# Round 2 neg v Harvard BN

## 1nc

### elections

#### Obama is winning but its close and reversible

**Cook, 10/4**/12 – editor and publisher of the Cook Political Report for National Journal (Charlie, “Mitt Romney Breaks His Losing Streak” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004?mrefid=mostViewed>)

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.

#### The plan is unpopular swings the election

**Schirach, 12** (Paolo von Schirach, The global society monitor, “Grim prospects for renewable energy in the US subsidies politically unpopular- natural gas a much cheaper alternative USG should focus on R&D”, http://schirachreport.com/index.php/2012/05/11/grim-prospects-for-renewable-energy-in-the-us-subsidies-politically-unpopular-natural-gas-a-much-cheaper-alternative-usg-should-focus-on-rd/)

¶ American enthusiasm for renewable energy, not too deep to begin with, has gone away. In part this has to do with loss of interest in “climate change” and its dire consequences. Unfortunately, climate change has been and is mostly an issue of political belief, rather than upholding science. And as the intensity of the political fervor somehow waned, in large part replaced by more immediate economic fears, so did political support for all the renewable energy technologies that were supposed to create, relatively quickly it was thought, workable alternatives to carbon based energy.¶ Unpopular subsidies¶ An additional reason for waning support is that keeping renewable energy alive means also subsidizing it for a few more years. And this is less and less politically palatable at a time of budgetary constraints at every level. Paying more for electricity simply because this kind is clean looks like an unaffordable luxury, whatever the consequences of burning more (cheaper) fossil fuels may be.

#### New financial incentives for Native Americans are perceived as wasteful spending

**Sullivan, 10** – JD, University of Arizona (Bethany, “Changing Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework for Renewable-Energy Development in Indian Country,” 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 823, Fall, lexis)

Aside from reforming the existing tax credit system, the federal government could also create new tax credits aimed at private businesses engaged in renewable-energy projects on reservations. n166 One possible financial incentive would be a special employment tax credit. Under this type of approach, employers receive a credit for wages paid to qualified employees, i.e., employees who are members of the tribe or otherwise classify as Indian. n167 Not only would this incentivize outside businesses to operate on the reservation, it would also encourage them to hire locally. This has the dual benefits of contributing to the tribal economy and increasing tribal involvement with renewable-energy projects. In joint-ownership arrangements, this type of tax credit would give tribes [\*847] substantial leverage in demanding that a certain percentage of the project's employees be tribe members. The disadvantage with this approach is that it fails to get to the heart of the problem. It only indirectly attempts to level the tax-credit-based disparity and it is questionable, at best, whether the benefits of new tax credits would be proportional to the benefits of existing renewable tax credits.¶ Another approach would be to increase the grant money available to tribally owned or jointly owned renewable-energy projects. Under this plan, rather than allocating several hundred thousand dollars to each tribal project for preliminary studies, the DOE and/or DOI would provide the bulk of necessary investment funding. n168 Since the construction and installation costs of renewable-energy generation from wind turbines, solar panels, and other renewable technologies are quite costly, this could require a budget of hundreds of millions of dollars. n169 Considering the current economic climate and constraints on federal spending, a proposal such as this is unlikely to get far in Congress.

#### Romney causes massive foreign backlash and nuclear wars around the globe

Doug Bandow 5-15-2012; Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 2

#### Increase requires specification

**OED, 89** (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)

increase, v.

3. To become greater in some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.

#### Incentive implies a particular mechanism

**Marbek Resource Consultants, 06** (Report prepared for the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment “NATIONAL EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) WORKSHOP,” 9/27, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/epr\_wkshp\_rpt\_1376\_e.pdf

There were numerous suggestions for specific changes to the sixteen principles presented. The following list captures each suggestion (each number in parentheses corresponds to a principle presented):

􀁹 The suggestion was made, and supported by others, that the word “incentives” for producers be replaced with the word “encourage”, since the term “incentive” usually implies a particular mechanism (#1).

#### This is distinct from actions with incentive effects

**Webb, 93** – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993)  Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may **vary with the type of incentive** in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the **conditions attached** to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public* funds are *either disbursed or* contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effectswhich exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Violation: they’re not topical because they don’t specify the incentives they provide

#### C. Voting issue

#### 1. Negative ground – “incentives” is the direct object of resolutional action, ALL negative strategies are premised off of it, not specifying makes the aff a conditional moving target

#### 2. Kills topic education, generic incentives don’t exist, they must be tailored

**Arvizu, 7** - Director National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Dan, CQ Congressional Testimony, “ENCOURAGING SOLAR ENERGY,” 6/19, lexis

We applaud the Committee for its continuing examination of solar and other sources of renewable electricity and fuels. If we are to ensure the nation receives the full range of benefits that renewable energy technologies can provide, we will need a carefully balanced blend of new technology, market acceptance and government policies. It is not a question of whether to rely solely on the market, or on new research, or on government action, as we work to solve our energy problems. To accelerate deployment of renewable energy technologies, we need to effectively combine all three. It's also crucial that this mix of technology, markets and policies be crafted so that each works in conjunction with the others. The reality is that distinct renewable energy technologies - be they solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, biomass power, biofuels or geothermal - are in different places in terms of their economics, technological maturity and market acceptance. While a broad range of policies are needed to spur on these varied technologies, the specifics of policies and incentives to be enacted ideally must be tailored to fit the unique requirements of each of the systems and devices we are seeking to deploy.

### 3

#### Oil prices will stabilize at breakeven levels

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### Wind power expansion would shift natural gas to transportation and massively reduce oil demand

TGCO 2010; Texas Gulf Coast Online, Wind Power Plan Could Solve Oil Crisis http://www.texasgulfcoastonline.com/News/tabid/86/ctl/ArticleView/mid/466/articleId/106/Wind-Power-Plan-Could-Solve-Oil-Crisis.aspx

If the United States takes advantage of the so-called "wind corridor," stretching from the Canadian border to West Texas, energy from wind turbines built there could supply 20 percent or more of the nation's power. Power from thousands of wind turbines that would line the corridor could be distributed throughout the country via electric power transmission lines and could fuel power plants in large population hubs. Fueling these plants with wind power would then free up the natural gas historically used to power them, and would mean that natural gas could replace foreign oil as fuel for motor vehicles. Using natural gas for transportation needs could replace one-third of the United States' imported oil and would save more than $230 billion a year. As imports grow and world prices rise, the amount of money we send to foreign nations every year is soaring. At current oil prices, we will send $700 billion dollars out of the country this year alone. Projected over the next 10 years the cost will be $10 trillion. America uses a lot of oil, every day 85 million barrels of oil are produced around the world and 21 million of those are used here in the United States. That's 25% of the world's oil demand used by just 4% of the world's population. World oil production peaked in 2005. Despite growing demand and an unprecedented increase in prices, oil production has fallen over the last three years. Oil is getting more expensive to produce, harder to find and there just isn't enough of it to keep up with demand. The simple truth is that cheap and easy oil is gone. A 2005 Stanford University study found that there is enough wind power worldwide to satisfy global demand 7 times over, even if only 20% of wind power could be captured. Building wind facilities in the corridor that stretches from the Texas panhandle to North Dakota could produce 20% of the electricity for the United States at a cost of $1 trillion. It would take another $200 billion to build the capacity to transmit that energy to cities and towns. It's a one-time cost and compared to the $700 billion we spend on foreign oil every year, it's a bargain. Building new wind generation facilities and better utilizing our natural gas resources can replace more than one-third of our foreign oil imports in 10 years. The benefits for the Texas economy and real estate values on the coast are enormous - and the entire country will benefit from lower gas prices.

#### US demand is crucial to oil exporter revenue – transition to domestic energy would devastate petrostates

Gregory D. Miller, April 2010; assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence” Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 107119 http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf

The United States should not maintain its dependence on oil simply to prevent economic instability in Russia, regional conflict in the Middle East, or the growth of the drug trade in Venezuela, but the United States must be cautious regarding how it goes about reducing its consumption. Some states are even more dependent on oil revenues than the West is on oil imports, and the United States must be careful about rushing toward energy independence without first considering the unintended consequences. The United States only gets about 15 percent of its oil from the Middle East. Nearly 22 percent of all OPEC oil, however, is sold to the United States.26 The United States is the world’s largest consumer of oil (more than 25 percent), and a reduction in U.S. demand will have a dramatic effect on the price of oil and on the world’s oil-exporting states. The real effects of a drop in U.S. consumption are difficult to predict and may depend on how the United States reduces its demand. If it does so simply through conservation, then the gradual decline in demand will likely have minimal effects on oil exporters. On the other hand, a drastic drop in demand, such as that associated with the development of a new technology, will have significant economic repercussions for a number of countries, even those that do not sell much oil to the United States.

#### The impact is Russian growth and stability

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But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China**.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### 4

#### Plan’s coercive

**Rothbard, no date** (Murray Rothbard, former teacher, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, New Liberty – Involuntary Servitude, no date, p. <http://www.mises.org/rothbard/newliberty4a.asp>)

In a sense, the entire system of taxation is a form of involuntary servitude. Take, in particular, the income tax. The high levels of income tax mean that all of us work a large part of the year? several months? for nothing for Uncle Sam before being allowed to enjoy our incomes on the market. Part of the essence of slavery, after all, is forced work for someone at little or no pay. But the income tax means that we sweat and earn income, only to see the government extract a large chunk of it by coercion for its own purposes. What is this but forced labor at no pay? The withholding feature of the income tax is a still more clear-cut instance of involuntary servitude. For as the intrepid Connecticut indus­trialist Vivien Kellems argued years ago, the employer is forced to expend time, labor, and money in the business of deducting and transmit­ting his employees' taxes to the federal and state governments, yet the employer is not recompensed for this expenditure. What moral principle justifies the government's forcing employers to act as its unpaid tax collectors?

#### Decision rule

**Petro**, **74** (Sylvester, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, University of Toledo Law Review, p.480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

### States

**The 50 state governments and relevant subnational actors should establish energy financing banks to substantially increase financial incentives for energy production on lands defined by 18 United States Code section 1151 for wind power and solar power.**

#### States should establish energy finance banks to do the plan – solves all the case and doesn’t require new spending

**Muro and Berlin, 9/12**/12 – \*senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings AND \*\* Senior Vice President for Policy and Planning, and General Counsel at the Coalition for Green Capital (Mark and Ken, “State Clean Energy Finance Banks: New Investment Facilities for Clean Energy Deployment”, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/9/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro>)

Given these challenges, states that want to realize the benefits of clean energy deployment should consider a new approach to funding clean energy programs. Specifically, they should investigate the possibility of developing state clean energy finance banks that use limited public dollars and leverage private capital to provide a combination of low-interest rate funding that makes clean energy projects competitive and low-cost 100-percent up-front loans for energy efficiency projects.¶ Such an approach would address the deployment and diffusion challenges faced by clean energy ¶ technologies while recognizing that federal and state appropriations, tax credits, and other incentives ¶ and subsidies will be sharply diminished in the years ahead because of the budget crisis at all levels of ¶ government. Likewise, the development of such finance entities would address the need for states to ¶ develop a new paradigm for financing strong clean energy and energy efficiency projects as part of a ¶ push to develop strong regional industries.¶ So-called “clean energy finance banks” or “green banks” are ideally suited to solve the present ¶ problems because they offer a practical way for states to make available leveraged, low-cost financing ¶ for project developers in their states. First, they can be developed out of existing state programs while ¶ bringing into the enterprise the equivalent of substantial new resources given their ability to leverage ¶ funds. Likewise, because the banks would provide debt financing, they would be repaid on their loans, ¶ putting them in the position to borrow funds and to establish revolving loan funds that would provide ¶ funds that could be reinvested without new sources of financing. Furthermore, clean energy finance ¶ banks, if established as independent institutions, would be able to issue revenue bonds without the full ¶ faith and credit of the state and without the restrictions facing states, which have limited borrowing ¶ capacity. Finally, clean energy finance banks could efficiently seek large investors with patient, longterm capital who are seeking a long-term, conservative rate of return, such as pension fund investors.

### 6

#### The United States federal government should subject an expansion of financial incentives for energy production on lands defined by 18 United States Code section 1151 for wind power and solar power to prior, binding consultation with Native American tribes. The expansion of financial incentives for energy production on lands defined by 18 United States Code section 1151 for wind power and solar power should only be approved for tribes those tribes that request the aforementioned proposal in this consultation process.

#### It competes - the CP is less than the plan – many tribes will say yes to more wind incentives but the assumption they all will is based on romantic cultural stereotypes.

**Bosworth, 10** – Honors Thesis for Environmental Studies at Macalester College (Kai, “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development,” 5/3,

<http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi_honors>

As many rural communities reject wind power projects, developers are more likely to turn towards communities that may be more accepting of the risks of wind power. Although Native American communities are not the only marginalized rural communities in the US, they have disproportionately born the brunt of many of the environmental risks of energy production, and wind power has the potential to slot into this same process. A number of restrictive policies may change in the upcoming years that will make it easier for both tribes and independent developers to construct wind power projects. As President Barack Obama remarked in 2009, “We’re streamlining and expediting the permit process for energy development and transmission across Tribal lands. We are securing Tribal access to financing and investments for new energy projects” (National Wildlife Federation 2010, 16). A federal amendment to restructure the tax credits available to wind power and make them available to tribes is being debated as I finish this paper. While these policy changes have yet to emerge, it is likely that as the wind power industry continues to grow nationwide, more wind power projects will be developed in Native American communities.¶ Articulations of wind power and Native American communities have fit into narratives of indigeneity and nature, and these narratives further help to change the conditions through which wind power projects can be developed. The assumption that Native Americans will or should unequivocally accept wind power because they value nature differently or more authentically denies Native American communities any agential role to negotiate their own livelihoods and relationships with diverse¶ environmental processes. It is to assume that each Native American community, or each individual, values the same thing – the global environmental benefit of the wind turbine. Policies, guidebooks, histories, and other representations are built upon this romantic image rather than the various other conditions that govern renewable energy development.

#### Genuine, binding consultation with tribes over new energy productionis vital to ending racism, fostering collaboration and ending jurisdictional conflicts over energy development The permutation is lip-service and reinforces status quo mistrust. The counterplan alone creates a process that solves the case better – the plan is more likely to turn itself

**Tanana and Ruple, 12** - \* Fellow with the University of Utah's Institute for Clean and Secure Energy AND \*\* Fellow with the University of Utah's Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources & the Environment (Heather and John, “Energy Development in Indian Country: Working within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving towards Collaboration,” 32 Utah Envtl. L. Rev. 1, lexis)

B. Moving Towards Collaboration¶ A collaborative approach in and around Indian country is needed to ensure efficient energy development. Land and resource ownership is highly fragmented, and Indian country jurisdiction remains a complicated and often misunderstood concept. Agency personnel may not understand the geographic extent of Indian country or why Indian country is not synonymous with current reservation boundaries. Formal agreements and maps of the geographic extent of Indian country and associated state regulatory jurisdictional limits are rare. n309 As a result, federal, state, and tribal officials must rely on informal understandings and ad-hoc [\*44] decision-making processes. The lack of clarity can create uncertainty for those potentially subject to regulation, as they legitimately question who will regulate their development and fear that a project extending across jurisdictional boundaries could be subject to multiple and conflicting requirements or worse, a jurisdictional battle between governments or agencies. Moreover, energy developers may be forced to configure proposals to address regulatory rather than resource constraint, which may in turn lead to inefficient development, redundant infrastructure, and a greater overall level of environmental impact.¶ Where jurisdiction is unclear, the risk of inconsistent regulation increases, uncoordinated cumulative effects assessments become more likely, and inadequate protection of transient resources, such as migrating wildlife and air quality related values, is more likely to occur. Energy resources within Indian country hold tremendous promise to reduce dependence on foreign oil and spur economic development. However, in order to prevent haphazard development, federal, state, and tribal governments must work together. Failure to coordinate plans among federal agencies, tribal governments, state governments, and the general public can lead to program duplication and inefficient accomplishment of governmental programs. n310 It is essential to bring all the relevant players into the land use planning process "so that they will have a voice in decisions that affect their interests." n311¶ Presently, energy resources are managed by different parties under different requirements, advancing different interests. Fragmented ownership, combined with divergent management objectives, threatens to either impede development or result in development that neither maximizes efficiencies nor minimizes environmental degradation. In order to prevent such outcomes, it is critical that federal, state, and tribal leaders coordinate their efforts to create synergies rather than conflicts.¶ Intergovernmental coordination can be facilitated by cross-jurisdictional, landscape-level land and resource management strategies, such as an ecosystem co-management agreement. n312 "Ecosystem management focuses on entire ecosystems, not just individual resources, emphasizing the need for inter-jurisdictional coordination to ensure ecological integrity and sustainable resource systems." n313 Such agreements, when done appropriately, can bring multiple sovereigns together to address and resolve maters of mutual concern to each [\*45] other. n314 Co-management agreements can also help avoid litigation and overcome situations when limited tribal capacities impede independent resource management. n315 Different levels of power sharing can be utilized in a co-management approach as well, ranging from joint decision-making to mere notification. n316 This flexibility allows agreements to be tailored to the individual needs and capabilities of a given area.¶ Overall, "intergovernmental agreements can serve both Indian and non-Indian communities by reducing cross-jurisdictional disputes and providing flexible and effective ways to manage inter-jurisdictional environmental resources." n317 Given the overlapping concerns and impacts of energy development, including the mobility of pollutants, such agreements provide an ideal solution for federal-tribal-state conflicts.¶ Neither tribes nor states can effectively regulate regional environmental quality without the cooperation of the other. Joint regulatory programs avoid jurisdictional disputes by allowing the parties to agree on who will regulate a particular activity for a particular period of time. Moreover, cooperative agreements lower intergovernmental tensions that can damage the overall quality of state/tribal relations and also provide greater flexibility for both tribal and state policy-makers in the future. n318¶ In order to be successful, one scholar suggests that co-management must include the following principles: 1) recognition of tribes as sovereign governments; 2) incorporation of the federal trust responsibility; 3) legitimate structures for tribal involvement; 4) integration of tribes early in the decision-making process; 5) recognition and incorporation of tribal expertise; and 6) dispute resolution mechanisms. n319 As the next section discusses, there are various obstacles in achieving each of these principles.¶ [\*46] ¶ IV. Moving towards Collaboration¶ Competition between tribes and states is mutually destructive, wastes taxpayer dollars, impedes economic development, and is based on racism and self-defeatism. Only through communication, cooperation, and understanding can sovereignty be made a positive force for the continued growth of both sovereigns and the people they serve. n320¶ While co-management between federal, state, and tribal governments may represent one advantageous path forward, achieving true collaboration will be difficult. This section addresses the barriers that must be overcome to pave the way for future partnerships and concludes with examples of innovative agreements to share regulatory responsibilities across jurisdictional boundaries.¶ A. Stumbling Blocks to Reaching Collaboration¶ Various hurdles stand between current practices and effective cooperative management. First, deep-rooted mistrust between the sovereign entities must be overcome. "Even where cooperative agreements prove, on balance, beneficial to tribes, it may be difficult to sustain them if ... mistrust makes them politically controversial." n321 Historic federal policies and state mistreatment resulted in harm to tribes, culminating in mistrust of these entities. For example, the allotment era left many tribal communities in a state of disarray, and the subsequent termination era called for an end to the trust relationship between the federal and tribal governments. As a result, more than 100 tribes and bands lost federal recognition and were terminated. n322¶ Additionally, tribes have historically battled states over resources, boundaries, and jurisdiction. Disputes over natural resources within the Uintah Basin have been contentious, with the tribe deferring development of the promised Ute Indian Water Project until other portions of the Central Utah Project (CUP) could be completed, delivering water to non-Indians along the Wasatch Front. n323 When the promised Ute Indian Water Project was not built, the tribe declared the deferral agreement null and void and obtained a $ 198 million settlement from the federal [\*47] government. n324 The State of Utah continued to negotiate settlement of Indian water right claims, but with the atmosphere tainted by cases such as Hagen and Brough n325 and continuing concerns over administration of tribal water rights, no resolution could be obtained. n326¶ Consultation with tribes is the first step towards remedying past harm and providing tribes with an equal seat at the table. Historic adversaries must be able to sit face-to-face before they can see eye-to-eye. While current federal policy encourages consultation and coordination with Indian tribes, n327 in the eyes of some, it remains "difficult to avoid the conclusion that "consultation' is the latest federal codeword for lip service." n328 Despite the existence of internal agency policies advocating government-to-government relations with tribes, "the ability of tribes to participate as decision makers with enforceable rights is often ambiguous," leaving open the question of what it means to have meaningful consultation. n329 Similarly, [\*48] few states include a tribal consultation requirement in their state environmental review laws. n330¶

### 7

#### China leads the world in global wind competitiveness

**Bozzato 12** [“The Wind Dragon: a Chinese tale of wind power”, June 4, 2012, Fabrizio Bozzato, M.A. in International Relations (University of Tasmania, Australia) and a Master in Political Science (University of Milan, Italy, Chin Forsight]

Because of the hectic pace of China’s economic and social development, Chinese energy demand will continue to grow rapidly in next 40 years. Beijing appears determined to pursue a low-carbon development strategy, and wind energy is going to be one of the main resources for achieving China’s low carbon goals.¶ According to figures released in March 2012 by the China Wind Energy Association, last year China consolidated its position as the global wind power leader in both newly and cumulative installed capacities, deploying an impressive 17.6 gigawatts of wind turbines. Notably, by the end of 2011, the added production capability took the national cumulative installed wind power electrical generation to 62.4 gigawatts, up 39.4 percent from the previous year. In December 2011, Longyuan Power, China’s largest wind power developer, connected 99.3 megawatts of wind turbines to the grid in a pilot intertidal wind farm in the Eastern province of Jiangsu. Meanwhile, deep inland, the desert province of Gansu is becoming the frontline of the country’s efforts toward a greener energy mix by massively investing in renewable energy, which includes the erection of wind turbines at the rate of more than one per hour.

#### The plan undermines Chinese wind competitiveness

**Chhabara 8** (Rajesh, Climate Change Corp, “Who’ll Solve the Wind Turbine Supply Crisis?” 4/29/8, http://www.climatechangecorp.com/content.asp?contentid=5344)

In April this year, China set a massive target of expanding wind power capacity to 100,000MW by 2020, from the current 5,600MW. Previously, in 2006, China passed the Renewable Energy Law, which requires power grid companies to buy the entire output of registered renewable energy producers in their areas. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top industry planning body, sets the purchase price.

CLSA Research estimates that the US, Europe and China will be spending about $150 billion on wind projects in the next five years.

US dithers, China surges ahead

In the US, an unstable regulatory regime is one factor hindering turbine production.

Sporadic tax breaks for renewable energy projects, usually on a year-to-year basis, have discouraged US manufacturers from scaling up. Congress, for example, has stalled the extension of PTCs beyond the end of 2008.

In the past, when tax credits lapsed the demand for wind turbines came crashing down the following year. If the trend is repeated this time, it may actually result in overcapacity of turbine manufacturing in the US, at least for the domestic market.

Yet energy analysts say that if the US market slows down due to lack of tax breaks, **China will more than compensate.**

In the short term, massive demand from China may further tighten turbine supply, but expanding local production should ease the global crunch within a couple of years. Today, the Chinese market is dominated by the top three foreign manufacturers, Vestas, GE Wind and Gamesa, who enjoy a combined market share of 47%. However, this is set to change.  
Zhang Guobao, vice president of China’s NDRC, says: “We are planning several measures to support the wind power industry including localisation of equipment production.” According to the Global Wind Energy Council (www.worldenergy.org), China will become the top wind turbine manufacturer by 2009.

To encourage production, China increased tariffs on imported wind turbines in May, while slashing import taxes on components. The latter incentive, to help Chinese firms compete internationally for scarce parts, will put pressure on the industry in the rest of the world. But, again, this is a short-term problem. Government rules already require that turbines have at least 70% domestically produced components. As a result, leading manufacturers have been setting up factories in China.

As things presently stand, most Chinese manufacturers can produce only smaller turbines, up to 1MW. Chinese firms are trying to overcome this weakness by licensing agreements and joint ventures with western companies.

Goldwind, China’s largest wind turbine maker, raised $245 million through an Initial Public Offer (IPO) early this year to fund a huge expansion. LM Glassfiber of Denmark, which has a cooperation agreement with Goldwind, opened its second turbine blade factory in China in October last year.  
Other major Chinese turbine makers – Sinovel, Windey, Dongfang, MingYang and HEC – are also expanding capacities and shopping for joint ventures and licensing agreements with global players.

China High, the country’s largest manufacturer of gearboxes – the most critical and complex part in a wind turbine – plans a four-fold increase in production in the next two years. The company is aiming to become one of the top three global manufacturers of gearboxes, with half of revenue coming from exports.   
China High, which already supplies to GE, REpower, Nordex and Goldwind, raised $272 million through an IPO to fund massive expansion. The company is raising another $250 million through convertible bonds and plans to buy a special-steel plant to secure supplies and reduce costs. Special steel accounts for half the cost of gearboxes.  
Among the foreign players, Germany’s Nordex – the fourth largest wind turbine maker in China – announced in November that it would quadruple production capacity to 800MW by 2011 to meet growing demand.  
Currently, MingYang is China’s only turbine exporter. But in the next three to five years, the number of exporters is likely to grow as other firms aggressively expand and acquire technology. Foreign manufacturers may be scaling up their production in China, but in the longer term it is the emergence of Chinese turbine and component manufacturers that will probably change the global landscape of wind power.

Response from the big players

With over 8,000 parts required to make a wind turbine, requiring a large network of reliable suppliers, component supply is creating the most problematic bottleneck for turbine makers. In order to meet increasing demand, leading players are rushing to beef up their supplies by setting up new plants, signing long-term contracts with suppliers and even making acquisitions.

#### That’s key to the Chinese development model

**Wang, 05** – Michigan State University (Joy, Wind Power in China: Social Acceptability and Development of a Domestic Manufacturing Industry”, http://forestry.msu.edu/China/New%20Folder/Joy\_Wind.pdf)

China does not necessarily require the development of its own domestic wind industry and market, but from the successes of various other countries utilizing wind power, it seems such development is key to the success of wind energy within a country.

“All leading turbine manufacturers are from countries with significant domestic wind power development, and most all have been very successful in their home markets…the size of the home market is a key determinant of global success in wind turbine manufacturing. Moreover,…the top 5 countries in terms of installed capacity are also home to 9 of the top 10 wind companies globally” (Lewis & Wiser, 2005, p. 58).

The wind power market and domestic turbine manufacturers support each other. To form a strong market, a government can formulate incentives for industry to become involved. “Companies facing unstable markets are less willing to spend money on R&D and product development” (Lewis & Wiser, p. 58). With a more stable wind market, more investor interest could be gathered, and more spending on long term manufacturing R&D could be stimulated.

2. Decrease costs to further the market

A domestic wind industry can lower costs and further the market. “As the market has grown, wind power has shown a dramatic fall in cost. Production costs have fallen by up to 50% over 15 years” (BTM Consult, 2005, p. 10). Wind turbines hold about 75% of the total cost of an onshore wind project (BTM Consult, 2005,). With localized production, not only would less be spent on transportation, labor costs would also be much cheaper in China than abroad. A significant savings could be realized in turbine production, bettering the economics and feasibility of large-scale utilization of wind energy in China.

3. Better accessibility to best available wind technology

With its booming economy and strong desire to prove itself, China is demanding better products with its increasing wealth. The wind industry will be no different. If no domestic turbine manufacturers develop cutting-edge technology, any technology China receives will be second rate. Products are likely tested intensely before placement on the global market, where their performance reflects upon the manufacturing company. All commercially sold turbines will generally be reliable, with the newest technology in continued research and testing.

If China relies on non-domestic wind turbine manufacturers to supply its wind power generation facilities, it cannot expect the best technology to enter its borders first. So far, the largest installation in China to date is 1.5MW at the Nanhui and Chongming wind farms in Shanghai by General Electric (GE Wind), while the largest wind turbine installation to date has been 300 MW in the United States (BTM Consult, 2005), 200 times larger. Higher turbine capacities will transform to land savings since more electricity is generated per turbine. With limited arable land, it would make sense for China to search for better and larger turbines to reduce land requirements for the same amount of generated electricity.

4. Opportunity to demonstrate technological prowess

With its economic rise, China has shown an increasing desire to prove itself. The 2003 launch of China’s first manned rocket demonstrates its drive to push domestic technology to further limits. The successful rocket launching caused a swell of national pride. A show of local technological prowess in wind energy could cause a similar effect (Lewis & Wiser, 2005), while also offering a relatively new global industry in which to make a presence. From this aspect, it is not surprising to see China’s desire to have its own domestic wind power industry.

5. Alleviate power shortages in areas of need

Wind power could be used to alleviate brown-outs and other electricity shortages in the more affluent east coast. Near the time of Wallace’s paper (1997), over 20 million households in the heavily populated areas were without electricity. With the largest wind resources located along the southeastern coast and an intense appetite for energy in the same region, it is likely wind power can help alleviate the lacking electricity supply there.

6. Employment opportunities

The creation of a domestic wind power market and industry could generate employment opportunities in both urban and rural areas. A strong domestic market and wind turbine manufacturing industry will create a demand and supply for wind power. By having a local manufacturing base, China could mobilize significant numbers of its currently unemployed

masses. In 2003, 8 million urban people registered unemployment. Once the numbers of unregistered urban unemployed is considered, the total could further increase. From 1998-2003, unemployment grew at an annual rate of 5.6% (“China Statistical,” 2004). With almost 60% of China’s 2003 population located in rural areas (“China Statistical,” 2004), the total unemployed number could be significantly larger. Wind Force 12 estimates that 444,000 individuals will be occupied in the Chinese wind power industry in 2020 (2005).

7. Poverty alleviation

Though the demand for electricity may be greatest along the coast, the wind turbine manufacturers may be elsewhere. Strategically placed manufacturers throughout rural China could provide higher paying work, **alleviating poverty**. The 2003 per capita net income of rural households in the 12 western provinces was 1966¥, less than 75% of the national per capital rural net income (“China Statistical,” 2004).

8. Catalyst for further infrastructure development

A domestic wind industry could provide an additional catalyst for the development of efficient transportation systems in which to transport wind related turbines. Factories in rural locations would not necessarily be distanced from the final product destination. With 23.9% of the national energy industry located in the 12 western provinces (“China Statistical,” 2004), a well-established energy transmission infrastructure must already exist. Much of China’s wind resources also are in the area. Not only will manufacturers to realize financial savings by being geographically closer to more final product destinations, the location of wind power manufacturers there could also stimulate the improvement and adaptation of existing infrastructure to suit new needs. This possibility might require large financial resources, but the reaped benefits might justify further exploration.

9. Environmental benefits

Other environmental benefits can be realized through localized production outside of the clean energy turbines produce. If turbine manufacturers locate to more rural areas, resident income and standard of living will increase. Farmland might be less stressed, as income no longer relies singly on the land’s goods. Grasslands could benefit similarly as flock size decrease when factory work is obtained. From such possibilities, wind energy could potentially benefit soil stability. As school fees become more affordable, educational levels will increase. Higher educational attainment could increase environmental consciousness and also lessen environmental degradation.

#### Solves CCP collapse

**Pethokoukis 12-1-**08 (James, US News, “Bad Economy Could Cause China Crackup” <http://www.usnews.com/blogs/capital-commerce/2008/12/1/bad-economy-could-cause-china-crackup.html?s_cid=etRR-0126>)

¶ I have written a series of blog posts warning about the geopolitical and economic fallout of a sharp slowdown in China's economy. Simply put: Slower growth **could lead to** dangerous political instability. **The sole source of the** authoritarian **government's legitimacy has been its ability to deliver an even-rising standard of living** for more than a generation. Don't believe me? Here is what President Jintao Hu said over the weekend at a party meeting:  ¶ *“In this coming period, we will starkly confront the effects of the sustained deepening of the international financial crisis and pressure as global economic growth clearly slows. ... Whether we can turn this pressure into momentum, turn challenges into opportunities, and maintain steady and relatively fast economic development is a test of our Party's capacity to govern.”*  ¶ This is why China has been hesitant to allow any dramatic appreciation by the yuan vs. the dollar. To the extent that a stronger currency slows the economy, the ruling Communist Party views a rapid yuan appreciation as an existential threat. This what journalist Will Hutton, author of *The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a Partner or Face It as an Enemy*, [told me early last year](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/070105/5china.htm):  ¶ *"Unrest is growing even under current conditions. Such a rapid appreciation of the yuan over a short period could be a tipping point for a wave of unrest, which could threaten the regime's stability. The party leadership sees the demand for fast yuan appreciation as an act of economic warfare. In these terms, you can see why. ... The World Bank estimates that if China's growth rate fell by just 2 percent, up to 60 percent of China's bank loans would become nonperforming–so threatening both China's and, via Hong Kong, Asia's financial system. The flow of saving to finance the U.S.'s deficit would dry up, probably forcing U.S. interest rates up–so worsening the economic slowdown. ... There is the risk of a credit crunch forced by the banking system being overwhelmed by nonperforming loans. ... The risk of political instability is low, but it exists."*  ¶ Me: Let's remember that China a) has been -- along with America -- one of the primary engines of global economic growth as well as buy of U.S. bonds, and b) has nuclear weapons. While no freedom-loving member of Western Civilization has any love for the current despotic regime, neither do we want to see political and economic chaos in China. Fun China Fact: Back in the 1990s, Pentagon analysts thought a bad economy could result in the fall of the Communists from power and the political dissolution of the country into maybe a dozen smaller nations. Hey, have fun, Hillary!

#### Nuclear war

**Plate 2003** (Tom, Professor at UCLA, The Straits Times, June 28, L/N)

But, while China's prosperity may be good for Americans, is it necessarily the same for the totalitarians running China? After all, having created a runaway economic elephant, will the Communist Party leaders be able to stay in the saddle? Before long, the Chinese middle class alone may approach the size of the entire population of America. It will want more freedom, not less – bet on it. But imagine a China disintegrating – on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion – because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia – once occupied by Japan – into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth – the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

### Native Americans

#### No impact to cultural survival – doesn’t spillover to effect all of humanity

**Coates 2009** – former adjunct professor at George Washington University, President of the Kanawha Institute for the Study of the Future and was President of the International Association for Impact Assessment and was President of the Association for Science, Technology and Innovation, M.S., Hon D., FWAAS, FAAAS, (Joseph F., Futures 41, 694-705, "Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the earth”, ScienceDirect, WEA)

The first category of significant dreadful outcomes: the death of cultures, raises definitional questions of what is a culture, and how to define the boundaries on it and what it means for it to disappear. Obviously, most of the cultures that would be at risk today are small, involving thousands, tens of thousands, or surely well under a million people. Cultures larger than that are becoming increasingly globalized, westernized, and part of an expanding international advanced-nation culture, with local flavors in different parts of the world. When we turn to the smaller cultures, there is not even a good guess as to how many there are, but an excellent surrogate for that is the number of languages that there are. Each culture insofar as it is isolated has created its own language. The linguists tell us that languages are dying in great numbers.¶ Another side of the question is, whether the death of cultures is good or bad. There are, worldwide, people who deplore the loss of any culture. (We are not thinking about people, but about the culture of a people.) Unfortunately, they would like to see functional groups of the people at cultural risk preserved to become parts of a living museum. That is unfair and, to say the least, undemocratic. Consider the case of the people who manage and harvest the reindeer in Finland, the Lapps. Their culture is in large part framed around a great annual cycle. The animals are collected together and moved much like the situation so common in our western movies of taking the herds of cattle from Texas to the Midwest slaughter houses and railroad yards. The snowmobile was introduced into Lapp society and has been rapidly changing their customs. Some outsiders, as noted, deplore this. But remember, no one forced the snowmobile on the Lapps; it is their free choice and it is outrageous to think that we would deprive them of free choice to adopt what they see will enhance the quality of their lives. On net, I see the loss of cultures as, in some romantic sense, regrettable and undesirable, but in terms of the overall benefits to humankind, the integration of the minor cultures into a global culture carries far more benefit for them and for the world than local survival does.

#### Indian culture is resilient

Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt, Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, 1993, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/pub\_120.htm,

American Indian societies are phenomenally resilient. In the last several centuries, they have faced winds of economic, political, and cultural change that have blown as fiercely over them as over any people in history. These winds have brought military violence and subjugation, epidemics of disease, seizures of land and property, vicious racism, and economic deprivation. Yet, as the twenty-first century approaches, hundreds of distinct Indian nations built upon dozens of cultural lineages still persevere and grow, variously bound together by ties of family, language, history, and culture. The lesson from Indian Country is a lesson of strength.

#### Brain drain alt cause

Joseph **Kalt** and Stephen **Cornell, 2005,** Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard and professor of sociology and of public administration at University of Arizona, “Two Approaches to Economic Development on American Indian”, ([http://jopna.net/pubs/jopna\_ 2005-02\_Approaches.pdf](http://jopna.net/pubs/jopna_2005-02_Approaches.pdf) )

There’s a brain drain as a lot of the people with good ideas—particularly younger tribal members—leave home for somewhere else, desperate to support their families and discouraged by political favoritism, bureaucratic hassles, and the inability of tribal government to deal with the basic problems. Patterns of failure, mismanagement, and corruption encourage outside perceptions of Indian incompetence and reservation chaos that make it even harder to defend tribal sovereignty. **The ultimate economic result is continued poverty**. In short, the standard approach doesn’t work.

**Cultural survival is impossible and there’s no impact anyway.**

**Blake 2000** (Michael Blake, Professor of political philosophy and philosophy at Harvard University, August/September 2000, Civilization, p. 51-53)

One frequently hears that endangered cultural groups have a right to preservation, and indeed to outside aid and legal sanctions toward that end. Anthropologists and activists have made such claims on the grounds that the survival of these groups has inherent value. Some advocacy groups have even gone so far as to equate the absence of such special rights with genocide. There is no great moral distinction, such rhetoric seems to suggest, between allowing a culture to assimilate into the wider surrounding society and actually going out and killing its members en masse. This vague moral equation has turned up of late in the discussion of issues as varied as affirmative action, Southern regionalism, Quebecois nationalism, and the moral status of such culturally overwhelming institutions as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s. If we take these arguments at face value, cultural survival is something very close to a moral absolute; to refuse to endorse it is to sign up on the side of cultural atrocity and numbing global conformity This is a shame, because it is surprisingly difficult to figure out exactly what is morally relevant about cultural survival in itself. The first challenge is pinning down just what the term might mean. It cannot simply mean the continued existence of the individuals comprising the endangered culture, since their survival is entirely compatible with their complete assimilation and hence with the destruction of their culture. Nor however, can it mean the preservation of all existing aspects of a culture, for some degree of cultural change and adaptation is normal, indeed inevitable. Cultural stasis is not a plausible ideal, let alone a worthy guide to policy. The messy reality of cultural survival, then, lies somewhere between disintegration and the deep freeze. The most plausible meaning of the slogan as a political goal might be simply the preservation of difference: the desire that whatever cultures now exist not lose their distinctiveness and blend into surrounding society; and that they continue to serve as means by which some people make sense of their place in the world, however much the content of their cultures may change over time. The key idea here is that the number of cultures now present not be reduced, however much the lifeways and customs comprising each individual culture might change over time. But what reason have we, then, to think that cultural survival is valuable in itself? One argument draws an analogy between cultures and other threatened aspects of the social and natural world: We ought to preserve cultures because to do otherwise is to allow something unique and irreplaceable to leave the world. Refusing to act against assimilation might thus be thought roughly akin to, say; shooting the last of a particularly beautiful species of condor. This argument, though, claims too much, for we feel an equivalent sense of loss when we face not the destruction of a culture but merely its reworking from the inside—and, thereby the destruction of specific elements within it. For example, during Quebec’s Quiet Revolution— the tumultuous postwar period during which French Canada cast off clerical authority and conservatism and fashioned itself into a modem secular society—much of the culture was completely remade and many traditional norms and practices abandoned. We might easily sympathize with the feeling that there was a loss to the world in what was thereby abandoned. We do have reason to regret the fact that current ways by which the world is understood— our own ways included—will eventually disappear. But our justifiable sadness does not give us good reason to declare that what is now endangered ought to be preserved forever, or to forbid ourselves from altering inherited cultural norms—abandoning some, amending others, and embracing foreign ways and customs as our own. One could even say that this sadness is the inevitable price we pay for freedom: If we had no choice about what norms to adopt, and knew that our children would live as our ancestors lived before us, the world would lose one source of woe but gain many more. This approach to defending cultural survival, then, has some serious defects. Another line of argument harnesses the value of cultural survival to the more kindred value of cultural diversity gaining support from the undoubted attractiveness of the latter. On reflection, however, the ideal of cultural diversity seems scarcely less mysterious and ambiguous than the notion of cultural survival itself. The ambiguity in valuing diversity lies, on one level, in whether it means valuing people of distinct backgrounds or valuing the diversity of backgrounds itself. The first notion—that people ought to be respected as equals regardless of their ethnicity race, gender, and other distinguishing traits—is today a part of any plausible political philosophy But it hardly follows that we must value and preserve diversity itself, in the abstract; we have, I think, no reason to regret that the world does not contain twice as many cultures as it does. We might try to defend cultural diversity in the abstract by pointing out how much we benefit by its concrete existence. But this raises in turn another deep ambiguity—that between diversity of cultures and diversity within cultures. Exposure to a wide variety of lifeways is clearly of great moral value; it enables people to flourish in ways that conformity and sameness instead suppress. But there is no necessary link between the desirability of diversity within cultures and the demand that there be a wide variety of cultures themselves. More to the point, the latter demand can actually work against diversity. Political measures designed to foster a culture’s survival must perforce ascribe a negative value to assimilation; they therefore end up penalizing those individuals within it who seek, for example, to borrow or adapt from other cultures. In so doing, advocates of cultural survival often provoke a stilling insistence on cultural purity and conformity; one need only think of the recurrent French crusades for linguistic purity to realize how quickly a drive for cultural preservation can begin to resemble a paternalistic—and, if imposed from outside, patronizing—intolerance. It is one of the sharpest ironies of the cultural survival movement that defending a diversity of cultures tends to repress the possibilities for diversity within cultures.

#### Multiple jurisdictional barriers overwhelm the plan

Sullivan, 10 – JD, University of Arizona (Bethany, “Changing Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework for Renewable-Energy Development in Indian Country,” 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 823, Fall, lexis)

Unfortunately, the IEED's TERA program has produced unsatisfactory results. Not a single tribe, as of present, has successfully attained a TERA. n54 This may partially be a consequence of the multi-step TERA application requirements, including: submission of documentation demonstrating a tribe's financial and personnel capacity to administer energy agreements and programs, establishment of a tribal environmental review process, and consultative meetings with the Director of the Indian Energy and Economic Development Office. n55 Perhaps more problematic are conflicting sentiments within tribes over distancing tribal energy development from federal government protection, an issue strongly debated among Indian law practitioners and scholars. n56 So, although tribes could arguably benefit [\*832] from the decreased federal oversight that TERAs would provide, it appears that this mechanism, on its own, is insufficient to truly stimulate renewable development.¶ In summary, the Act has provided for federal programs that encourage the development of tribal renewable resources, yet its policy goals of tribal economic and energy development and tribal self-determination have not yet been met. In part, this may be a function of inadequate appropriations for the Act's provisions. n57 An alternative explanation, however, is that the Act fails to address substantial obstacles to tribal renewable-energy development. The most significant obstacles can be generally divided into two categories: (1) tribal inability to take advantage of federal tax incentives in the renewable-energy industry and (2) unfavorable case law concerning tribal civil jurisdiction.

#### No model – other countries won’t comply

Walter, 2003.(Barbara F., Associate Professor Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at University of California, San Diego, December, “REPUTATION AND WAR: Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” International Studies Review. Vol. 5, no. 4., http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wab04/wab04.pdf )

Between 1940 and 1996, governments were seventy percent less likely to negotiate with rebels seeking independence or greater territorial autonomy than with rebels seeking any other goal. Current theories suggest that this is due to the economic, strategic, or psychological value of territory under dispute. I argue that a government’s decision to negotiate has more to do with the signal the government wishes to send to future challengers than with any specific characteristics of the land in question. If the government believes it could face multiple separatist challenges in the future, it will invest in a reputation for toughness now rather than face additional challengers down the road. If the government knows it will face such a challenge only once, there is less reason to invest in a reputation and negotiation is likely to result. An analysis of all self determination movements between 1940 and 2000 demonstrates that governments of multiethnic states are far *less* likely to negotiate than are governments that preside over more homogenous populations.

#### And, at best the model is only selective

Gevork **Ter-Gabrielian**, Department of Political Science Bowling Green State University, August **1999** “Strategies in Ethnic Conflict” Fourth World Journal <http://www.cwis.org/fwj/41/ethnic.html>

Accommodation, if it is possible to achieve in a form of federation or consociation, is a solution. However, the cases of accommodation are rare, and there is no guarantee that accommodation in a society divided by ethnic conflict will result in a long-lasting peace. Moreover, state elites are reluctant to consider accommodation as an option because they believe that a federative arrangement would give ethnic groups an even more legitimate opportunity to break away. This happened in Czechoslovakia. Before 1992, it was only nominally federation. In the 1992 Constitution, it was re-named Czecho-Slovakia, and the federation comprised of two equal republics was constituted. In less than a year Slovakia seceded. This was the only case of indeed peaceful ('velvet') divorce in the post-Soviet space. All other post-Soviet states, except for Russia and Romania, rather than enhancing the status of their ethnic groups have nominally discarded even the existing political autonomies (in the best case substituting them by a vague cultural autonomy), which, in turn, has become a cause for ethnic conflict escalation (Naumkin, 1994). If states are not liberal by their ideology, if they are not economically secure and politically well-established democracies, they tend to reject the option of accommodation to the demands of ethnic groups.

### Environment Leadership

#### Can’t solve environmental leadership – past alt causes

**Victor 8** - law professor at Stanford's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

(David G., "The next U.S. President won't be green", 5-1-08 <http://www.newsweek.com/id/135073/>)

The U.S. record on international environmental issues is highly uneven for reasons that have little to do with George W. Bush's leadership. His administration has been tarred across the planet for reckless leadership on international environmental issues. (Its actual record, while dreadful, is not a uniform failure. It has done useful things in a few areas, such as a thoughtful initiative to help conserve forests in the Congo Basin.) But the signature of Bush's reckless foreign policy in this area, his decision to withdraw from the Kyoto treaty barely three months after taking office, actually has its roots in the Clinton administration. Clinton was highly committed to environmental issues and his vice president, Al Gore, was an even more passionate leader. Their zealous diplomats negotiated a treaty that was larded with commitments that the United States never could have honored. The promise to cut U.S. emissions 7 percent below 1990 levels is a good example. Because actual emissions were rising steadily, it would have been impractical to turn them around in time to meet the 2012 Kyoto deadline. The U.S. Congress never could have passed the requisite legislation, and no leader in the White House could have changed that voting arithmetic. The U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was inevitable.

What does this mean for America's credibility in the world? When the American president promises, should anyone listen?

Increasingly, other countries are learning that the answer is no—because American leaders have a habit of promising a lot more than they can deliver. Environmental issues are particularly prone to overpromising, and not just by the United States. Europe, too, is fresh with unrealistic claims by political leaders. The European Union, for example, has launched negotiations for the post-Kyoto agreement by claiming that Europeans will cut greenhouse-gas emissions 20 percent to 30 percent by 2020—an outrageous goal considering that most of Europe (with the exception mainly of Britain and Germany) will fail to meet their existing targets, and emissions are actually rising. Europe as a whole would blow through its Kyoto targets if not for its generous use of a scheme that lets them take credit for overseas investment in low-carbon technologies—despite mounting evidence that many of those overseas credits don't actually deliver real reductions in emissions. Smart politicians know that the benefits lie mainly in the promising today and not in the delivery long in the future.

Ironically, the more enthusiastic the leader, the less credibility he or she has. While the Clinton administration was busy negotiating the Kyoto treaty, the U.S. Senate was passing a resolution, 95 to 0, to signal that it would reject any treaty that didn't contain specific commitments by developing countries to control their effluent of greenhouse gases. Since the developing countries had already rejected that outcome the Clinton administration had little room to maneuver. The great reversal in U.S. "leadership" on global warming over the last year—signaled by President Bush's speech three weeks ago embracing the need for limits on greenhouse gases—came from the people rather than top leaders. Public concern about global warming is rising (though it will be checked by the even more acute worries on the economy and war). The Bush speech was more a recognition that serious efforts to develop climate legislation are already well underway without his stamp. Many states are already planning to regulate greenhouse gases. The Senate has a serious bill on this subject scheduled for floor debate starting June 2. Its sponsors are Joe Lieberman (the former running mate of Al Gore but now alienated from the Democratic Party for his overly independent views) and John Warner (a Republican who has no former track record on global warming). These are ideal leaders for this issue because often it takes the fresh faces focused on building bipartisan majorities to get things done in America.

Perhaps the most interesting signal that American presidents are losing the ability to lead is an effort to rewrite the rules that would govern environmental treaties under American law. Committed environmentalists have rightly noted that America's Constitution requires a two-thirds vote for treaties in the Senate. That standard is nearly impossible to meet because one third of the Senate is usually opposed to anything interesting. Serious efforts are now underway to reinterpret environmental "treaties" as agreements between Congress and the president, which would require only a majority vote. Most trade agreements, for example, travel under this more lax standard and also have special voting rules that require Congress to approve the agreement as a whole package rather than pick it apart piece by piece. Rebranding and changing voting rules makes it easier to approve agreements, boosting the credibility of the president to negotiate agreements that serve the country's interest.

#### And, economic factors block

Christian Science Monitor 2007 [Warming's bad guys made good, lexis]

Leaders of the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, the United States and China, laid out plans in the past week to reduce their impact on the planet. But these two giants on the global scene also suggested two won'ts: They won't be bound to action by other nations and they won't hurt their own economies.

Even with those caveats, the fact that the Bush administration and China's top governing body, the State Council, acted just before the G-8 summit of industrial leaders this week is a healthy sign.

They now recognize their interests, and perhaps the welfare of all nations - especially poor ones - are at stake. They should be welcomed for joining the effort to save the global "commons" that is the atmosphere and oceans.

#### Coal exports tank cred

**Kenworthy, 11** – senior fellow at the Center for American Progress (Tom, Austin American Statesman, “Enabling coal exports clouds environmental, economic goals” 7/30, <http://www.statesman.com/opinion/enabling-coal-exports-clouds-environmental-economic-goals-1675017.html>)

In late March, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar traveled to Cheyenne, Wyo., to announce that his department would soon sell leases to 752 million tons of coal from public holdings in the Powder River Basin, and was proceeding on future sales of an additional 1.6 billion tons.

Salazar called coal "a critical component of America's comprehensive energy portfolio, as well as Wyoming's economy" and said "it's important that we continue to encourage safe production of this important resource."

Salazar made no mention of the potential for some of that coal being sold and shipped to Asia. He may have been the only person in Wyoming that day with an interest in energy who wasn't thinking about coal exports.

Just before Salazar's visit to Wyoming, the two giant companies that mine about half of the state's annual coal production, Peabody Energy and Arch Coal, announced deals that could lead to a big jump in the now relatively small business of sending western U.S. coal to hungry markets in China, Japan, India and other Asian nations. In mid-June, newspapers in the Pacific Northwest reported that two Oregon ports on the Columbia River are also being considered as sites for exporting coal to Asia.

All of that has prompted an escalating battle in the Pacific Northwest over what could be the first U.S. coal export terminals on the West Coast. And, combined with Salazar's boosterism, it has raised questions about whether the United States is backsliding on the fight against global climate change.

Before heading to Wyoming, Salazar might have done well to visit the White House's website and read its straightforward commitment "to leading the charge to reduce the dangerous pollution that causes global warming. ... "

There is nothing in federal law that requires the Interior Department to consider greenhouse gas emissions in how it manages its 500 million acres of land, or that gives Washington control over the construction of coal export terminals in the Pacific Northwest. But pressure is building to consider carbon pollution in evaluating the environmental consequences of federal land management decisions under the National Environmental Policy Act.

And the coal lease decision does beg the question of why we would want to foster China's current economic growth strategy of buying up resources and infrastructure around the world in service of its own economic dominance, rather than investing in developing the domestic clean energy technologies and advanced production processes that could make us global leaders in the emerging clean energy economy.

Rather than sending conflicting signals about its dedication to fighting global warming, the Obama administration needs to get ahead of the issue and clarify where it stands on whether it's a good idea to facilitate coal exports.

#### International cooperation impossible – divergent environmental objectives

**Sussman, 04** (October 2004, G., International Politicla Science Review, “The USA and Global Environmental Policy: Domestic Constraints on Effective Leadership,” http://ips.sagepub.com/content/25/4/349.accessible-long, asb)

Explanations about international affairs generally and global environmental policy in particular tend to focus on interstate relations and the ability of governments to cooperate. In order to pursue international cooperation and achieve environmental progress on a global scale, nation-states must overcome their differences, a point made repeatedly in the literature. When Oran Young (1997: 8-9) drew attention to the international commons and transboundary externalities, he raised the issue of the potentially adverse environmental consequences imposed on one party by the actions of another. Similarly, Paarlberg (1997: 149-50) has pointed out that "Most international relations scholars have depicted global environmental policymaking as an 'international cooperation' problem. The greatest barriers to successful policymaking are presumed to be differences between governments abroad, not differences within governments at home." Pamela Chasek (2000: 427) has argued that "states are the final determinants of the outcomes of global environmental issues." Richard Falk (1971: 37-8) characterized the problem of global environmental policy as one in which "Each government is mainly concerned with the pursuit of national goals. These goals are defined in relation to economic growth, political stability, and international prestige." In addition, as Neil Carter (2001: 238) explains, "Regime formation is aided by the willingness of a powerful nation, or a group of nations, to take a leadership role by cajoling or bullying weaker states into supporting a treaty" (see also Porter et al., 2000: 13-14).

#### Soft power fails

**Rachman 9** [Gideon Rachman is the Economist's bureau chief in Brussels, June 1 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e608b556-4ee0-11de-8c10-00144feabdc0.html]

Barack Obama is a soft power president. But the world keeps asking him hard power questions.

From North Korea to Guantánamo Bay, from Iran to Afghanistan, Mr Obama is confronting a range of vexing issues that cannot be charmed out of existence.

The problem is epitomised by the US president’s trip to the Middle East this week. Its focal point will be a much-trailed speech in Cairo on Thursday June 4, in which he will directly address the Muslim world.

The Cairo speech is central to Mr Obama’s efforts to rebuild America’s global popularity and its ability to persuade – otherwise known as soft power. The president has been trying out potential themes for the speech on aides and advisers for months. He is likely to emphasise his respect for Islamic culture and history, and his personal links to the Muslim world. He will suggest to his audience that both the US and the Islamic world have, at times, misjudged and mistreated each other – and he will appeal for a new beginning.

George W. Bush launched a military offensive in the Middle East. Mr Obama is launching a charm offensive.

There is plenty to be said for this approach. Mr Bush embroiled America in a bloody war in Iraq that strengthened Iran and acted as a recruiting sergeant for America’s enemies. Mr Obama’s alternative strategy is based on diplomacy, engagement and empathy.

Mr Bush had a shoe thrown at him in his last appearance in the Middle East. So if Mr Obama receives his customary standing ovation in Cairo, that will send a powerful symbolic message. But the president should not let the applause go to his head. Even if his speech is a success, the same foreign-policy problems will be sitting in his in-tray when he gets back to the Oval Office – and they will be just as dangerous as before.

In particular, there is chatter in official Washington that the Israelis may be gearing up to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities before the end of the year. The Obama administration is against any such move and it is normally assumed that Israel would not dare to pull the trigger without the go-ahead from Washington – not least because the Israelis would have to fly across US-controlled airspace to get to their targets. But the Americans do not have a complete veto over Israel’s actions. One senior US official asks rhetorically: “What are we going to do? Shoot down their planes?”

A conflict between Israel and Iran would scatter the Obama administration’s carefully laid plans for Middle East peace to the winds. It would also make talk of improving American soft power around the world seem beside the point. The immediate task would be to prevent a wider regional war.

In the meantime, the US will press on with the effort to achieve peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. But even that goal is unlikely to be advanced much by Mr Obama’s trip to the Middle East. Many in the audience in Cairo and in the wider Islamic world will want and even expect the new president to lay out a complete vision for a peace settlement and to apply unambiguous pressure on Israel. For reasons of domestic politics, diplomacy and timing, Mr Obama is highly unlikely to do this.

Yet while his Arab audience may be disappointed by what he has to say about the Middle East peace process, Mr Obama is already facing an increasingly tense relationship with the new Israeli government. The administration has now clashed openly with the Israelis over the Netanyahu government’s tolerance of expanded settlements in occupied Palestinian land.

Mr Obama is also running up against the limits of soft power elsewhere. Closing the prison camp at Guantánamo was meant to be the ultimate tribute to soft power over hard power. The Obama team argued consistently that the damage that Guantánamo did to America’s image in the world outweighed any security gains from holding al-Qaeda prisoners there. Yet, faced with the backlash against releasing the remaining 240 prisoners or imprisoning them in the US, the Obama administration has back-tracked. It is not clear whether Guantánamo will be closed on schedule or what will happen to the riskier-sounding prisoners, who may still be held indefinitely. The much-criticised military trials are likely to be revived.

In Afghanistan, Mr Obama is trying a mixture of hard and soft power. There will be a military surge – but also a “civilian surge”, designed to build up civil society and governance in Afghanistan. Old hands in Washington are beginning to shake their heads and mutter about Vietnam.

Mr Obama’s preferred tools of diplomacy, engagement and charm do not seem to be of much use with Kim Jong-il of North Korea, either. The North Koreans have just tested a nuclear weapon – leaving the Obama administration scratching its head about what to do.

The president’s charisma and rhetorical skill are real diplomatic assets. If Mr Obama can deploy them to improve America’s image and influence around the world, that is all to the good. There is nothing wrong with trying to re-build American “soft power”.

The danger is more subtle. It is that President Yes-we-can has raised exaggerated hopes about the pay-off from engagement and diplomacy. In the coming months it will become increasingly obvious that soft power also has its limits.

#### Soft power resilient

**Nye 6** – IR Professor, Harvard (Joseph, 6/25, Why Do They Hate Us?, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062200972\_pf.html)

Fortunately, even when the U.S. government's foreign policies are unattractive to others, our culture and our open political processes can produce a "meta" form of soft power -- winning grudging admiration for our freedoms at the same time that our policies are unpopular. After all, anti-American protests were rampant around the world during the Vietnam War, but the protesters did not sing "The Internationale"; they sang the American civil rights anthem "We Shall Overcome." Today, the fact that America remains democratic and self-critical, that its free press exposes governmental flaws and that the legislative and judicial branches can act against the executive, means that anti-American critics of U.S. foreign policies can still feel a residual attraction to our society. As Sweig puts it, "The best antidote to Anti-America may well come not from how we fight (or prevent) the next war but from the degree to which we keep intact the social contract and international appeal of American society." She also urges Washington to adopt a changed foreign policy style that develops empathy for foreign cultures, practices better manners and pays more attention to rules and fairness. Anti-Americanism will not go away, but it need not dominate the 21st century if Americans follow the advice of this well-reasoned book.

#### No impact to the environment

**Boucher 98** (Doug, "Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Science and Society, Fall, http://www.driftline.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive\_msg.cgi?file=spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international\_1998/marxism-international.9802&msgnum=379&start=32091&end=32412)

The political danger of catastrophism is matched by the weakness of its scientific foundation. Given the prevalence of the idea that the entire biosphere will soon collapse, it is remarkable how few good examples ecology can provide of this happening m even on the scale of an ecosystem, let alone a continent or the whole planet. Hundreds of ecological transformations, due to introductions of alien species, pollution, overexploitation, climate change and even collisions with asteroids, have been documented. They often change the functioning of ecosystems, and the abundance and diversity of their animals and plants, in dramatic ways. The effects on human society can be far-reaching, and often extremely negative for the majority of the population. But one feature has been a constant, nearly everywhere on earth: life goes on. Humans have been able to drive thousands of species to extinction, severely impoverish the soil, alter weather patterns, dramatically lower the biodiversity of natural communities, and incidentally cause great suffering for their posterity. They have not generally been able to prevent nature from growing back. As ecosystems are transformed, species are eliminated -- but opportunities are created for new ones. The natural world is changed, but never totally destroyed. Levins and Lewontin put it well: "The warning not to destroy the environment is empty: environment, like matter, cannot be created or destroyed. What we can do is replace environments we value by those we do not like" (Levins and Lewontin, 1994). Indeed, from a human point of view the most impressive feature of recorded history is that human societies have continued to grow and develop, despite all the terrible things they have done to the earth. Examples of the collapse of civilizations due to their over- exploitation of nature are few and far between. Most tend to be well in the past and poorly documented, and further investigation often shows that the reasons for collapse were fundamentally political.

#### Tech solves --- their evidence is media alarmism

**Stossel,** Journalist, winner of the Peabody Award, anchors ABC News, **07** [John, “Environmental Alarmists Have It Backwards”,

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/how\_about\_economic\_progress\_da.html]

Watching the media coverage, you'd think that the earth was in imminent danger -- that human life itself was **on the verge of extinction**. Technology is fingered as the perp. Nothing could be further from the truth. John Semmens of Arizona's Laissez Faire Institute points out that Earth Day misses an important point. In the April issue of The Freeman magazine, Semmens says the environmental movement overlooks how hospitable the earth has become -- thanks to technology. "The environmental alarmists have it backwards. If anything imperils the earth it is ignorant obstruction of science and progress. ... That technology provides the best option for serving human wants and conserving the environment should be evident in the progress made in environmental improvement in the United States. Virtually every measure shows that pollution is headed downward and that nature is making a comeback." (Carbon dioxide excepted, *if* it is really a pollutant.) Semmens describes his visit to historic Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts, an area "lush with trees and greenery." It wasn't always that way. In 1775, the land was cleared so it could be farmed. Today, technology makes farmers so efficient that only a fraction of the land is needed to produce much more food. As a result, "Massachusetts farmland has been allowed to revert back to forest." Human ingenuity and technology not only raised living standards, but also restored environmental amenities. How about a day to celebrate that? Yet, Semmens writes, the environmental movement is skeptical about technology and is attracted to three dubious principles: sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and stakeholder participation. The point of sustainable development, Semmens says, "is to minimize the use of nonrenewable natural resources so there will be more left for future generations." Sounds sensible -- who is for "unsustainable" development? But as the great economist Julian Simon often pointed out, resources are manmade, not natural. Jed Clampett cheered when he found oil on his land because it made him rich enough to move to Beverly Hills. But his great-grandfather would have cursed the disgusting black gunk because Canadian geologist Abraham Gesner hadn't yet discovered that kerosene could be distilled from it. President Bush chides us for our "addiction to oil." But under current conditions, using oil makes perfect sense. Someday, if we let the free market operate, someone will find an energy source that works better than oil. Then richer future generations won't need oil. So why deprive ourselves and make ourselves poorer with needless regulation now? Anyway, it's not as if we're running out of oil. That's one of the myths I expose in my new book, "Myths, Lies and Downright Stupidity". If the price of a barrel of oil stays high, entrepreneurs will find better ways to suck oil out of the ground. At $50 a barrel, it's even profitable to recover oil that's stuck in the tar sands in Alberta, Canada. Those tar sands alone contain enough oil to meet our needs for a *hundred* years. The precautionary principle, popular in Europe, is the idea that no new thing should be permitted until it has been proved harmless. Sounds good, except as Ron Bailey of Reason writes, it basically means, "Don't ever do anything for the first time." Stakeholder participation means that busybodies would be permitted to intrude on private transactions. Semmens's example is DDT, which for years would have saved children from deadly malaria, except that "'stakeholders' from the environmental quarter have prevailed on governments to ban the trade in this product." The first victims of these principles are the poor. We rich Westerners can withstand a lot of policy foolishness. But people in the developing world live on the edge, so anything that retards economic progress -- including measures to arrest global warming -- will bring incredible hardship to the most vulnerable on the planet. If we care about human life, we should celebrate Economic Progress Day.

#### Soft power is necessary not sufficient—everything turns it

**Quinn, 11** – Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Birmingham, having previously worked at the University of Leicester and the University of Westminster alongside his graduate studies at the LSE. His chief area of interest is the role of national history and ideology in shaping US grand strategy (Adam, “The art of declining politely: Obama’s prudent presidency and the waning of American power”, International Affairs 87:4 (2011) 803–824 http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/87\_4quinn.pdf

Nevertheless, this qualification demands two further qualifications of its own. The first is that if we consider ‘soft power’ as a national attribute then it is difficult to separate it with confidence from the economic and military dimensions of power. Is it really likely that America’s ideological and cultural influence will endure undiminished in the absence of the platform of military and economic primacy upon which it has been constructed? It may be overstatement to suggest that, borrowing Marxist terminology, hard power represents the ‘base’ and soft power mere ‘superstructure’. But one could plausibly argue that even America’s non-coercive power and political appeal are inextricably entwined with the status conferred upon it by possession of a preponderance of material resources. While vestigial soft power may delay or mitigate the consequences of relative material decline, it is surely unrealistic to expect it to override them such as to allow the US to continue to exercise the same influence in a multipolar or non-polar world as it did in a unipolar one.

## 2nc elections

### Overview

#### Romney will gut federal support for renewables

**Wood, 9/6**/12 – AOL Energy (Elisa, “Renewable Energy: More, Less or the Same under Obama or Romney?,”

<http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/06/renewable-energy-more-less-or-the-same-under-obama-or-romney/>)

For renewable energy, the 2012 presidential race reveals the downside of being championed.

President Barack Obama channeled a historic amount of money into green energy in his first term and made it a centerpiece of his jobs platform. As a result, renewable energy is big target for those taking aim at Obama.

"Because the Obama White House has made renewable energy an important part of the focus, it has become important for the other side to beat it up," said Arno Harris, CEO of Recurrent Energy and board chairman of the Solar Energy Industries Association.

The brawl is at times colorful with quips from both sides about powering cars with windmills – or maybe dogs – on their roofs. Romney's jabbed that Obama thinks he can turn back the rising oceans. And 'Solyndra' has become the 'Halliburton' of this election: a single company name that one party uses to try to encapsulate all they see wrong with the other.

Jokes and hyperbole aside, how far apart are Romney and Obama on renewables?

"There is a real difference in policy," said Andrew Holland, senior fellow for energy and climate at the American Security Project. "Romney, and now Paul Ryan [Romney's vice presidential running mate], are quite anti-renewable energy."

Romney hasn't abandoned renewable energy. But he's also not pursuing it with the same "purposefulness," according to Dan Berwick, director of policy and business development at Borrego Solar.

To Incentivize or not to Incentivize?

In his nomination acceptance at the Republican National Convention, Romney included renewables in the list of energy resources North America must take "full advantage of" to reach energy independence. However, Romney promotes few of the market incentives the industry now enjoys. He describes a more narrow federal role, one where funding goes to basic research.

#### Obama key to environmental leadership

Walter and Nan Simpson, 4-22-2012; Walter, University Energy Officer for 26 years and was director of the UB Green Office at the University at Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo); Buffalo News

http://www.buffalonews.com/editorial-page/viewpoints/article822432.ece

Let’s not reverse progress While Obama has not yet delivered on some environmental priorities, his environmental record is solid in many areas. He appears to be committed to addressing environmental problems in a meaningful way within the constraints of what he views as politically possible. Obama’s re-election offers the promise of continuing his pro-environment programs and the hope he will do more in his second term. Cleaner air, water and energy mean tens of thousands of green jobs with improved public health outcomes that reduce health care costs. The president understands this win-win. Additionally, Obama is likely to do more on climate change in a second term if re-elected with a Democratic Congress and an increasingly informed public demanding action on this life-and-death issue. None of this will happen if Romney is elected our next president. Worse, given the GOP’s radical turn, a Republican victory would take us in reverse — undermining and eliminating laws and regulations that now protect our environment and public health. The critically important environmental vote goes to Obama.

