high ground on issues that poll in his favor while exploiting the divisions within the GOP,” said a former Republican leadership aide who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. “**With this in mind, the next logical place for him to go is immigration. Unlike issues like energy** or tax reform where the GOP is united, he can claim a big win on immigration reform while striking a political blow to Republicans.”

### AT: Winners Win

#### Winners lose---PC’s not renewable, is zero-sum, and diminishes fast

Ryan 9 Selwyn, Professor Emeritus and former Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, “Obama and political capital,” 1/18 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article\_opinion?id=161426968

Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be difficult **for him** to deliver half of what he **has** promised, let alone all of it. Reality will force **him to make** many "u" turns and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a **vast accumulation of political capital**, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and fast diminishing **asset** in today's world of instant communication, which once misspent, is **rarely ever renewable**. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who did not know how to husband the political capital with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama's face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You." Despite the general optimism about Obama's ability to deliver, many groups have already begun to complain about being betrayed. Gays, union leaders, and women have been loud in their complaints about being by-passed or overlooked. Some radical blacks have also complained about being disrespected. Where and when is Joshua going to lead them to the promised land, they ask? When is he going to pull the troops out of Iraq? Civil rights groups also expect Obama to dis-establish Guantanamo as soon as he takes office to signal the formal break with Dick Cheney and Bush. They also want him to discontinue the policy which allows intelligence analysts to spy on American citizens without official authorisation. In fact, Obama startled supporters when he signalled that he might do an about-turn and continue this particular policy. We note that Bush is signalling Obama that keeping America safe from terrorists should be his top priority item and that he, Bush, had no regrets about violating the constitutional rights of Americans if he had to do so to keep them safe. Cheney has also said that he would do it again if he had to. The safety of the republic is after all the highest law. Other groups-sub-prime home owners, workers in the automobile sector, and the poor and unemployed generally all expect Obama to work miracles on their behalf, which of course he cannot do. Given the problems of the economy which has not yet bottomed out, some promises have to be deferred beyond the first term. Groups, however, expect that the promise made to them during the campaign must be kept. Part of the problem is that almost every significant social or ethnic group believes that it was instrumental in Obama's victory. White women felt that they took Obama over the line, as did blacks generally, Jews, Hispanics, Asians, rich white men, gays, and young college kids, to mention a few of those whose inputs were readily recognisable. Obama also has a vast constituency in almost every country in the world, all of whom expect him to save the globe and the planet. Clearly, he is the proverbial "Black Knight on a White Horse." One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that American politics **is not a winner-take-all system**. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting anything donepolitically, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, requiresgroups to negotiate, bargain and engage in **serious horse trading.** No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do. Although Obama is fully aware of the political limitations of the office which he holds, he is fully aware of the vast stock of political capital which he currently has in the bank and he evidently plans to enlarge it by drawing from the stock held by other groups, dead and alive. He is clearly drawing heavily from the caparisoned cloaks of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Obama seems to believe that by playing the all-inclusive, multipartisan, non-ideological card, he can get most of his programmes through the Congress without having to spend capital by using vetoes, threats of veto, or appeals to his 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party").

#### PC is finite---fights on one issue make pushing others harder

Hayward 12 John is a writer at Human Events. “DON’T BE GLAD THE BUFFETT RULE IS DEAD, BE ANGRY IT EVER EXISTED,” 4/17, http://www.humanevents.com/2012/04/17/dont-be-glad-the-buffett-rule-is-dead-be-angry-it-ever-existed/

Toomey makes the excellent point that Obama’s class-warfare sideshow act is worse than useless, because it’s wasting America’s valuable time, even as the last fiscal sand runs through our hourglass. Politicians speak of “political capital” in selfish terms, as a pile of chips each party hoards on its side of the poker table, but in truth America has only a finite amount of political capital in total. When time and energy is wasted on pointless distractions, the capital expended---in the form of the public’s attention, and the debates they hold among themselves---cannot easily be regained. ¶ There is an “opportunity cost” associated with the debates we aren’t having, and the valid ideas we’re not considering, when our time is wasted upon nonsense that is useful only to political re-election campaigns. Health care reform is the paramount example of our time, as countless real, workable market-based reforms were obscured by the flaccid bulk of ObamaCare. The Buffett Rule, like all talk of tax increases in the shadow of outrageous government spending, likewise distracts us from the real issues.

#### Winner’s win theory not true for Obama

**American Prospect, 5-16-11**, p. http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack\_obamas\_theory\_of\_power

Obama won more legislative trophies during his first two years than Clinton did, but in many respects, they were poisoned chalices. Health reform proved broadly unpopular because of political missteps—a net negative for Democrats in the 2010 midterm. The stimulus, though valuable, was too small to be a major political plus. Obama hailed it as a great victory rather than pledging to come back for more until recovery was assured. He prematurely abandoned the fight for jobs as his administration’s central theme, though the recession still wracked the nation. And because of the administration’s alliance with Wall Street, Obama suffered both the appearance and reality of being too close to the bankers, despite a partial success on financial reform. Obama’s mortgage-rescue program was the worst of both worlds—it failed to deliver enough relief to make an economic difference yet still signaled politically disabling sympathy for both “deadbeat” homeowners and for bankers. (See this month’s special report on page A1.)

