# Round 2 – Neg v Mo State GN

## 1nc

### 1

#### Financial incentives for production are different from policy incentives—the aff is the latter

Diehl 7 – Junior Staff Member, Journal of Land, Resources & Environmental Law; J.D candidate (Rustin P., “NOTE: Transitioning to a Clean Renewable Energy Network in the West”, 27 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 345, Lexis Law)

Many studies have considered the benefits and achieved results of the available renewable energy financial incentives. While studies agree that these incentives are effectively promoting business integration of renewable energies, it is questionable whether the incentives encourage private adoption of renewable energy technology.n55 The incentives for implementing clean renewable power generation fall into two main categories: financial incentives and policy  [\*354]  incentives. These incentives can be provided at federal, state, and municipal levels.

A laundry list of financial incentives include: corporate equipment rebates, energy efficient mortgages, accelerated corporate depreciation schedules, corporate tax credits, corporate **production incentives**, corporate and personal tax exemptions, personal tax credits, federal grant programs, USDA renewable energy systems and energy efficiency improvements loan programs, green power purchasing or aggregation, corporate tax incentive, industry recruitment incentives, property tax incentives, state public benefit funds, and state sales tax incentives. n56

Some of the **policy incentives** encouraging the use of renewable energies include: construction and design policies, contractor licensing, equipment **certifications**, generation disclosure rules, net metering rules, renewables portfolio set asides, required utility green power option, and solar and wind access laws. n57 In addition to these policy incentives, many states have adopted portfolio mandates or portfolio standards, which require certain percentages of energy come from renewable sources.n58

#### Loan guarantees are credit tools, not direct incentives

**Kubert and Sinclair, 11** - Clean Energy States Alliance – paper produced for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Charles and Mark, “State Support for Clean Energy Deployment: Lessons Learned for Potential Future Policy” April, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49340.pdf) EE/RE = Energy Efficiency/Renewable Energy)

Align Tools with Program Goals: If the primary goal is to maximize GHG emission reductions per dollar invested, then credit enhancement tools (e.g., loan guarantees and interest rate buydowns) could be more effective than direct incentives because of the manner in which they leverage private capital markets. If the goal is to maximize near-term energy savings, then broad EE incentives could be preferable to RE support. Note that programs can have multiple goals and that optimizing design for certain goals can subordinate others, so program design will need to reflect overall priorities.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground—including the whole range of policy incentives inflates solvency and avoids the best mechanism CPs.

#### 2. Limits—different incentive schemes have different lit bases, blending them all together undermines conceptual coherence and makes thorough research impossible.

### States cp

**The 50 state governments and relevant subnational actors should establish energy financing banks served with the task of substantially increasing commercial loan guarantees to develop and deploy Power Reactor Innovative Small Module reactors for the purpose of energy production in the United States.**

#### States can incentivize nuclear power -- solves the case.

**NEI, ‘8** [“Building Confidence in Licensing New U.S. Nuclear Plants,” Jan/Feb, http://nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/newslettersandreports/nuclearpolicyoutlook/]

“The view is that when the federal government isn’t taking the lead, the legislatures need to step up to the plate,” said Melissa Savage, program director for the Agriculture, Energy and Environmental Committee of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). States are “repealing moratoriums, holding committee session study hearings, looking at changing regulations, and just getting the conversation started in some cases,” she noted. “We’re facing a pretty critical energy crunch in the country. The issue is starting to bubble back up,” Savage said. “In some states, it never went away.” Ten states have passed policies instituting some form of cost recovery assurance for nuclear plant construction. Three states have introduced and one has passed legislation requiring that nuclear energy be included in some form of clean or alternative energy portfolio. Six of the 13 states with moratoriums preventing new nuclear plants are considering removing those bans. Two states have passed local tax incentives for nuclear plants.

### 3

#### Oil prices will stabilize now – prices will stick above exporter break-even levels without significant changes

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### Nuclear power reduces oil dependence – displaces oil power generation, powers maritime and ground transportation, and causes hydrogen transition

ANS 2012; American Nuclear Society, Top 10 Myths about Nuclear Energyhttp://www.new.ans.org/pi/resources/myths/

Myth # 10: Nuclear energy can't reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Truth: Nuclear-generated electricity powers electric trains and subway cars as well as autos today. It has also been used in propelling ships for more than 50 years. That use can be increased since it has been restricted by unofficial policy to military vessels and ice breakers. In the near-term, nuclear power can provide electricity for expanded mass-transit and plug-in hybrid cars. Small modular reactors can provide power to islands like Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Nantucket and Guam that currently run their electrical grids on imported oil. In the longer-term, nuclear power can directly reduce our dependence on foreign oil by producing hydrogen for use in fuel cells and synthetic liquid fuels.

#### High prices are key to the Russian economy and domestic stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China**.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### 4

The United States federal government should:

* Streamline regulations to facilitate licensing, siting, and waste disposal for Power Reactor Innovative Small Module reactors including fast-tracking the nuclear licensing process
* Offer substantial tax credits for private sector investment in Power Reactor Innovative Small Module reactors valued equivalently to commercial loan guarantees. These tax credits should be annually adjusted for inflation, not be limited to first movers, and not be subject to megawatt limitations.

#### Federal loan guarantees create moral hazard and drive excessive bank risk taking

**de Rugy, 12** – senior fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason (Veronique, “A Guarantee for Failure”, 7/18, <http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/de-Rugy-Testimony.pdf>)

Federally backed loans create a classic moral hazard. Because the loan amount is guaranteed, banks have less incentive to evaluate applicants thoroughly or apply proper oversight. In other words, the less skin the lender has in the game, the less likely it is that the lender will vet the quality of the project. In addition, the company that borrows the money risks less than it would if its loan weren’t guaranteed. Further, each time the government bails out a firm or shoulders the cost of a loan guarantee, it conveys to borrowers and bankers alike the mistaken idea that it’s okay for them to take excessive risks.

In a March 2012 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the DOE loan guarantee program was riddled with program inefficiencies, which calls the fairness of its decisions into question. 24 When the GAO requested data from the DOE on the status of applications, the DOE did not have consolidated data readily available and had to assemble the data from various sources over several months. Inadequate documentation and out-of-date review processes reduce one’s sense of confidence in the consistency and fairness of DOE’s decisions and raise questions about DOE’s ability to fully assess and mitigate project risks.

Moreover, the private sector (in the absence of government intervention) builds the infrastructure to assess risk, but the federal government has neither the expertise nor the incentive to build such a safety net. This increases the likelihood that loan guarantees will be awarded based on factors other than the ability of the borrower to repay the loan, such as political connections and congressional pork. 25 The moral hazard of loan guarantees increases when rules intended to prevent the program from being a pure company giveaway are removed. When, as part of the stimulus bill of 2009, the government lifted the subsidy fees for 1705 loans, the cost to taxpayers went up and high-risk companies were drawn in.

#### Bank risk taking drives investment bubbles – risks collapse of the economy

**Baldwin, 12** - professor of International Economics, Graduate Institute, Geneva; CEPR Policy Director, and VoxEU.org Editor-in-Chief(Richard, “A new eReport: Excessive risk-taking by banks” 3/30, <http://www.voxeu.org/article/excessive-risk-taking-banks-new-ereport>)

For many, the global crisis was caused by the interlinked fragilities that arose in the banking and financial sectors; these themselves were created by mindless deregulation and permissive monetary policy. By the late 2000s, the system was so precarious that shocks from many directions could have triggered the economic conflagration we witnessed.

The actual trigger was the bursting in fall 2007 of the US housing bubble – a bubble that was created by banks’ excessive risk-taking. The hallmark of this risk-taking was the subprime mortgage – for example the infamous loans to NINJA customers (No Income No Job or Assets). But such excessive risk-taking by banks is far from rare. Ireland went bust in 2010 due to risky loans made by national banks; Iceland suffered a similar fate in 2008, and Spain is flirting with a comparable outcome due to excessive risk-taking in property lending by its banks.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

#### Regulatory reform and tax incentives provides substantial private sector capital, solves the case and avoids the moral hazard of loan guarantees

**O’Keefe, 10** - CEO, George C. Marshall Institute (William, “Private Incentives Needed”, 1/11, National Journal’s Experts Blog, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/01/should-taxpayers-back-new-nucl.php>)

Should Congress do more to help revive the nuclear energy industry?

Though there can be legitimate debate over whether climate change will disadvantage future generations, there’s no doubt their prospects are grim if Washington continues on its current debt and spending binge. To that end, further government support for industry -- nuclear or other -- is a path to stifling innovation and hampering the economy.

When the Senate first started debating the Energy Policy Act of 2005, lawmakers included a proposal for limited loan guarantees for the first few new nuclear plants as a way to jump start the industry. By the time the bill passed, that limited amount had ballooned. And now the nuclear industry is looking for $100 billion in guarantees.

The inability of utilities to raise sufficient capital to fund new plants is telling in and of itself. If private capital markets had confidence that government, federal and state, were serious about supporting nuclear power growth, they’d likely provide the necessary funds at a reasonable cost. But there is no basis for confidence. Congress can change the ground rules on a whim, regulatory agencies can bow to pressure and impose unreasonable burdens, environmentalists can stir up political and public opposition, and trial lawyers could have a field day in court.

Except when employed in limited circumstances, subsidies are very poor public policy instruments that waste tax dollars and reward those who gain from government what they can't win in competitive market. Subsidies should be avoided like the plague. Instead of using taxpayer funds to substitute for private capital and create a moral hazard, government would better serve the interests of increased, cleaner energy by creating incentives for the private sector to make prudent investments. For instance, lawmakers could remove the continuing uncertainty about waste disposal, streamline the licensing process, re-examine regulations governing sitting and operating nuclear facilities, and offer tax credits for a fixed period of time.

### Hagel da

#### Obama will heavily invest PC in the Hagel nomination – its necessary to ensure he survives confirmation – it will be a heavy lift

Wall Street Journal January 6, 2013 “White House to Go on Offense for Hagel Pick” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323482504578225532918927080.html

Those officials acknowledge they have a bruising confirmation fight ahead. They also say they are confident they will prevail because Republicans ultimately won't be able to topple a former colleague, a Vietnam veteran and a two-term GOP senator from Nebraska who served on the foreign relations and intelligence committees. Mr. Obama also may announce his nominee to head the Central Intelligence Agency, a position left vacant when David Petraeus resigned last year after admitting to an affair. The two leading candidates for the post are White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan and acting CIA Director Michael Morell. Republican lawmakers on Sunday stepped up their opposition to Mr. Hagel, who initially voted for the Iraq war but grew to oppose it and who supported Mr. Obama for president in 2008. Critics also have cited Mr. Hagel's past criticisms of Israel as a basis for their opposition. Sen. Lindsay Graham (R., S.C.) said Sunday on CNN that it would "probably be a bridge too far" for him to support Mr. Hagel. Mr. Hagel's foreign policy views, he said, are "outside the mainstream," and he would be "the most antagonistic secretary of defense towards the state of Israel in our nation's history." Other Republicans, such as Sen. Ted Cruz (R., Texas), cited what they see as a leniency on Iran and a past reluctance to impose sanctions on Tehran as reasons for their opposition. "He has consistently advocated weakness with respect to our enemies, with respect to the nation of Iran," Mr. Cruz said on Fox. "Weakness in a secretary of defense invites conflict, because bullies don't respect weakness." Mr. Hagel's backers say he will respond to charges he isn't sufficiently supportive of Israel by pointing to votes he made in the Senate for a total of $38 billion in aid for the Jewish state, along with multiple trips to meet with leaders there. Mr. Hagel, said a person close to the decision-making process, believes in America's "special relationship" with Israel, but also believes that relationship enables officials from both governments to "speak frankly" with each other. Regarding Iran, Mr. Hagel voted at least three times for sanctions and is a supporter of multilateral sanctions, the person said, adding that Mr. Hagel has opposed some sanctioning based on specific details, not a broader opposition to sanctions. Mr. Hagel believes that military action should always be an option but, based on his war experience, believes it should only be seriously considered after diplomatic options are exhausted, this person said. The month long lag between the initial floating of Mr. Hagel's name for the post and Monday's expected announcement has provided opponents with ample oxygen for a strong fight. While a number of former high-ranking national-security officials have voiced support, backers on Capitol Hill were reluctant to campaign hard for someone who had yet to be nominated, said one person close to the process. The Republican National Committee also joined the fray Sunday, firing its initial shots against Mr. Hagel and indicating the opposition is increasingly organized. Mr. Hagel already has been openly criticized on the airwaves by the Emergency Committee for Israel, an issue-advocacy group that criticized Democrats during the 2012 campaign. Opponents also have been quick to circulate additional ammunition for their cause, such as an Iranian PressTV report Sunday headlined, "Obama expected to nominate anti-Israel Hagel as secretary of defense." One of the chief reasons Mr. Obama chose Mr. Hagel is his willingness to buck his own party in opposing the Iraq war, a senior administration official said. The position plays well to Democrats, some of whom have been critical of his potential nomination. Mr. Hagel's views on Afghanistan and the drawdown of troops there also dovetail with Mr. Obama's, and overseeing the final phases of the war may be the most important task the next secretary of defense faces. It was vital to Mr. Obama that he have someone in that position whose views are aligned with his own on Afghanistan. Another key reason Mr. Obama is willing to spend political capital on Mr. Hagel is the president wants a Republican in his cabinet, said the person familiar with the process, and there are few open positions to fulfill that goal. Defense has been a problematic area for Democratic presidents, and the White House feels Mr. Obama benefited from initially having Robert Gates, a Republican, in the slot because it gave him some political cover with GOP critics. Mr. Obama is less likely to back down in the face of opposition to Mr. Hagel after losing the nomination of U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, who withdrew from consideration for secretary of state in the wake of GOP criticism. The White House plans to push back by casting Mr. Hagel as a decorated war hero with two Purple Hearts and underscoring that he would be the first enlisted military member to run the Defense Department. Crucial for Mr. Hagel's nomination will be the extent to which Democrats back him to offset Republican criticism. The White House intends to make clear Mr. Hagel apologized for a comment he made opposing an openly gay ambassador nominee about a decade ago. Officials also will stress the president is confident that Mr. Hagel will complete the implementation of the repeal of "don't ask, don't tell," the policy banning gays from serving openly in the military. A senior administration official said Mr. Obama would not have chosen Mr. Hagel unless he had been assured he would see through the implementation of "don't ask, don't tell." The White House also intends to push back against critics of Mr. Hagel's positions on Iran and Israel by stressing that he will be responsible for carrying out the president's policies. Supporters of Mr. Hagel noted Sunday that the top Republican in the Senate, Sen. Mitch McConnell (R., Ky.) refused to voice opposition to Mr. Hagel, whose national-security expertise he has praised in the past. "I'm going to wait and see how the hearings go and see whether Chuck's views square with the job he would be nominated to do," Mr. McConnell said on ABC, where he pledged Mr. Hagel would receive "a fair hearing" from Senate Republicans. Still, marshaling the votes to back the controversial nominee will not be easy. A senior Republican aide on Capitol Hill said he didn't think Mr. Hagel would garner much Republican support and predicted as many as 15 to 20 Democrats would have difficulty voting for him, especially those who are facing re-election in 2014 and worry about upsetting the powerful pro-Israel lobby. Democrats and their independent allies hold 55 seats in the new Senate. Administration officials said they believe they can gain majority support, and they don't think that Republicans would go so far as to block consideration of the nomination entirely.

#### Plan unpopular – costs PC

Dardenon 9

[Steve is a writer for The Seeker Blog. “How The Integral Fast Reactor Was killed,” Oct 21, http://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear\_power\_industry\_news/b/nuclear\_power\_news/archive/2009/10/21/how-the-integral-fast-reactor-was-killed-10214.aspx]

Here’s a concise history of the Integral Fast Reactor, including how Sen. John Kerry orchestrated the killing: The anti-IFR forces were led by John Kerry. He was the principal speaker and the floor manager of the anti forces in the Senate debate. He spoke at length, with visual aids; he had been well prepared. His arguments against the merits of the IFR were not well informedand many were clearly wrong. But what his presentation lacked in accuracy it made up in emotion. He attacked from many angles, but principally he argued proliferation dangers from civilian nuclear power. While all serious weapons development programs everywhere in the world have always taken place in huge laboratories, in specialized facilities, behind walls of secrecy, and there has been negligible involvement with civilian nuclear power, it is impossible to argue that there CAN be none. For this reason the IFR processes were specifically designed to further minimize such possibilities, and, if developed, they would have represented a significant advance over the present situation. This did not slow Senator Kerry, as he went through the litany of anti-nuclear assertions, articulately and confidently. After both sides had their say the vote came, and the pro-IFR forces prevailed. But now the funding bill had to go to conferencea compromise committee of both houses whose job was to consolidate the different versions passed by the two houses into one bill to be sent to the President for signature into law. There was brief hope that IFR development could continue even in the face of the powerful opposition. But the conference committee, behind the closed doors normal to such meetings, upheld the House position. There was to be no IFR funding. The IFR was dead. A few weeks later, the mid-term elections swept Republicans into power in Congress. The IFR votes had always been politicized. With some significant exceptions, in fact just enough each year to fund the IFR, the vote had always been along party lines. Had the IFR been able to hang on for a few more weeks its development almost certainly would have gone on to completion.