### Uniqueness

**1nc Blumenthal says it will be close, but Obama leads every meaningful measure, prefer it –**

**a. samples the aggregate of all recent polling data, Blumenthal is the head of Pollster.com and his firm compiles data to correct for partisan polling firm’s ‘house effect’**

**b.it includes all swing state polls and accounts for likely voters**

**c. assumes alt causes like debates – these will make the race close, but won’t tip alone**

#### Conclusive lead despite alleged narrowing

**Silver, 10/2**/12 – statistician (Nate, “Is the Presidential Race Tightening Heading Into the Debates?”

http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/oct-1-is-the-presidential-race-tightening-heading-into-the-debates/?utm\_source=twitterfeed&utm\_medium=twitter

There were nine national polls published on Monday, which are listed in the table below. On average, they showed Mr. Obama with a 3.5 percentage point lead over Mr. Romney. That’s smaller than the leads we were seeing in national polls last week, which seemed to be concentrated more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama. It also suggests a smaller lead than recent state-by-state polls seem to imply. So has the race already shifted back toward Mr. Romney some? Perhaps, but this is less apparent from the trendlines within these polls. If you compare the nine surveys released on Monday against the last time they were published (in all cases, the comparison poll postdates the Democratic conventions), only four showed a shift toward Mr. Romney. An equal number, four, showed Mr. Obama gaining ground instead, while one poll remained unchanged. In all cases but one, the shift was extremely modest — within one percentage point in one direction or the other. The exception was a new CNN national poll, which had Mr. Romney closing his deficit from six points to three points. On average, however, the polls showed only a 0.2 percentage point gain for Mr. Romney — not a meaningful shift in either a statistical or a practical sense. And yet this simple version a trendline analysis does not tell the whole story either. Mr. Romney had appeared to lose further ground in the polls following the public release of his “47 percent” comments. All of polls that are used for comparison were released after the Democratic convention, but some predated the “47 percent” tape. It’s good for Mr. Romney that his national numbers on Monday looked more like those from just after the Democratic convention, when they weren’t great, rather than those from the past week or two, when they were worse. The FiveThirtyEight forecast model can account for these various contingencies, looking at exactly when the prior editions of a survey were released in order to calculate the consensus trendline. Viewed in this way, the national polls on Monday did contain modestly good news for Mr. Romney. But that doesn’t tell the whole story either, because there has also been a large volume of state polls released over the past day or two. Those polls can also be informative about the trend in the race. And in the state polls, it’s been harder to find evidence for a favorable trend for Mr. Romney. If anything, the opposite seems to be true. This was particularly the case in a University of New Hampshire survey published on Monday, which had Mr. Obama leading by 15 points in the Granite State — up from just a five-point lead in a poll taken just after the Democratic convention. The University of New Hampshire poll has a history of being fairly volatile, perhaps in part because voters in New Hampshire can be fickle with their political opinions. The poll certainly qualifies as an outlier relative to the consensus evidence in New Hampshire. At the same time, it’s not the kind of thing you’d expect to see if Mr. Romney were gaining ground in the race. Mr. Obama, not Mr. Romney, has also gotten highly favorable trendlines in a recent set of state-by-state polls released by the firm We Ask America, many of which show him with a considerably larger lead than he had before the conventions in those same states. The gap between state polls and national polls, which looked to have narrowed some last week, seems to be widening again. Perhaps appropriately given the mixed evidence on Monday, the FiveThirtyEight models produced something of a split verdict. Mr. Obama came off his highs in our “now-cast,” which projects what would happen if the election were held today. That version of the model had previously given Mr. Obama a 5.9 percentage lead in the national race, but it declined to 5.5 percentage points on Monday. Why are these “now-cast” numbers higher than the most recent national polls seem to suggest? In part because of the factor that I mentioned before — the “now-cast” uses state polls along with national polls to calculate its estimate of the national popular vote, and the state polls are a bit stronger for Mr. Obama. Also, last week’s national polls, which were more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama, still have some influence upon it. The Nov. 6 forecast, however, our signature product, is already assuming that Mr. Obama’s numbers will decline some, in large part, because it continues to weigh economic factors along with the polls. Those economic factors, in view of the formula, are more in line with only a very narrow win for Mr. Obama, on the order of two or three percentage points, similar to the margin by which George W. Bush defeated John Kerry in 2004. As we get closer and closer to the election, these economic factors will receive less weight, until they phase out completely by Election Day. But they continue to exert some influence on the forecast for the time being. In the Nov. 6 forecast, Mr. Obama’s projected margin of victory in the popular vote declined to 4.1 percentage points from 4.2. However, his probability of winning the Electoral College increased by a trivial amount, to 85.7 percent from 85.1.

#### Only that assumes cellphone users

**Silver, 9/19**/12 – statistician, editor of the NYT Fivethirtyeight blog (Nate, “Obama’s Lead Looks Stronger in Polls That Include Cellphones” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/obamas-lead-looks-stronger-in-polls-that-include-cellphones/#more-34740)

As I observed on Tuesday, and as The New Republic’s Nate Cohn also found, Barack Obama seems to have received a much clearer bounce in some types of polls than others. Although there are exceptions on either side, like the Gallup national tracking poll, for the most part Mr. Obama seems to be getting stronger results in polls that use live interviewers and that include cellphones in their samples — enough to suggest that he has a clear advantage in the race. In the polls that use an automated dialing method (“robopolls”) or which exclude cellphones, Mr. Obama’s bounce has been much harder to discern, and the race looks considerably closer. The difference seems especially pronounced at the state level. Mr. Obama got very strong results in a series of NBC News/Marist College polls last week in Ohio, Florida and Virginia, which included cellphones and used live interviewers. Likewise, Tuesday morning’s series of New York Times / CBS News / Quinnipiac polls had reasonably good news for Mr. Obama in Virginia and Wisconsin. By contrast, the automated polling firm Rasmussen Reports has recently released polls showing Mr. Obama two points behind Mitt Romney in New Hampshire and three points behind in Colorado — the worst results that it has shown for him in those states all year. Another automated polling firm, Gravis Marketing, recently put Mr. Obama at a five-point deficit in Virginia, in contrast to three traditional polls that put him ahead by margins ranging from four to eight points there. A third automated polling firm, Public Policy Polling, has shown stronger results for Mr. Obama, but they also had him with good results before the conventions, and so haven’t shown him gaining much ground. These results are consistent with some past research. Roughly one third of American households rely solely on mobile phones and do not have landlines, meaning they will simply be excluded by polls that call landlines only. Potential voters who rely on cellphones belong to more Democratic-leaning demographic groups than those which don’t, and there is reasonably strong empirical evidence that the failure to include them in polls can bias the results against Democrats, even after demographic weightings are applied. We keep track of which polling firms include cellphones in their samples and which do not. So on Monday night, I decided to run two alternate versions of the FiveThirtyEight forecast. (Note that all results are based on polls that were in our database as of Monday night, and so will not include Tuesday morning’s New York Times polls or others published on Tuesday.) In one of the forecasts, I ran the numbers based solely on polls that do include cellphones in their samples. The vast majority of these polls also use live interviewers, since federal law prohibits automated calls to cellphones under most circumstances. (Note, however, that one or two mostly automated polling firms, like SurveyUSA, use a separate sample based on live interviewers to reach cellphone-only voters; these were included in the model run.) In this universe, Mr. Obama seems poised for victory. The model forecasts him for a 4.1 percentage points win in the national popular vote. That compares with 2.9 percentage points in the regular FiveThirtyEight forecast, which includes polls both with and without cellphones.

#### Strong methodology problems with these debate polls

**Blumenthal, 10/5**/12 – editor of Pollster.com (Mark, “Obama-Romney Polls Start To See Romney Debate Bounce,” Huffington Post,

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/05/obama-romney-polls-debate_n_1943786.html>

Within the swing states, the only fresh data come from one-day, automated, recorded-voice polls conducted by both Rasmussen and We Ask America (a subsidiary of the Illinois Manufacturers Association) in Florida, Ohio and Virginia. Generally, pollsters prefer to call over several nights in order to make multiple attempts to interview voters who might not be at home or otherwise available on any one night. So these Rasmussen and We Ask America results should be interpreted with caution.

Five of the six one-night polls show single-digit shifts to Romney. The change on the Rasmussen surveys is relatively modest, averaging a roughly two-point gain for Romney on the margin. The We Ask America surveys show much bigger shifts. The more subtle changes are to be expected on the Rasmussen polls, since the pollster weights its samples to match party identification targets.

Another reason for caution: The one-night, automated surveys either miss voters in cell-phone-only households entirely (We Ask America) or rely on a small number of cell-phone-only interviews conducted with a non-random Internet panel (Rasmussen). Roughly one-third of U.S. adults now live in cell-phone-only households.

The new state polls have helped narrow the Obama-Romney margin on the HuffPost Pollster tracking model of the national popular vote. As of this writing, the HuffPost model, which is based on all available surveys both national and statewide, gives Obama a roughly three-point lead (48.3 to 45.2 percent), though it will continue to update as new polls become available.

Over the next week, new polls will be released using more rigorous methods, including national surveys that are usually more accurate than statewide surveys. The polls still to come will reach voters with more distance from their immediate reactions to Wednesday night's debate and will also begin to reflect any response to Friday's jobs report (showing the unemployment level declining to 7.8 percent).

### A2 Link uniqueness

#### Energy will be spotlighted in the debates and this makes the plan uniquely visible now

**Gardett, 9/28**/12 - managing editor of AOL Energy (Peter, “Energy & The US Electorate”,

http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/28/energy-and-the-us-electorate-white-paper/)

Americans have been able for decades to mostly ignore the sources of their energy as well as the impacts of the choices they make. In the US, energy has traditionally been cheap, widely available and extremely reliable.

In the late 1970s an OPEC oil embargo sparked handwringing in the US about energy choices and marked the ﬁrst government-sponsored cleantech boom. Widespread power outages and the collapse of Enron at the start of the last decade prompted another short-lived period of public interest in energy. Otherwise, the most Americans have seemed to know about energy is how to complain about prices at the gas pump.

Something’s changed. A mix of economic, technology, operational and political factors have brought energy issues to the forefront of political debate in the US over the past six months, and the conversation is set to intensify as the Presidential Debates and the November elections loom. Americans are becoming aware of their energy use, and its consequences.

#### Voters have just started paying attention now

**Fahrenthold 9/7**/12 (David, "Obama, Romney embark on post-convention drive to Election Day" Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-romney-embark-on-post-convention-drive-to-election-day/2012/09/07/df887d98-f8f0-11e1-8b93-c4f4ab1c8d13\_story.html)

Even now, after all that Romney and Obama have already said and done, it’s likely that many of their campaigns’ defining moments are still in the future. At this point in 2008, for instance, Lehman Brothers was still in business. Joe the Plumber was still just Joe, a plumber. And Obama was behind.

This year, Romney is hoping that the next plot twists will favor him.

“I know there’s a lot of bad news out there, but I’m looking beyond the bad news,” Romney said in Orange City, Iowa, trying to project optimism about both the U.S. economy and his own campaign. “I’m looking over the hill and seeing what’s going to happen just down the road just a bit. And what’s going to happen is America’s about to come roaring back.”

This is the last lap of a race that has always been close. Obama officially began his campaign last April. Romney began his last June. Now, after 15 months, the two remain virtually tied in national polls.

Obama does have a slight lead in two of eight key swing states: Florida and New Hampshire. Obama’s staff believes it has a “small but important” lead in others. But the polls show the remaining six — Virginia, Ohio, Iowa, Colorado, Nevada and Wisconsin — are still anybody’s guess.

In the past two weeks, both parties had hoped that their elaborate conventions might finally move this election’s stuck needle. Romney tried and failed: Polls showed no significant “bounce.” Obama’s convention ended Thursday, so it’s too soon to tell whether he did better.

At this point, few voters seem to be genuinely undecided. Polls show that less than one in 10 is genuinely open to changing his or her vote. But now, two vast machines — campaigns and allied organizations with at least $1 billion to spend — will set out to change the minds they can and motivate the ones already on their side.

On Friday, Romney’s campaign rolled out a $4.5 million ad buy, 15 new TV spots in eight states. “Here in [insert state name], we’re not better off under President Obama,” the ads said.

“This is when ordinary people, as opposed to you and I . . . really begin to pay attention,” said Candice Nelson, a professor at American University. “Most people have real lives.”

#### Renewables will collapse in the US – financial incentives are rolling back

Justin Jacobs 5-25-2012; Petroleum Economist June 2012, Is the boom-time over for US renewables, Lexis

Justin Jacobs, LONDON: The clean energy sector has been a rare bright spot for the ailing US economy since the financial crisis took hold. Strong political support from the Obama administration and generous stimulus spending has fuelled a golden age for wind and solar technologies and led to a resurgence in the moribund nuclear industry. Non-hydro renewable electricity generation in the US, including nuclear power, doubled from 2006 to 2011, even if it still accounts for less than a tenth of electricity produced. But the good times could soon come to an end, though, as stimulus funds run dry and a host of subsidy programmes expire over coming years, potentially creating a ruinous "funding cliff", a report from three think tanks has warned. The report, Beyond Boom and Bust: Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence, was written by authors from the Breakthrough Institute, the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program and the World Resources Institute. It points to 2012 as a make-or-break year for the sector. Federal funding for clean energy - wind, solar and nuclear primarily - is expected to fall by nearly half this year, from $30.7 billion in 2011 to around $16 billion. That is down from a peak of $44.3 billion dollars in 2009. And spending is projected to continue its precipitous decline. By 2014 federal spending on clean energy technologies is projected to fall to $11 billion, a decline of 75% from 2009, the report's author's claim. Last year, for example, a crucial grant programme known as Section 1603, which BP took advantage of to approve an $800 million wind farm in Kansas, was allowed to expire. That led to an increase of some 50%-130% in the cost of financing new wind projects, according to the report. Dozens of similar subsidy programmes, representing 70% of all clean energy support measures, are scheduled to expire by 2014. "In the first quarter of 2012, global clean energy investment dropped to its lowest level since 2008. Good news stories are being replaced with headlines about closing factories, bankruptcies, and cancelled projects. Clean tech appears to be at a crucial inflection point," says Letha Tawney, a co-author of the report and senior associate at the World Resources Institute.

### 2nc links

#### Link is Particularly true with respect to natives

**Sullivan, 10** – JD, University of Arizona (Bethany, “Changing Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework for Renewable-Energy Development in Indian Country,” 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 823, Fall, lexis)

Aside from reforming the existing tax credit system, the federal government could also create new tax credits aimed at private businesses engaged in renewable-energy projects on reservations. n166 One possible financial incentive would be a special employment tax credit. Under this type of approach, employers receive a credit for wages paid to qualified employees, i.e., employees who are members of the tribe or otherwise classify as Indian. n167 Not only would this incentivize outside businesses to operate on the reservation, it would also encourage them to hire locally. This has the dual benefits of contributing to the tribal economy and increasing tribal involvement with renewable-energy projects. In joint-ownership arrangements, this type of tax credit would give tribes [\*847] substantial leverage in demanding that a certain percentage of the project's employees be tribe members. The disadvantage with this approach is that it fails to get to the heart of the problem. It only indirectly attempts to level the tax-credit-based disparity and it is questionable, at best, whether the benefits of new tax credits would be proportional to the benefits of existing renewable tax credits.

Another approach would be to increase the grant money available to tribally owned or jointly owned renewable-energy projects. Under this plan, rather than allocating several hundred thousand dollars to each tribal project for preliminary studies, the DOE and/or DOI would provide the bulk of necessary investment funding. n168 Since the construction and installation costs of renewable-energy generation from wind turbines, solar panels, and other renewable technologies are quite costly, this could require a budget of hundreds of millions of dollars. n169 Considering the current economic climate and constraints on federal spending, a proposal such as this is unlikely to get far in Congress.

### energy key

#### Energy will be pivotal even if it’s not the top issue for voters because it will be close

**Levine, 12** - Steve LeVine is the author of The Oil and the Glory and a longtime foreign correspondent (“How dirty is Romney prepared to get to win election?” 6/13,

http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/12/how\_dirty\_is\_romney\_prepared\_to\_get\_to\_win\_election)

Yet if the election is as close as the polls suggest, the energy ads could prove a pivotal factor. "Advertising is generally not decisive. Advertising matters at the margins. ... But ask Al Gore if the margin matters," said Ken Goldstein, president of the Campaign Media Analysis Group at Kantar Media. "This is looking like an election where the margin may matter."

#### Energy key to the election

Kingston 12 – Director of News at Platts (John, “US election 2012: if not "all energy, all the time," a lot of energy for sure” The Barrel, http://china.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2012/04/11/election\_2012\_i.html)

Get ready for the energy election of 2012. Maybe because it was at a New York Times forum devoted to energy, so the inclination was to talk with that sort of grand vision. But three reporters for the Times who are out on the campaign trail made it clear to a packed room that energy will be a key area in which Mitt Romney goes after Barack Obama in 2012. As Helene Cooper, the Times' White House correspondent, noted, the Obama adminstration has a lot of confidence going into the campaign. But if national retail gasoline prices were to head toward the $5/gal mark, "all bets would be off." And lurking in the background to that is the possibility of some sort of spike in price driven by an Iranian incident. With the Romney vs. Obama race all but assured, the campaigns are now focusing more on each other, rather than on the GOP nominating process. As as the Times' domestic correspondent Jim Rutenberg said, "so far, energy is what the campaign is all about." The panelists showed two ads, one from the Obama campaign and one from American Crossroads, the Karl Rove-led group. We weren't able to find them online, but found similar ones that pretty much say the same thing as those shown at the Times forum. You can see them here and here. The "gist" of the American Crossroads ad, according to Rutenberg, is that "the Obama administration is shirking blame for everything," and is doing so on energy policy as well. "Drilling is down on federal lands, and federal lands' output is down." But Cooper quickly noted that the Obama administration's retort is that "it's down because we took a time out (the moratorium after Macondo)." Although that move still gets criticized in some quarters, the administration is "screaming about this," since it believes the drop in federal lands' output is justified by the actions it took in the wake of the Macondo spill. (This report does show that federal onshore production has risen, though the total is down. See page 5). When the President talks about energy, the Romney campaign "just loves it," according to Ashley Parker, the Times' reporter covering the former Massachussetts governor. "They like it because it gives (them) an opening."

#### Magnified by the nature of the link – the plan revs up the dirty energy spin machine

**Gardett, 8/23/12** (Peter, “As Voters Focus on Energy, API Chief Begs: 'Turn Us Loose',” http://energy.aol.com/2012/08/23/as-voters-focus-on-energy-api-chief-begs-turn-us-loose/)

The US oil and natural gas business has been an unusual bright spot for the American economy over the past four years, and that success has helped highlight energy issues as a major factor in the 2012 election cycle.

Energy has not traditionally been a focus of electoral politics beyond prices at the gasoline pump, but this year the broader focus on the economy and the government's role in directing it have brought to light the successes, the potential and the risks of energy development in the US.

"We're only in the early stages of a very robust debate on energy issues," American Petroleum Institute (API) CEO Jack Gerard told AOL Energy in a recent interview.

API has played its part in surfacing energy and the sector's role as an economic engine in a large awareness building campaign called Vote4Energy, revealed in Washington, DC to great fanfare at the beginning of this year. Unlike many industry group-led campaigns, API has implemented a long-term and fully committed strategy across the year as part of the campaign, and will be present at the upcoming Presidential nominating conventions planned for Tampa, Florida and Charlotte, North Carolina over the coming weeks.

The campaign will intensify over the remaining months of 2012 with particularly robust outreach planned for voters in five key states, including Virgina, Ohio, Florida, Colorado and North Carolina.

"We've broken through to a new means of engaging with the public," Gerard said, adding that he thinks the Vote4Energy campaign has been "wildly successful" so far. A recent poll conducted by API demonstrates what it says is broad-based and bipartisan support for the economic issues that in turn underpin the group's pro-energy development agenda.

## 2nc states

### 2nc states solve

#### Tribal-state agreements over taxation are historically successful

**Sullivan, 10** – JD, University of Arizona (Bethany, “Changing Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework for Renewable-Energy Development in Indian Country,” 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 823, Fall, lexis)

In order to reduce the problem of double taxation, many tribes have entered into special agreements with states called tax compacts. n199 Although the content of these compacts differ, they often involve a tribe and state agreeing to implement a single tax over an activity, the revenue of which they allocate between themselves. n200 The benefit of this approach is that it clarifies each sovereign's rights, making litigation unnecessary. Additionally, it prevents non-Indian actors on the reservation from being taxed twice for the same activity, decreasing the deterrent effect on investors. But states generally have much greater political and economic power than tribes and are able to leverage agreements in their own favor. n201 As a result, tribes ultimately give away substantial chunks of their tax revenue to the state to avoid conflict and litigation. n202

#### Clean energy finance banks solve wind – spurs massive new investment and decreases costs to spur commercialization and ends the need for subsidies and tax breaks

**Muro and Berlin, 9/12**/12 – \*senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings AND \*\* Senior Vice President for Policy and Planning, and General Counsel at the Coalition for Green Capital (Mark and Ken, “State Clean Energy Finance Banks: New Investment Facilities for Clean Energy Deployment”, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/9/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro>)

Clean energy finance banks, in this regard, hold great promise for financing both energy efficiency projects and the deployment of clean energy projects with low technology risks, including projects using existing wind and solar technologies. Such clean energy projects, because of their low technology risk and low financing risk (particularly when they have entered into long-term power purchase agreements for the purchase of their output) should be able to attract bond purchasers interested in long-term, safe returns and thus willing to accept rates of return at a conservative level. By providing standby purchase agreements or total return swaps, the clean energy finance bank could even increase the potential pool of tax equity investors by lowering the risk profile of such investments. At the same time, state clean energy finance banks could also be expanded to cover innovative, riskier new technologies and manufacturing facilities, although each of these propositions presents its own risk factors and would require a different funding “window” within the bank. Along these lines, state-organized clean energy finance banks offer a practical way for states to make available low-cost financing for project developers in their regions and keep the clean energy economy growing. Currently, a significant amount of relatively low-cost credit is available for at least large energy project developers. Studies that the Coalition for Green Capital (CGC) has conducted, however, show that lowering the cost of clean energy loans by 225 basis points and providing longterm loans to all developers would lower the cost for a clean energy project by 15 to 20 percent (See Figure 3).21CGC thinks that state clean energy finance banks could provide loans at this rate differential. A clean energy finance bank would establish loan loss reserves through credit subsidy fees or using bank capital that is replenished by credit subsidy fees.22 This would be an important gain. A 15 to 20 percent reduction in the cost of a wind or solar project would make many projects cost-competitive with conventional generation. For other projects, clean energy finance banks’ offer of a low-interest rate tranche, rather than the full cost of the project, might be enough for the project to proceed. In yet other cases, the banks’ financing would not replace all of the tax credits and incentives that are likely to be withdrawn for budget reasons but it would substantially reduce the need for such supports. The need for financing of energy efficiency projects is different. When faced with a choice of spending scarce dollars on energy efficiency rather than other uses, most homeowners and small businessmen, and even many large businesses, choose projects other than energy efficiency. As a result, to ensure adequate demand for energy efficiency projects, most energy programs subsidize the cost of energy efficiency projects, and many experts believe that 100 percent subsidies or financing of the up-front costs of energy efficiency projects is needed,23 with repayment limited to an estimate of the expected amount of the energy savings.24 The latter limitation becomes difficult if the cost of the project is too high since the cost of repayment at high interest rates would eventually exceed the estimated value of the energy savings. Currently there are low-cost financing programs but often the interest rates are held down by interest rate buy-downs. These types of programs will be very hard to bring to scale in an austere budget environment and in many places it is difficult to obtain 100-percent up-front financing. A clean energy finance bank should be able to provide financing at low enough rates after a loan loss reserve is established to avoid the need for interest rate buy-downs and help bring energy efficiency projects to scale. In any event, the low-cost lending through state clean energy finance banks should be able to substantially reduce the cost of clean energy projects and so make many of them cost-competitive with traditional power generation while reducing their reliance on subsidies.

### Modeling/perception

#### States are awesome at environmental leadership

**Northrop and Sassoon, 08** - Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com (Michael David, Yale Environment 360, 6-3, <http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015>)

Individually, the size of many of these state economies rivals those of most countries. State climate policy initiatives — though not yet implemented on a national scale — are collectively among the most advanced anywhere in the world. They provide a profound but largely unrecognized platform for national action, and for **a potential reassertion of global environmental leadership** by the United States. Indeed, state climate initiatives have provided hope to those in the global community who have waited patiently for the United States to engage meaningfully in international climate efforts.

#### Solve perception better than the aff

**Kate 8** – member, Clingendael International Energy Programme (Warner ten, May, A Green Light for the American Climate Discussion?, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080500\_ciep\_briefingpaper\_kate.pdf)

Kevin Conrad, together with the rest of the conference, accused the United States of lacking the **leadership it had promised** to show in the run-up to Bali. The US, as the largest consumer of energy in the world, and as de facto leader of the industrialized nations, is indispensable in setting a good example, and in such to convince the large developing economies such as China and India to contribute in mitigating climate change. Although on the international level the leadership of Washington has been sorely missed for several years, an increasingly vocal call for more leadership is originating from the national level. The autonomous governments of the American states are developing a number of climate initiatives, which they seek to couple with international initiatives, particularly the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). In the run-up to the international climate conference in Bali, the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) was launched on October 29, 2007. Apart from several member states of the European Union, together with Norway, New Zealand, and Canadian Provinces, sixteen individual states from the United States joined the partnership.2 ICAP provides a platform for the exchange of expertise in the field of emission trading systems which would, in the long term, enable these systems to be coupled. ICAP thus wants to contribute to the Bali-road map, in order to facilitate the creation of a global emission trading system.3 The Dutch minister of European Affairs, Frans Timmermans, called the signing of ICAP a milestone: “For the first time we have been able to establish sounds commitments across the Atlantic. You don’t need ‘Washington’ to make substantial agreements with the American States.”4

#### States create federal follow on

**Dutzik, 11** - senior policy analyst with Frontier Group, specializing in energy, transportation and climate policy (Tony, “The Way Forward on Global Warming Reducing Carbon Pollution Today and Restoring Momentum for Tomorrow by Promoting Clean Energy”, <http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/The-Way-Forward-on-Global-Warming.pdf>)

Over the past several years, vast resources have been devoted to winning comprehensive energy and climate legislation at the federal level, and for good reason— comprehensive federal legislation will be necessary to produce the emission reductions needed to put America and the world on track to prevent the worst impacts of global warming.

There are, however, countless additional opportunities to reduce emissions using existing federal statutes as well as the opportunities presented by action at state and local levels of government.

In this report, we estimate the potential impacts of 30 public policies, measures and initiatives to reduce global warming pollution, most of which can be adopted at the state level. With 50 states, that makes more than 1,000 potential opportunities to reduce global warming pollution.

State and local action on global warming is not a “second-best” solution to the climate crisis. Indeed, time and again, ambitious public policy action at the local or state level has created a precedent for strong action at the federal level. Moreover, as described below, state and local campaigns can involve and engage citizens in ways that federal legislative campaigns cannot. Under the right conditions, these policies can not only deliver concrete emission reductions, but they can also spur changes in infrastructure and transform economic conditions in ways that will make the goals of an eventual national program easier to meet.

### AT: 50 state fiat bad

Solvency advocate checks – our 1nc Harvard Law Review evidence says that collective state action is superior to federal action, prefer a literature – based interpretation of theory –it’s in the context of energy policy and it describes collective state action

a. Real world policy experts consider the counterplan, it’s in the literature, its arbitrary and unpredictable to exclude it from the negative arsenal

#### The States CP is the topic---jurisdictional questions are key to energy production debates

**Kay, 12** - Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell Dept. of Sociology (David, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,” http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714)

Questions about energy production and consumption are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21st Century. Some go to the heart of our nation’s system of federalism, as an underlying but everpresent friction mounts over the way in which decision making power has been divided between central and more locally distributed political units. What is at stake? According to one author, “the choice of regulatory forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy. That may explain why Americans have traditionally shed so much metaphorical and genuine blood deciding what are essentially jurisdictional disputes between governmental institutions.” i

A number of factors have raised these issues into greater prominence. Energy specific influences include the depletion of low cost oil, advances in energy extraction technology, and increased awareness of the link between climate change and energy consumption and production. Another element is the long standing but increasingly hardened absence of a broad based consensus over energy policy at the federal level, despite calls for such a policy that date back to at least the Nixon administration. These have been superimposed on shifting political trends in other areas, including the expanding national political divide. After the crest of federal adoption of new environmental legislation in the 1960’s and 1970’s, powerful and complex cross currents arose. Mostly “conservative” and anti- (or anti-“big”) government forces mobilized in the devolution, deregulation, privatization, and property rights movements. In contrast, “progressive” movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of economic and environmental issues) and personalization (eg. of communications/information technology) by promoting global governance in some arenas and relocalization or local empowerment in others.

Several energy examples being played out in New York State, as well as in other states and on the national stage, serve as useful and representative illustrations of the fundamental but insufficiently appreciated tensions raised. The first involves the spread of the controversial hydraulic fracturing technology that is used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” reserves of shale and other rocks. The second and third involve the generation and distribution of electricity: where the authority to site electricity generating stations is vested, and who has the authority to site transmission lines that move electricity from their mostly rural points of extraction or generation to their mostly urban points of consumption. ii These are but a few among many examples that highlight the extent to which the proliferating threads of debate about energy federalism are being cinched into an increasingly dense tangle.

#### b.Literature supports 50 state uniformity

**Northrop and Sassoon, 08** - Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com (Michael David, Yale Environment 360, 6-3, <http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015>)

But the states have far more to offer. They also have approved a host of energy-efficiency measures affecting all sectors of the economy. For example, one set of policies provides both emissions reductions and substantial economic savings from the building sector through improved building codes, insulation and weatherization programs, and lighting retrofits. From the waste management sector, waste reduction and recycling programs yield similar two-pronged benefits.

These policies go hand-in-hand with others mandating that an increasing percentage of a state’s energy come from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power. Many states — chief among them California — have shown similar national leadership by significantly toughening auto emissions standards, leading Congress to increase national vehicle standards last December and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to challenge the states in court.

The fact that so many states are acting with a similar impetus begs an important question: What would happen if you aggregated these policies and applied them on a national scale?

One study conducted by the Center for Climate Strategies (CCS) — a non-partisan group that has worked on climate policymaking and analysis with many of these states — indicates that the adoption of a comprehensive, nationwide climate and energy policy would have substantial economic benefits. Using data from 12 states that are leaders in the field of climate change and energy, CSS calculated that were all 50 states to adopt similar rules and legislation, the aggregate economic savings would be $25 billion. The nation could achieve a 33% reduction in projected greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 — a common interim target — and save money doing so.

**-Neg ground—checks tiny affs with no federal defense, otherwise there will be a huge topic explosion**

**-Reciprocal—they fiat each Congressperson votes for the plan and that local agencies enforce it**

**-Aff ground—they can read disad to states or impact turn**

**-No infinite regress—“in the US” in the topic means there’s only a few domestic government actors**

**Advocacy Skills- Forcing the aff to defend federal key warrants encourages the development of better researched and planned policies and is vital to being a competent energy policy advocate because ideas aren’t enough in congress, that’s key to social change and avoiding the lack of planning that caused poor policies like Iraq**

**Info Processing- Forcing the aff to research every intricacy of the plan encourages more holistic processing of information that encourages better research practices and critical thinking and causes more precise plan writing**

**Relevant Policy Choice – State Lawmakers must compare and choose in the absence of Federal Action – means our cp provides a real-world policy option**

**Biering 8 –** former Executive Fellow in the California Resources Agency (Brian, 23 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 35)

Federalism issues aside, the fundamental question policymakers need to resolve is whether it is more appropriate for the states to act now in the area of climate change, or whether the field should be simply left to the federal government to address in its own time.

#### 50 state fiat isn’t unprecedented

**Mountjoy 4,** (John J., Director of National Center for Interstate Compacts and Associate Director for National Policy Coordination, The Council of State Governments, “Solutions for States: Interstate Compacts as a Tool,” http://www.csg.org/programs/ncic/documents/SolutionsForStates.pdf)

Interstate compacts are contracts between states and carry with them the force and effect of statutory law. While most interstate compacts are rudimentary in function (regulating boundaries and water rights) and have signatories numbering below fifteen, several interstate compacts maintain membership of all 50 states (or close to it) and have administrative/regulatory agencies that oversee the functionality of the compact between states. The Drivers’ License Compact and its American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators regulate and allow states to recognize drivers’ licenses issued in other states. The Interstate Compact for Education and its Education Commission of the States maintain close cooperation and understanding among executive, legislative, professional, educational leadership on a nationwide basis at the State and local levels.

## 2nc China wind

### Overview

#### Chinese wind leadership is vital to soft power

**Bezlova, 06** (Antoaneta, Inter Press Service, “CHINA: HIGH COST WILL TEST BEIJINGS COMMITMENT TO GREEN ENERGY”, 1/16, lexis)

With soaring oil prices, frequent electricity shortages and worsening pollution, it would seem that the prospects for China's renewable energy industries have never been better. Beijing is keen to promote low-polluting alternative energy not only as a solution but also **to improve its profile as a responsible international player.**

But much depends on government will if renewable energy such as solar, wind and geothermal are to emerge as significant sources in China's overall energy mix.

**China soft power boosts US soft power campaigns**

**China Daily**, January 21, 20**05** “China plays a more active role”

[http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/118482.htm#](http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/118482.htm)

With economic and trade ties between China and the United States becoming increasingly interdependent, the latter has fully realized the higher cost if it took some insensible measures towards the former. Now the voice of dealing with relations with China in a more sober approach has run higher than ever in the United States. China has also raised its international status a lot through playing an active role in anti-terror and anti-proliferation campaigns, which have helped some countries, including the United States, change their bias against China. The establishment of dialogue mechanisms and the strengthening of diplomacy between states have also proved effective in preventing crises and enhancing common grounds. Over the past year, China's leaders have made frequent exchanges of visits with their counterparts in the United States, the European Union and Russia, establishing and perfecting their dialogue mechanisms in diplomatic, economic and military fields. These moves have not only helped enhance mutual trust and cooperation, but have also been conducive to eliminating misunderstandings and preventing crises. For example, the establishment of hot lines between Chinese and American highest-level leaders and the foreign ministerial-level communication mechanism has played an important role in stabilizing and advancing Sino-US ties.

 Besides, to remove the international community's mistrust and misgivings towards itself, China has taken as an important diplomatic task to actively integrate itself into the world's mechanisms and frameworks instead of passive explanations. China's dynamic economic momentum and bright prospects have served as an effective instrument in raising its international image.

#### China’s economy is key to the global economy

**Hoge, 04** (James, Editor of Foreign Affairs, from a speech given to Johns Hopkins University. “A Global Power Shift in the Making”. Foreign Affairs. July/August)

Nevertheless, China's own extraordinary economic rise is likely to continue for several decades -- if, that is, it can manage the tremendous disruptions caused by rapid growth, such as internal migration from rural to urban areas, high levels of unemployment, massive bank debt, and pervasive corruption. At the moment, China is facing a crucial test in its transition to a market economy. It is experiencing increased inflation, real-estate bubbles, and growing shortages of key resources such as oil, water, electricity, and steel. Beijing is tightening the money supply and big-bank lending, while continuing efforts to clean up the fragile banking sector. It is also considering raising the value of its dollar-pegged currency, to lower the cost of imports. If such attempts to cool China's economy -- which is much larger and more decentralized than it was ten years ago, when it last overheated -- do not work, it could crash. Even if temporary, such a massive bust would have dire consequences. China is now such a large player in the global economy that its health is **inextricably linked** to that of **the system at large**. China has become the engine driving the recovery of other Asian economies from the setbacks of the 1990s. Japan, for example, has become the largest beneficiary of China's economic growth, and its leading economic indicators, including consumer spending, have improved as a result. The latest official figures indicate that Japan's real GDP rose at the annual rate of 6.4 percent in the last quarter of 2003, the highest growth of any quarter since 1990. Thanks to China, Japan may finally be emerging from a decade of economic malaise. But that trend might not continue if China crashes.

#### We access china-russia

**Sharavin, 1** (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, “What the Papers Say”, 10/3)

Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces!

Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

### Link

#### U.S. energy policy will determine whether it can prevent China from surpassing U.S. wind leadership

**Markatos, 2/3/**09 - founder of Sustainable Energy Transition (Dennis, “Record Global Wind Growth: Becomes Race Between US & China”, Huffington Post,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-markatos/record-global-wind-growth\_b\_163728.html)

Wind power did not just have [outstanding growth in the US](http://setenergy.org/2009/01/28/2008-a-record-year-for-wind/) last year. This renewable energy success story was a worldwide phenomenon. Global wind capacity grew a record [27 GW](http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=30&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=177&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=4&cHash=04fdc8c00a), growing at the awesome speed of 28.8%.

The US became the global wind leader at 25.2 GW with Germany moving to #2 at 23.9 GW. The North American and European markets were roughly equal in 2008 growth, with Asia following closely behind.

China Rising

China doubled its wind capacity again this year, adding a big 6.3 GW to hit 12.2 GW installed (4th globally after Spain). And China is poised to grow faster than any other country in 2009, potentially doubling again to ~24 GW. At such a quick rate, China will probably pass Spain and Germany by 2010 (and accomplish its 30 GW by 2020 national goal 10 years in advance). Whether China will pass the US **in 2010-12** **depends on US energy policy**. If the US puts significant resources behind its stated goal to foster a green economic recovery, we may grow quickly enough to outpace China for many years.

#### Increasing U.S. wind subsidies will take markets from foreign competitors

**Wiser et al, 07** - Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, (Ryan Wiser, Mark Bolinger, and Galen Barbose, "Using the Federal Production Tax Credit to Build a Durable Market for Wind Power in the United States" November <http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/reports/63583.pdf>)

As the wind power business becomes more global in scope, turbines and components will be increasingly manufactured in areas where labor and materials are relatively inexpensive. Given transportation costs, however, some degree of local manufacturing will remain. In part because of the uncertain availability of the federal PTC, however, U.S.-based manufacturing of wind turbines and components remains somewhat limited. This is true despite recent progress in increasing local manufacturing of certain components by both domestic and international firms.15 Industry members were asked to estimate the proportion of U.S. wind project costs currently sourced from or manufactured in the United States, as well as expected trends in domestic manufacturing in the coming ten years under both an uncertain (i.e., short-term) PTC environment and under a single 10-year PTC extension.

Though responses show a range of opinions on the magnitude of future domestic manufacturing, directional consistency is clear: a longer-term PTC extension is expected by industry to yield a sizable increase in domestic wind turbine and component manufacturing (Figure 3). Under the present uncertain (i.e., short-term) PTC extension path, domestic manufacturing content is expected to remain largely constant over time at its current base of roughly 30%. A single, 10- year PTC extension, on the other hand, yields a median expected domestic manufacturing share of over 70%, bringing with it jobs and local economic development benefits.

### Uniqueness

#### Our evidence is future predictive – China will maintain its lead now

**Bozzato 12** [“The Wind Dragon: a Chinese tale of wind power”, June 4, 2012, Fabrizio Bozzato, M.A. in International Relations (University of Tasmania, Australia) and a Master in Political Science (University of Milan, Italy, Chin Forsight]

According to the Roadmap, if the marginal tariff for wind power is set at CNY 0.55/ kWh (excluding the long distance transmission cost), 700 GW could be installed around seven strategic areas before 2020. Until 2021, China will focus on onshore wind development and offshore wind power will remain at the start-up and organizational stages. From 2021 to 2030, land and offshore wind power will be synergically developed, and far offshore wind power will be launched. After 2030, China will continue to expand its land and offshore wind power capability on a massive scale. To meet such targets, the total investment in wind energy will be CNY 12,000 billion.¶ Advanced technologies will be widely employed, including highly efficient and cost-effective storage technologies and smart grids. Research and Development (R&D) are going to be the wings of the Chinese “Wind Dragon”. R&D will specifically focus on assessing wind resources (including forecasting), advanced wind turbines, wind farm construction and operation, etc. With time, investment costs per unit of wind power will gradually fall; the cost of wind power is expected to be the same as or close to the cost of coal power by 2020.

### Yes ccp impact

#### An economic crisis will trigger military aggression

**Shirk, 07** (Susan, served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State , CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER, p. 255)

If economic growth slows and problems multiply, there is a possibility that China's leaders could be tempted to "wag the dog"—mobilize domestic support by creating an international crisis. More likely, however, is that when confronted with a crisis, the leaders make threats they can't back away from because of their fear of appearing weak to the domestic audience. Only by understanding the dangers of China's domestic fragility and in­corporating this understanding into their policies can Chinese and Ameri­can decision makers avoid a catastrophic war.

## 1nr states

### China Add-on

#### Raises question of environmental leadership stuff

#### Nankivell evidence says that water supplies are scarce which is what causes the Russian invasion – plan can’t solve water and no impact to that anyways

**International 4/6** (International The News, April 6, 2012, “Track-II: Pakistan, India move to avert water war”, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-13729-Track-II:-Pakistan,-India-move-to-avert-water-war, dyang)

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan and India have agreed in principle of a need to set up an independent office of the Indus Water Commission (IWC) comprising neutral experts from outside the South Asian region with an unblemished record and integrity to avert wars on water issues between the two neighbourly nuclear states.

The understanding was reached during a dialogue on strategic relations including water disputes under the track-II diplomacy held in New Delhi on March 28-30.

Both sides also developed a experts from various international agencies such as the Work Bank, the UNEP and the EU. This independent commission of experts shall work directly under the UN to monitor and promote sustainable development in Kashmir and HP (Himachal Pradesh).

The independent IWC will also arrange real time data of minor, major tributaries and at all headworks, dams by website including three dimensional models of dams -- a three-dimensional model to represent geometric data of dams (flood storage+ ROR [3] Hydropower projects) for clarity of the global community.

Both sides also agreed for installation of satellite based real-time telemetry system in Indian-held Kashmir at a minimum 100 locations for monitoring water quality and quantity. This would also help remove mistrust on data exchange between the two countries.

The special debate was on water issues held with Dr Axel Harneit-Sievers, Germany in the chair and attended by Ramaswamy R Iyer, former Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources, India, Arshad H Abbasi, Water and energy expert, and Salman Haider, former Foreign Secretary.

The session ended with the outcome of a set of strong and applicable recommendations from both sides that the two countries should first **erase the mistrust** on water data pleading for the installation of telemetry system in IHK at a minimum 100 locations in trans-boundary rivers for monitoring water quality and quantity.

#### Squo solves

**Schwartz 03** – Adjunct Scholar, CEI (Joel, “Particulate Air Pollution: Weighing the Risks,” April, http://cei.org/pdf/3452.pdf)

America’s air quality has vastly improved in recent decades due to progressiveemission reductions from industrial facilities and motor vehicles.The country achievedthis success despite substantial increases in population, automobile travel, and energyproduction.Air pollution will continue to decline, both because more recent vehiclemodels start out cleaner and stay cleaner as they age than earlier ones, and also becausealready-adopted standards for new vehicles and existing power plants and industrialfacilities come into effect in the next few years.

#### China will never attack the Russian Far East–it would be diplomatic and military suicide

**MENON 2003** (Rajan, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University, The National Interest, Fall)

By contrast, China's military, which was quite recently a giant horde of foot soldiers, is modernizing steadily-chiefly with Russian weaponry, much of it supplied from cash-starved military industries in Khabarovsk, Komsomol'sk and Vladivostok. It may lag far behind the United States, but in force projection, speed, accuracy and lethality it is a wholly different force than it was a decade ago, thanks to Russian fighter jets, submarines, tanks and missiles, many of them built in the Russian Far East. Yet the chances that China will attempt to conquer Russia's Far East are slim. Such a brazen power play would damage China's wider interests. Taiwan might recoil in terror and treat Beijing's proposals for a negotiated reunification with even greater skepticism and wariness. The prevailing Western rationale for economic engagement with China-that commerce will transform and co-opt that country-would be shredded. China would likely face a counterbalancing, encircling coalition of the United States, India, Japan, Russia and Vietnam. Would such setbacks justify the burdens of ruling the vast, problem-infested Russian Far East? The Chinese leaders know their Sun Tzu: what they seek from the Russian Far East (access to resources and a benign northern front) can be had by means of silk-gloved hegemony. Chinese interests can be served without its formal occupation of the territory. Indeed, what may emerge could be a "reverse Manchurian" scenario, where the Russian Far East remains a titular part of Russia but is increasingly integrated into Beijing's sphere of influence. That is precisely what the conspiracy among geography, demography, power and time may create in Russia's Far East.

## 1nr Environmental Leadership

### No Mindset Shift/Solvency 2NC

#### Obama won’t be an environmental leader and Congress would block it anyway

**McDermott, 11** - edits the Business and Energy sections of TreeHugger, as well as writing about resource consumption, animal welfare issues, and the response of religious communities to our current environmental problems, also a goddamned hippie (Mat, “President Obama Continues Squandering Opportunities to Show Environmental Leadership” 1/26, <http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/president-obama-continues-squandering-opportunities-to-show-environmental-leadership.html>)

¶ By now you're likely well aware that despite talking about clean energy and jobs, President Obama made no mention of climate change or environmental issues as such during yesterday's State of the Union address. Which somehow makes it an even more important time to highlight comments that scientist-activist Dr James Hansen once wrote to Obama in advice. Obama Apparently Hasn't Listened to Hansen¶ New York Times has the entire letter--we don't know if it was ever actually read--but here are some of the highlights, which I personally find important and resonant:¶ The President should use his ascendancy to the most powerful position on the planet to help set a new sensible course for the planet and humanity. It would have required being blunt and honest about the situation and what was needed to break our addiction and avoid the tremendous inter-generational injustice that the present path will bring to pass. The path to a clean energy future would not be painful for the public, but it requires standing up to special interests who benefit from business-as-usual.¶ It is both a moral issue and a question of where the United States will stand in the future. Our economic standing is going to become second class this century if we do not move smartly toward a clean energy future.¶ Further along:¶ The other thing not mentioned above is that the most fundamental problem, which I keep repeating, is this: as long as fossil fuels are the cheapest energy, somebody will keep burning them -- implication, we must put a rising price on carbon. (Not cap-and-trade! A simple, honest approach -- collect a fee from fossil fuel companies at first sale, distribute that money, 100 percent, to the public.)¶ Nevertheless, the easiest thing that he could do, and perhaps the best that we can hope for, is for him to give a strong boost to nuclear power.¶ Unfortunately, he seems to fall prey to Democratic politics on this, rather than being a responsible leader.¶ Nuclear Energy May Help Greenhouse Gas Emissions, But Not Environment¶ The reference to nuclear power is something that Hansen brought up earlier in the letter--he called it a "huge mistake" that the Carter and Clinton administrations didn't more support the development of advanced reactor designs.¶ Personally I'm not sure nuclear power is any better solution to our greater environmental problems than continued reliance on other non-renewable fuels--even if it does address greenhouse gas emissions. And to be fair, President Obama continues to show strong support for clean energy, even if implementation isn't as robust as it could be or is needed to be.¶ President's Clean Energy Approach Neglects Why It's Important¶ But the part that is really lacking right now, linking together two things that Hansen advised as symbols of this lack, is President Obama showing or even hinting at moral leadership in establishing Hansen's "sensible course for the planet and humanity" and breaking away from business-as-usual thinking.¶ Pushing for 80% of US electricity coming from clean energy sources by 2035 is somewhat stepping away from that path, breaking away from the pack of polluters desperately trying to retain their profitable place in the world, but it is simply not enough.¶ The failure of President Obama to mention climate change, and the utter fingers-in-ears approach of Congress in even acknowledging that climate change is happening (on one side of the aisle) and in even attempting to push forward something that will effectively address it (on the other), just makes Hansen's words about intergenerational injustice all the more poignant.

### XT – Enviro Alt Causes

#### Failure to sign on to treaties shreds US environmental cred

Ivanova & Esty 8 – Maria Ivanova is Assistant Professor of Government and Environmental Policy at The College of William and Mary and the Director of the Global Environmental Governance Project at the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy. \*\*AND Daniel C. Esty is the Hillhouse Professor of Environmental Law and Policy at Yale University. He holds faculty appointments in both Yale’s Environment and Law Schools. He is the Director of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Center for Business & Environment at Yale. Summer-Fall 2008, "Reclaiming U.S. Leadership in Global Environmental Governance," SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 28, Number 2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v028/28.2.ivanova.html#back

However, the United States has since retreated from its global environmental leadership role. The George W. Bush Administration has obstructed progress on a number of international environmental initiatives: protecting **[End Page 57]** biodiversity, regulating the trade in genetically modified products, and instituting a legally binding treaty banning mercury. The high watermark—or perhaps the low tide—of U.S. obstructionism, however, came with the U.S. “unsigning” of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001 and once more at the 2007 international climate negotiations in Bali, Indonesia. The only developed nation not having ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the United States was the main opponent in Bali to a proposal for greenhouse gas reductions by 25 to 40 percent by 2020 from 1990 levels. As the United States balked at the emerging Bali consensus, an extraordinary diplomatic breech occurred: the U.S. delegation was booed. Lest there be any doubt, Nobel Laureate Al Gore weighed in, observing that the United States was “obstructing progress.”   
The list of international environmental initiatives that the United States has failed to join has become longer. The United States has yet to ratify the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, the 1992 Basel Convention on Export of Hazardous Waste, the 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity, and, of course, the Kyoto Protocol (see [Table 1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v028/28.2.ivanova.html" \l "tab01) for a chronological overview of main international environmental conventions and the status of U.S. participation). The Bush Administration’s “go-it-alone” strategy in security issues has mirrored a similar unilateralism in the international environmental domain. Once a leader in international environmental policy, the United States has lost much of its political influence today. What is more, U.S. withdrawal from multilateralism has left the United Nations—the imperfect but important instrument for international cooperation—“in limbo, neither strengthened nor abandoned,”[1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v028/28.2.ivanova.html" \l "f1) threatening the ability of the world community to resolve fundamental global problems.

### XT – No Cooperation

#### US influence irrelevant – too much variation based on politics

**Falkner in 5** – (November 15, 2005. “American Hegemony and the Global Environment” International Studies Review. Volume 7, Issue 4. JSTOR.)

Throughout the history of international environmental politics, the United States has played an active role in the creation and design of international regimes and has used its power to pursue its preferred policy objectives. To be sure, US hegemony has not translated into international policy outcomes in a straightforward manner. Nor has US foreign environmental policy been consistent over time in terms of its overall direction. Depending on the environmental issue that is the focus of attention and its broader international context, America’s hegemony has formed the basis for both international leadership and veto power in environmental regime formation. There is, thus, no simple correlation between the US position in the international system and its environmental objectives. As will be argued below, the inﬂuence of competing domestic interest groups and the fragmented nature of the foreign policy system in the United States are largely responsible for the considerable variation in US foreign environmental policy over time and across issue areas

#### A focus on defense blocks

**Sacramento Bee 2007** [U.S. rift with Europe: G-8 should stay focused on climate change, lexis]

Global climate change should top the agenda of this week's G-8 summit of leaders from the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and Great Britain -- plus Brazil, Mexico, China, India and South Africa.

But U.S. proposals for placing missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic (dubbed "son of Star Wars") has dominated discussions leading up to the talks -- and, unfortunately, have the potential to derail the push to fight global warming. The United States will have to take the lead to elevate the one issue and defuse the other.

The need for action is urgent. The Earth is rapidly reaching tipping points that will make it more difficult to head off dramatic changes in global warming in the future. And the Kyoto Protocol, where nations committed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, expires in 2012. The United States did not sign that agreement.

As German Chancellor Angela Merkel, chair of the G-8 and host of the summit, has said on climate change, "If the United States doesn't move, then others will also wait and see." Merkel wants the G-8 summit to agree to set long-term goals to cut greenhouse gas emissions to 50 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2050 -- and for this framework to be a new basis for an international agreement replacing the Kyoto Protocol. It would be nice to see such a landmark deal come out of the summit.

### Impact Defense 2NC

#### No impact to ozone

**Singer 2002** (S. Fred, Prof. Emeritus Env. Sci. – U. Virginia, “Correct Lessons from Shrinking Ozone Hole”, http://www.heartland.org/policybot/results/10609/Correct\_Lessons\_from\_Shrinking\_Ozone\_Hole.html)

I agree with the title of your editorial ("The sky is not falling" Oct 12, 2002) but wish to correct some of the scientific information:\* The Antarctic Ozone Hole (AOH) was never "theorized" but discovered in 1985 and explained only much later;\* By 1987, when the Montreal Protocol (to phase out CFCs) was concluded, the published data showed no increase in stratospheric chlorine, an ozone-destroying chemical, and therefore no evidence for a human influence. In fact, the chief US negotiator Richard Benedick bragged that he was able to pull off the Montreal accord without any backing from science. I quote from his book Ozone Diplomacy: " Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the treaty was............[that it] rested on scientific theories rather than on firm data;"\* According to the official UN report of 2002, stratospheric chlorine is still rising. No matter: The size of the AOH has been controlled by changing weather patterns rather than by chlorine levels;\* In spite of theoretical predictions, there has been no direct observational evidence for a steady increase of ultraviolet radiation at the Earth's surface. Therefore all imagined impacts cited in the editorial -- skin cancers, cataracts, etc. -- are based on speculation.

#### No impact or spillover to biodiversity

**Ridder 2008** – PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, “Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation”) \*ES = environmental services

The low resilience assumption

Advocates of the conservation of biodiversity tend not to acknowledge the distinction between resilient and sensitive ES. This ‘low resilience assumption’ gives rise to, and is reinforced by the almost ubiquitous claim within the conservation literature that ES depend on biodiversity.

An extreme example of this claim is made by the Ehrlichs in Extinction. They state that “all [ecosystem services] will be threatened if the rate of extinctions continues to increase” then observe that attempts to artificially replicate natural processes “are no more than partially successful in most cases. Nature nearly always does it better. When society sacrifices natural services for some other gain… it must pay the costs of substitution” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1982, pp. 95–96). This assertion—that the only alternative to protecting every species is a world in which all ES have been substituted by artificial alternatives—is an extreme example of the ‘low resilience assumption’. Paul Ehrlich revisits this flawed logic in 1997 i nhis response (with four co-authors) to doubts expressed by Mark Sagoff regarding economic arguments for species conservation (Ehrlich et al. 1997, p. 101).

The claim that ES depend on biodiversity is also notably present in the controversial Issues in Ecology paper on biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (Naeem et al. 1999) that sparked the debate mentioned in the introduction. This appears to reflect a general tendency among authors in this field (e.g., Hector et al. 2001; Lawler et al. 2002; Lyons et al. 2005). Although such authors may not actually articulate the low resilience assumption, presenting such claims in the absence of any clarification indicates its influence.

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the ‘conservation dilemma’, which “arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it” (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation:

Have there been permanent and significant ‘resource’ effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartram’s great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192)

Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species “do not seem to have any conventional value at all” and that the rarest species are “the ones least likely to be missed… by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine” (p. 215). The appearance of comments within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeld’s—and from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respect—is uncommon but not unheard of (e.g., Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

The low resilience assumption is also undermined by the overwhelming tendency for the protection of specific endangered species to be justified by moral or aesthetic arguments, or a basic appeal to the necessity of conserving biodiversity, rather than by emphasising the actual ES these species provide or might be able to provide humanity. Often the only services that can be promoted in this regard relate to the ‘scientific’ or ‘cultural’ value of conserving a particular species, and the tourism revenue that might be associated with its continued existence. The preservation of such services is of an entirely different order compared with the collapse of human civilization predicted by the more pessimistic environmental authors.

The popularity of the low resilience assumption is in part explained by the increased rhetorical force of arguments that highlight connections between the conservation of biodiversity, human survival and economic profit. However, it needs to be acknowledged by those who employ this approach that a number of negative implications are associated with any use of economic arguments to justify the conservation of biodiversity.

#### Extinction impossible and ahistorical

**Posner 5** (Richard A., Judge U.S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, Professor Chicago School of Law, January 1, 2005, Skeptic, Altadena, CA, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but **none has come close** to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of **limited lethality**; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time. That the human race has not yet been destroyed by germs created or made more lethal by modern science, as distinct from completely natural disease agents such as the flu and AIDS viruses, is even less reassuring. We haven't had these products long enough to be able to infer survivability from our experience with them. A recent study suggests that as immunity to smallpox declines because people am no longer being vaccinated against it, monkeypox may evolve into "a successful human pathogen," (9) yet one that vaccination against smallpox would provide at least some protection against; and even before the discovery of the smallpox vaccine, smallpox did not wipe out the human race. What is new is the possibility that science, bypassing evolution, will enable monkeypox to be "juiced up" through gene splicing into a far more lethal pathogen than smallpox ever was.

### Soft Power – Alt Cause

#### Single reforms—soft power is doomed and their authors are clowns

**Afrasiabi, 07 –** PhD and author on Iran (Kaveh, Asia Times, “The illusion of American 'smart power'”

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\_East/IK13Ak02.html)

Over the years, Nye has been anything but shy about claiming credit for his singular contributions to the theories of power, yet much of it is undeserved, as any competent sociologist probing the history of thoughts, running from Max Weber to Antonio Gramsci to Michel Foucault, regarding the subtleties and complexities of power, would readily attest. Nye's theory is an excellent theory that can never be refuted precisely because it cannot be pinned down, its core assumptions too nebulous to lend themselves to scientific parsimony.

Aside from contradictory notions and simplistic truisms, eg, "strengthen America" by "bolstering its soft power", the report is distinguished by its unabashed glorification of the American military - that has "never been put in the service of building a colonial empire in the manner of European militaries". A little micro-focusing on post September 11, 2001, American interventionism, curiously absent in the whole report, would arguably lead to a diametrically different conclusion. Too much focus on power actually distracts from conscious policies.

To be sure, the authors of the "smart power" report are not void of praise for European imperialism, particularly the 19th-century British imperialism that, they claim, contains precious lessons for the "smarter" America of the 21st century. Their point - about "legitimized British power in the eyes of others" - is clearly Eurocentric and blind to the perception of the colonized populations who eventually removed the chains one way or another. But that is a separate story.

Tightly packed into the report is the incontrovertible fact that American standing in the world has suffered. Yet, any report focused on "how America wields power in the world" that omits a serious consideration of the multiple causes, such as the American quagmire in Iraq, cannot possibly be taken seriously.

The trouble is, however, that both authors of the report are on record supporting the 2003 invasion, although in fairness to Nye, he did criticize it as the "right war at the wrong time", and targeted President George W Bush's failure to "neglect of allies and institutions" that have created a "a sense of illegitimacy". [3] The problem with Nye's approach, however, is the failure to recognize that the "pretextual" war against a sovereign nation in the Middle East, which bypassed the UN, could not possibly have the required legitimacy even if professor Nye and his arsenal of "soft power" pills were in order at the White House; in a word, contrary to Nye, it was the wrong war at the wrong time.

Formerly of the US State Department, Francis Fukuyama has agreed that procuring legitimacy has to do with "justice". In other words, an unjust war cannot be called legitimate no matter what the verbal acrobatics by the likes of Nye and others, who pay lip service to the "de-legitimating" US Middle East policies, ie, neglecting the Middle East peace process, mentioned only in passing in the above-said report, without due consideration of the serious ramification of such neglects with respects to the threats facing the US today.

While side-stepping the Iraq issue with the lame excuse of "broader" perspectives that need to "replace the narrow lens focused on Iraq", the report gives several other reasons for the waning influence of US, ie, reactions to American-led globalization, US's "angry" response to September 11, perception of incompetence, and the side-effects of Cold War success as a lone superpower. Here, the authors conflate the long-term causes of power decline with the negative fall outs of questionable policies, such as with respect to US unilateralism.

Regarding the latter, Robert Jervis has correctly pointed at the structural causes of American unilateralism, chiefly the absence of external restraints to American power. In comparison, Nye and Armitage mention other nations resorting to the UN to "constrain" the US power, yet provide no analysis of why the US has fallen astray from "norm-based internationalism", the fact that it has to do with power dynamism and America's "totalizing" power grab at the global level, to borrow a term from the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Pierre-Felix Guattari.

In light of their benign, tolerant attitude toward the exercise of American power, even under the Bush administration, which is said to have used "elements of smart power", Nye and Armitage never really get to the bottom of their own frank admission that today many nations "resent US's unbounded dominance".

Instead of drawing from this insight the necessity of a multi-polar world order, the report on "smart power" is keen on maintaining America's "preeminence" in the world and the various ways to ensure it, simultaneously throwing ideas such as "shared leadership" and "accommodating rising powers". True to its contradictory nature, the report on the one hand admits that global politics is not a "zero-sum game" and, yet, in the same breath sends the message that "China can only become preeminent if the US continues to allow its own power of attraction to atrophy".

Flawed, inadequate diagnosis of the problems behind America's waning influence go hand-in-hand with equally inadequate prescriptions for a new US foreign policy, no matter how useful the insights on increasing foreign aid, closing down Guantanamo detention center, focusing on public diplomacy, that is, the usual panoply of "neo-liberal" recipes for action, with the sole exception of omitting the word "interdependence" previously highlighted in Nye's own writings.

These **recommendations are not far-reaching enough**, often tackling the symptoms rather than the real causes of problems, overall denoting a mindset that reflects policy continuity (with the past and the present) when discontinuity should have the upper hands signaling a real foreign policy reorientation away from the disastrous policies of the Bush presidency.

Clearly, such a reorientation is impossible short of a paradigmatic shift away from the core assumptions of the American hegemonic model (which are only superficially questioned in this report). Devoid of such a radical shift, the report's "smart power" has nested in it the elements of a vicious policy circle, bound to reintroduce failed US policies under new guises.

### Soft Power – No Impact

#### No impact to soft power—countries will still work with us

**Kagan, 06** (Robert, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Washington Post, 1/15, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr)

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's United States, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America*,* and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

## 1nr Culture

### Culture Impact D

#### Without funding for language preservation, Native American culture loss is inevitable

**Lutz 7**

(Ellen L., executive director of Cultural Survival, former director of the Center for Human rights and Conflict Resulution, former professor of International criminal law at Tufts, former director of California’s Human Rights Watch, JD UC Berkeley, MA Anthropology Bryn Mawr, “Saving America’s Endangered Languages,” Rescuing Critically Endangered Native American Languages, Cultural Survival Quarterly 31.2 (Summer 2007), <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/saving-americas-endangered-languages>)

Revitalizing critically endangered Native American languages is not on the list of urgent public policy priorities. Yet to the Native Americans whose languages are just a few years away from extinction, the loss goes to the heart of their identity. It’s a matter of cultural survival.

Native Americans did not lose their languages. Their languges were stolen from them by immigrants to American shores who believed in assimilation, the melting pot, and the great American dream. But Native Americans were not immigrants. They were conquered peoples who were pushed off their lands and marginalized. They clung to their languages and cultures to prevent the loss of their identities, but the government set up a system of boarding schools that punished Indians for speaking languages other than English, instilling in them the fear that if they taught their children their languages, their children would suffer. Even after the boarding schools were closed the fear remained. As a result, among the estimated 154 indigenous languages still remaining in the United States, half are spoken by only a handful of elders over 70 and are not being taught to children. Many tribes have the will to revitalize their languages, but urgently need a substantial influx of funding, training, and technical support to produce new fluent speakers.  
Research shows that language revitalization is a key empowerment tool for Native American communities. Language learning confers cognitive advantages, enhances self-esteem and cultural well-being, and strengthens community bonds. As one indigenous language instructor put it, “Our language is the number-one source of our soul, our pride, our being, our strength, and our identity.”

### No Modeling

#### Using other countries’ constituencies to measure our favorability in lab is meaningless

**Ajami 8**

(Fouad, Bradley Prize Recipient, School of Advanced Foreign International Studies at John Hopkins University, author of *The Foreigner’s Gift*, “Anti-Americanism is Mostly Hype,” June 23, Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121417762529095457.html?mod=opinion\_main\_commentaries)

So America is unloved in Istanbul and Cairo and Karachi: It is an annual ritual, the June release of the Pew global attitudes survey and the laments over the erosion of America's standing in foreign lands.

We were once loved in Anatolia, but now a mere 12% of Turks have a "favorable view" of the U.S. Only 22% of Egyptians think well of us. Pakistan is crucial to the war on terror, but we can only count on the goodwill of 19% of Pakistanis.

American liberalism is heavily invested in this narrative of U.S. isolation. The Shiites have their annual ritual of 10 days of self-flagellation and penance, but this liberal narrative is ceaseless: The world once loved us, and all Parisians were Americans after 9/11, but thanks to President Bush we have squandered that sympathy.

It is an old trick, the use of foreign narrators and witnesses to speak of one's home. Montesquieu gave the genre its timeless rendition in his Persian Letters, published in 1721. No one was fooled, these were Parisian letters, and the Persian travelers, Rica and Usbek, mere stand-ins for an author taking stock of his homeland after the death of Louis XIV and the coming of an age of enlightenment and skepticism.

# Round 4 Neg v Vandy WS

## 1nc

### T

#### Energy production excludes transformation – it must be primary

**Eurostat** (EU Commission’s energy statistics organization) July 6, **2012** “Glossary: Primary production of energy” <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary:Primary_production_of_energy>

Primary production of energy is any extraction of energy products in a useable form from natural sources. This occurs either when natural sources are exploited (for example, in coal mines, crude oil fields, hydro power plants) or in the fabrication of biofuels. Transforming energy from one form into another, such as electricity or heat generation in thermal power plants (where primary energy sources are burned), or coke production in coke ovens, is not primary production.

#### Thorium is not production – it’s an energy transformation

**Guardian 11** [Eifion Rees for The Ecologist, June 23, 2011, Guardian Environment Network, “Don't believe the spin on thorium being a greener nuclear option”]

Anti-nuclear campaigner Peter Karamoskos goes further, dismissing a 'dishonest fantasy' perpetuated by the pro-nuclear lobby.¶ Thorium cannot in itself power a reactor; unlike natural uranium, it does not contain enough fissile material to initiate a nuclear chain reaction. As a result it must first be bombarded with neutrons to produce the highly radioactive isotope uranium-233 – 'so these are really U-233 reactors,' says Karamoskos.¶

#### That’s a voter –

#### First, Limits – Secondary production is an catch-all category – explodes the literature base

Kim **Woodard** (Research Assistant at the Resource Systems Institute of the East-West Center, Chairman and CEO of Javelin Investments) **1980** “The International Energy Relations of China” p. 457

Secondary energy production can most easily be defined as the conversion of one energy fuel to another. As such, it is a catch-all category that can be used to provide a cluster of statistical energy production series that do not easily fall into either primary production or energy consumption categories. The number and variety of secondary energy production statistics could be multiplied indefinitely by an ever sharper differentiation of substages in the flow of energy commodities through society. I have chosen co include just a few forms of secondary energy production in this analysis—coke production, thermal electric power generation, total electric power generation, total refined petroleum production, the differentiated production of petroleum fuels, plant use of energy in energy production, and the use of hydrocarbons in the production of petrochemical and fertilizer feedstocks. These were statistics that were available for the Chinese case or could be generated by inference from primary energy data and a few oversimplified assumptions. All the secondary energy production statistics presented in this section were generated by the computer and then rounded to a reasonable level of approximation. All the statistics presented for various forms of secondary energy production are general estimates, and none have been tested directly against whatever data exist in the Chinese press. Validation of the statistics would require separate in-depth analysis of each secondary energy production industry—a task far beyond the means of this book. These statistics, therefore, should be taken as a point of reference, not the final word.

#### Second, Precision - Separating primary and secondary forms of energy is key to overall energy policy

### Elections

#### Obama is winning but its close and reversible

**Cook, 10/4**/12 – editor and publisher of the Cook Political Report for National Journal (Charlie, “Mitt Romney Breaks His Losing Streak” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004?mrefid=mostViewed>)

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.

#### Nuclear power is unpopular with the public – multiple reasons

Mariotte 12 – executive director and the chief spokesperson for NIRS, has testified in the United States Senate and before the U.S. House of Representatives on nuclear power, a graduate of Antioch College. (Michael, Jun 5th, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say) Jacome

These are all fundamental questions, the answers to which could affect our future far more than, say, who will be the next Senator from Indiana. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, until recently—really the past two or three years—other than regularly-conducted, loudly-trumpeted and rarely relevant industry-sponsored polls, polling of public opinion on nuclear power (and a lot of other energy issues) was haphazard at best.

Gallup, for example, over the past 18 years as best as we can find out, has conducted only 10 polls (and most of these only asked a half-sample, putting their numbers into question) asking people their opinion on nuclear power. But beginning in 2009, Gallup has begun polling annually. Unfortunately, Gallup asks the exact same question, with the same wording, that the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) own well-tested polling does. And the NEI doesn’t ask questions that it doesn’t want the answers to. Even so, Gallup’s answers don’t quite match those NEI gets, and which are usually heavily promoted in the media by NEI.

To try to get a better sense of what the public really thinks about nuclear power (and since we can’t afford to conduct our own polling), we took a look at every poll we could find on the issue, and related energy issues, over the past two years, and in some cases further back. Yes, that includes GOP/Fox News favorite Rasmussen.

As DailyKos readers know, if not the general public, examining all the possible polls leads to a much greater confidence in conclusions than relying on a single poll. Thus, we have a fairly strong confidence that our conclusions are a good statement of where the American public is at on nuclear power and our energy future in the Spring of 2012.

Conclusion 1: The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy.

This one is a slam dunk.

New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayers in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).

ORC International (which polls for CNN, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer? Basically identical both years: 73% opposed in 2011, 72% opposed in 2012.

Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.

A third poll conducted by ORC for Civil Society Institute in March 2012 asked this question:

“Utilities in some states are allowed to charge electricity ratepayers for “Construction Work in Progress” for new power plants. This means that ratepayers – instead of the companies – pay for construction of new nuclear reactors and other major power plants before any electricity ever reaches customers, thereby lowering the financial risks to shareholders. Knowing this, which of the following statements about “Construction Work in Progress” most closely reflects your view?”

The answer: fully 80% opposed CWIP.

Most pollsters have not asked similar questions; interestingly though, Rasmussen did in May 2012 for an undisclosed client. Their question: “The government is providing billions in loan guarantees to help the development of new nuclear plants. Would that money be better spent on the development of alternative new energy sources?” Unfortunately, Rasmussen did not publicize the results and hid them behind a paywall, which we were not inclined to pursue. But if anyone has access to that, we’d love to know what Rasmussen found.

Conclusion 2: Americans do not think nuclear power is “clean” energy, and still don’t want to pay for it.

Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this:

About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’”

and this:

About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.”

Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that support plummeted.

This is consistent with findings over the past decade, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source.

A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.

Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”

This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.

Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.

Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.

But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.

Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).

Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:

“Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”

But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”

29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

Conclusions

Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

#### Energy will be the deciding factor in the election

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“It may be harder now for Republicans to land punches related to oil and gas, because the administration has called off the dogs, but many voters still think the president would like to thwart production and consumption of fossil fuels,” said one Insider. “Every time the president singles out the oil and gas industry for unfavorable tax treatment, voters are reminded of the White House's true goals."

Insiders said that energy issues will continue to be a sticking point in this election — to the very end.

“Energy is one of the president's biggest vulnerabilities. From Solyndra to 'cap and tax,' the administration has pursued one energy flop after another. The president's campaign team must agree, since their first ad was a defensive spot on their energy record, and the follow-up was a campaign swing through the country's energy heartland,” said another Insider. “Republicans are going to continue to pound away on the president's energy record to make sure he doesn't get away with trying to mask it.”