### AT: PC Not Key

#### Polcap is key to managing both sides to secure comprehensive reform

DMN, 13 (Dallas Morning News, “Editorial: Actions must match Obama’s immigration pledge,” 1/2/2013, <http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20130102-editorial-actions-must-match-obamas-immigration-pledge.ece>)

President Barack Obama said all the right things Sunday about immigration reform. The president told NBC’s Meet the Press that he is serious about getting Congress to overhaul the laws governing immigrants. He even declared that he will introduce an immigration bill this year. This newspaper welcomes that announcement. Texans particularly understand the unique challenges that an outdated immigration system presents. Even though the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. has subsided in the last few years, the many holes in the system leave families, schools, businesses and law enforcement struggling. And those are just some of the constituents challenged by flawed immigration laws. The president’s words to NBC’s David Gregory are only that — words. What will really matter is whether he puts his muscle into the task this year. We suggest that Obama start by looking at the example of former President George W. Bush. Back in 2006 and 2007, the Republican and his administration constantly worked Capitol Hill to pass a comprehensive plan. They failed, largely because Senate Republicans balked. But the opposition didn’t stop the Bush White House from fully engaging Congress, including recalcitrant Republicans. Obama may have a similar problem with his own party. The dirty little secret in the 2006 and 2007 immigration battles was that some Democrats were content to let Senate Republicans kill the effort. Labor-friendly Democrats didn’t want a bill, either. And they may not want one this year. That reluctance is a major reason the president needs to invest in this fight. He must figure out how to bring enough Democrats along, while also reaching out to Republicans. In short, the nation doesn’t need a repeat of the process through which the 2010 health care legislation was passed. Very few Republicans bought into the president’s plan, leaving the Affordable Care Act open to partisan sniping throughout last year’s election. If the nation is going to create a saner immigration system, both parties need to support substantial parts of an answer. The new system must include a guest worker program for future immigrants and a way for illegal immigrants already living here to legalize their status over time. Some House Republicans will object to one or both of those reforms, so Speaker John Boehner must be persuasive about the need for a wholesale change. But the leadership that matters most will come from the White House. The president has staked out the right position. Now he needs to present a bill and fight this year for a comprehensive solution. Nothing but action will count.

#### Star this card—PC matters, even if it’s intangible—Presidents have variable leverage—this card also proves the specific example of our DA can be true

Ryan J. Barilleaux 12, professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Miami University of Ohio, 2012, Tough Times for the President: Political Adversity and the Sources of Executive Power, Google Books (ebook edition so no page numbers)

The political resources of the president are more variable than constitutional and institutional ones. These resources correspond to what is usually termed "political capital"—their presence or absence can be **important factors in influencing** the dynamics of a political situation. These resources include the president's electoral margin, support in Congress, public support and approval, and interest groups (which can assist the president in promoting administration goals).

Beyond these resources, presidents are also able to draw on two other intangible factors that can and have been significant at many points in the history of the office: deference and crisis. The president is the beneficiary of deference, usually in foreign policy. Half a century ago, Aaron Wildavsky noted in "The Two Presidencies" that presidents are more likely to get their way from Congress in foreign affairs than in domestic policy,10 and that deference continues to apply and appeared throughout our case studies. Even in the midst of tough times, Congress tended to defer to the chief executive on international issues, even controversial wars. Of course, this deference was not absolute—as several presidents also found—but it was a significant resource for the president. This deference also enhances presidential influence in times of national crisis, when the ordinary pulling and hauling of politics gives way to consensus and rallying around the nation's leader. This has been the situation in Cold War crises, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and in the 2008 financial crisis.

Presidential Power Resources: Personal Skills

Presidents are also politicians and possess a variety of personal skills. These skills are the sorts that Neustadt focused on in his description of presidential power and include the chief executive's rhetorical skills, bargaining and negotiation skills, and ability to communicate through the media and relations with journalists. Personal resources include even the president's reputation—both professional and public—which can affect the likelihood of others to cooperate with the chief executive. Some presidents, such as Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, possessed an ability to connect with the public that helped each man survive a crisis that could have destroyed his presidency (Iran-Contra for Reagan, the Lewinsky scandal for Clinton); other presidents do not have such a rapport with the public and, like Jimmy Carter and George H. W. Bush, suffer for it. Finally, the president often has the ability to control timing and surprise to influence events; for example, Nixon used both to manage the diplomatic opening to China in 1972, thus contributing to his success in that endeavor.

Of course, presidents do not possess all of these personal resources in equal amount. Also, these personal resources are not uniform even in the same person. Even gifted politicians can find their personal skills failing them in certain circumstances (as happened to LBJ in the matter of Vietnam), whereas those who seem politically unskilled in one domain can be successful in another (as happened with Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords).