#### Obama winning the Hagel fight over the Israel lobby is a litmus test for its power over US foreign policy

Stephen Walt (Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University) December 14, 2012 “Top five reasons Obama should pick Chuck Hagel for SecDef” <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/13/top_five_reasons_obama_should_pick_chuck_hagel_for_secdef>

Having lost out on Susan Rice, Obama is unlikely to put forward a nominee he's not willing to fight for or whom he thinks he might lose. So if Hagel is his pick to run the Pentagon, you can bet Obama will go to the mattresses for him. And what better way for Obama to pay back Benjamin Netanyahu for all the "cooperation" Obama received from him during the first term, as well as Bibi's transparent attempt to tip the scale for Romney last fall? For what it's worth, I hope Obama nominates Hagel and that AIPAC and its allies go all-out to oppose him. If they lose, it might convince Obama to be less fearful of the lobby and encourage him to do what he thinks is best for the country (and incidentally, better for Israel) instead of toeing AIPAC's line. But if the lobby takes Hagel down, it will provide even more evidence of its power, and the extent to which supine support for Israel has become a litmus test for high office in America.

#### Now is pivotal – strengthening Israeli Lobby clout ensures broad war with Iran – otherwise peaceful negotiations will solve

Kaveh L Afrasiabi (former political science professor at Tehran University, Boston Universityand Bentley College. He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard University, UC Berkeley, Binghamton University, Center For Strategic Research, Tehran and Institute for Strategic Studies in Paris) December 22, 2012 “ Middle East peace hinges on will” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/NL22Ak05.html

The cause of peace is predicated on the propensity of decision-makers to opt for peaceful resolution of conflicts. While there are nearly always a host of historical and political factors that trigger conflicts, the optimal necessity for bringing those conflicts to an end always revolves around the will towards peace, an important ingredient often missing in the Middle East. By all indications, 2013 will be a pivotal year for war and peace in the Middle East. The questions of who will gain the upper hand and whether the region will experience positive or negative development are difficult if not impossible to predict, but trends are unmistakable and tabulating them individually helps to decipher the evolving dynamics. To begin with, we can safely assume that the tumults of state-building in post-Arab Spring countries will continue in Tunisia and Egypt, and that Bahrain and Jordan will likely experience a continuation of the political struggle for change. It seems clear that the Kurdish issue in Iraq will grow more prominent and that Baghdad will be more beset with problems of terrorism and political factionalism. It can also be assumed that the Saudis will continue to struggle with issues of succession, and internal and regional instability; that regime change will rear as an issue in Syria; and that Israel's expansionism will be left unchecked by the US and other Western powers. The Iran nuclear standoff will still likely dominate the foreign policy agenda of the second Obama administration, particularly if the "Israel Lobby" has its say. But there are also doubts in the year. For example, what are the chances that the Syrian regime will survive in 2013? Or the Saudi-backed Bahraini regime, or Egypt's Mohamed Morsi administration? Is it feasible that the US, led by a new secretary of state, could start pressing Israel for a viable peace process, as well as for a peaceful resolution of the Iran nuclear standoff? The fundamental ambiguity surrounding such questions stems from our inability to predict the nature of policies that will be adopted and pursued by the multiple actors, given the welter of policy options that individually or collective can tip the balance towards or away from war or peace. Geopolitically, the struggle over Syria will be the dominant issue in the coming year, in light of the country's strategic significance. Should Damascus falls to the Western and Saudi-backed rebels, this would create a significant shift in the regional balance. The trend is toward a re-enactment of the Libya scenario, where parts of Syria are declared a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-protected "no fly zone". However, any regime change process could be accelerated by the introduction of chemical warfare, considered the US's "red line". A United Nations peacekeeping force may be stationed in a de facto partitioned Syria, but that would require a more durable rebel advance and an ability to retain zones of control, which may or may not happen in the coming months, given the conflict's fluidity. For those seeking genuine peace in Syria, there is no doubt that in 2013 that much more attention must be given to the role of the UN special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, who insists on the need for a political dialogue between the embattled government and the opposition. A new peace process There is broad consensus in policy circles around the world that a push for a new Middle East peace process is urgently called for. The week-long Gaza war in October and the subsequent Israeli announcement of new settlement expansions - as well as Palestine's acension to observer status at the UN - have breathed new impetus into pursuing what is needed and yet continues to be ignored by Washington. Obama will lose face in the world if he ignores this priority any further. He should appoint a new special envoy, direct his new secretary of state to pursue another Camp David meeting with the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, and send clear signals to Israel that it must halt land-grab actions that defy international law. Most likely, Israel will placate such US demands to some extent but only on the condition of a much tougher US approach toward Iran. The problem with this request, however, is that it militates against the improving conditions for fruitful nuclear talks. If Iran is handed such a setback in Syria, this could derail talks over Tehran's nuclear program, as it would result in heightened national security concerns. Syria has afforded both Russia and more recently Iran a Mediterranean foothold that is too valuable in the strategic realm to give up without a big fight, given the global spread of US and NATO power, so it is a given that Tehran and Moscow will do all they can to prevent Assad's demise. On the other hand, should Iran take a proactive role in shaping an orderly post al-Assad Syria - akin to the part it played at the 2001 Bonn summit on Afghanistan - then this may ease Iran-US tensions. What is clear, however, is that Iran is strongly opposed to foreign intervention in Syria and will likely increase its military assistance to Damascus in parallel with increased foreign meddling. A greater proxy war throughout the Middle East is thus anything but foreclosed, particularly if the US steps up its counter-Iran strategy. This brings us to a consideration of the chance for Iran nuclear talks succeeding in 2013. Prospects for Iran nuclear talks It is likely we will witness a major breakthrough in the Iran nuclear standoff in 2013. Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are making decent progress to reach a new modality for cooperation (see Iran nuclear talks produce a litmus test, Asia Times Online, December 18, 2012 ) and this should set a positive tone for the multilateral talks between Iran and the "5 +1" nations (the United Nations Security Council's permanent five members plus Germany). Guarded optimism is therefore not out of place, since Iran's nuclear program remains under the IAEA's supervision and Tehran has backed away from certain steps that could be deemed provocative, such as amassing a high volume of 20% enriched uranium. It has instead displayed concrete signs of its willingness to build confidence with the West, reaching out to sections of the Syrian opposition and playing a more active role in regional conflict management. But will Israel and its powerful lobby in Washington succeed in torpedoing the potential for a breakthrough in the nuclear crisis? This crucial question hinges on the ability of the White House to devise a sound Middle East policy in 2013 that does not cater to Israel's warmongering. Already, there are serious efforts by the Jewish Lobby under way to ensure that after the "fiscal cliff", the US's highest priority should be "preventing a nuclear Iran", to paraphrase a policy article in Wall Street Journal, dated December 17, penned by Charles Webb, Dennis Ross and Michael Makovsky. A clue to the absurd nature of Iranophobic discourse in the US, this seminal article makes a strong pitch for Obama's prioritization of the Iran threat by describing the fictitious scenario of a "Saudi-Iran nuclear exchange". Unfortunately, no matter how absurd, the pro-Israel lobbyists are busy at work in Washington and it remains to be seen if Obama can withstand their pressure. Lest we forget, the first Obama administration's Iran engagement policy was a dismal failure, due mainly to contradictory and half-hearted mini-steps poorly articulated at the strategic level, and not the least because of the influence of such ardent voices of Israel within the administration such as Dennis Ross. Whether or not the second Obama administration can improve and diversify its Iran policy skills is an important question that will have significant implications for the broader US Middle Eastern policy. A new foreign policy team determined to reach out for genuine dialogue with Tehran is desperately needed in Washington, and in the coming weeks and months we will have a clearer picture that would shed lights on the answer to this question.

#### Extinction

The Nation, 2005[8/6, Lexis]

The above analysis vividly indicates US aggressive intentions on some pretext against Iran. US at present is covertly aligning her allies against Iran and looking for the opportunity to initiate the offensive. The most probable hypothesis is that US would make Iran’s nuclear development programme the pretext for launching offensive. Under such an eventuality Russia would guard Iran’s interest to pre-empt US intrusion towards CAS and Russia. Any offensive action of US on Iran would amount to annexation of Gwadar Port and Karachi Port for making a ‘bridge-head’. She would make safe access for India to provide logistic support to the US forces. In this regard she would neutralise Pakistan military capabilities through electronic jamming and containing its troops through limited offensive on Eastern and Western borders and to block and keep China away from the battlefield. Both US and India know that any intrusion in Pakistan would invoke China’s bitter reaction against them. All these reactions would result into a world war. In brief the big powers would make Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India as the battleground. In this scenario both India and Israel would launch pre-emptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear strongholds and defence installations. As declared by Pakistan that any attempt on its nuclear installation would amount to strong reaction against that country. This reaction, under all possibility, would initiate nuclear war. Both Russia and China would also react to guard their strategic interests in Iran and Pakistan respectively. Initiation of nuclear weapons would amount to mass destruction and elimination of most of the global civilisation.

### Prolif

#### Can’t solve Hypocrisy

Perkovich, ‘8

[George, vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” October, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons.pdf]

This Brief summarizes four security interests that would be served by making the longterm project of abolishing nuclear weapons a central purpose of U.S. policy: preventing proliferation; preventing nuclear terrorism; reducing toward zero the unique threat of nuclear annihilation; and fostering optimism regarding U.S. global leadership. Each of these objectives can be (and has been) pursued without the larger purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons. However, the chances of success will steadily diminish if the few nuclear-armed states try to perpetuate a discriminatory order based on haves and have-nots and if they enforce it firmly against some states and hollowly against others. Such inequity breeds noncooperation and resistance when what is needed now is cooperation to prevent proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and the failure of deterrence. Why should everyone cooperate in enforcing a system that looks like it was designed to favor just a few?

#### 20 years to solvency

**Diesendorf 10** [Mark, “Nuclear power: no solution to climate change”, Green Left, April 17, 2010]

The integral fast reactor [which promises to use existing stockpiles of nuclear waste to make carbon-free energy,] doesn't exist — it is the archetypal ink-moderated paper reactor. It's true that a tiny physical version of this concept, called Experimental Breeder Reactor-2, once operated in the US. But experimental energy technologies are just that — experiments, designed to test a concept.¶ They have to be redesigned before they can be scaled-up to a medium-sized demonstration stage. Then, provided several successful demonstrations can be achieved over a period of many years, they usually need further design modifications before they could possibly move to commercial scale with full mass-production.¶ Realistically, this whole process would take at least 20 years in the US — much longer in Australia if our government was so foolish as to become involved.

#### IFRs won’t solve prolif– cheaters gonna cheat

**Green 10** [“NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR POWER & INTEGRAL FAST REACTORS Friends of the Earth, Australia www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear February 2010 Contact: Jim Green”, khirn]

The IFR concept – e.g. destroying nuclear waste and fissile (weapons) material and producing electricity in the process. In practice, there's every likelihood they would be problematic. Nuclear engineer Dave Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned Scientists has summed up the dilemma: "The IFR looks good on paper. So good, in fact, that we should leave it on paper. For it only gets ugly in moving from blueprint to backyard." The main problem is that the **claims made about the proliferation resistance of IFRs are overblown**. George Stanford, who worked on an IFR R&D program in the US, notes that proliferators "could do [with IFRs] what they could do with any other reactor − operate it on a special cycle to produce good quality weapons material." It may be easy to use an IFR to produce weapons materials (e.g. inserting and irradiating uranium targets) or it may be difficult – but it is certainly possible. IFR advocates assume that IFRs will be run on a normal operating cycle such that they would produce low-grade, highly-contaminated plutonium which would be contained within an intensely radioactive and intensely hot mixture that would greatly frustrate proliferators. But a proliferator would simply operate the reactor on a short irradiation cycle, producing weapon grade plutonium contained in a mixture which is not nearly so radioactive or hot. Likewise,IFR advocates claim that exceptionally heavily-shielded reprocessing facilities would be required to separate the plutonium because of the intense radioactivity and heat – but again they're making **the implausible assumption that a proliferator would run the reactor on a normal operating cycle.**

IFRs fail -- experience with every new reactor design proves there will be huge

#### No nuclear exports—bureaucracy and foreign government competition

NEI, Nuclear Energy Institute, Winter ‘12

(“U.S. Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness,” <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/insight/insightwinter2012/us-nuclear-export-rules-hurt-global-competitiveness/>)

Today, U.S. dominance of the global nuclear power market has eroded as suppliers from other countries compete aggressively against American exporters. U.S. suppliers confront competitors that benefit from various forms of state promotion and also must contend with a U.S. government that has not adapted to new commercial realities. The potential is tremendous—$500 billion to $740 billion in international orders over the next decade, representing tens of thousands of potential American jobs, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. ¶ With America suffering a large trade deficit, nuclear goods and services represent a market worth aggressive action.¶ However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. ¶ “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State Department. “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.”¶ America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade?¶ Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers.¶ “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. ¶ “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said.¶ Licensing U.S. Exports¶ Jurisdiction for commercial nuclear export controls is divided among the Departments of Energy and Commerce and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and has not been comprehensively updated to coordinate among the agencies or to reflect economic and technological changes over the decades. The State Department also is involved in international nuclear commerce. It negotiates and implements so-called “123 agreements” that allow for nuclear goods and services to be traded with a foreign country.¶ The federal agencies often have different, conflicting priorities, leading to a lack of clarity for exporters and longer processing times for export licenses.¶“The U.S. nuclear export regime is the most complex and restrictive in the world and the least efficient,” said Jones. “Furthermore, it is poorly focused on items and technologies that pose little or no proliferation concern. By trying to protect too much, we risk diminishing the focus on sensitive technologies and handicapping U.S. exports.” ¶ A case in point is the Energy Department’s Part 810 regulations. While 123 agreements open trade between the United States and other countries, Part 810 regulates what the United States can trade with another country. For certain countries, it can take more than a year to obtain “specific authorizations” to export nuclear items. Because other supplier countries authorize exports to the same countries with fewer requirements and delays, the Part 810 rules translate into a significant competitive disadvantage for U.S. suppliers.¶ Today, 76 countries require a specific authorization, but DOE has proposed almost doubling that number—to include for the first time countries that have never demonstrated a special proliferation concern, that are already part of the global nuclear supply chain, and that plan new nuclear infrastructure. ¶ The proposed Part 810 rule would do nothing to reduce lengthy license processing times, said Jones. Other nuclear supplier countries impose strict guidelines on their licensing agencies for timely processing of applications. Equivalent licenses must be processed in fewer than nine months in France, fewer than 90 days in Japan and 15 days in South Korea.¶ One possible solution, said McGoldrick, would be to set similar deadlines for issuance of licenses. U.S. agencies “could have deadlines set forth in the new [Part 810] regulations, which would give the relevant government agencies specified times in which to act on a license. Time could be exceeded only under certain circumstances,” said McGoldrick.¶ Instituting Same Rules for Everyone¶ At stake is not just the nation’s manufacturing base, but thousands of jobs. In 2008, all exports supported more than 10 million jobs, according to “The Report to the President on the National Export Initiative.” One of the report’s recommendations was to expand opportunities for U.S. commercial nuclear exports.

#### US won’t exert nonproliferation leadership

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, **but** often **elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives**. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of **nonproliferation failure**. The inconsistent or incomplete application of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. **U.S. reticence** historically, with some exceptions, **to prioritize nonproliferation**—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—**does not leave room for** great **optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**.

#### They can easily find other countries to provide them with nuclear tech

Hibbs 12

Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program Senior Associate, 8/7/12, Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z

U.S. resolve to include a no-ENR pledge in the body of new bilateral agreements will be seen by some countries as arrogant and unacceptable. Incorporating ENR terms into side-letters or preambles may be less offensive. That approach would also more easily facilitate including reciprocal commitments by the United States into its 123 bargains with foreign countries. These might include guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply through participation in the U.S. fuel bank, facilitating the country’s access to other back-up sources of nuclear fuel, and, in the future, perhaps even taking back U.S.-origin spent fuel.¶ The outcome of any negotiation for a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement will depend on the leverage both sides bring to the table. When the United States negotiated most of the 22 such agreements in force today, it was the world’s leading provider of nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel. As the examples of Jordan and Vietnam show, unlike half a century ago, nuclear newcomers today **don’t need to buy American**.¶ The vendor field is populated by firms in Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, Russia, and South Korea, and in the future they will be joined by others in China and India. Governments in these countries do not seek to establish a no-ENR requirement as a condition for foreign nuclear cooperation. Some of them, Australia and Canada for example, have strong nonproliferation track records. **Countries** now **seeking** to form **foreign industrial partnerships to set up nuclear power** programs **have numerous options and they will favor arrangements that provide them the most freedom and flexibility**.