#### Romney win would crush US-Russian cooperation

Mark Adomanis, 4-17-2012; analyst for Forbes, Mitt Romney's Incoherent Russia Policy http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/04/17/mitt-romneys-incoherent-russia-policy/

According to his campaign’s own words, Romney will basically ignore Central Asian authoritarianism, which literally everyone agrees is far nastier, more brutal, and more open than anything the Russians are guilty of, while simultaneously focusing on democracy promotion and regime change in Russia. That is to say Romney’s Russia policy will, to a large extent, be based on relentlessly confronting the Kremlin. But won’t the Kremlin react extremely poorly to an American policy that seeks not only to co-opt its longtime allies in Central Asia and but to depose the current regime? According to Romney, the answer is no: the Kremlin will be so impressed by the bravery and willpower of this American effort that it will more actively support American goals (though precisely why it would react positively to an open challenge to its authority is left unsaid). Despite the endless accusations of Obama’s “double standards” and his “moral relativism” Romney is quite openly embracing his own set of double-standards. As the campaign’s website itself says, one set of moral values will be applied to the Central Asians while a completely different, and much more exacting, set of values will be applied to the Russians. It goes almost without saying that this is the sort of bad-faith posturing that really drives the Russians batty and that they react very poorly to this sort of thing. While I personally am of a strongly realist orientation, and have little patience for the attempt to inject “values” into an international system that naturally tends to be amoral and anarchic, I understand that there is a coherent case to be made for the neoconservative position. Very intelligent people, including many of my friends and acquaintances, hold views similar to the ones Romney espouses towards, and while I can’t say I find them convincing I’m not nearly egotistical enough to think that my own views are the only “correct” ones. However Romney’s mix-and-match approach, a dollop of realism here, a large dose of neoconservatism there, a dash of accommodation here and a big helping of confrontation there, will not be a sober-minded attempt to appeal to everyone, but will instead be a disjointed mess that will simultaneously alienate and antagonize almost everyone in the region. While the foreign policy of any American president will never be perfectly within the bounds of a single school of thought, Romney’s entire Russia policy is a case study in avoiding hard choices. It quite openly attempts to be all things to all people: realists can look at it and see parts of their ideology, and neoconservatives can look at it and see parts of their ideology too. Romney will both openly confront the Russians and get more concessions from them, support democracy and work hand-in-hand with some of the world’s most repressive regimes, pursue missile defense and get Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, expand NATO and convince Russia to stop arming Syria, work to undermine Russia’s energy interests and get it to isolate Iran. There are no hard choices, no nasty compromises, and no trade-offs between values and interests: there is just the unapologetic exercise of American power and the positive consequences inevitably associated with it. Obama is himself very(!) far from being perfect, but at least his foreign policy seems to be a reasonably coherent attempt to advance America’s interests while avoiding, to the greatest extent possible, needless antagonism. As far as I can tell Romney’s main position is that Obama is bad, that everything he’s done is bad too, and that Romney would do better because… he said he will that’s why! There’s a deeper lesson in there about how this campaign is going to be waged, and a rather troubling one at that.

#### Extinction

**Nixon Center ‘3** (“Advancing American Interests and the U.S.-Russian Relationship: INTERIM REPORT,” SEPTEMBER 2K3 HTTP://WWW.NIXONCENTER.ORG/PUBLICATIONS/MONOGRAPHS/FR.HTM) // WLT

The proper starting point in thinking about American national interests and Russia—or any other country—is the candid question: why does Russia matter?  How can Russia affect vital American interests and how much should the United States care about Russia?  Where does it rank in the hierarchy of American national interests?  As the Report of the Commission on American National Interests (2000) concluded, Russia ranks among the few countries whose actions powerfully affect American vital interests.  Why? § First, Russia is a very large country linking several strategically important regions.  By virtue of its size and location, Russia is a key player in Europe as well as the Middle East and Central, South and East Asia.  Accordingly, Moscow can substantially contribute to, or detract from, U.S. efforts to deal with such urgent challenges as North Korea and Iran, as well as important longer term problems like Iraq and Afghanistan.  In addition, Russia shares the world’s longest land border with China, an emerging great power that can have a major impact on both U.S. and Russian interests.  The bottom line is that notwithstanding its significant loss of power after the end of the Cold War, Moscow’s geopolitical weight still exceeds that of London or Paris. § Second, as a result of its Soviet legacy, Russia has relationships with and information about countries that remain comparatively inaccessible to the American government, in the Middle East, Central Asia and elsewhere.  Russian intelligence and/or leverage in these areas could significantly aid the United States in its efforts to deal with current, emerging and still unforeseen strategic challenges, including in the war on terrorism. § Third, today and for the foreseeable future Russia’s nuclear arsenal will be capable of inflicting vast damage on the United States.  Fortunately, the likelihood of such scenarios has declined dramatically since the Cold War.  But today and as far as any eye can see the U.S. will have an enduring vital interest in these weapons not being used against America or our allies. § Fourth, reliable Russian stewardship and control of the largest arsenal of nuclear warheads and stockpile of nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons could be made is essential in combating the threat of “loose nukes.”  The United States has a vital interest in effective Russian programs to prevent weapons being stolen by criminals, sold to terrorists and used to kill Americans. § Fifth, Russian stockpiles, technologies and knowledge for creating biological and chemical weapons make cooperation with Moscow very important to U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons.  Working with Russia may similarly help to prevent states hostile to the United States from obtaining sophisticated conventional weapons systems, such as missiles and submarines. § Sixth, as the world’s largest producer and exporter of hydrocarbons (oil and gas), Russia offers America an opportunity to diversify and increase supplies of non-OPEC, non-Mid-Eastern energy. § Seventh, as a veto-wielding permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia can substantially ease, or complicate, American attempts to work through the UN and other international institutions to advance other vital and extremely important U.S. interests.  In a world in which many are already concerned about the use of U.S. power, this can have a real impact on America’s success at providing global leadership.  More broadly, a close U.S.-Russian relationship can limit other states’ behavior by effectively eliminating Moscow as a potential source of political support

#### Romney causes massive foreign backlash and nuclear wars around the globe

Doug Bandow 5-15-2012; Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### Coercion

#### Plan’s coercive

**Rothbard, no date** (Murray Rothbard, former teacher, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, New Liberty – Involuntary Servitude, no date, p. <http://www.mises.org/rothbard/newliberty4a.asp>)

In a sense, the entire system of taxation is a form of involuntary servitude. Take, in particular, the income tax. The high levels of income tax mean that all of us work a large part of the year? several months? for nothing for Uncle Sam before being allowed to enjoy our incomes on the market. Part of the essence of slavery, after all, is forced work for someone at little or no pay. But the income tax means that we sweat and earn income, only to see the government extract a large chunk of it by coercion for its own purposes. What is this but forced labor at no pay? The withholding feature of the income tax is a still more clear-cut instance of involuntary servitude. For as the intrepid Connecticut indus­trialist Vivien Kellems argued years ago, the employer is forced to expend time, labor, and money in the business of deducting and transmit­ting his employees' taxes to the federal and state governments, yet the employer is not recompensed for this expenditure. What moral principle justifies the government's forcing employers to act as its unpaid tax collectors?

#### Decision rule

**Petro**, **74** (Sylvester, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, University of Toledo Law Review, p.480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

### Uranium Prices

#### Uranium prices increasing now – rising demand

**Energy Report 9/13** [“Uranium Fundamentals Are at a Tipping Point: Alka Singh”, Business Insider 9/13/12]

Alka Singh: There are 433 currently operating nuclear power reactors around the world. Annually, they consume 177 million pounds (Mlb) of uranium. The world does not produce that much yellow cake. Last year, production was 130 Mlb. The gap is currently being filled largely by the Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement (HEU) with Russia and by other sources. As we approach the 2013 HEU Agreement expiry date, the supply/demand fundamentals will prove positive for uranium prices, and that will boost the price of uranium equities.¶ TER: Who has the pricing power in this market?¶ AS: When electrical power utilities buy uranium through long-term contracts, the agreements run as long as 8–10 years. That's why utilities have pricing power. The challenge now is that spot uranium prices are at $48 a pound (lb). But for many mines, the cost of production is $50–60/lb. The utilities have an enormous amount of power when it comes to determining the price of yellow cake. They are happy to sit on the sidelines and jump in to buy supply at basement prices. When spot prices compare favorably to the long-term prices, the utilities will buy supply from the short-term market. But, over time, the long-term prices determine where the market is heading.¶ TER: Globally, do state-owned energy utilities have a competitive advantage over the private utilities when it comes to obtaining uranium?¶ AS: Yes. Since state-owned utilities receive government backing for resources and loan guarantees, it's always easier for the public enterprises to be more successful. But, that is more so in developing countries, such as South Africa, than in the developed countries.¶ TER: How significant is military demand for uranium globally versus demand from electrical utilities?

#### Thorium depresses that demand

**Herring 99** [JS, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Nov 13, “Characteristics of Mixed Thorium”]

A comparison at higher uranium prices and comparable thorium prices is shown in [Table 15.](http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:EXMGjDGteUQJ:www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/11467-slJBpd/webviewable/11467.pdf+thorium+%22uranium+prices%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us&client=firefox-a#24) The yellowcake prices are about double today’s low levels, while the price of thorium has been reduced to $60 per kg. Because of the higher uranium costs, the tails assays from the enrichment plant has been lowered to 0.2 wt percent U-235. Thorium is about three times as abundant in nature as uranium, but has a higher price today, primarily **because of the smaller amounts mined**. On the other hand, about 60,000 t of uranium is mined worldwide annually. Thus one would expect that the economies of scale have already been achieved. The continued use of low enriched uranium in LWRs, where five to ten kilograms of uranium must be mined per kilogram of fuel, can be expected to put upward pressure on the price of uranium in the next century.

#### High uranium prices are key to Kazakhstan’s nuclear ambitions – this saves the Kazakh economy and sheds its oil export overdependence.

**Kassenova 8** [Togzhan, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Apr 28, “Kazakhstan's nuclear ambitions”]

In conclusion, Kazakhstan's nuclear ambitions are likely to be realized if uranium prices stay high and Kazatomprom is successful in further expanding its international partners. Kazatomprom's most immediate task is to secure customers for its final nuclear fuel product--fuel assemblies, an extra fuel fabrication stage Kazatomprom plans to start carrying out domestically. Having a nearly complete nuclear fuel cycle--save for enrichment--will ensure a stable cash flow for Kazatomprom and limit its dependence on the fluctuating market price of raw uranium. In the meantime, though, increased uranium sales will help alleviate the country's overdependence on oil exports and help modernize its nuclear sector. If Kazakhstan does become the world's leading uranium and nuclear fuel supplier, the ramifications for the country both in terms of increased gross domestic product and status on the world stage will be profound. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan will remain heavily dependent on the export of its natural resources and on the vagaries of the commodities markets.

#### Kazakh economic and energy leadership is the linchpin to Central Asian stability.

**Frost 8** [Patrick, Foreign Policy Association, Nov 13, “Kazakhstan and the Financial Crisis]

Rustemov is correct in stating that this economic crisis may lead to following and connected geopolitical disruptions and he’s also right in arguing that regional and multilateral groups, such as the SCO and OSCE, will be crucial in helping the world get through this mess in one stable piece. Another important aspect of his comments is the positive role Kazakhstan can play in impacting the crisis in a productive way and that is in securing energy resources and in providing food stuffs to alleviate shortages in other countries, specifically in harder hit CA states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s abundance of energy supplies, combined with President Nazarbayev’s prudent planning, have left the nation in good condition despite the tough times. Nazarbayev announced last month that the government would spend $2 billion to stimulate the economy, mainly targeting banks and the construction industry, funds drawn from the nation’s oil fund. Unfortunately, not all CA or world states have an oil fund to fall back on. What the whole of Central Asia can hope for is sturdy economic stewardship by its regional leader, Kazakhstan, and help from regional bodies, both from the East and West to weather what will most likely be a lengthy recession**. During this time, it will be vital to keep the region from falling into disrepair as poverty and extremism** would both be on the rise and this may lead to conflict. The US, Russia, China, and the EU all have roles to play in mitigating negative ramifications of this crisis in the region, but **a strong and active Kazakhstan is crucial**. As Muriel Mirak-Weissbach concludes: “Kazakhstan has become the foremost interlocutor in Central Asia, not only for Eurasian giants Russia and China, but also for the two major economies of western Europe, Germany and France. If the current world crisis can be overcome through participation of major Eurasian nations, **Kazakhstan can become the linchpin in the region for stability and security**.”

#### Central Asian instability causes nuclear war.

**Blank 2k** [Stephen, Strategic Studies Institute Soviet Expert, “US military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia,” http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs /Blank2000.pdf]

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to deter Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet the new Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty suggest that Russia and Turkey could be dragged into a confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat. 72 Thus many of the conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict in which third parties intervene are present in the Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or another big power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a client’s defeat are not as well established or apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat could prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontrolled escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. 73 Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Russian nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’s declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Russian nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s interests and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of major war there higher than almost everywhere else.

### Adv CP

**The United States federal government should fully fund the construction of 250,000 synthetic trees designed for the capture of carbon dioxide. The United States Federal Government should establish a legally-binding negative security assurance for all members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime that are in full compliance with their NPT obligations, and adopt a no nuclear first use declaratory policy towards permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, India, Pakistan, and Israel.**

#### Synthetic trees solve warming

**BBC News 3** [February 21, 2003, “Synthetic trees could purify air”]

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A scientist has invented an artificial tree designed to do the job of plants. But the synthetic tree proposed by Dr Klaus Lackner does not much resemble the leafy variety. "It looks like a goal post with Venetian blinds," said the Columbia University physicist, referring to his sketch at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Denver, Colorado. But the synthetic tree would do the job of a real tree, he said. It would draw carbon dioxide out of the air, as plants do during photosynthesis, but retain the carbon and not release oxygen. If built to scale, according to Dr Lackner, synthetic trees could help clean up an atmosphere grown heavy with carbon dioxide, the most abundant gas produced by humans and implicated in climate warming. He predicts that one synthetic tree could remove 90,000 tonnes of CO2 in a year - the emissions equivalent of 15,000 cars. "You can be a thousand times better than a living tree," he said

#### Restricting U.S. security assurances to NPT members is the only way to solidify the regime and prevent proliferation

George Bunn, first general counsel @ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jean du Preez, director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program @ the Center for Nonproliferation Studies @ Monterey Institute of International Studies, July/August 2007, More Than Words: The Value of U.S. Non-Nuclear-Use Promises, Arms Control, p. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007\_07-08/NonUse

The Future of Negative Security Assurances To states without nuclear weapons not allied to states that do have them, a credible promise by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against them should have value. Judging by the demands for such assurances from NAM, the largest caucus of NPT non-nuclear-weapon parties, the quest for legally binding NSAs will continue despite opposition from the United States and most of the P-5. At the 2000 NPT review conference, these NAM states together with the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a smaller coalition of non-nuclear-weapon nations formed in 1998 to advance nuclear disarmament, were successful in extracting a **clear acknowledgement by all NPT parties**, in particular the P-5, that legally binding NSAs would **strengthen the nonproliferation regime**. The final document of the 2000 review conference also called on the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 review conference to make recommendations on this issue. Despite several concrete proposals, including a draft nonuse protocol to the NPT submitted by the NAC, the PrepCom made no such recommendations. Indeed, the final PrepCom in 2004 reported Washington’s perception that the post-September 11, 2001, security environment obviated “any justification for expanding NSAs to encompass global legally binding assurances.” The U.S. delegation reacted to the PrepCom chairman’s summary by stating emphatically, “We did not, do not, and will not agree as stated in the summary that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority.” This message foreshadowed Washington’s position at the 2005 conference, where it asserted that “the very real nuclear threats from NPT violators and non-state actors” eclipses the “relevance of non-use assurances.” An acrimonious debate about security assurances was among the reasons for the failed 2005 NPT review conference. The United States refused even to discuss them seriously at this conference or at its preparatory meetings, saying: [T]he end of the Cold War has further lessened the relevance of non-use assurances from the P-5 to the security of NPT [non-nuclear-weapon states], particularly when measured against the very real nuclear threats from NPT violators and non-state actors.… [L]egally binding assurances sought by the majority of states have no relation to contemporary threats to the NPT.[11] Options for the Next Administration Attempts to negotiate NSAs with the United States under the Bush administration seem impractical, but the next U.S. administration needs to take up the issue in time for the 2010 NPT review conference. As with the 1995 conference, the United States should lead a P-5 initiative prior to the 2010 conference to reaffirm political pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. To build confidence in its nuclear intentions, it should allow the conference to establish a mechanism to consider ways to provide legally binding NSAs. In this regard, a new administration could consider several options. One option would be approval of another UN Security Council resolution going beyond the one adopted prior to the 1995 conference. Such a resolution of security assurances to NPT non-nuclear-weapon parties in full compliance with their obligations could include two key components. It could recognize that legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members in full compliance with their nonproliferation obligations would strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and that the Security Council should consider taking action against any nation threatening to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon NPT member. Although the first of these two parts would go a long way to address the concerns of many states that the United States and the other nuclear-weapon NPT members have weakened their NSA promises, the second statement would address the security of non-nuclear-weapon NPT members not aligned with any of the P-5. In light of the Bush administration’s insistence that the 1995 U.S. assurances, offered essentially to gain support for the indefinite extension of the NPT and recognized by the Security Council, are not legally binding on the United States, and that these assurances do not preclude the United States from preemptory attacks upon underground hiding places for biological or chemical weapons, the solemn declarations made by the United States and other P-5 members are now regarded as of little value by these non-nuclear-weapon NPT members. Unless a post-2008 U.S. administration wins back the confidence of these nonaligned states that U.S nuclear policies are not aimed at them, any approach through the Security Council would be unappealing. Another step would be to offer guarantees to countries in nuclear-weapon-free zones outside of Latin America. Other existing zones include Africa, Central Asia, the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. The United States has not yet committed itself legally not to attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons members of these zones. This leaves many to believe that the United States is keeping the nuclear option open even for states that have, in addition to their NPT non-nuclear-weapon state obligations, declared that their own and their neighbors’ territories must be free of nuclear weapons. A main driving force behind declaring these zones free of nuclear weapons is not to be threatened by states that have them. Nuclear-weapon-free zones play an important role in strengthening the security of states that belong to such zones, but these zones remain complementary instruments to the global nuclear nonproliferation norm: the NPT. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, only the NPT provides the framework for global assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Because amendment of the NPT is almost impossible, legally binding assurances could be more effectively addressed in a separate treaty or, better yet, a protocol to the existing NPT. Honoring only those assurances given to members of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones would exclude countries not covered by these zones or by other nuclear security arrangements. A nuclear-weapon state could also provide unilateral security assurances to a non-nuclear-weapon state. This may be feasible in a few cases, but it could also send the wrong signal. North Korea has sought such a promise from the United States. If U.S.-North Korean negotiations produce such a promise, it should of course be conditioned on North Korea’s observance of its commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons and to give up any that it now has. Such a promise, however, could send a dangerous message: the only way to extract assurances from the United States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is to seek such weapons first. If other states, such as Iran, use similar nuclear brinkmanship, the nonproliferation regime could be blown apart. Two other broader options could also be considered. One would be a new treaty containing promises by the P-5 not to use nuclear weapons against NPT-compliant non-nuclear-weapon members. Such a treaty has been proposed for negotiation at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). NPT outsiders India, Israel, and Pakistan, however, are active participants at this conference and would probably not agree to be excluded from the negotiations. At the same time, many non-nuclear-weapon states would be in principle opposed to accepting NSAs from these three nuclear-armed countries. In the eyes of NPT non-nuclear-weapon members, **why should nonmember states with nuclear weapons gain the benefits of a nuclear nonuse promise**? In addition, negotiating such a treaty in the CD would create yet another proliferation conundrum. Would Israel, which is a CD member, acknowledge its nuclear status and, as a result, be required to offer legally binding assurances to its Arab neighbors? Will its Arab neighbors accept Israel’s status and its offer? The answer to both questions is likely to be no. At the moment, the CD remains deadlocked over several issues, including whether to take up a Sri Lankan proposal that includes discussion of NSAs and possibly negotiation of such a treaty. The best option would probably be to negotiate a protocol to the NPT containing NSAs for all non-nuclear-weapon NPT members. The NAC submitted such a draft based on an earlier South African draft for consideration during the preparatory phase for the 2005 conference. The United States, however, categorically opposed it, and no serious negotiations on it resulted. A protocol to the NPT has the advantage of limiting the recipients of the promise to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members and thereby **providing a reward for joining and staying within the NPT**. Surely, security assurances should only be available to states that have forgone the nuclear weapons option. Non-NPT states-parties and NPT states-parties aspiring to acquire or develop nuclear weapons in contravention of the treaty **should not enjoy such security luxury**. Security assurances granted only to non-nuclear-weapon states in full compliance with their NPT nonproliferation obligations will **emphasize the basic principle that security is guaranteed by the NPT regime and not by nuclear weapons.** This would **strengthen** the regime and confirm the validity of the NPT and its **indefinite extension**. Legally binding security assurances linked to the NPT would also build confidence among NPT state-parties, addressing concerns over possible scenarios in which some nuclear-weapon states may consider using these arms.

### States

**The 50 state governments and relevant subnational actors should establish energy financing banks to fully fund the construction of Liquid Fluoride Thorium Nuclear Reactors and establish a matching funds program to develop and build a Liquid Fluoride Thorium Nuclear Reactor in research laboratories.**

#### States solve thorium reactors -- no barriers they can’t overcome.

Caruso, ‘10

[Doug, The Colombus Dispatch, 3-7, “The mighty thorium: The nearly perfect energy source nobody has heard of,” http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/science/2010/03/07/thorium-art-gc67nvgb-1.html]

Richard Denning, a professor of mechanical engineering at Ohio State University who studies the safety of nuclear reactor designs, agreed that uranium is a proven technology that is here to stay. "Right now, we're so into the fuel cycle," he said. "There is enough uranium to fuel the next generation of plants, which will look much like the last generation." Sorensen and others warn that if we don't invest in thorium, others will beat us to it. In addition to India, which is pursuing less-efficient, water-cooled thorium reactors, he said, the Czech Republic is exploring liquid fluoride thorium reactors similar to reactors tested at Oak Ridge. "You don't have to be a superpower to do this," Sorensen said. "You could be a state to do this. If the state legislature of Ohio said 'We want to become the thorium state,' it could. "A handful of engineers in the '50s did it."

### Warming

#### Don’t solve warming – tipping point inevitable, timeframe and insufficient amount of reductions block

**Smith, 11** [Gar, environmental journalist, He is the former editor of Earth Island Journal, and currently edits Earth Island Institute's weekly "eco-zine" The-Edge. NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCEhttp://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear\_Roulette\_book.pdf]

More than 200 new reactors have been proposed around the world but not enough reactors can be built fast enough to replace the world’s vanishing fossil fuel resources.2 Even if nuclear output could be tripled by 2050 (which seems unlikely in light of the industry’s record to date), this would only lower greenhouse emissions by 25 to 40 billion annual tons—12.5 to 20 percent of the reductions needed to stabilize the climate.3 The International Energy Agency estimates that renewables and efficiency measures could produce ten times these savings by 2050. The IEA estimates that cutting CO2 emissions in half by mid-century would require building 1,400 new 1,000-MW reactors—32 new reactors every year. But since it usually takes about 10 years from groundbreaking to atom-smashing, these reactors could not be constructed fast enough to prevent an irreversible “tipping” of world climate. This hardly seems feasible since the industry has only managed to bring 30 new reactors on-line over the past ten years. Of the 35 reactors the IEA listed as “under construction” in mid-2008, a third of these had been “under construction” for 20 years or longer. Some may never be completed. By contrast, a 1.5 MW wind turbine can be installed in a single day and can be operational 4 | The Watts Bar-1 reactor, 60 miles southwest of Knoxville, Tennesee, took 24 years to build. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in two weeks.4 Still, the pace of nuclear construction has picked up lately. In 2010, the number of reactor projects underway had ballooned to 66—with most located in China (27) and Russia (11). And it’s not just a matter of designing and building new reactors.The construction of 1,400 new nuclear reactors also would require building 15 new uranium enrichment plants, 50 new reprocessing plants and 14 new waste storage sites—a deal-breaker since the sole proposed U.S. storage site at Yucca Mountain is apparently dead .The cost of this additional nuclear infrastructure has been estimated at $3 trillion.5 Moreover, since the operating lifetime of these new reactors would still be a mere 40 years, even if new construction was practical, quick and affordable, it would only “solve” the global-warming problem for another 40 years, at which point the plants would need to be decommissioned.

#### Nuclear power can’t solve warming -- electricity sector emissions are too small, and inevitable demand increases mean the impact is negligible at best.

Green, ‘6

[Jim, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, has an honours degree in public health and a PhD in science and technology studies for his doctoral thesis on the Lucas Heights research reactor debates, energyscience.org.au, “Nuclear power and climate change,” November, <http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf>]

It is widely accepted that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions must be sharply reduced to avert climate change. However, nuclear power is at best a very partial, problematic and unnecessary response to climate change: • A doubling of nuclear power would reduce global greenhouse emissions by about 5%. A much larger nuclear expansion program would pose enormous proliferation and security risks, and it would run up against the problem of limited known conventional uranium reserves. • The serious hazards of civil nuclear programs - the repeatedly demonstrated contribution of civil nuclear programs to weapons proliferation, intractable waste management problems, and the risk of serious accidents. • The availability of a plethora of clean energy options - renewable energy sources plus energy efficiency - which, combined, can meet energy demand and sharply reduce greenhouse emissions. (See for example the reports produced by the Clean Energy Future Group).1 This information paper addresses the first of those arguments - the limitations of nuclear power as a climate change abatement strategy. A limited response Nuclear power is used almost exclusively for electricity generation. (A very small number of reactors are used for heat co-generation and desalination.) Electricity is responsible for less than one third of global greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Uranium Institute, the figure is “about 30%”.2 That fact alone puts pay to the simplistic view that nuclear power alone can ‘solve’ climate change. According to a senior energy analyst with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alan McDonald: “Saying that nuclear power can solve global warming by itself is way over the top”.3 Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium Information Centre (UIC) claims that a doubling of nuclear power would reduce greenhouse emissions in the power sector by 25%.4 That figure is reduced to a 7.5% reduction if considering the impact on overall emissions rather than just the power sector. The figure needs to be further reduced because the UIC makes no allowance for the considerable time that would be required to double nuclear output. Electricity generation is projected to increase over the coming decades so the contribution of a fixed additional input of nuclear power has a relatively smaller impact. Overall, it is highly unlikely that a doubling of global nuclear power would reduce emissions by more than 5%.

#### nuclear power can’t mitigate climate change -- climactic effects hinder reactor effectiveness -- their authors rely on a simplistic understanding of nuclear power.

Kopytko & Perkins, ‘11

[Natalie, PhD Researcher in the Environment Department, University of York, John, former chief economist at a major international consulting firm, advised the World Bank, United Nations, IMF, U.S. Treasury Department, Fortune 500 corporations, and countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, his books on economics and geo-politics have sold more than 1 million copies, spent many months on the New York Times and other bestseller lists, and are published in over 30 languages, “Climate Change, Nuclear Power, and the Adaptation-Mitigation Dilemma,” Energy Policy, [Volume 39, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03014215/39/1), January 2011, Pages 318–333, Science Direct]

Numerous analysts from industry, commerce, government, academia, andnon-profits have promoted nuclear power as an appropriate mitigation for climate change. In essentially all cases the logic of the proposal is simple and appealing: • climate change results primarily from burning fossil fuels, which releases carbon dioxide to the atmosphere; • nuclear power yields no carbon emissions as electricity is generated; • therefore nuclear power is an appropriate, indeed perhaps ideal, mitigation for climate change. Appealing as this logic model appears, it unfortunately ignores a wide range of other issues, each of which impinges upon the quest for reduced carbon emissions. Thus it is too simplistic and seriously misleads. The argument leads to easy conclusions about the suitability of nuclear power to temper climate change when in fact a more robust analysis suggests the opposite conclusion. Perhaps the single most important factor undermining the simple logic model stems from the fact that nuclear reactors require enormous amounts of water to cool or condense the coolant which transfers heat from the core to the turbines and cools the reactor core. This is why nuclear power plants are located near substantial amounts of water: the ocean, large lakes, and big rivers. If climate change affects the temperature, quality, or quantity of water, then existing nuclear power plants may be adversely affected. This paper examines several ways in which climate change has already affected water in ways that create problems for existing nuclear power plants. Specifically it examines the effects of sea level rise on nine existing coastal sites in the USA and the consequences of changes in water for inland reactors in France. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) models of sea level rise and a review of existing reports and published literature suggest that numerous existing plants have been or may be adversely affected by climate change. We call the set of interactions among climate change, water, and nuclear power the “adaptation-mitigation dilemma.” This term signals that existing and projected climate change threatens the operations and safety of existing plants and poses other challenges to efforts to adapt to climate change. Thus existing nuclear power plants may not represent a good technology for mitigation of climate change. A separate question concerns the potential of new nuclear power plants to avoid the problems with water we identify in this paper. Maybe it’s possible to build new plants that don’t suffer the syndrome of problems in the adaptation-mitigation dilemma. For reasons explained in the conclusion of this paper, however, we believe that it may be quite difficult to fully avoid the dilemmas identified here. At the very least, avoiding these challenges will add costs and possibly increase the risks of nuclear power, both of which are already severe handicaps for this technology. This paper acknowledges that sharply differing opinions abound on what, if any, role is appropriate for nuclear power in the debates about climate change. It seeks, however, to shift the analysis and debates about nuclear power away from “Is it a good, safe, cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions?” to “What can we learn about current nuclear power plants and how they have been or probably will be affected by the climate change that has already occurred?” With this shift comes the potential for analysis that is less fought with ideological baggage that hinders a clear understanding of nuclear power.

#### Historical climate occilation proves its natural

**Carter 2-8–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (February 2012, “Eight Centuries of Climate Change in Northeast Spain” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2012/feb/8feb2012a3.html>) Jacome

According to Morellon *et al*. (2011), "in the context of present-day global warming, there is increased interest in documenting climate variability during the last millennium," since "it is crucial to reconstruct pre-industrial conditions to discriminate anthropogenic components (i.e., greenhouse gases, land-use changes) from natural forcings (i.e., solar variability, volcanic emissions)."

Against this backdrop, Morellon *et al*. conducted a multi-proxy study of several short sediment cores they recovered from Lake Estanya (42°02'N, 0°32'E) in the Pre-Pyrenean Ranges of northeast Spain, which "provides a detailed record of the complex environmental, hydrological and anthropogenic interactions occurring in the area since medieval times." More specifically, they say that "the integration of sedimentary facies, elemental and isotopic geochemistry, and biological proxies (diatoms, chironomids and pollen), together with a robust chronological control, provided by AMS radiocarbon dating and 210Pb and 137Cs radiometric techniques, enabled precise reconstruction of the main phases of environmental change, associated with the Medieval Warm Period (MWP), the Little Ice Age (LIA) and the industrial era." And what did they find?

The thirteen researchers identified the MWP as occurring in their record from AD 1150 to 1300, noting that their pollen data reflect "warmer and drier conditions," in harmony with the higher temperatures of the Iberian Peninsula over the same time period that have been documented by Martinez-Cortizas *et al*. (1999), the higher temperatures of the Western Mediterranean region found by Taricco *et al*. (2008), and the global reconstructions of Crowley and Lowery (2000) and Osborn and Briffa (2006), which "clearly document warmer conditions from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries," which warmth, in the words of Morellon *et al*. is "likely related to increased solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000), persistent La Niña-like tropical Pacific conditions, a warm phase of the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation, and a more frequent positive phase of the North Atlantic Oscillation (Seager *et al*., 2007)."

Following hard on the heels of the MWP, Morellon *et al*. note the occurrence of the LIA, which they recognize as occurring from AD 1300 to 1850. And here they report that, on the Iberian Peninsula, "lower temperatures (Martinez-Cortizas *et al*., 1999) characterize this period," which "coincided with colder North Atlantic (Bond *et al*., 2001) and Mediterranean sea surface temperatures (Taricco *et al*., 2008) and a phase of mountain glacier advance (Wanner *et al*., 2008)." And following the LIA they identify the transition period of AD 1850-2004 that takes the region into the Current Warm Period.

In discussing all three of these distinctive periods, they say that "a comparison of the main hydrological transitions during the last 800 years in Lake Estanya and solar irradiance (Bard *et al*., 2000) reveals that lower lake levels dominated during periods of enhanced solar activity (MWP and post-1850 AD) and higher lake levels during periods of diminished solar activity (LIA)." And *within* the LIA, they note that periods of higher lake levels or evidence of increased water balance occurred during the solar minima of Wolf (AD 1282-1342), Sporer (AD 1460-1550), Maunder (AD 1645-1715) and Dalton (AD 1790-1830).

In light of these several observations it would appear that the multi-centennial climate oscillation uncovered by Morellon *et al*. has been driven by a similar oscillation in solar activity, as well as by multi-decadal solar activity *fluctuations* superimposed upon that longer-period *oscillation*. And these relationships suggest that **there is no compelling need to attribute 20th-century global warming to the concomitant increase in the air's CO2 content**. **Natural variability appears** quite **capable of explaining it all.**

#### No impact to Co2 and it doesn’t cause warming

**Happer, Ph.D. in Physics, 11**—Chairman of the Board of Directors (GMI); Cyrus Fogg Brackett Professor of Physics, Princeton University, Ph.D. in Physics from Princeton (William, 23 May 2011, The Truth About Greenhouse Gases, http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=953, RBatra)

Although human beings and many other animals would do well with no CO2 at all in the air, there is an upper limit that we can tolerate. Inhaling air with a concentration of a few percent, similar to the concentration of the air we exhale, hinders the diffusional exchange of CO2 between the blood and gas in the lung. Both the United States Navy (for submariners) and nasa (for astronauts) have performed extensive studies of human tolerance to CO2. As a result of these studies, the Navy recommends an upper limit of about 8000 ppm for cruises of ninety days, and nasa recommends an upper limit of 5000 ppm for missions of one thousand days, both assuming a total pressure of one atmosphere. Higher levels are acceptable for missions of only a few days.

We conclude that atmospheric CO2 levels should be above 150 ppm to avoid harming green plants and below about 5000 ppm to avoid harming people. That is a very wide range, and our atmosphere is much closer to the lower end than to the upper end. The current rate of burning fossil fuels adds about 2 ppm per year to the atmosphere, so that getting from the current level to 1000 ppm would take about 300 years—and 1000 ppm is still less than what most plants would prefer, and much less than either the nasa or the Navy limit for human beings.

Yet there are strident calls for immediately stopping further increases in CO2 levels and reducing the current level. As we have discussed, animals would not even notice a doubling of CO2 and plants would love it. The supposed reason for limiting it is to stop global warming—or, since the predicted warming has failed to be nearly as large as computer models forecast, to stop climate change. Climate change itself has been embarrassingly uneventful, so another rationale for reducing CO2 is now promoted: to stop the hypothetical increase of extreme climate events like hurricanes or tornados. But this does not necessarily follow. The frequency of extreme events has either not changed or has decreased in the 150 years that CO2 levels have increased from 270 to 390 ppm.

Let me turn to some of the problems the non-pollutant CO2 is supposed to cause. More CO2 is supposed to cause flooded cities, parched agriculture, tropical diseases in Alaska, etc., and even an epidemic of kidney stones. It does indeed cause some warming of our planet, and we should thank Providence for that, because without the greenhouse warming of CO2 and its more potent partners, water vapor and clouds, the earth would be too cold to sustain its current abundance of life.

Other things being equal, more CO2 will cause more warming. The question is how much warming, and whether the increased CO2 and the warming it causes will be good or bad for the planet.

The argument starts something like this. CO2 levels have increased from about 280 ppm to 390 ppm over the past 150 years or so, and the earth has warmed by about 0.8 degree Celsius during that time. Therefore the warming is due to CO2. But **correlation is not causation**. Roosters crow every morning at sunrise, but that does not mean the rooster caused the sun to rise. The sun will still rise on Monday if you decide to have the rooster for Sunday dinner.

There have been many warmings and coolings in the past when the CO2 levels did not change. A well-known example is the medieval warming, about the year 1000, when the Vikings settled Greenland (when it was green) and wine was exported from England. This warm period was followed by the “little ice age” when the Thames would frequently freeze over during the winter. **There is no evidence for significant increase of CO2 in the medieval warm period, nor for a significant decrease at the time of the subsequent little ice age.** Documented famines with millions of deaths occurred during the little ice age because the cold weather killed the crops. Since the end of the little ice age, the earth has been warming in fits and starts, and humanity’s quality of life has improved accordingly.

A rare case of good correlation between CO2 levels and temperature is provided by ice-core records of the cycles of glacial and interglacial periods of the last million years of so. But these records show that **changes in temperature preceded changes in CO2 levels, so that the levels were an effect of temperature changes**. This was probably due to outgassing of CO2 from the warming oceans and the reverse effect when they cooled.

#### No extinction – empirically denied

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On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

### Prolif

#### The US can’t prevent proliferation.

Mez, ‘12

[Lutz, senior Associate Professor at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Freie Universität Berlin, and managing director of the Environmental Policy Research Centre, “Nuclear energy – any solution for sustainability and climate protection?” Energy Policy, Science Direct]

Viewed in historical terms, military use of nuclear energy has gone hand in hand with the development of civil nuclear technology, because most countries attached first priority to the development of nuclear weapons and other military uses, with production of energy in nuclear power plants at first only being a waste product. This by-product developed its own momentum, however: nuclear power became an icon for clean, highly modern technology and technological progress. Moreover, it was a risk-free, highly profitable business for operators of plants because governments paid considerable sums in subsidies and producers could pass on costs to electrical power customers. Branches of the economy which are the most intensive users of electrical power profited from cheap nuclear power —as did the militaries in countries with nuclear weapons—because civil nuclear facilities offer many possibilities for military use.¶ The borderlines between military and civil nuclear technology and thus between war and peace are often hazy (Mez et al., 2010). In order to minimize the risks of military use, regulation of civil use of nuclear energy have been contemplated within a multilateral framework for some time. The idea of establishing an international atomic energy agency (IAEA), to which states are to transfer uranium stocks and other fissionable material, was proposed by former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Atoms for Peace speech3 as far back as 1953 and during the first Geneva atomic conference in 1955. The purpose of the IAEA was to develop methods to ensure that fissionable nuclear material can be used by humankind in a peaceful manner—in agriculture, medicine and energy production for countries and regions of the world with limited energy resources. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970, constituted an attempt to prevent nuclear beggarsfrom becoming nuclear powers through civil nuclear technology transfer. In reality, however, a series of countries including Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have obtained nuclear weapons under the pretext of civil use of nuclear power, while other countries such as Iran are accused of having this same intention. This development shows that it is difficult to prevent nuclear weapons from being built and that there is a great likelihood that more and more countries will obtain nuclear capabilities in the future. When a nuclear infrastructure is in place and the basic material for weapons is being produced in facilities for enrichment or reprocessing—in military reactors, dual-purpose reactors or fast breeder-reactors—then it is merely a question of political will and willingness to invest in nuclear technology which decides whether a country develops nuclear weapons or not.

#### Nuclear leadership is impossible -- US arsenal creates hypocrisy and international resentment.

Perkovich, ‘8

[George, vice president for studies and director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” October, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons.pdf]

This Brief summarizes four security interests that would be served by making the longterm project of abolishing nuclear weapons a central purpose of U.S. policy: preventing proliferation; preventing nuclear terrorism; reducing toward zero the unique threat of nuclear annihilation; and fostering optimism regarding U.S. global leadership. Each of these objectives can be (and has been) pursued without the larger purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons. However, the chances of success will steadily diminish if the few nuclear-armed states try to perpetuate a discriminatory order based on haves and have-nots and if they enforce it firmly against some states and hollowly against others. Such inequity breeds noncooperation and resistance when what is needed now is cooperation to prevent proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and the failure of deterrence. Why should everyone cooperate in enforcing a system that looks like it was designed to favor just a few?

#### No domino theory—nonproliferation has zero utility

**Potter 8** William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Summer 2008, Divining Nuclear Intentions, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v033/33.1.potter.pdf

Hymans is keenly aware of the deficiency of past proliferation projections, which he attributes in large part to the “tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general ‘roguishness’ of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions” (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.49¶Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear.”50 As he points out, **the new domino theory, like its discredited** Cold War **predecessor**, **assumes an oversimplified view about** why and how **decisions** to acquire nuclear weapons are taken.51 **Leaders’** nuclear **preferences**, he maintains, “**are not** highly **contingent on what other states** decide,” and, therefore, “proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states” (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces “an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self assertive ones,” and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisonmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a “ticket to international status”; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters.¶ As discussed earlier, Hymans argues that the need for a nuclear deterrent is entirely in the eye of the beholder—a leader with an oppositional nationalist NIC. By the same token, **just because some** leader**s seek** to achieveinternationalprestige through acquisition of the bomb, **it does not mean** that **other leaders** “necessarily **view the bomb as the right ticket** to punch”: witness the case of several decades of Argentine leaders, as well as the Indian Nehruvians (pp. 211212). The case of Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat, though not discussed by Hymans, also seems to at this category.¶ Hymans’s focus on the individual level of analysis leads him to discount bureaucratic political explanations for nuclear postures, as well. Central to his argument is the assumption that decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken “without the considerable vetting that political scientists typically assume precedes most important states choices” (p. 13). As such, **although** he is prepared to credit **nuclear energy bureaucracies** as **play**ing **a** supporting **role** in the ef forts by Australia, France, and India to go nuclear, **he does not observetheir influence to be a determining factor** in root nuclear decisions by national lead ers. Moreover, contrary to a central premise of Solingen’s model of domestic political survival, Hymans ands little evidence in his case studies of leaders pursuing nuclear weapons to advance their political interests (p. 213). For ex ample, he argues, the 1998 nuclear tests in India were as risky domestically for Vajpayee as they were internationally (p. 214).¶ Most provocatively, Hymans invokes an individual-centric mode of analysis to challenge the necessity and utility of a strong international nonproliferation regime. As discussed in a preceding section, **he finds no evidencethat the NPT** regime **prevented any**of the **leaders** who desired nuclear weapons **from pursuing them**.

#### Won’t happen – too expensive and controversial

**Tepperman 09** - former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek (Jonathon, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb”, 44:154, 9-7)

The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; **that's spread at glacial pace**." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

#### No motive—low odds of success deter and capabilities are underutilized

**Moodie 2** – president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (Brad Roberts and Michael Moodie, Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/DefHor/DH15/DH15.htm)

The argument about terrorist motivation is also important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing. This restraint seems to derive from an **understanding of mass casualty attacks as** both unnecessary and **counterproductive**. They are unnecessary because terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means. Also, they are counterproductive because they might alienate key constituencies, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins’ famous words, terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that “it’s not a matter of if but when.”

The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties— had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden’s constituency would appear to be not the “Arab street” or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal.

But this debate cannot be considered settled. Bin Laden and his followers could have killed many more on September 11 if killing as many as possible had been their primary objective. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged—militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. To kill millions in America with biological or other weapons would only commit the United States—and much of the rest of the international community—to the annihilation of the perpetrators.

#### Terrorism is low probability and low impact – can be contained and prevented

**Gross and Gilles 4/23** – director of Internet Communications for Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign, and director of Sol Kula Healing (April 23 2012, Matthey Barrett and Mel, “How Apocalyptic Thinking Prevents Us from Taking Political Action,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-perils-of-apocalyptic-thinking/255758/>, mrs)

Nothing inspires fear like the end of the world, and ever since Y2K, the media's tendency toward overwrought speculation has been increasingly married to the rhetoric of apocalypse. Today, nearly any event can be explained through apocalyptic language, from birds falling out of the sky (the Birdocalypse?) to a major nor'easter (Snowmageddon!) to a double-dip recession (Barackalypse! Obamageddon!). Armageddon is here at last -- and your local news team is live on the scene! We've seen the equivalent of grade inflation (A for Apocalypse!) for every social, political, or ecological challenge before us, an escalating game of one-upmanship to gain the public's attention. Why worry about global warming and rising sea levels when the collapse of the housing bubble has already put your mortgage underwater? Why worry that increasing droughts will threaten the supply of drinking water in America's major cities when a far greater threat lies in the possibility of an Arab terrorist poisoning that drinking supply, resulting in millions of casualties?

Yet not all of the crises or potential threats before us are equal, nor are they equally probable -- a fact that gets glossed over when the media equate the remote threat of a possible event, like epidemics, with real trends like global warming.

Over the last decade, the 24-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes -- or in our neighborhoods. For example, **after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents**. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000 -- compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder. The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype.

This over-reliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat?

In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media portrays as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster -- from meteor impacts to supervolcanic eruptions -- are **extraordinarily** rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true -- their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable.

#### Thorium doesn’t solve prolif-uses fissile material in every part of its fuel cycle

**Makhijani and Boyd 9 \***Dr. Arjun Makhijani is President of the [Institute for Energy and Environmental Research](http://www.ieer.org/). He holds a Ph.D. in engineering (specialization: nuclear fusion) from the University of California at Berkeley [http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/thorium2009factsheet.pdf, Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power]

Thorium is not actually a “fuel” because it is not fissile and therefore cannot be used to start or sustain a nuclear chain reaction. A fissile material, such as uranium-235 (U-235) or plutonium-239 (which is made in reactors from uranium-238), is required to kick-start the reaction. The enriched uranium fuel or plutonium fuel also maintains the chain reaction until enough of the thorium target material has been converted into fissile uranium-233 (U-233) to take over much or most of the job. An advantage of thorium is that it absorbs slow neutrons relatively efficiently (compared to uranium-238) to produce fissile uranium-233. ¶ The use of enriched uranium or plutonium in thorium fuel has proliferation implications. Although U-235 is found in nature, it is only 0.7 percent of natural uranium, so the proportion of U-235 must be industrially increased to make “enriched uranium” for use in reactors. Highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are nuclear weapons materials. ¶ In addition, U-233 is as effective as plutonium-239 for making nuclear bombs. In most proposed thorium fuel cycles, reprocessing is required to separate out the U-233 for use in fresh fuel. This means that, like uranium fuel with reprocessing, bomb-making material is separated out, making it vulnerable to theft or diversion. Some proposed thorium fuel cycles even require 20% enriched uranium in order to get the chain reaction started in existing reactors using thorium fuel. It takes 90% enrichment to make weapons-usable¶ uranium, but very little additional work is needed to move from 20% enrichment to 90% enrichment. Most of the separative work is needed to go from natural uranium, which has 0.7% uranium-235, to 20% U-235. ¶ It has been claimed that thorium fuel cycles with reprocessing would be much less of a proliferation risk because the thorium can be mixed with uranium-238. In this case, fissile uranium-233 is also mixed with non-fissile uranium-238. The claim is that if the uranium-238 content is high enough, the mixture cannot be used to make bombs without a complex uranium enrichment plant. This is misleading. More uranium-238 does dilute the uranium-233, but it also results in the production of more plutonium-239 as the reactor operates. So the proliferation problem remains – either bomb-usable uranium-233 or bomb-useable plutonium is created and can be separated out by reprocessing. ¶ Further, while an enrichment plant is needed to separate U-233 from U-238, it would take less separative work to do so than enriching natural uranium. This is because U-233 is five atomic weight units lighter than U-238, compared to only three for U-235. It is true that such enrichment would not be a straightforward matter because the U-233 is contaminated with U-232, which is highly radioactive and has very radioactive radionuclides in its decay chain. The radiation-dose-related problems associated with separating U-233 from U-238 and then handling the U-233 would be considerable and more complex than enriching natural uranium for the purpose of bomb making. But in principle, the separation can be done, especially if worker safety is not a primary concern; the resulting U-233 can be used to make bombs. There is just no way to avoid proliferation problems associated with thorium fuel cycles that involve reprocessing. Thorium fuel cycles without reprocessing would offer the same temptation to reprocess as today’s once-through uranium fuel cycles.¶

#### Thorium waste can be weaponized

**FEA no date** \*Friends of the Earth Australia is a group that campaigns for environmental sustainability [http://www.foe.org.au/anti-nuclear/issues/nfc/power-weapons/thorium, “thorium and wmd proliferation risks”]

Thorium fuel cycles are promoted on the grounds that they pose less of a proliferation risk compared to conventional reactors. However, whether there is any significant non-proliferation advantage depends on the design of the various thorium-based systems. No thorium system would negate proliferation risks altogether.¶ Neutron bombardment of thorium (indirectly) produces uranium-233, a fissile material which can be used in nuclear weapons (1 Significant Quantity of U-233 = 8kg).¶ The USA has successfully tested weapon/s using uranium-233 cores. India may be interested in the military potential of thorium/uranium-233 in addition to civil applications. India is refusing to allow safeguards to apply to its entire 'advanced' thorium/plutonium fuel cycle, stongly suggesting a military dimension.¶ The possible use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to initiate a thorium-232/uranium-233 reaction, or proposed systems using thorium in conjunction with HEU or plutonium as fuel, present risks of diversion of HEU or plutonium for weapons production as well as providing a rationale for the ongoing operation of dual-use enrichment and reprocessing plants.¶ Thorium fuelled reactors could also be used to irradiate uranium to produce weapon grade plutonium.

### Solvency

#### Don’t buy the hype – their authors are lobbyists and thorium’s not feasible or inevitable

**Guardian 11** [Eifion Rees for The Ecologist, June 23, 2011, Guardian Environment Network, “Don't believe the spin on thorium being a greener nuclear option”]

The pro-thorium lobby claim a single tonne of thorium burned in a molten salt reactor (MSR) – typically a liquid fluoride thorium reactor (LFTR) – which has liquid rather than solid fuel, can produce one gigawatt of energy. A traditional pressurised water reactor (PWR) would need to burn 250 tonnes of uranium to produce the same amount of energy.¶ They also produce less waste, have no weapons-grade by-products, can consume legacy plutonium stockpiles and are meltdown-proof – if the hype is to be believed.¶ India certainly has faith, with a burgeoning population, chronic electricity shortage, few friends on the global nuclear stage (it hasn't signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty) and the world's largest reserves of thorium. 'Green' nuclear could help defuse opposition at home (the approval of two new traditional nuclear power reactors on its west coast led to fierce protests recently) and allow it to push ahead unhindered with its stated aim of generating 270GW of energy from nuclear by 2050.¶ China, Russia, France and the US are also pursuing the technology, while India's department of atomic energy and the UK's Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council are jointly funding five UK research programmes into it.¶ There is a significant sticking point to the promotion of thorium as the 'great green hope' of clean energy production: it remains unproven on a commercial scale. While it has been around since the 1950s (and an experimental 10MW LFTR did run for five years during the 1960s at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the US, though using uranium and plutonium as fuel) it is still a next generation nuclear technology – theoretical.¶ China did announce this year that it intended to develop a thorium MSR, but nuclear radiologist Peter Karamoskos, of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), says the world shouldn't hold its breath.¶ 'Without exception, [thorium reactors] have never been commercially viable, nor do any of the intended new designs even remotely seem to be viable. Like all nuclear power production they rely on extensive taxpayer subsidies; the only difference is that with thorium and other breeder reactors these are of an order of magnitude greater, which is why no government has ever continued their funding.'¶ China's development will persist until it experiences the ongoing major technical hurdles the rest of the nuclear club have discovered, he says.¶ Others see thorium as a smokescreen to perpetuate the status quo: the world's only operating thorium reactor – India's Kakrapar-1 – is actually a converted PWR, for example. 'This could be seen to excuse the continued use of PWRs until thorium is [widely] available,' points out Peter Rowberry of No Money for Nuclear (NM4N) and Communities Against Nuclear Expansion (CANE).¶ In his reading, thorium is merely a way of deflecting attention and criticism from the dangers of the uranium fuel cycle and excusing the pumping of more money into the industry.¶ And yet the nuclear industry itself is also sceptical, with none of the big players backing what should be – in PR terms and in a post-Fukushima world – its radioactive holy grail: safe reactors producing more energy for less and cheaper fuel.¶ In fact, a 2010 National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) report (PDF)concluded the thorium fuel cycle 'does not currently have a role to play in the UK context [and] is likely to have only a limited role internationally for some years ahead' – in short, it concluded, the claims for thorium were 'overstated'.

#### Doesn’t solve waste

**Guardian 11** [Eifion Rees for The Ecologist, June 23, 2011, Guardian Environment Network, “Don't believe the spin on thorium being a greener nuclear option”]

All other issues aside, thorium is still nuclear energy, say environmentalists, its reactors disgorging the same toxic byproducts and fissile waste with the same millennial half-lives. Oliver Tickell, author of Kyoto2, says the fission materials produced from thorium are of a different spectrum to those from uranium-235, but 'include many dangerous-to-health alpha and beta emitters'.¶ Tickell says thorium reactors would not reduce the volume of waste from uranium reactors. 'It will create a whole new volume of radioactive waste from previously radio-inert thorium, on top of the waste from uranium reactors. Looked at in these terms, it's a way of multiplying the volume of radioactive waste humanity can create several times over.'¶ Putative waste benefits – such as the impressive claims made by former Nasa scientist Kirk Sorensen, one of thorium's staunchest advocates – have the potential to be outweighed by a proliferating number of MSRs. There are already 442 traditional reactors already in operation globally, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The by-products of thousands of smaller, ostensibly less wasteful reactors would soon add up.

#### That dooms investment

**Gray 12** [Feb 14, “A Strong Step, but Hurdles Remain” By Chuck Gray Executive Director, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, khirn]

A predictable investment climate can lead to stable rates. At the end of the day, we hope the big winners are the consumers who pay for the bulk of building these plants. Still, the industry has several hurdles to clear before we can call this a full-blown “renaissance.” The biggest hurdle now is getting potential investors to look at the operating life of a nuclear plant—likely to be 60 years—and be confident that it will prove a good economic choice. With the current excitement over suddenly abundant shale gas, there may be a tendency to believe natural gas prices will remain a lower cost option.Another hurdle is that the nation’s nuclear-waste policy remains at an impasse. Despite the billions consumers have paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund for three decades, we are perhaps further from a solution than we were in 1982, when Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The recent report from the Blue Ribbon Commission of America’s Nuclear Future offered numerous positive recommendations. NARUC, in a resolution approved last week, supports many of them, particularly the proposals that reform the Nuclear Waste Fund. Many of the BRC’s solutions require congressional action, no sure bet in any political atmosphere, and certainly an unlikely one now. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, speaking to us at our Winter Committee Meetings last week, said she is working with Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chair Jeff Bingaman on legislation on the BRC recommendations

#### Tech is 40 years away

**NNL 10** \*The UK National Nuclear Laboratory [http://ripassetseu.s3.amazonaws.com/www.nnl.co.uk/\_files/documents/aug\_11/NNL\_\_1314092891\_Thorium\_Cycle\_Position\_Paper.pdf, “The Thorium Fuel Cycle” August 2010]

In the foreseeable future (up to the next 20 years), the only realistic prospect for deploying thorium fuels on a commercial basis would be in existing and new build LWRs (e.g., AP1000 and EPR) or PHWRs (e.g., Candu reactors). Thorium fuel concepts which require first the construction of new reactor types (such as High Temperature Reactor (HTR), fast reactors and Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS)) are regarded as viable only in the much longer term (of the order of 40+ years minimum) as this is the length of time before these reactors are expected to be designed, built and reach commercial maturity. While there will be differences in detail between the performance of thorium fuels in LWRs and PHWRs due to the different irradiation times and environment, any benefits are considered roughly comparable. Although thorium fuels in LWRs have to date progressed to a later stage of development than in PHWRs, the LWR experience is now very dated and is less relevant to current and foreseeable future requirements. The lead times for LWR and PHWR implementation are therefore considered comparable. NNL’s view is that significant R&D investment will still be required and the timescale to commercial readiness even in existing reactors will be long.

#### Empirics proves increasing incentives fails -- it can’t overcome huge obstacles to nuclear construction.

**Slocum, ‘12**

[Tyson, director of Public Citizen’s Energy Program, 2-3, “We Can't Afford to Expand Nuclear Power,” http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-nuclear-power-be-expanded/we-cant-afford-to-expand-nuclear-power]

In recent years, industry-driven legislative efforts—most notably the sweep of incentives for nuclear power in the 2005 Energy Policy Act—have been implemented to jump-start the nuclear industry, but even that mountain of money and regulatory rollbacks can't do the impossible: build a nuclear power plant affordably, safely, or timely and find a solution to the thousands of tons of highly radioactive waste. From loan guarantees to charging ratepayers up front for the cost of construction, to liability protections from Fukushima-style accidents, the industry has been unable to bring a new reactor online. Why? Because even with all this taxpayer help, it's still too costly. Photovoltaic solar this year will break the dollar-per-watt barrier, ushering in a rooftop revolution of cheap, clean, and consumer-owned energy. In addition to turning our buildings into power stations, investing in making our structures more energy-efficient remains the most cost-effective energy investment. Energy-efficiency programs can displace 23 percent of projected demand and provide a huge return for consumers. Charging taxpayers billions of dollars to bring a new reactor online wipes out any incentives to invest in these programs and suppresses local renewable projects that could bring green jobs and advance U.S. leadership in clean energy technology.

## 2nc elections

### Overview

#### Romney tanks warming policy

**Wood, 9/6**/12 – AOL Energy (Elisa, “Renewable Energy: More, Less or the Same under Obama or Romney?,”

<http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/06/renewable-energy-more-less-or-the-same-under-obama-or-romney/>)

For renewable energy, the 2012 presidential race reveals the downside of being championed.

President Barack Obama channeled a historic amount of money into green energy in his first term and made it a centerpiece of his jobs platform. As a result, renewable energy is big target for those taking aim at Obama.

"Because the Obama White House has made renewable energy an important part of the focus, it has become important for the other side to beat it up," said Arno Harris, CEO of Recurrent Energy and board chairman of the Solar Energy Industries Association.

The brawl is at times colorful with quips from both sides about powering cars with windmills – or maybe dogs – on their roofs. Romney's jabbed that Obama thinks he can turn back the rising oceans. And 'Solyndra' has become the 'Halliburton' of this election: a single company name that one party uses to try to encapsulate all they see wrong with the other.

Jokes and hyperbole aside, how far apart are Romney and Obama on renewables?

"There is a real difference in policy," said Andrew Holland, senior fellow for energy and climate at the American Security Project. "Romney, and now Paul Ryan [Romney's vice presidential running mate], are quite anti-renewable energy."

Romney hasn't abandoned renewable energy. But he's also not pursuing it with the same "purposefulness," according to Dan Berwick, director of policy and business development at Borrego Solar.

To Incentivize or not to Incentivize?

In his nomination acceptance at the Republican National Convention, Romney included renewables in the list of energy resources North America must take "full advantage of" to reach energy independence. However, Romney promotes few of the market incentives the industry now enjoys. He describes a more narrow federal role, one where funding goes to basic research.

#### Obama key to environmental leadership

Walter and Nan Simpson, 4-22-2012; Walter, University Energy Officer for 26 years and was director of the UB Green Office at the University at Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo); Buffalo News

http://www.buffalonews.com/editorial-page/viewpoints/article822432.ece

Let’s not reverse progress While Obama has not yet delivered on some environmental priorities, his environmental record is solid in many areas. He appears to be committed to addressing environmental problems in a meaningful way within the constraints of what he views as politically possible. Obama’s re-election offers the promise of continuing his pro-environment programs and the hope he will do more in his second term. Cleaner air, water and energy mean tens of thousands of green jobs with improved public health outcomes that reduce health care costs. The president understands this win-win. Additionally, Obama is likely to do more on climate change in a second term if re-elected with a Democratic Congress and an increasingly informed public demanding action on this life-and-death issue. None of this will happen if Romney is elected our next president. Worse, given the GOP’s radical turn, a Republican victory would take us in reverse — undermining and eliminating laws and regulations that now protect our environment and public health. The critically important environmental vote goes to Obama.

#### Russian relations prevent global nuclear war and nuclear terrorism and Iran crisis—now key

**NTI 9** [Global Security Newswire, “Russia Open to U.S. Suggestions on Improving Relations, Curbing Iran” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090318\_4374.php 3/19]

Russian leaders have shown an interest in improving ... outcome," the report adds (Nixon Center release, March 16).

Russian leaders have shown an interest in improving relations with Washington, a thaw that could enable the two former Cold War rivals to cooperate more closely on efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, the Washington Post reported today (see GSN, March 16).

The two nations experienced growing tensions during the Bush administration as they disagreed over a variety of international security issues, particularly a U.S. plan to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe as a hedge against potential Iranian missile threats. Regarding Iran, Russia has cautiously supported some U.N. Security Council resolutions setting mild sanctions against Iran for its refusal to freeze its uranium enrichment program, but Moscow scuttled U.S. efforts last year to boost those penalties.

Trying to change the climate, U.S. President Barack Obama has sent his counterpart a letter seeking a packaged solution to U.S.-Russian disputes, and Moscow appears interested, according to some analysts and officials.

Russian officials "want to send a message to the Obama administration that they're prepared to have a new relationship, but it will have to be quid pro quo," said Dmitri Simes, president of the Washington-based Nixon Center. "If they have to sacrifice their special relationship with Iran, they want to see a change in their relationship with the United States" (Pan/DeYoung, Washington Post, March 18).

Simes directed a commission that called on the Obama administration this week to recognize the importance of good Russian relations to a breadth of international issues, including the Iranian nuclear crisis.

"Without deep Russian cooperation, no strategy is likely to succeed in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war," says the commission report. "Working with Moscow to solve the Iran problem, including possibly strengthening sanctions on Iran if necessary, should be a top U.S. priority."

"However, America is unlikely to be able to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue solely through sanctions, and Russia's cooperation could contribute substantially to a successful outcome," the report adds (Nixon Center release, March 16).

#### Spoiler alert

**Allison and Blackwill, 10/30**/11 – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67178.html

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies.

No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow.

First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.

Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose.

Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success.

Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups.

Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries.

Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps.

Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order.

Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is **vital to the U.S. economy**.

Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin.

Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

#### Outweighs the aff

**Bostrom 2002** (Nick Bostrom, 2002. Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale. "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

**Iran prolif turns the aff – two reasons**

#### Global uncontrollable prolif

Ryan **Mauro**, 4-15-20**11**; Director of Intelligence at IWIC, The Middle Eastern Nuclear Domino, http://frontpagemag.com/2011/04/15/the-middle-eastern-nuclear-domino/print/

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is forcing its enemies in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, to also consider acquiring them to counter the threat. A Middle East nuclear arms race will soon begin that could quickly spiral out of country and spread beyond the region. Arnaud de Borchgrave has brought attention to a significant statement by Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former chief of Saudi intelligence, at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies. He called on the Gulf Cooperation Council, which consists of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, to create a united army and to begin “acquiring the nuclear might to face that of Iran.” This is the first time that an influential member of the Saudi Royal Family has called for beginning a nuclear weapons program, which is undoubtedly what he was referring to. It has been long rumored that Saudi Arabia agreed to finance the Pakistani nuclear weapons program in return for a guarantee that weapons and delivery systems would be provided if the need arose. A 2003 report gave credence to these rumors, alleging that the Saudis agreed to give the Pakistanis cheap oil in return for access to their nuclear technology. Notably, in 1999, Prince Sultan Bin Abdul-Aziz visited Pakistan’s uranium enrichment and missile factory at Kahuta, as did officials from the United Arab Emirates on a separate trip. According to GlobalSecurity.org, the Saudis have the necessary infrastructure to quickly start-up a nuclear weapons program. “While there is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has chosen a nuclear option, the Saudis have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent,” it says. In 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed that several Arab countries were expressing an interest in a domestic nuclear energy program; the oft-used front for working on weapons. These countries included Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt—all enemies of Iran. Jordan has also begun a nuclear program and has sought help from the Obama Administration in developing it. It is unclear who will lead Egypt after elections are held in September, but the Mubarak regime was not shy about telling U.S. officials off-the-record that it was ready to develop nuclear weapons if Iran is not stopped. One cable released by Wikileaks from May 2008 stated that “Mubarak said that Egypt might be forced to begin its own nuclear weapons program if Iran succeeds in those efforts.” He also said in 2007, “We don’t want nuclear weapons in the area, but we are obligated to defend ourselves…We will have to have the appropriate weapons.” Another contributing factor to the upcoming arms race is Iran’s desire to share its technology with its allies. Ayatollah Khamenei was in Khartoum when he said in 2006 that Iran would be willing to share its nuclear technology with Islamic countries. Sudan is now hoping to open a nuclear reactor by 2020 while President Bashir transforms it into a full-fledged Sharia-based state. Agents of Sudan have contacted those that belonged to the Abdul-Qadeer Khan nuclear trafficking ring, as have representatives of Iran, North Korea, Syria, Nigeria and Burma. A U.S. official said “they have propositioned them to get them to come out of retirement.” Iran’s closest ally, Syria, also has a nuclear program and is likely to be a recipient of Iranian assistance. Its North Korean-designed nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israel in September 2007 would have been able to make enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs per year once fully operational. The Syrian government continues to obstruct the IAEA’s investigation into the purpose of the site and has not provided an adequate explanation for traces of uranium discovered by the agency. Last month, Syria finally agreed to allow the IAEA to visit a fertilizer plant in Homs suspected of being connected to the nuclear program but access is still being denied to other sites. Another site has just been discovered near Damascus that is thought to be related to uranium conversion. Another possible beneficiary of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is Venezuela. Hugo Chavez has been secretly assisting the Iranian nuclear program, openly discussing the possibility of opening up a “nuclear village” and signing deals related to uranium exploration. In November 2008, an Iranian government company was given permission to mine for gold in Venezuela in an area that also holds one of the largest deposits of uranium on the planet. An Israeli intelligence report alleges that Venezuela is already providing Iran with much-needed raw uranium. Hugo Chavez has talked openly about his desire to start his own “civilian” nuclear program. This would cause immense fear in countries threatened by him like Colombia that could result in a similar domino effect. The nuclear arms race will even extend into Asia. North Korea is believed to be helping the Burmese junta pursue nuclear weapons and the country could provide Iran with uranium in return for nuclear technology. The Democratic Voice of Burma has obtained a pile of secret documents and photographs exposing the secret nuclear program that is believed to have cost Burma $3.5 billion since 2001. One Burmese defector claims he met with an Iranian nuclear scientist and intelligence officer in February 2004 to discuss transfers of uranium yellowcake. As with Venezuela, this development could also spark a regional nuclear arms race as neighbors like Thailand feel vulnerable. The affects of a nuclear Iran are hard to fathom. Its Arab enemies are ready to develop, at the least, the capacity for nuclear break-out that enables them to quickly produce weapons. The Iranian regime is unlikely to hold its technology from its allies, broadening the nuclear arms race to other continents**. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons** or even the capacity to quickly produce them, **it won’t change just the Middle East.** **It will change the world**.

#### Tanks all international credibility and makes every impact more likely and dangerous

**Lindsay and Takeyh** 20**10** (James M. Lindsay is Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. After Iran Gets the Bomb, Foreign Affairs, Mar/ April

The dangers of Iran's entry into the nuclear club are well known: emboldened by this development, Tehran might multiply its attempts at subverting its neighbors and **encouraging terrorism** against the United States and Israel; the risk of both conventional and nuclear war in the Middle East would escalate; more states in the region might also want to become nuclear powers; the geopolitical balance in the Middle East would be reordered; and broader efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons would be undermined. **The advent of a nuclear Iran** -- even one that is satisfied with having only the materials and infrastructure necessary to assemble a bomb on short notice rather than a nuclear arsenal -- **would be seen as a major diplomatic defeat** for the United States. **Friends and foes would openly question the U.S. government's power and resolve** to shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively.

### Uniqueness

#### Conclusive lead despite alleged narrowing

**Silver, 10/2**/12 – statistician (Nate, “Is the Presidential Race Tightening Heading Into the Debates?”

http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/oct-1-is-the-presidential-race-tightening-heading-into-the-debates/?utm\_source=twitterfeed&utm\_medium=twitter

There were nine national polls published on Monday, which are listed in the table below. On average, they showed Mr. Obama with a 3.5 percentage point lead over Mr. Romney. That’s smaller than the leads we were seeing in national polls last week, which seemed to be concentrated more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama. It also suggests a smaller lead than recent state-by-state polls seem to imply. So has the race already shifted back toward Mr. Romney some? Perhaps, but this is less apparent from the trendlines within these polls. If you compare the nine surveys released on Monday against the last time they were published (in all cases, the comparison poll postdates the Democratic conventions), only four showed a shift toward Mr. Romney. An equal number, four, showed Mr. Obama gaining ground instead, while one poll remained unchanged. In all cases but one, the shift was extremely modest — within one percentage point in one direction or the other. The exception was a new CNN national poll, which had Mr. Romney closing his deficit from six points to three points. On average, however, the polls showed only a 0.2 percentage point gain for Mr. Romney — not a meaningful shift in either a statistical or a practical sense. And yet this simple version a trendline analysis does not tell the whole story either. Mr. Romney had appeared to lose further ground in the polls following the public release of his “47 percent” comments. All of polls that are used for comparison were released after the Democratic convention, but some predated the “47 percent” tape. It’s good for Mr. Romney that his national numbers on Monday looked more like those from just after the Democratic convention, when they weren’t great, rather than those from the past week or two, when they were worse. The FiveThirtyEight forecast model can account for these various contingencies, looking at exactly when the prior editions of a survey were released in order to calculate the consensus trendline. Viewed in this way, the national polls on Monday did contain modestly good news for Mr. Romney. But that doesn’t tell the whole story either, because there has also been a large volume of state polls released over the past day or two. Those polls can also be informative about the trend in the race. And in the state polls, it’s been harder to find evidence for a favorable trend for Mr. Romney. If anything, the opposite seems to be true. This was particularly the case in a University of New Hampshire survey published on Monday, which had Mr. Obama leading by 15 points in the Granite State — up from just a five-point lead in a poll taken just after the Democratic convention. The University of New Hampshire poll has a history of being fairly volatile, perhaps in part because voters in New Hampshire can be fickle with their political opinions. The poll certainly qualifies as an outlier relative to the consensus evidence in New Hampshire. At the same time, it’s not the kind of thing you’d expect to see if Mr. Romney were gaining ground in the race. Mr. Obama, not Mr. Romney, has also gotten highly favorable trendlines in a recent set of state-by-state polls released by the firm We Ask America, many of which show him with a considerably larger lead than he had before the conventions in those same states. The gap between state polls and national polls, which looked to have narrowed some last week, seems to be widening again. Perhaps appropriately given the mixed evidence on Monday, the FiveThirtyEight models produced something of a split verdict. Mr. Obama came off his highs in our “now-cast,” which projects what would happen if the election were held today. That version of the model had previously given Mr. Obama a 5.9 percentage lead in the national race, but it declined to 5.5 percentage points on Monday. Why are these “now-cast” numbers higher than the most recent national polls seem to suggest? In part because of the factor that I mentioned before — the “now-cast” uses state polls along with national polls to calculate its estimate of the national popular vote, and the state polls are a bit stronger for Mr. Obama. Also, last week’s national polls, which were more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama, still have some influence upon it. The Nov. 6 forecast, however, our signature product, is already assuming that Mr. Obama’s numbers will decline some, in large part, because it continues to weigh economic factors along with the polls. Those economic factors, in view of the formula, are more in line with only a very narrow win for Mr. Obama, on the order of two or three percentage points, similar to the margin by which George W. Bush defeated John Kerry in 2004. As we get closer and closer to the election, these economic factors will receive less weight, until they phase out completely by Election Day. But they continue to exert some influence on the forecast for the time being. In the Nov. 6 forecast, Mr. Obama’s projected margin of victory in the popular vote declined to 4.1 percentage points from 4.2. However, his probability of winning the Electoral College increased by a trivial amount, to 85.7 percent from 85.1.