Weighing Risks, Obstacles, and Opportunities

Presidents must decide when and how to apply their power resources to gain leverage in specific contexts, and those decisions are made by weighing the risks, obstacles, and opportunities of action or inaction. Lyndon Johnson famously commented in frustration about his office,

"Power? The only power I've got is nuclear—and I can't use that."11 Whereas the legalistic approach to presidential powers tended to view the veto, pardons, and treaty power in isolation from the political circumstances in which they are exercised, presidents must employ their power resources in the real world of politics. That was the insight of LBJ's remark: the president's leverage is a matter of leverage in context.

The first contextual factor that a president must weigh are the risks of the situation: the risk of inaction, the risk of failure, the risk of a court challenge (especially in cases of venture constitutionalism) or other negative reaction, the risk of bad timing, and other risks. Weighing these risks is an eminently political decision, and consciousness of them has led chief executives to proceed with caution (e.g., Lincoln and the timing of the Emancipation Proclamation, Kennedy and civil rights legislation) or with boldness (e.g., Nixon's opening to China, Reagan's firing of striking air traffic controllers, or Clinton's willingness to shut down the government).

A second contextual factor that presidents must weigh is the obstacles

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 that stand in their way. These include opposition to the president's goals: who opposes them, how numerous and how powerful the opposition is, what resources the opposition possesses, and other considerations. Other obstacles include constitutional and legal barriers to the president's plan and goals, bureaucratic resistance, economic constraints, and other obstacles imposed by the particular situation. For example, Barack Obama was able to overcome the obstacles that stood in the way of the health care reform plan (although some remained after the bill's passage that raised questions about its implementation), whereas Bill Clinton in 1994 was unable to overcome opposition to his plan and George W. Bush in 2005 could not attract support for his call for Social Security reform.

Obstacles also include the intensity of opposition to the president's goals, which can make the president's job even more difficult: in the cases of Truman and MacArthur, Eisenhower and Orville Faubus in Little Rock, or Kennedy confronting George Wallace at the University of Alabama in 1963, each chief executive had to contend with a highly motivated adversary. This fact is a key reason why each of these presidents had to rely on executive power (Neustadt's "command") in order to act as he believed the situation required.

Third, specific situations also present opportunities. These include opportunities to advance the president's policy goals (e.g., change environmental policy, support democracy abroad), promote their political goals (such as reelection), meet their responsibilities (which often motivates forays into venture constitutionalism),12 or seize other opportunities.

Of course, obstacles, risks, and opportunities must be weighed in relation to one another. These calculations may be simple and obvious or complex and subtle, depending on the situation. Presidents must determine what power resources can be applied to advance their goals and how these contextual factors will affect the likelihood of success. Conversely, a president may believe that the situation requires action, even if the risks are very high and the obstacles to success are formidable (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis).

In any situation, the president's power resources, weighed against the risks, obstacles, and opportunities presented by circumstances, are applied as leverage toward advancing the president's goals. Obviously, the consequent leverage will not be the same in all circumstances but will vary according to the situation.

## 2NR

### Uniqueness

#### Business and big labor conflicts over guestworkers won’t take down the legislation now – conclusive

David Nakamura (writer for the Washington Post) March 22, 2013 “Immigration reform impasse deepens between labor, business” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/03/22/immigration-reform-impasse-deepens-between-labor-business/

Business and labor leaders accused one another of putting a comprehensive immigration overhaul in the Senate at risk late Friday, as the two sides remained at an impasse over terms of a new visa program for foreign workers.¶ A bipartisan Senate group appeared unable to negotiate a compromise as the senators prepared to leave Washington for a two-week Easter break. The group has said it hopes to unveil a comprehensive reform bill that would include a path to citizenship for the nation’s 11 million illegal immigrants shortly after the Senate resumes work April 8.¶ But the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO remained at loggerheads over wages for foreigners who are granted visas for low-skilled jobs. Both sides agreed to a plan that would offer up to 200,000 visas to foreign workers in jobs where companies are unable to find enough Americans to do the work.¶ The Senate draft bill proposes a complicated pay scale based on median wages in industries and regional markets, but the labor union is asking the senators to offer the workers a higher pay scale than the chamber is willing to accept.¶ Chamber vice president Randel Johnson, the business organization’s lead negotiator, in a statement said that the “unions have jeopardized the entire immigration reform effort … because of their refusal to take a responsible stance on a small temporary worker program.”¶ But Jeff Hauser, a spokesman for the AFL-CIO, said that the union remains committed to supporting immigration reform and a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.¶ “The coalition of immigrants and union members that elected President Obama did not do so in order to create a new kind of worker visa program but in order to stop the crisis of deportations wrecking communities across the country,” Hauser said. “There is no moral or political logic behind greedy elements of the business community thinking that they can hijack immigrant activism in order to further reduce the wages of housekeepers and gardeners, and so their temper tantrum this week will ultimately fail.”¶ Senate aides said they did not expect the impasse to derail the effort to produce a bipartisan bill that could serve as a template for a deal between Congress and the White House. Although the senators are leaving Washington, aides will remain to work on a written draft of the legislation over the next two weeks.¶