#### No widespread proliferation

Hymans 12

Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, 4/16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.¶ As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Terrorism is low probability and low impact – can be contained and prevented

**Gross and Gilles 4/23** – director of Internet Communications for Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign, and director of Sol Kula Healing (April 23 2012, Matthey Barrett and Mel, “How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-perils-of-apocalyptic-thinking/255758/>, mrs)

Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world, and ever since Y2K, the media's tendency toward overwrought speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse. Today, nearly any event can be explained through apocalyptic language, from birds falling out of the sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!). Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that increasing droughts will threaten the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of casualties?

Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are equal, nor are they equally probable -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming.

Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes -- or in our neighborhoods. For example, **after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents**. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype.

This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat?

In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic eruptions -- are **extraordinarily** rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable.

#### No retal

**Mueller 5** (John, Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University, Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NB.PDF)

However, history clearly demonstrates that overreaction is not necessarily inevitable. Sometimes, in fact, leaders have been able to restrain their instinct to overreact. Even more important, restrained reaction--or even capitulation to terrorist acts--has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically. That is, there are many instances where leaders did nothing after a terrorist attack (or at least refrained from overreacting) and did not suffer politically or otherwise. Similarly, after an unacceptable loss of American lives in Somalia in 1993, Bill Clinton responded by withdrawing the troops without noticeable negative impact on his 1996 re-election bid. Although Clinton responded with (apparently counterproductive) military retaliations after the two U.S. embassies were bombed in Africa in 1998 as discussed earlier, his administration did not have a notable response to terrorist attacks on American targets in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) in 1996 or to the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, and these non-responses never caused it political pain. George W. Bush's response to the anthrax attacks of 2001 did include, as noted above, a costly and wasteful stocking-up of anthrax vaccine and enormous extra spending by the U.S. Post Office. However, beyond that, it was the same as Clinton's had been to the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the same as the one applied in Spain when terrorist bombed trains there in 2004 or in Britain after attacks in 2005: the dedicated application of police work to try to apprehend the perpetrators. This approach was politically acceptable even though the culprit in the anthrax case (unlike the other ones) has yet to be found. The demands for retaliation may be somewhat more problematic in the case of suicide terrorists since the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act are already dead, thus sometimes impelling a vengeful need to seek out other targets. Nonetheless, the attacks in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, and against the Cole were all suicidal, yet no direct retaliatory action was taken. Thus, despite short-term demands that some sort of action must be taken, experience suggests politicians can often successfully ride out this demand after the obligatory (and inexpensive) expressions of outrage are prominently issued.

#### India is winning the SMR export race in the status quo

CSIS ‘10 [“India’s Nuclear Push” <http://csis.org/blog/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-push>]

**“**In India's statement to the 54th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Indian Atomic Energy Commission chairman Srikumar Banerjee said that Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) is ‘ready to offer Indian PHWRs of 220 MWe or 540 MWe for export’”**.** ¶It’s happening– second-tier nuclear suppliers from China, South Korea, and now India are waking up to the opportunities that may emerge from intensified interest in nuclear power. India is entering the nuclear supply business at a time when new nuclear states are looking for alternatives to the huge, expensive reactors sold by the French, Russians, Japanese, Canadians, and Americans. ¶ ¶ Last year, Korea won the plum contract in the Middle East – a $20 billion agreement to build 4 nuclear power reactors in the United Arab Emirates. The UAE plans to construct a total of 10 reactors, using one contractor. China, while busily constructing nuclear power plants at home, will build a few new reactors in Pakistan and reportedly is interested in Turkish and Arab state plans to import. India will be next off the starting block of this export race.¶ ¶ There’s no way to predict how price-competitive India’s export reactors will be. NPCIL is a public enterprise under the control of the government’s Department of Atomic Energy. One of the suggested virtues of the U.S.-India nuclear deal was that the Indian nuclear sector would be forced to clean up its act as foreign competition grew in India.One way for the NPCIL to become more self-sustaining is through exports. ¶ ¶What will motivate nuclear power newcomers to buy Indian, Korean or Chinese? First, the reactor vendors from the advanced nuclear states are in disarray. AREVA has its much-publicized cost overruns in Olkiluoto; Japanese vendors do not have an export history; and Russian reactors were previously sold only in the Eastern bloc countries or allies. Russia will expand from reactors in India and Iran to potential contracts with Turkey and Vietnam.¶ ¶ China, South Korea and Indiaallhave smaller reactors to offer**.** In the United States, while there is interest in small modular reactors, there aren’t any licensed**.** These smaller reactors are more likely to fit the needs of states that are new to nuclear power. Not only do they lack the billions of dollars it takes to build large 1000MWe-1600MWe reactors, but they also lack the extensive transmission grids to accommodate large, centralized electricity generators.

#### India maintaining its export market lead for new nuclear energy key to Indian leadership and nuclear electricity- no other country is investing in new nuclear tech

K1 Team ’12 (The K1 Criticality Project is a think-tank led by Emlyn Hughes and Dr. Ivana Nikolic Hughes @ Columbia University, Citing Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, <http://k1project.org/energy/fissile-material-indias-investments-in-new-nuclear/>, July 2012)

With a population of 1.2 billion that is expected to multiply over the next couple of decades, India has taken a keen interest in new nuclear technologies and is fast becoming a key player in the energy arena. The International Energy Agency, an energy research organization, expects that India’s energy demand will “more than double by 2030”. It is furthermore clear that India will need to expand its power grid in order to reach the significant portion of the country that currently does not have electricity. With pressure coming from the international community to reduce its carbon emissions, India is looking for energy investments that will pay-off in the long-term. As Rajendra K. Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, astutely stated, “India cannot emulate developed countries. We have to find a path that is distinctly different”. Part of the answer lies in India’s exploitation of new nuclear technologies. Currently, uranium can be purchased on the market at a competitive price, which seems to preclude the much needed investment in research and development of new nuclear technologies. However, it is imperative that these newer technologies receive adequate attention because nuclear energy seems to be a likely interim fuel source for the transition from carbon-based fuels to fully-renewable energy sources. In its current state, nuclear energy does not seem to be safe or efficient enough to win wide-spread trust from citizens and policy-makers. Therefore, the need for new nuclear technologies is becoming ever the more pressing. One important technology that India is making inroads on is the thorium-fueled fast breeder nuclear reactor. As India’s Department of Atomic Energy clearly recognizes, “We have rather meager reserves of uranium…We, however, have nearly a third of the entire world’s thorium…Our strategies for large scale deployment of nuclear energy must be, and are therefore, focused towards utilisation of thorium.” India currently has a three-stage nuclear power program that will eventually allow it to make full use of its thorium reserves. In the first stage, the fast neutron reactors that India is developing will burn uranium in pressurized-heavy water reactors to produce plutonium. During the second stage, the fast neutron reactors will burn the plutonium with a uranium and thorium blanket. Thorium itself is a fertile element, and while it has the capacity to fission, it needs a boost from low-enriched uranium or plutonium, which can be sourced from spent fuel or decommissioned nuclear weapons. Thus, using thorium addresses many of the waste disposal, proliferation, and safety hazards that are often associated with conventional, uranium-based nuclear reactors. Investing in thorium-based reactors is cost efficient for India more so than for many other countries for two primary reasons: one being the vast thorium reservces, and the other being its limited reactor base. Both these factors would reduce the comparative cost that India would undertake with this investment. Gradually, as the country approaches the third stage of the nuclear program, the reactors will burn the U-233 from the second stage and the fuel blanket will be primarily composed of thorium. Thus, about two-thirds of the reactor’s power will be fueled by thorium. Additionally, thorium fuel bundles can last much longer than conventional uranium fuel bundles. Thus, the spent uranium would eventually be replaced by thorium, eventually creating a fully thorium-fueled reactor. In 2002, construction on a prototype fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam was approved by the regulatory authority, and it is expected to progress to the second stage of the program by 2013. Six additional fast reactors are slated for construction, with four of them planned for 2020. Within 25 years, India plans to increase its use of nuclear power for electricity generation from 2.8% to 9%. With the passing of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which allows India even greater independence in the trade of nuclear energy and technologies with other countries, India may eventually be established as a preeminent center for nuclear technologies. There is speculation that India is offering for export the designs of its heavy-water reactors, and this would allow India’s considerable investments to become a global energy investment. Dr. S. Banerjee, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, mentioned in a 2010 address to the IAEA that the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited is “ready to offer Indian PHWRs of 220 MWe or 540 MWe capacity for export”. India’s investments will provide India with the electricity capacity that it desperately needs, while simultaneously providing the global energy market with a competitive source of safer and more efficient nuclear energy. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses writes that “The time has also come for India to think beyond domestic development of nuclear power reactors and showcase its civilian nuclear capabilities abroad.”

#### Indian leadership solves extinction

Kamdar ‘7 (Mira Kamdar, World Policy Institute, 2007, Planet India: How the fastest growing democracy is transforming America and the world, p. 3-5)

No other country matters more to the future of our planet than India. There is no challenge we face, no opportunity we covet where India does not have critical relevance. From combating global terror to finding cures for dangerous pandemics, from dealing with the energy crisis to averting the worst scenarios of global warming, from rebalancing stark global inequalities to spurring the vital innovation needed to create jobs and improve lives—India is now a pivotal player. The world is undergoing a process of profound recalibration in which the rise of Asia is the most important factor. India holds the key to this new world. India is at once an ancient Asian civilization, a modern nation grounded in Enlightenment values and democratic institutions, and a rising twenty-first-century power. With a population of 1.2 billion, India is the world’s largest democracy. It is an open, vibrant society. India’s diverse population includes Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, Jews, and animists. There are twenty-two official languages in India. Three hundred fifty million Indians speak English. India is the world in microcosm. Its geography encompasses every climate, from snowcapped Himalayas to palm-fringed beaches to deserts where nomads and camels roam. A developing country, India is divided among a tiny affluent minority, a rising middle class, and 800 million people who live on less than $2 per day. India faces all the critical problems of our time—extreme social inequality, employment insecurity, a growing energy crisis, severe water shortages, a degraded environment, global warming, a galloping HIV/AIDS epidemic, terrorist attacks—on a scale that defies the imagination. India’s goal is breathtaking in scope: transform a developing country of more than 1 billion people into a developed nation and global leader by 2020, and do this as a democracy in an era of resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The world has to cheer India on. If India fails, there is a real risk that our world will become hostage to political chaos, war over dwindling resources, a poisoned environment, and galloping disease. Wealthy enclaves will employ private companies to supply their needs and private militias to protect them from the poor massing at their gates. But, if India succeeds, it will demonstrate that it is possible to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.  It will prove that multiethnic, multireligious democracy is not a luxury for rich societies.  It will show us how to save our environment, and how to manage in a fractious, multipolar world.  India’s gambit is truly the venture of the century.

### Warming

#### Warming locked in—current construction and no international deal means it will be runaway

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

The world is likely to build so many fossil-fuelled power stations, energy-guzzling factories and inefficient buildings in the next five years that it will become impossible to hold global warming to safe levels, and the last chance of combating dangerous climate change will be "lost for ever", according to the most thorough analysis yet of world energy infrastructure.

Anything built from now on that produces carbon will do so for decades, and this "lock-in" effect will be the single factor most likely to produce irreversible climate change, the world's foremost authority on energy economics has found. If this is not rapidly changed within the next five years, the results are likely to be disastrous.

"The door is closing," Fatih Birol, chief economist at the International Energy Agency, said. "I am very worried – if we don't change direction now on how we use energy, we will end up beyond what scientists tell us is the minimum [for safety]. The door will be closed forever."

If the world is to stay below 2C of warming, which scientists regard as the limit of safety, then emissions must be held to no more than 450 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the level is currently around 390ppm. But the world's existing infrastructure is already producing 80% of that "carbon budget", according to the IEA's analysis, published on Wednesday. This gives an ever-narrowing gap in which to reform the global economy on to a low-carbon footing.

If current trends continue, and we go on building high-carbon energy generation, then by 2015 at least 90% of the available "carbon budget" will be swallowed up by our energy and industrial infrastructure. By 2017, there will be no room for manoeuvre at all – the whole of the carbon budget will be spoken for, according to the IEA's calculations.

Birol's warning comes at a crucial moment in international negotiations on climate change, as governments gear up for the next fortnight of talks in Durban, South Africa, from late November. "If we do not have an international agreement, whose effect is put in place by 2017, then the door to [holding temperatures to 2C of warming] will be closed forever," said Birol.

But world governments are preparing to postpone a speedy conclusion to the negotiations again. Originally, the aim was to agree a successor to the 1997 Kyoto protocol, the only binding international agreement on emissions, after its current provisions expire in 2012. But after years of setbacks, an increasing number of countries – including the UK, Japan and Russia – now favour postponing the talks for several years.

Both Russia and Japan have spoken in recent weeks of aiming for an agreement in 2018 or 2020, and the UK has supported this move. Greg Barker, the UK's climate change minister, told a meeting: "We need China, the US especially, the rest of the Basic countries [Brazil, South Africa, India and China] to agree. If we can get this by 2015 we could have an agreement ready to click in by 2020." Birol said this would clearly be too late. "I think it's very important to have a sense of urgency – our analysis shows [what happens] if you do not change investment patterns, which can only happen as a result of an international agreement."

Nor is this a problem of the developing world, as some commentators have sought to frame it. In the UK, Europe and the US, there are multiple plans for new fossil-fuelled power stations that would contribute significantly to global emissions over the coming decades.

The Guardian revealed in May an IEA analysis that found emissions had risen by a record amount in 2010, despite the worst recession for 80 years. Last year, a record 30.6 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon dioxide poured into the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels, a rise of 1.6Gt on the previous year. At the time, Birol told the Guardian that constraining global warming to moderate levels would be "only a nice utopia" unless drastic action was taken.

The new research adds to that finding, by showing in detail how current choices on building new energy and industrial infrastructure are likely to commit the world to much higher emissions for the next few decades, blowing apart hopes of containing the problem to manageable levels. The IEA's data is regarded as the gold standard in emissions and energy, and is widely regarded as one of the most conservative in outlook – making the warning all the more stark. The central problem is that most industrial infrastructure currently in existence – the fossil-fuelled power stations, the emissions-spewing factories, the inefficient transport and buildings – is already contributing to the high level of emissions, and will do so for decades. Carbon dioxide, once released, stays in the atmosphere and continues to have a warming effect for about a century, and industrial infrastructure is built to have a useful life of several decades.

Yet, despite intensifying warnings from scientists over the past two decades, the new infrastructure even now being built is constructed along the same lines as the old, which means that there is a "lock-in" effect – high-carbon infrastructure built today or in the next five years will contribute as much to the stock of emissions in the atmosphere as previous generations.

The "lock-in" effect is the single most important factor increasing the danger of runaway climate change, according to the IEA in its annual World Energy Outlook, published on Wednesday.

#### Existing carbon triggers the impact

Daniel **Rirdan 12**, founder of The Exploration Company, “The Right Carbon Concentration Target”, June 29, <http://theenergycollective.com/daniel-rirdan/89066/what-should-be-our-carbon-concentration-target-and-forget-politics?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=The+Energy+Collective+%28all+posts%29>

James Hansen and other promi­nent cli­ma­tol­o­gists are call­ing to bring the CO2 atmos­pheric level to 350 parts per million. In fact, an orga­ni­za­tion, 350.org, came around that ral­ly­ing cry. This is far more radical than most politicians are willing to entertain. And it is not likely to be enough. The 350ppm target will not reverse the clock as far back as one may assume. It was in 1988 that we have had these level of car­bon con­cen­tra­tion in the air. But wait, there is more to the story. 1988-levels of CO2 with 2012-levels of all other green­house gases bring us to a state of affairs equiv­a­lent to that around 1994 (2.28 w/m2). And then there are aerosols. There is good news and bad news about them. The good news is that as long as we keep spewing mas­sive amounts of particulate matter and soot into the air, more of the sun’s rays are scattered back to space, over­all the reflec­tiv­ity of clouds increases, and other effects on clouds whose over­all net effect is to cool­ing of the Earth sur­face. The bad news is that once we stop polluting, stop run­ning all the diesel engines and the coal plants of the world, and the soot finally settles down, the real state of affairs will be unveiled within weeks. Once we fur­ther get rid of the aerosols and black car­bon on snow, we may be very well be worse off than what we have had around 2011 (a pos­si­ble addi­tion of 1.2 w/m2). Thus, it is not good enough to stop all green­house gas emis­sions. In fact, it is not even close to being good enough. A carbon-neutral econ­omy at this late stage is an unmit­i­gated disaster. There is a need for a carbon-negative economy. Essentially, it means that we have not only to stop emitting, to the tech­no­log­i­cal extent pos­si­ble, all green­house gases, but also capture much of the crap we have already out­gassed and lock it down. And once we do the above, the ocean will burp its excess gas, which has come from fos­sil fuels in the first place. So we will have to draw down and lock up that carbon, too. We have taken fos­sil fuel and released its con­tent; now we have to do it in reverse—hundreds of bil­lions of tons of that stuff.