#### Only that assumes cellphone users

**Silver, 9/19**/12 – statistician, editor of the NYT Fivethirtyeight blog (Nate, “Obama’s Lead Looks Stronger in Polls That Include Cellphones” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/obamas-lead-looks-stronger-in-polls-that-include-cellphones/#more-34740)

As I observed on Tuesday, and as The New Republic’s Nate Cohn also found, Barack Obama seems to have received a much clearer bounce in some types of polls than others. Although there are exceptions on either side, like the Gallup national tracking poll, for the most part Mr. Obama seems to be getting stronger results in polls that use live interviewers and that include cellphones in their samples — enough to suggest that he has a clear advantage in the race. In the polls that use an automated dialing method (“robopolls”) or which exclude cellphones, Mr. Obama’s bounce has been much harder to discern, and the race looks considerably closer. The difference seems especially pronounced at the state level. Mr. Obama got very strong results in a series of NBC News/Marist College polls last week in Ohio, Florida and Virginia, which included cellphones and used live interviewers. Likewise, Tuesday morning’s series of New York Times / CBS News / Quinnipiac polls had reasonably good news for Mr. Obama in Virginia and Wisconsin. By contrast, the automated polling firm Rasmussen Reports has recently released polls showing Mr. Obama two points behind Mitt Romney in New Hampshire and three points behind in Colorado — the worst results that it has shown for him in those states all year. Another automated polling firm, Gravis Marketing, recently put Mr. Obama at a five-point deficit in Virginia, in contrast to three traditional polls that put him ahead by margins ranging from four to eight points there. A third automated polling firm, Public Policy Polling, has shown stronger results for Mr. Obama, but they also had him with good results before the conventions, and so haven’t shown him gaining much ground. These results are consistent with some past research. Roughly one third of American households rely solely on mobile phones and do not have landlines, meaning they will simply be excluded by polls that call landlines only. Potential voters who rely on cellphones belong to more Democratic-leaning demographic groups than those which don’t, and there is reasonably strong empirical evidence that the failure to include them in polls can bias the results against Democrats, even after demographic weightings are applied. We keep track of which polling firms include cellphones in their samples and which do not. So on Monday night, I decided to run two alternate versions of the FiveThirtyEight forecast. (Note that all results are based on polls that were in our database as of Monday night, and so will not include Tuesday morning’s New York Times polls or others published on Tuesday.) In one of the forecasts, I ran the numbers based solely on polls that do include cellphones in their samples. The vast majority of these polls also use live interviewers, since federal law prohibits automated calls to cellphones under most circumstances. (Note, however, that one or two mostly automated polling firms, like SurveyUSA, use a separate sample based on live interviewers to reach cellphone-only voters; these were included in the model run.) In this universe, Mr. Obama seems poised for victory. The model forecasts him for a 4.1 percentage points win in the national popular vote. That compares with 2.9 percentage points in the regular FiveThirtyEight forecast, which includes polls both with and without cellphones.

#### Strong methodology problems with post-debate polls

**Blumenthal, 10/5**/12 – editor of Pollster.com (Mark, “Obama-Romney Polls Start To See Romney Debate Bounce,” Huffington Post,

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/05/obama-romney-polls-debate_n_1943786.html>

Within the swing states, the only fresh data come from one-day, automated, recorded-voice polls conducted by both Rasmussen and We Ask America (a subsidiary of the Illinois Manufacturers Association) in Florida, Ohio and Virginia. Generally, pollsters prefer to call over several nights in order to make multiple attempts to interview voters who might not be at home or otherwise available on any one night. So these Rasmussen and We Ask America results should be interpreted with caution.

Five of the six one-night polls show single-digit shifts to Romney. The change on the Rasmussen surveys is relatively modest, averaging a roughly two-point gain for Romney on the margin. The We Ask America surveys show much bigger shifts. The more subtle changes are to be expected on the Rasmussen polls, since the pollster weights its samples to match party identification targets.

Another reason for caution: The one-night, automated surveys either miss voters in cell-phone-only households entirely (We Ask America) or rely on a small number of cell-phone-only interviews conducted with a non-random Internet panel (Rasmussen). Roughly one-third of U.S. adults now live in cell-phone-only households.

The new state polls have helped narrow the Obama-Romney margin on the HuffPost Pollster tracking model of the national popular vote. As of this writing, the HuffPost model, which is based on all available surveys both national and statewide, gives Obama a roughly three-point lead (48.3 to 45.2 percent), though it will continue to update as new polls become available.

Over the next week, new polls will be released using more rigorous methods, including national surveys that are usually more accurate than statewide surveys. The polls still to come will reach voters with more distance from their immediate reactions to Wednesday night's debate and will also begin to reflect any response to Friday's jobs report (showing the unemployment level declining to 7.8 percent).

### A2 voter id

#### Voter suppression and fundraising doesn’t clinch it for Romney

**Levine, 10/3**/12 – contributing editor of the Washington Monthly, (Art, Three Ways Romney Can Still Win the Election, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-levine/can-democratic-convention\_b\_1860015.html)

Of course, practically unlimited, still-undisclosed funds and widespread voting barriers can hardly guarantee a win for a candidate as unpopular and clueless as Mitt Romney. With or without a raft of legalized dirty tricks helping him, Romney remains an unlikely winner but hardly out of the running.

### 2nc links

#### Link is particularly true on thorium

Westenhaus, ‘10

[Brian, OilPrice.com -- Energy News, 9-14, “Thorium: A Cheap, Clean and Safe Alternative to Uranium,” <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Thorium-A-Cheap-Clean-And-Safe-Alternative-To-Uranium.html>]

In the U.S. research pioneers are exploring a truly radical shift to a liquid fuel based on molten-fluoride salts, an idea once pursued by US physicist Alvin Weinberg at Oak Ridge National Lab in Tennessee in the 1960s. The original documents were recovered by Mr. Sorensen.¶ The matter today wallows in the U.S. administrations passive silence on research – a hint that loyalties are to the environmental pressure groups – even as thorium would solve those group’s primary objections and the entrenched interests. It’s eerily like the 1930s when researchers knew the Nazis were busily working on an atomic bomb, news that met simple disbelief. U.S. president Roosevelt needed more than a letter from Einstein, but a meeting shifted the minds such that Roosevelt started the Manhattan project.

#### The link slashes the case -- public opposition prevents nuclear expansion.

**Ramana, ‘11**

[M. V., appointed jointly with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security -- Princeton University, works on the future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament, member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, 7-1, “Nuclear Power and the Public,” SAGE Journals]

Opinion polls show that public support for nuclear power has declined since the Fukushima crisis began, not only in Japan but also in other nations around the world. People oppose nuclear power for a variety of reasons, but the predominant concern is the perception that it is a risky technology. Some communities that are closely associated with it even suffer from stigmatization. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power—including information campaigns, risk comparisons, and efforts to promote nuclear power as a solution to climate change. None of these strategies has worked well, mostly because the public lacks trust in the nuclear industry. Public resistance to nuclear power is likely to continue, making it difficult to site and build new reactors. This resistance may be a major obstacle to the rapid expansion of nuclear power.

#### The public supports existing reactors, not new ones – reject lobby spin

**Mariotte, 12** - Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Michael, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos, 6/5, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters. Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?” This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way. Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition. Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima. But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today. Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question). Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that: “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.” But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?” 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.” Conclusions Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

### A2 florida

#### Averages of all polls by many polling cites show Obama is winning Florida

**Powers, 10/1**/12 (Scott, Orlando Sentinel, Gravis Marketing Florida poll: presidential, senate races even, http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/news\_politics/2012/10/gravis-marketing-florida-poll-presidential-senate-races-even.html)

Polling aggragators say Obama and Nelson are ahead by more, though they rely on several of the polls Republicans have lately been attacking.

RealClear Politics, which averages most-recent polls, including the new Gravis poll, on a rolling basis, gives Obama a 3.3 percent lead in Florida and Nelson a 8.3 percent advantage.

The Huffington Post’s Election Dashboard’s aggregation, which also includes the new Gravis polll, gives Obama a 3 point lead in Florida and Nelson a 9.1 point lead.

Nate Silver’s 538 blog, which calculates percentage chances of victory based on rolling recent polls, gives Obama a 70.3 percent chance of winning Florida, and Nelson a 97.8 percent chance.

### A2 romney not crazy

#### Obama’s Russia policy is key to Afghan stability and successful nuclear sanctions on Iran

Michael O’Hanlon 8-13-2012; Director of Research and Senior Fellow Foreign Policy at Brookings; Obama vs. Romney on Foreign Policy http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/08/13-obama-romney-ohanlon

RUSSIA RESET: Romney has called Russia our greatest geopolitical foe and lambasted many of President Vladimir Putin’s policies. The Obama administration, while of late angry with Russia over Syria, has still made “Russia reset” a centerpiece of its grand strategy. It has negotiated a new nuclear arms accord, spent lots of time in summits with Russian leaders, worked hard on the Iran and Afghanistan portfolios and (until lately) toned down its public spats with Moscow — especially when President Dmitry Medvedev was in office. This led, among other accomplishments, to a major tightening of sanctions on Iran and North Korea, as well as the development of crucial northern supply routes into Afghanistan, which kept the war effort going even when Pakistan denied the North American Treaty Organization access for six months.

## 2nc States

### 2NC States Solve

#### States incentives solve nuclear development

**Dow Jones Newswires, 7** (5-21-07, “States Maneuver to Lure New Nuclear Power Plants” <http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=19778941>)

In a positive shift for U.S. power companies planning a new fleet of nuclear facilities, nuclear power has gained popularity in several states as a solution to high power prices and growing demand.

Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia are offering incentives to develop new nuclear generation, hoping that nuclear power prices will be lower and less volatile than power generated by natural gas. State regulators also hope new nuclear power plants will create jobs and bolster local industry. Nuclear operators say state rules ensuring cost recovery of new plants - particularly pre-construction costs - will likely affect their decisions about where to build new plants.

Louisiana and Florida have approved measures that would allow New Orleans-based Entergy Corp. (ETR) and Juno Beach, Fla.-based FPL Group (FPL) to pass on some pre-construction nuclear plant development costs to their customers, while Georgia regulators are considering a similar move.

**States create federal follow on**

**Dutzik, 11** - senior policy analyst with Frontier Group, specializing in energy, transportation and climate policy (Tony, “The Way Forward on Global Warming Reducing Carbon Pollution Today and Restoring Momentum for Tomorrow by Promoting Clean Energy”, <http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/The-Way-Forward-on-Global-Warming.pdf>)

Over the past several years, vast resources have been devoted to winning comprehensive energy and climate legislation at the federal level, and for good reason— comprehensive federal legislation will be necessary to produce the emission reductions needed to put America and the world on track to prevent the worst impacts of global warming.

There are, however, countless additional opportunities to reduce emissions using existing federal statutes as well as the opportunities presented by action at state and local levels of government.

In this report, we estimate the potential impacts of 30 public policies, measures and initiatives to reduce global warming pollution, most of which can be adopted at the state level. With 50 states, that makes more than 1,000 potential opportunities to reduce global warming pollution.

State and local action on global warming is not a “second-best” solution to the climate crisis. Indeed, time and again, ambitious public policy action at the local or state level has created a precedent for strong action at the federal level. Moreover, as described below, state and local campaigns can involve and engage citizens in ways that federal legislative campaigns cannot. Under the right conditions, these policies can not only deliver concrete emission reductions, but they can also spur changes in infrastructure and transform economic conditions in ways that will make the goals of an eventual national program easier to meet.

### AT: 50 state fiat bad

#### The States CP is the topic---jurisdictional questions are key to energy production debates

**Kay, 12** - Senior Extension Associate with the Community & Regional Development Institute-Cornell Dept. of Sociology (David, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?,” http://devsoc.cals.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714)

Questions about energy production and consumption are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21st Century. Some go to the heart of our nation’s system of federalism, as an underlying but everpresent friction mounts over the way in which decision making power has been divided between central and more locally distributed political units. What is at stake? According to one author, “the choice of regulatory forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy. That may explain why Americans have traditionally shed so much metaphorical and genuine blood deciding what are essentially jurisdictional disputes between governmental institutions.” i

A number of factors have raised these issues into greater prominence. Energy specific influences include the depletion of low cost oil, advances in energy extraction technology, and increased awareness of the link between climate change and energy consumption and production. Another element is the long standing but increasingly hardened absence of a broad based consensus over energy policy at the federal level, despite calls for such a policy that date back to at least the Nixon administration. These have been superimposed on shifting political trends in other areas, including the expanding national political divide. After the crest of federal adoption of new environmental legislation in the 1960’s and 1970’s, powerful and complex cross currents arose. Mostly “conservative” and anti- (or anti-“big”) government forces mobilized in the devolution, deregulation, privatization, and property rights movements. In contrast, “progressive” movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of economic and environmental issues) and personalization (eg. of communications/information technology) by promoting global governance in some arenas and relocalization or local empowerment in others.

Several energy examples being played out in New York State, as well as in other states and on the national stage, serve as useful and representative illustrations of the fundamental but insufficiently appreciated tensions raised. The first involves the spread of the controversial hydraulic fracturing technology that is used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” reserves of shale and other rocks. The second and third involve the generation and distribution of electricity: where the authority to site electricity generating stations is vested, and who has the authority to site transmission lines that move electricity from their mostly rural points of extraction or generation to their mostly urban points of consumption. ii These are but a few among many examples that highlight the extent to which the proliferating threads of debate about energy federalism are being cinched into an increasingly dense tangle.

## 2nc uranium da

### uranium

#### Strong Kazakh nuclear sector strengthens the global non-proliferation regime.

**Kassenova 8** [Togzhan, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Apr 28, “Kazakhstan's nuclear ambitions”]

Benefits of Kazakhstan's nuclear energy push¶ First and foremost, Kazakhstan responsibly defends nonproliferation and export controls. It is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And in addition to its general IAEA membership, Kazakhstan has signed the IAEA Safeguards Protocol and signed and ratified the IAEA's Additional Protocol. Adherence to the Additional Protocol subjects all of Kazakhstan's nuclear facilities to stringent IAEA oversight, including comprehensive declarations, reporting, and site-access obligations. Together with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan established a [nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia](http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf_support/060905_canwfz.pdf) PDF in September 2006, which prohibits it from possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons and from assisting or encouraging other nations to acquire them. Its enthusiasm for the nuclear-weapon-free zone makes it extremely unlikely Kazakhstan will use its nuclear know-how to pursue nuclear weapons or to help another country develop them.¶ Other reasons to support the country's nuclear plans:¶ As revenue generated by the uranium industry increases, money can be invested back into further improving the physical protection of domestic plants, internal control measures, the safeguarding of radioactive material, and the training of nuclear industry workers in the ethics of nonproliferation. Since the Soviet collapse, significant improvements have been achieved in all aspects of nuclear safety and security at Kazakh nuclear sites and facilities, mostly with the help of U.S.-funded nonproliferation assistance programs. Due to cooperation with the IAEA, the most sensitive facility--the Ulba Metallurgical Plant at Ust-Kamenogorsk--has the highest level of safeguards in Central Asia, which brings it close to Western standards. Although according to analysts, more resources should be channeled into nuclear security culture and nonproliferation education.¶ By participating in the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) proposed international fuel bank, the IUEC, and the U.S.-sponsored Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), **Kazakhstan can contribute to limiting proliferation of full fuel-cycle technologies**. Laura Holgate, NTI's vice president for Russia/newly independent states programs, has suggested that Kazakhstan could become a site for such a bank because of its nuclear infrastructure, strong nonproliferation record, and large Muslim population, making Kazakhstan perhaps a more appealing host from the perspective of non-Western countries.10 Russia's IUEC is complimentary to GNEP, which seeks to expand the use of nuclear energy while **decreasing the risk of proliferation** and addressing the challenge of nuclear waste disposal.

## 1nr prolif

### leadership fails

#### Prolif leadership fails---a few distinctions at the top:

#### 1—the aff can’t solve simply through benign tech transfer—IF economics were the only thing that drove nuclear plant decisions, then obviously there would never be prolif because it’s EXPENSIVE

Lewis 12

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, 8/1/12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full

Creating market incentives to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing seems like a reasonable thing to do - **except that most states make nuclear decisions on something other than a cost basis**. Nuclear power enthusiasts have been no strangers to wishful thinking, starting with claims that nuclear energy would be "too cheap to meter." Government decisions about nuclear power tend to **prioritize** concerns about **sovereignty** and keeping technological pace with neighbors. It is not hard to see national nuclear programs as something akin to national airlines - money-losing prestige projects that barely take market forces into account. Often, aspiring nuclear states look to countries like the United States and Japan as models. If such countries invest heavily in fuel-cycle services, developing states might **try to copy** them **rather than** simply **become** their **customers**.

#### They can easily find other countries to provide them with nuclear tech

Hibbs 12

Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program Senior Associate, 8/7/12, Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z

U.S. resolve to include a no-ENR pledge in the body of new bilateral agreements will be seen by some countries as arrogant and unacceptable. Incorporating ENR terms into side-letters or preambles may be less offensive. That approach would also more easily facilitate including reciprocal commitments by the United States into its 123 bargains with foreign countries. These might include guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply through participation in the U.S. fuel bank, facilitating the country’s access to other back-up sources of nuclear fuel, and, in the future, perhaps even taking back U.S.-origin spent fuel.

The outcome of any negotiation for a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement will depend on the leverage both sides bring to the table. When the United States negotiated most of the 22 such agreements in force today, it was the world’s leading provider of nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel. As the examples of Jordan and Vietnam show, unlike half a century ago, nuclear newcomers today **don’t need to buy American**.

The vendor field is populated by firms in Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, Russia, and South Korea, and in the future they will be joined by others in China and India. Governments in these countries do not seek to establish a no-ENR requirement as a condition for foreign nuclear cooperation. Some of them, Australia and Canada for example, have strong nonproliferation track records. **Countries** now **seeking** to form **foreign industrial partnerships to set up nuclear power** programs **have numerous options and they will favor arrangements that provide them the most freedom and flexibility**.

#### US won’t exert nonproliferation leadership – can’t access 123 stuff

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, **but** often **elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives**. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of **nonproliferation failure**. The inconsistent or incomplete application of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. **U.S. reticence** historically, with some exceptions, **to prioritize nonproliferation**—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—**does not leave room for** great **optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making**.

#### Nuclear energy cred fails—countries say no to US tech and their agreements if it constrains them

Cleary 12

Richard Cleary, American Enterprise Institute Research Assistant, 8/13/12, Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making, npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30

The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: **Countries face political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making**. **A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity**, such as Pakistan or Brazil, **is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side controls**. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.

#### leadership on prolif-resistant nuclear energy cooperation fails, causes backlash that undermines nonproliferation

Hibbs 12

Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program Senior Associate, 8/7/12, Negotiating Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/07/negotiating-nuclear-cooperation-agreements/d98z

**U.S. resolve to include a no-ENR pledge in the body of new bilateral agreements will be seen** by some countries **as arrogant and unacceptable**. Incorporating ENR terms into side-letters or preambles may be less offensive. That approach would also more easily facilitate including reciprocal commitments by the United States into its 123 bargains with foreign countries. These might include guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply through participation in the U.S. fuel bank, facilitating the country’s access to other back-up sources of nuclear fuel, and, in the future, perhaps even taking back U.S.-origin spent fuel.

The outcome of any negotiation for a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement will depend on the leverage both sides bring to the table. When the United States negotiated most of the 22 such agreements in force today, it was the world’s leading provider of nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel. As the examples of Jordan and Vietnam show, unlike half a century ago, nuclear newcomers today don’t need to buy American.

The vendor field is populated by firms in Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Niger, Russia, and South Korea, and in the future they will be joined by others in China and India. Governments in these countries do not seek to establish a no-ENR requirement as a condition for foreign nuclear cooperation. Some of them, Australia and Canada for example, have strong nonproliferation track records. **Countries** now **seeking** to form **foreign industrial partnerships to set up nuclear power** programs **have numerous options and they will favor arrangements that provide them the most freedom and flexibility**.

**Equity in international nuclear affairs matters**. By negotiating with its partners voluntary political agreements, including side benefits to limit the application of sensitive technologies, instead of trying to legally **compel** them to make **concessions that are politically onerous, the U**nited **S**tates **can** serve its nonproliferation and security interests while **avoid**ing the **challenge to U.S. credibility** that would follow from rigid application of a one-size-fits-all policy.

The United States should show nonproliferation leadership by generally discouraging countries without enrichment and reprocessing capabilities from embarking in this direction. But negotiators need policy guidelines that provide for flexibility and encourage them to create incentives to get desired results. To some extent, the current policy may be informed by the insight that trying to negotiate no-ENR terms into the operative text of an agreement may fail, and that other approaches may be more productive. It also reflects the reality that U.S. leverage on nuclear trade is declining.

### Prolif Impact D

#### No widespread proliferation

Hymans 12

Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR, 4/16/12, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### No impact – every actor has incentives to overstate consequences

**Farley 11**, assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, (Robert, "Over the Horizon: Iran and the Nuclear Paradox," 11-16, [www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10679/over-the-horizon-iran-and-the-nuclear-paradox))

But states and policymakers habitually overestimate the impact of nuclear weapons. This happens among both proliferators and anti-proliferators. Would-be proliferators seem to expect that possessing a nuclear weapon will confer “a seat at the table” as well as solve a host of minor and major foreign policy problems. Existing nuclear powers fear that new entrants will act unpredictably, destabilize regions and throw existing diplomatic arrangements into flux. These predictions almost invariably turn out wrong; nuclear weapons consistently fail to undo the existing power relationships of the international system.

The North Korean example is instructive. In spite of the dire warnings about the dangers of a North Korean nuclear weapon, the region has weathered Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation in altogether sound fashion. Though some might argue that nukes have “enabled” North Korea to engage in a variety of bad behaviors, that was already the case prior to its nuclear test. The crucial deterrent to U.S. or South Korean action continues to be North Korea’s conventional capabilities, as well as the incalculable costs of governing North Korea after a war. Moreover, despite the usual dire predictions of nonproliferation professionals, the North Korean nuclear program has yet to inspire Tokyo or Seoul to follow suit. The DPRK’s program represents a tremendous waste of resources and human capital for a poor state, and it may prove a problem if North Korea endures a messy collapse. Thus far, however, the effects of the arsenal have been minimal.

Israel represents another case in which the benefits of nuclear weapons remain unclear. Although Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, most in the region understood that Israel possessed nuclear weapons by the late-1960s. These weapons did not deter Syria or Egypt from launching a large-scale conventional assault in 1973, however. Nor did they help the Israeli Defense Force compel acquiescence in Lebanon in 1982 or 2006. Nuclear weapons have not resolved the Palestinian question, and when it came to removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Israel relied not on its nuclear arsenal but on the United States to do so -- through conventional means -- in 2003. Israeli nukes have thus far failed to intimidate the Iranians into freezing their nuclear program. Moreover, Israel has pursued a defense policy designed around the goal of maintaining superiority at every level of military escalation, from asymmetrical anti-terror efforts to high-intensity conventional combat. Thus, it is unclear whether the nuclear program has even saved Israel any money.

The problem with nukes is that there are strong material and normative pressures against their use, not least because states that use nukes risk incurring nuclear retaliation. Part of the appeal of nuclear weapons is their bluntness, but for foreign policy objectives requiring a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer, they are useless. As a result, states with nuclear neighbors quickly find that they can engage in all manner of harassment and escalation without risking nuclear retaliation. The weapons themselves are often more expensive than the foreign policy objectives that they would be used to attain. Moreover, normative pressures do matter. Even “outlaw” nations recognize that the world views the use of nuclear -- not to mention chemical or biological -- weapons differently than other expressions of force. And almost without exception, even outlaw nations require the goodwill of at least some segments of the international community.

Given all this, it is not at all surprising that many countries eschew nuclear programs, even when they could easily attain nuclear status. Setting aside the legal problems, nuclear programs tend to be expensive, and they provide relatively little in terms of foreign policy return on investment. Brazil, for example, does not need nuclear weapons to exercise influence in Latin America or deter its rivals. Turkey, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, decided a long time ago that the nuclear “problem” could be solved most efficiently through alignment with an existing nuclear power.

Why do policymakers, analysts and journalists so consistently overrate the importance of nuclear weapons? The answer is that everyone has a strong incentive to lie about their importance. The Iranians will lie to the world about the extent of their program and to their people about the fruits of going nuclear. The various U.S. client states in the region will lie to Washington about how terrified they are of a nuclear Iran, warning of the need for “strategic re-evaluation,” while also using the Iranian menace as an excuse for brutality against their own populations. Nonproliferation advocates will lie about the terrors of unrestrained proliferation because they do not want anyone to shift focus to the manageability of a post-nuclear Iran. The United States will lie to everyone in order to reassure its clients and maintain the cohesion of the anti-Iran block.

None of these lies are particularly dishonorable; they represent the normal course of diplomacy. But they are lies nevertheless, and serious analysts of foreign policy and international relations need to be wary of them.

Nonproliferation is a good idea, if only because states should not waste tremendous resources on weapons of limited utility. Nuclear weapons also represent a genuine risk of accidents, especially for states that have not yet developed appropriately robust security precautions. Instability and collapse in nuclear states has been harrowing in the past and will undoubtedly be harrowing in the future. All of these threats should be taken seriously by policymakers. Unfortunately, as long as deception remains the rule in the practice of nuclear diplomacy, exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape.

### AT: Covert

#### Not a big deal

Seng 97

(Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. @ U. Chicago, Security Studies, “Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States”, Vol. 6, Iss. 4, p. 85)

The significance of limiting the scope of input in nuclear planning and rehearsal, however, will vary depending on the complexity and subtlety required in nuclear operations and the related systems of nuclear control. Minor proliferators will enjoy an operational and organizational simplicity that allows them to plan sufficiently and operationalize effectively despite the constraints of opacity.

Opacity will pose no significant barrier to a "thorough vetting of operational tradeoffs" in minor proliferators because their operational choices will be so few and straightforward. The superpowers had to sort through, design and implement operations conditioned by choices between counter-force and countervalue targets; sea-based, land-based, and air-launched attack options; extended deterrence complications and numerous theaters of operation. Minor proliferators will have a few dozen weapons at a few air bases or missile sites, and they will have a short list of potential counter-value targets. What could possibly be so complicated about their operational options that they could not be thoroughly considered by a closed group of political and military leaders?

Moreover, the operational simplicity and flexibility of minor proliferators would allow them to get by with far less preplanning than in other states. As we discussed earlier, minor proliferators will have no extensive coordination problems in their nuclear organizations, they will not be shackled by complicated and inflexible SOPS, and they are not at risk of unforeseen organizational events in their simple control systems. Accordingly, leaders can maintain a high degree of direct control over nuclear operators and they can intervene and adapt operations on the spot if necessary. Their nuclear use options will be open to a high degree of extemporizing and customizing should it become necessary.

### at retaliation impact

**No retaliation**

**Sanger and Baker 10** – (David E. and [Peter](file:///C:\Documents%20and%20Settings\MarcJacome\Desktop\GBS%20HJ%20Tub\Space%20-%202011-2012\Case%20Negs\Peter), April, New York Times “Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms”. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/06arms.html>)

WASHINGTON — [President Obama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per) said Monday that he was revamping American nuclear strategy to substantially narrow the conditions under which the United States would use [nuclear weapons](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier), even in self defense. But the president said in an interview that he was carving out an exception for “outliers like Iran and North Korea” that have violated or renounced the main treaty to halt nuclear proliferation. Discussing his approach to nuclear security the day before formally releasing his new strategy, Mr. Obama described his policy as part of a broader effort to edge the world toward making nuclear weapons obsolete, and to create incentives for countries to give up any nuclear ambitions. To set an example, the new strategy renounces the development of any new nuclear weapons, overruling the initial position of his own defense secretary. Mr. Obama’s strategy is a sharp shift from those adopted by his predecessors and seeks to revamp the nation’s nuclear posture for a new age in which rogue states and terrorist organizations are greater threats than traditional powers like Russia and China. It eliminates much of the ambiguity that has deliberately existed in American nuclear policy since the opening days of the Cold War. For the first time, the United States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the United States with biological or chemical weapons, or launched a crippling cyberattack.

**Ayson concedes the impact is unlikely and requires non-existent triggers**

**Ayson 10** (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate with Oxford’s Centre for International Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593)

Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the ﬁssile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks, 40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science ﬁction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identiﬁable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efﬁciency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” 41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American ofﬁcials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be deﬁnitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would ofﬁcials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was **already** involved **in** some sort of limited **armed conﬂict with Russia** and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conﬂict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

**[Impact card begins]**

Washington's early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that …might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

**[Impact card ends]**

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufﬁciently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation.

## 1nr warming

### Warming Internal

#### Can’t solve warming -- transportation sector emissions.

Ahearne et al., ‘12

[John F., adjunct scholar for Resources for the Future and an adjunct professor of engineering at Duke University, Federation of American Scientists, February, “The Future of Nuclear Power in the United States,” http://www.fas.org/pubs/\_docs/Nuclear\_Energy\_Report-lowres.pdf]

In response to mitigating climate change, many countries will ﬁnd that nuclear power is neither the least-cost nor the quickest approach to reducing carbon dioxide emissions.1 Until nuclear energy is able to produce hydrogen or process heat, or until transportation sectors are electriﬁed, nuclear energy’s potential contribution to reducing carbon dioxide emissions will be somewhat limited.

#### That’s key.

**Gordon, ‘10**

[Deborah, nonresident senior associate in the Energy and Climate Program -- Carnegie Endowment, December, “The Role of Transportation in Driving Climate Disruption.” http://carnegieendowment.org/files/transport\_climate\_disruption.pdf]

Through the twenty-first century, on-road transportation is expected to be a leading climate-forcing activity worldwide. Cars and trucks emit almost no sulfates (cooling agents) but are major emitters of carbon dioxide, black carbon, and ozone—all of which cause warming and are detrimental to human health. U.S. on-road transportation is responsible for 40 percent of global on-road climate warming (“radiative forcing” in climate terms). U.S. on-road transportation is projected to have a net radiative forcing of 66 mWm-2 on a twenty-year horizon, as shown in Figure 11. U.S. on-road transportation represents nearly half (41 percent) of global radiative forcing in this sector over a twenty-year timeframe.

#### Can’t solve warming in time -- the US would have to start bringing a new reactor online every week.

Alvarez, ‘10

[Robert, Senior Scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies, currently focused on nuclear disarmament, environmental, and energy policies, 2-17, “Five Reasons NOT to Invest in Nuclear Power,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-alvarez/five-reasons-not-to-inves\_b\_465585.html?]

Assuming that all $54.5 billion in nuclear loan guarantees being sought by Obama are successful -- this will provide less than one percent of the nation's current electrical generating capacity. Replacing the existing fleet of 104 reactors which are expected to shut down by 2056 could cost about $1.4 trillion. Add another $500 billion for a 50% increase above current nuclear generation capacity to make a meaningful impact on reducing carbon emissions. This means the U.S. would have to start bringing a new reactor on line at a rate of once a week to once a month for the next several decades.

**Even if they’re right about everything, nuclear power can’t be deployed in time to stop warming- one accident eliminates solvency**

**N02NP.org 7 \***N02 Nuclear Power.org is a site created and run by Pete Roche who is an energy consultant based in Edinburgh and policy adviser to the Scottish Nuclear Free Local Authorities, and the National Steering Committee of [UK NFLA](http://nfznsc.gn.apc.org/). Pete was co-founder of the Scottish Campaign to Resist the Atomic Menace (SCRAM), he has represented Greenpeace at international meetings and is active in several other areas relating to environmental protection and nuclear power [http://www.no2nuclearpower.org.uk/reports/Opportunity\_Costs\_Nuclear.pdf, January 2007 “Opportunity Costs of Nuclear Power]

Timing To tackle climate change the speed with which carbon abatement measures can be introduced is also important. The construction of nuclear power stations will have a long lead-time. During the period when reactors are being constructed, capital is tied up and therefore unavailable for investing in alternative carbon abatement techniques. Because nuclear investments are also inherently slower to deploy, then such investments also retard carbon displacement. Delivering a kilowatt-hour from a new nuclear power station costs at least three times as much as saving one through efficiency measures. Thus every dollar spent on efficiency would displace three times more coal than a dollar spent on new reactors. But, perhaps more importantly, the savings from spending on efficiency can go into effect much more quickly, because it takes so long to build reactors. (2) The UK Association for the Conservation of Energy, for example, says that the most optimistic assumption is that one new nuclear power plant could be operating in the UK by 2020, delivering perhaps just over one million tonnes of carbon saving. In contrast energy efficiency "could save around 25 million tonnes of carbon through cost-effective energy efficiency measures" by that date. (3) In 2004, decentralised low- and no-carbon generation added 28GW of capacity worldwide – six times more than nuclear power, with three times more extra output. (4) This was achieved despite nuclear power’s generally higher subsidies per kWh and its far easier access to the grid. Decentralised energy can be installed quickly without needing complex regulatory processes. Despite moves around the globe to speed up regulatory approval of new reactors it is hard to imagine how this balance of speed could ever shift in favor of nuclear power. New reactors take a long time to build are delay-prone, complex, and contentious technology, and one a single major accident or terrorist attack could scuttle nuclear stations virtually everywhere.

### Warming Science

#### Cosmic waves cause warming, emanating from exploding stars

**Dillow 12** [Clay, 9/6/12, Popular Science, “Global Warming Could Be Linked to the Number of Exploding Stars in the Sky”]

As we enter the high season of electoral politics, you’re going to hear things about global warming that may seem a bit dubious--that it doesn’t exist, that it exists and George W. Bush invented it, that cataclysmic climate change has already occurred and we are all doomed, that climate change is the result of the failed stimulus, etc. But an astrophysicist working on one of the cosmos greatest mysteries has another theory that might sound equally implausible on its face, but actually makes some sense: that we can measure future global warming based on the number of exploding stars we see in the sky.¶ Dr. Charles Wang of the University of Aberdeen has put forth a new theory concerning supernova that involves a Higgs Boson-like mystery particle that is scheduled to be tested at CERN. That’s interesting, but perhaps more intriguing is the idea that his theory could aid in our understanding of where global warming originates and where it is going.¶ Technology, Clay Dillow, astrophysics, climate change, global warming, Space, supernovaeIt turns out exploding stars elsewhere in the universe have an effect on the temperature of Earth’s atmosphere. When stars explode elsewhere, the massive amount of cosmic rays created affect space weather in that corner of the cosmos, making it cloudier. That cloudiness shades Earth from other cosmic waves that are likely impacting the atmosphere here. The cloudier it is out there, the cooler Earth’s atmosphere is. So, the theory goes, fewer star explosions equals a warmer atmosphere. And a warmer climate.¶ That doesn’t help us much from a policy perspective. We don’t yet fully understand the mechanisms by which individual stars go supernova, and we certainly don’t have the means to control star explosions. But since we do record these explosions--roughly one per year--we could use that data to help predict future changes in climate.

#### Thousand year correlations vote neg

* our evidence is from an environmentalist and a renewable energy company owner which means there is 0 incentive to lie

**Vahrenholt 6/18** – PhD in Chemistry, director of RWE Innogy, one of Europe's largest renewable energy companies. (Fritz, “Global warming: second thoughts of an environmentalist”, The Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/9338939/Global-warming-second-thoughts-of-an-environmentalist.html>) Jacome

Far from it: real, hard data from ice cores, dripstones, tree rings and ocean or lake sediment cores reveal significant temperature changes of more than 1°C, with warm and cold phases alternating in a 1,000-year cycle. These include the Minoan Warm Period 3,000 years ago and the Roman Warm Period 2,000 years ago. During the Medieval Warm Phase around 1,000 years ago, Greenland was colonised and grapes for wine grew in England. The Little Ice Age lasted from the 15th to the 19th century. All these fluctuations occurred before man-made CO2.

Based on climate reconstructions from North Atlantic deep-sea sediment cores, Professor Gerard Bond discovered that the millennial-scale climate cycles ran largely parallel to solar cycles, including the Eddy Cycle which is – guess what – 1,000 years long. So it is really the Sun that shaped the temperature roller-coaster of the past 10,000 years.

But then coal, oil and gas arrived: from the 1850s onwards, Man pumped large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and the CO2 level today stands at 0.039%,compared to 0.028% previously.

With our empirically proven natural pre-industrial pattern, however, we would predict that solar activity had risen since 1850, more or less in parallel with an increase in temperatures. Indeed, both timing and amount of warming of nearly 1°C fit nicely into this natural scheme. The solar magnetic field more than doubled over the past 100 years.

**Glaciers aren’t shrinking—new satellite data proves**

**Bamber, Ph.D. in Geosciences, 12**—BSc, Ph.D., Professor of Geo Sciences, Director of Bristol Glaciology Centre (Jonathan, *Nature* 482, 23 February 2012, “Climate change: Shrinking glaciers under scrutiny,” RBatra) \*\*GICs = “glaciers and ice caps”

Glaciers and ice caps are pivotal features of both water resources and tourism. They are also a significant contributor to sea-level rise. About 1.4 billion people are dependent on the rivers that flow from the Tibetan plateau and Himalayas1. Yet significant controversy2 and uncertainty surround the recent past and future behaviour of glaciers in this region. This is not so surprising when one considers the problem in hand. There are more than 160,000 glaciers and ice caps worldwide. Fewer than 120 (0.075%) have had their mass balance (the sum of the annual mass gains and losses of the glacier or ice cap) directly measured, and for only 37 of these are there records extending beyond 30 years. Extrapolating this tiny sample of observations to all glaciers and ice caps is a challenging task that inevitably leads to large uncertainties.

In an article published on Nature's website today, Jacob and colleagues3 describe a study based on satellite data for Earth's changing gravity field that tackles this problem. Their results have surprising implications for both the global contribution of glaciers to sea level and the changes occurring in the mountain regions of Asia.

Melting glaciers are an iconic symbol of climate change. On the basis of the limited data mentioned above, they seem to have been receding, largely uninterrupted, almost everywhere around the world for several decades4. Scaling up the small sample of ground-based observations to produce global estimates is, however, fraught with difficulty. Size, local topography, altitude range, aspect and microclimate all affect the response of individual glaciers in complex ways. Even the seasonality of changes in temperature and precipitation strongly influence the glaciers' response, and those that terminate in a lake or ocean behave differently again.

Nonetheless, until recently there was little alternative to some form of extrapolation of the terrestrial observations to large regions and numbers of glaciers. One such high-profile assessment5 concluded that, during the period 1996–2006, the mass loss from glaciers and ice caps (GICs) increased steadily, contributing a sea-level rise of 1.1 ± 0.24 millimetres per year by 2006. In this study5, the authors concluded that GICs had been the dominant mass contributor to sea-level rise over the study period, and they extrapolated their results forward to argue that this would also be the case in the future.

Then along came the Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE), which consists of a pair of satellites that have been making global observations of changes in Earth's gravity field since their launch in 2002. They have been used in various studies to examine the changing mass of the great ice sheets of Antarctica and Greenland6 and several other large glaciated regions7. But, so far, the data have not been analysed simultaneously and consistently for all areas.

The difficulty with doing this is that GRACE measures the gravity field of the complete Earth system. This includes mass exchange and/or mass redistribution in the oceans, atmosphere, solid Earth and land hydrology, in addition to any changes in GIC volume. To determine the latter, it is clearly essential to be able to separate it from the other sources of mass movement that affect the gravity field. A second, related issue is the effective resolution of the observations. The GRACE satellites are sensitive to changes in the gravity field over distances of a few hundred kilometres. They cannot 'see' the difference between the signal from one glacier or small ice cap and another.

To isolate the GIC signal from others at the surface, Jacob and colleagues defined units of mass change — called mass concentrations, or mascons — within each of their 18 GIC regions (including the European Alps; Fig. 1). Each region might have many tens of mascons defining the geographic extent of significant ice volume within the sector3. Combined with global models of land hydrology and atmospheric-moisture content, the authors were able to isolate the GIC mass trends over the eight-year (2003–10) period of the observations. What they found was unexpected.

First, the contribution of GICs (excluding the Antarctica and Greenland peripheral GICs) **to sea-level rise was less than half the value of the most recent, comprehensive estimate**8 obtained from extrapolation of in situ measurements for 2001–05 (0.41 ± 0.08 compared with 1.1 mm yr−1). Second, losses for the High Mountain Asia region — comprising the Himalayas, Karakoram, Tianshan, Pamirs and Tibet — **were insignificant**. Here, the mass-loss rate was just 4 ± 20 gigatonnes per year (corresponding to 0.01 mm yr−1 of sea-level rise), compared with previous estimates that were well over ten times larger. By a careful analysis, the authors discounted a possible tectonic origin for the huge discrepancy, and it seems that this region is more stable than previously believed.

### Warming Impact

**Long timeframe means intervening actors and tech solve**

**Michaels 7** – Cato senior fellow (Patrick, 2/2, Live with Climate Change, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=7502)

Consequently, the best policy is to live with some modest climate change now and encourage economic development, which will generate the capital necessary for investment in the more efficient technologies of the future.

Fortunately, we have more time than the alarmists suggest. The warming path of the planet falls at the lowest end of today's U.N. projections. In aggregate, our computer models tell us that once warming is established, it tends to take place at a constant, not an increasing, rate. Reassuringly, the rate has been remarkably constant, at 0.324 degrees F per decade, since warming began around 1975. The notion that we must do "something in 10 years," repeated by a small but vocal band of extremists, enjoys virtually no support in the truly peer reviewed scientific literature.

Rather than burning our capital now for no environmental gain (did someone say "ethanol?"), let's encourage economic development so people can invest and profit in our more efficient future.

People who invested in automobile companies that developed hybrid technology have been rewarded handsomely in the past few years, and there's no reason to think environmental speculators won't be rewarded in the future, too.

#### Their impact arguments are exaggeration

**O’Neill 11** – (Brendan, editor of Spiked, 1-4, “The icy grip of the politics of fear,” <http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/10046/>)

Other climate-change campaigners told us to prepare for Saharan weather. A book published as part of Al Gore’s ‘Inconvenient Truth’ jamboree in 2007 - The Global Warming Survival Handbook - said there would soon be ‘searing temperatures, killer storms, drought, plague and pestilence’. Award-winning green theorists told us to prepare for life on a ‘hotter planet’ in which ‘the traditional British winter [is] probably gone for good’. Newspapers provided us with a ‘hellish vision of life on a hotter planet’ where deserts would ‘reach into the heart of Europe’ and global warming would ‘reduce humanity to a few struggling groups of embattled survivors clinging to life near the poles’. Dramatic stuff. And unadulterated nonsense. The thing that occupied people’s minds at the end of 2010 was not how to explain to their sweating children in the deserts of Hampshire why snow disappeared from our lives, but rather how to negotiate actual snow. Again, this isn’t to say that the snow proves there is no planetary warming at all: if it is mad to cite every change in the weather as proof that Earth is doomed, then it’s probably also unwise to dance around in the slushy white stuff in the belief that it proves that all environmental scientists are demented liars. But the world of difference between expert predictions (hot hell) and our real experiences (freezing nightmare) is a powerful symbol of the distance that now exists between the apocalypse-fantasising elites and the public. What it really shows is the extent to which the politics of global warming is driven by an already existing culture of fear. It doesn’t matter what The Science (as greens always refer to it) does or doesn’t reveal: campaigners will still let their imaginations run riot, biblically fantasising about droughts and plagues, because theirs is a fundamentally moralistic outlook rather than a scientific one. It is their disdain for mankind’s planet-altering arrogance that fuels their global-warming fantasies - and they simply seek out The Science that best seems to back up their perverted thoughts. Those predictions of a snowless future, of a parched Earth, are better understood as elite moral porn rather than sedate risk analysis.

# Round 5 Neg v Wake Forest CD

## 1nc

### 1NC Toicality

#### Interpretation - ‘financial incentives’ precludes purchases from the government – has to be direct production quotas

Edward W. Nelson et al (M.D., former Chairman of the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, James E. Childress, Ph.D. Jennie Perryman, R.N., M.S.N. Victor Robards, M.D. Albert Rowan Michael S. Seely, R.N., B.S.N. Sylvester Sterioff, M.D. Mary Rovelli Swanson, R.N., M.B.A.) 1993 “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation” http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4

A definition of terms is necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

### 1NC Topicality

#### Energy production excludes ANY conversion or transformation process – limited to extraction

Energici (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February 2012 “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

#### First, Limits – Secondary production is an catch-all category – explodes the literature base

Kim **Woodard** (Research Assistant at the Resource Systems Institute of the East-West Center, Chairman and CEO of Javelin Investments) **1980** “The International Energy Relations of China” p. 457

Secondary energy production can most easily be defined as the conversion of one energy fuel to another. As such, it is a catch-all category that can be used to provide a cluster of statistical energy production series that do not easily fall into either primary production or energy consumption categories. The number and variety of secondary energy production statistics could be multiplied indefinitely by an ever sharper differentiation of substages in the flow of energy commodities through society. I have chosen co include just a few forms of secondary energy production in this analysis—coke production, thermal electric power generation, total electric power generation, total refined petroleum production, the differentiated production of petroleum fuels, plant use of energy in energy production, and the use of hydrocarbons in the production of petrochemical and fertilizer feedstocks. These were statistics that were available for the Chinese case or could be generated by inference from primary energy data and a few oversimplified assumptions. All the secondary energy production statistics presented in this section were generated by the computer and then rounded to a reasonable level of approximation. All the statistics presented for various forms of secondary energy production are general estimates, and none have been tested directly against whatever data exist in the Chinese press. Validation of the statistics would require separate in-depth analysis of each secondary energy production industry—a task far beyond the means of this book. These statistics, therefore, should be taken as a point of reference, not the final word.

#### Second, Precision - Separating primary and secondary forms of energy is key to overall energy policy – precision outweighs

Sara **Øvergaard** (Senior Executive Officer in the Department on Energy Statistics at Statistics Norway) September **2008** “Issue paper: Definition of primary and secondary energy” <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/londongroup/meeting13/LG13_12a.pdf>

The ability to separate primary and secondary energy is important in energy statistics. The Energy Balance is set up to record the flow of new energy entering the system of national energy supply, its transformation and losses until end use. To avoid double counting, it is important to be able to separate new energy entering the system, (primary) and the energy that is transformed within the system (secondary). Internationally agreed definitions on primary and secondary energy are therefore important in order to compare Energy Balances. A consistent differentiation between primary and secondary energy is also useful in energy planning when developing long-range policies and for energy analysts who are concerned with broader energy or environmental issues, such as conversion losses, transmission losses, distribution, energy efficiency measures and carbon emissions from energy sources. When defining primary and secondary energy, it is important that the definition is operational and founded on the laws of physics. The definitions must be operational, meaning that it should be helpful for statisticians enabling them to make a clear and consistent division between primary and secondary energy based on information about the sources that the energy is embodied in and the processes that it has been part of. The definition of primary and secondary energy should be founded on physics, and not on the ability of statisticians to measure or record it. For example, in the OECD/IEA/Eurostat, Energy Statistics Manual2, the major difference between the Eurostat and the IEA Energy Balance format lies in the presentation of the production of primary and secondary fuels. Statisticians can for example due to measurement problems choose to assume that the actual mechanical energy taken from a hydro source is equal to the electric generated energy, but this should not influence the fact that hydro is a primary energy source, and that the electricity produced from this source is secondary energy.

### 1NC Elections

#### Obama is winning but its close and reversible – the average of recent polls puts Obama ahead

**Cook, 10/4**/12 – editor and publisher of the Cook Political Report for National Journal (Charlie, “Mitt Romney Breaks His Losing Streak” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004?mrefid=mostViewed>)

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.

#### Plan angers environmental base and lobbies

**Defense News 7** (10-8, 2007, lexis)

“The military is telling us, ‘We want this stuff, it’s great,’” said Jack Holmes, the CEO of Syntroleum, which produced the first batch of synthetic fuel for the military to test. “The strong support seen by the military has not necessarily been echoed by Congress because of a very strong anti-coal, anti-carbon lobby.”¶ Environmentalists say coal-to-fuel plants give off twice the amount of carbon dioxide as traditional refineries.

#### Catering to the environmental base and environmental lobbies is key to Obama’s re-election

Hudson, investigative journalist and Congressional Correspondent, 9-11-12  
Audrey, Human Events, “Has Obama made the planet greener?”, http://www.humanevents.com/2012/09/11/is-the-planet-greener-because-of-obama-al-gore-says-no/, accessed 9-16-12,

Democrats wax lyrical when it comes to President Barack Obama’s durable accomplishments to protect the environment and his administration’s efforts to abandon a fossil fuel-based energy in favor of experimental sources of electricity.¶ Among the party’s bragging points, the Obama administration doubled the amount of electricity derived from wind and solar, made historic investments in clean energy, and set the first national standards for mercury emissions.¶ “We can’t have an energy strategy for the last century that traps us in the past,” Obama said in March. “We need an energy strategy for the future—an all-of-the-above strategy for the 21st century that develops every source of American-made energy.”¶ According to Obama’s reelection campaign, that strategy ensures “we never have to choose between protecting our environment and strengthening our economy.”¶ Securing the liberal base¶ It’s a winning strategy for Obama to secure his liberal base and capture support from “Big Green” and the endorsement of significant environmental groups including the Sierra Club, Environment America, League of Conservation Voters, and Clean Water Action.¶ “Together, we can build upon the historic successes of the last four years, including landmark fuel efficiency standards and the first-ever protections against toxic mercury pollution, to build a clean energy economy that creates thousands of new jobs and works for every American,” said Michael Brune, the Sierra Club’s executive director.¶ Republicans argue that the Obama reign has been a disaster for energy development and say it is a significant factor in a still-faltering economy.¶ Obama says his policies have significantly reduced the country’s reliance on foreign oil, but at the same time his administration has drastically cut back on the number of permits to drill along the Outer Continental shelf. Although development continues mostly unabated on private property, exploration on public land continues to stall. And the price of gasoline at the pump has risen from an average of $1.84 during Obama’s inaugural celebration, to an estimated $3.75 today.

#### Romney causes massive foreign backlash and nuclear wars around the globe

Doug Bandow 5-15-2012; Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 1NC Coercion

#### Plan’s coercive

**Rothbard, no date** (Murray Rothbard, former teacher, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, New Liberty – Involuntary Servitude, no date, p. <http://www.mises.org/rothbard/newliberty4a.asp>)

In a sense, the entire system of taxation is a form of involuntary servitude. Take, in particular, the income tax. The high levels of income tax mean that all of us work a large part of the year? several months? for nothing for Uncle Sam before being allowed to enjoy our incomes on the market. Part of the essence of slavery, after all, is forced work for someone at little or no pay. But the income tax means that we sweat and earn income, only to see the government extract a large chunk of it by coercion for its own purposes. What is this but forced labor at no pay? The withholding feature of the income tax is a still more clear-cut instance of involuntary servitude. For as the intrepid Connecticut indus­trialist Vivien Kellems argued years ago, the employer is forced to expend time, labor, and money in the business of deducting and transmit­ting his employees' taxes to the federal and state governments, yet the employer is not recompensed for this expenditure. What moral principle justifies the government's forcing employers to act as its unpaid tax collectors?

#### Decision rule

**Petro**, **74** (Sylvester, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, University of Toledo Law Review, p.480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

### 1NC Counterplan

**The United States federal government should enact a $56 billion increase in defense spending for the current fiscal year. The United States federal government should mandate that defense spending, excluding expenditures regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, should make up no less than 4 percent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product. The United States federal government should establish an independent Oil Reserve Board charged with minimizing the economic impact of oil market volatility on the military; the board will release oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to the military if the price of oil exceeds the military’s ability to purchase it without undermining operations and maintenance accounts.**

#### The CP solves the economic impact of oil price volatility

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Before it spends as much as $100 billion to double the SPR, the U.S. government should manage its existing stocks more effectively, as well as encourage other countries to do the same. Its first step should be to create a new, independent oil reserve board that would take over nearly all the SPR responsibilities currently assigned to the president, the Department of Energy, and the State Department. The board would be the IEA's main point of contact in the United States and would decide when to stock oil and when to release it, with a view to building the U.S. government's ability to respond efficiently to large geopolitical shocks in the world oil market. (It would not, however, act to influence oil prices on a regular basis, which is best left to market forces.) Such independent management would boost the SPR's usefulness and allow for better syncing with commodity markets. The board would have a broad mandate to release oil when it determined that the markets could not generate an orderly response to a shock on their own. Using this broad authority, it would not only release oil when necessary but also announce ahead of crises under what conditions it would step in. Such signaling would help reduce some of the confusion that reigns today. The board would also tailor its measures to the particular problems that needed solving. If an oil shock prompted concerns over inflation, for example, then the board might urge adjustments in monetary policy by the Federal Reserve, which would be more effective in that case than a release of oil stocks.

This new management system would require Congress to pass new laws, including one updating the SPR's size. For now, the best approach in this regard would probably be to expand the SPR so that it covered 90 days' worth of imports (the IEA's requirement anyway), which, at current import levels, would be about 1.2 billion barrels. But the new legislation should also empower the Oil Reserve Board to adjust that figure if it could justify that a larger or smaller cache was required.

The Oil Reserve Board's success will hinge on how the market responds to it. Today's SPR is huge -- although assessments vary, it is believed to be about twice the size of all the private stocks on U.S. soil -- but little is known about how private stocks are managed. The board would help gather and publish more information on such stocks in the United States and contribute to the varied international efforts to improve data on oil production, trade, and storage. Such information is now surprisingly poor given the importance of oil to modern economies, the tightness of today's oil market, and the necessity of understanding the exact relationship between public stocks and private stocks. Also, poor management of strategic reserves can discourage private investors from building stocks of their own. There appears to be little such crowding out today, but that could simply reflect the fact that the SPR is largely considered to be dormant or "dead." But a more effective SPR would amplify the danger, and so the board would have to be especially vigilant and make sure to devise clear rules allowing use of the SPR only in the face of severe and unexpected shocks.

The Oil Reserve Board would also periodically assess whether the U.S. government needed other types of reserves, such as of gasoline, jet fuel, and other refined products. Such stocks, which are very costly to build and maintain, do not appear to be warranted now. They were not warranted in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes because the temporary easing of U.S. environmental standards allowed more such products to be sold on the domestic market and ample additional supplies were redirected from Europe. The situation could change, however, as the United States increasingly depends on large imports of refined products from distant locations that could be more vulnerable to disruption.

There are no perfect models for an effective stockpile system, but a good example can be drawn from the U.S. Federal Reserve's role in monetary policy. Much as with the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, the point of creating the Oil Reserve Board would be to vest critical economic decision-making power in an authority that is relatively independent of political meddling and yet also subject to political oversight. During crises, the Oil Reserve Board would also have the independence to make difficult decisions that could cause near-term harm -- as did the Federal Reserve when it chose to take actions that prompted the inflation-taming recession of the early 1980s. But there would also be important differences between the two bodies. For instance, the Oil Reserve Board would do little much of the time because its role would be to act only in the context of large geopolitical shocks to the oil market. Thus, it might be best to embed the Oil Reserve Board within the Federal Reserve system, whose large and competent staff could be drawn on when the normally dormant board surged into activity. The board could be an arm of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (which has the most expertise in energy markets) or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (which is best equipped to interact with the commodity markets).

The Oil Reserve Board would need to control the funds to support itself, maintain existing oil stockpiles, and, especially, purchase additional oil for the SPR. Unlike the Federal Reserve, which pays for most of its activities with the securities and other financial instruments it holds, the Oil Reserve Board would best be financed through direct authorization from Congress. If Congress balks at this proposal, a less-than-perfect alternative would be to fund the Oil Reserve Board's activities by channeling to the board oil delivered to the country by producers instead of paying federal royalties on that oil into the SPR (currently the government's favorite strategy for stocking the reserves while hiding the real costs of doing so). Such "royalty in kind" oil or, perhaps, the proceeds from an oil-import fee could be earmarked for the board and put into a trust fund managed by the Treasury Department.

IT'S A SMALL WORLD

The better management of oil reserves in the United States could help with reserves worldwide by allowing Washington to lead by example and exert more leverage with other IEA members. For starters, new standards are needed to better reflect the realities of the oil trade today. The IEA rule requiring that members hold reserves to cover 90 days of imports is arbitrary and ineffective: with domestic markets integrated into global ones, the exact volume of a country's oil imports is unimportant. All IEA members should instead be required to hold reserves in proportion to the amount of oil they consume, and the IEA should develop metrics that could be used to adjust members' reserve requirements according to their exposure to interruptions in supply and delivery. That approach, rather than a focus on the sheer volume of imports, would give countries incentives to invest in securing their supply networks -- in the case of the United States, for example, the oil platforms and ports along the Gulf of Mexico. The IEA should also assess its members' compliance based on their reserve management. Reserves that are overseen by independent professional authorities and are fully integrated into the IEA's reserve-coordination system -- such as would be the case under the Oil Reserve Board -- would be deemed most reliable because the IEA could count on their being more readily available in times of need than those managed by opaque and unpredictable processes or institutions vulnerable to political interference.

The IEA should also encourage countries to count the stocks they hold outside their territories as part of the fulfillment of their reserve obligations. This approach would encourage Japan and South Korea, for example, to satisfy their reserve requirements by holding strategic stocks anywhere along the supply chain, from the Persian Gulf to their own shores, at a fraction of current costs. (Japan currently relies heavily on steel tanks on high-value property at home to store its reserves.) This approach would also make for a more constructive interaction between producers and consumers: it would encourage producers to keep their oil stocks in large importing countries, which would mean more reliable deliveries and so be good for consumers, too. South Korea already counts as part of its strategic reserves oil stored for it by Norway's StatoilHydro, and Saudi Arabia is exploring a similar option with Chinese and Indian companies.

Oversight of the strategic-oil-management procedures of the IEA's members could be added to the agency's existing reviews of national energy policies. The IEA's review teams should grade each country's strategic-oil-reserve system according to the credibility, transparency, and independence of its management. Such an approach on the part of the IEA would make it easier for states to integrate their choices about strategic oil reserves with other aspects of their energy policies. For example, a country that could reliably reduce its demand for oil in a crisis -- by either using other fuels or relaxing environmental standards temporarily to allow for the use of high-sulfur crude -- would not be required to hold as large a stockpile as one that could not. With such a system in place, the international management of oil stocks would in time come to be less dominated by energy ministries and more by the type of coordination exercised by central bankers and financial-market regulators.

#### The CP solves military power.

**Talent & Hall, ‘10**

[Jim, distinguished fellow in government relations -- the Heritage Foundation, Heath, Heritage, “Sowing the Wind: The Decay of American Power and its Consequences,” http://www.freedomsolutions.org/2010/03/sowing-the-wind-the-decay-of-american-power-and-its-consequences/]

There were certainly ups and downs in the status of America’s military in the thirty years after World War II, but the situation took a dramatic turn for the worse during the Carter years. After Vietnam, the country questioned its Cold War commitments, and President Carter, unlike his predecessors, fundamentally questioned not just the effectiveness but the legitimacy of using American power abroad. In addition, Congress was much more liberal because of the post-Watergate elections.[90] These trends converged to produce reductions in defense funding which, combined with the poor morale of the post-Vietnam years, had disastrous results. The military became a “hollow” force, not capable of performing its missions.[91] It was like a house that appeared in good condition on the outside, but on the inside had no wiring or plumbing. A number of events brought home the military’s deterioration. In 1979, the Captain of the USS Canisteo refused to certify that his ship was seaworthy on the grounds that his sailors were untrained.[92] Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird issued a blistering report detailing the lack of military readiness.[93] America’s embassy was seized in Iran, and the rescue attempt—Operation Desert One—was a fiasco.[94] And most ominously, the Soviet Union increased the stakes in the Cold War by invading Afghanistan.[95] In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President. He clearly understood that American power was a stabilizing force in the world. He made it a priority to secure two immediate double-digit increases in the defense budget and followed those increases with substantial increases for several more years.[96] The effect was immediate and electric. The Pentagon was able to recapitalize its “platforms”—ships, planes, and tracked vehicles—with equipment that employed the latest technology and thereby made the force less vulnerable and more lethal—what the military calls “force multipliers.”[97] Training increased and morale soared. The extra money made it possible to increase compensation, which made the volunteer military an outstanding success.[98] The effect was to shift momentum abroad decisively in the direction of freedom. American power, coupled with Reagan’s sense of resolution, forced the Soviet Union into a corner. Just a few years after the leaders of the Soviet Union believed they could build a blue-water navy which could challenge the United States, the same leadership realized they were in a competition they could not win. The Soviets collapsed under the pressure.[99] After the Cold War, Reagan’s defense buildup provided the overwhelming force behind America’s victory in Operation Desert Storm and created the conditions that allowed for peace and prosperity throughout the 1990s, and up until September 11, 2001.[100] However, history then took another swing. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, official Washington believed America was in a “threat trough.”[101] Throughout the 1990s and up until the attacks of September 11, 2001, the accepted view was that any existential threat to the United States lay at least ten years in the future. Because of that view, defense decisions that should have been based on hardheaded military assessments were driven, instead, by budget considerations.[102] As a result, Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton began to significantly reduce the size of the military. The active-duty Army was reduced from the 18 divisions of Operation Desert Storm to 10 by 1996—its size today. The size of the Navy and Air Force was reduced by approximately one-third.[103] President Clinton also substantially cut modernization and procurement budgets well beyond what the cuts in force size and structure warranted. Throughout the 1990s, this policy was knows as the “procurement holiday”—the government simply stopped replacing its inventory of ships, aircraft, and ground combat vehicles.[104] Ironically, at the same time as the size of the military was reduced and its inventory was allowed to age, its missions were increased.[106] The post-Cold War world proved to be tremendously unstable, and both President Clinton and George W. Bush used the military repeatedly to stop genocide, provide humanitarian aid, and protect the progress of freedom.[107] America has deployed its military dozens of times since 1991, including in four major combat engagements—a far higher rate than during the Cold War.[108] The reductions in the size of our armed forces and in the procurement budgets had profound implications for military readiness. The military has “rusted” and is becoming technologically obsolete. When equipment is not replaced at the rate at which it is wearing out, the remaining inventory gets older. As technology changes, new programs must be designed and purchased in adequate numbers, or the services lose their qualitative edge. Technology makes the force more effective and less vulnerable; it enables the military to perform its missions with greater speed and certainty of success and with fewer casualties. Ultimately, our servicemen and women pay the price for equipment that is unreliable or out of date. The condition of the inventory in the various services is discussed in detail below. The force structure and procurement reductions saved money in the short term but increased costs in the long term. Old equipment breaks down more often, which drives up maintenance costs. For example, because of budget shortfalls, the Air Force continues to fly its C-5A transports, which are 35–40 years old[109] and have a mission capable rate of approximately 50%; which means that half of the C-5A’s missions have to be scratched because of breakdowns.[110] Also, when a smaller force is used more often, the length and number of deployments goes up, causing more movement and stress among the troops—what the military calls “turbulence.” That leaves less time for training between deployments. It also makes it more difficult to recruit and retain personnel. The total effect is to put downward pressure on morale and readiness levels and increase the cost of recruitment and retention. Furthermore, the reductions in modernization and procurement caused the defense industrial base to shrink. The effect in the short term was less competition and higher per-unit and program costs. In the longer term, the nation lost capabilities which are very difficult to reconstitute. For example, the pressure on the shipbuilding budget and the consolidation of shipyards has imperiled America’s ability to design modern submarines.[111] Moreover, inadequate budgets forced the services into more costly procurement decisions. They were continually forced to delay and then stretch out new program development, buy fewer platforms once a new program was developed, and buy piecemeal instead of through efficient multiyear contracts. For example, the services desperately need additional “lift” or cargo capacity, because as bases abroad have been closed the military cannot forward position as many assets.[112] The Air Force had originally planned to sign a multi-year contract in 2005 for 42 more C-17 cargo aircraft.[113] Budget shortfalls have forced them to buy the aircraft a few at a time, which has cost the taxpayer $50 million more per plane. This effect was compounded because political leaders promised that budgets would increase significantly in the out years of planning horizons, so that the Pentagon kept programs alive hoping to fund them two or three years down the road. Then the promised funding was not forthcoming, so that programs were never developed, or so few platforms were purchased that the costs of design and development could not be spread over a wide enough base to hold down program costs. For example, the Navy originally planned to buy 32 of the new DDG-1000 destroyers; it now will buy no more than 3.[114] The per-unit cost of each vessel, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), could reach as high as $5 billion.[115] In short, when old platforms are not replaced, readiness levels drop, and the cost of maintaining the inventory climbs rapidly. Although America did not have a “hollow” force at the end of the Clinton years, the force had begun to “rust” badly. President George W. Bush increased procurement funding,[116] but nowhere near the amount needed to make up for the shortfalls of the 1990s, especially since higher maintenance, program, and personnel costs ate up more of the budget.[117] Once the Iraq War began, extra money was spent to pay for the ongoing operations of that conflict. Those funds could only be used to replace equipment lost during the war; by and large, the war funding was not available to recapitalize the existing inventory, and it could not be used at all to pay for the development or procurement of new programs. So the defense budget looked bigger, but actually the extra spending on the war squeezed even further the “core” budget that the military uses to prepare for the future by recapitalizing its inventory of ships, planes, and tracked vehicles.[118] The situation now facing the American military is extremely grave. In one respect the military is better off than it was in 1981. The all-volunteer force has become a proven, mature and successful model; America is protected by the best servicemen and women in the history of its military. But there are not enough of them, and they are using a generation of equipment that is reaching the end of its useful life and that in any event is not sophisticated enough to sustain the technological edge on which they depend when they go into combat. To understand what is at stake we discuss below the individual needs and deficiencies of the services in greater detail. 1. THE NAVY America has enjoyed maritime supremacy since the end of World War II, an important factor in its military’s successes over the past 60 years. To maintain this advantage in the years to come, an aggressive and robust funding plan must be developed that allows the Navy to recapitalize and modernize its aging and shrinking fleet. At the twilight of the Reagan administration, the Navy boasted 566 ships.[119] Today, some 20 years later, the Navy struggles to sustain a fleet of only 283 ships.[120] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, former Chief of Naval Operations, said that, Harnessing sea power in the 21st century will demand much more of us than simply putting ordnance on target—though clearly that remains a core capability. It will demand the ability to aggregate and disaggregate forces quickly; it will demand highly sophisticated networks, connectivity and stealth; it will demand better joint, allied and coalition interoperability; and it will demand that we build for the future a new fleet of ships, aircraft and submarines to wield that power across the spectrum of conflict.[121] In February of that same year, the Navy presented its annual thirty-year-shipbuilding plan to Congress. In that plan, the Navy proposed to increase the size of its fleet from 285 battle force ships in 2006 to 313 by 2020 and beyond.[122] The 313-ship fleet as outlined by the Navy would be comprised of 11 aircraft carriers, 69 guided-missile destroyers, 19 guided-missile cruisers, 55 littoral combat ships, 48 attack submarines, 4 guided-missile submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 31 amphibious ships, 12 future Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships, and 50 logistics and support ships.[123] In March 2008, just two years after the 313-ship fleet was first presented to Congress, the CBO testified before Congress that: “Executing the Navy’s most recent 30-year shipbuilding plan will cost an average of about $25 billion a year (in 2009 dollars), or double the $12.6 billion a year the Navy has spent, on average, since 2003.”[124] According to the same CBO testimony, “If implemented . . . the Navy’s 2009 plan would keep the fleet at or above the 313-ship goal beginning in 2019 and for most years thereafter.”[125] That being said, the CBO testimony continued by saying: Notwithstanding its achievement of at least 313 ships in 2019, the Navy’s 2009 plan would fall short of the service’s stated goals for a number of the components of the fleet. The Navy would experience shortfalls in attack submarines (41 in 2028-2030 versus a stated requirement of 48), guided-missile submarines (none after 2028 versus a stated requirement of 4), ballistic missile submarines (12 after 2030 versus a stated requirement for 14), one LPD-17 amphibious transport dock, and two T-AKE logistics ships for the service’s future MPF squadron.[126] The upshot is that even if the Navy’s current plans for 313 ships were carried out, they would not fully support essential elements of the Navy’s submarine fleet, a vital tool in the Navy’s efforts to maintain maritime superiority over China in the Western Pacific.[127] At a time when China is producing four to five submarines a year, the United States is acquiring only one and will not begin acquiring two until fiscal year 2011.[128] In addition, the Navy has abandoned plans to buy substantial numbers of its new DDG-1000 Destroyers.[129] That means the Navy is conceding that it will not have adequate naval fire support for Marine amphibious landings. Another area of concern is the Navy’s stock of aircraft carriers.[130] The 313-ship plan calls for the Navy to have eleven aircraft carriers, but with the decommissioning of the USS Enterprise in November 2012, the Navy will only have ten operational aircraft carriers until September 2015, at the earliest, when the USS Gerald R. Ford is expected to be commissioned.[131] The reality is that this gap is expected to be much longer with the likelihood of construction delays and the fact that it will take an additional thirty months for the new carrier to become operationally ready.[132] Even after this period of five to six years with only ten operational aircraft carriers, the Navy will have no margin for error with eleven carriers; there will certainly be times when one or more of the commissioned carriers will be docked for maintenance and therefore non-operational. All of this strongly suggests that a Navy of 313 ships is inadequate, but that number is in any event unattainable at anything approaching the current budget numbers. If the goal of a 313-ship fleet is to be realized and sustained, the Navy must see an increase in the shipbuilding budget on the order of $12 billion per year.[133] Navy aviation procurement also needs an increase—the Navy must have planes to put on its aircraft carriers—so the entire budget shortfall for the Navy is somewhere between $15 and $22 billion per year.[134] 2. THE ARMY The Army is stressed—it is being asked to do more with less at a time when the operational tempo of our Army’s conventional forces has seen a dramatic increase. On February 26, 2008, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of the Army Peter Geren and Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr. stated that, “[w]hile the Army remains the best led, best trained, and best equipped Army in the world, it is out of balance.”[135] Secretary Geren and General Casey continued their testimony by saying: The combined effects of an operational tempo that provides insufficient recovery time for personnel, Families, and equipment, a focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities, and Reserve Components assigned missions for which they were not originally intended nor adequately resourced, result in our readiness being consumed as fast as we can build it. Therefore, our top priority over the next several years is to restore balance through four imperatives: Sustain, Prepare, Reset, and Transform.[136] Simply stated, as it is constituted today, the Army is much too small and its stock of fighting vehicles is in desperate need of recapitalization and modernization. The national military strategy calls for a military capable of defending the homeland, sustaining four peacekeeping engagements, and fighting two large-scale regional conflicts at approximately the same time. As it stands today, the Army is too small to execute this strategy within an acceptable margin of risk to our servicemen and servicewomen. “Throughout the Cold War, end strength of the U.S. active-duty force never dropped below 2.0 million personnel and peaked at over 3.5 million during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. From 1989 to 1999, end strength dropped steadily from 2.1 million to 1.4 million, where it has remained.”[137] At the outset of the Clinton administration the Army was nearly twice as big as it is today.[138] The Army’s force structure was cut from 18 divisions during Operation Desert Storm to 10 divisions by 1996–its size today.[139] In 1993, even before the increased operational tempo of the 1990s and 2000s and before the War on Terror, it was clear that the active duty army should have at the least twelve divisions.[140] It costs at least $2 billion to stand up and sustain an additional division, which means at least another $4 billion per year must be spent on increased Army force structure.[141] Increasing force structure is not the only challenge facing the Army in the years ahead. The Army is also in desperate need of a major commitment to modernize and recapitalize its inventory of fighting equipment. It is vital that our Army ensures that units and Soldiers have the right capabilities to accomplish the wide variety of operations that we will conduct in the 21st century. Continuous modernization is the key to enhancing our capabilities and maintaining a technological advantage over any enemy we face. We never want to send our Soldiers into a fair fight.[142] The Future Combat Systems is the program that will provide the Army with enhanced capabilities and a technological advantage in combat. That system is designed to replace many of the tanks and nearly all of the tracked vehicles in the Army. Secretary Geren and General Casey in their testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee said: Future Combat Systems (FCS) are the core of our modernization effort and will provide our Soldiers an unparalleled understanding of their operational environment, increased precision and lethality, and enhanced survivability. These improved capabilities cannot be achieved by upgrading current vehicles and systems. FCS will use a combination of new manned and unmanned air and ground vehicles, connected by robust networks, to allow Soldiers to operate more effectively in the complex threat environments of the 21st century.[143] According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: America’s ground forces have borne the brunt of underfunding in the past and the bulk of the costs-both human and material of the wars of the present. By one count, investment in Army equipment and other essentials was underfunded by more than 50 Billion dollars before we invaded Iraq. By another estimate, the Army’s share of total defense investments between 1990 and 2005 was about 15%. So resources are needed not only to recoup from the losses of war, but to make up for the shortfalls of the past and to invest in the capabilities of the future.[144] In April 2008, GAO found that, Restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete; however the total cost is uncertain. Based on GAO’s analysis of Army cost estimates and cost data, it appears that the Army’s plans to equip modular units, expand the force, reset equipment, and replace prepositioned equipment are likely to cost at least $190 billion through fiscal year 2013.[145] Unless the necessary funding is provided—and current defense budgets are not adequate to do so—the Army cannot provide its troops with equipment that sustains the technological edge which America has enjoyed over the last two decades. That means missions either cannot be performed or will result in substantial and unnecessary casualties. 3. THE AIR FORCE For the first time in its 61-year existence, the Air Force is teetering on the brink of losing its historic ability to guarantee American military dominance in the air. America is losing its historical advantages in air, space and cyberspace. The Air Force is feeling the effects of increased operational tempo perhaps more than any of the other Services. “In 2007, America’s Airmen conducted nearly 1,600 strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq alone, Air Force strikes increased by 171% over the previous year, while in Afghanistan strikes increased by 22%.”[146] In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in February 2008, Michael Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force and General Michael Moseley, Chief of Staff of the Air Force addressed the increased operational tempo the Air Force has experienced since Operation Desert Shield when they said: For over seventeen years, since Operation DESERT SHIELD, the United States Air Force has been engaged in continuous combat operations. Our Airmen have maintained constant watch, deployed continuously, engaged America’s adversaries directly, responded to human crises around the world, and provided the Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power to secure our Nation.[147] While the Army was losing divisions, the Air Force was losing tactical air wings. The number of tactical air wings in the Air Force was reduced from thirty seven at the time of Operation Desert Storm to twenty by the mid-1990s.[148] At the same time the size of the Air Force was shrinking the average age of its aircraft was rapidly rising. At the end of the Vietnam era, in 1973, the average age of Air Force aircraft was approximately nine years old.[149] Twenty years later, in 1993, the year of President Clinton’s Bottom-up Review, the average age of the Air Forces inventory of aircraft was just under fifteen years.[150] Today, the average age of Air Force aircraft has risen to nearly twenty five years.[151] In the coming years, the Air Force must purchase its new superiority fighter, the F-22, as well as the Joint Strike Fighter or equivalent aircraft. Additionally, the Air Force must fund its strategic-airlift requirement, design and build a new tanker, and develop an interdiction bomber to replace the B-52. Here are some examples of the modernization crisis facing the Air Force: \* KC-135 Tanker: The oldest of the service’s nearly 500 tankers date from the second Eisenhower Administration, which means they are nearly 50 years old. The current plan, given budget limitations, is to replace them at a rate of 12–14 next-generation tankers per year, which means that the Air Force will fly the KC-135 at least until the mid-2030s when it will be more than 80 years old.[152] \* B-52 Bomber: Our remaining fleet of B-52s date from the early 1960s. Like the KC-135, the current plan, again due to funding shortfalls, is to fly the B-52 until the mid-2030s. Flying the B-52 in combat in 2030 would be as ridiculous as flying the B-17 bomber, built in the late 1930s, in combat today.[153] \* F-15 Fighter: The F-15 “Eagle” first flew in the early 1970s and remains the mainstay of our air superiority and strike fighter inventory. With that being said, an Air National Guard F-15 broke apart during a routine training flight a year ago. Much like the KC-135 and the B-52, the Air Force plans to retain nearly 200 F-15s in the air superiority mission until the mid-2020s, when they will be almost 50 years old.[154] \* T-38 “Talon” Trainer: The Air Force inventory of over 500 supersonic T-38 trainers dates to the 1960s. This is the primary undergraduate trainer for new pilots who will fly the F-15, F-16 and F-22 fighters, among other aircraft. The current plan is to fly these aircraft for another 20-plus years, when most of them will be 60 years of age.[155] The shortfall for the Air Force is at least $20 billion per year; it is difficult to estimate it with any greater precision, because so many of the programs are not even in the design phase, and there are so many questions about Air Force plans.[156] For example, to save money, the Air Force will try to design and build an aircraft that has both cargo and tanker capabilities.[157] The viability of such a design, and the cost and capabilities of the aircraft assuming it can be built, are impossible to predict with any real accuracy. But there is no doubt whatsoever that the Air Force must in some fashion recapitalize its tanker inventory and increase its lift capacity—and also no doubt that the current and projected budgets for the Department of Defense are nowhere near adequate to prevent the Air Force from losing technological superiority.[158] 4. THE NATIONAL GUARD & RESERVE The militias have played an integral role in domestic and foreign missions since well before America’s founding in 1776. Since September 11, 2001, Guard and Reserve components of the U.S. military have conducted major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and participated in domestic missions ranging from border security to hurricane victim rescue and recovery.[159] Between the end of World War II and 1989, reservists were involuntarily deployed for federal service four times in response to war and national emergencies (the Korean conflict, the Berlin airlift, the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War)—an average of about one deployment every eleven years.[160] Since 1990, reservists have been deployed an average of about once every three years in response to peace keeping and nation building missions, war, and national emergencies (the Persian Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia/Kosovo, Operation Noble Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom).[161] The combination of a much smaller active-duty force, much higher operational tempo, and much older inventory have put significant pressure on the National Guard and Reserve components. This pressure has only increased since the Iraqi engagement.[162] The mission of these troops is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.[163] The Guard’s mission also includes the role of responding to state emergencies, such as natural disasters and civil disorders. Systematic underfunding of the military has hit the Guard and Reserves directly, with substantial effect. It has left them with insufficient and aging equipment. According to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, the Guard had only seventy five percent of the equipment it needed on hand prior to September 11, 2001.[164] In May 2007, General Blum reported to the United States House of Representatives Homeland Security Subcommittee on Management, Investigations and Oversight that, “At the beginning of this year (2007), the Army National Guard had on hand approximately forty percent of the equipment which it is required to have.”[165] His testimony makes clear that, in addition to a severe equipment shortage, the Guard also is trying to make do with old equipment that is difficult and expensive to maintain and not easily deployable or useful in all of their missions. The growing need for equipment is not just being felt around the world. The increased operational tempo on foreign soil has exhausted the Guard’s domestic stockpile of vehicles, weapons, and communications gear, leaving remaining units with one third of the equipment required to defend the homeland and respond to national emergencies.[166] The Guard is transferring equipment from stateside units to units that are foreign deployed at a rapid rate. According to GAO, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 100,000 pieces of equipment to units overseas as of July 2005.[167] It is appropriate to ensure that deployed units are equipped with the newest state-of-the-art equipment. But that does not mean units remaining in the United States should be equipped with worn out and dated vehicles and gear—or not have any equipment at all! Some of our Guard units are still using M35 series trucks, M113 armored personnel carriers, and older M1 tanks with 105mm guns.[168] Other units rely on radio equipment that cannot change frequencies, use outdated encryption technology, and cannot communicate effectively with active duty units or first responders.[169] This undermines training and homeland readiness and spells trouble for reservists headed for future foreign deployments. It means they will go to war with equipment they have never used before, much less trained with. The Guard and Reserves need an equipment modernization program of their own that will provide them with the necessary resources to purchase new equipment with the latest technologies and the proper mix of capabilities for foreign and domestic missions. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team is a proven model that should be employed to modernize and equip the Guard. The Stryker unit is a wheeled combat force that is highly mobile and transportable in C-130, C-5, or C-17 aircraft. It is fast, maneuverable, and includes large numbers of infantry that can perform a diverse set of missions including medical evacuations, reconnaissance, fire support, engineering, and troop carrier variants.[170] But at current funding levels, it will be impossible to equip the active duty Army, much less the reserve component, with the necessary upgraded equipment.[171] A second major concern affecting the viability of the Guard and Reserves centers on the size of the active-duty force. The reduction of active duty force structure in the 1990s occurred despite clear warnings that the smaller active Army would not be able to carry out its missions within an acceptable margin of risk. Those warnings have come home to roost. According to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, “The use of reserve component personnel increased from 12.7 million duty days in fiscal year 2001 to 68.3 million duty days in fiscal year 2005.”[172] In 2004, more than 40% of our forces in Iraq were reservists. In its 2002 Emergency Supplemental Request to Congress, Pentagon officials indicated that the Department of Defense could not implement the National Security Strategy without the National Guard and Reserve.[173] The overuse of the Guard and Reserve is inhibiting recruiting and retention. The reserve component service members did not join with the expectation of being on active duty for years at a time.[174] They have remained faithful and done their duty far better than anyone could have expected, but it is unreasonable to expect them to continue serving when the government isn’t doing its part to sustain the Army with adequate manpower and equipment. The Commission’s report indicates that in fiscal year 2005, “nearly all the reserve components fell short of their recruiting goals: the Army National Guard by twenty percent, Army Reserves by sixteen percent, Air National Guard by 14 percent and Navy Reserve by fifteen percent.”[175] The problem is likely to get worse as the services enter the current funding crisis; Reserve components tend to be given what is “leftover” from defense budgets and therefore suffer even more than the active duty components when budgets are inadequate.[176] II. FOUR PERCENT FOR FREEDOM There is, in sum, a substantial and growing gap between what America is projected to spend on defense and the minimum necessary to recapitalize the force and increase the Army and Marines to the size which everyone now agrees is necessary.[177] Had the government addressed the needs honestly in the 1990s, the cost would have been moderate; however, the delay has increased the cost to much higher levels than was necessary. The current gap, for modernization and procurement alone, is at least $50–60 billion per year, and very probably more than that.[178] The necessary amount can be provided by raising the defense budget to approximately four percent of GDP, using as a base year for GDP calculation the year prior to the submission of a Presidential budget, and sustaining the budget against inflation thereafter. The amount is not large by historical standards; as a practical matter, what is required is one double digit increase in the defense budget, followed by inflationary increases thereafter.[179] This approach, called the “Four Percent for Freedom” solution by The Heritage Foundation, would send a clear global message that the United States intends to sustain its commitments around the world. It would permit the Pentagon to attempt what has heretofore been unthinkable in Washington—long term planning. Funding at a stable level would allow the service chiefs to budget in a way that would reduce the costs of new programs over their useful lives, instead of fighting each other for money every budget cycle or maneuvering to keep vital programs on life support by delaying them in a way that guarantees they will cost more in the long run. Sending the signal that defense will be funded honestly and adequately would also draw investment capital back into the defense industrial base, which would increase competitiveness and efficiency in that part of the economy and bring costs down over time. Finally, by reassuring the global markets that America is strong, the “Four Percent for Freedom” solution would help reduce risk within the international economy and promote economic growth at home and abroad; and even a small positive effect on the economy would more than pay for the necessary additional funds for increasing and modernizing the force. The peace and prosperity of the 1990s came in large part as a result of the Reagan defense buildup.[180] What would it be worth economically to prevent a major terror attack on our homeland, reduce the risk that China invades Taiwan, or reduce the risk that Kim Jong-il will use his nuclear capability? Military strength does have a price, but as America has found out again and again, the price of weakness, both in blood and treasure, is far greater. The increase in funding can be supplemented by savings elsewhere in the defense budget. For example, a dedicated effort to reduce earmarks can save several billion dollars per year, and better management of the military health care system can reduce costs without depriving service members or retirees of care.[181] But there is no point in pretending that a budget shortfall of the size that now exists—created, again, by the failure to be honest in the past about real needs—can be met by reducing other parts of the defense budget. That is impossible. The savings cannot come from reducing manpower because force structure is already too low. It cannot come from decreased funding for operations and maintenance; if anything, that account is likely to cost more because of the age of the inventory. Nor can the shortfall be funded by freezing or reducing compensation for the troops. Apart from the fact that Congress should and would never reduce salaries in the middle of a war—and America will be fighting the terrorists for a long time—the services must recruit and retain high quality people to sustain the volunteer force. Today’s military demands skilled people with sophisticated training. The days of “grunts” in the service have long since come to an end. There is no responsible defense expert who argues that the current capitalization requirements can be met without substantial additional funding; it is hardly possible to do so, because simple budgetary math shows that the Pentagon cannot acquire the new programs at anything close to currently projected funding levels. And the new programs are obviously necessary, unless the nation is comfortable forcing its servicemen and women to drive tracked vehicles or fly airplanes that are 50 to 60 years old or sail in a Navy that has one third fewer ships than it needs.

### 1NC Heg Adv

#### Heg is inevitable

Maher 11 – Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68

The United States will continue to be the ‘‘default power’’ (to use Josef Joffe’s term) in the near future.20 No other country will be able to duplicate the overall reach and influence of the United States—in terms of economic, political, and military power—for at least several decades. It is not clear, moreover, how many peoplewouldwant to live in aworlddominated byChina, India,Russia, or even Europe. The United States retains a number of tremendous advantages compared to possible strategic competitors: its demographics; advanced technology; raw materials; research universities and laboratories; continued dominance in global mass culture, and labor market flexibility.

#### Hegemony isn’t key to solve war - Rivalry, stability, and deterrence claims are all false

**Friedman 10**—research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in pol sci, MIT (Ben, Military Restraint and Defense Savings, 20 July 2010, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html)

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrest than they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival. Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us — either directly or by forcing us to become a garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

#### No transition wars

**MacDonald and Parent 2011** - \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami (Paul and Joseph, International Security, 35.4, "Graceful decline? The surprising success of great power retrenchment", http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC\_a\_00034-MacDonald\_proof2.pdf, WEA)

Wars, preventive or otherwise, do not appear to be a common fate for declining states, and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases, and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in or- dinal rank.60 In addition, in six of fifteen cases, declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound, eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. Further, even if retrenchment was not successful, this does not prove that a preferable policy existed.61 In many cases of decline, there are few restorative solutions available; politics is often a game of unpalatable alterna- tives. Short of a miracle, it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain, France, or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft, even with the benefit of hindsight.

#### Airpower not key to heg – empirics

**RECORD 2k** (Jeffrey, Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College and former professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, FAILED STATES AND CASUALTY PHOBIA)

Admittedly, an air-option-only approach to dealing with small wars would be a mistake. Aside from conveying reluctance of political will to adversaries and allies alike, the military effectiveness of such an approach would be inherently circumscribed by air power’s own limitations. Air power’s record as a tool of political coercion is not impressive in the absence of other factors at play, including the presence of ground forces. And as the war against Serbia demonstrated, air power can influence but not control events on the ground. Withholding ground forces simply because of fear of casualties renders the United States a one-armed superpower. It also reduces air power’s potential effectiveness because the very presence of U.S. ground forces, even if not actually committed to combat, forces the enemy to concentrate his ground forces, thereby increasing their vulnerability to air attack.

#### Peaceful China rise and no war

**Rosecrance and Qingguo 2010** – \*political science professor at Cal and senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former director of the Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA, \*\*PhD from Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University (Jia Qingguo and Richard Rosecrance, Global Asia, 4.4, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?”, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>, WEA)

Will China and the US Go to War?   
If one accepts the previous analysis, the answer is “no,” or at least not likely. Why?   
First, despite its revolutionary past, China has gradually accepted the US-led world order and become a status quo power. It has joined most of the important inter-governmental international organizations. It has subscribed to most of the important international laws and regimes. It has not only accepted the current world order, it has become a strong supporter and defender of it. China has repeatedly argued that the authority of the United Nations and international law should be respected in the handling of international security crises. China has become an ardent advocate of multilateralism in managing international problems. And China has repeatedly defended the principle of free trade in the global effort to fight the current economic crisis, despite efforts by some countries, including the US, to resort to protectionism. To be sure, there are some aspects of the US world order that China does not like and wants to reform. However, it wishes to improve that world order rather than to destroy it.   
Second, China has clearly rejected the option of territorial expansion. It argues that territorial expansion is both immoral and counterproductive: immoral because it is imperialistic and counterproductive because it does not advance one’s interests. China’s behavior shows that instead of trying to expand its territories, it has been trying to settle its border disputes through negotiation. Through persistent efforts, China has concluded quite a number of border agreements in recent years. As a result, most of its land borders are now clearly drawn and marked under agreements with its neighbors. In addition, China is engaging in negotiations to resolve its remaining border disputes and making arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputed islands and territorial waters. Finally, even on the question of Taiwan, which China believes is an indisputable part of its territory, it has adopted a policy of peaceful reunification. A country that handles territorial issues in such a manner is by no means expansionist.   
Third, China has relied on trade and investment for national welfare and prestige, instead of military conquest. And like the US, Japan and Germany, China has been very successful in this regard. In fact, so successful that it really sees no other option than to continue on this path to prosperity.   
Finally, after years of reforms, China increasingly finds itself sharing certain basic values with the US, such as a commitment to the free market, rule of law, human rights and democracy. Of course, there are still significant differences in terms of how China understands and practices these values. However, at a conceptual level, Beijing agrees that these are good values that it should strive to realize in practice.   
A Different World   
It is also important to note that certain changes in international relations since the end of World War II have made the peaceful rise of a great power more likely. To begin with, the emergence of nuclear weapons has drastically reduced the usefulness of war as a way to settle great power rivalry. By now, all great powers either have nuclear weapons or are under a nuclear umbrella. If the objective of great power rivalry is to enhance one’s interests or prestige, the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons means that these goals can no longer be achieved through military confrontation. Under these circumstances, countries have to find other ways to accommodate each other — something that China and the US have been doing and are likely to continue to do.   
Also, globalization has made it easier for great powers to increase their national welfare and prestige through international trade and investment rather than territorial expansion. In conducting its foreign relations, the US relied more on trade and investment than territorial expansion during its rise, while Japan and Germany relied almost exclusively on international trade and investment. China, too, has found that its interests are best served by adopting the same approach.   
Finally, the development of relative pacifism in the industrialized world, and indeed throughout the world since World War II, has discouraged any country from engaging in territorial expansion. There is less and less popular support for using force to address even legitimate concerns on the part of nation states. Against this background, efforts to engage in territorial expansion are likely to rally international resistance and condemnation.   
Given all this, is the rise of China likely to lead to territorial expansion and war with the US? The answer is no.

### 1NC Oil Adv

#### Food wars don’t escalate or spillover

**Paarlberg, 08 -** professor of political science at Wellesley College and a visiting professor of government at Harvard University (Robert, “The Real Food Crisis,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 6/27, lexis)

Ironically, it was only when the so-called food crisis of the 1970s came to an end, during the slow-growth decade of the 1980s, that food circumstances in poor countries significantly worsened. In Latin America, even though world **food prices** were falling sharply, the number of hungry people increased from 46 million to more than 60 million. The reason was a regional "debt crisis" triggered by higher U.S. interest rates after 1979. The number of hungry people also increased sharply in Africa during the 1980s. The reason was faltering farm production, exacerbated in some regions by severe drought and civil conflict. The price for imported food was down, but hunger was up. Most real food crises are local rather than global.

#### No impact to Iranian prolif

**Farley, IR prof, 9**—assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky (Robert, What If Iran Got the Bomb? It would be time to calm down, 7 July 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/07/what\_if\_iran\_got\_the\_bomb?page=0,0, AMiles)

There are profound differences between the Islamic Republic and the People's Republic, and 2009 is not 1969. Simply because the PRC survived a superpower confrontation, several chaotic leadership changes, and a Cultural Revolution without ever using its nukes doesn't mean that Iran poses no threat. However, it does suggest that nuclear deterrence may be as robust as advertised and that deterrence applies even to states led by people who say and do crazy things (like refraining from Western neckwear). Given Mao's penchant for bizarre behavior, earlier concerns that China might recklessly employ the nuclear weapons it was seeking in the late 1950s were probably even more legitimate than such concerns over Iran now. Nevertheless, China has acted as a responsible steward of nuclear weapons, even in situations of existential danger. So, rather than preparing for war against Iran, or believing that unconditional talks will eventually succeed (a nice hope, but unlikely), or offering a green light to a nervous regional ally convinced that nukes in crazy hands will inevitably lead to their use, perhaps American policymakers should take some comfort from history. Why not let Iran cross the nuclear threshold and spend time and energy focusing on how to make the deterrence of a nuclear Iran effective? After all, that now seems to look like the only realistic option. In short, the best lesson for the West may be this: Calm down.

#### Prices aren’t high enough to collapse the economy, but falling prices would tank petrostates and cause insane, rapid price shocks that access your impact

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And that's the whole problem here - the gap between geological costs of production and the geopolitical cost of survival is simply too wide for producers to cover without falling back on draconian measures. If this 'self-correcting' mechanism between price and political unrest starts supporting an informal price floor then so be it, but we shouldn't be fooled that this is serving anyone's interests - on either side of the consumer-producer ledger. Yes, it will help firm prices when certain producers struggle to adapt to rapidly shifting economic conditions, but assuming that more and more producer states hit political problems as prices slip, we're merely cementing the 'too big to fail' status of the very largest oil producers. Seeing petro-states dropping like political flies as prices correct isn't a proper 'solution' for a floor, not only because prices will rebound with a vengeance when markets tighten, but because it will make us even more dependent on a handful of key suppliers. As we all know from previous problems in Iraq (2.9 mb/d), Iran (3 mb/d), Libya (1.48 m/bd), Nigeria (2.4 mb/d) and even Venezuela (2.7 mb/d), once things go politically wrong, it takes a very long time, if ever, to get back to optimal production levels. It's the antithesis of where consumers want to be in terms of sourcing plentiful and fungible supplies. Final scene: corpses all over the stage By way of reminder, as much as petro-states currently face a systemic crisis trying to set a price floor, it was only in March that we saw how badly placed OPEC is to moderate the market at the top. Seeing petro-states in a pickle might warm the hearts of many right now, but markets can turn, and turn fast. When they do, the oil weapon will shift target as well. It will no longer be pointed at petro players heads, but directly at consumer states. That's the consequence of a dysfunctional energy system - not just with a $50-$150/b outlook eminently possible, but swings well beyond that 'price band' all too likely. Splitting this price directly in two and sticking close to $100/b might not be that bad an idea after all: Mopping up the mess from producer state implosion would require an effort far beyond the international systems capabilities and reach. Carefully agreed truces are always better than outright wars, particularly for those squeamish about collateral damage. Corpses would litter the entire energy stage.

#### No economic impact to oil shocks – trade and petrodollar recycling check

Tobias N. Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman August 2011 Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

VII. CONCLUSION Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the U.S. economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. In this paper, we offer a global perspective on the macroeconomic impact of oil prices. In doing so, we are filling a void of research on the effects of oil prices on developing economies. Our findings indicate that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy. Indeed, we find that the United States has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies, but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25 percent increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of one percent, spread over 2–3 years. One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies. We provide a model illustrating this effect and find supporting empirical evidence.

#### Kazakhstan is dependent on high oil prices – energy price decline would crush growth

BMI 7-26-2012; Business Monitor International, Robust Oil Revenues Allow For Expansionary State Budget http://store.businessmonitor.com/article/639203

BMI View: Kazakhstan's general government budgetary position will remain robust over our forecast period due in large part to the country's National Oil Fund. Relatively high oil prices over the coming years will enable the government to run a state budget deficit (consisting of the central and local governments but not including the National Oil Fund) in line with President Nursultan Nazarbayev's long-term plan to improve Kazakhstan's social welfare via higher public spending. We forecast the general government consolidated budgetary position to remain in strong surplus over our forecast period to 2021. In 2012 and 2013 the general government surplus will fall to 9.8% of GDP, down marginally from 2011 at 10.3% of GDP. The weak external environment will translate to weaker revenue growth in our view, which we forecast to come in at to 15.0% in 2012, 16.0% in 2013 from 33.1% in 2011. However, high global energy and commodity prices will preclude a more substantial slowdown in revenue growth. Kazakhstan is highly dependent on global commodity prices as a net hydrocarbon exporter and major exporter of grains and livestock. In spite of a weak global economic outlook, prices for commodities Kazakhstan exports remain high by historical standards due to a number of supply-side constraints, which will keep revenues to the government, in particular to the National Oil Fund (NF) well supported. [graph omitted, kd] High oil revenues will see to it that the government is able to continue running a deficit on the state budget (consisting of the central and local governments but not including the National Oil Fund) in line with President Nursultan Nazarbayev's '2010-2014 National Program of Forced Industrial and Innovative Development' to improve the social development in the country. [graph omitted, kd] We forecast the state budget deficit to widen to 2.9% of GDP in 2012 and 2.6% in 2013 from 2.1% in 2011. Public spending on education, public health and social security will continue to make up the bulk of government expenditure, totalling 50.6% of total spending in 2011, up from 49.6% in 2010 and only 27.8% in 2008. We forecast state expenditure to increase by 28.0% in 2012 and 20.0% in 2013, up from 21.7% in 2011. [graph omitted, kd] Growth in revenues to the state budget will increase by 20.0% this year and by 22.0% in 2013, down slightly from the 24.9% growth racked up in 2011. Indeed, revenue growth has held up well this year, propped up by continued growth in tax receipts. Over the period January to June according to data released by the ministry of finance, tax receipts increased by 27.0% year-on-year (y-o-y) on average, while nontax receipts have remained under pressure falling by an average 7.2% y-o-y in the same period. Risks To Outlook The key risk to our fiscal outlook for the Kazakh government remains global oil prices. A more precipitous fall in global energy prices would have a serious impact on the Kazakh government's ambitious modernisation and social spending plans. Indeed, strong revenues into the National Oil Fund, with assets equivalent to KZT7.7trn (USD50.6bn) at end-2011, are key to the government's ability to run an expansionary fiscal policy. A dramatic fall in these revenues would put severe strain on the government's spending plans and cause the surplus on the general government budget to fall and the deficit on the state budget to widen.

#### Weak growth and social spending decline collapses Kazakhstan and draws in Russia, China, and the US

Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Marek Matusiak, and Krzysztof Strachota 12-27-2011; Centre for Eastern Studies, Bloody clashes in western Kazakhstan http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-12-21/bloody-clashes-western-kazakhstan

Despite the regional nature of the disturbances, and the authorities’ current control of the situation, the recent events in the Mangystau region pose a very serious challenge for the government. The suppression of the riots by force has allowed the government to temporarily stave off the threat of an escalation of instability, but this has in no way solved the problems that lie at the root of the tension, and have in fact raised the level of public discontent. If the government limits itself to the use of force, we may expect further outbreaks of discontent. The riots have revealed the depth of the internal tensions in Kazakhstan: the social background (despite the country’s relative prosperity), but also a sense of the alienation and arrogance of the governing elites. The events in Western Kazakhstan have also struck at the unwritten social contract which is one of the pillars of the authoritarian political system, and thus indirectly at the personal authority of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Social consent to this system has been based on the internal stability and economic development which he has guaranteed. In Kazakhstan there is currently no political alternative to the ruling camp, nor are there conditions to establish such a force. Tensions are inherent in the fundamental challenge facing Kazakhstan today of the succession of power; President Nursultan Nazarbayev is 71 years of age, and moves towards the emergence of a successor to him have long been playing out. The early, centrally-controlled parliamentary elections scheduled for 15 January 2012 are an indirect part of this process, but its success is by no means guaranteed. The current crisis has also increased the room for manoeuvre of those oligarchs resident abroad who have lately sharply criticised the government (especially Mukhtar Abliyazov), and weakened the position of the favourite for the succession, Timur Kulibayev. He is the President’s son-in-law, and his control extends to the key energy sector, including those companies where the strikes have taken place. This crisis has complicated the international position of Kazakhstan, which from the political and economic points of view is a key state in the region, and of fundamental importance in the regional strategic calculations of Russia (the region’s traditional great power), China (whose significance and presence in Central Asia is growing rapidly), and the USA. The succession of power will raise the geopolitical stakes. Kazakhstan's internal problems will be exacerbated above all by Russia, which has the strongest instruments for influencing events in this country (including close contacts with the ruling elite; its influence on the opposition abroad; and on Kazakhstan’s information space, including the pro-opposition K+ and Respublika, which are both hosted in Russia). The Russian media and internet are already using the problems in Kazakhstan to discredit their geopolitical rivals; they have attributed the riots to the US as an attempt to carry out a ‘Libyan scenario’ in Central Asia, and have emphasised the anti-Chinese elements of the strikes in Kazakhstan (a Chinese company is co-owner of one of the oil companies in Aktau).

#### High oil prices are key to Mexican budget balance and growth

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Mexico’s BMV Exchange signed a letter of intent to join the Integrated Market of Latin America (MILA) in December 2011. The MILA is a cross-border trading integration of the equity markets in Colombia, Chile and Peru. The integrated market is already the largest in Latin America by number of issuers, and the addition of Mexican securities would increase market capitalization to just over $1 trillion. While trading on the exchange has been below expectations, it has helped increase liquidity and market access for many companies in the region. Integration of the Mexican economy could mean a lowered cost of capital and higher liquidity for Mexican firms, increasing growth over the long-term. While traded stocks show how much the Mexican economy has grown and diversified in recent years, the national economy remains highly dependent on oil, which produces 35% of the government’s revenue and 7-10% of GDP**.** When world oil prices plunged in 2009, the Mexican economy shrank by more than 6%. A poor record of capital investment in PEMEX has led to declining production and fears of becoming a net importer of oil. This should be avoided through industry liberalization and an increase in private investment in oil services and in PEMEX itself. These measures will most likely be extremely incremental due to the high level of nationalistic emotion involved in ownership of oil assets. But they will happen over the next few years out of sheer necessity. Continued oil dependence and general skittishness of global markets mean investors in Mexican securities may experience fits of increased volatility. Longer term investors may want to gradually build a position through buying on days of significant sell-offs. But the fundamentals are positive.

#### Mexican economic collapse would cause brain drain, collapse anti-drug efforts, and crush the US economy

Edward Littlefield 2009 Research associate, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “As Mexico’s Problems Mount: The Impact of the Economic Recession on Migration Patterns from Mexico,” March 28th, http://www.indigenousportal.com/Politics/As-Mexico%E2%80%99s-Problems-Mount-The-Impact-of-the-Economic-Recession-on-Migration-Patterns-from-Mexico.html

Implications for Mexico and the United States Evidently, through migration, remittances, and NAFTA-induced trade integration, the Mexican economy has become increasingly dependent upon that of the United States, making the former extremely vulnerable to the effects of the current financial crisis. The decrease in migration flows and remittances is thus implicit in the current debate about Mexico’s descent into being a “failed state.” A Mexican economic collapse, spurred by a decrease in the migrants and remittances upon which the country’ s economy is reliant, would weaken the state’s capacity to finance counter-narcotics activity, increase pay-rolls to prevent political and military officials from corruption related to drug trafficking, recuperate the depressed economy, and keep their best and brightest at home. These series of developments would have a negative consequence for the United States economy and the Obama administration, as well. Mexico is the United States’ third largest export market, and the cheap labor that Mexican immigrants provide, although not nearly as coveted given the current recession, is an important part of the national economy. Additionally, Mexico’s potential economic and military collapse deserves to be viewed as a national security threat to the U.S., given the spread of drug-related violence to border states such as Arizona, where authorities blame a rise in home invasions and kidnappings on organized crime from south of the border.

#### High prices key to dollar hegemony – forces capital investment in the US

Stratfor 1-8-2008. “Annual Forecast 2008,” web.stratfor.com/images/writers/STRATFOR\_Annual\_1\_08.pdf.

Quietly developing in the background, the global economy is undergoing a no less dramatic transformation. While we expect oil prices to retreat somewhat in 2008 after years of surges, their sustained strength continues to shove a great deal of cash into the hands of the world’s oil exporters — cash that these countries cannot process internally and that therefore will either be stored in dollars or invested in the only country with deep enough capital pools to handle it: the United States. Add in the torrent of exports from the Asian states, which generates nearly identical cash-management problems, and the result is a deep dollarization of the global system **even as the U.S. dollar gives ground**. **The talk on the ﬁnancial pages will be of dollar** (implying American) **weakness, even as the currency steadily shifts from the one of ﬁrst resort to the true foundation of the entire system**.

#### Dollar hegemony is key to overall US hegemony and prevents currency status shift

Robert Looney, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Political power and prestige. The benefits of "power and prestige" are nebulous. Nevertheless, the loss of key currency status and the loss of international creditor status have sometimes been associated, along with such non-economic factors as the loss of colonies and military power, in discussions of the historical decline of great powers. Causality may well flow from key currency status to power and prestige and in the opposite direction as well.[8] On a broader scale, Niall Ferguson[9] notes that one pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. government sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency. Quoting several noted authorities, he notes that [the role of the dollar] enabled the United States to be "far less restrained…than all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or strategic policies it decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a 'hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy form foreigners in the form of seignorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). The web contains many more radical interactions of the dollar's role. Usually something along the following lines: World trade is now a game in which the U.S. produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies…. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the U.S. has extracted from oil-producing countries for U.S. tolerance of the oil-exporting cartel since 1973.[10] **America's coercive power in the world is based as much on the dollar's status as the global reserve currency as on U.S. military muscle**. Everyone needs oil, and to pay for it, they must have dollars. To secure dollars, they must sell their goods to the U.S., under terms acceptable to the people who rule America. The dollar is way overpriced, but it's the only world currency. Under the current dollars-only arrangement, U.S. money is in effect backed by the oil reserves of every other nation.[11] While it is tempting to dismiss passages of this sort as uninformed rants, they do contain some elements of truth. There are tangible benefits that accrue to the country whose currency is a reserve currency. The real question is: if this situation is so intolerable and unfair, why hasn't the world ganged up on the United States and changed the system? Why haven't countries like Libya and Iran required something like euros or gold dinars in payment for oil? After all, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 the International Monitary Fund's Standard Drawing Rights (unit of account) was certainly an available alternative to the dollar.[12]

## 2nc counterplan

### 2nc – solves DOD

#### CP solves the DOD – it hedges against a price increase undermining readiness

**Green, 12** - resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. (Kenneth, “End the DoD's Green Energy Fuelishness” 7/2, <http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/07/02/end_the_dods_green_energy_fuelishness_99741.html>

Green warriors make several arguments for the green fleet. First, they argue that when conventional fuel prices go up, military costs go up. Second, they argue that we are at perpetual risk of supply disruption. Third, they argue that the military could spur development of these new fuel technologies to make them cost competitive with conventional fuels. Fourth, they argue that new technologies that make ships and planes more energy efficient would enhance mobility and performance.

Virtually none of these arguments pass a laugh test. Yes, when conventional fuels rise in price, military operating costs go up. But in a global fuel market, the market value of any liquid fuel will track with the world price of oil on an energy-content basis. Simply switching to biofuels offers no price protection in a world of fuel-fungibility. Analysts at Rand put it quite succinctly in a recent report. "Alternative liquid fuels do not offer DoD a way to appreciably reduce fuel costs."

As to the risk of a supply interruption, we don't face one: Rand further observes, while the U.S. military uses a lot of fuel, when looked at in context, it uses a tiny percentage of world, or even North American production. Its consumption is less than one-half of 1 percent of global petroleum demand. The U.S. also produces over 8 million barrels a day. "we can find no credible scenario in which the military would be unable to access the 340,000 bpd of fuel it needs to defend the nation," says Rand. And, of course, there's that whole Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which can hold 727 million barrels of oil. Let's see, 727 million divided by 340,000...the SPR could power the military by itself for almost 6 years.

### AT: DOD fuel costs

#### Fuels costs are only 3% of the DOD budget and the budget is growing

**Schlossberg, 11** - University of Pennsylvania (Andrew, “The Military Dimensions of Post-Cold War US Oil Policy: Access to Oil and Consequences for Geostrategy,” <http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1173&context=curej>)

The US military as a whole is the single largest institutional consumer of oil in the United States, and one of the largest consumers of energy in the world. Based on 2009 numbers, the Department of Defense accounts for 80.3% of all federal energy use, and 88.0% of all federal petroleum use. 42 While these numbers only correspond to roughly 1.7% of total energy consumption in the US, the number is greater than the entire nation of Greece, and if DoD were a state, it would rank thirty-second in the United States, roughly equal to the entire economy of Oregon, in annual energy consumption. Said another way, every 3 days, DoD consumes about 1 million barrels of petroleum. 43 In FY09, the Defense Department spent, by its estimate, $10.5 billion on fuel amounting to 129 million barrels of oil for the year, up from 107 million barrels of oil in 2000. 44 Also, in FY00, fuel costs represented 1.2% of the total DoD spending, but by FY08, fuel costs had risen to 3.0%. Over the same time, total defense spending had more than doubled, but fuel costs increased nearly 500%. 45 Some analysts have estimates that the military uses fuel at twice the rate it did in the first Persian Gulf War and four times the rate it did in the Second World War. 46 The amount of fuel that DoD consumes is simply astounding, and it continues to grow given commitments to two wars and rising oil prices. Below are two graphs that illustrate the rise in military fuel spending and consumption since 2000:

**[table omitted]**

While consumption only increased by 20 million barrels over the 11 year period (a 15% increase), spending has increased by over $8 billion, a 500% increase over the same period. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly led to a surge in fuel use in that period, but price fluctuations in the market also contributed to the abrupt rise in spending, as it peaked at over $17 billion during the 2008 recession. 47 Such large-scale spending is highly sensitive to fluctuations in global prices of crude oil; between 2004 and 2006, for example, DLA Energy expenditures on oil procurement doubled due in large part to the run-up in world crude prices.

## 2nc china

### A2 hostile rise

#### They won’t challenge US heg

**Lee 2008** – Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University, also teaches IR and comparative politics of East Asia, visiting faculty at Kansai Gaidai University in Japan (Wei-chin, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 43, No. 5, October 2008, "Long shot and short hit", Sage journals online, WEA)

One recent debate between Brzezinski and Mearsheimer is a typical example of varying perspectives in dealing with China’s rise in military power. Brzezinski has argued that the US decision to stay in East Asia has an added advantage for China in restraining a militarily powerful, increasingly nationalistic, and potentially nuclear-capable Japan. Moreover, China’s credible nuclear credentials and strong economic performance in an interdependent global market have made Chinese leaders become more rational, calculating, and conscious than before in order to avoid any mutually disastrous policies, including its oil diplomacy, with the USA (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, 2005). Such a ‘kinder and gentler’ view of China has been explored and elaborated by various studies indicating that China has virtually transformed into a **responsible and cooperative player**, in words and in deeds, in the international community, not only by vigorously embracing multilateralism, but also actively and bilaterally cultivating cooperative security partnerships with various countries (Goldstein, 2005). Given China’s insufficient military capability and the vulnerability derived from the RMA, **it serves no significant security benefit for China to challenge US hegemony**. In fact, China has adapted itself to be a rule-abiding **status quo supporter**, rather than a radical rule challenger, in the international society. **Even under provocative situations, China’s tame and cool-handed responses have been demonstrated in several presumably serious US–China tests**, including Lee Teng-hui’s abrupt announcement of the ‘two-state’ theory in 1999, the EP-3 spy plane incident in 2001, and the US war on terror and unpopular war in Iraq in recent years. China has appeared to learn, internalize, and integrate the laws, norms and rules of the international community, just as neoliberal institutionalists and constructivists had long articulated and prescribed.

## 2nc oil prices

### Dollar hegemony

#### Dollar hegemony status is key to overall US economic and military leadership

William Clark, 2003; economic consultant and journalist, January (revised March 2003), “The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War with Iraq”, <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/RRiraqWar.html>

This unique geo-political agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1974 has worked to our favor for the past 30 years, as this arrangement has eliminated our currency risk for oil, raised the entire asset value of all dollar denominated assets/properties, and allowed the Federal Reserve to create a truly massive debt and credit expansion (or `credit bubble' in the view of some economists). These structural imbalances in the U.S. economy are sustainable as long as: 1. Nations continue to demand and purchase oil for their energy/survival needs 2. the world's monopoly currency for global oil transactions remains the US dollar 3. the three internationally traded crude oil markers remain denominated in US dollars These underlying factors, along with the `safe harbor' reputation of U.S. investments afforded by the dollar's reserve currency status propelled the U.S. to economic and military hegemony in the post-World War II period. However, the introduction of the euro is a significant new factor, and appears to be the primary threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Moreover, in December 2002 ten additional countries were approved for full membership into the E.U. Barring any surprise movements, in 2004 this will result in an aggregate E.U. GDP of $9.6 trillion and 450 million people, directly competing with the U.S. economy ($10.5 trillion GDP, 280 million people).

#### And dollar reserve status change would cause instant economic collapse

Robert Looney, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Otherwise, the effect of an OPEC switch to the euro would be that oil-consuming nations would have to flush dollars out of their (central bank) reserve funds and replace these with euros. The dollar would crash anywhere from 20-40% in value and the consequences would be those one could expect from any currency collapse and massive inflation (think Argentina currency crisis, for example). You'd have foreign funds stream out of the U.S. stock markets and dollar denominated assets, there'd surely be a run on the banks much like the 1930s, the current account deficit would become unserviceable, the budget deficit would go into default, and so on. Your basic 3rd world economic crisis scenario. "The United States economy is intimately tied to the dollar's role as reserve currency. This doesn't mean that the U.S. couldn't function otherwise, but that the transition would have to be gradual to avoid such dislocations (and the ultimate result of this would probably be the U.S. and the E.U. switching roles in the global economy)."

### A2 econ/shocks

#### Shocks actually increase growth and international trade

Tobias N. Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman August 2011 Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

Stylized fact #6**: Oil price** **shocks** are generally associated with contemporaneous increases in GDP. The results **dispel any notion** of oil shocks always having an immediate and widespread negative impact on output. On the contrary: these episodes have generally been associated with GDP growth increasing in the same year, with the median volume increase ranging from 0.2 percentage points for oil-importing OECD countries to 1.5 percentage points for the oil exporters. This positive impact is seen in a majority of cases, with the share of episodes with above-median GDP volume growth ranging from 58 percent for oil-importing OECD countries to 63 percent for middle-income oil importers. Within the groups, the impact varies across countries (Figures 4 and 5), but it is notable that the U.S. is very much at the low end of the distribution. Indeed, median U.S. GDP volume growth during the oil shock episodes was 0.4 percent lower than median growth over the entire sample period and above the median in only 5 of the 12 episodes. On both counts, these are the lowest figures among all the OECD countries, possibly reflecting relatively low fuel taxes and higher energy intensity in the U.S. 10 From these results, we conclude that oil shock episodes have typically been associated with widespread contemporaneous increases in international trade and, surprisingly, in economic output as well. The increases in trade likely reflect that the oil exporters’ higher export earnings during periods with large oil price increases are partially recycled as higher imports from the rest of the world. With petrodollars also creating activity in other countries via the flow of remittances and investments, these offsetting effects help explain the lack of a negative GDP impact.11 Surprising as it is, it is important to stress that these are only the contemporaneous effects in the year of the oil price shock. Indeed, results in the literature suggest that the negative impact on output for advanced economies only really materializes after four quarters (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2005, and Jiménez-Rodriguez, 2004).

#### Monetary policy and decreased oil dependence checks the impact

Ross DeVol 3-13-2012; chief research officer at the Milken Institute, a non-partisan, independent economic think tank. He is also author of “Jobs for America: Investments and Policies for Economic Growth and Competitiveness.” The $110 Effect: What Higher Gas Prices Could Really Do to the Economy <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/the-110-effect-what-higher-gas-prices-could-really-do-to-the-economy/254386/>

It is not only good short-term news that consumers have cut their purchases of gasoline since the 2007 jump in prices; it's even better long-term news for the broader economy. As the chart above shows, the U.S. economy doesn't require as much oil to produce a given level of GDP as it did prior to the first oil price shock (OPEC I) in 1973-74. Oil consumption (average barrels per day) per $1 million of real GDP dropped from 3.34 in 1975 to 1.46 in 2010, a 56.2 percent drop. A confluence of factors contributed to this, ranging from the introduction of more energy-efficient capital equipment and transportation vehicles to natural gas replacing oil in electricity generation. Oil accounts for miniscule share of electricity generation (less than 1 percent), the biggest reduction of any end-use segment since OPEC I. In post-World War II recessions, the Fed had either been tightening monetary policy (raising interest rates) prior to the onset of the recession or did so immediately after the spike in oil prices. Rising inflation-adjusted interest rates provided an additional channel through which the oil shock was transmitted to the real economy (the part of the economy producing goods and services). For example, the real fed funds rate hit 4.5 percent in 1973 and 9.3 percent in 1981. With a weak recovery after the Great Recession, and slack in labor and product markets, the Fed simply won't engage in such a highly restrictive monetary policy stance. Today, the Fed would likely move to implement a third round of quantitative easing in reaction to a spike in prices in an effort to boost the economy. Today's range of oil prices are **not high enough to trigger a recession**.

#### High prices don’t historically cause downturns, either – unconnected monetary policy is to blame

Jeff Harding 2-25-2012; real estate lawyer, Adjunct Professor of Real Estate Investment at Santa Barbara City College The ‘High Oil Prices = Recession’ Fallacy http://dailycapitalist.com/2012/02/25/the-high-oil-pricesrecession-fallacy/

Every time we see oil prices go up we hear that it will cause inflation and/or the economy will go into the tank. … 7 out of the 8 postwar U.S. recessions had been preceded by a sharp increase in the price of crude petroleum. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 led to a doubling in the price of oil in the fall of 1990 and was followed by the ninth postwar recession in 1990-91. The price of oil more than doubled again in 1999-2000, with the tenth postwar recession coming in 2001. Yet another doubling in the price of oil in 2007-2008 accompanied the beginning of recession number 11, the most recent and frightening of the postwar economic downturns. So the count today stands at 10 out of 11, the sole exception being the mild recession of 1960-61 for which there was no preceding rise in oil prices. [Hamilton, 2009. Rv. 2010] The premise is wrong. What causes price inflation is an expansion of money supply (and a desire of people to spend it, often quickly). What causes recessions is malinvestment of capital caused, again, by money supply expansion. The classic argument is that because 70% of the economy is driven by consumer spending, an increase in gasoline prices will cause a decrease in consumer spending, which will cause an economic decline. Sounds logical on its face. There are empirical studies that show either increases in gasoline prices will not impact discretionary spending (McCarthy, 20110) or that large increases in petroleum prices will cause recessions (Hamilton). Take your pick. The above chart1 shows the peak of real YoY GDP percentage change (light blue lines) and the relative price of gasoline (red), the product that most directly affects consumers. If gasoline prices have been increasing prior to the peak, then there is statistical data showing that those prices may have had an impact on GDP. From that one might conclude that because oil prices were rising prior to the peak in GDP, and because GDP subsequently declined, then high oil prices may have caused a decline in GDP. (Because A happened and then B happened, thus A caused B?) Or, is it just a coincidence? What we see in the data is coincidence rather than confirmation. Take price increases of oil and gasoline. It doesn’t cause price inflation (i.e., all prices rise). Instead it’s a supply and demand thing. When OPEC jacks up oil prices, people spend more on gas and less on other things. The consumer goods they don’t buy decline in price. Money is redirected by market forces to petroleum producers who are incentivized to discover and produce more oil. Ultimately, under normal circumstances, prices come down. This process is a bit distorted because we have a cartel-controlled market. But, if OPEC keeps prices too high, people reduce consumption, cartel revenues go down, and OPEC reduces prices to stimulate consumption. This is what happened in the current business cycle. It is the same with recessions and oil prices. Each of the recessions we’ve had in the last 40 years can be adequately explained by causes other than oil/gas prices. For example, while oil/gas prices shot up prior to the 2008 Crash, no one suggests that was a cause of it. Rather we know that oil prices went up as a result of a fiat money fueled boom that drove up all commodity prices. Looking at our chart, we can start with the 1973 – 1975 recession. That was the time of the Arab Oil Embargo (Oct. 1973 to March 1974). If the theory that high oil prices equals recession holds true then why did the economy recover when gas prices continued to rise post-recovery? What really happened was that the Fed cut interest rates by half in 1970-1971, and then started raising them in 1973 to combat rising prices. By the time the recession started in November 1973, the Fed Funds rate peaked at just over 10%. It isn’t as if the oil embargo didn’t cause disruption in the economy; it did, but most of the economic disruption was caused by the government’s price controls and rationing. But it didn’t cause the recession. Next, GDP peaked in April 1978 (gasoline-PPG $0.631) and declined until October 1980 ($1.223). Recall that price inflation almost hit 15% in 1980. The recession started in January 1980 ($1.11) and ended in July 1980 ($1.247). Gasoline prices continued to increase during the subsequent recovery. There is no correlation between oil prices and recession or price inflation. GDP peaked again in Q2 1981 ($1.353) and bottomed out in November 1982 ($1.268). We went into recession in July 1981 ($1.353) until November 1982 ($1.268). You can see an oil price correlation here, but other things were going on: high inflation. By June 1981, the CPI was still over 10%. Carter had appointed Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman in August 1979 and he started raising the Fed Funds rate from around 10% until it reached 19% in January 1981, and kept it high (8% to 10%) for much his term (ended in 1987). This broke price inflation (it settled in the 3.5 to 4.5 range). Thus monetary policy rather than oil prices was the cause of the recession. From then on, gasoline prices declined and remained relatively stable until 1999 ($0.90 to $1.30) when it started climbing again. The July 1990 ($1.139) to March 1991 ($1.138) recession shows that GDP peaked in late 1987 (about $0.95) and gasoline prices peaked in January 1991 ($1.304) and the recession ended in March 1991. But again, other things were driving the economy: a real estate boom-bust cycle, and that was largely driven by cheaper money and accelerated depreciation rules (those rules ended in 1986). Prices fluctuated but remained in the $1.20s for most of the next eight years. By 1999, the rise in gasoline prices coincided with peak GDP in late 1999 (Dec., $1.353) and gas prices rose, almost steadily since then. The 2001 recession came and went (March-$1,503) — November-$1.324). But, what else was going on? This was a time of incredible production and technological innovation that again benefited from the Fed’s cheap money (spurred by Greenspan to revive the economy from the 1990 – 1991 recession). It worked. But Dot Com boom turned into Dot Bomb bust as the Fed raised interest rates and cooled the economy off from its “irrational exuberance”. The Fed decided it needed to stimulate the economy from the bust and from November 2000 to June 2004, the Fed lowered interest rates from 6.5% to 1.00%. From then on oil prices followed commodities prices and gasoline prices continued to climb. By late 2003 ($1.578) the rate of growth of GDP peaked and thereafter was slowing, although it continued to grow until January 2006 ($2.359). At this point, the Fed again sought to cool down the economy and the Fed Funds rate went from 1.00% up to 5.26% by July 2007. Again, it worked and the real estate markets began to come apart. By H2 2008 ($4.142), GDP began to decline, thus beginning the bust phase of our current boom-bust cycle. Current price is $3.591. Thus, while you can argue that rising oil and gas prices may have had some negative effects on the economy because of some economic disruption, in every case, the cause of our recession was anything but rising prices. Regardless you are still going to hear that rising oil and gas prices are going to ruin the economy and cause us to go back into recession. While I believe the economy will decline starting in H2 2012, the reasons have nothing to do with oil prices. Don’t let the pundits scare you with this economic fallacy. There is enough to worry about.

### Russia

#### High prices are key to the Russian economy and domestic stability

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But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but **high oil prices**. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, **Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy**, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic decline causes nuclear war and extinction

Filger2009 – Sheldon Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, May 10, 2009, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### Modernization is key to maintain the nuclear threshold by reducing conventional insecurity – prevents miscalc and escalation

BettinaRenz andRodThorntonJanuary 2012; lecturers on international security in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Nottingham “Russian Military Modernization Cause, Course, and Consequences” Problems of Post-Communism Volume 59, Number 1 / January / February 2012 p 44 - 54

The perceived weakness of this triad means that the Kremlin was pleased with the START agreement of March 2010. The treaty limits favor Moscow in that it does not have to cut any of its own nuclear warheads or delivery systems—the numbers of ICBMs and warheads in its own triad are actually below the negotiated caps. Only the United States has had to bring its numbers down.58 Normally, in the arranging of such international security treaties, negotiating from a position of military weakness—as Russia was—is not conducive to the ability to drive a hard bargain. Moscow has been lucky, however, in that Washington seems not to be too interested in the shape of Russia’s current and future nuclear arsenal. Rather, in terms of perceived security threats, Washington has its eye more on the terrorist ball than on the Russian one. Additionally, under STA RT, Russia does not have to reduce the number of its tactical nuclear weapons. It has more of these than the United States. These are prized and important assets to Moscow, and they have become even more prized and important as Russia’s conventional military has become weaker. They are seen more and more as the fallback option if Russia one day faces some sort of defeat in a conventional conflict—against the likes of Georgia or China. In the largest Russian military exercise held since the end of the cold war—conducted recently in the Russian Far East—tactical nuclear weapons (i.e., mines) were notionally “exploded” as part of the exercise play.59 This fact alone seems to confirm that Russia’s conventional military weakness has led to a reduction in its nuclear-use threshold. Conclusion The current modernization in the Russian military is long overdue. Because it is long overdue, it has to be completed in a rushed, haphazard fashion and against a backdrop of a military–industrial complex unable to fulfill its role in the process. Traditionally, military modernization is not achieved lightly, given the bureaucratic inertia and cultural norms that are always present. When, as in the current situation in Russia, such barriers to change are aided and abetted by any number of additional problems (not to mention the rampant corruption that is endemic across all levels of Russian state institutions, including the military), then it must be expected that Russia’s armed forces will be striving for some time to become truly “modern.”60 In essence, what should have been accomplished as an evolution over many years, and should have begun during the Yeltsin era, is now being attempted as a revolution in the post–Georgian war era. As with any revolutionary change, a good deal of disruption and disaffection has been created. Moreover, the current Russian military is a weakened military. The psychology of the tsarist/Soviet/Russian military has always been that numbers counted, that mass would prevail. Numbers inspired confidence, and numbers could deter. But the current Russian military is losing numbers while not making up for them by creating smaller, more professional forces equipped with the requisite technologies. Quality is not replacing quantity. The military is in a state of flux. Russian politicians and military figures both now lack a genuine confidence in the armed forces’ ability to deter. This can have two consequences. Either Russia takes large steps to avoid the possibility of military confrontation by stressing diplomatic solutions to possible threat scenarios (as the tsarist government did in 1914), or it goes the opposite way, fearing that if any state is threatening military action against Russia then the **hair trigger comes into operation** (Israeli-style). That is, the mentality of the first, preemptive strike becomes paramount—taking advantage of surprise—and using what assets Russia now has. The alternative is to take the risk of waiting to be attacked and maybe “losing.” What is clear is that, with its armed forces currently weakened by the process of change, the sense of vulnerability generated has led Russia, in classic confirmation of the security dilemma concept, to magnify the threats it faces, or thinks it faces. Conscious of its vulnerability to threats, real or imagined, Moscow may begin to look more and more toward the inflexible tool of its tactical nuclear weapons as its principal defense mechanism. While no one really supposes that such weapons will be used in any confrontation with the West, the same cannot be said of any possible conflict with the Chinese. Ironically, Beijing’s military still relies on mass. The best modern military counter to mass is to employ either PGMs or tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian military has hardly any of the former but plenty of the latter. Hair triggers and tactical nuclear weapons are not comfortable bedfellows.

### A2 food prices

#### Alt causes to food price rise

**Breaking Views 8** (4/15, Higher food prices will reduce poverty, http://www.livemint.com/2008/04/15235340/Higher-food-prices-will-reduce.html)

Food prices have certainly seen a meteoric rise. The food price index calculated by the Food and Agriculture Organization, a United Nations body, shot up by 37% between December 2006 and December 2007.

The World Bank estimates that global food prices have soared by 83% in the last three years. Some markets, notably for rice, have been seriously disrupted. The increases are a special shock because real food prices have fallen over the last 30 years.

**Several forces have driven prices up.** Soaring energy prices have raised the cost of agricultural inputs such as fuel and fertilizers, and indirectly the price of equipment. Natural disasters such as drought in Australia have stretched markets further. Diversion of crops from food to ethanol production may have forced prices up as well.

#### High prices increase production, solves immediate crises and dampens the price climb

**Abbot et al, 09** — agricultural economist at Purdue (Philip, “What’s Driving Food Prices? March 2009 Update,”

http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/1702-Farm%20-%203-10-09%20-%20Food%20Prices%20Update%20-%20Book%20for%20Posting.pdf

The July 2008 What’s Driving Food Prices? report suggested that market mechanisms would result in adjustments over time. High prices ultimately result in reductions in consumption and increases in production. Both have occurred, with a considerable exchange rate adjustment and the added shock of a world financial crisis. World stocks-to-use ratios still remain relatively tight by historic standards for corn, soybeans, wheat and rice. As a result, prices also remain relatively high by historic standards. The period from 1998 to 2005 was one of surplus stocks, with consumption outpacing production and drawing down stocks. From 2006 to mid-2008, the on-going growth of world food demand was extended by the surge in biofuels usage. These large demand expansions came during two weak production years (2006/07 and 2007/08) and shortages became the norm. Today, world stocks have increased somewhat from dangerously low levels. World crop area has increased, and the surge in biofuels demand will be less than had been anticipated just a few months ago. This means a better balance of production and utilization in the near-term. The depths of the current world economic downturn and eventual recovery will be important drivers of grain and oilseed prices in the next few years, as will be energy prices and biofuels policy around the world.

## 1nr T

### 1NR Coal Violation Cards

#### Coal production is quantities extracted from mines

EIA (Energy Information Administration) 2012 “Glossary” <http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/>

Coal production: The sum of sales, mine consumption, issues to miners, and issues to coke, briquetting, and other ancillary plants at mines. Production data include quantities extracted from surface and underground mines, and normally exclude wastes removed at mines or associated reparation plants.

#### Production is defined by each specific energy type – prefer specific definitions

EIA (Energy Information Administration) 2012 “Glossary” <http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/>

Production: See production terms associated with specific energy types.

#### Conversion of coal to other sources is explicitly secondary production

EIA (Energy Information Administration) 2012 “Glossary” <http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/>

Primary energy: Energy in the form that it is first accounted for in a statistical energy balance, before any transformation to secondary or tertiary forms of energy. For example, coal can be converted to synthetic gas, which can be converted to electricity; in this example, coal is primary energy, synthetic gas is secondary energy, and electricity is tertiary energy. See Primary energy production and Primary energy consumption.

### 1NR Precision Cards

#### The phrase “energy production” is too imprecise – our interpretation is critical to maintain the integrity of the topic and our analysis of energy policy

Tom Noyes (works in health care finance in the Wilmington area. He has worked in city government, led two non-profit organizations, directed communications for four political campaigns and earned an MBA in finance) December 2005 “Economics and the Environment, Part 1: What Happens When We Light a Fire” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/12/08/170460/--Economics-and-the-Environment-Part-1-What-Happens-When-We-Light-a-Fire

If we wish to be precise, we wouldn't use the phrase "energy production." Most of what we call "energy production" involves burning something. A ton of coal is an asset. Smoke coming out a smokestack is not an asset. Setting fire to an asset is not production. It can economically useful by keeping us warm or converting iron ore to steel, but it is not, strictly speaking, production, defined as the creation of an asset. This simple rephrasing of what happens when we light a fire leads to useful insights into economics and the environment. Consider the similar phrase, "timber production." A tree standing in a forest may not be considered to have any economic value. But when a logger cuts down the tree, it becomes an asset as soon as it hits the ground and is hauled off to the lumber mill. Understanding that it is a fallacy to say that an asset can be created when something is destroyed suggests that we need to look more closely at the assumptions underlying the way we think about economics and the environment.

#### Even if you don’t buy that – ‘Energy production’ as a term refers to primary production

NBSC (National Bureau of Statistics of China) 2002 “7. Production and Consumption of Energy” http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/classificationsmethods/definitions/t20020517\_402787580.htm

Total Energy Production refers to the total production of primary energy by all energy producing enterprises in the country in a given period of time. It is a comprehensive indicator to show the capacity, scale, composition and development of energy production of the country. The production of primary energy includes that of coal, crude oil, natural gas, hydro-power and electricity generated by nuclear energy and other means such as wind power and geothermal power. However, it excludes the production of fuels of low calorific value, bio-energy, solar energy and the secondary energy converted from the primary energy.

**Precision is vital—turns solvency and research quality**

**Resnick 1** [Evan Resnick, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring 2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, “Defining Engagement”]

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a **precondition** for **effective policymaking**. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

### 1NR Limits Impacts

#### Participation

**Rowland 84** (Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that **entire programs** either **cease functioning** or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

#### Innovation, limits outweigh marginal cost of discarding affs that “think outside the box”

Intrator, 10 [David President of The Creative Organization, October 21, “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

# Round 8 Neg v Wake LM

## 1nc

### 1

#### Increase requires specification

**OED, 89** (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)

increase, v.

3. To become greater in some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.

#### Incentive implies a particular mechanism

**Marbek Resource Consultants, 06** (Report prepared for the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment “NATIONAL EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) WORKSHOP,” 9/27, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/epr\_wkshp\_rpt\_1376\_e.pdf

There were numerous suggestions for specific changes to the sixteen principles presented. The following list captures each suggestion (each number in parentheses corresponds to a principle presented):

􀁹 The suggestion was made, and supported by others, that the word “incentives” for producers be replaced with the word “encourage”, since the term “incentive” usually implies a particular mechanism (#1).

#### Violation: they’re not topical because they don’t specify the incentives they provide

#### C. Voting issue

#### 1. Negative ground – “incentives” is the direct object of resolutional action, ALL negative strategies are premised off of it, not specifying makes the aff a conditional moving target

#### 2. Kills topic education

**Arvizu, 7** - Director National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Dan, CQ Congressional Testimony, “ENCOURAGING SOLAR ENERGY,” 6/19, lexis

We applaud the Committee for its continuing examination of solar and other sources of renewable electricity and fuels. If we are to ensure the nation receives the full range of benefits that renewable energy technologies can provide, we will need a carefully balanced blend of new technology, market acceptance and government policies. It is not a question of whether to rely solely on the market, or on new research, or on government action, as we work to solve our energy problems. To accelerate deployment of renewable energy technologies, we need to effectively combine all three. It's also crucial that this mix of technology, markets and policies be crafted so that each works in conjunction with the others. The reality is that distinct renewable energy technologies - be they solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, biomass power, biofuels or geothermal - are in different places in terms of their economics, technological maturity and market acceptance. While a broad range of policies are needed to spur on these varied technologies, the specifics of policies and incentives to be enacted ideally must be tailored to fit the unique requirements of each of the systems and devices we are seeking to deploy.

### 2

#### Obama is winning but its close and reversible – the average of recent polls puts Obama ahead

**Cook, 10/4**/12 – editor and publisher of the Cook Political Report for National Journal (Charlie, “Mitt Romney Breaks His Losing Streak” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004?mrefid=mostViewed>)

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.

#### The public supports existing reactors, not new ones – reject lobby spin

**Mariotte, 12** - Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Michael, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos, 6/5, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters. Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?” This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way. Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition. Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima. But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today. Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question). Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that: “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.” But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?” 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.” Conclusions Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

#### Energy key to the election

Kingston 12 – Director of News at Platts (John, “US election 2012: if not "all energy, all the time," a lot of energy for sure” The Barrel, http://china.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2012/04/11/election\_2012\_i.html)

Get ready for the energy election of 2012. Maybe because it was at a New York Times forum devoted to energy, so the inclination was to talk with that sort of grand vision. But three reporters for the Times who are out on the campaign trail made it clear to a packed room that energy will be a key area in which Mitt Romney goes after Barack Obama in 2012. As Helene Cooper, the Times' White House correspondent, noted, the Obama adminstration has a lot of confidence going into the campaign. But if national retail gasoline prices were to head toward the $5/gal mark, "all bets would be off." And lurking in the background to that is the possibility of some sort of spike in price driven by an Iranian incident. With the Romney vs. Obama race all but assured, the campaigns are now focusing more on each other, rather than on the GOP nominating process. As as the Times' domestic correspondent Jim Rutenberg said, "so far, energy is what the campaign is all about." The panelists showed two ads, one from the Obama campaign and one from American Crossroads, the Karl Rove-led group. We weren't able to find them online, but found similar ones that pretty much say the same thing as those shown at the Times forum. You can see them here and here. The "gist" of the American Crossroads ad, according to Rutenberg, is that "the Obama administration is shirking blame for everything," and is doing so on energy policy as well. "Drilling is down on federal lands, and federal lands' output is down." But Cooper quickly noted that the Obama administration's retort is that "it's down because we took a time out (the moratorium after Macondo)." Although that move still gets criticized in some quarters, the administration is "screaming about this," since it believes the drop in federal lands' output is justified by the actions it took in the wake of the Macondo spill. (This report does show that federal onshore production has risen, though the total is down. See page 5). When the President talks about energy, the Romney campaign "just loves it," according to Ashley Parker, the Times' reporter covering the former Massachussetts governor. "They like it because it gives (them) an opening."

#### Romney causes massive foreign backlash and nuclear wars around the globe

Doug Bandow 5-15-2012; Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 3

#### Oil prices will stabilize at breakeven levels

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### Nuclear power reduces oil dependence – displaces oil power generation, powers maritime and ground transportation, and causes hydrogen transition

ANS 2012; American Nuclear Society, Top 10 Myths about Nuclear Energyhttp://www.new.ans.org/pi/resources/myths/

Myth # 10: Nuclear energy can't reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Truth: Nuclear-generated electricity powers electric trains and subway cars as well as autos today. It has also been used in propelling ships for more than 50 years. That use can be increased since it has been restricted by unofficial policy to military vessels and ice breakers. In the near-term, nuclear power can provide electricity for expanded mass-transit and plug-in hybrid cars. Small modular reactors can provide power to islands like Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Nantucket and Guam that currently run their electrical grids on imported oil. In the longer-term, nuclear power can directly reduce our dependence on foreign oil by producing hydrogen for use in fuel cells and synthetic liquid fuels.

#### Speculation controls oil prices – incentivizing any part of the energy production chain can have ripple effects on the market

Professional Wealth Management (PWM) 6-1-2011 Commodity funds - Speculative investors take profits and run, Professional Wealth Management (PWM) Lexis

However, fund managers stress that the market is less than perfect, and there are opportunities to be manipulated. "Many people think our investment universe is just a tightly correlated set of energy and mining stocks, when it actually extends well beyond the primary producers to include downstream processing and parallel value chains in areas like forest products and building materials; we also consider engineers, service companies, shippers and makers of alternative energy equipment," says Ruairidh Stewart, co-manager, Martin Currie Global Resources Fund. "It is often assumed that 'it's all about the oil price', but even oil companies never mind the many other, less correlated areas of our universe can outperform the wider market when the price of the commodity falls through the floor," he explains.

#### The impact is Russian growth and stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China**.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### 4

#### Plan’s coercive

**Rothbard, no date** (Murray Rothbard, former teacher, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, New Liberty – Involuntary Servitude, no date, p. <http://www.mises.org/rothbard/newliberty4a.asp>)

In a sense, the entire system of taxation is a form of involuntary servitude. Take, in particular, the income tax. The high levels of income tax mean that all of us work a large part of the year? several months? for nothing for Uncle Sam before being allowed to enjoy our incomes on the market. Part of the essence of slavery, after all, is forced work for someone at little or no pay. But the income tax means that we sweat and earn income, only to see the government extract a large chunk of it by coercion for its own purposes. What is this but forced labor at no pay? The withholding feature of the income tax is a still more clear-cut instance of involuntary servitude. For as the intrepid Connecticut indus­trialist Vivien Kellems argued years ago, the employer is forced to expend time, labor, and money in the business of deducting and transmit­ting his employees' taxes to the federal and state governments, yet the employer is not recompensed for this expenditure. What moral principle justifies the government's forcing employers to act as its unpaid tax collectors?