#### Historical climate occilation proves its natural

**Carter 2-8–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (February 2012, “Eight Centuries of Climate Change in Northeast Spain” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2012/feb/8feb2012a3.html>) Jacome

According to Morellon *et al*. (2011), "in the context of present-day global warming, there is increased interest in documenting climate variability during the last millennium," since "it is crucial to reconstruct pre-industrial conditions to discriminate anthropogenic components (i.e., greenhouse gases, land-use changes) from natural forcings (i.e., solar variability, volcanic emissions)."

Against this backdrop, Morellon *et al*. conducted a multi-proxy study of several short sediment cores they recovered from Lake Estanya (42°02'N, 0°32'E) in the Pre-Pyrenean Ranges of northeast Spain, which "provides a detailed record of the complex environmental, hydrological and anthropogenic interactions occurring in the area since medieval times." More specifically, they say that "the integration of sedimentary facies, elemental and isotopic geochemistry, and biological proxies (diatoms, chironomids and pollen), together with a robust chronological control, provided by AMS radiocarbon dating and 210Pb and 137Cs radiometric techniques, enabled precise reconstruction of the main phases of environmental change, associated with the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), the Little Ice Age (LIA) and the industrial era." And what did they find?

The thirteen researchers identified the MWP as occurring in their record from AD 1150 to 1300, noting that their pollen data reflect "warmer and drier conditions," in harmony with the higher temperatures of the Iberian Peninsula over the same time period that have been documented by Martinez-Cortizas *et al*. (1999), the higher temperatures of the Western Mediterranean region found by Taricco *et al*. (2008), and the global reconstructions of Crowley and Lowery (2000) and Osborn and Briffa (2006), which "clearly document warmer conditions from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries," which warmth, in the words of Morellon *et al*. is "likely related to increased solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000), persistent La Niña-like tropical Pacific conditions, a warm phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, and a more frequent positive phase of the North Atlantic Oscillation (Seager *et al*., 2007)."

Following hard on the heels of the MWP, Morellon *et al*. note the occurrence of the LIA, which they recognize as occurring from AD 1300 to 1850. And here they report that, on the Iberian Peninsula, "lower temperatures (Martinez-Cortizas *et al*., 1999) characterize this period," which "coincided with colder North Atlantic (Bond *et al*., 2001) and Mediterranean sea surface temperatures (Taricco *et al*., 2008) and a phase of mountain glacier advance (Wanner *et al*., 2008)." And following the LIA they identify the transition period of AD 1850-2004 that takes the region into the Current Warm Period.

In discussing all three of these distinctive periods, they say that "a comparison of the main hydrological transitions during the last 800 years in Lake Estanya and solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000) reveals that lower lake levels dominated during periods of enhanced solar activity (MWP and post-1850 AD) and higher lake levels during periods of diminished solar activity (LIA)." And *within* the LIA, they note that periods of higher lake levels or evidence of increased water balance occurred during the solar minima of Wolf (AD 1282-1342), Sporer (AD 1460-1550), Maunder (AD 1645-1715) and Dalton (AD 1790-1830).

In light of these several observations it would appear that the multi-centennial climate oscillation uncovered by Morellon *et al*. has been driven by a similar oscillation in solar activity, as well as by multi-decadal solar activity *fluctuations* superimposed upon that longer-period *oscillation*. And these relationships suggest that **there is no compelling need to attribute 20th-century global warming to the concomitant increase in the air's CO2 content**. **Natural variability appears** quite **capable of explaining it all.**

#### No extinction – empirically denied

**Carter 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CMarc%5CDesktop%5CSurviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

#### Their impact evidence uses bad studies and massively exaggerates the impact

**Carter 11 –** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (July 20, 2011, “[Why Climate Change Effect Studies are Pessimistic](http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/jul/20jul2011a1.html)” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/jul/20jul2011a1.html>) Jacome

Hundreds of studies have been published on the effects of future climate change on various ecosystems or species, but the conclusions are often easily disputed. Why are these results so shaky? This study shows that there are systematic gaps in the methods used, and that these gaps all tend to falsely increase the potential negative impacts

**<marked here>**

of climate change and inflate the certainty of the studies.

In this study, criteria for conducting reliable and useful assessments of impacts of future climate were suggested. The major steps involve: clearly defining an emissions scenario; selecting a climate model; evaluating climate model skill and bias; quantifying General Circulation Model (GCM) between-model variability; selecting an ecosystem model and assessing uncertainty; properly considering transient vs. equilibrium responses; including effects of CO2 on plant response; evaluating implications of simplifying assumptions; and considering animal linkage with vegetation. A sample of the literature was surveyed in light of these criteria. Many of the studies reviewed used climate simulations that were >10 years old and not representative of best current models. Future effects of elevated CO2 on plant drought resistance and productivity were generally included in growth model studies but not in niche (habitat suitability) studies, causing the latter to forecast greater future adverse impacts or even negative impacts when positive effects are likely. Overly simplified spatial representation was frequent and caused the existence of refugia to be underestimated. Few studies compared multiple climate simulations and ecosystem models (including parametric uncertainty), leading to a false impression of precision and potentially arbitrary results due to high between-model variance. No study assessed climate model retrodictive skill or bias. For niche models, the equilibrium assumption (that species must, following warming, instantly move to a new geographic region corresponding to their niche model, or else die) is unsupported by any experimental data. That is, no evidence exists in most cases that projected climate change will cause a species to die out in their current range. Instead, geographic displacement should take hundreds to thousands of years for plants and result from gradual competitive processes. Thus the risk of extinction is grossly exaggerated in most studies. Overall, no current studies in the survey met all of the proposed criteria and typically have very little quantification of uncertainty. The net effect is a strong bias in this literature toward predicting negative consequences of climate change.

## 2nc politics

### 2nc ov hagel

#### Strikes lead to breakout prolif

**Logan 6** (Justin, Foreign Policy Analyst @ Cato, Policy Analysis #583, “The Bottom Line on Iran: The costs and benefits of Preventive War”, 12-4, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa583.pdf)

The United States would likely also suffer serious unintended consequences if it were to attack Iran. These would include causing even more nuclear proliferation, as Washington’s adversaries concluded that nuclear weapons were the only way of deterring a U.S.-led regime change; causing large-scale civilian casualties, which would further pollute America’s image in the world; and damaging the already limited prospects for political and economic liberalization inside Iran. On the issue of proliferation, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has embraced a transformative foreign policy that has focused on fundamentally altering the international order. This approach is seen as inherently dangerous to many countries, given U.S. military action against Serbia and Iraq, among other nations, as well as loose talk about “regime change” in certain target states, and support for regime-changing “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, after the September 11 attacks, President Bush identified a list of enemy states, and explicitly put them on notice in the infamous “axis of evil” speech. Of those countries, the one that the United States suspected of having nuclear weapons, North Korea, has been essentially untouched. The one country we were certain did not have nuclear weapons, Iraq, was invaded. As Kenneth Pollack has pointed out, “The Iraq example coupled with the North Korea example probably is part of the motivation for some in Iran to get a nuclear weapon.” 79 In addition, Iran lives in a notoriously rough neighborhood: Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, as does Russia, just to the region’s north. Turkey rests under the NATO umbrella, and Israel possesses nuclear weapons of its own. In the end, attacking Iran would only further underscore the dilemma faced by states that find themselves on Washington’s hit list. Without nuclear weapons, there is no assurance that the United States will not attack—other than supine acquiescence to Washington’s various demands. 80 As Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling has pointed out, the perverse fact is that America’s counterproliferation policy is a prime driver of proliferation.

#### Obama losing over Hagel crushes his perception of resolve abroad

Financial Times December 27, 2012 “Hagel for defence” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ad8eba06-503d-11e2-9b66-00144feab49a.html#axzz2HH2u4ZZI

Yet ever since Mr Hagel emerged as the clear frontrunner, he has come under a barrage of criticism. Sadly, his critics have mostly overlooked his sensible views on the future of the US military and focused on some remarks he made several years ago about the “Jewish lobby”. These comments may have been ill-judged but there is nothing in Mr Hagel’s record on Israel that suggests bias or hostility, still less anti-Semitism. He has shown support for a two-state solution – which Israel also favours – and the necessity for the US to play an even-handed role in fostering it. The whispering campaign against him is obnoxious. By choosing Mr Hagel, Mr Obama would not just make a welcome bipartisan appointment. He would also show some political muscle. While he has not yet nominated Mr Hagel, the White House has floated his name for weeks. Were the US president to prompt Mr Hagel to withdraw his name now, it would signal a big retreat. It would also come just weeks after Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, stepped aside in the race for secretary of state despite being the president’s preferred candidate. Two successive withdrawals would send a message at home and abroad that Mr Obama lacks resolve.

#### Nuclear wars everywhere

**Hanson 09** – Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover Institution, Stanford University [Dr. Victor Davis Hanson, “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis Hanson,” Interview with the [Oregon Patriots](http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon), Resistnet.com, December 7, 2009 at 3:52pm, pg. http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon/forum/topics/change-weakness-disaster-obama/showLastReply.]

BC: Are we currently sending *a message of weakness to our foes and allies*? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world? Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy **rests on** public **perceptions**, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether **China,** **Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria**, etc. — are just **wait**ing to see who’s going to be the first to **try Obama** — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. **If he slips***once****, it will be*** 19***79*** ***redux***, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — **Venezuela, Russia, Iran**, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause **the most damage**? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that **North Korea** might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. **India**’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

#### Strikes would bolster Iranian support for the mullahs crush US international image and increase global terrorism

**McFaul et al 7** (Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani, Fellows and Coordinators of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, and Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Washington Quarterly, “A Win-Win U.S. Strategy for Dealing with Iran”, 30:1, Winter, L/N)

Moreover, because Iran's facilities are spread out and located in urban areas, a preventive military strike could kill hundreds, if not thousands, of innocent Iranians and destroy ancient buildings of historical and religious importance. Isfahan is the central headquarters of Iran's nuclear program, but it is also Iran's most beautiful city and home to many precious civilizational landmarks. Widespread air attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and other military assets -- they would have to be massive and widespread to have any chance of success -- would rally the Iranian people around the mullahs, strengthen the regime, and undermine the considerable admiration and goodwill Iranians now feel for the United States. Whatever time such strikes purchased in setting back Iran's nuclear program would be more than offset by the extended lease on life they would give to the regime. Needless to say, a unilateral strike against Iran would only further damage the United States' standing in the world at a time when U.S. prestige internationally is at an alltime low. Finally, such a strike would provide ammunition to the arsenal of fanatics in the Muslim world, including some in the Tehran regime, who see an ongoing "crusade" by the Judeo-Christian West against the Muslim East. The Iranian government has often threatened that, in the case of an attack, it would mobilize its militia and terrorist proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and the rest of the Middle East to attack U.S. forces and interests around the world, including Iraq No doubt this would include Afghanistan, where there are already signs of escalating Iranian mischief.

#### International co-op turns proliferation and environmental collapse

**Dyer, 04** - worked as a freelance journalist, columnist, broadcaster and lecturer on international affairs for more than 20 years, but he was originally trained as an historian. Born in Newfoundland, he received degrees from Canadian, American and British universities, finishing with a Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London. (Gwynne, "The end of war," Toronto Star, 12/30, l/n)

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future.. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system.

### A2 no impact

#### AIPAC influence guarantees war with Iran

Gary Leupp (writer for Counterpunch) February 2007 “AIPAC Demands "Action" on Iran” http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/02/24/aipac-demands-quot-action-quot-on-iran/

In other words, the American Israel Political Affairs Committee is the main political force urging—indeed, demanding—U.S. action. That’s the AIPAC already under scrutiny for receiving classified information about Iran from Lawrence Franklin, former Defense Department subordinate of Douglas Feith. (That’s the neocon Feith who supervised the Office of Special Plans—headed by Abram Shulsky, the neocon specialist on Leo Strauss who currently heads up the Iran Directorate at the Pentagon—that shamelessly cherry-picked intelligence to support the Iraq attack. That’s the Franklin who worked in the OSP, and was sentenced last month to 13 years in prison. Feith has not been indicted on any charge and continues to insist in defiance of reason and even a Pentagon internal investigation finding it "inappropriate" that his office’s disinformation project was "good government." Small wonder Gen. Tommy Franks, formerly head of the U.S. Central Command, famously called Feith "the fucking stupidest guy on the face of the earth." Congressional investigations are just now getting underway into Feith’s role in facilitating the invasion of Iraq.) That’s the AIPAC embarrassed by the indictment of its policy director Steven Rosen and senior Iran analyst Keith Weissman for illegally conspiring to pass on classified national security information to Israel. Despite the already intimate ties between Israeli and U.S. intelligence (documented by Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski among others) it seems the Israelis felt obliged to spy on the Pentagon to learn just how inclined the Americans were to oblige them by attacking Iran. Now, as Israeli calls for a U.S. attack on Iran become more shrill by the day, AIPAC recognizes that the American people profoundly distrust Vice President Cheney and the nest of neocon liars he has sheltered. The Bush-Cheney war machine has been pretty well exposed, and that must worry the warmongers within the group. Israeli Defense Force chief artillery officer Gen. Oded Tira has griped that "President Bush lacks the political power to attack Iran," adding that since "an American strike in Iran is essential for [Israel's] existence, we must help him pave the way by lobbying the Democratic Party (which is conducting itself foolishly) and US newspaper editors. We need to do this in order to turn the Iran issue to a bipartisan one and unrelated to the Iraq failure." Tira urges the Lobby to turn to "potential presidential candidates. . . so that they support immediate action by Bush against Iran," while Uri Lubrani, senior advisor to Defense Minister Amir Peretz, tells the Jewish Agency’s Board of Governors that the US "does not understand the threat and has not done enough," and therefore "must be shaken awake." Many Americans would find such statements deeply offensive in their arrogance and condescension. President Bush has indeed been weakened by the "Iraq failure" Tira acknowledges, arising from a war that the Lobby once endorsed with enormous enthusiasm. (As Gen. Wesley Clark put it way back in August 2002, "Those who favor this attack now will tell you candidly, and privately, that it is probably true that Saddam Hussein is no threat to the United States. But they are afraid at some point he might decide if he had a nuclear weapon to use it against Israel." Recall that that weapon was imaginary.) So now, the Israeli war advocates aver, the U.S. president needs to be helped to do the right thing and attack Iran by lobbyists who will use their power to force the fools in the Democratic Party, especially presidential candidates. Because Americans don’t understand and have to be shaken out of their current skeptical mode. By who? By AIPAC, of course! The confidence expressed by these gentlemen (in the second most powerful political action committee in the country) is quite extraordinary. But alas, maybe it’s warranted. Giraldi dispassionately concludes: "Knowing that to cross the Lobby is perilous, Congressmen from both parties squirm and become uneasy when pressured by AIPAC to ‘protect Israel,’ even if it means yet another unwinnable war for the United States. The neocons know full well that if a war with Iran were to be started either inadvertently or by design, few within America’s political system would be brave enough to stand up in opposition."