#### Decision rule

**Petro**, **74** (Sylvester, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, University of Toledo Law Review, p.480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

### 5

**The 50 state governments and relevant subnational actors should establish energy financing banks served with the task of substantially increasing High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor energy production funding in the United States.**

#### States can incentivize nuclear power -- solves the case.

**NEI, ‘8** [“Building Confidence in Licensing New U.S. Nuclear Plants,” Jan/Feb, http://nei.org/resourcesandstats/publicationsandmedia/newslettersandreports/nuclearpolicyoutlook/]

“The view is that when the federal government isn’t taking the lead, the legislatures need to step up to the plate,” said Melissa Savage, program director for the Agriculture, Energy and Environmental Committee of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). States are “repealing moratoriums, holding committee session study hearings, looking at changing regulations, and just getting the conversation started in some cases,” she noted. “We’re facing a pretty critical energy crunch in the country. The issue is starting to bubble back up,” Savage said. “In some states, it never went away.” Ten states have passed policies instituting some form of cost recovery assurance for nuclear plant construction. Three states have introduced and one has passed legislation requiring that nuclear energy be included in some form of clean or alternative energy portfolio. Six of the 13 states with moratoriums preventing new nuclear plants are considering removing those bans. Two states have passed local tax incentives for nuclear plants.

### 6

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its Prismatic Brick Reactor energy production funding in the United States.

#### The counterplan is competitive – HTGR’s are subdivided into pebble bed reactors and prismatic brick reactors – we PIC out of pebble beds

**IAEA 10** [“High Temperature Gas Cooled ¶ Reactor Fuels and Materials”¶ INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ¶ VIENNA, 2010]

The starting point of contemporary HTGR design concept is early air and CO2 cooled ¶ reactors. The substitution of He instead of air or CO2 provided excellent neutronic and ¶ thermal characteristics together with a graphite moderator. Historical HTGR technology ¶ development is shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1 There are two mainstream HTGR design ¶ concepts; the prismatic core design and the pebble bed core design. They both possess ¶ common advantages of the HTGR design such as inherent safety and high efficiency. ¶ Historically, the initial design efforts were started at the Atomic Energy Research ¶ Establishment (AERE) in the United Kingdom in 1956. Simultaneously, another independent ¶ study was initiated in Germany to a design pebble bed core version of the system. The work ¶ in the UK resulted in the construction of the DRAGON reactor, a 20 MWt test reactor, at ¶ Winfrith [3]. This facility was extensively utilized to demonstrate capabilities of HTGRs and ¶ coated particle fuel. It operated from 1964 to 1976. The German efforts were also successful ¶ in the building and operation of the AVR pebble bed reactor in 1966 at Jülich, Germany [4]. ¶ This reactor accumulated 122 000 hours of operation in 21 years.

#### Pebble beds are unsafe – risk meltdowns

**Moormann 9** [Rainer Moormann, “PBR Safety Revisited”, 01 April 2009, Nuclear Engineering International Magazine]

A re-evaluation [1,2] concludes that the high AVR contamination was mainly caused by unacceptably high core temperatures, and not only by inadequate fuel quality, as presumed in the past. We can rule out the possibility that only the poor quality of the fuel was responsible for the fuel elements’ failure to retain fission products, because the same fuel type that in the AVR (BISO coating, UC2-kernel) has released a major fraction of strontium-90 was also used in core 2 of the US Peach Bottom block-type HTR without any significant strontium-90 release. Second, there was almost no correlation between the release of metallic fission products and noble gas release that indicates inadequate fuel quality. Third, AVR contamination increased by several orders of magnitude shortly after raising the coolant temperatures to 950°C.¶ The unacceptably high AVR core temperatures were not detected until 1987, one year before final shutdown, because a PBR core cannot be equipped with standard instruments. From 1986, temperature measurement in the AVR was performed by 190 monitor pebbles containing a set of melt wires. This method only determines the maximum core temperature a pebble has seen during its pass through the pebble bed; it gives almost no results on spatial- or time-dependent temperature distribution.¶ Temperature measurement with monitor pebbles is also a time-consuming process. The first alarming results were not obtained until 15 months after starting measurements. The whole measurement campaign was never finished. At final AVR shutdown, about 25% of the monitor¶ pebbles remained in the core and thus were not examined. In those monitor pebbles that were examined, a significant fraction had wires that were completely melted. This means that the core temperatures were more than 200K higher than previously calculated, although the maximum core temperatures are not known. Crude estimates indicate that maximum core temperatures were about 300K higher than predicted. This accelerated fission product release from fuel elements.¶ Furthermore, azimuthal temperature differences at the margin of the active core were measured in the side reflector, pointing to a power asymmetry. Also, unpredictable hot gas currents with temperatures greater than 1100°C were measured in the hot gas chamber below the steam generator. These currents may have damaged the steam generator, and caused the leak in 1978 that lead to a steam/water ingress accident. Despite some effort spent in the past decades, these temperature problems are not yet understood. External bypass flows of the coolant in the core have recently been assumed to be the main reason for the high AVR temperature. If external flows reduce the core cooling, it is reasonable to expect a homogeneous core temperature increase. This was not found, so external bypass flows cannot explain the high AVR temperatures. In fact, temperature measurements in the hot gas chamber indicate that the location of hot spots vary over time, in periods that match variations in pebble bed arrangement. Examination of the distribution of fission product release in spent AVR fuel elements also indicates the presence of hot spots. These observations hint at an inherent safety problem with pebble beds.

#### Prismatic brick design solves these concerns

**Ryan 11** [DARyan Energy Blog, “Part 6 – High Temperature Gas cooled Reactors”, D.A. Ryan, Scottish engineer, June 3, 2011]

One could blame both of these as faults of the Pebble bed fuel delivery system than anything necessarily wrong with the HTGR concept. Indeed Dr Moormann, an expert in HTGR’s, highlights a number of problems and issues with Pebble beds here some of which I’ve already mentioned, but also the problem of dust generation by Pebble movement. I would note that Dr Albert Koster, of PBMR (the South African Pebble bed reactor company) rebuts these points here. But clearly we could fix a number of these problems by just abandoning the pebble bed concept and going for a prismatic block fuel arrangement (i.e we fix the fuel in place and refuel/defuel it just like an ordinary reactor).

#### Damage from a meltdown will be catastrophic and collapse the economy

Union of Concerned Scientists, “Nuclear Reactor Air Defenses”, 2-21-2007

<http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/nuclear_safety/nuclear-reactor-air-defenses-1.html>

An accident at a US nuclear power plant could kill more people than were killed by the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.1 The financial repercussions could also be catastrophic. The 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant cost the former Soviet Union more than three times the economical benefits accrued from the operation of every other Soviet nuclear power plant operated between 1954 and 1990.

#### Global nuclear war

James Cusick, Sunday Herald (Scotland) 3.18.09

http://www.sundayherald.com/oped/opinion/display.var.2495478.0.dont\_bank\_on\_financial\_trouble\_being\_resolved\_without\_conflict.php

I'm not saying that America is about to declare war on China, or that Germany is going to invade France. But there are profound economic stresses in central Europe that could rapidly turn into conflict in the bankrupt Baltic states, Hungary, Ukraine. And if the Great Recession, as the IMF's Dominique Strauss-Kahn called it last week, turns into a Great Depression, with a prolonged collapse in international trade and financial flows, then we could see countries like Pakistan disintegrate into nuclear anarchy and war with neighbouring India, which will itself be experiencing widespread social unrest. Collapsing China could see civil war too; Japan will likely re-arm; Russia will seek to expand its sphere of economic interests. Need I to go on?

#### One major accident will destroy all investment in nuclear power

**Caldicott, ‘6** – Founder and President of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute (Helen, Nuclear Power is not the answer, pg. ix)

Nuclear power is exorbitantly expensive, and notoriously unreliable. Wall Street is deeply reluctant to re-involve itself in any nuclear investment, despite the fact that in the 2005 Energy Bill the U.S. Congress allocated $13 billion in subsidies to revive a moribund nuclear power industry. To compound this problem, the global supplies of usable uranium fuel are finite. If the entire world's electricity production were replaced today by nuclear energy, there would be less than nine more years of accessible uranium. But even if certain corporate interests are convinced that nuclear power at the moment might be a beneficial investment, one major accident at a nuclear reactor that induces a meltdown would destroy all such investments and signal the end of nuclear power forever.

### Solvency

#### Quick expansion is impossible -- lack of recent construction experience, atrophy of US nuclear manufacturing industry, production bottlenecks, skilled labor shortage.

#### Squassoni, ‘8

[Sharon, Senior Associate, Nonproliferation Program -- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-12, “The Realities of Nuclear Expansion” Congressional Testimony: House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global Warming, Washington, DC]

There are significant questions about whether nuclear expansion that could affect global climate change is even possible. In the United States, as the chief operating officer of Exelon recently told an industry conference, constraints include: the lack of any recent U.S. nuclear construction experience; the atrophy of U.S. nuclear manufacturing infrastructure; production bottlenecks created by an increase in worldwide demand; and an aging labor force. Lack of construction experience translates into delays, which translate into much higher construction costs. Although reactors typically take at least four years to build, delays can increase finance costs considerably. A recent example – the construction of Okiluoto-3 in Finland – demonstrates that an 18-month delay cost 700 million Euros in a project with a fixed cost of three billion Euros.18 In an analysis for a nuclear industry conference, the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton prioritized 15 different risks in new reactor construction. The most significant risks and those most likely to occur included engineering, procurement and construction performance, resource shortages and price escalation.19 The atrophy of nuclear manufacturing infrastructure is significant in the United States, but also worldwide. The ultra-heavy forgings for reactor pressure vessels and steam generators constitute the most significant chokepoint. Japan Steel Works (JSW) is currently the only company worldwide with the capacity to make ultra-large forgings (using 600-ton ingots) favored by new reactor designs. Other companies – such as Sfarsteel (formerly Creusot Forge) in France and Doosan Industry in South Korea – have smaller capacities. The purchase of Creusot Forge by AREVA in 2005 means that former customers of Creusot reportedly are shifting to Japan Steel Works, lengthening the two-year waiting list. According to JSW officials, it can now only produce 5.5 sets of forgings per year; this will expand to 8.5 sets in 2010. Even then, nuclear forgings at JSW compete with orders for forgings and assembly from other heavy industries, for example, oil and gas industries, which can be more profitable. China will open new plants, possibly this year, to produce ultra-heavy forgings. In the meantime, using smaller capacity forgings means more components, with more weld seams, and therefore will require more safety inspections, costing utilities more money when the reactors are shut down and not generating electricity. One AREVA estimate is that the daily cost of shutdowns (for inspections or other reasons) is $1 million. In the United States, a significant portion of supporting industries needs to be rebuilt or recertified. In the 1980s, the United States had 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 holders of N-stamp certificates from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.20 Today, there are just 80 suppliers and 200 N-stamp holders. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) notes that some of the decline in N-stamp holders is due to consolidation of companies, but nonetheless is encouraging firms to get recertified. In addition, certain commodities used in reactor construction may also present supply problems, such as alloy steel, concrete and nickel. The cost of these inputs, according to Moody’s, has risen dramatically in recent years. Competition from other electricity and construction projects According to a 2008 Bechtel estimate, if electricity demand grows in the United States 1.5% each year and the energy mix remains the same, the United States would have to build 50 nuclear reactors, 261 coal-fired plants, 279 natural-gas-fired plants and 73 renewables projects by 2025. All of these will require craft and construction labor. In addition, electricity generation projects will compete with oil infrastructure projects. In addition, nuclear power construction competes with other large investment projects for labor and resources. Rebuilding from Hurricane Katrina and big construction projects in Texas will continue to place pressure on construction labor forces. A Bechtel executive recently stated that the U.S. faced a skilled labor shortage of 5.3 million workers in 2010, which could rise to a shortage of 14 million by 2020. Adding to this is the retirement of baby boomers, and much slower growth in the number of college graduates.21 A typical nuclear power plant in the United States takes about 4 years to build, and requires 1400 to 2300 construction workers.

#### Nuclear power isn’t cost competitive -- numerous low-cost alternatives swamp its marketplace value.

#### Cooper, ‘11

[Mark, Senior Research Fellow for Economic Analysis -- Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School, 2-14, “Mark Cooper: Why Nuclear Reactor Loan Guarantees Are Now More Imprudent Than Ever,” <http://yubanet.com/opinions/Mark-Cooper-Why-Nuclear-Reactor-Loan-Guarantees-Are-Now-More-Imprudent-Than-Ever.php#.UAemK3B9nNU>]

Factor 3: Natural gas is not the only alternative with which nuclear cannot compete. There are numerous lower cost alternatives available to meet the need for electricity whether or not the U.S. adopts policies to reduce carbon emissions in the electricity sector. If technologies are allowed to compete on a level playing field to meet the need for electricity, nuclear reactors would be unable to win in the marketplace for the foreseeable future. Policies that address climate change help most of the alternatives as much as nuclear if not more so. This is a key reason why capital markets will not fund these projects and the industry is so desperate for subsidies.

#### That prevents industry expansion.

Johnson, ‘11

[Toni, Senior Editor/Senior Staff Writer -- CFR, 3-18, “Nuclear Power Expansion Challenges,” http://www.cfr.org/united-states/nuclear-power-expansion-challenges/p16886]

Costs remain the biggest hurdle for the nuclear industry. The production of electricity from nuclear reactors--once online--is economically competitive with other power generation (PDF) types, says the World Nuclear Association. However, a 2003 Massachusetts Institute for Technology paper on nuclear power, which was updated in 2009, notes that high start-up costs, regulatory uncertainty, and long-lead construction times put nuclear power at an investment disadvantage (PDF).

#### Can’t fiat past this – financial incentives’ precludes purchases from the government – has to be direct production quotas

Edward W. Nelson et al (M.D., former Chairman of the OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, James E. Childress, Ph.D. Jennie Perryman, R.N., M.S.N. Victor Robards, M.D. Albert Rowan Michael S. Seely, R.N., B.S.N. Sylvester Sterioff, M.D. Mary Rovelli Swanson, R.N., M.B.A.) 1993 “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation” http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4

A definition of terms is necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

**Limits – an already broad topic is infinitely expanded by purchase anything affs – that overburdens neg research and undermines preparedness for all debates**

### Russia

#### Relations are impossible and won’t result in cooperation

**LaFranchi, 3/3/12** [Christian Science Monitor, “A cold-war chill US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria/%28page%29/2]

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men."

Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East.

Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests?

Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people.

Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and diverging international visions.

Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills.

The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further.

"I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says.

Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level.

"Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington.

Three years ago this month, President Obama said he **hoped to promote** more **cooperation** between the U.S. and Russia. It would be hard to see how that may happen as Vladimir Putin approaches power once again. Host Scott Simon speaks with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, about Sunday's elections in Russia.

#### Too late to solve—Russia no longer trusts anything we do

**Cohen, 2/28/12** [Professor, Russian Studies at New York University, America's Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-f-cohen/us-russia-policy_b_1307727.html?ref=politics&ir=Politics>]

In short, the United States is farther from a partnership with Russia today than it was more than twenty years ago.

Third: Who, it must be asked, is to blame for this historic failure to establish a partnership between America and post-Soviet Russia? In the United States, Moscow alone is almost universally blamed. The facts are different. There have been three compelling opportunities to establish such a partnership. All three were lost, or are being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.

- The first opportunity was following the end of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s. Instead, the Clinton administration adopted an aggressive triumphalist approach to Moscow. That administration tried to dictate Russia's post-Communist development and to turn it into a U.S. client state. It moved the U.S.-led military alliance, NATO, into Russia's former security zone. It bombed Moscow's remaining European ally, Serbia. And along the way, the Clinton administration broke strategic promises made to Moscow.

- The second opportunity for partnership was after 9/11, when the Bush administration repaid Russian President Vladimir Putin's extraordinary assistance in the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan by further expanding NATO to Russia's borders and by unilaterally withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the linchpin of its nuclear security.

- Now, since 2008, the Obama administration is squandering the third opportunity, its own "re-set," by refusing to respond to Moscow's concessions on Afghanistan and Iran with reciprocal agreements on Russia's top priorities, NATO expansion and missile defense.

In short, every opportunity for a U.S.-Russian partnership during the past twenty years was lost, or is being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.

Fourth: How to explain, we must also ask, such unwise U.S. policies over such a long period? The primary explanation is a policy-making outlook, or ideology, that has combined the worst legacy of the Cold War with the worst American reaction to the end of the Soviet Union.

- Washington's two most consequential (and detrimental) decisions regarding post-Soviet Russia have **continued the militarized approach** of the Cold War: to move NATO eastward; and to build missile defense installations near Russia's borders.

- At the same time, Washington's triumphalist reaction to the end of the Soviet state produced a winner-take-all diplomatic approach that has been almost as aggressive. Consider the three primary components of this so-called diplomacy:

1. Presumably on the assumption that Russia's interests abroad are less legitimate than America's, Washington has acted on a double-standard in relations with Moscow. The unmistakable example is that while creating a vast U.S.-NATO sphere of military and political influence around Russia, Washington adamantly denounces Moscow's quest for any zone of security, even on its own borders.

2. Similarly, U.S. negotiations on vital issues have been based on the premise (called "selective cooperation") that Moscow should make all major concessions while Washington makes none. And on rare occasions when Washington did promise major concessions, it reneged on them, NATO's eastward expansion being only the first instance. (Can anyone who doubts this generalization cite a single meaningful concession -- any substantive reciprocity -- that Moscow has actually gotten from the United States since 1992?)

3. Meanwhile, presumably on the assumption that Russia's political sovereignty at home is less than our own, Washington has pursued intrusive "democracy-promotion" measures that flagrantly trespass on Moscow's internal affairs. This practice began in the 1990s with actual directives from Washington to Moscow ministries and with legions of onsite U.S. "advisers" and it continues today -- recently, for example, with the American vice president lobbying in Moscow against Putin's return to the Russian presidency and with the new U.S. ambassador's profoundly ill-timed meeting with leaders of Moscow's street protests.

In short, blaming Putin for anti-Americanism in Russia, as the U.S. State Department and media do, ignores the real cause: Twenty years of American military and diplomatic policies have convinced a large part of **Russia's political class** (and intelligentsia) that Washington's intentions are aggressive, aggrandizing and deceitful -- anything but those of a partner. (In that context, part of the Russian elite has criticized Putin for being "pro-American.")

#### No risk of a return to hostility—solves the imapct

**Nesnera 11**  (Andre Nesnera is a Senior Correspondent at Voice of America, graduate The Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), “Putin Presidency Unlikely to Derail US-Russia Relations,” http://www.voanews.com/english/news/europe/Putin-Presidency-Unlikely-to-Derail-US-Russia-Relations-131345683.html)

Many experts agree with Legvold that there will not be any real change in U.S.-Russia relations with Vladimir Putin back as president. Matthew Rojansky at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says Putin, as prime minister, if not calling all the shots, at least approved the key decisions related to U.S. relations. “So for example, I don’t see New START [strategic arms agreement] being rolled back," said Rojansky. "I don’t see cooperation on Afghanistan being rolled back. The Libya [U.N.] resolution [imposing a no-fly zone] which Russia didn’t block was a difficult call and Putin certainly had reservations and you heard him expressing those reservations. But did he ultimately come to some kind of consensus with Medvedev? Clearly he did. I think the two of them operate as a unit.” Rojansky believes that while the substance of the U.S.-Russia relationship may not change, the tone might. “Obama has invested very heavily in his relationship with Medvedev," he said. "It made sense. It was relatively easy for him because he and Medvedev come from a similar kind of origin in the sense of both being lawyers, both being technology oriented, both being kind of globalists in their outlook. Putin just doesn’t have that. And I don’t see Putin and Obama pushing the relationship to be very active by sheer force of personality and interest in one another. I just don’t think that’s going to happen.” The analysts believe one thing is for sure: the U.S.-Russia relationship has grown over the years to such an extent that they say **a return to the tension-filled Cold War days is virtually impossible.**

#### No impact to Iranian prolif

**Farley, IR prof, 9**—assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky (Robert, What If Iran Got the Bomb? It would be time to calm down, 7 July 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/07/what\_if\_iran\_got\_the\_bomb?page=0,0, AMiles)

There are profound differences between the Islamic Republic and the People's Republic, and 2009 is not 1969. Simply because the PRC survived a superpower confrontation, several chaotic leadership changes, and a Cultural Revolution without ever using its nukes doesn't mean that Iran poses no threat. However, it does suggest that nuclear deterrence may be as robust as advertised and that deterrence applies even to states led by people who say and do crazy things (like refraining from Western neckwear). Given Mao's penchant for bizarre behavior, earlier concerns that China might recklessly employ the nuclear weapons it was seeking in the late 1950s were probably even more legitimate than such concerns over Iran now. Nevertheless, China has acted as a responsible steward of nuclear weapons, even in situations of existential danger. So, rather than preparing for war against Iran, or believing that unconditional talks will eventually succeed (a nice hope, but unlikely), or offering a green light to a nervous regional ally convinced that nukes in crazy hands will inevitably lead to their use, perhaps American policymakers should take some comfort from history. Why not let Iran cross the nuclear threshold and spend time and energy focusing on how to make the deterrence of a nuclear Iran effective? After all, that now seems to look like the only realistic option. In short, the best lesson for the West may be this: Calm down.

#### Iran prolif isn’t a threat – they don’t want the bomb and if they get it they won’t use it

**Pinker, 11** [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, *The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined*, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

If current pundits are to be believed, then as you are reading these words the New Peace will already have been shattered by a major war, perhaps a nuclear war, with Iran. At the time of this writing, tensions have been rising over the country’s nuclear energy program. Iran is currently enriching enough uranium to fashion a nuclear arsenal, and it has defied international demands that it allow inspections and comply with other provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has taunted Western leaders, supported terrorist groups, accused the United States of orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, denied the Holocaust, called for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” and prayed for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the Muslim savior who would usher in an age of peace and justice. In some interpretations of Shi’a Islam, this messiah will show up after a worldwide eruption of war and chaos. All this is, to say the least, disconcerting, and many writers have concluded that Ahmadinejad is another Hitler who will soon develop nuclear weapons and use them on Israel or furnish them to Hezbollah to do so. Even in less dire scenarios, he could blackmail the Middle East into acceding to Iranian hegemony. The prospect might leave Israel or the United States no choice but to bomb its nuclear facilities preemptively, even if it invited years of war and terrorism in response. A 2009 editorial in the *Washington Times* spelled it out: “War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?”279 This chilling scenario of a nuclear attack by Iranian fanatics is certainly possible. But is it *inevitable*, or even highly likely? One can be just as contemptuous of Ahmadinejad, and just as cynical about his motives, while imagining less dire alternatives for the world ahead. John Mueller, Thomas Schelling, and many other foreign affairs analysts have imagined them for us and have concluded that **the Iranian nuclear program is not the end of the world**.280 Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for energy and medical research. In 2005 Supreme Leader Khameini (**who wields more power than Ahmadinejad**) issued a fatwa declaring that **nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam**.281 If the government went ahead and developed the weapons anyway, it would not be the first time in history that national leaders have lied through their teeth. But having painted themselves into this corner, the prospect of forfeiting all credibility in the eyes of the world (including major powers on whom they depend, like Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil) might at least give them pause. Ahmadinejad’s musings about the return of the Twelfth Imam do not necessarily mean that he plans to hasten it along with a nuclear holocaust. Two of the deadlines by which writers confidently predicted that he would set off the apocalypse (2007 and 2009) have already come and gone.282 And for what it’s worth, here is how he explained his beliefs in a 2009 television interview with NBC correspondent Ann Curry: *Curry:* You’ve said that you believe that his arrival, the apocalypse, would happen in your own lifetime. What do you believe that you should do to hasten his arrival? *Ahmadinejad:* I have never said such a thing.... I was talking about peace.... What is being said about an apocalyptic war and—global war, things of that nature. This is what the Zionists are claiming. Imam . . . will come with logic, with culture, with science. He will come so that there is no more war. No more enmity, hatred. No more conflict. He will call on everyone to enter a brotherly love. Of course, he will return with Jesus Christ. The two will come back together. And working together, they would fill this world with love. The stories that have been disseminated around the world about extensive war, apocalyptic wars, so on and so forth, these are false. 283 As a Jewish atheist, I can’t say I find these remarks completely reassuring. But with one obvious change they are not appreciably different from those held by devout Christians; indeed, they are milder, as many Christians do believe in an apocalyptic war and have fantasized about it in bestselling novels. As for the speech containing the phrase that was translated as “wiping Israel off the map,” the *New York Times* writer Ethan Bronner consulted Persian translators and analysts of Iranian government rhetoric on the meaning of the phrase in context, and they were unanimous that Ahmadinejad was daydreaming about regime change in the long run, not genocide in the days ahead.284 The perils of translating foreign bombast bring to mind Khrushchev’s boast “We will bury you,” which turned out to mean “outlive” rather than “entomb.” There is a parsimonious alternative explanation of Iran’s behavior. In 2002 George W. Bush identified Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as the “axis of evil” and proceeded to invade Iraq and depose its leadership. North Korea’s leaders saw the writing on the wall and promptly developed a nuclear capability, which (as they no doubt anticipated) has put an end to any musings about the United States invading them too. Shortly afterward Iran put its nuclear program into high gear, aiming to create enough ambiguity as to whether it possesses nuclear weapons, or could assemble them quickly, to squelch any thought of an invasion in the mind of the Great Satan. If Iran does become a confirmed or suspected nuclear power, the history of the nuclear age suggests that the most likely outcome would be nothing. As we have seen, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless for anything but deterrence against annihilation, which is why the nuclear powers have repeatedly been defied by their nonnuclear adversaries. The most recent episode of proliferation bears this out. In 2004 it was commonly predicted that if North Korea acquired a nuclear capability, then by the end of the decade it would share it with terrorists and set off a nuclear arms race with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.285 In fact, North Korea did acquire a nuclear capability, the end of the decade has come and gone, and nothing has happened. It’s also unlikely that any nation would furnish nuclear ammunition to the loose cannons of a terrorist band, thereby giving up control over how they would be used while being on the hook for the consequences.286 In the case of Iran, before it decided to bomb Israel (or license Hezbollah to do so in an incriminating coincidence), with no conceivable benefit to itself, its leaders would have to anticipate a nuclear reprisal by Israeli commanders, who could match them hothead for hothead, together with an invasion by a coalition of powers enraged by the violation of the nuclear taboo. Though the regime is detestable and in many ways irrational, one wonders whether its principals are so indifferent to continuing their hold on power as to choose to annihilate themselves in pursuit of perfect justice in a radioactive Palestine or the arrival of the Twelfth Imam, with or without Jesus at his side. As Thomas Schelling asked in his 2005 Nobel Prize lecture, “What else can Iran accomplish, except possibly the destruction of its own system, with a few nuclear warheads? Nuclear weapons should be too precious to give away or to sell, too precious to waste killing people when they could, held in reserve, make the United States, or Russia, or any other nation, hesitant to consider military action.”287 Though it may seem dangerous to consider alternatives to the worst-case scenario, the dangers go both ways. In the fall of 2002 George W. Bush warned the nation, “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof —the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” The “clear evidence” led to a war that has cost more than a hundred thousand lives and almost a trillion dollars and has left the world no safer. A cocksure certainty that Iran will use nuclear weapons, in defiance of sixty-five years of history in which authoritative predictions of inevitable catastrophes were repeatedly proven wrong, could lead to adventures with even greater costs.

#### In this context, you should round down to zero risk

**Graham 7** (senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, July - September 2007, “The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness,” http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### China

#### Relations fail but no impact to hostility

**Blackwill 2009** – former US ambassador to India and US National Security Council Deputy for Iraq, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Robert D., RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf, WEA)

Alternatively, will the current world economic crisis change relations between China and the United States in a much more positive and intimate direction, producing what some are calling a transcendent G-2? This seems improbable for seven reasons. First, the United States and China have profoundly different visions of Asian security. For Washington, maintaining U.S. alliances in Asia is the hub of its concept of Asian security, whereas, for Beijing, America’s alliance system is a destabilizing factor in Asian security and over time should wither away. These opposing concepts will be an enduring source of tension between the two sides. Second, these two countries systematically prepare for war against one another, which is reflected in their military doctrines, their weapons procurement and force modernization, and their deployments and military exercises. As long as this is the case, it will provide a formidable psychological and material barrier to much closer bilateral relations. Third, the United States is critical of China’s external resource acquisition policy, which Washington believes could threaten both American economic and security interests in the developing world. Fourth, despite their deep economic dependence on each other, U.S.-China economic relations are inherently fragile. China sells too much to the United States and buys too little, and the United States saves too little and borrows too much from China. This will inevitably lead to a backlash in the United States and a Chinese preoccupation with the value of its American investments. Fifth, Chinese environmental policy will be an increasing problem, both for U.S. policymakers who are committed to bringing China fully into global efforts to reduce climate degradation and for Chinese leaders who are just as determined to emphasize domestic economic growth over international climate regimes. Sixth, China and the United States have wholly different domestic political arrangements that make a sustained entente difficult to manage. Americans continue to care about human rights in China, and Beijing resents what it regards as U.S. interference in its domestic affairs. This will be a drag on the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. And seventh, any extended application by Washington of “Chimerica,” as Moritz Schularick of Berlin’s Free University has called it,23 would so alarm America’s Asian allies, beginning with Japan, that the United States would soon retreat from the concept.24

Nevertheless, these factors are unlikely to lead to a substantial downturn in U.S.-China bilateral ties. In addition to their economic interdependence, both nations have important reasons to keep their interaction more or less stable. As Washington wants to concentrate on its many problems elsewhere in the world, especially in the Greater Middle East, Beijing prefers to keep its focus on its domestic economic development and political stability. Neither wants the bilateral relationship to get out of hand. In sum, a positive strategic breakthrough in the U.S.-China relationship or a serious deterioration in bilateral interaction both seem doubtful in the period ahead. And the current economic downturn will not essentially affect the abiding primary and constraining factors on the two sides. Therefore, the U.S.-China relationship in five years will probably look pretty much as it does today—part cooperation, part competition, part suspicion—unaffected by today’s economic time of troubles, except in the increasing unlikely event of a cross-strait crisis and confrontation.

#### Relations are resilient

**Rosecrance and Qingguo 2010** – \*political science professor at Cal and senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former director of the Burkle Center for International Relations at UCLA, \*\*PhD from Cornell, Professor and Associate Dean of the School of International Studies of Peking University (Jia Qingguo and Richard Rosecrance, Global Asia, 4.4, “Delicately Poised: Are China and the US Heading for Conflict?”, <http://www.globalasia.org/l.php?c=e251>, WEA)

Sustained Cooperation?   
The fact that the rise of China is unlikely to lead to armed conflict with the US does not necessarily mean that the two countries can achieve a wholly cooperative relationship in the long term. For that to happen, the two need to have shared interests, aspirations, and mutually acceptable approaches to promoting their national goals. It appears that these conditions are increasingly becoming a reality.   
To begin with, after years of interaction, China and the US have developed a shared stake in cooperation. Their relationship has deepened to the point where their economic futures have become closely interlinked. Western demand, principally from the US, sustains a whole range of Chinese industries. Chinese investments support America’s deficit financing, with China holding more than $1 trillion of US government debt. The US, meanwhile, contributes greatly to China’s foreign trade surplus. If America stopped buying Chinese goods, it would put a serious crimp in Chinese economic growth. Chinese sovereign wealth funds are also moving into the US financial market to rebalance the amount of foreign direct investment on each side.   
The Emergence of Shared Values   
Chinese-American ties now range well beyond economics. As major beneficiaries of existing international arrangements, both China and the US have an important stake in many areas, including defending a free trade system, maintaining international peace and stability, opposing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting terrorism, ensuring secure energy supplies and reversing global warming. In addition, as a result of changes within China, the two countries increasingly find themselves sharing similar aspirations in the world. Among other things, China has replaced its centrally-planned economy with a market-oriented one. It has attached increasing importance to the rule of law. It has publicly advocated protection of human rights and has adopted many measures to improve its human rights situation. It has also tried to introduce democratic reforms such as nationwide village-level elections and measures to broaden participation in the selection of leaders at various levels of the Chinese government and in the policy making process. Recently, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that China wants democracy and will make more efforts in this regard. These and other changes on the part of China have narrowed the value differences between the two countries and provided an expanding political basis for China-US cooperation.   
Finally, leaders of the two countries have learned how to cooperate after years of interaction. With the scope and depth of contacts increasing, China and the US find themselves with greater understanding and appreciation of each other’s legitimate interests and political sensitivities than ever before. Policy makers in the two countries not only know each other as counterparts, but also increasingly as personal friends. Many become acquainted long before they become important in their respective policy making institutions. Previous misunderstandings at the policy level are no longer serious. This has made miscalculation between the two countries less likely and facilitated cooperation.

#### Alt causes are inevitable

**Lawrence & Lum 11** – Beijing Bureau Chief for the Far Eastern Economic Review & specialist in Asian Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (Susan V. & Thomas, "US-China Relations: Policy Issues" Congressional Research Service, January 12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA535780&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The U.S.-China relationship remains dogged, however, by long-standing mutual mistrust. That mistrust stems in part from the two countries’ very different political systems. Many in the United States are uncomfortable with China’s authoritarian system of government and see continued Communist Party rule in a post-Cold War world as an anachronism. Many Communist Party elites in China are suspicious that the United States seeks to constrain China’s rise, and in the longer-term, to foist multi-party democracy on China and push the Communist Party from power. The two countries’ different economic models have led to mistrust, too. Some in the United States believe that China has achieved its economic successes by playing by a different, and not always fair, set of rules. Such critics point to China’s alleged strong reliance on exports for growth and the PRC government’s policy of keeping China’s currency artificially weak, in part to make Chinese exports more attractive to importing nations. Other points of contention include the PRC government’s direct and indirect subsidies and other forms of support for its state-owned corporations, and its inability or unwillingness to prevent violations of foreign intellectual property by Chinese entities. For their part, PRC officials have sometimes criticized the United States for its high levels of consumption, low savings rate, and long-term debt. Chinese officials have also criticized the United States’ allegedly loose monetary policy. Mistrust is particularly pronounced on security matters. The United States increasingly sees China’s military modernization as aimed at constraining the U.S. military’s freedom of movement in Asia and deterring any U.S. intervention in the case of a Chinese use of force against Taiwan.1 In mirror image, China sees the United States as intent on thwarting its unification with Taiwan and constraining the activities of its own military throughout Asia. Although China stated in a 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement that it “welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region” (see “The 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement,” below), many in China chafe at the surveillance activities undertaken by the U.S. military along China’s coast and at U.S. military exercises in waters near China, and regard U.S. military alliances in Asia as aimed to a significant degree at China. With U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan, which shares a short border with China to the west, and with U.S. military and intelligence agencies deeply engaged in Pakistan, also a neighbor to the west, some Chinese commentators speak of their country being “encircled” by U.S. forces.2 The bilateral relationship was strained in 2010 by long-standing issues of disagreement between the United States and China such as Taiwan and Tibet and China’s currency policy, as well as by each side’s responses to unexpected new crises in Asia. China condemned the Obama Administration’s January 2010 announcement of a long-planned sale of a package of arms to Taiwan. It also strongly protested President Obama’s February 2010 meeting with the Dalai Lama, although in hosting the meeting, the President was following in the footsteps of his predecessors in the White House. Among the unexpected crises that undermined U.S.-China relations was a series of North Korean provocations, starting in March 2010 with North Korea’s apparent sinking of a South Korean naval vessel. China incurred U.S. criticism for its efforts to shield North Korea from the most serious diplomatic consequences for its actions, while the United States unsettled China when it responded to the North Korean actions by scheduling military exercises in the Yellow Sea that China charged were meant in part as a threat to China. In September 2010, the collision of a Chinese fishing trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels near disputed islands in the East China Sea set off a new crisis. The United States angered China by voicing its support for Japan in the ensuing China-Japan spat, and by clarifying that that the U.S. military alliance with Japan covers the disputed islands. Also contributing to bilateral tensions in 2010 were China’s reassertion of expansive claims to territory in the South China Sea, and the United States’ subsequent July 2010 declaration of a “national interest” in freedom of navigation in the sea. The 2009 Joint Statement, issued during President Obama’s November 2009 state visit to China, laid down some significant new statements of principle. In the document, the U.S. side declared that the United States “welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs,” while the Chinese side stated that China “welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region.” This was the first time China agreed to put in writing such a positive characterization of the U.S. presence in Asia, although the wording of the Chinese-language version of the statement was more conditional than the English. While the English text appeared to signal an acceptance that the United States presence contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region, the Chinese text stated that China welcomes U.S. “efforts” for peace, stability, and prosperity in the region, leaving open the question of how China sees the U.S. presence as contributing to peace, stability, and prosperity currently.10 The 2009 Joint Statement also included the controversial statement that, “respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.”11 “Core interests” was left undefined. Critics have suggested that the language may have raised unrealistic expectations on the Chinese side of greater U.S. deference to China on issues that China considers part of its core interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and the maintenance of domestic stability through suppression of dissent.12 The “core interests” language in the Joint Statement may also have encouraged China to experiment with referring to the South China Sea as a “core national interest” in some closed-door meetings with foreign officials in 2010. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, those statements contributed to the U.S. decision to declare a “national interest” in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea at a meeting in Hanoi in July 2010.13 Finally, in the 2009 Joint Statement, the two sides stated that, “they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S. China relationship for the 21st Century.”14 While this statement may seem formulaic, officials in both governments are careful to include it in almost every official statement related to the relationship. Its repetition is considered to provide reassurance of each country’s commitment to the relationship. The “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” formulation marked an evolution from President George W. Bush’s description of the relationship as “constructive, cooperative, and candid,”15 with “candid” upgraded to “positive” and “comprehensive” added to reflect the broad range of issues on which the two countries expected to work together. The Obama-Hu language was a departure from the language agreed to by President Bill Clinton and his counterpart, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, in a 1997 Joint Statement, in which they pledged, “to build toward a constructive strategic partnership.”16

#### No China war

Robert J. Art, Fall 2010 Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall 2010): p359(33)

The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability vis-a-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically. These three benchmarks--China's ambitions will grow as its power grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising-dominant power dyads--are the starting points from which to analyze America's interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.

#### Won’t pass the nuclear threshold

**Moore 6** (Scott; Research Assistant – East Asia Nonproliferation Program – James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies – Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat,” 10/18, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_80.html)

Despite the tumult, there is broad consensus among experts that the concerns generated in this discussion are exaggerated. The size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is small, estimated at around 200 warheads;[3] Jeffrey Lewis, a prominent arms control expert, claims that 80 is a realistic number of deployed warheads.[4] In contrast, the United States has upwards of 10,000 warheads, some 5,700 of which are operationally deployed.[5]

Even with projected improvements and the introduction of a new long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the DF-31A China's nuclear posture is likely to remain one of "minimum deterrence."[6] Similarly, despite concern to the contrary, there is every indication that China is extremely unlikely to abandon its No First Use (NFU) pledge.[7] The Chinese government has continued to deny any change to the NFU policy, a claim substantiated by many Chinese academic observers.[8] In sum, then, fears over China's current nuclear posture seem somewhat exaggerated.

This document, therefore, does not attempt to discuss whether China's nuclear posture poses a probable, general threat to the United States; most signs indicate that even in the longer term, it does not. Rather, it seeks to analyze the most likely scenarios for nuclear conflict. Two such possible scenarios are identified in particular: a declaration of independence by Taiwan that is supported by the United States, and the acquisition by Japan of a nuclear weapons capability.

Use of nuclear weapons by China would require a dramatic policy reversal within the policymaking apparatus, and it is with an analysis of this potential that this brief begins. Such a reversal would also likely require crises as catalysts, and it is to such scenarios, involving Taiwan and Japan, that this brief progresses. It closes with a discussion of the future of Sino-American nuclear relations.

#### No Asia war—multiple safeguards and reversible tensions

**Feng 10 –** professor at the Peking University International Studies [Zhu, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia?utm\_source=feed]

As such, the surge of defense expenditures in East Asia does not add up to an arms race. No country in East Asia wants to see a new geopolitical divide and spiraling tensions in the region. The growing defense expenditures powerfully illuminate the deepening of a regional “security dilemma,” whereby the “defensive” actions taken by one country are perceived as “offensive” by another country, which in turn takes its own “defensive” actions that the first country deems “offensive.” As long as the region doesn’t split into rival blocs, however, an arms race will not ensue. What is happening in East Asia is the extension of what Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job call “competitive arms processes.” The history of the cold war is telling in this regard. Arm races occur between great-power rivals only if the rivalry is doomed to intensify. The perceived tensions in the region do not automatically translate into consistent and lasting increases in military spending. Even declared budget increases are reversible. Taiwan’s defense budget for fiscal year 2010, for instance, will fall 9 percent. This is a convincing case of how domestic constraints can reverse a government decision to increase the defense budget. Australia’s twenty-year plan to increase the defense budget could change with a domestic economic contraction or if a new party comes to power. China’s two-digit increase in its military budget might vanish one day if the type of regime changes or the high rate of economic growth slows. Without a geopolitical split or a significant great-power rivalry, military budget increases will not likely evolve into “arms races.” The security dilemma alone is not a leading variable in determining the curve of military expenditures. Nor will trends in weapon development and procurement inevitably induce “risk-taking” behavior. Given the stability of the regional security architecture—the combination of U.S.-centered alliance politics and regional, cooperation-based security networking—any power shift in East Asia will hardly upset the overall status quo. China’s military modernization, its determination to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best,” hasn’t yet led to a regional response in military budget increases. In contrast, countries in the region continue to emphasize political and economic engagement with China, though “balancing China” strategies can be found in almost every corner of the region as part of an overall balance-of-power logic. In the last few years, China has taken big strides toward building up asymmetric war capabilities against Taiwan. Beijing also holds to the formula of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue except in the case of the island’s de jure declaration of independence. Despite its nascent capability of power projection, China shows no sign that it would coerce Taiwan or become **militarily** assertive over contentious territorial claims ranging from the Senkaku Islands to the Spratly Islands to the India-China border dispute. 

## 2nc Pebble bed pic

### A2 perm do both

#### Either could be picked because no cost difference

**World Nuclear News, 11** (“Areva modular reactor selected for NGNP development” 2/15, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Areva_modular_reactor_selected_for_NGNP_development-1502124.html>)

The Alliance said that it had reached the same conclusions as INL: that there is "currently no substantive technical differentiation that provides the basis for choosing the reactor design concept - whether pebble bed or prismatic; there currently is no reason to believe that there will be a substantial difference in the costs and plant economic evaluations outside of the achievable power rating; and, either design concept can be successfully licensed." However, the Alliance noted that the "only practical differentiators are associated with the anticipated difference in capital cost for the range of reactor concept ratings achievable for each and the business case for reactor design development and licensing." Capital costs for a plant with an installed capacity of 2400-3000 MWt would be some 30% less using 625 MWt prismatic reactor modules than with 250 MWt pebble bed modules.

### AT: Perm Do CP

**The perm is severance** – **the counterplan is functionally and textually competitive, because HTGRs include pebble beds**

**TutorVista** [“Nuclear reactors”, 2010, <http://physics.tutorvista.com/modern-physics/nuclear-reactors.html>]

High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR)

It is also known as very high temperature reactor (VHTR). As from the name it is evident that this reactor is gas cooled. These reactors are based on either prismatic block reactors or pebble bed reactors.

### 2NC Pebble Bed Bad

#### 1 – Compaction risks meltdown

**Moormann 9** [Rainer Moormann, “PBR Safety Revisited”, 01 April 2009, Nuclear Engineering International Magazine]

First, then, is the issue of pebble bed compaction. A stochastic pebble bed shows a void fraction of 0.4, but the densest possible packing has a void fraction of only 0.26. Pebble flow may lead to compaction, as experiments indicate. Such compaction results in higher temperatures not only because of the higher power density but also because of the significantly larger pressure drop in compacted regions. The pressure drop tends to reduce the coolant flow through compacted regions. Second, fuel elements with high and low burn-up need to be sufficiently mixed over the entire pebble bed. Accumulations of fuel with relatively little burn-up (and high power) raise temperatures significantly. Third, irregularities in pebble flow may change the local heat production and the corresponding core temperature profile. Retardation of fuel element flow, which is unavoidable near reflectors, may lead to unacceptably high burn-up, which enhances fission product release.

#### That’s catastrophic

Caldicott, ‘6

[Helen, Founder and President -- the Nuclear Policy Research Institute, “Nuclear Power is not the Answer,” p. 119-21]

Should the core temperatures for any reason-during an unexpected accident triggered by human or mechanical error-exceed 1,600 degrees centigrade, however, the carbon coating would fail (at the same temperature that zirconium would oxidize and burn, as in most other currently operating reactors) thus initiating the release of massive quantities of radioactive isotopes.'? The radioactive kernels themselves would melt if temperatures went above 2,000 degrees centigrade. This situation would induce a graphite fire similar to Chernobyl. ¶ Other problems include the design of the cooling system. If air were to enter the primary helium circuit, the carbon coating of the kernels could spontaneously ignite, causing a severe graphite fire with catastrophic radioactive releases similar to Chernobyl. And although the reactors themselves will be located underground, the two steam turbine generators and the reactor cavity cooling system will be above ground, making them extremely vulnerable to sabotage and fires.21 Other problems beset the PBMR: • It is difficult to prevent radioactive helium leaking from the PBMR reactor. 22 • It is difficult to fabricate hundreds of thousands of fuel pebbles without imperfections. • The PBMR creates less low-level waste but a greater volume of high-level waste. • PBMRs achieve their economic advantages by replacing the steel-lined, reinforced-concrete containment structures with a far less robust enclosure building. Even the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards calls this "a major safety tradeoff.

## 2nc elections

### overview

#### Romney win would crush US-Russian cooperation

Mark Adomanis, 4-17-2012; analyst for Forbes, Mitt Romney's Incoherent Russia Policy http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/04/17/mitt-romneys-incoherent-russia-policy/

According to his campaign’s own words, Romney will basically ignore Central Asian authoritarianism, which literally everyone agrees is far nastier, more brutal, and more open than anything the Russians are guilty of, while simultaneously focusing on democracy promotion and regime change in Russia. That is to say Romney’s Russia policy will, to a large extent, be based on relentlessly confronting the Kremlin. But won’t the Kremlin react extremely poorly to an American policy that seeks not only to co-opt its longtime allies in Central Asia and but to depose the current regime? According to Romney, the answer is no: the Kremlin will be so impressed by the bravery and willpower of this American effort that it will more actively support American goals (though precisely why it would react positively to an open challenge to its authority is left unsaid). Despite the endless accusations of Obama’s “double standards” and his “moral relativism” Romney is quite openly embracing his own set of double-standards. As the campaign’s website itself says, one set of moral values will be applied to the Central Asians while a completely different, and much more exacting, set of values will be applied to the Russians. It goes almost without saying that this is the sort of bad-faith posturing that really drives the Russians batty and that they react very poorly to this sort of thing. While I personally am of a strongly realist orientation, and have little patience for the attempt to inject “values” into an international system that naturally tends to be amoral and anarchic, I understand that there is a coherent case to be made for the neoconservative position. Very intelligent people, including many of my friends and acquaintances, hold views similar to the ones Romney espouses towards, and while I can’t say I find them convincing I’m not nearly egotistical enough to think that my own views are the only “correct” ones. However Romney’s mix-and-match approach, a dollop of realism here, a large dose of neoconservatism there, a dash of accommodation here and a big helping of confrontation there, will not be a sober-minded attempt to appeal to everyone, but will instead be a disjointed mess that will simultaneously alienate and antagonize almost everyone in the region. While the foreign policy of any American president will never be perfectly within the bounds of a single school of thought, Romney’s entire Russia policy is a case study in avoiding hard choices. It quite openly attempts to be all things to all people: realists can look at it and see parts of their ideology, and neoconservatives can look at it and see parts of their ideology too. Romney will both openly confront the Russians and get more concessions from them, support democracy and work hand-in-hand with some of the world’s most repressive regimes, pursue missile defense and get Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, expand NATO and convince Russia to stop arming Syria, work to undermine Russia’s energy interests and get it to isolate Iran. There are no hard choices, no nasty compromises, and no trade-offs between values and interests: there is just the unapologetic exercise of American power and the positive consequences inevitably associated with it. Obama is himself very(!) far from being perfect, but at least his foreign policy seems to be a reasonably coherent attempt to advance America’s interests while avoiding, to the greatest extent possible, needless antagonism. As far as I can tell Romney’s main position is that Obama is bad, that everything he’s done is bad too, and that Romney would do better because… he said he will that’s why! There’s a deeper lesson in there about how this campaign is going to be waged, and a rather troubling one at that.

#### Romney will label China a currency manipulator – causes trade wars

Mike Shedlock, 7-31-2012; registered investment advisor representative for SitkaPacific Capital Management, “Is global trade about to collapse? Where are oil prices headed? A chat with Mish Shedlock by James Stafford” http://energybulletin.net/stories/2012-07-31/global-trade-about-collapse-where-are-oil-prices-headed-chat-mish-shedlock

Oilprice.com: In regards to presidential elections, how do you think energy will fare under Obama and under Romney? Which sectors will benefit, and which will suffer? Mish: Mitt Romney has declared that if he’s elected he is going to label China a currency manipulator and increase tariffs on China across the board. That's something that I believe he might be able to do by mandate. If he's elected and he does follow through, I think the result will be a global trade war the likes of which we have not seen since the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act compounded problems during the Great Depression. Simply put, I think that global trade will collapse if Romney wins and he follows through on his campaign promises.

#### Obama solves US – Sino relations

**Stokes and Hatchigian, 12** [U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year Taking the Long View in a Season of Heated Rhetoric, Jacob, Research Assistant at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where his research focuses on U.S. national security and defense policy. His writing has appeared in CNN.com, Politico, BusinessWeek, The Baltimore Sun, The Guardian and The American Prospect, among other publications, Senior Fellow at American Progress.¶ http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QG6048mP53AJ:www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2012/03/pdf/us\_china\_relations.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us]

Conservatives and progressives today approach the challenge of China very differently. Many conservatives, including most of the Republican candidates for¶ the presidential nomination, are critiquing the Obama administration’s policies¶ on China—a tactic designed to chip away at President Barack Obama’s high poll¶ numbers on national security issues and distract from congressional obstruction-¶ ism on key steps to improve our economic competitiveness at home.¶ But they are not offering many sensible ideas. Today’s conservative approaches¶ on China—which too often end up shortsighted, inconsistent, emotional, and¶ belligerent—will fail. Strategies that aim for short-term political point scoring—or, even worse, calculated efforts to create a new Cold War enemy—will¶ undermine global security.¶ In contrast, the Obama administration’s approach is steady, clear-eyed, and¶ focused on results. The administration has pushed back on China multiple¶ times—taking China to task on unfair trade, forming a united front to get China¶ to back down from aggressive actions in the South China Sea, and selling arms to¶ Taiwan over furious protests from Beijing. President Obama’s Asia strategy, which¶ is deepening partnerships and engagement in the region, is designed to ensure that¶ as China grows it contributes to peace and stability and follows the rules of the¶ international system. At the same time the administration does not let differences¶ prevent the United States from working with Beijing on important joint challenges such as North Korea’s nuclear program and clean energy.1¶ This progressive approach offers the best tactic for dealing with China because for¶ the foreseeable future China will be both a rival and a partner. Our policymak-¶ ers have to play the long game, ensuring our strategies for China make sense not¶ just during campaign seasons but for this year, this decade, and beyond. Fostering¶ successful policies toward China requires a steady hand and a concerted effort to¶ refrain from overheated tirades and knee-jerk responses.

Outweighs the case’s access to Russia

Obama just better

### U

**1nc Blumenthal says it will be close, but Obama leads every meaningful measure, prefer it –**

**a. samples the aggregate of all recent polling data, Blumenthal is the head of Pollster.com and his firm compiles data to correct for partisan polling firm’s ‘house effect’**

**b.it includes all swing state polls and accounts for likely voters**

**c. assumes alt causes like debates – these will make the race close, but won’t tip alone**

#### Conclusive lead despite alleged narrowing

**Silver, 10/2**/12 – statistician (Nate, “Is the Presidential Race Tightening Heading Into the Debates?”

http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/oct-1-is-the-presidential-race-tightening-heading-into-the-debates/?utm\_source=twitterfeed&utm\_medium=twitter

There were nine national polls published on Monday, which are listed in the table below. On average, they showed Mr. Obama with a 3.5 percentage point lead over Mr. Romney. That’s smaller than the leads we were seeing in national polls last week, which seemed to be concentrated more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama. It also suggests a smaller lead than recent state-by-state polls seem to imply. So has the race already shifted back toward Mr. Romney some? Perhaps, but this is less apparent from the trendlines within these polls. If you compare the nine surveys released on Monday against the last time they were published (in all cases, the comparison poll postdates the Democratic conventions), only four showed a shift toward Mr. Romney. An equal number, four, showed Mr. Obama gaining ground instead, while one poll remained unchanged. In all cases but one, the shift was extremely modest — within one percentage point in one direction or the other. The exception was a new CNN national poll, which had Mr. Romney closing his deficit from six points to three points. On average, however, the polls showed only a 0.2 percentage point gain for Mr. Romney — not a meaningful shift in either a statistical or a practical sense. And yet this simple version a trendline analysis does not tell the whole story either. Mr. Romney had appeared to lose further ground in the polls following the public release of his “47 percent” comments. All of polls that are used for comparison were released after the Democratic convention, but some predated the “47 percent” tape. It’s good for Mr. Romney that his national numbers on Monday looked more like those from just after the Democratic convention, when they weren’t great, rather than those from the past week or two, when they were worse. The FiveThirtyEight forecast model can account for these various contingencies, looking at exactly when the prior editions of a survey were released in order to calculate the consensus trendline. Viewed in this way, the national polls on Monday did contain modestly good news for Mr. Romney. But that doesn’t tell the whole story either, because there has also been a large volume of state polls released over the past day or two. Those polls can also be informative about the trend in the race. And in the state polls, it’s been harder to find evidence for a favorable trend for Mr. Romney. If anything, the opposite seems to be true. This was particularly the case in a University of New Hampshire survey published on Monday, which had Mr. Obama leading by 15 points in the Granite State — up from just a five-point lead in a poll taken just after the Democratic convention. The University of New Hampshire poll has a history of being fairly volatile, perhaps in part because voters in New Hampshire can be fickle with their political opinions. The poll certainly qualifies as an outlier relative to the consensus evidence in New Hampshire. At the same time, it’s not the kind of thing you’d expect to see if Mr. Romney were gaining ground in the race. Mr. Obama, not Mr. Romney, has also gotten highly favorable trendlines in a recent set of state-by-state polls released by the firm We Ask America, many of which show him with a considerably larger lead than he had before the conventions in those same states. The gap between state polls and national polls, which looked to have narrowed some last week, seems to be widening again. Perhaps appropriately given the mixed evidence on Monday, the FiveThirtyEight models produced something of a split verdict. Mr. Obama came off his highs in our “now-cast,” which projects what would happen if the election were held today. That version of the model had previously given Mr. Obama a 5.9 percentage lead in the national race, but it declined to 5.5 percentage points on Monday. Why are these “now-cast” numbers higher than the most recent national polls seem to suggest? In part because of the factor that I mentioned before — the “now-cast” uses state polls along with national polls to calculate its estimate of the national popular vote, and the state polls are a bit stronger for Mr. Obama. Also, last week’s national polls, which were more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama, still have some influence upon it. The Nov. 6 forecast, however, our signature product, is already assuming that Mr. Obama’s numbers will decline some, in large part, because it continues to weigh economic factors along with the polls. Those economic factors, in view of the formula, are more in line with only a very narrow win for Mr. Obama, on the order of two or three percentage points, similar to the margin by which George W. Bush defeated John Kerry in 2004. As we get closer and closer to the election, these economic factors will receive less weight, until they phase out completely by Election Day. But they continue to exert some influence on the forecast for the time being. In the Nov. 6 forecast, Mr. Obama’s projected margin of victory in the popular vote declined to 4.1 percentage points from 4.2. However, his probability of winning the Electoral College increased by a trivial amount, to 85.7 percent from 85.1.

#### Only that assumes cellphone users

**Silver, 9/19**/12 – statistician, editor of the NYT Fivethirtyeight blog (Nate, “Obama’s Lead Looks Stronger in Polls That Include Cellphones” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/obamas-lead-looks-stronger-in-polls-that-include-cellphones/#more-34740)

As I observed on Tuesday, and as The New Republic’s Nate Cohn also found, Barack Obama seems to have received a much clearer bounce in some types of polls than others. Although there are exceptions on either side, like the Gallup national tracking poll, for the most part Mr. Obama seems to be getting stronger results in polls that use live interviewers and that include cellphones in their samples — enough to suggest that he has a clear advantage in the race. In the polls that use an automated dialing method (“robopolls”) or which exclude cellphones, Mr. Obama’s bounce has been much harder to discern, and the race looks considerably closer. The difference seems especially pronounced at the state level. Mr. Obama got very strong results in a series of NBC News/Marist College polls last week in Ohio, Florida and Virginia, which included cellphones and used live interviewers. Likewise, Tuesday morning’s series of New York Times / CBS News / Quinnipiac polls had reasonably good news for Mr. Obama in Virginia and Wisconsin. By contrast, the automated polling firm Rasmussen Reports has recently released polls showing Mr. Obama two points behind Mitt Romney in New Hampshire and three points behind in Colorado — the worst results that it has shown for him in those states all year. Another automated polling firm, Gravis Marketing, recently put Mr. Obama at a five-point deficit in Virginia, in contrast to three traditional polls that put him ahead by margins ranging from four to eight points there. A third automated polling firm, Public Policy Polling, has shown stronger results for Mr. Obama, but they also had him with good results before the conventions, and so haven’t shown him gaining much ground. These results are consistent with some past research. Roughly one third of American households rely solely on mobile phones and do not have landlines, meaning they will simply be excluded by polls that call landlines only. Potential voters who rely on cellphones belong to more Democratic-leaning demographic groups than those which don’t, and there is reasonably strong empirical evidence that the failure to include them in polls can bias the results against Democrats, even after demographic weightings are applied. We keep track of which polling firms include cellphones in their samples and which do not. So on Monday night, I decided to run two alternate versions of the FiveThirtyEight forecast. (Note that all results are based on polls that were in our database as of Monday night, and so will not include Tuesday morning’s New York Times polls or others published on Tuesday.) In one of the forecasts, I ran the numbers based solely on polls that do include cellphones in their samples. The vast majority of these polls also use live interviewers, since federal law prohibits automated calls to cellphones under most circumstances. (Note, however, that one or two mostly automated polling firms, like SurveyUSA, use a separate sample based on live interviewers to reach cellphone-only voters; these were included in the model run.) In this universe, Mr. Obama seems poised for victory. The model forecasts him for a 4.1 percentage points win in the national popular vote. That compares with 2.9 percentage points in the regular FiveThirtyEight forecast, which includes polls both with and without cellphones.

### A2 voter id/

#### Voter suppression and fundraising doesn’t clinch it for Romney

**Levine, 10/3**/12 – contributing editor of the Washington Monthly, (Art, Three Ways Romney Can Still Win the Election, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/art-levine/can-democratic-convention\_b\_1860015.html)

Of course, practically unlimited, still-undisclosed funds and widespread voting barriers can hardly guarantee a win for a candidate as unpopular and clueless as Mitt Romney. With or without a raft of legalized dirty tricks helping him, Romney remains an unlikely winner but hardly out of the running.

### A2 october surprise

#### This is ahistorical and unverifiable – and nobody knows who it would favor

**Jackson, 10/1/12 –** covers the White House for USA Today (David, USA Today, “Will there be an 'October Surprise' in Election 2012?” http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/10/01/obama-romney-october-surprise/1605487/)

The month has turned, and election junkies are asking a familiar question: Will there be an October Surprise?

Taegan Goddard's Political Dictionary defines "October Surprise" as "a news event late in a political campaign that has the potential to influence the outcome of an election," but it is as much myth as reality.

Late-breaking news can affect elections, such as the late-game revelation of George W. Bush's DWI arrest in the 2000 election.

But big events can happen anytime. A pivotal development in 2008 -- the collapse of Lehman Brothers and subsequent financial meltdown -- happened in September.

Will Mitt Romney's "47% tape," disclosed last month, be seen as the big event of Campaign 2012? Or will it be the next unemployment report, due in October?

While some observers look to this month's debates for an "October Surprise," no one knows when -- of if -- anything will happen. That's the nature of surprises.

### 2nc link

#### The link slashes the case -- public opposition prevents nuclear expansion.

**Ramana, ‘11**

[M. V., appointed jointly with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security -- Princeton University, works on the future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament, member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, 7-1, “Nuclear Power and the Public,” SAGE Journals]

Opinion polls show that public support for nuclear power has declined since the Fukushima crisis began, not only in Japan but also in other nations around the world. People oppose nuclear power for a variety of reasons, but the predominant concern is the perception that it is a risky technology. Some communities that are closely associated with it even suffer from stigmatization. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power—including information campaigns, risk comparisons, and efforts to promote nuclear power as a solution to climate change. None of these strategies has worked well, mostly because the public lacks trust in the nuclear industry. Public resistance to nuclear power is likely to continue, making it difficult to site and build new reactors. This resistance may be a major obstacle to the rapid expansion of nuclear power.

#### The public supports existing reactors, not new ones – reject lobby spin

**Mariotte, 12** - Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Michael, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos, 6/5, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters. Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?” This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way. Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition. Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima. But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today. Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question). Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that: “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.” But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?” 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.” Conclusions Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

### Link uniqueness

#### Obama distancing himself from nuclear issues in the run-up to the election

LEVINE 9/7/12 (Gregg; Contributing Editor and Former Managing Editor – Firedoglake and Contributing Writer for Truthout, “Obama Drops Nuclear from Energy Segment of Convention Speech,” <http://capitoilette.com/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-from-energy-segment-of-convention-speech/>)

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever.

That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means):

We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles.

Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.”

But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina.

That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.”

But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term.

Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this):

[W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build.

That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important.

In the wake of Fukushima, where hundreds of thousands of Japanese have been displaced, where tens of thousands are showing elevated radiation exposure, and where thousands of children have thyroid abnormalities, no one can be cavalier about promising a safe harnessing of the atom. And in a world where radioisotopes from the breached reactors continue to turn up in fish and farm products, not only across Japan, but across the northern hemisphere, no one can pretend this is someone else’s problem.

Obama and his campaign advisors know all this and more. They know that most industrialized democracies have chosen to shift away from nuclear since the start of the Japanese crisis. They know that populations that have been polled on the matter want to see nuclear power phased out. And they know that in a time of deficit hysteria, nuclear power plants are an economic sinkhole.

And so, on a night when the president was promised one of the largest audiences of his entire campaign, he and his team decided that 2012 was not a year to throw a bone to Obama’s nuclear backers. Obama, a consummate politician, made the decision that for his second shot at casting for the future, nuclear power is political deadweight.

#### Even though Obama supports nuclear energy he’s downplaying it in the run up to the election – plan forces it into the spotlight

JOHNSON ’12 (John; Nuclear Energy Insider, “US Campaign Trail: is nuclear in the equation?” 4/25, <http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/new-build/us-campaign-trail-nuclear-equation>)

Alternative energy policies have received a fair amount of publicity from the Obama administration, although nuclear power specifically is rarely mentioned on the campaign trial, primarily due to perceived safety questions.

#### Obama and the DOE are downplaying SMR grants -- they won’t get caught up in election year politics.

Nelson & Northey, 9-24-12

[Gabriel, Hannah, E&E reporters, “NUCLEAR ENERGY: DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3]

Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants. The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants. DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago. As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest. "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how." Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle. Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made. "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email. That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending.

#### Obama is cutting nuclear incentives

**Bendery, 12** – Huffington Post (Jennifer, "Obama's Budget Nixes New Money For Program That Funded Solyndra," Huffington Post, 2/14, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/obama-budget-solyndra-program\_n\_1276605.html)

WASHINGTON -- In a quiet shift from the past two years, President Barack Obama's 2013 budget includes no new money for the Department of Energy loan guarantee program, the same program that House Republicans have scrutinized for losing more than $500 million in taxpayer dollars to the now-defunct solar power company, Solyndra.

Obama has regularly included huge increases to the program's loan guarantee authority in his budget, though Congress has not approved his proposals. He provided a $36 billion increase for nuclear reactors in his 2011 budget, and again in his 2012 budget. He also included $200 million in credit subsidies for renewable and energy efficiency projects in his 2012 budget. This year, he provided nothing.

Meg Reilly, a spokeswoman for the Office of Management and Budget, said in an email that Obama opted not to put new money toward the loan guarantee program this time because the administration is waiting on the results of an evaluation of the Energy Department's loan portfolio. Reilly also said the program still has "a significant amount of remaining resources" from prior years and that the focus will be on putting those funds to use. There's about $10 billion in its reserves.

The Energy Department "continues to conduct due diligence and is in active negotiations with a number of additional project sponsors," Reilly said. "It's important to point out here that, as of January 2012, over $24 billion in direct loans and loan guarantees have closed to support a diverse range of over 30 wind, solar, electric vehicles and other clean energy projects projected to fund more than 50,000 jobs."

But some environmental groups say Obama's budgetary shift is hugely significant because it means no new money for building nuclear power plants -- and they speculate that, at least in part, they have Solyndra to thank for the shift.

"The entire loan program has fallen into some disrepute on Capitol Hill ... because of Solyndra and some of the other renewable programs getting in trouble," said Michael Mariotte, executive director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, an information hub for organizations concerned with nuclear power. The administration "may have decided to cut their losses" and stop providing new funds to the program altogether.

## 2nc states

### A2 fed regs

#### Federal role has already achieved the funding and selected the design – spurring additional investment in first commercial plants is now key

**World Nuclear News, 11** (“Areva modular reactor selected for NGNP development” 2/15, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Areva_modular_reactor_selected_for_NGNP_development-1502124.html>)

An Areva prismatic steam-cycle high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (SC-HTGR) concept has been selected by the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) Industry Alliance as the optimum design for next generation nuclear power plants. In addition to generating electricity, these modular plants could produce process heat for use by industry.

The US Energy Policy Act of 2005 established the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project to develop, construct and operate a prototype HTGR and associated electricity or hydrogen production facilities by 2021. The legislation stipulated that the NGNP project was to be led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and that a cost-sharing arrangement should be entered into with the private sector. For this purpose, the NGNP Industry Alliance - which includes major reactor vendors and potential end users - was established in 2009. The total cost of the project is currently estimated at some $4 billion.

Three companies were selected to conduct design and engineering studies for the NGNP: General Atomics, Areva and Westinghouse/PBMR. General Atomics submitted conceptual plant configurations based on its Gas-Turbine Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR), while Areva put forward concepts based on its similar Antares HTGR design. Meanwhile, Westinghouse and PBMR submitted conceptual configurations based on the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR). A subsequent evaluation by INL considered comparative advantages of the concepts for design, analysis, safety and operational performance attributes. The NGNP Industry Alliance has now evaluated the work completed by INL.

The Alliance said that it had reached the same conclusions as INL: that there is "currently no substantive technical differentiation that provides the basis for choosing the reactor design concept - whether pebble bed or prismatic; there currently is no reason to believe that there will be a substantial difference in the costs and plant economic evaluations outside of the achievable power rating; and, either design concept can be successfully licensed." However, the Alliance noted that the "only practical differentiators are associated with the anticipated difference in capital cost for the range of reactor concept ratings achievable for each and the business case for reactor design development and licensing." Capital costs for a plant with an installed capacity of 2400-3000 MWt would be some 30% less using 625 MWt prismatic reactor modules than with 250 MWt pebble bed modules.

The Alliance said that it had selected an unspecified Areva reactor concept, presumably based on the Antares design, "as the optimum design." It said, "The Areva HTGR technology's capability and modular design would support a broad range of market sectors, providing highly-efficient energy to industries such as electrical power generation, petrochemicals, non-conventional oil recovery and synthetic fuel production." Areva, it said, "has the technical and design capabilities to develop a HTGR for the process heat co-generation and generation markets."

It added that "additional investors are being pursued to fully capitalize a venture in order to build an initial fleet of HTGR plants for industry." The Alliance noted, "Deploying next generation nuclear technology is a critical step in solving the long-term needs for secure sources of energy, conserving fossil fuels and slowing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Clean, safe nuclear energy from HTGR would increase US energy independence and extend the life of domestic oil and natural gas resources."

The Alliance noted that the reference steam cycle-based prismatic reactor is intended "to satisfy a broad range of industrial heat needs while relying on existing and available technologies for the reactor and the plant." However, follow-on applications requiring higher application temperatures would consequently introduce "greater design challenges."

The NGNP Industry Alliance has eleven member companies, including reactor vendors Areva and Westinghouse, utility Entergy, and potential end-users of electricity and process heat such as Dow Chemical and ConocoPhillips. The NGNP licensing plan was submitted to Congress by the DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in August 2008. Entergy Nuclear, as a member of the Alliance, has assumed the role of applicant for the HTGR pre-application and licensing activities for the Alliance.

## 1NR case

### Heg Add-on

#### Heg is inevitable

Maher 11 – Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68

The United States will continue to be the ‘‘default power’’ (to use Josef Joffe’s term) in the near future.20 No other country will be able to duplicate the overall reach and influence of the United States—in terms of economic, political, and military power—for at least several decades. It is not clear, moreover, how many peoplewouldwant to live in aworlddominated byChina, India,Russia, or even Europe. The United States retains a number of tremendous advantages compared to possible strategic competitors: its demographics; advanced technology; raw materials; research universities and laboratories; continued dominance in global mass culture, and labor market flexibility.