#### Israel lobby push for war with Iran guarantees wider Middle East war – and collapses the economy

Muhammad Sahimi (writer for Anti-War.com) December 31, 2012 “The War Party and the Israel Lobby Wish for War With Iran in 2013” The War Party and the Israel Lobby Wish for War With Iran in 2013

As we begin 2013, the War Party and its ally, the Israel lobby, are pushing hard to make sure that they get their wish for the New Year, namely, a devastating war with Iran. To them, it is not enough that the illegal unilateral sanctions that the United States and its allies have imposed on Iran are ruining the lives of tens of millions of ordinary Iranians. It is not enough that the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iranians are being threatened with life-threatening illnesses, who cannot get the medicine they need, partly because of economic sanctions. It is not enough that the arts and culture of Iran, particularly a renowned movie industry, are seriously threatened by a lack of funds brought about by the sanctions. The War Party and Israel lobby will be satisfied only if Iran is attacked and destroyed, which will inevitably lead to a much wider war in the entire Middle East. The push is coming from several fronts. The Party and the Lobby have staged an all-out attack to sabotage the possible nomination of former senator Chuck Hagel as defense secretary. His “sin”? Among other things, Hagel has stated in the past that “I am a United States senator, I am not an Israeli senator,” and that when the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) comes knocking with a pro-Israel letter, “you’ll get 80 or 90 senators on it. I don’t think I’ve ever signed one of the letters” because they were “stupid.” But, most importantly, the unforgivable “sin” of Hagel has been opposing sanctions on Iran and advocating diplomacy and negotiations, which Likud-led Israel rejects. A top Senate Republican aide has threatened, “Send us Hagel [as the nominee for defense secretary], and we will make sure every American knows he is an anti-Semite.” Even gay Republicans got into the act. In a full-page ad in The New York Times, Log Cabin Republicans proclaimed that Hagel “is wrong on gays’ rights, wrong on Iran, wrong on Israel.” In another front, retiring Sen. Joe “bomb-Iran-for-Israel’s-sake” Lieberman is using his last days in the Senate to push President Obama to attack Iran. Led by him and Sens. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), a letter was sent to the president, signed by 57 senators, urging him to be prepared for war with Iran and asking him “to reiterate your readiness to take military action against Iran if it continues its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon.” Never mind that there is no evidence of weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program. Even the totally politicized International Atomic Energy Agency reports time and again that it has found no evidence of diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful purposes, nor has it found any evidence for a secret parallel military program in Iran. While pushing the president to attack Iran, the letter also stated, “We urge you to expand America’s outreach and support to the Iranian people and support of the cause of human rights and democracy in Iran…. The current government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will eventually end up in the ash heap of history, not because of the efforts of the United States, but because of the desire of the Iranian people to enjoy the basic freedoms that are their universal right, and that many of their neighbors increasingly are demanding.” Iranians living in Iran have not asked the Party and the Lobby to speak on their behalf. But on the one hand, the Party and the Lobby advocate war and sanctions that will destroy Iran and kill hundreds of thousands of its citizens, if not more, and on the other hand, they support “democracy” and “human rights” for Iran amid the destruction that they are advocating. This “support” for the Iranian people, in addition to the unilateral sanctions and the misery that they have brought, is offered while it has become increasingly difficult, for example, for Iranian students to receive visas to come here to study. In the latest round of imposing even more restrictions on Iranian students, those who wish to study in the energy field, such as oil and natural gas, are refused visas. This restriction is in addition to those already imposed on those who wish to study nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, biology, etc. In the universe of the Party and the Lobby, the meanings of democracy and human rights are totally different from ours. In theirs, the prerequisites to democracy in a nation such as Iran are destroying the country and its historical and cultural heritage (as happened in Iraq), killing its people, taking control of its resources, and only then giving them “democracy” and “human rights.” The most fundamental human rights of every human being are living in peace and having the minimum for a decent life. The sanctions are denying such fundamental rights of the Iranian people, and war will destroy their nation and the rest of the Middle East, yet the Party and the Lobby want to bring misery in the name of human rights and democracy. The Party and the Lobby are also hard at work to convince the public that war with Iran is inevitable. In a gala at the “research” arm of the AIPAC, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dennis Ross and Elliott Abrams, two of the most trusted Lobby men, and the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey, insisted that the president will attack Iran in 2013 if diplomacy does not succeed. Ross, the Middle East envoy during the Clinton administration and until November 2011 President Obama’s adviser on Iran in the National Security Council, said, “I think there’s the stomach in this administration, and this president, that if diplomacy fails to use force [against Iran].” Jeffrey said, “I think [Obama’s] first choice will be a negotiated settlement. Failing that, I think that we’re going to strike. One way or the other, these guys [the Iranians] are either going to stop their program or, before we’re halfway through 2013, they’re going to have enough [enriched nuclear materiel] to go critical in a few weeks,” adding, “I think if we don’t get a negotiated settlement, and these guys are actually on the threshold [of weaponization capability], as Obama said during the campaign, then the president is going to take military action.” This is while the Iranians have been converting — as they had said they would — their enriched uranium at 19.75% to fuel plates for use in the Tehran Research Reactor, which provides medical isotopes for 850,000 patients every year, hence making it practically impossible to use that uranium for bombs, even if they wanted to. Then, during discussion with Ross and Abrams halfway through the gala, WINEP director Robert Satloff asked the two, “Will either America or Israel employ preventive military action against Iran’s nuclear program — yes or no?” The two replied, “Yes.” Satloff then asked, “Will this happen in 2013?” Ross said, “Yes,” and Abrams added, “Yes, I agree.” In another piece of sheer nonsense propaganda, former senator Charles Robb, Ross, and Michael Makovsky of the Bipartisan Policy Center cooked up another absurd scenario in order to encourage war on Iran. In a piece published by the Wall Street Journal, the trio considered the possibility of a “Saudi-Iran nuclear exchange” and the effect that it would have on the supply and price of oil and concluded that, “As American and other policy makers contemplate what it will take to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions, they must not dwell exclusively on the potential short-term impacts of economic pressure or military action. Over the medium and long term, the economic costs of a nuclear Iran may be no less real and far more enduring.” The idea that an Islamic country may attack Saudi Arabia, which houses Islam’s two holiest sites, with nuclear weapons is beyond absurd, but it goes to show that the Party and the Lobby are willing to say anything to provoke a war. The authors did not, of course, ask the crucial question: If Saudi Arabia is going to have a nuclear exchange with Iran, who will supply it with nuclear technology? The West, of course, and in particular France and the U.S. So, why should the Saudis be given nuclear technology, if there are true concerns about a “Saudi-Iran nuclear exchange” and nuclear proliferation? Is it enough that the Kingdom is already buying close to $100 billion worth of weapons from the West, weapons that in all likelihood it will never need or use? Will John Kerry, as the new secretary of state, make a difference in U.S. policy toward Iran? It remains to be seen, but he is certainly more moderate than Hillary Rodham Clinton, who threatened to obliterate Iran. Documents released by WikiLeaks indicate that Kerry wants to resolve the dispute with Iran through negotiations. Many Iranian-Americans supported his bid for the presidency in 2004. He has said in that past that, “his own intention, had he been elected president [in 2004], was to pursue front channel and back channel contacts with the Iranian regime.” He also told Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Qatar’s king, that “the United States recognizes Iran’s ambitions to be a regional player, and wants a dialogue about what sort of power it will be.” War with Iran will benefit no one but the Party, the Lobby, and the far right in Israel. It will not only destroy the Middle East and kill hundreds of thousands, if not more, it will also lead to a decades-long war of attrition between Muslims and the West that will also destroy the West’s economy. The only solution to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program is patient and sincere diplomacy, in which every step that Iran takes to address the concerns over its nuclear program is reciprocated by the U.S. and its allies, who could at least suspend some of their illegal sanctions, which would provide relief for tens of millions of Iranians. Then, and only then, can we talk sincerely about democracy and human rights for the Iranian people.

#### Hagel key to prevent war with Iran

Michael Brün (visiting assistant professor of Economics at the Illinois State University) December 30, 2012 “Israel lobby should not have veto over US president's cabinet” http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/20121230652285915.html

Now comes Chuck Hagel, a Republican Senator who would normally also be easy to confirm in the Senate, as Obama's choice for Secretary of Defence. But unlike in the case of Susan Rice, there are real, substantive objections to real substantive positions he has held: he was an early critic of the Iraq war; he wants to get out of Afghanistan, soon; he does not want a war with Iran; and he has supported cuts in military spending. This makes him neocon enemy number one, someone who must be crushed. Of course, the neocons have their voices like the Weekly Standard and the Washington Post editorial board, but for those who may have noticed they have lost a lot of influence since they led us into that ugly war that nobody wants to remember in a place called Iraq. In fact, even George W Bush had to be careful about listening to them during his second term. So on their own, the neocons couldn't really get in the way of a nomination like this one, a decorated Vietnam veteran, and a Republican no less. But the neocons joined up with a powerful ally - the most powerful lobby in the country, the Israel lobby. And that is no exaggeration: the Washington Post reported a few years ago that the annual AIPAC dinner in Washington, DC, was attended by the majority of the Senate and a big chunk of the US House. The pharmaceutical and insurance industries have some pretty formidable lobbies and they may be able to set the boundaries for healthcare reform, but they are not going to get 51 senators to show up at an annual dinner, no matter how fine the cuisine. It's almost not worth mentioning the smears that the Israel lobby has managed to get taken seriously, since they are not worth dignifying. So, Hagel once said he was a US senator and not a senator in the Israeli government. And for this he has been vilified. This really completes my argument. Is there any other country in the world where a legislator can be denounced for not being sufficiently loyal to a foreign government? This is worse than the McCarthy era; at least back then you had to swear loyalty to the US government. And he once used the term "Jewish lobby" instead of "Israel lobby", thus denying credit where credit is due, to right-wing evangelical Christians and other fine citizens who also would like to see a war with Iran and fight for the foreign policy agenda of Israel's far right. This is a bit like taking someone to task for referring to the "Florida Cuban-American lobby", thus leaving out right-wing Nicaraguans, Venezuelans and other haters who want to see the Castro brothers dead and the US on its way to re-possessing the island. Last week, Eliot Engel became the first important Democratic Congressman to attack Chuck Hagel and oppose his nomination as Secretary of Defence. Engel is part of the Israel lobby and unfortunately he is now the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs committee. One of his first acts after being elected to Congress was to sponsor a resolution declaring Jerusalem to be the undivided capital of Israel, an extremist position even by US State Department standards. Promoting the Israel lobby Engel is a good example of how the Israel lobby, in alliance with the much weaker neocons, influences much more of US foreign policy than just the Middle East. Until the Democrats lost the House in 2010, he was Chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. What was he doing there, since his main interest is Israel? He was there to use the Committee to try to advocate for Israeli foreign policy in this hemisphere. Of course, he had allies among neocon Republicans like Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, fanatical Cuban-born Florida right-winger who is the current (outgoing) Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Though the Republicans were more extreme, Engel shared their hostility toward left governments - now governing the majority of Latin America - that didn't fall into line. This included of course avowedly socialist governments such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela; but in 2010, when Brazil, together with Turkey, tried to broker a nuclear fuel swap arrangement with Iran, in an attempt to defuse the escalating confrontation between the US and Iran, Engel was quick to publicly denounce and threaten Brazil for doing, actually, what Washington had asked them to do. It is important to understand that Engel's commitment to the foreign policy of Israel is not the result of Jewish voters in New York's 17th Congressional district. Jews are less than 14 percent of his district, which is majority African-American and Latino. And most American Jews do not agree with the extremist policies of the Israeli government, which Engel represents. This is a problem of an ideological and political commitment of someone working with a powerful lobby to influence US foreign policy. Engel was one of 81 House Democrats who went against the majority of their party in the House and voted to authorise George W Bush's invasion of Iraq. Most of these 81 Democrats had strong ties to the Israel lobby, distinguishing them from the Democrats who voted against the war. Would Congress have authorised that war without the influence of the Israel lobby? It's difficult to say, just as it is difficult to say how much their influence will be decisive if we end up going to war with Iran - a cause that Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu has lobbied for on national US TV and that the Israel lobby is eager to promote. But this country can no longer afford to have this kind of influence on such important decisions. The fight over the Hagel nomination, which would never have been a fight if not for the Israel lobby, is just the latest example. Hagel's presence in the Obama cabinet could easily, in some circumstances, make the difference between war and peace. But Obama, it seems, only won the first battle with his re-election in November. He now has a tougher battle against people who nobody elected.

### A2 no pass

#### Hagel will win confirmation vote now despite opposition

Michael Tomasky (writer for the Daily Beast) January 7, 2013 “The Hagel Nomination” http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/01/07/the-hagel-nomination.html

We have many theories today as to why the Potus is proceeding with the nomination of Chuck Hagel to the Pentagon, despite what appears to be fairly significant opposition from senators of Hagel's own party. Let's cut to the darkest-scenario chase: Suppose they filibuster him. That is extremely hard to envision--senators filibustering a former senator for a cabinet position. But with these people, you just never know. My guess at this point would be that even if they have more than 40 votes against him, they would permit an up-or-down vote to proceed, **and Hagel would pass**. I would bet today, though, that **they don't even have 40 at the end of the day; more like 15 to 25 nay votes** would be my guess. Which won't matter once he gets the post. Clarence Thomas had 48 votes against him, a fact that does not, alas, detract a whit from his votes and opinions. I would reckon that Obama is counting on something like the above. It's a little risky to proceed with a second "controversial" nomination after the Susan Rice mess. He must feel pretty confident that at the end of the day Hagel will get through.

#### Every ounce of Obama’s political capital is key to getting Hagel across the finish line

Scott Wong and Manu Raju (writers for Politico) January 6, 2013 “Chuck Hagel takes fire from Capitol Hill” http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/chuck-hagel-takes-fire-from-capitol-hill-85805.html?hp=t1

And despite heaping praise on Hagel when he retired from the Senate after the 2008 elections, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Sunday failed to extend an olive branch to the Nebraska Republican, instead suggesting there would be “tough questions” ahead. Even Senate Democrats are privately signaling they‘re not yet on board with the Hagel pick, and that the White House has a lot of work to do to get him across the finish line. The nomination comes at a tricky time for the White House — just as the fights over raising the debt ceiling and government appropriations are set to begin. And it could put a number of at-risk or pro-Israel Democrats in tough political spots — especially if the nomination fight grows even more contentious. Democrats are also scratching their heads over why Obama appears willing to go to the mat for Hagel, while abandoning his push for a close friend and member of his inner circle, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, to become secretary of state. Rice, an unabashed Democrat, abandoned her bid after withering GOP criticism over the deadly attacks on the U.S. consulate in Libya. Though different in substance, the controversy over Rice’s remarks is not unlike the current pushback over Hagel’s past foreign policy positions and controversial remarks. “It is a strange signal for the White House to send that they are willing to fight for Hagel but not Rice,” one Senate Democratic aide said Sunday. “Democrats are not currently unified behind Hagel, and it will take some real work by the administration to get them there, if it’s even possible.” Senior Republicans agreed, noting that after Hagel infuriated Republicans and Democrats alike over the years, there isn’t a natural base for him. “I can’t imagine why [Obama] would choose to burn his political capital on this nomination. For what? There is no constituency for Chuck Hagel,” said one senior GOP aide. “Obama will expend every ounce of political capital he has to get him across the finish line. Dems will hate this.”

#### Obama PC key – empirical

James Wall (Contributing Editor of The Christian Century magazine) December 26, 2012 “Hagel Defenders Battle Neocon Opposition” http://www.opednews.com/articles/1/Hagel-Defenders-Battle-Neo-by-James-Wall-121226-757.html

The Washington Post wrote in a lead editorial, December 18, that President Obama should not nominate former Nebraska Senator Chuck Hagel as his Defense Secretary because the President "has available other possible nominees who are considerably closer to the mainstream and to the president's first-term policies." Daily Beast columnist Andrew Sullivan responded to the Post editorial in his best high dudgeon fashion: "Considerably closer to the mainstream... is not a good thing if the mainstream (including the Washington Post) led us to endless, pointless, fruitless occupations and wars that have deeply wounded American credibility and credit, as well as costing up to a hundred thousand innocent lives? We need less mainstream thought in Washington, not more." The Post editorial reads like a set of instructions to a pro-Israel media/political hit squad on how to block Hagel as Obama's nominee for Defense Secretary. Is Hagel doomed to suffer the Charles Freeman treatment? Freeman, an experienced diplomat, had displayed the same independence from Zionist pressure that Chuck Hagel has shown. When Freeman was initially chosen by the new Obama administration in 2009 to serve as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the neocons swung into action. Politicians and media voices painted Freeman, unfairly, as a danger to Israel. The White House did little to rally support for Freeman, who soon agreed to withdraw his name, though not without some strong words about the machinations of the Israel Lobby. When Barack Obama hit his first term neocon stone wall, he capitulated. In a new essay for Consortium News, Freeman recalls his earlier experience, noting that: "The tactics of the Israel Lobby plumb the depths of dishonor and indecency and include character assassination, selective misquotation, the willful distortion of the record, the fabrication of falsehoods, and an utter disregard for the truth." Today, a second term awaits Obama. Once again the White House has floated a name that was bound to arouse opposition from the neocons. What will Obama do this time? Thus far, the White House appears to have left Hagel to the mercy of his opponents. Unlike Freeman, however, **Hagel has begun to hear sounds of support,** with the widely read Andrew Sullivan leading a growing media/political support effort for Hagel. Is some of this support generated behind the scenes from the White House? Possibly.

### Link wall

#### The NRC is highly politicized and scrutinized by Congress

Energy and Commerce Committee 7/17 Energy and Commerce Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. “NRC Commissioners Set to Testify Next Tuesday,” 2012, http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/nrc-commissioners-set-testify-next-tuesday

Since the start of the 112th Congress, the Energy and Commerce Committee has been actively conducting oversight of the NRC with a focus on how the actions of former NRC ChairmanGregory Jaczko politicized the Commission, undermining its ability to effectively execute its safety and licensing mission. Moving forward, the committee will continue its oversight efforts to determine any steps that need to be taken to restore the commission’s integrity and make sure history doesn't repeat itself.