#### Doesn’t solve war

**Friedman 10**—research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in pol sci, MIT (Ben, Military Restraint and Defense Savings, 20 July 2010, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html)

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrest than they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival. Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us — either directly or by forcing us to become a garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

### Solvency

#### Construction won’t be successful -- bottlenecks.

Johnson, ‘11

[Toni, Senior Editor/Senior Staff Writer -- CFR, 3-18, “Nuclear Power Expansion Challenges,” http://www.cfr.org/united-states/nuclear-power-expansion-challenges/p16886]

Construction Bottlenecks. Another obstacle for getting new nuclear construction under way is the capacity to make ultra-large forging. Pressure vessels--at the core of a nuclear reactor--can be made in several pieces. However, most utilities now want vessels forged in a single piece. Welds can become brittle and leak radiation (older reactors slated for U.S. license extensions have their welds rigorously checked before approval). No welds can decrease the time a reactor is shut down for safety inspections, saving the reactor money. Only one company in the world, Japan Steel Works, currently can forge reactor vessels this way (Bloomberg). The company can only do about five a year, though it hopes to expand to twelve per year by 2012. The company's current order backlog is about three years. This requires utilities to place orders well in advance of construction, plunking down about $100 million just to get in the queue.

#### Nuclear engineer shortage prevents solvency.

Szondy, ‘12

[David, freelance writer -- Gizmag, 2-16, “Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?” <http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/>]

Not only complicated, but expensive and potentially dangerous. Though hundreds of reactors were built all over the world and some countries, such as France, generate most of their electricity from it, nuclear power has faced continuing questions over cost, safety, waste disposal and proliferation. One hundred and four nuclear plants provide the United States with 20 percent of the nation's power, but a building permit hadn't been issued since 1978 with no new reactors coming on line since 1996 and after the uproar from the environmental movement after nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, it seemed unlikely that any more would ever be approved - until now. This fierce domestic opposition to nuclear power has caused many governments to take an almost schizophrenic stance regarding the atom.¶ Germany, for example, decided to abandon nuclear power completely in favor of alternative energy, but then the severe winter of 2011-12 got so cold that the Danube was freezing and Berlin had to put some of the mothballed reactors back into service. This opposition also means that many Western countries have a shortage of nuclear engineers because many see it as a dying industry not worth getting into. This is particularly acute in the United States and Britain, neither of which have retained the capacity for building the huge reactor vessels and must farm this out to overseas manufacturers.

#### No licensing

Tucker 11 (William, energy writer for the American Spectator, "America’s Last Nuclear Hope," March 2011, http://0101.nccdn.net/1\_5/28c/010/2c9/America-s-Last-Nuclear-Hope-Tucker-TAS.pdf-http://0101.nccdn.net/1\_5/28c/010/2c9/America-s-Last-Nuclear-Hope-Tucker-TAS.pdf)

So why isn't there more coordination between the civilian and military efforts? In fact there is some. The first commercial reactor built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in 1957 was actually a submarine reactor "beached" by Admiral Rickover's Navy. Since then hundreds of nuclear technicians trained in the Navy have gone on to find jobs in the nuclear industry. One reason most new reactors are now being planned in the South is the large presence of Navy veterans. But beyond that, the Navy's long experience with nuclear does not seem to build anyone's confidence that the technology can be handled in the civilian field. Instead, the great impediment to all this is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the gargantuan Washington bureaucracy that regularly wins awards as the "best place to work in the federal government" yet seems unable to deliver on its main purpose, which is to issue licenses for nuclear reactors. The NRC last issued a license for a nuclear reactor in 1976. No one knows if it will ever issue one again. One utility, Southern Electric, has received permission to begin site clearance at the Vogtle plants 3 and 4 in Georgia. But the Vogtle plants will be Westinghouse AP1000s, a model for which the NRC has not yet issued design approval, let alone permission to build particular projects. Four AP1000s are already well under construction in China, with the first scheduled to begin operation in 2013. Yet here the NRC is still trying to figure out how to protect the reactor from airplanes. Even though the containment structure is strong enough to withstand a direct hit from a commercial jet, the NRC asked Westinghouse to put up a concrete shield to protect adjacent buildings. Then after Westinghouse had completed the revision, the NRC decided the shield might fall down in an earthquake. Further revisions are still pending. When Hyperion first approached the NRC about design approval for its small modular reactor in 2006, the NRC essentially told it to go away -- it didn't have time for such small potatoes. Since then the NRC has relented and sat down for discussions with Hyperion last fall. Whether the approval process can be accelerated is still up for grabs, but at least there has been a response from the bureaucracy. OR COURSE, the NRC is only responding to the lamentations and lawsuits from environmentalists and nuclear opponents who have never reconciled themselves to the technology, even though nuclear's carbon-free electricity is the only reliable source of power that promises to reduce carbon emissions. If a new reactor project does ever make it out of the NRC, it will be contested in court for years, with environmental groups challenging the dotting of every i and crossing of every t in the decision-making. It will be a miracle if any proposal ever makes it through the process.

### Russia

#### Russia doesn’t want or need us

Shleifer and Treisman 11 – Professor of Economic at Harvard and Professor of PoliSci at UCLA Andrei Shleifer,Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and Daniel Treisman, Professor of Political Science at the University of California,Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. “Why Moscow Says No: A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology”. Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2011. Vol. 90, Iss.1; pg. 122.ProQuest.

With very few exceptions, **Russia does not need or want help** from Washington in achieving its main objectives. What it would value is for the United States to stop interfering in its neighborhood, militarizing the border states, and attempting to undermine Russia's position in energy markets. rational ambivalence Nonetheless, Russia might still hope that the United States succeeds in its global endeavors. For example, the Kremlin has no desire to see Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. A victory for radical Islamists there could embolden insurgencies throughout Central Asia and invigorate the North Caucasus' terrorist networks. Yet Russian officials are unsure that nato can defeat the Taliban or at least impose a stable settlement. Looking ahead to the situation after U.S. troops leave, the Kremlin does not want to take positions now that will make it impossible to deal with Kabul's future rulers. Moscow also knows that some level of tension keeps its southern neighbors in line. When they feel threatened by the Taliban, Central Asia's leaders are more ready to cooperate in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and to welcome Russia's military presence in the region. At the same time, Moscow is concerned about the recent flood of Afghan heroin across its borders; opium production has doubled since the nato invasion. And polls show that Russia's public is far less happy than Putin and Medvedev about assisting nato in Afghanistan. Iran evokes another set of complicated calculations. Moscow would prefer that Tehran not develop nuclear weapons. Yet many Russian officials doubt that even the toughest economic sanctions- fully backed by Russia-would prevent this outcome. Meanwhile, Russia has economic interests in Iran that it would be costly to jeopardize. Its exports to the country have grown from $250 million in 1995 to $3.3 billion in 2008. Moscow hopes for contracts to build additional nuclear power stations, develop oil and gas fields, and supply Iran with modern weapons. It also is loath to give Tehran's radicals any excuses for stirring up trouble in the North Caucasus. A resolution of the conflict between Tehran and Washington would threaten Russia's commercial and strategic interests. Western investment would likely pour into the Iranian oil and gas sectors, competing with Russian multinationals. The lifting of sanctions and the lowering of tensions would depress petroleum prices; new pipelines might be built to carry Iranian gas to Europe. In many ways, the current stalemate serves the Kremlin's purposes. And on the question of North Korea's nuclear program, Russia would like to see Pyongyang disarm but doubts that even its strong support for sanctions would have much of an effect. At the same time, it worries that any military escalation or a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang could send refugees flooding into Russia's Far East. The New start treaty mostly ratified cuts in the Russian nuclear arsenal that were occurring anyway as the weapons aged. Further reductions are not so clearly in Russia's interest; as antimissile systems become more accurate and powerful, Moscow will need to maintain enough missiles and warheads to remain sure of a second-strike capability. On climate change, the Kremlin recognizes that global warming would impose huge costs, causing floods and destroying infrastructure. Still, how the expense of cutting pollution should be shared among the major industrial and industrializing countries remains contentious. Like other countries, Russia has a powerful pro-carbon lobby. limited but constructive Washington should not expect much help from Moscow, not because Kremlin officials are overwhelmed by wounded pride and paranoia but because Washington's priorities are not their priorities- and may not be in their interest at all. The parallel with U.S.-Chinese relations is instructive. In dealing with Beijing, U.S. policymakers perceive conflicts of interest for what they are. They do not feel compelled to patronize and psychoanalyze their Chinese counterparts. It is hard to imagine a U.S. president on the eve of a Beijing summit berating President Hu for his obsolete Marxist mentality and promising to build up Premier Wen Jiabao as a counterweight. If divergent interests make a close relationship between Moscow and Washington unlikely in the next few years, there are grounds for greater optimism in the long run. As its interactions with the United States have shrunk, Russia has been gradually integrating into Europe, both economically and culturally. Because these changes are slow and not particularly dramatic, they have gone largely unnoticed. As it develops further, Russia will become even more European-without losing its distinct identity. In 2008, Russians made 39 times as many trips to western Europe and 19 times as many trips to China as they did to the United States. Of the 41,000 Russian students who studied abroad in 2008, 20,000 were at institutions in Europe; only 5,000 were in the United States. Meanwhile, in 2009,Russians were more likely to buy property in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic than in the United States.

#### Political and domestic barriers

**Blank, 11** (Dr. Stephen J. Blank has served as an expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world at the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the University of California, Riverside. November 2011. “Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy,” pg 7-8. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1085>, Callahan)

Another way of articulating this problem is to note that it is the fundamental nature of the Russian domestic political system, and a fact heightened by its juxtaposition to the U.S. and European systems, that drives the dynamic of hostility in East-West relations and fosters a situation where Russian thinking about security takes its cognitive and policy points of departure from what the German philosopher Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of conflict.19 On a regular basis, the glaring asymmetries in the two sides’ domestic political systems engender long-lasting perceptions based on mutual or reciprocal suspicion among powerful domestic constituencies that then try to obstruct meaningful progress in arms control or in overcoming 8 outstanding differences on regional security issues in Eurasia. Consequently, any effort to determine not just Russia’s posture but its evolving perspectives must take into account both the competing security orientations of the two states and the so-called values gap that fuels the mistrust, in order to understand Russian thinking to determine where accords can be reached or differences bridged and where they cannot be so resolved.

#### a.) Targeted at ocean

**Slcoombe 09** – (Walter 2009, june 21-23, “De-alerting, diagnoses, prescriptions, and side-effects” http://www.ewi.info/system/files/Slocombe.pdf)

Moreover, in recent years, both the US and Russia, as well as Britain and China, have modified their procedures so that even if a nuclear-armed missile were launched, it would go not to a “real” target in another country but – at least in the US 6 case - to empty ocean. In addition to the basic advantage of insuring against a nuclear detonation in a populated area, the fact that a missile launched in error would be on flight path that diverged from a plausible attacking trajectory should be detectable by either the US or the Russian warning systems, reducing the possibility of the accident being perceived as a deliberate attack. De-targeting, therefore, provides a significant protection against technical error.

#### Iran prolif impacts make zero sense

Pena, 12 [1/10, **Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy** Is Iran-Nuke Fear Realistic?, http://consortiumnews.com/2012/01/10/is-iran-nuke-fear-realistic/]

At the heart of U.S. disbelief are centrifuges that can be used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. But there isn’t anything in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treat (NPT) — to which Iran is a signatory — that prohibits a country from enriching uranium.

Moreover, the foundation of the NPT is a false promise. Essentially, non-nuclear-weapons states (such as Iran) agree not to develop nuclear weapons (Article II) in exchange for nuclear-weapons states (such as the U.S.) agreeing to eventually (with no specific deadline) divest themselves of their nuclear weapons (Article VI). Apparently, the Iranians believe this about as much as that there is a bridge in Brooklyn for sale.

But why would the Iranians want nukes anyway? It couldn’t be that neighboring Israel has nuclear weapons (not that the Israelis are admitting that they do). And it certainly couldn’t be because U.S.-imposed regime change via military force (most recently right next door to Iran in Iraq) seems to happen to countries that don’t have nuclear weapons, e.g., notice that regime change in North Korea is happening because Kim Jong-Il died of natural causes.

Not that either of these could be considered legitimate concerns, from Iran’s perspective. And if the Iranians got nukes, the West’s argument goes, that would be the end of the world because they would most certainly use them. After all, Ahmadinejad supposedly threatened to wipe Israel off the map.

This assumes, of course, that the Iranians are suicidal. It is hard to imagine that the Israelis would sit idly by and not retaliate with their nuclear arsenal (which is likely enough to wipe Iran off the map). Ditto for any concerns about Iran lobbing a nuke at the United States (with an even larger and more capable nuclear arsenal that could wipe Iran off the map several times over — not to mention the minor detail that the Iranians don’t have a delivery platform capable of reaching the United States).

But Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, the argument goes, so wouldn’t they give nukes to terrorists? This, of course, was a central tenet of the Bush administration’s rationale for invading Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein in the wake of 9/11.

But the reality is that there is no history of any country with dreaded weapons of mass destruction giving them away to terrorists. Indeed, Saddam Hussein was known to have both chemical and biological weapons (in the 1980s) and he supported terrorists — but he never gave those weapons to terrorists.

It is also hard to fathom why the regime in Tehran would spend billions of dollars (perhaps tens of billions of dollars) in pursuit of nuclear weapons technology only to give it away to terrorists (the Bushehr reactor complex is estimated to have cost $4-6 billion, and the Iranians are believed to be constructing three to five more nuclear facilities at an estimated cost of $3.2 billion).

So strip away the veneer of threats and posturing, and the underpinning logic is anything but logical. Unfortunately, this passes for and seems to be accepted as sound foreign policy.

#### There is no nuclear program—their evidence is sensationalist journalism

**Horton 2010** – co-founder of the American University in Central Asia, lecturer at Columbia Law School, Contributing Editor for Harper’s (9/17, CSM, “Reality check: Iran is not a nuclear threat”, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0917/Reality-check-Iran-is-not-a-nuclear-threat, WEA)

US media distortions

In mid-August, for example, after The New York Times quite uncharacteristically ran a piece diminishing the supposed danger of Iranian nukes, the story was misrepresented in newspapers and on TV stations across the country in the most frightening terms. As MSNBC’s news reader put it that afternoon: “Intelligence sources say Iran is only one year away from a nuclear bomb!”

On August 13, on Fox News, former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton implicitly urged Israel to attack Iran’s new light-water reactor at Bushehr before it began “functioning,” the implication being that the reactor represented some sort of dire threat. But the facts are not on Mr. Bolton’s side. The Bushehr reactor is not useful for producing weapons-grade plutonium, and the Russians have a deal to keep all the waste themselves.

On September 6, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a new paper on the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement which reported that the agency has “continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran to any military or other special purpose.”

Yet despite the IAEA report and clear assertions to the contrary, news articles that followed **were dishonest to the extreme**, interpreting this clean bill of health as just another wisp of smoke indicating nuclear fire in a horrifying near-future.

A Washington Post article published the very same day led the way with the aggressive and misleading headline “UN Report: Iran stockpiling nuclear materials,” “shorthanding” the facts right out of the narrative. The facts are that Iran’s terrifying nuclear “stockpile” is a small amount of uranium enriched to industrial grade levels for use in its domestic energy and medical isotope programs, all of it “safeguarded” by the IAEA.

More sensational claims

If the smokescreen wasn’t thick enough, late last week a group of Marxist holy warrior exiles called the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq, working with the very same neoconservatives who sponsored Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress – which manufactured so much of the propaganda that convinced the American people to support the invasion of that country – accused the Iranian government of building a secret nuclear enrichment facility buried deep in tunnels near Qazvin.

Headlines once again blared in total negligence and without verification that here indeed was, an official told Fox News, proof that Iran has a “hidden, secret nuclear weapons program.’” TV news anchors on every channel furiously mopped sweat from their brows, hearts-a-tremor. When will the forces of good rise to stop this evil?!

Yet even US officials quickly admitted that they’ve known about these tunnels for years. “[T]here’s no reason at this point to think it’s nuclear,” one US official said – a quote that appeared in Fox’s article, but only after five paragraphs of breathless allegations. All day long, top-of-the-hour news updates on TV and radio let the false impression stand.

IAEA inspectors have had open access to the gas conversion facility at Isfahan, the enrichment facility at Natanz, and the new lightwater reactor at Bushehr, as well as the secondary enrichment facility under construction at Qom.

An ignored clean bill of health

The September 6 IAEA report confirming for the zillionth time the non-diversion of nuclear material should be the last word on the subject until the next time they say the same thing: Iran, a long-time signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is not in violation of its Safeguards Agreement.

So what’s all the hubbub about Iran’s “nuclear defiance” and “danger”?

The IAEA’s latest report does note that Iran has “not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” Indeed, the agency’s frequent mentions of Iran’s “lack of full cooperation” is a big reason why US media reports portray Iran in ominous terms.

But here, too, US media frequently miss the point. Never mind that 118 nations around the world have signed a statement criticizing the IAEA’s “peaceful activities” conclusion as a departure from standard verification language. More broadly, Iran’s “lack of full cooperation” by itself is an outcome of Western bullying and propaganda.

Real reason for lack of cooperation

The US and the UN, acting upon no legitimate authority whatsoever, have demanded that Iran submit to an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which would allow endless inspections on issues not directly related to Iran’s use of nuclear materials. They have also demanded that Iran cease all uranium enrichment and submit to an endless regime of questions based mostly on the “alleged studies” documents, which several sources have said are forgeries posing as a pilfered laptop of a dead Iranian nuclear scientist. [Editor's note: The original version of this article misstated an implication of the Additional Protocol.]

These separate, UN Security Council-mandated investigations have even demanded blueprints for Shahab 3 missiles – a subject far removed from hexafluoride gas or any legitimate IAEA function. In 2003, Iran voluntarily agreed to the extra burden of the unratified Additional Protocol during “good faith negotiations” with the so-called “E-3,” Britain, France, and Germany, acting on behalf of the US. When those negotiations broke down, Iran withdrew in 2006.

#### Empirics prove our claims

Perry et al. 09 – former secretary of defense (“America’s Strategic Posture, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States”, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat\_posture\_report.pdf,)

The second is de-alerting. Some in the arms control community have pressed enthusiastically for new types of agreements that take U.S. and Russian forces off of so-called “hair trigger” alert. This is simply an erroneous characterization of the issue. The alert postures of both countries are in fact highly stable. They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and indeed presidential decision-making. The proper focus really should be on increasing the decision time and information available to the U.S. president—and also to the Russian president—before he might authorize a retaliatory strike. There were a number of incidents during the Cold War when we or the Russians received misleading indications that could have triggered an accidental nuclear war. With the greatly reduced tensions of today, such risks now seem relatively low. The obvious way to further reduce such risks is to increase decision time for the two presidents. The President should ask the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to give him an analysis of factors affecting the decision time available to him as well as recommendations on how to avoid being put in a position where he has to make hasty decisions. It is important that any changes in the decision process preserve and indeed enhance crisis stability.

#### Zero chance – this card smokes them

**Marashi, 1/6**/12 - is Director of Research at the National Iranian American Council (Reza, The Political Psychology of Obama’s Iran Policy, <http://muftah.org/?p=2505>)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey and CENTCOM Commander James Mattis, whose areas of command include Iraq and Afghanistan, have a keen interest in Iran because of its regional influence.  For these reasons, they know that war with Iran is not a viable, risking regional chaos and breaking the back of America’s military.  Privately, Dempsey and Mattis both acknowledge that sanctions will not work because they fail to achieve the primary U.S. objective – changing Iranian government policies and behavior.  As a result, these men will be a leading voice inside the Obama administration, publicly encouraging diplomacy and communication while privately probing an unofficial long-term policy of containment and below-the-radar efforts to destabilize the Iranian government.

As the United States moves away from sustained diplomatic engagement with the Iranian government, American military commanders will become an increasingly important voice on Iran policy – perhaps trumped only by President Obama himself.  Dempsey and Mattis are particularly influential.  Nobody on the political right can attack them, few can say “no” to them, and they have a nearly unrivaled ability to convince Congress and the administration on key national security issues.  Even Obama is inclined to go along with their recommendations – a President can rarely go wrong politically when he says, “I’m going to listen to my generals.”

Neither Obama nor his generals will advocate for the military to engage in the first two CENTCOM scenarios.  In their view, the likelihood of failure far outweighs the chances of success. However, all three men increasingly believe that developing a strategy for the third scenario – containing and changing the regime – will provide political cover for the United States to avoid engaging in kinetic tactics.  They acknowledge the “moderate risk” associated with influence operations and support for opposition groups inside Iran, but nonetheless seek to better understand what outreach to the various facets of Iran’s disenchanted society might look like, including to opposition politicians, major industry, labor and transportation unions, government employees, bazaar merchants, and oil workers. They also seek to understand how the United States can help these amorphous groups organize and coalesce.  This long-term policy option is seen as providing flexibility, even if plans go awry.  Barring a major and unforeseen Iranian concession on the nuclear front, this policy trajectory will be difficult to disrupt.

### China

#### Gyroscope argument—relations will never be strong enough to solve their impact, but they also won’t be confrontational enough to cause it

Harry **Harding 11**, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative, at least in the short to medium term. The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of development, and perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. Fortunately, an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely, especially if one is primarily concerned with the risks of military conflict. The high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries has already created a relatively resilient relationship. The cost of military conflict, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, will be a significant deterrent against military conflict. Equally important, the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – is presently quite low, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

#### Science diplomacy fails

**Dickson 9** – journalist for SciDev (David, Dir. SciDev.Net, “The limits of science diplomacy”, 6-4, http://www.scidev.net/en/climate-change-and-energy/science-networks/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html)

The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international perspective — scientists often ignore national boundaries and interests when it comes to exchanging ideas or collaborating on global problems. So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on scientific and technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working relationships. More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt dialogue has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations provided a conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control. Only so much science can do Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence

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and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.

#### No China war

**Brendon 10** — fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge University (Piers, 20 October 2010, “China Also Rises”, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/china-rises-4236>)

This is not the case. Not only does history not repeat itself, it contains no rhythms or patterns which enable its students to make sure predictions. It is a “flickering lamp,” wrote Winston Churchill, in a world governed by time and chance. Human beings and all their works are subject, as Edward Gibbon said, to “the vicissitudes of fortune.” Or, in the somewhat less coherent words of Margaret Thatcher, “the unexpected happens” and “fail-safe plans are designed to go wrong.” But while certainty is unattainable, history does offer more optimistic possibilities than the saga of Chinese humiliation at foreign hands may suggest. One conceivable outcome that deserves serious consideration is that **we are at the dawn of an era of fruitful cooperation between China and America.**

It must be said that commercially successful states do not automatically or immediately beat their pruning hooks into swords. For all its overwhelming industrial and mercantile dominance, the United States remained a tenth-rate military power (except for its navy) until galvanized by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Deng’s China itself put the modernization of its armed forces behind that of agriculture, manufacturing and science, and in the two decades after 1981 its troop numbers fell by half, to 2.3 million. Admittedly, its defense spending rose thereafter, but it remains a much-lower percentage of GDP than does America’s. And this year the rise has been checked, apparently in order to assuage foreign worries about its military modernization.

In other words, **there is no necessary correlation between economic growth and military strength**. Witness Stalin’s Russia, which made guns at the expense of butter during the 1930s, starving itself great. As Hitler and Mussolini also showed, this is a policy to which totalitarian states are particularly prone. Yet China’s leaders seem dedicated to augmenting prosperity in order to secure stability. Having been racked by internal convulsions for generations, the country evidently prefers tyranny to anarchy, even to democracy. Anything is better than a return to the bloody turmoil of the Taiping or the warlord era or to the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. As Deng Xiaoping insisted, “Stability supersedes all.”

The ideal of harmony is quintessentially Confucian. The philosopher stressed that good order is the basis of prosperity and security. **Violence is a last resort** and will probably be ineffective

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. Historically, China has assimilated aggression, rolling with punches, overcoming hardness with softness. Where possible it has avoided taking the offensive. This is not to say, of course, that the Beijing government avoids coercion close to home, as became tragically clear in the suppressing of the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and the crushing of resistance in Tibet. But it is to suggest that China prefers, particularly in a nuclear age, to use “soft power” and “smile diplomacy” abroad.

**THERE IS little evidence** that China wishes to jeopardize its burgeoning affluence by adventurist attempts to contest American hegemony. On the contrary, the Chinese leadership is all too conscious that the Soviet Union’s endeavor to compete militarily with the United States was a major factor in its collapse. Prosperity breeds contentment. As Jonathan Swift noted in The Battle of the Books, quarrels usually stem from want rather than plenty, and “we may observe in the republic of dogs . . . that the whole state is ever in the profoundest peace after a full meal.”

Needless to say, accidents do happen, and when American bombers destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, a wave of spontaneous fury engulfed the People’s Republic. The bombing was said to be a “barbarian” act of aggression comparable to the imperialist invasion of China after the Boxer Rebellion. It was even compared to a Nazi war crime. Fearing domestic and international damage, however, the authorities did their best to calm the storm. The kept press assuaged popular passions. Television reports were emollient. Censorship of the Internet was tightened via a list of some thousand taboo words, the building blocks of the Great Firewall of China.

There was a similar response to George W. Bush’s disastrous invasion of Iraq, which replaced Chinese sympathy for the United States in the wake of 9/11 with feelings of anxiety and mistrust—feelings exacerbated by President Obama’s failure to pull America out of the Afghan quagmire. Just as England’s difficulty was once Ireland’s opportunity, so America’s difficulty might have been China’s. But, no. The Chinese media tamped down outbursts of chauvinism which might have led to public protests. One result, according to Susan Shirk’s excellent book China: Fragile Superpower, was that the American abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib was condemned much more vehemently in the Great Republic than in the People’s Republic.

Perhaps nationalism has succeeded Communism as the creed of Red China, but its rulers show signs of wanting to make their country a good citizen of the world. They have signally reduced the number of land-border disputes with their fourteen neighbors. They have participated eagerly in international forums such as the World Trade Organization. They have eased relations with Japan and, horrified by the nuclear brinkmanship of Kim Jong Il, mediated with Korea. They have muted criticisms of the United States, even when Jiang Zemin’s Boeing 767 was found to contain twenty-seven sophisticated bugging devices after being refitted in Texas in 2001—a covert operation which might have been designed to demonstrate that the term “intelligence agency” is an oxymoron.

Wang Jisi articulates the official Chinese position: since Mao’s victory in 1949 the Communist elite has generally believed that America and other hostile outside forces have been intent on conquering and destabilizing China. But **globalization has increased the cost of conflict and reduced the danger of war.** It has also magnified many of the problems from which China suffers, such as pollution, urban overcrowding and huge disparities of wealth—100 million people live on less than a dollar a day and a quarter of the population lacks access to clean drinking water. So China’s priority is to tackle these problems. It aims to build a rich and great society, dedicated to peace, progress, harmony, sustainable development and international cooperation.

#### China war is no longer possible

**Lee 2008** – Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University, also teaches IR and comparative politics of East Asia, visiting faculty at Kansai Gaidai University in Japan (Wei-chin, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Volume 43, No. 5, October 2008, "Long shot and short hit", Sage journals online, WEA)

One recent debate between Brzezinski and Mearsheimer is a typical example of varying perspectives in dealing with China’s rise in military power. Brzezinski has argued that the US decision to stay in East Asia has an added advantage for China in restraining a militarily powerful, increasingly nationalistic, and potentially nuclear-capable Japan. Moreover, China’s credible nuclear credentials and strong economic performance in an interdependent global market have made Chinese leaders become more rational, calculating, and conscious than before in order to avoid any mutually disastrous policies, including its oil diplomacy, with the USA (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, 2005). Such a ‘kinder and gentler’ view of China has been explored and elaborated by various studies indicating that China has virtually transformed into a responsible and cooperative player, in words and in deeds, in the international community, not only by vigorously embracing multilateralism, but also actively and bilaterally cultivating cooperative security partnerships with various countries (Goldstein, 2005). Given China’s insufficient military capability and the vulnerability derived from the RMA, it serves no significant security benefit for China to challenge US hegemony. In fact, China has adapted itself to be a rule-abiding status quo supporter, rather than a radical rule challenger, in the international society. **Even under provocative situations, China’s tame and cool-handed responses have been demonstrated in several presumably serious US–China tests**, including Lee Teng-hui’s abrupt announcement of the ‘two-state’ theory in 1999, the EP-3 spy plane incident in 2001, and the US war on terror and unpopular war in Iraq in recent years. China has appeared to learn, internalize, and integrate the laws, norms and rules of the international community, just as neoliberal institutionalists and constructivists had long articulated and prescribed.

#### They are threat inflation—strategic importance does not mean conflicts will escalate

**Desker and Bitzinger 2008** – \*Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, \*\*Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (Richard and Barry, Survival 50:6, "Why East Asian War is Unlikely", pages 105-28, EBSCO, WEA)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity

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like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common eopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

# Doubles neg v Wake BM

## 1nc

### T – Substantial

**Interpretation: Substantially is at least 90%**

**Words and Phrases, 05** (v. 40B, p. 329)

N.H. 1949. **The word “substantially**” as used in provision of Unemployment Compensation Act that experience rating of an employer may be transferred to an employing unit which acquires the organization, trade, or business, or “substantially” all of the assets thereof, **is an elastic term** which does not include a definite, fixed amount of percentage, **and** the transfer **does not have to be 100 per cent but cannot be less than 90 per cent in the ordinary situation**. R.L. c 218, § 6, subd. F, as added by Laws 1945, c.138, § 16.

#### We spend $100 billion on nuclear power now

**Walsh 08** (Bryan, staff writer, “Is Nuclear Power Viable?” Time) http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1812540,00.html

More nuclear subsidies, which many on Capitol Hill are pushing for, won't do the trick either. Lovins notes that the U.S. nuclear industry has received $100 billion in government subsidies over the past half-century, and that federal subsidies now worth up to $13 billion a plant — roughly how much it now costs to build one — still haven't encouraged private industry to back the atomic revival. At the same time, the price of building a plant — all that concrete and steel — has risen dramatically in recent years, while the nuclear workforce has aged and shrunk. Nuclear supporters like Moore who argue that atomic plants are much cheaper than renewables tend to forget the sky-high capital costs, not to mention the huge liability risk of an accident — the insurance industry won't cover a nuclear plant, so it's up to government to do so. Conservatives like Republican presidential candidate John McCain tend to promote nuclear power because they don't think carbon-free alternatives like wind or solar could be scaled up sufficiently to meet rising power demand, but McCain's idea of a crash construction program to build hundreds of new nuclear plants in near future seems just as unrealistic.

#### Violation: They only increase nuclear power by a small amount

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground—big cases are key to our DAs

#### 2. Limits—they justify infinite tiny affs

### T – Primacy

#### Energy production excludes ANY conversion or transformation process – limited to extraction

Energici (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February 2012 “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

#### Violation – the plan affects only the secondary forms of energy production

#### That’s a voter –

#### First, Limits – Secondary production is an catch-all category – explodes the literature base

Kim **Woodard** (Research Assistant at the Resource Systems Institute of the East-West Center, Chairman and CEO of Javelin Investments) **1980** “The International Energy Relations of China” p. 457

Secondary energy production can most easily be defined as the conversion of one energy fuel to another. As such, it is a catch-all category that can be used to provide a cluster of statistical energy production series that do not easily fall into either primary production or energy consumption categories. The number and variety of secondary energy production statistics could be multiplied indefinitely by an ever sharper differentiation of substages in the flow of energy commodities through society. I have chosen co include just a few forms of secondary energy production in this analysis—coke production, thermal electric power generation, total electric power generation, total refined petroleum production, the differentiated production of petroleum fuels, plant use of energy in energy production, and the use of hydrocarbons in the production of petrochemical and fertilizer feedstocks. These were statistics that were available for the Chinese case or could be generated by inference from primary energy data and a few oversimplified assumptions. All the secondary energy production statistics presented in this section were generated by the computer and then rounded to a reasonable level of approximation. All the statistics presented for various forms of secondary energy production are general estimates, and none have been tested directly against whatever data exist in the Chinese press. Validation of the statistics would require separate in-depth analysis of each secondary energy production industry—a task far beyond the means of this book. These statistics, therefore, should be taken as a point of reference, not the final word.

Second, Precision - Separating primary and secondary forms of energy is key to overall energy policy

### Elections

#### Obama is winning but its close and reversible – the average of recent polls puts Obama ahead

**Cook, 10/4**/12 – editor and publisher of the Cook Political Report for National Journal (Charlie, “Mitt Romney Breaks His Losing Streak” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004?mrefid=mostViewed>)

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.

#### The public supports existing reactors, not new ones – reject lobby spin

**Mariotte, 12** - Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service (Michael, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” Daily Kos, 6/5, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters. Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?” This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way. Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition. Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima. But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today. Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question). Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that: “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.” But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?” 29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.” Conclusions Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

#### Energy key to the election

Kingston 12 – Director of News at Platts (John, “US election 2012: if not "all energy, all the time," a lot of energy for sure” The Barrel, http://china.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2012/04/11/election\_2012\_i.html)

Get ready for the energy election of 2012. Maybe because it was at a New York Times forum devoted to energy, so the inclination was to talk with that sort of grand vision. But three reporters for the Times who are out on the campaign trail made it clear to a packed room that energy will be a key area in which Mitt Romney goes after Barack Obama in 2012. As Helene Cooper, the Times' White House correspondent, noted, the Obama adminstration has a lot of confidence going into the campaign. But if national retail gasoline prices were to head toward the $5/gal mark, "all bets would be off." And lurking in the background to that is the possibility of some sort of spike in price driven by an Iranian incident. With the Romney vs. Obama race all but assured, the campaigns are now focusing more on each other, rather than on the GOP nominating process. As as the Times' domestic correspondent Jim Rutenberg said, "so far, energy is what the campaign is all about." The panelists showed two ads, one from the Obama campaign and one from American Crossroads, the Karl Rove-led group. We weren't able to find them online, but found similar ones that pretty much say the same thing as those shown at the Times forum. You can see them here and here. The "gist" of the American Crossroads ad, according to Rutenberg, is that "the Obama administration is shirking blame for everything," and is doing so on energy policy as well. "Drilling is down on federal lands, and federal lands' output is down." But Cooper quickly noted that the Obama administration's retort is that "it's down because we took a time out (the moratorium after Macondo)." Although that move still gets criticized in some quarters, the administration is "screaming about this," since it believes the drop in federal lands' output is justified by the actions it took in the wake of the Macondo spill. (This report does show that federal onshore production has risen, though the total is down. See page 5). When the President talks about energy, the Romney campaign "just loves it," according to Ashley Parker, the Times' reporter covering the former Massachussetts governor. "They like it because it gives (them) an opening."

#### Romney causes massive foreign backlash and nuclear wars around the globe

Doug Bandow 5-15-2012; Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle. America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### Coercion

#### Plan’s coercive

**Rothbard, no date** (Murray Rothbard, former teacher, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, New Liberty – Involuntary Servitude, no date, p. <http://www.mises.org/rothbard/newliberty4a.asp>)

In a sense, the entire system of taxation is a form of involuntary servitude. Take, in particular, the income tax. The high levels of income tax mean that all of us work a large part of the year? several months? for nothing for Uncle Sam before being allowed to enjoy our incomes on the market. Part of the essence of slavery, after all, is forced work for someone at little or no pay. But the income tax means that we sweat and earn income, only to see the government extract a large chunk of it by coercion for its own purposes. What is this but forced labor at no pay? The withholding feature of the income tax is a still more clear-cut instance of involuntary servitude. For as the intrepid Connecticut indus­trialist Vivien Kellems argued years ago, the employer is forced to expend time, labor, and money in the business of deducting and transmit­ting his employees' taxes to the federal and state governments, yet the employer is not recompensed for this expenditure. What moral principle justifies the government's forcing employers to act as its unpaid tax collectors?

#### Decision rule

**Petro**, **74** (Sylvester, Professor of Law at Wake Forest University, University of Toledo Law Review, p.480)

However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway – “I believe in only one thing: liberty.” And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism, and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenitsyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.

### Oil (without link)

#### Oil prices will stabilize at breakeven levels

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### Nuclear power reduces oil dependence – displaces oil power generation, powers maritime and ground transportation, and causes hydrogen transition

ANS 2012; American Nuclear Society, Top 10 Myths about Nuclear Energyhttp://www.new.ans.org/pi/resources/myths/

Myth # 10: Nuclear energy can't reduce our dependence on foreign oil. Truth: Nuclear-generated electricity powers electric trains and subway cars as well as autos today. It has also been used in propelling ships for more than 50 years. That use can be increased since it has been restricted by unofficial policy to military vessels and ice breakers. In the near-term, nuclear power can provide electricity for expanded mass-transit and plug-in hybrid cars. Small modular reactors can provide power to islands like Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Nantucket and Guam that currently run their electrical grids on imported oil. In the longer-term, nuclear power can directly reduce our dependence on foreign oil by producing hydrogen for use in fuel cells and synthetic liquid fuels.

#### Speculation controls oil prices – incentivizing any part of the energy production chain can have ripple effects on the market

Professional Wealth Management (PWM) 6-1-2011 Commodity funds - Speculative investors take profits and run, Professional Wealth Management (PWM) Lexis

However, fund managers stress that the market is less than perfect, and there are opportunities to be manipulated. "Many people think our investment universe is just a tightly correlated set of energy and mining stocks, when it actually extends well beyond the primary producers to include downstream processing and parallel value chains in areas like forest products and building materials; we also consider engineers, service companies, shippers and makers of alternative energy equipment," says Ruairidh Stewart, co-manager, Martin Currie Global Resources Fund. "It is often assumed that 'it's all about the oil price', but even oil companies never mind the many other, less correlated areas of our universe can outperform the wider market when the price of the commodity falls through the floor," he explains.

#### The impact is Russian growth and stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China**.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### Heidegger

The rhetoric of alternative energy furthers a purely technological understanding of the world --- both nature and humanity itself become mere resources --- eviscerating our connection to being

Beckman, 2k (Tad, Harvey Mudd College Philosophy teacher, “Heidegger Background from 20th Century Philosophy Course,” http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/HEIDART.HTML)

Perhaps it is not difficult to understand the separate paths of the fine arts, craftsmanship, and modern technology. Each seems to have followed different human intentions and to have addressed different human skills. However, while the fine arts and craftsmanship remained relatively consistent with techne in the ancient sense, modern technology withdrew in a radically different direction. As Heidegger saw it, "the revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such." (P. 14) Modern technology sets-upon nature and challenges-forth its energies, in contrast to techne which was always a bringing-forth in harmony with nature. The activity of modern technology lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merely decisively re-directed; nature is actually "set-upon." The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conveys an atmosphere of violence and exploitation. To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors? Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit."(p. 14) This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern tology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs. The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, **standing in reserve for our use**. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. At this point, we have almost completed the analysis of modern technology in its essence. Only one final aspect of this analysis remains; it is an understanding of the overarching context in which technology came to proceed along this path. Heidegger named this context by the German word 'Ge-stell,' which has been translated to the English word, 'enframing.' In Heidegger's words, "enframing [Ge-stell] means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve." {[7], p. 20} But, "where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense." {[7], p. 28} To understand the essence of modern technology as enframing, Heidegger claims is to understand the problem of technology in its fullest sense; for in enframing we will understand the deeper context in which humans journeyed from involvement with nature into an intrusion upon it. We must move, then, to understand what Heidegger meant by enframing. We are to understand technology through enframing in two very important ways. First, technology is a process, or coming-to-presence, which is underway in the world and which has truly gigantic proportions. The two concepts that Heidegger used as analogies in arriving at the word 'Ge-stell' were 'Gebirg" and 'Gemuet.' Both of these are processes of cosmic scope. The former is the gradual building, emergence, folding, and eroding of a mountain range. The latter is the welling up and building of emotional feelings that originate in the depths of our beings, as differentiated from the simple emotions that arise quickly and spontaneously in normal contexts. Second, technology viewed as enframing is a process that is shaping human destiny today and that has been shaping human destiny in relation to the universe for almost as long as we conceive of our history. What we call technology and think to be a neutral instrument standing ready for our control is actually a specific manifestation of this whole process. {[7], p. 19} The concept of enframing suggests that human life in the context of the natural world is gathered wholly and cosmically within the essence of technology. Just as the technology that we now see ongoing in the world shows the characteristic of challenging-forth the objects around us, the whole process within which human life is developing challenges-us-forth to this mode of revealing the real or of ordering nature into standing reserve. Our control over technology is an **illusion**; it and we alike **are being shaped**, like an evolving mountain range, in the process that Heidegger called enframing. The possession of what we commonly call technology is only a fragmentary, though characteristic, aspect of that whole development; language thought, religion, art, and all other aspects of human life are coordinated into this development as a part of enframing. To see the essence of technology in this way delivers us into the final phase of Heidegger's analysis, the great danger to humanity that technology represents. Just as enframing organizes our lives progressively into a disposition of challenging and ordering the things around us into standing reserve, its progress as a development of human destiny **challenges and orders us into standing reserve for its own ends.** "The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but danger as such. Yet when destining reigns in the mode of Enframing, it is the supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of standing-reserve, then he comes to the **very brink of a precipitous fall**; that is, he comes to the point **where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.** Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself." {[7], pp. 26-7; emphasis added} Just as humans have progressively limited the being of the natural objects around them, Heidegger observed, **they too have acquired a progressively limited character or being**. While we have come to think that we encounter only ourselves in the world, "**in truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., in his essence."** {[7], p. 27} While all epochs of human evolution contain danger, the epoch of modern technology possesses the gravest danger because it is the epoch whose characteristic is to conduct humanity out of its own essence.

And their form of calculability makes limitless, global wars inevitable

*Dallmayr****,*** *4* (PhD, Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, Notre Dame, Constellations Volume 11, No 1, 2004 The Underside of Modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel Fred Dallmayr)

Themes and insights of this kind are carried forward in Die Geschichte des Seyns, a series of texts dating from the onset of World War II. Politically, the texts are still more nonconformist and rebellious than preceding writings—an aspect largely attributable to their grim context. Central to the volume is again the critique of Machenschaft defined as a made of being that “pushes everything into the mold of ‘makeability’.” As before, Machenschaft is intimately linked with the glorification of power (Macht), and the latter is anchored ultimately in “will” to power and in “unconditional subjectivity” (a chief trait of modern metaphysics). To effectuate its rule, power relies on violence (Gewalt) as its chief instrument. When violence or brutality becomes predominant, matters are starkly simplified: everything is geared toward the “unconditional annihilation (Vernichtung) of opposing forces by unconditional means.” The unleashing of brutal violence carries in its train the “devastation” (Verwüstung) of everything with the result that a “desert” (Wüste) spreads where nothing can grow any longer—especially not thoughtfulness and care for being. A particularly vivid and harrowing sign of this devastation is the hankering for warfare—a warfare that, due to the totalizing ambitions of Machenschaft, now turns into “**total war” (**totaler Krieg). Given the steadily widening range of modern technology and weaponry, Heidegger adds somberly, the relentless struggle for power and more power necessarily leads to “unbounded or limitless wars (grenzenlose Kriege) furthering the empowerment of power.” Unsurprisingly, **such wars ultimately take the form of “world wars” in the service of a globally unleashed Machenschaft.16**

**The affs technological solutions reproduce ecological catastrophes that kill billions. this discourse of management creates an eclipse of being and serial policy failure. Vote neg to break the confines of technological thought in an act of doing nothing.**

Ladelle McWhorter. Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University. “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection.” *Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy.* 1992. pp. 1-3

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverish­ing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution — consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chloro­fluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe.¶ Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?¶ Heidegger's work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.¶ Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.¶ But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."' Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human.¶ What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management.¶ We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers — of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies — so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify?¶ In numerous essays — in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" — Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness — a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something

far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery' is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the relevation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together. Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.4 Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world. The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."' Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed.

This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything.

### States

The 50 state governments and relevant subnational actors should establish energy financing banks to substantially increase loan guarantees for the American Centrifuge Project.

#### States should establish energy finance banks to do the plan – solves all the case and doesn’t require new spending

**Muro and Berlin, 9/12**/12 – \*senior fellow and policy director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings AND \*\* Senior Vice President for Policy and Planning, and General Counsel at the Coalition for Green Capital (Mark and Ken, “State Clean Energy Finance Banks: New Investment Facilities for Clean Energy Deployment”, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/9/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro/12%20state%20energy%20investment%20muro>)

Given these challenges, states that want to realize the benefits of clean energy deployment should consider a new approach to funding clean energy programs. Specifically, they should investigate the possibility of developing state clean energy finance banks that use limited public dollars and leverage private capital to provide a combination of low-interest rate funding that makes clean energy projects competitive and low-cost 100-percent up-front loans for energy efficiency projects.¶ Such an approach would address the deployment and diffusion challenges faced by clean energy ¶ technologies while recognizing that federal and state appropriations, tax credits, and other incentives ¶ and subsidies will be sharply diminished in the years ahead because of the budget crisis at all levels of ¶ government. Likewise, the development of such finance entities would address the need for states to ¶ develop a new paradigm for financing strong clean energy and energy efficiency projects as part of a ¶ push to develop strong regional industries.¶ So-called “clean energy finance banks” or “green banks” are ideally suited to solve the present ¶ problems because they offer a practical way for states to make available leveraged, low-cost financing ¶ for project developers in their states. First, they can be developed out of existing state programs while ¶ bringing into the enterprise the equivalent of substantial new resources given their ability to leverage ¶ funds. Likewise, because the banks would provide debt financing, they would be repaid on their loans, ¶ putting them in the position to borrow funds and to establish revolving loan funds that would provide ¶ funds that could be reinvested without new sources of financing. Furthermore, clean energy finance ¶ banks, if established as independent institutions, would be able to issue revenue bonds without the full ¶ faith and credit of the state and without the restrictions facing states, which have limited borrowing ¶ capacity. Finally, clean energy finance banks could efficiently seek large investors with patient, longterm capital who are seeking a long-term, conservative rate of return, such as pension fund investors.

### Conditions CP

Sample text:

The United States federal government should:

- provide diminishing loan guarantees, but the American Centrifuge Project must become cost competitive within allotted commitments of time must improve in price and performance in order to continually receive this incentive.

#### Temporary, diminishing incentives are vital to inducing competition, technological innovation and ending subsidy dependence

**Jenkins, 12** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, Congressional Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 5/22, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=31b79a1a-83a0-4ae6-8c80-30fe754ad0ea>)

Recognizing that investment horizons, technology development cycles, and market conditions vary across advanced energy technology segments, precise policy mechanisms will likely differ from sector to sector. Yet whether through production or investment subsidies, consumer rebates, market-­‐creating regulations or standards, or other market incentives, we recommend that any advanced energy deployment subsidies meet the following policy design criteria. Reformed policies should:¶ 1. ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE MARKET. Deployment policies should create market opportunities for advanced clean energy technologies while fostering competition between technology firms.¶ 2. DRIVE COST REDUCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS. Deployment policies should create market incentives and structures that demand and reward continual improvement in technology performance and cost.¶ 3. PROVIDE TARGETED AND TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR MATURING TECHNOLOGIES. Deployment policies must not operate in perpetuity, but rather should be terminated if technology segments either fail to improve in price and performance or become competitive without subsidy.¶ 4. REDUCE SUBSIDY LEVELS IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGY COSTS. Deployment incentives should decline as technologies improve in price and performance to both conserve limited taxpayer and consumer resources and provide clear incentives for continued technology improvement.¶ 5. AVOID TECHNOLOGY LOCK-OUT AND PROMOTE A DIVERSE ENERGY PORTFOLIO. Deployment incentives should be structured to create market opportunities for energy technologies at different levels of maturity, including new market entrants, to ensure that each has a chance to mature while allowing technologies of similar maturity levels to compete amongst themselves.¶ 6. PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS CERTAINTY. While deployment incentives should be temporary, they must still provide sufficient certainty to support key business decisions by private firms and investors.¶ 7. MAXIMIZE THE IMPACT OF TAXPAYER RESOURCES AND PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE PRIVATE CAPITAL. Deployment incentives should be designed to avoid creating unnecessarily high transaction costs while opening up clean tech investment to broader private capital markets.

#### Conditioning new incentives on price competition solves the aff better and avoids our disads

**Hayward, 10** – resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Steven, “Post-Partisan Power: How a Limited and Direct Approach to Energy Innovation Can Deliver Clean, Cheap Energy, Economic Productivity and National Prosperity”, October, <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan%20Power.pdf>)

The government has a long history of successfully driving innovation and price declines in emerging technologies by acting directly as a demanding customer to spur the early commercialization and largescale deployment of cutting-edge technologies. From radios and microchips to lasers and camera lenses, the federal government, in particular the DOD, has helped catalyze the improvement of countless innovative technologies and supported the emergence of vibrant American industries in the process. 67¶ Yet today’s mess of open-ended energy subsidies reward production of more of the same product, not innovation. The federal government showers subsidies across many energy options, from oil and coal to ethanol and wind power. None of these efforts, however, are designed or optimized to drive and reward innovation and ensure the prices of these technologies fall over time, making the subsidies effectively permanent. This must change.¶ Competitive Deployment Incentives¶ The current energy subsidy and deployment framework should be turned on its head. Government investments succeed not when they are blanket subsidies but rather when they are narrowly targeted to specific outcomes, such as developing computers to allow for rocket systems, building a communications network to survive a nuclear attack, or creating increasingly efficient and powerful jet engines. These public investments paid off handsomely in personal computers, the Internet, and gas turbines used in both commercial air travel as well as modern natural gas power plants. 68¶ In an era of expanding federal debt, across-the-board energy subsidy reform should be pursued. Incentives for energy technology deployment should be targeted and disciplined. Technologies should receive competitive deployment incentives only to the extent that they are becoming cheaper in unsubsidized terms over time. ¶ The strategy that we propose would be aimed at low-carbon technologies that, at a minimum, satisfy the following criteria: ¶  The technology has been demonstrated and has proven technical feasibility at commercial scale; ¶  Is currently priced above normal market rates and is locked out of markets by more mature, ¶ entrenched technology competitors; ¶  Has potential for significant and sustained cost and performance improvements during deployment ¶ and scale-up; ¶ #Has strong prospects for significant market penetration once the technology reaches competitive ¶ prices. ¶ Targeted and competitive deployment incentives could be created for various classes of energy technologies to ensure that each has a chance to mature. Incentive levels should fall at regular intervals, terminating if the technology class either fails to improve in price or reaches cost parity in the absence of any further incentives.¶ Structured in this manner, reformed national energy deployment incentives will not select winners and losers, nor will it create permanently subsidized industries. These public investments will instead provide opportunity for all emerging low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs while increasing the rate at which early-stage clean and affordable energy technologies are commercialized.

#### The CP prevents the collapse of the energy bubble – avoids economic collapse

**Swezey, 11** – project director for The Breakthrough Institute (Devon, “Clean Tech Sector Heading for a Major Crash” 7/11, <http://blacklistednews.com/?news_id=14600&print=1>)

The global clean energy industry is set for a major crash. The reason is simple. Clean energy is still much more expensive and less reliable than coal or gas, and in an era of heightened budget austerity the subsidies required to make clean energy artificially cheaper are becoming unsustainable.

Clean tech crashes are nothing new. The U.S. wind energy industry has collapsed three times before, first in the mid 1990s and most recently in 2002 and 2004 when Congress failed to extend the tax credit that made it profitable. But the impact and magnitude of the coming clean tech crash will far outstrip those of past years.

As part of its effort to combat the economic recession, the federal government pumped nearly $80 billion in direct investment and tax credits into the clean energy sector, catalyzing an unprecedented industry expansion. Solar energy, for example, grew 67% in the United States in 2010. The U.S. wind energy industry also experienced unprecedented growth as a result of the generous Section 1603 clean energy stimulus program. The industry grew by 40% and added 10 GW of new turbines in 2009. Yet many of the federal subsidies that have driven such rapid growth are set to expire in the next few years, and clean energy remains unable to compete without them.

The crash won't be limited to the United States. In many European countries, clean energy subsidies have become budget casualties as governments attempt to curb mounting deficits. Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the Czech Republic have all announced cuts to clean energy subsidies.

Such cuts are not universal, however. China, flush with cash, is bucking the trend, committing $760 billion over 10 years for clean energy projects. China is continuing to invest in low-carbon energy as a way of meeting its voracious energy demand, diversifying its electricity supply, and alleviating some of the negative health consequences of its reliance on fossil energy.

If U.S. and European clean energy markets collapse while investment continues to ramp up in China, the short-term consequences will likely be a migration of much of the industry to Asia. As we wrote in our 2009 report, "Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant," this would have significant economic consequences for the United States, as the jobs, revenues and other benefits of clean tech growth accrue overseas.

In the long-term, however, clean energy must become much cheaper and more reliable if it is to widely displace fossil fuels on the scale of national economies and become a commercially viable industry.

Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle

Why is the United States still locked in this self-perpetuating boom-bust cycle in clean energy? The problem, according to a new essay by energy experts David Victor and Kassia Yanosek in this week's Foreign Affairs, is that our system of clean energy subsidization is jury-rigged to support the deployment of only the least-risky and most mature clean energy technologies, while lacking clear incentives for continual innovation that could make clean energy competitive on cost with conventional energy sources. Rather, we should "invest in more innovative technologies that stand a better chance of competing with conventional energy sources over the long haul." According to Victor and Yanosek, nearly seven-eighths of global clean energy investment goes toward deploying existing technologies that aren't competitive without subsidy, while only a small share goes to encouraging innovation in existing technologies or developing new ones.

This must change. Rather than simply subsidize production of current technologies, we need a comprehensive energy innovation strategy to develop, manufacture, and deploy riskier but more promising clean energy technologies that may eventually compete with fossil energy at scale. Instead of rewarding companies for building the same product, we should reward companies who continuously improve designs and cut costs over time.

Such a federal strategy will require major federal investments, but of a different kind than the subsidies that have driven the clean tech industry in years past. For starters, we must dramatically ramp up funding for early-stage clean energy research and development. A growing bipartisan group of think tanks and business leaders have pushed an investment of at least $15 billion annually in energy R&D, up from its current $4 billion level.

Targeted funding is needed to solve technology challenges and ensure that innovative technologies can develop and improve. One key program that helps fulfill this need is ARPA-E, which funds a portfolio of innovative technology companies and helps connect them with private investors. But ARPA-E's budget has continually been under assault in budget negotiations, hampering its ability to catalyze innovation in the energy sector and limiting its impact.

We also need to invest in cutting-edge advanced manufacturing capabilities and shared technology infrastructure that would help U.S. companies cut costs and improve manufacturing processes. As the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology wrote in a report released last week, manufacturing is vital to innovation, "because of the synergies created by locating production processes and design processes near to each other." Furthermore, bringing down manufacturing costs, such as by supporting shared infrastructure for small firms, or offering financing for the adoption of innovative technologies in manufacturing, will be a key component of reducing the costs of new clean energy innovations.

Lastly, the nation's hodgepodge of energy deployment subsidies is in dire need of reform. As Breakthrough and colleagues wrote in "Post-Partisan Power," we need an energy deployment regime that demands and rewards innovation, rather than just supporting more of the same. Brookings' Mark Muro (a co-author or PPP) expands, "targeted and competitive deployment incentives could be created for various classes of energy technologies that would ensure that each has a chance to mature even as each is challenged to innovate and locate price declines." Rather than create permanently subsidized industries, such investments would "provide the opportunity for opportunity for all emerging low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs," while speeding commercialization.

It is clear that the current budgetary environment in the United States presents challenges to the viability of the fast-growing clean energy industry. But it also presents an opportunity. By repurposing existing clean energy policies and investing in clean energy innovation, the United States can be the first country to make clean energy cheap and reliable, a distinction that is sure to bring major economic benefits in a multi-trillion dollar energy market.

#### Causes global war

**Royal, 10** [Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996,2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to create a ‘rally round the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

### Russia

**In this context, you should round down to zero risk**

**Graham 7** (senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, July - September 2007, “The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness,” http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

**Deterrence prevents Russian involvement**

**Turner 2** (Admiral Stansfield, Former Director – Central Intelligence Agency, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter / Spring, 26 Fletcher F. World Aff. 115, Lexis)

There are, of course, other centrals question to be considered: Would Russian psychology differ from American and would Russian society be willing to accept large numbers of nuclear detonations on their soil in order to perpetrate a nuclear war against the United States? These are difficult questions to answer. The more pertinent concern, however, is that this is an issue of life or death. No head of state could contemplate plunging the world into nuclear conflict without considering both the mortal threat to his or her citizens, and also the likelihood of his or her own death, underground shelters notwithstanding. The presumption that heads of state prefer to live than to die gives us one benchmark. Another is [\*120] the Cuban missile crisis, in which both Leonid Khruschev and President Kennedy quite visibly backed away from the prospect of very limited nuclear war. Finally, Russia's economy, being about the size of Belgium's, is so small that its leaders would be well aware that recovery, even from a small nuclear attack, would be a very lengthy process. In terms of nuclear detonation threats, the United States must consider Russian deterrence as very close to its own.

**Russia won’t be aggressive**

**The Atlantic 10/26**/11 (“Withdrawal From Afghanistan Could Kill the U.S.-Russia 'Reset',” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/withdrawal-from-afghanistan-could-kill-the-us-russia-reset/247357/)

But it's not clear how Moscow intends the group to work. While the recent CSTO exercises focused on conventional military threats, Moscow has shown little stomach for militarily action outside its own borders. Last year, as unrest in CSTO member-state Kyrgyzstan devolved into horrific ethnic pogroms, the CSTO declined to step in. Some top officials have suggested that they should try to combat popular movements like the Arab Spring, even considering such as options as shutting down Twitter to forestall popular uprisings in Central Asia. But **military intervention, it seems, is not on the table**. Other officials say the CSTO should act as a security assistance tool, building up the hapless, often corrupt security forces of Central Asia to be able to manage threats from Afghanistan on their own.

**No risk of US-Russia war**

**Bradley 11** (Jason Bradley is in national security and has remained in the field since separating from the military after eight years of service. He is a political science major with strong interests in American politics, history, economics, and foreign policy. 3/5/2011, “Russia Will Not and Cannot Challenge US Hegemony,” http://bigpeace.com/jbradley/2011/03/05/russia-will-not-and-cannot-challenge-us-hegemony/)

Fellow contributor here, Jim Hanson, beat me to the punch on Russia’s military buildup. While true they are making efforts to modernize their military, mostly comprised of old Soviet era equipment, they still have a lot of making up to do. Even under the most optimistic of circumstances, Russian military clout would still leave a lot to be desired, at least compared to the US. What is clear, at least for the foreseeable future, is a resurgent Russia set to challenge US hegemony just isn’t in its future. The Russian Federation’s ascension from the Cold War has operated paradoxically. It is not a nation state (in the European sense) but has strong currents of nationalism running through the mainstream of life, entertainment, politics, and education. It projects itself as modern, democratic, and Western but distinctly Russian therefore often putting it at odds with the Western nations. Yet it has steadily veered towards reimperialization, struggles with implementing a market economy, shown no use for political pluralism, and autocratic control from the Kremlin increases each year, with each passing election. Relations between the US and Russia have reached different points of and hot and cold over the years since the Cold War ended. They seemed to have worsened in the last months of George W Bush’s presidency. Some have tried to make it easy to speculate that an extension of the Cold War resumed when the US placed American missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland. Likewise, they made easy to entertain the Cold War entered a re-icing stage when Russia invaded Georgia. The Russian-Georgia war could be viewed as a turn for the worse in the US-Russian confrontation. And the Russian victory plus the will to use military force in its region, tipped the balance to Russia. This is fanciful thinking. Russia does not possess the superpower qualities needed in order to align the world back in a bipolar arrangement, as was the case during the Cold War. Nor is it able to operate and deploy globally to such an extent as to significantly undermine America’s long-term interests or force it to reallocate resources away from fighting terrorism in the Middle East. Instead, Russia exists on the periphery of Europe with a few basic goals: Sovereignty, reclaiming some of its geopolitical clout, oil production, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. As is always dominant in international relations, Russia has sought domestic strength and stability through its oil supply and used its leverage in natural resources as a political weapon. Between 1998 and 2006, the price of oil rose from $15 to $70 per barrel creating huge cash surpluses. When the price of oil plummeted, the vulnerabilities of Russia’s economy were apparent. While it is true that Russia is the main oil and natural gas supplier in Europe, with some future estimates predicting it could possibly export 70 percent to the region, it appears these estimates could be flawed. Partly the reason why Russia is exporting so much oil in recent years is because it started at the bottom after the Soviet collapsed. In other words, Russia climbed so high because of how far it had fallen. Since then, however, it has discovered no new oil, relies on old wells, and allows little foreign investment for industry growth. As a result, oil exports have declined since 2008. Russia’s oil exports seem to have peaked at least for the time being. Even more troubling perhaps is Russia’s demographic crisis. Russia’s population has lost 7 million people since 1992; death rates outnumber birth rates by a quarter million. “In the last 40 years the death rate for men between 15 and 64 years of age has jumped by an average of 50 percent” (J. McHugh, 2008). Conclusion These are not the qualities of a robust nation destined to challenge US hegemony. Instead, Russia resents the US policy of full spectrum dominance and nuclear supremacy, because of which Russia finds iself unable to compete. All the old Cold War relics simply add theater to a very basic international relations scenario. A stronger power is preventing a weaker one from doing what it wants. Nonetheless, there is real apprehension on the part of Russia from perceived encirclement by NATO, a growing number of American military bases throughout the world, and American missiles. The simple truth is that **the Cold War did indeed end with the collapse of the Soviet Empire** and Russia is not likely to fill the role as new Cold War nemesis. Neither though does it have to be a partner with the US or the West. “Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western Solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system” (D. Trenin, 2007). In the eyes of Russia, the missile shield project is about America establishing nuclear primacy. With American missiles in the region, American military armaments going to Georgia, and high tech experimental missile defense satellites into space, **Russia has lost the capability to counter a nuclear first strike**. Russia finds its considerable nuclear arsenal vulnerable if not obsolete. By greatly reducing Russia’s threat of nuclear strike, the US has essentially eliminated “mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD of course was viewed as the ultimate equilibrium in the nuclear standoff during the Cold War. American nuclear primacy, however, swung the equilibrium decidedly in the favor of America leaving Russia out in the cold. It is no mystery as to why Russia feels exposed to possible hostility from the U.S. and NATO over its expansion. In view of this, Russia can become more aggressive, obstruct international cooperation, and exert its influence in places that are possible. It can even increase its military posture and become more Moscow-centric. For example, Russia announced this year it will continue its military modernization and buildup that started in 2008. Reportedly, Russia is willing to spend an estimated $600 to 700 billion over ten years to move away from its Soviet era weaponry. This equates to roughly 5 percent of Russia’s estimated gross domestic product. In comparison, the US on the other hand makes up roughly 47 percent of the world’s total military spending! At such a reduced state and under an insurmountable disadvantage, militarily and economically speaking, today’s Russia and the world it finds itself in pales in comparison to yesterday’s Soviet Union and the bygone Cold War era. Therefore, at no time in the foreseeable future can Russia rise to the status of the former Soviet Union, realign the world back into a bipolar arrangement, and hope to challenge the US across the globe.

### Iran

#### No impact to Iranian prolif

**Farley, IR prof, 9**—assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky (Robert, What If Iran Got the Bomb? It would be time to calm down, 7 July 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/07/what\_if\_iran\_got\_the\_bomb?page=0,0, AMiles)

There are profound differences between the Islamic Republic and the People's Republic, and 2009 is not 1969. Simply because the PRC survived a superpower confrontation, several chaotic leadership changes, and a Cultural Revolution without ever using its nukes doesn't mean that Iran poses no threat. However, it does suggest that nuclear deterrence may be as robust as advertised and that deterrence applies even to states led by people who say and do crazy things (like refraining from Western neckwear). Given Mao's penchant for bizarre behavior, earlier concerns that China might recklessly employ the nuclear weapons it was seeking in the late 1950s were probably even more legitimate than such concerns over Iran now. Nevertheless, China has acted as a responsible steward of nuclear weapons, even in situations of existential danger. So, rather than preparing for war against Iran, or believing that unconditional talks will eventually succeed (a nice hope, but unlikely), or offering a green light to a nervous regional ally convinced that nukes in crazy hands will inevitably lead to their use, perhaps American policymakers should take some comfort from history. Why not let Iran cross the nuclear threshold and spend time and energy focusing on how to make the deterrence of a nuclear Iran effective? After all, that now seems to look like the only realistic option. In short, the best lesson for the West may be this: Calm down.

#### Iran prolif isn’t a threat – they don’t want the bomb and if they get it they won’t use it

**Pinker, 11** [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, *The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined*, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

If current pundits are to be believed, then as you are reading these words the New Peace will already have been shattered by a major war, perhaps a nuclear war, with Iran. At the time of this writing, tensions have been rising over the country’s nuclear energy program. Iran is currently enriching enough uranium to fashion a nuclear arsenal, and it has defied international demands that it allow inspections and comply with other provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has taunted Western leaders, supported terrorist groups, accused the United States of orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, denied the Holocaust, called for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” and prayed for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the Muslim savior who would usher in an age of peace and justice. In some interpretations of Shi’a Islam, this messiah will show up after a worldwide eruption of war and chaos. All this is, to say the least, disconcerting, and many writers have concluded that Ahmadinejad is another Hitler who will soon develop nuclear weapons and use them on Israel or furnish them to Hezbollah to do so. Even in less dire scenarios, he could blackmail the Middle East into acceding to Iranian hegemony. The prospect might leave Israel or the United States no choice but to bomb its nuclear facilities preemptively, even if it invited years of war and terrorism in response. A 2009 editorial in the *Washington Times* spelled it out: “War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?”279 This chilling scenario of a nuclear attack by Iranian fanatics is certainly possible. But is it *inevitable*, or even highly likely? One can be just as contemptuous of Ahmadinejad, and just as cynical about his motives, while imagining less dire alternatives for the world ahead. John Mueller, Thomas Schelling, and many other foreign affairs analysts have imagined them for us and have concluded that **the Iranian nuclear program is not the end of the world**.280 Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for energy and medical research. In 2005 Supreme Leader Khameini (**who wields more power than Ahmadinejad**) issued a fatwa declaring that **nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam**.281 If the government went ahead and developed the weapons anyway, it would not be the first time in history that national leaders have lied through their teeth. But having painted themselves into this corner, the prospect of forfeiting all credibility in the eyes of the world (including major powers on whom they depend, like Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil) might at least give them pause. Ahmadinejad’s musings about the return of the Twelfth Imam do not necessarily mean that he plans to hasten it along with a nuclear holocaust. Two of the deadlines by which writers confidently predicted that he would set off the apocalypse (2007 and 2009) have already come and gone.282 And for what it’s worth, here is how he explained his beliefs in a 2009 television interview with NBC correspondent Ann Curry: *Curry:* You’ve said that you believe that his arrival, the apocalypse, would happen in your own lifetime. What do you believe that you should do to hasten his arrival? *Ahmadinejad:* I have never said such a thing.... I was talking about peace.... What is being said about an apocalyptic war and—global war, things of that nature. This is what the Zionists are claiming. Imam . . . will come with logic, with culture, with science. He will come so that there is no more war. No more enmity, hatred. No more conflict. He will call on everyone to enter a brotherly love. Of course, he will return with Jesus Christ. The two will come back together. And working together, they would fill this world with love. The stories that have been disseminated around the world about extensive war, apocalyptic wars, so on and so forth, these are false. 283 As a Jewish atheist, I can’t say I find these remarks completely reassuring. But with one obvious change they are not appreciably different from those held by devout Christians; indeed, they are milder, as many Christians do believe in an apocalyptic war and have fantasized about it in bestselling novels. As for the speech containing the phrase that was translated as “wiping Israel off the map,” the *New York Times* writer Ethan Bronner consulted Persian translators and analysts of Iranian government rhetoric on the meaning of the phrase in context, and they were unanimous that Ahmadinejad was daydreaming about regime change in the long run, not genocide in the days ahead.284 The perils of translating foreign bombast bring to mind Khrushchev’s boast “We will bury you,” which turned out to mean “outlive” rather than “entomb.” There is a parsimonious alternative explanation of Iran’s behavior. In 2002 George W. Bush identified Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as the “axis of evil” and proceeded to invade Iraq and depose its leadership. North Korea’s leaders saw the writing on the wall and promptly developed a nuclear capability, which (as they no doubt anticipated) has put an end to any musings about the United States invading them too. Shortly afterward Iran put its nuclear program into high gear, aiming to create enough ambiguity as to whether it possesses nuclear weapons, or could assemble them quickly, to squelch any thought of an invasion in the mind of the Great Satan. If Iran does become a confirmed or suspected nuclear power, the history of the nuclear age suggests that the most likely outcome would be nothing. As we have seen, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless for anything but deterrence against annihilation, which is why the nuclear powers have repeatedly been defied by their nonnuclear adversaries. The most recent episode of proliferation bears this out. In 2004 it was commonly predicted that if North Korea acquired a nuclear capability, then by the end of the decade it would share it with terrorists and set off a nuclear arms race with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.285 In fact, North Korea did acquire a nuclear capability, the end of the decade has come and gone, and nothing has happened. It’s also unlikely that any nation would furnish nuclear ammunition to the loose cannons of a terrorist band, thereby giving up control over how they would be used while being on the hook for the consequences.286 In the case of Iran, before it decided to bomb Israel (or license Hezbollah to do so in an incriminating coincidence), with no conceivable benefit to itself, its leaders would have to anticipate a nuclear reprisal by Israeli commanders, who could match them hothead for hothead, together with an invasion by a coalition of powers enraged by the violation of the nuclear taboo. Though the regime is detestable and in many ways irrational, one wonders whether its principals are so indifferent to continuing their hold on power as to choose to annihilate themselves in pursuit of perfect justice in a radioactive Palestine or the arrival of the Twelfth Imam, with or without Jesus at his side. As Thomas Schelling asked in his 2005 Nobel Prize lecture, “What else can Iran accomplish, except possibly the destruction of its own system, with a few nuclear warheads? Nuclear weapons should be too precious to give away or to sell, too precious to waste killing people when they could, held in reserve, make the United States, or Russia, or any other nation, hesitant to consider military action.”287 Though it may seem dangerous to consider alternatives to the worst-case scenario, the dangers go both ways. In the fall of 2002 George W. Bush warned the nation, “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof —the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” The “clear evidence” led to a war that has cost more than a hundred thousand lives and almost a trillion dollars and has left the world no safer. A cocksure certainty that Iran will use nuclear weapons, in defiance of sixty-five years of history in which authoritative predictions of inevitable catastrophes were repeatedly proven wrong, could lead to adventures with even greater costs.