#### The plan is massively unpopular

**Mariotte 12** [Michael, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos -- June 5 -- http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say]

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.¶ Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.¶ Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”¶ 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

#### Nuclear power is politically toxic – the plan breaks Obama’s radio silence.

Elisa Wood September 13, 2012 What Obama and Romney Don't Say About Energy http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/13/what-obama-and-romney-dont-say-about-energy/

Still, nuclear is unlikely to become a bigger slice of the energy pie in the US over the next two decades because of the high cost to build new plants, according the US Energy Information Administration. That may explain part of the campaign silence about nuclear. Another is lingering public worry about Fukushima, say industry observers. Even those who see nuclear as safe, say they understand why the candidates would want to steer clear of the discussion. Daniel Krueger, a managing director for Accenture's utilities generation and energy markets practice, described nuclear as politically "toxic," but added, "To me as an industry guy, in my view Fukushima proved the safety of nuclear energy. We had a major plant which was hit by an earthquake and tidal wave, and no one died as a direct result of radiation exposure. And the operator willingly sacrificed a plant worth tens of billions to protect the public. It was unimaginable what hit that plant."

#### Link alone turns the case – siting problems

**C**ivil **S**ociety **I**nstitute, 3/7/**2012** (Survey: Americans Not Warming Up to Nuclear Power One Year After Fukushima, p. <http://www.civilsocietyinstitute.org/media/030712release.cfm>)

Peter Bradford, former member of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, former chair of the New York and Maine utility regulatory commissions, and currently adjunct professor at Vermont Law School on "Nuclear Power and Public Policy, said: "This survey is another piece of bad news for new nuclear construction in the U.S. For an industry completely dependent on political support in order to gain access to the taxpayers' wallets (through loan guarantees and other federal subsidies) and the consumers' wallets (through rate guarantees to cover even canceled plants and cost overruns), public skepticism of this magnitude is a near fatal flaw. The nuclear industry has spent millions on polls telling the public how much the public longs for nuclear power. Such polls never ask real world questions linking new reactors to rate increases or to accident risk. Fukushima has made the links to risk much clearer in the public mind. This poll makes the consequences of that linkage clear."

### A2 reprocess link turn

#### Congress hates reprocessing and won’t fund it

**Johnson, 7** (Jeff, “Reprocessing Key To Nuclear Plan” Chemical & Engineering News, 6/18, <http://pubs.acs.org/cen/government/85/8525gov1.html>)

Many in Congress have doubts about GNEP because of its size and cost and are concerned about its potential to provide terrorists and others easier access to separated plutonium. Some also worry it will draw away funds that are needed to complete Yucca Mountain. For 2007, Congress cut the Administration's GNEP request of $250 million to $168 million. For 2008, DOE is seeking $405 million, but the House Appropriations Committee in early June cut the request to $120 million and said, "It is unnecessary to rush into a plan that continues to raise concerns among scientists and has only weak support from industry."

The most controversial part of GNEP is the Administration's plan to reintroduce spent-fuel reprocessing in the U.S.

GNEP calls for construction by 2020 of the world's largest nuclear fuel reprocessing facility, capable of reprocessing 2,000 to 3,000 tons of spent reactor fuel a year. This is significantly larger than the French La Hague reprocessing plant—currently the biggest in the world—and large enough to reprocess all the waste generated annually by the U.S.'s 103 commercial nuclear power plants.

Located on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy, La Hague can treat 1,650 tons of spent fuel a year. Built as a commercial facility in 1976, La Hague now handles less than half its top design capacity, as its international business has come to an end. In addition to the French plant, an 800-ton facility is nearly ready to open in Japan, but it is unclear what will happen to the plutonium that becomes separated through reprocessing there.

The U.S. ended a fledgling reprocessing program during Jimmy Carter's presidency because he feared global proliferation of nuclear weapons. Carter's concern was heightened following India's detonation of a nuclear bomb in 1974. That bomb was made from plutonium that was reprocessed from an Indian civilian reactor provided by Canada with U.S. technical support.

Although President Ronald Reagan revoked a Carter executive order banning spent-fuel reprocessing, the U.S. continued to steer clear of reprocessing due to its cost. As a result, U.S. commercial reactors use nuclear fuel one time through and then store the spent fuel on-site with the intention of moving it eventually to a geologic repository.

That policy, Sell said, "makes no sense in a world where nuclear power is expanding." Spent fuel, he said, is an "incredible energy resource. Ninety-five percent of the energy value of uranium still is contained in spent fuel." Japan, France, Russia, and the U.K. reprocess nuclear fuel, he added.

A host of arms control groups, physicists, and members of Congress, however, have big doubts about GNEP, both on proliferation and economic grounds. They point to the same countries identified by Sell and note that some 250 tons of separated plutonium has been generated due to their reprocessing efforts—enough to make 30,000 nuclear bombs. The countries have stockpiled the plutonium but are not close to building a system of reactors to recycle the plutonium or a permanent waste repository. Reprocessing for some of these countries, particularly the U.K., has also resulted in extensive radioactivity pollution problems.

Then there is the funding issue. "GNEP is a waste of money," said Richard Garwin, a nuclear physicist and frequent governmental adviser on nuclear issues, speaking at a symposium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science earlier this year. He urged the U.S. to continue on its current path of storing the waste on-site while developing a geological repository. This strategy is far cheaper as well as more proliferation-resistant than reprocessing, he added.

### AT: PC Not Key

#### Yes vote switching—even due to unrelated legislation

**Simes and Saunders 2010** – \*publisher of the National Interest, \*\*Executive Director of The Nixon Center and Associate Publisher of The National Interest, served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005 (12/23, Dimitri and Paul, National Interest, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626, WEA)

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our own conversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that **Republican anger over unrelated legislation cost** five to ten **votes**. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had alienated many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty.

That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it would not have been so difficult for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to work more cooperatively with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

### A2 Winners Win

#### Winners lose---PC’s not renewable, is zero-sum, and diminishes fast

Ryan 9 Selwyn, Professor Emeritus and former Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, “Obama and political capital,” 1/18 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article\_opinion?id=161426968

Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be difficult **for him** to deliver half of what he **has** promised, let alone all of it. Reality will force **him to make** many "u" turns and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a **vast accumulation of political capital**, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and fast diminishing **asset** in today's world of instant communication, which once misspent, is **rarely ever renewable**. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who did not know how to husband the political capital with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama's face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You." Despite the general optimism about Obama's ability to deliver, many groups have already begun to complain about being betrayed. Gays, union leaders, and women have been loud in their complaints about being by-passed or overlooked. Some radical blacks have also complained about being disrespected. Where and when is Joshua going to lead them to the promised land, they ask? When is he going to pull the troops out of Iraq? Civil rights groups also expect Obama to dis-establish Guantanamo as soon as he takes office to signal the formal break with Dick Cheney and Bush. They also want him to discontinue the policy which allows intelligence analysts to spy on American citizens without official authorisation. In fact, Obama startled supporters when he signalled that he might do an about-turn and continue this particular policy. We note that Bush is signalling Obama that keeping America safe from terrorists should be his top priority item and that he, Bush, had no regrets about violating the constitutional rights of Americans if he had to do so to keep them safe. Cheney has also said that he would do it again if he had to. The safety of the republic is after all the highest law. Other groups-sub-prime home owners, workers in the automobile sector, and the poor and unemployed generally all expect Obama to work miracles on their behalf, which of course he cannot do. Given the problems of the economy which has not yet bottomed out, some promises have to be deferred beyond the first term. Groups, however, expect that the promise made to them during the campaign must be kept. Part of the problem is that almost every significant social or ethnic group believes that it was instrumental in Obama's victory. White women felt that they took Obama over the line, as did blacks generally, Jews, Hispanics, Asians, rich white men, gays, and young college kids, to mention a few of those whose inputs were readily recognisable. Obama also has a vast constituency in almost every country in the world, all of whom expect him to save the globe and the planet. Clearly, he is the proverbial "Black Knight on a White Horse." One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that American politics **is not a winner-take-all system**. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting anything donepolitically, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, requiresgroups to negotiate, bargain and engage in **serious horse trading.** No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do. Although Obama is fully aware of the political limitations of the office which he holds, he is fully aware of the vast stock of political capital which he currently has in the bank and he evidently plans to enlarge it by drawing from the stock held by other groups, dead and alive. He is clearly drawing heavily from the caparisoned cloaks of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Obama seems to believe that by playing the all-inclusive, multipartisan, non-ideological card, he can get most of his programmes through the Congress without having to spend capital by using vetoes, threats of veto, or appeals to his 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party").

#### PC is finite---fights on one issue make pushing others harder

Hayward 12 John is a writer at Human Events. “DON’T BE GLAD THE BUFFETT RULE IS DEAD, BE ANGRY IT EVER EXISTED,” 4/17, http://www.humanevents.com/2012/04/17/dont-be-glad-the-buffett-rule-is-dead-be-angry-it-ever-existed/

Toomey makes the excellent point that Obama’s class-warfare sideshow act is worse than useless, because it’s wasting America’s valuable time, even as the last fiscal sand runs through our hourglass. Politicians speak of “political capital” in selfish terms, as a pile of chips each party hoards on its side of the poker table, but in truth America has only a finite amount of political capital in total. When time and energy is wasted on pointless distractions, the capital expended---in the form of the public’s attention, and the debates they hold among themselves---cannot easily be regained. ¶ There is an “opportunity cost” associated with the debates we aren’t having, and the valid ideas we’re not considering, when our time is wasted upon nonsense that is useful only to political re-election campaigns. Health care reform is the paramount example of our time, as countless real, workable market-based reforms were obscured by the flaccid bulk of ObamaCare. The Buffett Rule, like all talk of tax increases in the shadow of outrageous government spending, likewise distracts us from the real issues.

#### PC finite

**Gerson, 12/17** (Michael, 12/17/10, Washington Post, “When it comes to politics, Obama's ego keeps getting in the way,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html>)

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because political capital is limited. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership.

Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done.

**Winner’s win theory not true for Obama**

**American Prospect, 5-16-11**, p. http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=barack\_obamas\_theory\_of\_power

Obama won more legislative trophies during his first two years than Clinton did, but in many respects, they were poisoned chalices. Health reform proved broadly unpopular because of political missteps—a net negative for Democrats in the 2010 midterm. The stimulus, though valuable, was too small to be a major political plus. Obama hailed it as a great victory rather than pledging to come back for more until recovery was assured. He prematurely abandoned the fight for jobs as his administration’s central theme, though the recession still wracked the nation. And because of the administration’s alliance with Wall Street, Obama suffered both the appearance and reality of being too close to the bankers, despite a partial success on financial reform. Obama’s mortgage-rescue program was the worst of both worlds—it failed to deliver enough relief to make an economic difference yet still signaled politically disabling sympathy for both “deadbeat” homeowners and for bankers. (See this month’s special report on page A1.)

## 2nc states

### States solvency wall

#### Energy finance banks solve without new budgetary spending

**Muro and Berlin, 9/12**/12 – \*senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings AND \*\* Senior Vice President for Policy and Planning, and General Counsel at the Coalition for Green Capital (Mark and Ken, “State Clean Energy Finance Banks: New Investment Facilities for Clean Energy Deployment”, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/9/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro)

Given these challenges, states that want to realize the benefits of clean energy deployment should consider a new approach to funding clean energy programs. Specifically, they should investigate the possibility of developing state clean energy finance banks that use limited public dollars and leverage private capital to provide a combination of low-interest rate funding that makes clean energy projects competitive and low-cost 100-percent up-front loans for energy efficiency projects. Such an approach would address the deployment and diffusion challenges faced by clean energy technologies while recognizing that federal and state appropriations, tax credits, and other incentives and subsidies will be sharply diminished in the years ahead because of the budget crisis at all levels of government. Likewise, the development of such finance entities would address the need for states to develop a new paradigm for financing strong clean energy and energy efficiency projects as part of a push to develop strong regional industries. So-called “clean energy finance banks” or “green banks” are ideally suited to solve the present problems because they offer a practical way for states to make available leveraged, low-cost financing for project developers in their states. First, they can be developed out of existing state programs while bringing into the enterprise the equivalent of substantial new resources given their ability to leverage funds. Likewise, because the banks would provide debt financing, they would be repaid on their loans, putting them in the position to borrow funds and to establish revolving loan funds that would provide funds that could be reinvested without new sources of financing. Furthermore, clean energy finance banks, if established as independent institutions, would be able to issue revenue bonds without the full faith and credit of the state and without the restrictions facing states, which have limited borrowing capacity. Finally, clean energy finance banks could efficiently seek large investors with patient, longterm capital who are seeking a long-term, conservative rate of return, such as pension fund investors.

#### State governments can use financial incentives to spur nuclear power – empirically attracts private sector financing and captures their signal arguments

**NEI 9** (Nuclear Energy Institute, “Policies That Support New Nuclear Power Plant Development”, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/factsheet/policiessupportnewplantdevelopment/?print=true)

State Policies

Several states have passed legislation or implemented regulations, or both, to support construction of new nuclear power plants.

These policies range from property tax incentives to pre-determination of rate-making principles for a project before construction begins.

The policies that help most with financing new plants in regulated states are those that:

* Require the state public utility commission to determine if a proposed plant is prudent before construction begins and approve costs periodically during construction, thereby guaranteeing these capital costs will be added to the rate base when the plant comes online.
* Allow the carrying cost of construction work in progress (CWIP)—or the financing cost associated with construction—to be passed on to ratepayers during construction. Allowing CWIP reduces the cost ratepayers will pay for power from the plant when it goes into commercial operation.

Some unregulated states assist with financing for unregulated plants by allowing pre-negotiated, long-term power purchase agreements (PPA). PPAs guarantee the project will have a source of cash flow (and cost recovery) once it is operational.

State-level policies send positive signals to the financial community, helping companies finance projects reasonably, and, thereby, keeping the cost of electricity for consumers lower.

#### Anything they can do, states can do better

**Rabe, 2** – Senior Fellow, Governance Studies at the Brookings Institute (Barry, “Statehouse and Greenhouse: The States Are Taking the Lead on Climate Change” spring http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring\_energy\_rabe.aspx)

American states provide particularly fertile ground for policy innovation in climate change. First, many are quite large in terms of population, physical size, and resources devoted to environmental protection. They also spew a lot of harmful emissions. Indeed, if the American states were counted as sovereign nations, approximately half would rank among the top 60 national emitters of greenhouse gases around the globe. The annual carbon dioxide emissions of Texas, for example, exceed those of France. Indiana's exceed Indonesia's, and Georgia's exceed Venezuela's. ¶ Second, states already have considerable jurisdiction over many spheres of environmental and energy policy with direct relevance to the climate change problem. State rules affect electricity rates, land use, waste management, and transportation. States also implement many federal environmental laws, issuing more than 90 percent of all environmental permits and conducting more than 75 percent of all enforcement actions. ¶ Third, a growing body of scholarship suggests that far more innovation in American environmental and energy policy now emanates from the statehouses than from Congress. States now dominate policy formation in pollution prevention and cross-media regulatory integration, an exigency long neglected in Washington.

### Fed Modeling

#### State action gets modeled federally

**Lash, 7 –** head of the World Resources Institute, former Secretary of Natural Resources for Vermont (Jonathan, “Climate Policy in the State Laboratory: How States Influence Federal Regulation and the Implications for U.S. Policy,” World Resources Institute, September, <http://www.wri.org/publication/climate-policy-in-the-state-laboratory>)

America has a long and inspiring tradition of policy innovation and activism that is incubated at the state level. The states often take to the front lines of cutting-edge policy development, creating fresh and inventive programs to address the concerns and needs of their constituents.

From standards for organic agriculture, to removing asbestos from schools, to creating enterprise zones, and reducing acid rain pollution, the states have shown a path forward and provided both the problem-solving acumen as well as the pressure to induce the Federal government to act**.**

Of all the environmental problems now confronting this nation and the rest of the world, none holds greater potential for irrevocable and destructive disruption to our lives than climate change. Yet, up to now, our national government has failed to respond with initiatives appropriate to what looms ahead.

The most significant first steps designed to measure and control the emission of greenhouse gases have come from an impressive number of states in this country. Ten states in the Northeast, seven in the West, and several in the Midwest are in the process of implementing mandatory programs to measure and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

And not surprisingly, as well, is the fact that over 100 cities have gotten on board, to one degree or another, taking concrete steps to reduce their contribution to climate change or to add their political clout to efforts to spur the national commitment needed to help catalyze essential international compacts.

This timely report documents state efforts now underway to address the problem of climate change and our contribution to it. It puts them into the historical context of previous initiatives by states to lead our country in making difficult but necessary national decisions.

 Just as there is no “silver-bullet” technology that will solve climate change, there is no “silver-bullet” policy either. The commitment to policy innovation by U.S. states may prove to be the wellspring from which we build the low-carbon economy of the future**.**

### at: gnep signal

#### The US is fully funding GNEP now – prior reductions have been offset by AFCI funding

**World Nuclear Association, 12** (July, “International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation

(formerly Global Nuclear Energy Partnership)” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf117\_international\_framework\_nuclear\_energy\_cooperation.html)

The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), developed from the former Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), is a partnership of countries aiming to ensure that new nuclear in initiatives meet the highest standards of safety, security and non‐proliferation. ¶ IFNEC involves both political and technological initiatives, and extends to financing and infrastructure. ¶ The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), formerly the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), aims to accelerate the development and deployment of advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies while providing greater disincentives to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. GNEP was initiated by the USA early in 2006, but picked up on concerns and proposals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Russia. The vision was for a global network of nuclear fuel cycle facilities all under IAEA control or at least supervision.¶ Domestically in the USA, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) was based on the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI), and while GNEP faltered with the advent of the Barack Obama administration in Washington from 2008, the AFCI is being funded at higher levels than before for R&D "on proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste reduction strategies." Two significant new elements in the strategy are new reprocessing technologies which separate all transuranic elements together (and not plutonium on its own), and advanced burner (fast) reactors to consume the result of this while generating power.¶ GNEP was set up as both a research and technology development initiative and an international policy initiative. It addresses the questions of how to use sensitive technologies responsibly in a way that protects global security, and also how to manage and recycle wastes more effectively and securely. The USA had a policy in place since 1977 which ruled out reprocessing used fuel, on non-proliferation grounds. Under GNEP, reprocessing is to be a means of avoiding proliferation, as well as addressing problems concerning high-level wastes. Accordingly, the US Department of Energy set out to develop advanced fuel cycle technologies on a commercial scale.

### AT: 50 state fiat bad

#### b.Literature supports 50 state uniformity

**Northrop and Sassoon, 08** - Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com (Michael David, Yale Environment 360, 6-3, <http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015>)

But the states have far more to offer. They also have approved a host of energy-efficiency measures affecting all sectors of the economy. For example, one set of policies provides both emissions reductions and substantial economic savings from the building sector through improved building codes, insulation and weatherization programs, and lighting retrofits. From the waste management sector, waste reduction and recycling programs yield similar two-pronged benefits.

These policies go hand-in-hand with others mandating that an increasing percentage of a state’s energy come from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Many states — chief among them California — have shown similar national leadership by significantly toughening auto emissions standards, leading Congress to increase national vehicle standards last December and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to challenge the states in court.

The fact that so many states are acting with a similar impetus begs an important question: What would happen if you aggregated these policies and applied them on a national scale?

One study conducted by the Center for Climate Strategies (CCS) — a non-partisan group that has worked on climate policymaking and analysis with many of these states — indicates that the adoption of a comprehensive, nationwide climate and energy policy would have substantial economic benefits. Using data from 12 states that are leaders in the field of climate change and energy, CSS calculated that were all 50 states to adopt similar rules and legislation, the aggregate economic savings would be $25 billion. The nation could achieve a 33% reduction in projected greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 — a common interim target — and save money doing so.

## 1nr case

### Prolif

#### US pressure won’t be effective without huge arsenal cuts.

Daalder & Lodal, ‘8
[Ivo, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, Jan, US Atlantic Council Former President, Former White House and Defense Department Official to Nixon, Ford, Clinton, Foreign Affairs, "The Logic of Zero," Vol. 87, Issue 6, EBSCO]

As the United States works diplomatically to create a broad international coalition, it can use the emerging consensus to help convince nuclear aspirants and new nuclear powers that their drive for a nuclear option must come to an end. Active diplomacy with Iran and North Korea must of course continue, backed when necessary by additional pressure to convince both countries that the benefits of forgoing or ending the nuclear option outweigh those of building or retaining the bomb. The likelihood of success would be significantly enhanced if the United States and other nuclear powers were demonstrably committed to adhering to the same nonnuclear status and fissile-material oversight that they are demanding Iran, North Korea, and every other nuclear aspirant accept.

#### The US can’t influence global nuclear trade -- international actors will resist influence.

**Kerr et al, ‘11**

[Paul K, Analyst in Nonproliferation -- CRS, Mark Holt, Specialist in Energy Policy, Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation, 8-10, “Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress,” http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171374.pdf]

The ability of the United States to influence regulations for international nuclear commerce have arguably diminished. As discussed above, the U.S. nuclear industry’s market power has declined and foreign competitors have been concluding nuclear supply agreements with other countries. Moreover, some influential governments have demonstrated limited enthusiasm for such regulations. For example, as noted, some members of the NSG displayed resistance to proposals that would restrict the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Furthermore, the NSG decided in 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines—a step which many observers argued would assist New Delhi’s nuclear weapons program. 85 Some suppliers may use the 2008 decision to justify supplying other states that do not meet NSG guidelines; indeed, China has agreed to supply Pakistan with two additional nuclear reactors. 86 It is also possible that Israel and Pakistan, which, like India, do not have full-scope safeguards and have not signed the NPT, may continue to ask for exemptions from NSG guidelines. For its part, Israel proposed export criteria in 2007 that would have had the effect of exempting Israel from the current NSG guidelines 87 and is widely believed to have sought a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.

### Prolif Turn

#### Proliferation happens by using political cover to make nuclear weapons – still possible with IFR’s

**Green 10** [“NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR POWER & INTEGRAL FAST REACTORS Friends of the Earth, Australia www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear February 2010 Contact: Jim Green”, khirn]

Advocates assume that IFRs will consume more fissile material than they produce – such reactors are called 'burners'. But IFRs are close relatives of the 'breeder' reactors that do the opposite. Some IFR advocates propose building an initial fleet of breeders to build up stockpiles of fissile material to fuel a second fleet of IFRs. Some IFR advocates propose initially deploying IFR technology in nuclear weapons states and weaponscapable states. But dozens and dozens of similar proposals have come and gone over the decades, rejected by the countries that would be excluded. There is a long history of 'peaceful' nuclear programs providing political cover and the technical means to further nuclear weapons programs. The direct use of power reactors has been the smaller part of the problem. The larger part of the problem has been real or feigned interested in nuclear power providing a rationale for the acquisition of proliferation sensitive nuclear facilities including enrichment plants, reprocessing plants and research reactors. For IFRs, the good news is that they would not operate in conjunction with enrichment plants or conventional reprocessing plants. But they do need to be kickstarted with a load of fissile material. Ideally that fissile material would come from existing civil or military stockpiles. But there are some less than ideal scenarios – e.g. the requirement for an initial load of fissile material providing a rationale for the ongoing operation of enrichment and reprocessing plants or the construction of new ones. Tom Blees' plan for an initial fleet of breeders is also of concern. Real or feigned interested in developing IFRs could also be used as a rationale for constructing prototype or test fast reactors, which could potentially be used to produce fissile material for weapons.

### Exports

#### Alt cause—export regulations

Platts, 10/1/2012. “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149.

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

\*\*\*Burdensome U.S. export regulations are the critical obstacle to nuclear leadership—the U.S. actually still has the supply chain, but massive delays in processing push countries away from the U.S.

### Prolif Leadership 2NC

#### Prolif leadership fails---a few distinctions at the top:

#### 1—the aff can’t solve simply through benign tech transfer—IF economics were the only thing that drove nuclear plant decisions, then obviously there would never be prolif because it’s EXPENSIVE

Lewis 12

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, 8/1/12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full

Creating market incentives to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing seems like a reasonable thing to do - **except that most states make nuclear decisions on something other than a cost basis**. Nuclear power enthusiasts have been no strangers to wishful thinking, starting with claims that nuclear energy would be "too cheap to meter." Government decisions about nuclear power tend to **prioritize** concerns about **sovereignty** and keeping technological pace with neighbors. It is not hard to see national nuclear programs as something akin to national airlines - money-losing prestige projects that barely take market forces into account. Often, aspiring nuclear states look to countries like the United States and Japan as models. If such countries invest heavily in fuel-cycle services, developing states might **try to copy** them **rather than** simply **become** their **customers**.

#### 2---if the US tried to constrain nuclear tech at all, countries wouldn’t use our tech—supply side restrictions fail because of other suppliers

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: **Countries face political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making**. **A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity**, such as Pakistan or Brazil, **is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side controls**. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.

#### Prefer our evidence—countries will support proliferators

Ford 12

Chris Ford, Hudson Institute, served until September 2008 as United States Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, and prior to that as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament verification and compliance policy, 6/28/12, Perilous Precedents: Proliferation as Policy in Alternative Nuclear Futures, www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=9026

I sometimes wonder, however, whether the seeming irresistibility of the case for nonproliferation may sometimes get in the way of our analytical acuity as we look at the geopolitical environment. It is not uncommon in our diplomatic relations, for instance, to hear it declared with great assurance that "Country Such-and-Such shares our interest in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation" – and to have it be assumed, in effect, that if we just *remind* its leaders of this shared interest, they will see the light and come around to our point of view. If there is a problem in obtaining someone's cooperation on nonproliferation matters, we tend to see this as being merely due to disagreements over "tactics," or perhaps just some lack of *capacity* to do be helpful despite genuinely good intentions.¶ At worst, we suspect merely that others are holding out in order to bargain for as high a price as possible in return for giving us the cooperation they really *do*, in their hearts, agree is important anyway. **This may be unwise** on their part – or perhaps on ours for commoditizing such cooperation by trying to purchase it through concessionary inducements – but we assume that such bargaining doesn't *really* bespeak a significant difference of opinion about the value of nonproliferation. Only the would-be proliferator regimes themselves, we might think, actually *want* nuclear weapons to spread – and even then one usually doesn't have to look far to find some analyst who feels their pursuit of such devices is an unfortunate but understandable choice, taken only grudgingly in the face of real or perceived foreign threats. Almost no one, we sometimes seem to assume, *really* supports proliferation.¶ But perhaps we should take a step back from the obviousness of such conclusions, and consider the possibility that, "proliferation as policy" is not always felt to be an inherently irrational strategy. It is a strategy that it remains powerfully in our interest to prevent others from adopting, of course. We probably miss something important, however, if we see proliferation as no more than some kind of aberrance or confusion.¶ "Proliferation-as-policy" is actually something that seems to have appealed to a number of real-world decision-makers in the past. Many of you doubtless knows these stories at least as well as I do, but let me offer some examples:¶ The Soviets gave Beijing a great deal of help in its weapons development, though by all accounts Khrushchev balked just before fulfilling the final clauses of his 1957 cooperation agreement with the Chinese, and stopped before providing Mao Zedong with an actual weapon prototype.¶ French scientists provided a great deal of sensitive dual-use technology to Israel, including the reactor at Dimona and a plutonium-separation capability that many observers believe to form the core of Israel's weapons program even today.¶ China helped Pakistan develop its nuclear weapons program, to the point – it has been reported – that Beijing provided actual weapons designs.¶ Even in the midst of the ongoing nuclear crisis over Iran's previously-secret nuclear program, Russia provided Tehran with the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Russian entities apparently also designed the plutonium-production reactor that Iran is constructing at Arak.¶ China is reported to have provided uranium hexafluoride (UF6) feedstock to Iran's secret enrichment program in the early 1990s, and to have provided the blueprints for Iran's uranium conversion facility.¶ North Korea is reported to have provided Libya with UF6, and – more infamously – to have constructed a plutonium-production reactor for Bashar al-Assad in Syria, though the Israelis bombed it in 2007.¶ The official story about Abdul Qadeer Khan's notorious nuclear smuggling ring is that it was some kind of a rogue operation, without official support or encouragement, but few analysts today seem really to believe this. It is widely believed that the Pakistani government, or a significant portion of it, was indeed complicit in Khan's operations.¶ Finally, Saudi Arabia has long been rumored to have helped finance Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.¶ The evidence thus suggests that proliferation isn't just about those who want to acquire nuclear weapons: at one point or another, a number of **countries** have apparently **concluded that *supporting* proliferation is in their interest**.

### Prolif Impact D

#### No domino theory—nonproliferation has zero utility

Potter 8

William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Summer 2008, Divining Nuclear Intentions, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v033/33.1.potter.pdf

Hymans is keenly aware of the deficiency of past proliferation projections, which he attributes in large part to the “tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general ‘roguishness’ of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions” (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.49¶ Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.”50 As he points out, **the new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, assumes an oversimplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken**.51 **Leaders’ nuclear preferences**, he maintains, “**are not** highly **contingent on what other states decide**,” and, therefore, “**proliferation tomorrow will** probably **remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states**” (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces “an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self assertive ones,” and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisonmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a “ticket to international status”; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters.¶ As discussed earlier, Hymans argues that the need for a nuclear deterrent is entirely in the eye of the beholder—a leader with an oppositional nationalist NIC. By the same token, just because some leaders seek to achieve interna tional prestige through acquisition of the bomb, it does not mean that other leaders “necessarily view the bomb as the right ticket to punch”: witness the case of several decades of Argentine leaders, as well as the Indian Nehruvians (pp. 211212). The case of Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat, though not discussed by Hymans, also seems to at this category.¶ Hymans’s focus on the individual level of analysis leads him to discount bu reaucratic political explanations for nuclear postures, as well. Central to his argument is the assumption that decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken “without the considerable vetting that political scientists typically assume precedes most important states choices” (p. 13). As such, although he is prepared to credit nuclear energy bureaucracies as playing a supporting role in the ef forts by Australia, France, and India to go nuclear, he does not observe their influence to be a determining factor in root nuclear decisions by national lead ers. Moreover, contrary to a central premise of Solingen’s model of domestic political survival, Hymans ands little evidence in his case studies of leaders pursuing nuclear weapons to advance their political interests (p. 213). For ex ample, he argues, the 1998 nuclear tests in India were as risky domestically for Vajpayee as they were internationally (p. 214).¶ Most provocatively, Hymans invokes an individual-centric mode of **analysis** to **challenge** **the necessity and utility of a strong international nonproliferation regime**. As discussed in a preceding section, **he finds no evidence that the NPT regime prevented any** of the **leaders who desired nuclear weapons from pursuing them**.

### India DA

#### Asia war escalates – miscalculation

Landay 2k (Jonathan S. Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, -2K [“Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in Asian Conflicts”, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, March 10, p. Lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

#### India-China conflict goes nuclear

Fisher 11 (Max, Associate Editor at the Atlantic, Editor of the International Channel, “5 Most Likely Ways the US and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War”)

(4) China or India occupies disputed territory. In 1962, China seized a disputed district called Tawang along its border with India. Since then, China hasn't shown much interest in using military force to invade disputed territory. But Indian politics have become increasingly nationalist and its leaders insecure about the rising Chinese power. India's decades-long territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir -- which came very close to sparking nuclear war in the 1990s -- means that India is extremely sensitive about its borders. It's not hard to foresee an erratic Indian politician or a twitchy general trying to preempt some imagined Chinese invasion of a disputed territory. If that happens, China's response could easily escalate the stand-off, whether intentionally or not. India, like China, not yet clarified precisely when it will and will not consider using nuclear weapons. The U.S., a close ally of India, would probably be compelled to step in -- as it has between India and Pakistan. But that might add to the volatility and the ways things could spiral out of control. Photo: Indian army Brahmos missile launcher passes on a flotilla towards the India Gate memorial during rehearsal for the Republic Day parade in New Delhi.

#### Turns warming

Nagpur ’12 (NAGPUR, The Economist, “The future is black”, <http://www.economist.com/node/21543138>, January 21, 2012)

Power is essential for India’s long-term growth. But electricity is unlikely to flow fast enough STAB a finger at the middle of a map of India and you will hit Nagpur. Some 20 miles (32 kilometres) north-west of the city is a sloping tunnel bored into the rock. Ride two miles down into the gloom, hanging from a wire, and after a torch-lit hike past underground streams and conveyor belts you arrive at a black wall. Sweating men are rigging it with tubes of explosives and wire detonators. Soon they will blast it apart, and down should tumble tonnes of India's most important commodity: coal. In coal India has something as abundant as people. As more Indians enjoy the trappings of middle-class life and the country industrialises, demand for coal-fired electricity will continue to rise smartly, roughly in line with economic growth. India may not have much oil or gas to call its own but it has the world's fifth-largest coal reserves. And it has successfully raised a mountain of the other raw material needed to turn carbon into sparks: capital. Some $130 billion has been ploughed into the power industry in the past five years. Of that, $60 billion or so has come from the private sector—probably the largest-ever private-sector investment India has seen. Possessing coal and capital is no guarantee that India's energy boiler will work properly, however. It also involves multiple states, government ministries, regulators, mandarins, politicians, tycoons, environmentalists, villagers, activists, crooks and bandits. There are the usual gripes of an emerging economy: blackouts (during peak hours the system delivers 10% less electricity than customers want) and an inadequate grid that does not reach some 300m people (although it has improved a lot in recent years). There is also a risk that India cannot deliver the long-term increase in electricity generation that its economy needs to fulfil its potential. On January 18th a group of influential businessmen gathered in Delhi to bend the prime minister's ear on this very matter. The problem is partly one of design. Coal is dug up by a state-monopolist that has failed to boost output significantly in recent years, unlike China (see chart 1), and so cannot keep up with demand. Power is distributed to homes and firms by publicly owned grid companies that are often bankrupt, their tariffs kept too low by local politicians. Trapped in the middle are the firms that run power stations. In desperation they are importing pricier foreign coal, but the grid companies cannot afford the power it produces. With too little coal and wobbly customers, the private firms that have built new power stations are in financial trouble. Another wave of private investment looks unlikely. In India, though, no one expects perfect design. The economy sits somewhere between the old command-and-control approach and the new ways of markets and private capital. What is worrying is that India's talent for improvisation—a collective ability to muddle through—has deserted it when it comes to providing electricity. The problem has been clear for ages. A circuitous blame game is taking place. Ministries squabble but no one knocks heads together. If you trawl round the offices of industry bosses the livid letters they brandish trace their incandescent correspondence with each other. Power, so vital for growth, is India's biggest bottleneck. The danger is that it becomes a metaphor for the whole economy: many fear that the muddle-through approach of the past two decades of boom has diminishing returns. One dam thing after another It wasn't always all about coal. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister after independence, was obsessed with hydroelectric dams, calling them the “temples of modern India”. It would have been good for India's environment, and the world's, had many more temples been raised. The fad for hydro trickled away and it now provides only 14% of India's power compared with up to a half in the 1960s. That seems unlikely to change—India is too chaotic and free a place to manage the feats of national machismo that allowed China to build the Three Gorges dam. Although new projects are planned in places such as Kashmir and neighbouring Bhutan, harnessing Himalayan rivers to power all of India is for now a dream, not a policy. The subcontinent has plenty of sun and wind, and states including Gujarat and Tamil Nadu are keen to encourage investments in renewable energy. These are likely to be niche sources of power, thanks to problems getting land and their high cost. As for nuclear power, India's attitude has long been hyperbolic on paper and ambivalent in practice, despite striking a civilian nuclear deal with America in 2005. Foreign companies are put off by the prospect of unlimited liability in the event of an accident. Nuclear plants face opposition from hostile state governments and protesters. Events in Japan have not helped. “By the time people forgot Chernobyl, along came Fukushima,” says one industry bigwig. The result is that, as in China, fossil fuels will dominate the energy mix (see chart 2). Carbon emissions will rise in tandem, by about two-and-a-half times between 2010 and 2030 according to McKinsey, a consultancy. The growth of India's power industry—assuming it is built and largely fired by fossil fuels—would contribute about a tenth of the total global rise in emissions over the period. Most Indians do not feel too guilty, arguing that dirtier rich countries, not poor ones, should show restraint. India's emissions will remain far below those from America and China both in absolute terms and per head.

### 2NC UQ Wall

#### India is the only country exporting SMRs by 2015- India has dominance of the SMR market by decades- this is the card you call for at the end of the round

Barton ‘9 (Charles Barton, Researcher for the Energy Collective, “India pushes Small Reactor Sales to Asian, African Countries”, <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2009/06/india-pushes-small-reactor-sales-to.html>, June 20, 2009)

Earlier this week, Rod Adams interviews ANS President Tom Sanders on the Atomic Show. The interview is well worth the time you spend listening to it. Tom lays out a vision of the future of the nuclear economy based on small, factory produced reactors. Although he does not refer to the LFTR, the LFTR definitely fits into his concept. Tom's vision is international, because he sees a huge market in developing nations for small reactors. Tom's interview is encouraging, because it suggests that my thinking is on the right track. David Walters recent post on large verses small reactors also triggered a Brian Wang post on the small reactor business model. It is not simply that bloggers are talking about small reactors, but an increasing number of potential or actual manufacturers are announcing their intent to build small reactors. None of these reactors will be available until sometime in the next decade. Small factory built reactors clearly are an idea whose time has come. But in India that time came a generation ago and never left. Indian small reactors have been completely overlooked in the small reactor discussion, even though only India currently builds and markets advanced small reactors for electrical production. If you want to order a small reactor today, and be assured delivery before 2015, you will need to talk to the Indians. According to Hindu Business Line, NPCIL plans to market its small and mid size reactors to Kazakhstan, South-East Asian countries and African nations. A proposal for reactor sales to Kazakhstan is already on the anvil, with discussions between NPCIL and the central Asian nation’s nuclear utility Kazatomprom at an advanced stage. According to Government sources, while feelers have also been received from South-East Asian countries, Kazakhstan is likely to be the first breakthrough. India has been proactively exploring the possibility of exporting indigenous PHWRs to developing nations that are eyeing nuclear power generation but are constrained by small-sized electricity grids. . . . small size nuclear reactors are apt for countries that have small grids of around 10,000 MW. Use of large reactor units in case of countries having small grids could potentially lead to grid failures if even a single large unit shuts down at any point in time. Besides, assembling clusters of 220 MWe reactors is projected to be more cost-effective than large-sized reactors from the US or Europe, officials said. Several Asean countries are reported to be eyeing the nuclear option, with Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand among those having announced plans to tap atomic energy in the future. An unnamed official of NPCIL told Hindu Business Line, “Currently, India is perhaps the only country to have an actively working technology, design and infrastructure for manufacture of small reactors with a unit capacity of 220 MWe. These units have a great potential for exports, particularly to nations with small grids that are planning nuclear forays with relatively lower investment levels.” NPCIL has an expanding Internet presence. A downloadable brochure advertises the two reactors. Reportedly capital costs of small Indian Reactors may run as low as $0.90 per watt, but such cost estimates are based on prevailing Indian wage rates.

### AT: Fuel Leasing

#### GNEP dead

**World Nuclear News**, 5-29-**2009,** “Fatal blow to GNEP?”, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-DoE\_cancels\_GNEP\_EIS-2906095.html

The US Department of Energy is cancelling the wide-ranging environmental analysis of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) project. Its decision follows a change in government policy on commercial reprocessing.¶ ¶ The proposed GNEP program, which was part of President George Bush's Advanced Energy Initiative, is intended to support a safe, secure and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy, both domestically and internationally. Domestically, the GNEP program would promote technologies that support economic, sustained production of nuclear-generated electricity, while reducing the impacts associated with used nuclear fuel disposal and reducing proliferation risks. As yet, DoE has no specific proposed actions for the international component of the GNEP program. Rather, the USA, through the GNEP program, is considering various initiatives to work cooperatively with other countries. So far, 25 countries have joined the GNEP partnership.¶ ¶ In a notice published in the Federal Register, the Department of Energy (DoE) said that it had decided to cancel the GNEP programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) because it is no longer pursuing domestic commercial reprocessing, which was the primary focus of the prior administration's domestic GNEP program.¶ ¶ In March 2006, the DoE published an advance notice of intent to prepare an EIS for the GNEP technology demonstration program, soliciting comments on the proposed scope, alternatives and environmental issues to be analyzed. The DoE stated that the technology demonstration program would demonstrate technologies needed to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle that enables recycling and consumption of used fuel in a proliferation-resistant manner.¶ ¶ The comments that the DoE received included suggestions to prepare an environmental impact statement addressing the entire GNEP program. The DoE agreed and in October 2008 announced the availability of its draft GNEP PEIS. The document provides an analysis of the potential environmental consequences of alternatives to the present US open fuel cycle, in which nuclear fuel is used one time and eventually sent to geologic disposal. DoE's stated preference in the draft was to close the fuel cycle, although it did not identify a specific preferred alternative.

#### 1NC Link ev— Causes a US dominated export market

Rosner, Goldberg, and Hezir et. al. ‘11 (Robert Rosner, Robert Rosner is an astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, and Stephen Goldberg, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, Joseph S. Hezir, Principal, EOP Foundation, Inc., Many people have made generous and valuable contributions to this study. Professor Geoff Rothwell, Stanford University, provided the study team with the core and supplemental analyses and very timely and pragmatic advice. Dr. J’Tia Taylor, Argonne National Laboratory, supported Dr. Rothwell in these analyses. Deserving special mention is Allen Sanderson of the Economics Department at the University of Chicago, who provided insightful comments and suggested improvements to the study. Constructive suggestions have been received from Dr. Pete Lyons, DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; Dr. Pete Miller, former DOE Assistant Secretary of Nuclear Energy; John Kelly, DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Reactor Technologies; Matt Crozat, DOE Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy; Vic Reis, DOE Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary for Science; and Craig Welling, DOE Deputy Office Director, Advanced Reactor Concepts Office, as well as Tim Beville and the staff of DOE’s Advanced Reactor Concepts Office. The study team also would like to acknowledge the comments and useful suggestions the study team received during the peer review process from the nuclear industry, the utility sector, and the financial sector. Reviewers included the following: Rich Singer, VP Fuels, Emissions, and Transportation, MidAmerican Energy Co.; Jeff Kaman, Energy Manager, John Deere; Dorothy R. Davidson, VP Strategic Programs, AREVA; T. J. Kim, Director—Regulatory Affairs & Licensing, Generation mPower, Babcock & Wilcox; Amir Shahkarami, Senior Vice President, Generation, Exelon Corp.; Michael G. Anness, Small Modular Reactor Product Manager, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Matthew H. Kelley and Clark Mykoff, Decision Analysis, Research & Technology, Westinghouse Electric Co.; George A. Davis, Manager, New Plant Government Programs, Westinghouse Electric Co.; Christofer Mowry, President, Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Energy, Inc.; Ellen Lapson, Managing Director, Fitch Ratings; Stephen A. Byrne, Executive Vice President, Generation & Transmission Chief Operating Officer, South Carolina Electric & Gas Company; Paul Longsworth, Vice President, New Ventures, Fluor; Ted Feigenbaum, Project Director, Bechtel Corp.; Kennette Benedict, Executive Director, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist; Bruce Landrey, CMO, NuScale; Dick Sandvik, NuScale; and Andrea Sterdis, Senior Manager of Strategic Nuclear Expansion, Tennessee Valley Authority. The authors especially would like to acknowledge the discerning comments from Marilyn Kray, Vice-President at Exelon, throughout the course of the study, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power”, <http://epic.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/SMRWhite_Paper_Dec.14.2011copy.pdf>, November 2011, LEQ)

As stated earlier, SMRs have the potential to achieve significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. They could provide alternative base load power generation to facilitate the retirement of older, smaller, and less efficient coal generation plants that would, otherwise, not be good candidates for retrofitting carbon capture and storage technology. They could be deployed in regions of the U.S. and the world that have less potential for other forms of carbon-free electricity, such as solar or wind energy. There may be technical or market constraints, such as projected electricity demand growth and transmission capacity, which would support SMR deployment but not GW-scale LWRs. From the on-shore manufacturing perspective, a key point is that the manufacturing base needed for SMRs can be developed domestically. Thus, while the large commercial LWR industry is seeking to transplant portions of its supply chain from current foreign sources to the U.S., the SMR industry offers the potential to establish a large domestic manufacturing base building upon already existing U.S. manufacturing infrastructure and capability, including the Naval shipbuilding and underutilized domestic nuclear component and equipment plants. The study team learned that a number of sustainable domestic jobs could be created – that is, the full panoply of design, manufacturing, supplier, and construction activities – if the U.S. can establish itself as a credible and substantial designer and manufacturer of SMRs. While many SMR technologies are being studied around the world, a strong U.S. commercialization program can enable U.S. industry to be first to market SMRs, thereby serving as a fulcrum for export growth as well as a lever in influencing international decisions on deploying both nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. A viable U.S.-centric SMR industry would enable the U.S. to recapture technological leadership in commercial nuclear technology, which has been lost to suppliers in France, Japan, Korea, Russia, and, now rapidly emerging, China.

### Warming

#### Don’t solve warming – tipping point inevitable, timeframe and insufficient amount of reductions block

**Smith, 11** [Gar, environmental journalist, He is the former editor of Earth Island Journal, and currently edits Earth Island Institute's weekly "eco-zine" The-Edge. NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCEhttp://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear\_Roulette\_book.pdf]

More than 200 new reactors have been proposed around the world but not enough reactors can be built fast enough to replace the world’s vanishing fossil fuel resources.2 Even if nuclear output could be tripled by 2050 (which seems unlikely in light of the industry’s record to date), this would only lower greenhouse emissions by 25 to 40 billion annual tons—12.5 to 20 percent of the reductions needed to stabilize the climate.3 The International Energy Agency estimates that renewables and efficiency measures could produce ten times these savings by 2050. The IEA estimates that cutting CO2 emissions in half by mid-century would require building 1,400 new 1,000-MW reactors—32 new reactors every year. But since it usually takes about 10 years from groundbreaking to atom-smashing, these reactors could not be constructed fast enough to prevent an irreversible “tipping” of world climate. This hardly seems feasible since the industry has only managed to bring 30 new reactors on-line over the past ten years. Of the 35 reactors the IEA listed as “under construction” in mid-2008, a third of these had been “under construction” for 20 years or longer. Some may never be completed. By contrast, a 1.5 MW wind turbine can be installed in a single day and can be operational 4 | The Watts Bar-1 reactor, 60 miles southwest of Knoxville, Tennesee, took 24 years to build. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in two weeks.4 Still, the pace of nuclear construction has picked up lately. In 2010, the number of reactor projects underway had ballooned to 66—with most located in China (27) and Russia (11). And it’s not just a matter of designing and building new reactors.The construction of 1,400 new nuclear reactors also would require building 15 new uranium enrichment plants, 50 new reprocessing plants and 14 new waste storage sites—a deal-breaker since the sole proposed U.S. storage site at Yucca Mountain is apparently dead .The cost of this additional nuclear infrastructure has been estimated at $3 trillion.5 Moreover, since the operating lifetime of these new reactors would still be a mere 40 years, even if new construction was practical, quick and affordable, it would only “solve” the global-warming problem for another 40 years, at which point the plants would need to be decommissioned.

#### Even if they’re right about everything, nuclear power can’t be deployed in time to stop warming- one accident eliminates solvency

**N02NP.org 7 \***N02 Nuclear Power.org is a site created and run by Pete Roche who is an energy consultant based in Edinburgh and policy adviser to the Scottish Nuclear Free Local Authorities, and the National Steering Committee of [UK NFLA](http://nfznsc.gn.apc.org/). Pete was co-founder of the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace (SCRAM), he has represented Greenpeace at international meetings and is active in several other areas relating to environmental protection and nuclear power [http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/reports/Opportunity\_Costs\_Nuclear.pdf, January 2007 “Opportunity Costs of Nuclear Power]

Timing To tackle climate change the speed with which carbon abatement measures can be introduced is also important. The construction of nuclear power stations will have a long lead-time. During the period when reactors are being constructed, capital is tied up and therefore unavailable for investing in alternative carbon abatement techniques. Because nuclear investments are also inherently slower to deploy, then such investments also retard carbon displacement. Delivering a kilowatt-hour from a new nuclear power station costs at least three times as much as saving one through efficiency measures. Thus every dollar spent on efficiency would displace three times more coal than a dollar spent on new reactors. But, perhaps more importantly, the savings from spending on efficiency can go into effect much more quickly, because it takes so long to build reactors. (2) The UK Association for the Conservation of Energy, for example, says that the most optimistic assumption is that one new nuclear power plant could be operating in the UK by 2020, delivering perhaps just over one million tonnes of carbon saving. In contrast energy efficiency "could save around 25 million tonnes of carbon through cost-effective energy efficiency measures" by that date. (3) In 2004, decentralised low- and no-carbon generation added 28GW of capacity worldwide – six times more than nuclear power, with three times more extra output. (4) This was achieved despite nuclear power’s generally higher subsidies per kWh and its far easier access to the grid. Decentralised energy can be installed quickly without needing complex regulatory processes. Despite moves around the globe to speed up regulatory approval of new reactors it is hard to imagine how this balance of speed could ever shift in favor of nuclear power. New reactors take a long time to build are delay-prone, complex, and contentious technology, and one a single major accident or terrorist attack could scuttle nuclear stations virtually everywhere.

### Tech Solves 2NC

#### Long timeframe means intervening actors and tech solve

**Michaels 7** – Cato senior fellow (Patrick, 2/2, Live with Climate Change, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=7502)

Consequently, the best policy is to live with some modest climate change now and encourage economic development, which will generate the capital necessary for investment in the more efficient technologies of the future.

Fortunately, we have more time than the alarmists suggest. The warming path of the planet falls at the lowest end of today's U.N. projections. In aggregate, our computer models tell us that once warming is established, it tends to take place at a constant, not an increasing, rate. Reassuringly, the rate has been remarkably constant, at 0.324 degrees F per decade, since warming began around 1975. The notion that we must do "something in 10 years," repeated by a small but vocal band of extremists, enjoys virtually no support in the truly peer reviewed scientific literature.

Rather than burning our capital now for no environmental gain (did someone say "ethanol?"), let's encourage economic development so people can invest and profit in our more efficient future.

People who invested in automobile companies that developed hybrid technology have been rewarded handsomely in the past few years, and there's no reason to think environmental speculators won't be rewarded in the future, too.