### China

**No China war**

Robert J. Art, Fall 2010 Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall 2010): p359(33)

The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.-China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest America's maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each state's homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a second-strike capability vis-a-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically. These three benchmarks--China's ambitions will grow as its power grows; the United States cannot successfully wage economic warfare against a China that pursues a smart reassurance (peaceful rise) strategy; and Sino-American relations are not doomed to follow recent past rising-dominant power dyads--are the starting points from which to analyze America's interests in East Asia. I now turn to these interests.

**Won’t pass the nuclear threshold**

**Moore 6** (Scott; Research Assistant – East Asia Nonproliferation Program – James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies – Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat,” 10/18, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_80.html)

Despite the tumult, there is broad consensus among experts that the concerns generated in this discussion are exaggerated. The size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal is small, estimated at around 200 warheads;[3] Jeffrey Lewis, a prominent arms control expert, claims that 80 is a realistic number of deployed warheads.[4] In contrast, the United States has upwards of 10,000 warheads, some 5,700 of which are operationally deployed.[5]

Even with projected improvements and the introduction of a new long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the DF-31A China's nuclear posture is likely to remain one of "minimum deterrence."[6] Similarly, despite concern to the contrary, there is every indication that China is extremely unlikely to abandon its No First Use (NFU) pledge.[7] The Chinese government has continued to deny any change to the NFU policy, a claim substantiated by many Chinese academic observers.[8] In sum, then, fears over China's current nuclear posture seem somewhat exaggerated.

This document, therefore, does not attempt to discuss whether China's nuclear posture poses a probable, general threat to the United States; most signs indicate that even in the longer term, it does not. Rather, it seeks to analyze the most likely scenarios for nuclear conflict. Two such possible scenarios are identified in particular: a declaration of independence by Taiwan that is supported by the United States, and the acquisition by Japan of a nuclear weapons capability.

Use of nuclear weapons by China would require a dramatic policy reversal within the policymaking apparatus, and it is with an analysis of this potential that this brief begins. Such a reversal would also likely require crises as catalysts, and it is to such scenarios, involving Taiwan and Japan, that this brief progresses. It closes with a discussion of the future of Sino-American nuclear relations.

**Interdependence checks**

**Perry and Scowcroft 9** William (Michael and Barbara Berberian professor at Stanford University.) and Brent (resident trustee of the Forum for International Policy.) “US Nuclear Weapons Policy.” 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. Online.

Economic interdependence provides an incentive to avoid military conflict and nuclear confrontation. Although the United States has expressed concern about the growing trade deficit with China, the economies of the two countries have become increasingly intertwined and interdependent. U.S. consumers have bought massive quantities of cheap Chinese goods, and Beijing has lent huge amounts of money to the United States. Similarly, Taiwan and the mainland are increasingly bound in a reciprocal economic relationship. These economic relation- ships should reduce the probability of a confrontation between China and Taiwan, and keep the United States and China from approaching the nuclear brink, were such a confrontation to occur. On other nuclear issues, China and the United States have generally supported each other, as they did in the six-party talks to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. Here, the supportive Beijing-Washington relationship points toward potentially promising dialogues on larger strategic issues.

**No risk of South China Sea conflicts**  
**Haddick 2010** [10/15, Robert—managing editor of Small Wars Journal and writer for Foreign Policy, “This Week at War: China Backs Down for Now”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/15/this\_week\_at\_war\_china\_backs\_down\_for\_now]

An unexpectedly strong backlash in the region may have prompted the Chinese to retreat. Chinese leaders may have been surprised by the resistance of ASEAN's leaders and the sharp response in Tokyo over the recent Chinese fishing boat incident in the Senkaku Islands. Chinese leaders have likely concluded that a tactical retreat is wiser than risking stiffening resistance in the region. China took steps to patch up its relationship with Japan; after Japan released the Chinese fishing boat captain, China released four Japanese workers it had seized. China also unfroze diplomatic contact when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed to meet on Oct. 4 with Japan Prime Minister Naoto Kan in Brussels.

### Bioweapons

**No extinction**

**O’Neill 4** O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brendan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport*,* professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

#### Deterrence is sufficient in the status quo – primacy is a paper tiger Bin 06 (Li Bin, a Chinese physicist, works on arms control and international security, professor of the Department of International Relations and Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University, directs the Arms Control Program at Tsinghua University, 2006, “Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth”, Issue 4, <http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=213&Itemid=8&lang=zh>)

The Lieber and Press paper also raises the concern that China might use nuclear weapons to destroy American cities if the United States supports the separatists in Taiwan in a war for separation, a suggestion which arose from a Chinese military scholar.6 In fact, a more accurate interpretation of this comment is that China could extend its nuclear deterrence to dissuade mass conventional attack from the United States in a Sino-U.S. war over Taiwan. The idea is that China could compensate for its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis the United States by adding the influence of nuclear weapons. However, the United States should not be concerned about this for two reasons. First, China’s leaders fully understand that nuclear weapons are a paper tiger in this kind of conventional conflict. No matter who is defeated in conventional war (if it ever came to that), neither China nor the United States would be able to alter the outcome using nuclear weapons. The second reason is that to deter a nuclear attack (minimum deterrence) does not require nuclear primacy. A retaliatory nuclear force larger than the base criterion described by Robert McNamara should be sufficient for this purpose.7 The coercive power of minimum nuclear deterrence (deterring others from using nuclear weapons) has been held by the United States for over half a century. If the United States would achieve nuclear primacy today, it would make little contribution to the U.S. minimum nuclear deterrence.

#### History proves

**Blair and Yali 06** [Bruce G. Blair, President of the World Security Institute, author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, and Chen Yali, editor in chief of Washington Observer, a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group, Autumn 2006, “The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy”, pp. 51-77, World Security Institute, <http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_4.pdf>.]

All sides all but ignored the theoretical first strike capability of the United States during the past 15 years (and much longer in the case of China). This history is not a perfect crucible for testing all of the professors’ hypotheses, but the preponderance of evidence so far refutes their argument.

What this recent history really seems to be suggesting is that U.S. nuclear primacy is an academic artifice that was and is practically useless for understanding America’s relations with other nuclear powers. Nuclear primacy in modern times offers no exploitable political leverage. Russia and China appear quite confident in their deterrent arsenals in spite of the lopsided U.S. advantage estimated by models of nuclear war.

## 2nc elections

### 2nc overview

**Pakistan collapse causes nuclear war**

**Pitt, 9** – New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence." (5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,” http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)

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But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself.

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Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that **Pakistan could collapse** under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the **entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster**. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

#### Romney makes Russian aggression more probable

Mark Adomanis, 4-17-2012; analyst for Forbes, Mitt Romney's Incoherent Russia Policy http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/04/17/mitt-romneys-incoherent-russia-policy/

According to his campaign’s own words, Romney will basically ignore Central Asian authoritarianism, which literally everyone agrees is far nastier, more brutal, and more open than anything the Russians are guilty of, while simultaneously focusing on democracy promotion and regime change in Russia. That is to say Romney’s Russia policy will, to a large extent, be based on relentlessly confronting the Kremlin. But won’t the Kremlin react extremely poorly to an American policy that seeks not only to co-opt its longtime allies in Central Asia and but to depose the current regime? According to Romney, the answer is no: the Kremlin will be so impressed by the bravery and willpower of this American effort that it will more actively support American goals (though precisely why it would react positively to an open challenge to its authority is left unsaid). Despite the endless accusations of Obama’s “double standards” and his “moral relativism” Romney is quite openly embracing his own set of double-standards. As the campaign’s website itself says, one set of moral values will be applied to the Central Asians while a completely different, and much more exacting, set of values will be applied to the Russians. It goes almost without saying that this is the sort of bad-faith posturing that really drives the Russians batty and that they react very poorly to this sort of thing. While I personally am of a strongly realist orientation, and have little patience for the attempt to inject “values” into an international system that naturally tends to be amoral and anarchic, I understand that there is a coherent case to be made for the neoconservative position. Very intelligent people, including many of my friends and acquaintances, hold views similar to the ones Romney espouses towards, and while I can’t say I find them convincing I’m not nearly egotistical enough to think that my own views are the only “correct” ones. However Romney’s mix-and-match approach, a dollop of realism here, a large dose of neoconservatism there, a dash of accommodation here and a big helping of confrontation there, will not be a sober-minded attempt to appeal to everyone, but will instead be a disjointed mess that will simultaneously alienate and antagonize almost everyone in the region. While the foreign policy of any American president will never be perfectly within the bounds of a single school of thought, Romney’s entire Russia policy is a case study in avoiding hard choices. It quite openly attempts to be all things to all people: realists can look at it and see parts of their ideology, and neoconservatives can look at it and see parts of their ideology too. Romney will both openly confront the Russians and get more concessions from them, support democracy and work hand-in-hand with some of the world’s most repressive regimes, pursue missile defense and get Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, expand NATO and convince Russia to stop arming Syria, work to undermine Russia’s energy interests and get it to isolate Iran. There are no hard choices, no nasty compromises, and no trade-offs between values and interests: there is just the unapologetic exercise of American power and the positive consequences inevitably associated with it. Obama is himself very(!) far from being perfect, but at least his foreign policy seems to be a reasonably coherent attempt to advance America’s interests while avoiding, to the greatest extent possible, needless antagonism. As far as I can tell Romney’s main position is that Obama is bad, that everything he’s done is bad too, and that Romney would do better because… he said he will that’s why! There’s a deeper lesson in there about how this campaign is going to be waged, and a rather troubling one at that.

Iran threat -- > Iran prolif – Bandow

#### Romney win would collapse the economy

Robert Reich 8-20-2012; Chancellor’s Professor of Public Policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley. The Ryan-Romney Economic Plan Would Be A Disaster For America http://www.businessinsider.com/the-five-reasons-why-the-ryan-romney-economic-plan-would-be-a-2012-8

Mitt Romney hasn’t provided details so we should be grateful he’s selected as vice president a man with a detailed plan Romney says is “marvelous,” “bold and exciting,” “excellent,” “much needed,” and “consistent with” what he’s put out. So let’s look at the five basic features of this “marvelous” Ryan plan. FIRST: It would boost unemployment because it slashes public spending next year and the year after, when the economy is still likely to need a boost, not a fiscal drag. It would be the same austerity trap now throwing Europe into recession. According to the Economic Policy Institute, Ryan’s plan would mean 1.3 million fewer jobs next year than otherwise, and 2.8 million fewer the year after. SECOND: Ryan would take from lower-income Americans and give to the rich – who already have the biggest share of America’s total income and wealth in almost a century. His plan would raise taxes on families earning between 30 and 40 thousand dollars by almost $500 a year, and slash programs like Medicare, food stamps, and children’s health What would Ryan do with these savings? Reduce taxes on millionaires by an average of over $500,000 a year. THIRD: Ryan wants to turn Medicare into vouchers that won’t keep up with the rising costs of health care – thereby shifting the burden onto seniors. By contrast, Obama’s Affordable Care Act saves money on Medicare by reducing payments to medical providers like hospitals and drug companies. FOURTH: He wants to add money to defense while cutting spending on education, infrastructure, and basic research and development. America already spends more on defense than the next five biggest military spenders put together. Our future productivity depends on the public investments Ryan wants to cut. FIFTH: And finally, Ryan’s budget doesn’t even reduce the federal budget deficit – not for decades. Remember: He’s adding to military spending, giving huge additional tax cuts to the very rich, and stifling economic growth by cutting spending too early. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities estimates Ryan’s Roadmap would push public debt to over 175 percent of GDP by 2050. So there you have it. The Ryan – Ryan-ROMNEY – economic plan. And the five reasons why it would be a disaster for America.

#### Obama solves US – Sino relations

**Stokes and Hatchigian, 12** [U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year Taking the Long View in a Season of Heated Rhetoric, Jacob, Research Assistant at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where his research focuses on U.S. national security and defense policy. His writing has appeared in CNN.com, Politico, BusinessWeek, The Baltimore Sun, The Guardian and The American Prospect, among other publications, Senior Fellow at American Progress.¶ http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QG6048mP53AJ:www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2012/03/pdf/us\_china\_relations.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us]

Conservatives and progressives today approach the challenge of China very differently. Many conservatives, including most of the Republican candidates for¶ the presidential nomination, are critiquing the Obama administration’s policies¶ on China—a tactic designed to chip away at President Barack Obama’s high poll¶ numbers on national security issues and distract from congressional obstruction-¶ ism on key steps to improve our economic competitiveness at home.¶ But they are not offering many sensible ideas. Today’s conservative approaches¶ on China—which too often end up shortsighted, inconsistent, emotional, and¶ belligerent—will fail. Strategies that aim for short-term political point scoring—or, even worse, calculated efforts to create a new Cold War enemy—will¶ undermine global security.¶ In contrast, the Obama administration’s approach is steady, clear-eyed, and¶ focused on results. The administration has pushed back on China multiple¶ times—taking China to task on unfair trade, forming a united front to get China¶ to back down from aggressive actions in the South China Sea, and selling arms to¶ Taiwan over furious protests from Beijing. President Obama’s Asia strategy, which¶ is deepening partnerships and engagement in the region, is designed to ensure that¶ as China grows it contributes to peace and stability and follows the rules of the¶ international system. At the same time the administration does not let differences¶ prevent the United States from working with Beijing on important joint challenges such as North Korea’s nuclear program and clean energy.1¶ This progressive approach offers the best tactic for dealing with China because for¶ the foreseeable future China will be both a rival and a partner. Our policymak-¶ ers have to play the long game, ensuring our strategies for China make sense not¶ just during campaign seasons but for this year, this decade, and beyond. Fostering¶ successful policies toward China requires a steady hand and a concerted effort to¶ refrain from overheated tirades and knee-jerk responses.

### Link uniqueness

#### Obama distancing himself from nuclear issues in the run-up to the election

LEVINE 9/7/12 (Gregg; Contributing Editor and Former Managing Editor – Firedoglake and Contributing Writer for Truthout, “Obama Drops Nuclear from Energy Segment of Convention Speech,” <http://capitoilette.com/2012/09/07/obama-drops-nuclear-from-energy-segment-of-convention-speech/>)

President Obama no longer promises to “safely harness nuclear power”–that likely would have sounded like a cruel joke in a world now contaminated by the ongoing Fukushima disaster–but beyond that, he does not promise anything about nuclear power at all. There was no platitude, no carefully crafted signal to the industry that has subsidized much of Obama’s political career, no mention of nuclear power whatsoever.

That is not to say that the entire 2012 Democratic National Convention was a nuclear-free zone. A few hours before the president took the stage at the Time Warner Cable Arena, James Rogers, co-chair of the Charlotte host committee, and oh, by the way, CEO of Duke Energy, stepped to the lectern and endorsed Obama’s “all of the above” energy “strategy” (they keep using that word; I do not think it means what they think it means):

We need to work even harder toward a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy. That means we need to invest heavily in new zero-emission power sources, like new nuclear, wind and solar projects, as well as new technologies, like electric vehicles.

Well, if you are looking for a future of affordable, reliable and cleaner energy, you need look no further than nu–wait, what? If you are looking for those three features in an energy future, it is hard to imagine a worse option than the unsustainably expensive, chronically unreliable and dangerously dirty nuclear power plant. And, as has been discussed here many times, nuclear is not a zero-emission source, either. The massive carbon footprint of the nuclear fuel lifecycle rivals coal, and that doesn’t even consider the radioactive isotopes that facilities emit, even when they are not encountering one of their many “unusual events.”

But the CEO of the Charlotte-based energy giant probably has his eyes on a different prize. Rogers, who has been dogged by questions about a power grab after Duke’s merger with Progress Energy and his lackluster performance as fundraiser-in-chief for the DNC, sits atop a company that operates seven US nuclear power plants, and is partners in a plan to build two new AP1000 reactors in Cherokee County, South Carolina.

That last project, which is under active review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, awaiting a combined construction and operating license, is one of a small handful of proposed new nuclear facilities currently scrambling for financing. The South Carolina plant, along with a pair of reactors in Georgia, two slated for a different site in South Carolina, and possibly one more in Tennessee, represent what industry lobbyists like to call the “nuclear renaissance.”

But completion of any of the above is nowhere close to guaranteed, and even if some of these reactors are eventually built, none will be able to generate even one kilowatt of commercial power until years after President Obama completes his sought-after second term.

Which, if you really care about America’s energy future, is, of course, all for the better. As even James Rogers noted in his speech (and he gets props for this):

[W]e cannot lose sight of energy efficiency. Because the cleanest, most efficient power plant is the one we never have to build.

That Duke’s CEO thought to highlight efficiency is interesting. That President Obama, with his well-documented ties to the nuclear industry, chose not to even mention nuclear power is important.

In the wake of Fukushima, where hundreds of thousands of Japanese have been displaced, where tens of thousands are showing elevated radiation exposure, and where thousands of children have thyroid abnormalities, no one can be cavalier about promising a safe harnessing of the atom. And in a world where radioisotopes from the breached reactors continue to turn up in fish and farm products, not only across Japan, but across the northern hemisphere, no one can pretend this is someone else’s problem.

Obama and his campaign advisors know all this and more. They know that most industrialized democracies have chosen to shift away from nuclear since the start of the Japanese crisis. They know that populations that have been polled on the matter want to see nuclear power phased out. And they know that in a time of deficit hysteria, nuclear power plants are an economic sinkhole.

And so, on a night when the president was promised one of the largest audiences of his entire campaign, he and his team decided that 2012 was not a year to throw a bone to Obama’s nuclear backers. Obama, a consummate politician, made the decision that for his second shot at casting for the future, nuclear power is political deadweight.

#### Even though Obama supports nuclear energy he’s downplaying it in the run up to the election – plan forces it into the spotlight

JOHNSON ’12 (John; Nuclear Energy Insider, “US Campaign Trail: is nuclear in the equation?” 4/25, <http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/new-build/us-campaign-trail-nuclear-equation>)

Alternative energy policies have received a fair amount of publicity from the Obama administration, although nuclear power specifically is rarely mentioned on the campaign trial, primarily due to perceived safety questions.

#### Obama and the DOE are downplaying SMR grants -- they won’t get caught up in election year politics.

Nelson & Northey, 9-24-12

[Gabriel, Hannah, E&E reporters, “NUCLEAR ENERGY: DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3]

Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants. The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants. DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago. As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest. "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how." Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle. Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made. "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email. That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending.

#### Obama is cutting nuclear incentives

**Bendery, 12** – Huffington Post (Jennifer, "Obama's Budget Nixes New Money For Program That Funded Solyndra," Huffington Post, 2/14, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/obama-budget-solyndra-program\_n\_1276605.html)

WASHINGTON -- In a quiet shift from the past two years, President Barack Obama's 2013 budget includes no new money for the Department of Energy loan guarantee program, the same program that House Republicans have scrutinized for losing more than $500 million in taxpayer dollars to the now-defunct solar power company, Solyndra.

Obama has regularly included huge increases to the program's loan guarantee authority in his budget, though Congress has not approved his proposals. He provided a $36 billion increase for nuclear reactors in his 2011 budget, and again in his 2012 budget. He also included $200 million in credit subsidies for renewable and energy efficiency projects in his 2012 budget. This year, he provided nothing.

Meg Reilly, a spokeswoman for the Office of Management and Budget, said in an email that Obama opted not to put new money toward the loan guarantee program this time because the administration is waiting on the results of an evaluation of the Energy Department's loan portfolio. Reilly also said the program still has "a significant amount of remaining resources" from prior years and that the focus will be on putting those funds to use. There's about $10 billion in its reserves.

The Energy Department "continues to conduct due diligence and is in active negotiations with a number of additional project sponsors," Reilly said. "It's important to point out here that, as of January 2012, over $24 billion in direct loans and loan guarantees have closed to support a diverse range of over 30 wind, solar, electric vehicles and other clean energy projects projected to fund more than 50,000 jobs."

But some environmental groups say Obama's budgetary shift is hugely significant because it means no new money for building nuclear power plants -- and they speculate that, at least in part, they have Solyndra to thank for the shift.

"The entire loan program has fallen into some disrepute on Capitol Hill ... because of Solyndra and some of the other renewable programs getting in trouble," said Michael Mariotte, executive director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, an information hub for organizations concerned with nuclear power. The administration "may have decided to cut their losses" and stop providing new funds to the program altogether.

### U

**1nc Blumenthal says it will be close, but Obama leads every meaningful measure, prefer it –**

**a. samples the aggregate of all recent polling data, Blumenthal is the head of Pollster.com and his firm compiles data to correct for partisan polling firm’s ‘house effect’**

**b.it includes all swing state polls and accounts for likely voters**

#### Conclusive lead despite alleged narrowing

**Silver, 10/2**/12 – statistician (Nate, “Is the Presidential Race Tightening Heading Into the Debates?”

http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/02/oct-1-is-the-presidential-race-tightening-heading-into-the-debates/?utm\_source=twitterfeed&utm\_medium=twitter

There were nine national polls published on Monday, which are listed in the table below. On average, they showed Mr. Obama with a 3.5 percentage point lead over Mr. Romney. That’s smaller than the leads we were seeing in national polls last week, which seemed to be concentrated more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama. It also suggests a smaller lead than recent state-by-state polls seem to imply. So has the race already shifted back toward Mr. Romney some? Perhaps, but this is less apparent from the trendlines within these polls. If you compare the nine surveys released on Monday against the last time they were published (in all cases, the comparison poll postdates the Democratic conventions), only four showed a shift toward Mr. Romney. An equal number, four, showed Mr. Obama gaining ground instead, while one poll remained unchanged. In all cases but one, the shift was extremely modest — within one percentage point in one direction or the other. The exception was a new CNN national poll, which had Mr. Romney closing his deficit from six points to three points. On average, however, the polls showed only a 0.2 percentage point gain for Mr. Romney — not a meaningful shift in either a statistical or a practical sense. And yet this simple version a trendline analysis does not tell the whole story either. Mr. Romney had appeared to lose further ground in the polls following the public release of his “47 percent” comments. All of polls that are used for comparison were released after the Democratic convention, but some predated the “47 percent” tape. It’s good for Mr. Romney that his national numbers on Monday looked more like those from just after the Democratic convention, when they weren’t great, rather than those from the past week or two, when they were worse. The FiveThirtyEight forecast model can account for these various contingencies, looking at exactly when the prior editions of a survey were released in order to calculate the consensus trendline. Viewed in this way, the national polls on Monday did contain modestly good news for Mr. Romney. But that doesn’t tell the whole story either, because there has also been a large volume of state polls released over the past day or two. Those polls can also be informative about the trend in the race. And in the state polls, it’s been harder to find evidence for a favorable trend for Mr. Romney. If anything, the opposite seems to be true. This was particularly the case in a University of New Hampshire survey published on Monday, which had Mr. Obama leading by 15 points in the Granite State — up from just a five-point lead in a poll taken just after the Democratic convention. The University of New Hampshire poll has a history of being fairly volatile, perhaps in part because voters in New Hampshire can be fickle with their political opinions. The poll certainly qualifies as an outlier relative to the consensus evidence in New Hampshire. At the same time, it’s not the kind of thing you’d expect to see if Mr. Romney were gaining ground in the race. Mr. Obama, not Mr. Romney, has also gotten highly favorable trendlines in a recent set of state-by-state polls released by the firm We Ask America, many of which show him with a considerably larger lead than he had before the conventions in those same states. The gap between state polls and national polls, which looked to have narrowed some last week, seems to be widening again. Perhaps appropriately given the mixed evidence on Monday, the FiveThirtyEight models produced something of a split verdict. Mr. Obama came off his highs in our “now-cast,” which projects what would happen if the election were held today. That version of the model had previously given Mr. Obama a 5.9 percentage lead in the national race, but it declined to 5.5 percentage points on Monday. Why are these “now-cast” numbers higher than the most recent national polls seem to suggest? In part because of the factor that I mentioned before — the “now-cast” uses state polls along with national polls to calculate its estimate of the national popular vote, and the state polls are a bit stronger for Mr. Obama. Also, last week’s national polls, which were more in the range of a five- or six-point lead for Mr. Obama, still have some influence upon it. The Nov. 6 forecast, however, our signature product, is already assuming that Mr. Obama’s numbers will decline some, in large part, because it continues to weigh economic factors along with the polls. Those economic factors, in view of the formula, are more in line with only a very narrow win for Mr. Obama, on the order of two or three percentage points, similar to the margin by which George W. Bush defeated John Kerry in 2004. As we get closer and closer to the election, these economic factors will receive less weight, until they phase out completely by Election Day. But they continue to exert some influence on the forecast for the time being. In the Nov. 6 forecast, Mr. Obama’s projected margin of victory in the popular vote declined to 4.1 percentage points from 4.2. However, his probability of winning the Electoral College increased by a trivial amount, to 85.7 percent from 85.1.

#### Only that assumes cellphone users

**Silver, 9/19**/12 – statistician, editor of the NYT Fivethirtyeight blog (Nate, “Obama’s Lead Looks Stronger in Polls That Include Cellphones” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/obamas-lead-looks-stronger-in-polls-that-include-cellphones/#more-34740)

As I observed on Tuesday, and as The New Republic’s Nate Cohn also found, Barack Obama seems to have received a much clearer bounce in some types of polls than others. Although there are exceptions on either side, like the Gallup national tracking poll, for the most part Mr. Obama seems to be getting stronger results in polls that use live interviewers and that include cellphones in their samples — enough to suggest that he has a clear advantage in the race. In the polls that use an automated dialing method (“robopolls”) or which exclude cellphones, Mr. Obama’s bounce has been much harder to discern, and the race looks considerably closer. The difference seems especially pronounced at the state level. Mr. Obama got very strong results in a series of NBC News/Marist College polls last week in Ohio, Florida and Virginia, which included cellphones and used live interviewers. Likewise, Tuesday morning’s series of New York Times / CBS News / Quinnipiac polls had reasonably good news for Mr. Obama in Virginia and Wisconsin. By contrast, the automated polling firm Rasmussen Reports has recently released polls showing Mr. Obama two points behind Mitt Romney in New Hampshire and three points behind in Colorado — the worst results that it has shown for him in those states all year. Another automated polling firm, Gravis Marketing, recently put Mr. Obama at a five-point deficit in Virginia, in contrast to three traditional polls that put him ahead by margins ranging from four to eight points there. A third automated polling firm, Public Policy Polling, has shown stronger results for Mr. Obama, but they also had him with good results before the conventions, and so haven’t shown him gaining much ground. These results are consistent with some past research. Roughly one third of American households rely solely on mobile phones and do not have landlines, meaning they will simply be excluded by polls that call landlines only. Potential voters who rely on cellphones belong to more Democratic-leaning demographic groups than those which don’t, and there is reasonably strong empirical evidence that the failure to include them in polls can bias the results against Democrats, even after demographic weightings are applied. We keep track of which polling firms include cellphones in their samples and which do not. So on Monday night, I decided to run two alternate versions of the FiveThirtyEight forecast. (Note that all results are based on polls that were in our database as of Monday night, and so will not include Tuesday morning’s New York Times polls or others published on Tuesday.) In one of the forecasts, I ran the numbers based solely on polls that do include cellphones in their samples. The vast majority of these polls also use live interviewers, since federal law prohibits automated calls to cellphones under most circumstances. (Note, however, that one or two mostly automated polling firms, like SurveyUSA, use a separate sample based on live interviewers to reach cellphone-only voters; these were included in the model run.) In this universe, Mr. Obama seems poised for victory. The model forecasts him for a 4.1 percentage points win in the national popular vote. That compares with 2.9 percentage points in the regular FiveThirtyEight forecast, which includes polls both with and without cellphones.

### 2nc link

Already winning rural areas

#### 1nc - The public supports existing reactors, not new ones

#### New nuclear loan guarantees are unpopular with everyone

Mariotte 12 – executive director and the chief spokesperson for NIRS, has testified in the United States Senate and before the U.S. House of Representatives on nuclear power, a graduate of Antioch College. (Michael, Jun 5th, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say) Jacome

These are all fundamental questions, the answers to which could affect our future far more than, say, who will be the next Senator from Indiana. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, until recently—really the past two or three years—other than regularly-conducted, loudly-trumpeted and rarely relevant industry-sponsored polls, polling of public opinion on nuclear power (and a lot of other energy issues) was haphazard at best.

Gallup, for example, over the past 18 years as best as we can find out, has conducted only 10 polls (and most of these only asked a half-sample, putting their numbers into question) asking people their opinion on nuclear power. But beginning in 2009, Gallup has begun polling annually. Unfortunately, Gallup asks the exact same question, with the same wording, that the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) own well-tested polling does. And the NEI doesn’t ask questions that it doesn’t want the answers to. Even so, Gallup’s answers don’t quite match those NEI gets, and which are usually heavily promoted in the media by NEI.

To try to get a better sense of what the public really thinks about nuclear power (and since we can’t afford to conduct our own polling), we took a look at **every poll we could find** on the issue, and related energy issues, over the past two years, and in some cases further back. Yes, that includes GOP/Fox News favorite Rasmussen.

As DailyKos readers know, if not the general public, examining all the possible polls leads to a much greater confidence in conclusions than relying on a single poll. Thus, we have a fairly strong confidence that our conclusions are a good statement of where the American public is at on nuclear power and our energy future in the Spring of 2012.

Conclusion 1: The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy.

This one is a slam dunk.

New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayers in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).

ORC International (which polls for CNN, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer? Basically identical both years: 73% opposed in 2011, 72% opposed in 2012.

Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.

A third poll conducted by ORC for Civil Society Institute in March 2012 asked this question:

“Utilities in some states are allowed to charge electricity ratepayers for “Construction Work in Progress” for new power plants. This means that ratepayers – instead of the companies – pay for construction of new nuclear reactors and other major power plants before any electricity ever reaches customers, thereby lowering the financial risks to shareholders. Knowing this, which of the following statements about “Construction Work in Progress” most closely reflects your view?”

The answer: fully 80% opposed CWIP.

Most pollsters have not asked similar questions; interestingly though, Rasmussen did in May 2012 for an undisclosed client. Their question: “The government is providing billions in loan guarantees to help the development of new nuclear plants. Would that money be better spent on the development of alternative new energy sources?” Unfortunately, Rasmussen did not publicize the results and hid them behind a paywall, which we were not inclined to pursue. But if anyone has access to that, we’d love to know what Rasmussen found.

Conclusion 2: Americans do not think nuclear power is “clean” energy, and still don’t want to pay for it.

Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this:

About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’”

and this:

About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.”

Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that support plummeted.

This is consistent with findings over the past decade, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source.

A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.

Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.

Gallup and the Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”

This question doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reactors, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.

Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.

Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.

But other polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question. For example, the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found that support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today.

Even Rasmussen in its May 2012 poll found that only 44% support building new reactors. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).

Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:

“Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”

But perhaps the most telling, and easily the most interesting, poll comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”

29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good” and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”

Conclusions

Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines.

### at: jobs

#### No link turns – nuclear has no political clout – there’s not enough of a constituency

Tucker, 8-16-12

[William, veteran journalist, has written for many high-profile publications, “Nuclear’s Problem — Too Much Energy, Not Enough Jobs,” http://www.nucleartownhall.com/blog/william-tucker-nuclear%E2%80%99s-problem-%E2%80%94-too-much-energy-not-enough-jobs/]

So there you have it. America’s energy future is a contest between coal and wind. Which can create more jobs? If you think there’s a better option, you don’t have a place at the table. And that’s where nuclear stands today. Sure, there may be questions about potential accidents and the effects of radiation, but the real problem is this: Nuclear is so energy intensive that it doesn’t produce enough jobs to create a political constituency. Why does coal still have such enormous political clout? The answer is simple. It requires so much mining and transportation of raw material that hundreds of thousands of workers – whole states, in fact – become involved in the task. There are now 1300 coal mines in 27 states employing 88,000 workers. More than half a dozen of these states identify themselves as “coal states” – West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Colorado and Wyoming just fir a start. The state with the biggest coal reserves – Montana – hasn’t really started developing them yet. Next to farming, coal mining is most widely entrenched resource-based industry in the country. There is good reason for all this job creation. A1000-MW coal plant must be resupplied by a 110-car unit train arriving every 30 hours. Almost half the railroad freight in the U.S. is coal. Economists say there’s a real question of whether the railroads actually own the coal companies or the coal companies own the railroads. In any case, all this produces huge work forces with powerful labor union backing. Wind energy works the same way. Because each giant 45-story windmills produces only about 2 MW, thousands upon thousands will be required to produce electricity in commercial quantities. This creates a huge work force. The American Wind Energy Association claims 90,000 employees in the wind industry with more than 4,000 in California, Texas, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and North Dakota. Building out the transmission lines to carry this electricity to population centers will eventually employ thousands more. Wind is nothing if not labor intensive. So how does nuclear do by comparison? According to the Uranium Producers of America, there are 13 uranium mines in the U.S. employing 1635 people. Their annual output was 16, 000 tons of uranium oxide – the equivalent of two coal trains leaving the Powder River Basin (where one now departs every eight minutes). Our domestic production of uranium has actually been suppressed over the last two decades because we have been using former Soviet weapons material for half our fuel in the Megatons to Megawatts program, although the pace may pick up when the treaty expires next year. Worldwide there are only 46 uranium mines – as opposed to 450 coal mines in Kentucky alone. Recently the Russians have proposed supplying the entire world out of one uranium mine in Siberia. Nuclear’s great energy density has one glaring weakness – there is no possibility of building a huge mining and transport constituencies that can support the technology. Uranium does require reprocessing and there are major facilities in Kentucky and Ohio. But even those hardly constitute more than a ripple in the two states’ economies. Traditionally, the only places where nuclear has gained a political foothold is those states that have national laboratories. New Mexico’s Democratic Senator Pete Domenici was long a leading supporter because of the Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, which hosts Oak Ridge and the Tennessee Valley Authority, has now picked up the mantle. But Tennessee is much more involved in the auto industry and there is no “nuclear state” to match the half-dozen coal states. Well then, what about the 104 reactors that operate around the country? Don’t they generate some political support? The average reactor employs about 650 people and is extremely popular in its home territory. Bisconti Research has found that support for nuclear increases to around 85 percent in communities that host reactors. But this support tends to be highly localized and reactors create little ancillary employment. Replacing the fuel rods, for instance, requires only six tractor trailers arriving once every 18 months. Illinois gets almost half its electricity from nuclear and even Barack Obama was known to say a few nice things about it while he was Senator from Illinois. But most states with large nuclear complexes are equally committed to coal. Even in a state that is highly dependent on nuclear, the work force is so small as to be inconsequential. Vermont gets 60 percent of its electricity form Vermont Yankee, yet its efforts to close down the reactor have generated very little pushback. Vernon, the tiny town of 2,000 that supplies all this energy, is 100 percent in favor of keeping the reactor. But its interests are completed swamped by 623,000 other Vermonters who only get clean, cheap energy from nuclear and think they can do the same by covering the green mountains with 45-story windmills. The only place where nuclear has built a true constituency is in the South. This is partly because of the many military veterans in the region, since a large portion of the nuclear workforce has come up through the Nuclear Navy. South Carolina is probably the most pro-nuclear state in the country with Georgia and Tennessee also strongly in favor. It is no accident that the four new reactors licensed for construction will be built in Georgia and South Carolina. Areva is also completing its plutonium recycling plant at the Savannah River Site. But all these states are pretty much locked up for Republicans and have very little impact at the national level. So nuclear’s weakness is plain to see. It does very poorly at creating the kind of widespread employment that builds political constituencies. It is only good at producing energy.

### Link Turns Case

#### The link slashes the case -- public opposition prevents nuclear expansion

**Ramana, ‘11**

[M. V., appointed jointly with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security -- Princeton University, works on the future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament, member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials and the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board, 7-1, “Nuclear Power and the Public,” SAGE Journals]

Opinion polls show that public support for nuclear power has declined since the Fukushima crisis began, not only in Japan but also in other nations around the world. People oppose nuclear power for a variety of reasons, but the predominant concern is the perception that it is a risky technology. Some communities that are closely associated with it even suffer from stigmatization. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power—including information campaigns, risk comparisons, and efforts to promote nuclear power as a solution to climate change. None of these strategies has worked well, mostly because the public lacks trust in the nuclear industry. Public resistance to nuclear power is likely to continue, making it difficult to site and build new reactors. This resistance may be a major obstacle to the rapid expansion of nuclear power.

### A2 ohio

#### Obama now - Superior ground game and momentum

**Lim, 10/2/12 -** Associate Professor of Government at Wesleyan University (Elvin, “Obama is surging” http://blog.oup.com/2012/10/obama-is-surging/)

The Obama campaign, by fortune or by wit, has peaked at the right moment. Early voting has already started in Virginia, and starts in Iowa and Ohio next week. This means that the polls telling a uniform story of an Obama surge in crucial swing states aren’t just snap-shots; they are predictive of how voters — about 35 percent of total voters — are actually starting to vote as we speak.

Republicans like Karl Rove are saying that the CBS/NYT/Quinnipiac polls are wrong because they are using the turnout model of 2008. But Gallup found similar results. So did Bloomberg. So did the Washington Post. Obama’s numbers are moving up, and it is intellectually dishonest and ultimately self-defeating for some Republicans to spin a story about over-sampling Democrats to deny the plausible reality that a triangulation of polls are pointing to. (And by the way, the over-sampling spin is rather more complicated even than what its wonkish advocates say on TV, if only because no one knows what turnout is going to be.)

So right now, it is not looking good for Romney, who has to wait until October 5th to stand toe-to-toe with Obama, and demonstrate his presidential stature. It may be too late by then, which is why the Romney campaign has finally shifted from a national strategy to a state-by-state strategy, starting in Ohio. Whether or not it was wise to wait this late to start the ground game, we will know in six weeks. The Obama campaign has 96 offices in Ohio, nearly three times as many as Romney does — a strategic bet by the Democrats that the ground game matters more than the battle over the airwaves. The Republicans are expecting, in the post-Citizens United world, that the superPACS will step up to seal the deal for Romney.

#### Obama is winning Ohio by 10 points – it’s probably not even a swing state

**Britt, 9/26**/12 – Marketwatch (Russ, “Ohio surge puts Obama inches away from win, sites say” http://blogs.marketwatch.com/election/2012/09/26/ohio-surge-puts-obama-inches-away-from-win-sites-say/)

President Barack Obama’s surge in Ohio polls — with some giving him as much as a 10-point edge — has prompted a couple of web sites to chalk up the key battleground state into his camp, leaving him just a few electoral votes away from victory.

After putting Ohio in the category of “leaning” toward Obama, RealClearPolitics.com now figures that the incumbent is close to securing 265 electoral votes, five away from the 270 needed to win over Republican challenger Mitt Romney. The site gives Romney 191 electoral votes at this point.

RealClearPolitics, which averages out various presidential polls both at the national and state level, now says Obama’s Ohio lead is 5.2 points over Romney, enough to put the state in the “lean” category.

## 2nc States

### 2NC States Solve

#### States incentives solve nuclear development

**Dow Jones Newswires, 7** (5-21-07, “States Maneuver to Lure New Nuclear Power Plants” <http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=19778941>)

In a positive shift for U.S. power companies planning a new fleet of nuclear facilities, nuclear power has gained popularity in several states as a solution to high power prices and growing demand.

Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia are offering incentives to develop new nuclear generation, hoping that nuclear power prices will be lower and less volatile than power generated by natural gas. State regulators also hope new nuclear power plants will create jobs and bolster local industry. Nuclear operators say state rules ensuring cost recovery of new plants - particularly pre-construction costs - will likely affect their decisions about where to build new plants.

Louisiana and Florida have approved measures that would allow New Orleans-based Entergy Corp. (ETR) and Juno Beach, Fla.-based FPL Group (FPL) to pass on some pre-construction nuclear plant development costs to their customers, while Georgia regulators are considering a similar move.

#### State governments can use financial incentives to spur nuclear power – empirically attracts private sector financing and captures their signal arguments

**NEI 9** (Nuclear Energy Institute, “Policies That Support New Nuclear Power Plant Development”, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/factsheet/policiessupportnewplantdevelopment/?print=true)

State Policies

Several states have passed legislation or implemented regulations, or both, to support construction of new nuclear power plants.

These policies range from property tax incentives to pre-determination of rate-making principles for a project before construction begins.

The policies that help most with financing new plants in regulated states are those that:

* Require the state public utility commission to determine if a proposed plant is prudent before construction begins and approve costs periodically during construction, thereby guaranteeing these capital costs will be added to the rate base when the plant comes online.
* Allow the carrying cost of construction work in progress (CWIP)—or the financing cost associated with construction—to be passed on to ratepayers during construction. Allowing CWIP reduces the cost ratepayers will pay for power from the plant when it goes into commercial operation.

Some unregulated states assist with financing for unregulated plants by allowing pre-negotiated, long-term power purchase agreements (PPA). PPAs guarantee the project will have a source of cash flow (and cost recovery) once it is operational.

State-level policies send positive signals to the financial community, helping companies finance projects reasonably, and, thereby, keeping the cost of electricity for consumers lower.

**States create federal follow on**

**Dutzik, 11** - senior policy analyst with Frontier Group, specializing in energy, transportation and climate policy (Tony, “The Way Forward on Global Warming Reducing Carbon Pollution Today and Restoring Momentum for Tomorrow by Promoting Clean Energy”, <http://www.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/The-Way-Forward-on-Global-Warming.pdf>)

Over the past several years, vast resources have been devoted to winning comprehensive energy and climate legislation at the federal level, and for good reason— comprehensive federal legislation will be necessary to produce the emission reductions needed to put America and the world on track to prevent the worst impacts of global warming.

There are, however, countless additional opportunities to reduce emissions using existing federal statutes as well as the opportunities presented by action at state and local levels of government.

In this report, we estimate the potential impacts of 30 public policies, measures and initiatives to reduce global warming pollution, most of which can be adopted at the state level. With 50 states, that makes more than 1,000 potential opportunities to reduce global warming pollution.

State and local action on global warming is not a “second-best” solution to the climate crisis. Indeed, time and again, ambitious public policy action at the local or state level has created a precedent for strong action at the federal level. Moreover, as described below, state and local campaigns can involve and engage citizens in ways that federal legislative campaigns cannot. Under the right conditions, these policies can not only deliver concrete emission reductions, but they can also spur changes in infrastructure and transform economic conditions in ways that will make the goals of an eventual national program easier to meet.

## 2nc Condition cp

### AT: Perm – do both

Doesn’t solve- providing the plan’s guarantee of incentives cancels out any benefit to conditioning separate incentives based on cost. The plan’s guarantee eliminates any reason the industry would have to reform because they get the plan regardless of whatever measures they take to become cost competitive- that’s **Jenkins** and **Hayward** – the credibility of the condition depends upon the possibility of termination

#### All of our solvency turns are disads to the permutation – diminishing subsidies conditioned on performance are vital to innovation

**Jenkins, 12** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, Congressional Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 5/22, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=31b79a1a-83a0-4ae6-8c80-30fe754ad0ea>)

Whatever form it takes, a new suite of advanced energy deployment policies must simultaneously drive market demand and continual innovation.

By and large, today’s energy subsidies do not do enough to support America’s innovators, and they have not yet succeeded in driving down the costs of advanced energy technologies far enough to compete with conventional fuels. For example:

• Many of today’s clean energy subsidies are focused primarily on supporting the deployment of existing energy technologies at current prices, and most provide no clear pathway to subsidy independence. The federal renewable electricity PTC, for example, has provided the same level of subsidy to wind power since initial enactment in 1992. Subsidy levels increase each year at the rate of inflation, keeping per MWh subsidy levels constant in real dollar terms and providing no clear incentive for continual cost declines or pathway to eventual subsidy independence.

• If not designed with care, deployment policies can also lock out more promising but higher risk technologies from markets, slowing their development. This is a challenge in particular for the renewable portfolio standard and clean energy standard policies given serious consideration by this Committee. These policies typically encourage deployment of the lowest-cost qualifying energy technology available—generally wind power or biomass, or in the case of a proposed CES, natural gas-fired plants. Yet if designed in this manner, RPS or CES policies may do little to drive down the price of other advanced energy technologies, such as solar or advanced nuclear reactor designs, that may have higher costs now but hold the potential to become much cheaper in the long-run.

• Intermittent and haphazard policy support can also wreak havoc with the business confidence necessary for the long-term investments required to develop new and improved products. The PTC for wind power, for example, was first enacted in 1992, but has since expired three times, and has been renewed a total of seven times, often with less than a month to spare before pending expiration. Other clean tech subsidies, including key tax credits for solar, biofuels, energy efficient products, and other segments have experienced similarly erratic expirations. The market effects are chilling, and many private firms are forced to focus principally on ramping-up production for subsidized markets while they last, rather than pioneering next-generation designs and manufacturing processes for the long-term. The intermittent nature of many advanced energy support policies thus slows the pace of innovation in these sectors and actually prolongs the amount of time these sectors remain reliant on public subsidy.

The United States can do better than this. Deployment subsidies and policies should be reformed and designed from the beginning to better support innovative U.S. firms and reward companies for developing, producing, and improving advanced technologies that can ultimately compete on price with both fossil fuels and international competitors alike. Each dollar of federal support today should be optimized to move maturing advanced energy technology sectors towards eventual subsidy independence as soon as possible.

### AT: Perm – do the CP

1. Severs the plan – the plan provides incentives even if recipients don’t take measures to implement cost reduction. There isn’t an explicit termination clause in the plan, and it isn’t conditioned on cost competitiveness. An explicit termination clause must be offered at the outset – that’s **Jenkins** and **Hayward**, and there is no possible interpretation of the plan as written that does that

#### 2. Normal means for energy incentives is that they are unconditional – they’re flat and must increase each year to adjust for inflation

**Jenkins et al, 12** - Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, “Beyond Boom & Bust: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO SUBSIDY INDEPENDENCE” April,

<http://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust_Embargoed_4_17.pdfhttp://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust_Embargoed_4_17.pdf>)

Reducing the cost of clean energy technologies will require continuous innovation and improvement even after technologies are commercialized and launched into the marketplace. Yet, by and large, today’s energy subsidies do not do enough to support America’s innovators, and they have not yet succeeded in driving down the costs of clean energy far enough to compete with fossil fuels. The government, however, has a long history of successfully driving innovation and price declines in emerging technologies by acting as a demanding customer to spur the early commercialization, largescale deployment, and steady improvement of cutting-edge technology. 91

Unfortunately, clean tech deployment policies today often closely resemble crop supports, offering a flat production subsidy for any clean energy produced, rather than the demanding military procurement policies that delivered steady improvements and the eventual mass-adoption of everything from radios, microchips, and jet engines, to gas turbines, lasers, and computers. 92

Many of today’s clean energy subsidies are focused primarily on supporting the deployment of existing energy technologies at current prices, and most provide no clear pathway to subsidy independence. The federal renewable electricity PTC, for example, has provided the same level of subsidy to wind power and closed-loop biomass-fueled power plants since initial enactment in 1992 and to geothermal and other qualifying renewable electricity sources since 2004, when it was first extended to them. Subsidy levels increase each year at the rate of inflation, keeping per MWh subsidy levels constant in real dollar terms and providing no clear incentive for continual cost declines or pathway to eventual subsidy independence.

If not designed with care, deployment policies can also lock out more promising but higher risk technologies from markets, slowing their development. Renewable portfolio standards, for example, which require utilities to purchase a certain percentage of electricity generation from renewable sources, encourage deployment of the lowest-cost renewable energy technology available—generally wind power or biomass. But they do little to drive down the price of other, clean energy technologies, such as solar or advanced nuclear power designs, that may have higher costs now but hold the potential to become much cheaper in the long-run. 93

The intermittent and haphazard nature of US energy policy also wreaks havoc with the business confidence necessary for the long-term investments required to develop new and improved products. 94 The PTC for wind power, for example, was first enacted in 1992, but has since expired three times, and has been renewed a total of seven times, often with less than a month to spare before pending expiration. Other clean tech subsidies, including key tax credits for solar, biofuels, energy efficient products, and other segments have experienced similarly erratic expirations. The market effects are chilling, and many private firms are forced to focus principally on ramping-up production for subsidized markets while they last, rather than pioneering next-generation designs and manufacturing processes for the long-term.

In the worst cases, maintaining lucrative, blunt subsidies over prolonged periods can even create a disincentive for firms to innovate 95 or can support “dead end” technologies that have no viable path to long-term competitiveness. 96

#### Severs substantially

**Words and Phrases** 19**64** (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

**Severance is a voting issue – no counterplan would ever be competitive if it were legitimate, it destroys all neg ground**

## 1nr case

### Russia War

**No budget for war**

**Harding 10** (Luke Harding is an award-winning foreign correspondent with the Guardian, March 5, 2010, “Viktor Yanukovych promises Ukraine will embrace Russia,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/05/ukraine-russia-relations-viktor-yanukovych)

The defense budget of Russia, a superpower rival of the United States as the USSR until 1991, has dwindled to a small fraction of the Pentagon’s. It is not an existential or even semi-existential threat. The safety of the United States does not turn on mutually assured destruction. **Russia’s armed forces are a shadow of the Soviet Red Army**. Its military struggles to defeat primitive Islamic forces in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia.

**Rhetoric doesn’t translate into foreign policy aggressiveness**

**Lieber 8** – professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, Falling Upwards, World Affairs, Summer, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Lieber.html)

Farther East, and despite its economic recovery and the restoration of central power under Putin, Russia remains overwhelmingly dependent on the current boom in energy and commodity prices—and correspondingly vulnerable in the event of their decline. The country suffers from pervasive corruption, with a ranking from Transparency International that puts it at 121 among 163 countries in this category. Its population, already less than half that of the U.S. and plagued with alcoholism, chronic violence, a decrepit health-care system, and a male life expectancy of fewer than 60 years of age (lower than that of Bangladesh), shrinks by some half a million people per year. And its army, while bidding for attention and resources, remains weak and in disarray. As The Economist recently summarized Putin’s Russia, it has become one of the most “criminalized, corrupt and bureaucratized countries in the world.”

True, the Putin regime plays to its domestic base with strident nationalism and xenophobia. In doing so, it has actively opposed and occasionally subverted American policies on some issues while providing a degree of cooperation on others. Instances of the former include opposition to NATO enlargement and to the stationing of anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, the use of oil and gas resources as leverage against neighboring countries, overt and covert pressure against former Soviet Republics, and arms sales to Syria and Iran. Yet Moscow grudgingly collaborates where it has shared concerns, as with North Korea and combating terrorism. Russia presents a problem for the United States, but its erratic behavior, its priorities at home, and its own internal decline put it well short of being a major power challenger.

**Common interests and interdependence**

**VOA 7** (3/27, Experts Do Not Foresee US Conflict with Russia, http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-03-27-voa75.cfm)

The short answer to the question posed at the Hudson Institute is no. Armed conflict between the United States and Russia is neither inevitable nor likely. Indeed, Mikhail Delyagin, an adviser to former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, says a struggle with the West in general it is not in the interests of Russian elites. He spoke through an interpreter.

"Representatives of the ruling groups have their bank accounts in the West. And the second point is to understand that the Russian army does not exist and the Russian economy is extremely weak. Our Black Sea fleet is not even at the level of the forces of Bulgaria and Romania," he said.

One of the panel members at the Hudson Institute conference, Moscow political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky, says Russia and the United States, dominant powers of the 20th Century, now need to cooperate with one another. "In the 21st century, both the West and Russia are in a much more vulnerable position. We are both challenged by Islamic radicalism, and then, maybe more long term and less obvious, but maybe more dangerous -- the potential challenge of a rising China," he said.

Russian journalist Evgeny Kiselyev agrees that the United States and Russia have common interests. He says that Russians who communicate with Americans or have been to the United States generally have a good impression of this country. However, Kiselyev says some members of Russia's ruling class continue to resent America.

### Russia First Strike

Tritium not necessary to squo – just to make more

**Counterforce solves the impact**

**Lieber and Press 6** (Keir A. Lieber - assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, PhD from the University of Chicago, held fellowships from the Brookings Institution, Earhart Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Andrew Mellon Foundation, and Smith Richardson Foundation, \*\*AND Daryl G. Press - Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD in political science at MIT, associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard; "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy", Foreign Affairs Vol. 85, Iss. 2, pg. 42, Mar/Apr 2006, ProQuest)

Even as the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated. Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fieldedduring its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and low rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so. The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN patrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -- and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces -- is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces. Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads. Moscow could try to reduce its vulnerability by finding the money to keep its submarines and mobile missiles dispersed. But that would be only a short-term fix. Russia has already extended the service life of its aging mobile ICBMs, something that it cannot do indefinitely, and its efforts to deploy new strategic weapons continue to flounder. The Russian navy's plan to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines has fallen far behind schedule. It is now highly likely that not a single new submarine will be operational before 2008, and it is likely that none will be deployed until later. Even as Russia's nuclear forces deteriorate, the United States is improving its ability to track submarines and mobile missiles, further eroding Russian military leaders' confidence in Russia's nuclear deterrent. (As early as 1998, these leaders publicly expressed doubts about the ability of Russia's ballistic missile submarines to evade U.S. detection.) Moreover, Moscow has announced plans to reduce its land-based ICBM force by another 35 percent by 2010; outside experts predict that the actual cuts will slice 50 to 75 percent off the current force, possibly leaving Russia with as few as 150 ICBMs by the end of the decade, down from its 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the United States to carry out a first strike. To determine how much the nuclear balance has changed since the Cold War, we ran a computer model of a hypothetical U.S. attack on Russia's nuclear arsenal using the standard unclassified formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. We assigned U.S. nuclear warheads to Russian targets on the basis of two criteria: the most accurate weapons were aimed at the hardest targets, and the fastest-arriving weapons at the Russian forces that can react most quickly. Because Russia is essentially blind to a submarine attack from the Pacific and would have great difficulty detecting the approach of low-flying stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles, we targeted each Russian weapon system with at least one submarine-based warhead or cruise missile. An attack organized in this manner would give Russian leaders virtually no warning. This simple plan is presumably less effective than Washington's actual strategy, which the U.S. government has spent decades perfecting. The real U.S. war plan may call for first targeting Russia's command and control, sabotaging Russia's radar stations, or taking other preemptive measures -- all of which would make the actual U.S. force far more lethal than our model assumes. **According to our model**, such **a** simplified **surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM.** [See Footnote #1] **This finding is not based on best-case assumptions or an unrealistic scenario in which U.S. missiles perform perfectly and the warheads hit their targets without fail**. Rather, we used standard assumptions to estimate the likely inaccuracy and unreliability of U.S. weapons systems. Moreover, our model indicates that all of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would still be destroyed even if U.S. weapons were 20 percent less accurate than we assumed, or if U.S. weapons were only 70 percent reliable, or if Russian ICBM silos were 50 percent "harder" (more reinforced, and hence more resistant to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the unclassified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack even more likely to succeed.) To be clear, this does not mean that a first s trike by the United States would be guaranteed to work in reality; such an attack would entail many uncertainties. Nor, of course, does it mean that such a first strike is likely. But what our analysis suggests is profound: Russia's leaders can no longer count on a survivable nuclear deterrent. And unless they reverse course rapidly, Russia's vulnerability will only increase over time.

### Iran Prolif

Iran prolif impacts make zero sense

Pena, 12 [1/10, **Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy** Is Iran-Nuke Fear Realistic?, http://consortiumnews.com/2012/01/10/is-iran-nuke-fear-realistic/]

At the heart of U.S. disbelief are centrifuges that can be used to enrich uranium to weapons grade. But there isn’t anything in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treat (NPT) — to which Iran is a signatory — that prohibits a country from enriching uranium.

Moreover, the foundation of the NPT is a false promise. Essentially, non-nuclear-weapons states (such as Iran) agree not to develop nuclear weapons (Article II) in exchange for nuclear-weapons states (such as the U.S.) agreeing to eventually (with no specific deadline) divest themselves of their nuclear weapons (Article VI). Apparently, the Iranians believe this about as much as that there is a bridge in Brooklyn for sale.

But why would the Iranians want nukes anyway? It couldn’t be that neighboring Israel has nuclear weapons (not that the Israelis are admitting that they do). And it certainly couldn’t be because U.S.-imposed regime change via military force (most recently right next door to Iran in Iraq) seems to happen to countries that don’t have nuclear weapons, e.g., notice that regime change in North Korea is happening because Kim Jong-Il died of natural causes.

Not that either of these could be considered legitimate concerns, from Iran’s perspective. And if the Iranians got nukes, the West’s argument goes, that would be the end of the world because they would most certainly use them. After all, Ahmadinejad supposedly threatened to wipe Israel off the map.

This assumes, of course, that the Iranians are suicidal. It is hard to imagine that the Israelis would sit idly by and not retaliate with their nuclear arsenal (which is likely enough to wipe Iran off the map). Ditto for any concerns about Iran lobbing a nuke at the United States (with an even larger and more capable nuclear arsenal that could wipe Iran off the map several times over — not to mention the minor detail that the Iranians don’t have a delivery platform capable of reaching the United States).

But Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, the argument goes, so wouldn’t they give nukes to terrorists? This, of course, was a central tenet of the Bush administration’s rationale for invading Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein in the wake of 9/11.

But the reality is that there is no history of any country with dreaded weapons of mass destruction giving them away to terrorists. Indeed, Saddam Hussein was known to have both chemical and biological weapons (in the 1980s) and he supported terrorists — but he never gave those weapons to terrorists.

It is also hard to fathom why the regime in Tehran would spend billions of dollars (perhaps tens of billions of dollars) in pursuit of nuclear weapons technology only to give it away to terrorists (the Bushehr reactor complex is estimated to have cost $4-6 billion, and the Iranians are believed to be constructing three to five more nuclear facilities at an estimated cost of $3.2 billion).

So strip away the veneer of threats and posturing, and the underpinning logic is anything but logical. Unfortunately, this passes for and seems to be accepted as sound foreign policy.

**Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. Dare you to read a qualified card**

**Telegraph 12** – citing USIP and David Albright, President of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security, Senior Staff Scientist at the Federation of American Scientists and a member of the research staff of Princeton University’s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies (“Iran 'unlikely to start building nuclear weapon this year'”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9040154/Iran-unlikely-to-start-building-nuclear-weapon-this-year.html, WEA)

The institute has advised U.S. and foreign governments about Iran's nuclear capabilities and Albright is considered a respected expert on the issue. The report tracks closely with what is known of official U.S. government assessments.

US officials say Iran has not made the decision to build a nuclear weapon and that Iranian leaders haven't made the decision because they have to weigh the cost and benefits of building a nuclear weapon.

Much of what the Iranians are doing with their nuclear program has civilian uses, but they are keeping their options open, which significantly adds to the air of ambiguity, US officials told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

Some conservative and Israeli analysts in the past have challenged these types of assessments, asserting that Iranian nuclear efforts are sufficiently advanced that they could build a bomb in a year or less.

But according to the institute's report: "Although Iran is engaged in nuclear hedging, no evidence has emerged that the regime has decided to build nuclear weapons."

"Such a decision may be unlikely to occur until Iran is first able to augment its enrichment capability to a point where it would have the ability to make weapon-grade uranium quickly and secretly," the report obtained by Reuters said.

### at: israel strike iran

**Israel wont strike—all eyes are on it and logistical hurdles**

**Keiler, 10** [7/25/10, Jonathan F , former captain in the Army's Judge-Advocate General Corps, The American Thinker, “Surprise! Why An Israeli Strike on Iran is Unlikely”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/07/surprise\_why\_an\_israeli\_strike.html

If Israel does launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities it will be the most widely anticipated military operation in modern history, even more so than D-Day or the 2003 campaign against Iraq. The buildup to those operations lasted a few years. Speculation about an Israeli strike on Iran has persisted for more than a decade. And this leads one to the most obvious of conclusions -- that if Israel has not struck yet, it won't. I don't pretend to know one way or the other, but the fact that conditions for an Israeli strike against Iran were more favorable a few years ago than they are today is a relatively persuasive argument that the window of opportunity, if it ever existed, may have passed. In a recent piece, The Weekly Standard's Reuel Marc Gerecht makes this point, among many others. But the gist of Gerecht's piece is that if the leadership of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) believes that military success is probable, then the widely bruited, supposedly disastrous consequences of such a strike, (e.g. Iranian counter moves in the Persian Gulf and against American and Israeli interests, strengthening of the Iranian regime, weakening of opposition movements, etc.) are much overrated. Gerecht makes a compelling case for an Israeli strike, if the IAF leadership thinks it is feasible. Where I think he may err -- and many other pundits as well -- is in guessing that if the IAF proposes a plan, that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be particularly inclined accept an optimistic IAF evaluation and launch a strike. Of course, nobody knows the exact conditions for a successful IAF strike, although if you want a hypothetical plane-by-plane and target-by-target operational plan the Center for Strategic and International Studies produced one for general consumption. The real question is at what point Israel's political leadership pushes past the uncertainty. Here the threshold is likely much higher than Gerecht and other like-minded pundits imagine. It's true historically that Israel's leadership has put great faith in the IAF, and that this confidence has generally been well rewarded. The IAF is the world's only air force to have taken out enemy nuclear installations, and it is a perfect two-for-two in that regard (against Iraq and Syria.) Likewise, the IAF had spectacular successes in the 1967 War and the 1982 Lebanon War. On the other hand, over-reliance in the ability of Israel's airman to solve its military problems led to setbacks in the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 2006 Lebanon War. Gerecht not only places great store on what the IAF might tell Netanyahu but on the fact that Netanyahu is an ardent Zionist and Israeli patriot. And for that matter, there is little reason to doubt the bona fides of Defense Minister Ehud Barak, or any other element of Israel's mainstream leadership when it comes to a genuine desire to protect the nation. The radical anti-Zionist Israeli left has yet to come to power, and hopefully never will. Gerecht also particularly cites the Netanyahu's family background, noting that his father was a famous scholar of oppressed Spanish Jewry, and his brother, the only commando to die at Entebbe. Here is an implication that Netanyahu might be willing gamble on the IAF if he truly believes Iran is near to producing a nuclear weapon. But the brother who is likely to have the most influence on Netanyahu is not his fallen older brother Jonathan, but rather his younger brother Iddo, who has over the past decades devoted much time and effort to detailing the circumstances of Jonathan Netanyahu's death at Entebbe, the results of which are sobering. For the truth is, the military situation vis a vis Iran is in many ways more similar to Entebbe, than it is to the surgical anti-nuclear strikes carried out by the IAF against Iraq and Syria. And the reasons for this are the issues of complexity and surprise. An Israeli attack on Iran would be an enormously complex undertaking, so much so, that the actual point the attack, dropping bombs on Iran's nuclear facilities, is but one facet of a gigantic political, diplomatic, logistic, technical, and operational problem. It is similar to the situation faced at Entebbe, when the problem of getting a rescue force from Israel into the heart of Africa to a large extent subsumed the actual goal of the raid -- rescuing the hostages. The truth about Entebbe, divorced from superficial accounts of daring, heroism and Hollywood fantasy, is that the raid, which can legitimately be considered the boldest and most successful hostage rescue in history, came very close to becoming a tragic failure. There is insufficient space here for a full detailed account of the matter, but the actual rescue of the hostages was arguably the weakest part of the plan, and the portion of the operation that came closest to failure. In summary, Entebbe occurred in 1976, when Western armies were still adjusting to the problem of suicidal hostage takers, and sophisticated hostage rescue techniques were in their infancy. Many devices rescue forces take for granted today, such as flash bang grenades or night vision devices, were unavailable. Success, even for the best troops, was a hit and miss affair. Two years before Entebbe, at a high school in the northern Israeli town of Ma'alot, a botched IDF rescue attempt resulted in scores of deaths and injuries. The Entebbe rescue plan sought to avoid another Ma'alot through the element of surprise. It called for a thirty man sayeret matkal team (led by Lieutenant Colonel Netanyahu) to immediately drive off the first aircraft to land at Entebbe in a black Mercedes and a pair of Land Rovers meant to imitate Ugandan President Idi Amin's motorcade. The commandos themselves were crudely disguised in Ugandan style uniforms and blackface, and carried AK-47s like the Ugandan army. The vehicles were to drive up to the doors of the terminal where the hostages were held, whereupon the commandos were to leap out, rush the building and rescue the hostages before the terrorists knew what was happening. But this was just one element of a much more complex plan, that also required three other transport aircraft to reach Entebbe via a long dangerous flight route, land unobserved and unmolested, seize the airport, destroy Ugandan fighter planes, ambush Ugandan reinforcements, guard the rescue aircraft, treat and evacuate casualties and rescued hostages, refuel the aircraft and withdraw, all of which required 120 or so additional troops plus vehicles. There were of course, also multiple additional political, diplomatic, command/control and logistic considerations. In the event, Colonel Netanyahu's rescue convoy was intercepted by a pair of Ugandan soldiers several hundred meters from the terminal. The Israelis tried to kill both with small caliber silenced pistols, but one soldier survived the assault and fled. Commandos gunned him down with un-silenced machine guns. Ugandan soldiers then opened fire on the convoy as it moved out again. Netanyahu, fearing that the rescue team would be annihilated in its thin skinned vehicles, ordered the commandos to abandon them and run to the terminal, still at least fifty meters away. Some commandos fired back as they ran, emptying their ammo magazines. They arrived at the terminal disordered and sheltered in the lee of the building, the plan a shambles. To add to the confusion, the terminal building did not match the mock-up upon which they'd trained. The assault came to a stop. Netanyahu then stepped out into the open to urge on the attack and was mortally wounded. At this point the rescue at Entebbe would seem to have failed. What saved it was the still overwhelming effect of surprise, and a bit of individual courage and initiative. Inside the terminal the German and Palestinian terrorists had been alarmed by the shooting and shouting outside, but were so certain that they were safe from an Israeli rescue attempt that they attributed the commotion to in-fighting among the Ugandans, whom they held in low regard anyway. This over-confidence had been deliberately fostered by the Israeli government, which prior to the raid had essentially admitted surrender, and agreed (at that time contrary to Israeli practice) to negotiate with the terrorists. As the terrorists stood by, a few individual commandos acted on their own initiative and stormed the building. They killed the terrorists and rescued the hostages. Netanyahu and Barak are former commandos themselves, and when briefed by IAF commanders they will know the story of Entebbe, and countless other operations, many from personal involvement. They will understand that anything in a complex plan that can go wrong likely will. And they will also know that the one thing that saved the day at Entebbe, the element of strategic surprise, will be absent in an assault on Iran. The only surprise the Israelis can hope for in a strike against Iran is the precise date and time, and considering the complexities of getting scores of aircraft through hostile airspace before even reaching Iranian skies, they might not even have that. If the Israelis were serious about attacking Iran, the best thing they could do now is stop talking about it. Indeed, ideally, the Israelis would appear accept the position that seems to be that of the United States under President Obama -- that a nuclear Iran is inevitable and manageable. Then maybe they could lull the Iranian leadership and military into complacency and hope to regain a bit of strategic surprise. But right now, with every eye trained on Israeli skies and the world expectantly awaiting an Israeli assault, the chances of Israeli success must be dramatically reduced, a fact not lost on Netanyahu and Barak. I don't pretend to know what Israel will do, and nobody would be happier to see a successful Israeli strike on Iran than me, but logic suggests that if the Israelis haven't done it yet, they probably never will. And Benjamin Netanyahu is no more likely to launch an attack than his predecessors, for the same set of complex reasons that they were restrained.

**No Middle East war**

**Maloney and Takeyh, 7** – \*senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (Susan and Ray, International Herald Tribune, 6/28, “Why the Iraq War Won't Engulf the Mideast”, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0628iraq\_maloney.aspx)

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq.

The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq.

Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict.

Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries.

In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom.

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight.

Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight.

As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary.

So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq.

The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

### China First Strike

They wouldn’t do it – it would destroy their credibility in the disarmament movement

Zhenqiang 05 (Pan; China Security (World Security Institute China Program); http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=403)

The third reason is that a change in China’s NFU policy would deliver another crushing blow to the international efforts to maintain peace and stability through the arms control approach. The hostility by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush towards any constraints involving international, legally binding documents, including arms control agreements, has mostly paralyzed these efforts. In contrast, China firmly supports the reactivation of arms control efforts, advocating that all nuclear weapon states should honestly undertake their obligations of nuclear disarmament as stipulated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China has consistently stressed that the first step should be the conclusion of a treaty by all nuclear weapon states not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would be a significant confidence-building measure among these states to put their subsequent actions on the right track. But if China changes its position on NFU, it would be tantamount to reversing all of Beijing’s attitudes. China would no longer take interest in any nuclear disarmament measures in its desperate efforts for a nuclear build-up. Nor would Beijing be interested in developing a new international arms control mechanism, aimed at constraining the behavior of nuclear weapon states. In addition, nuclear proliferation could be further fuelled as non-nuclear weapon states would have one more exemplary argument that a nation can opt for nuclear weapons in the name of national interests.

### China

**No China war**

**Brendon 10** — fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge University (Piers, 20 October 2010, “China Also Rises”, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/china-rises-4236>)

This is not the case. Not only does history not repeat itself, it contains no rhythms or patterns which enable its students to make sure predictions. It is a “flickering lamp,” wrote Winston Churchill, in a world governed by time and chance. Human beings and all their works are subject, as Edward Gibbon said, to “the vicissitudes of fortune.” Or, in the somewhat less coherent words of Margaret Thatcher, “the unexpected happens” and “fail-safe plans are designed to go wrong.” But while certainty is unattainable, history does offer more optimistic possibilities than the saga of Chinese humiliation at foreign hands may suggest. One conceivable outcome that deserves serious consideration is that **we are at the dawn of an era of fruitful cooperation between China and America.**

It must be said that commercially successful states do not automatically or immediately beat their pruning hooks into swords. For all its overwhelming industrial and mercantile dominance, the United States remained a tenth-rate military power (except for its navy) until galvanized by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Deng’s China itself put the modernization of its armed forces behind that of agriculture, manufacturing and science, and in the two decades after 1981 its troop numbers fell by half, to 2.3 million. Admittedly, its defense spending rose thereafter, but it remains a much-lower percentage of GDP than does America’s. And this year the rise has been checked, apparently in order to assuage foreign worries about its military modernization.

In other words, **there is no necessary correlation between economic growth and military strength**. Witness Stalin’s Russia, which made guns at the expense of butter during the 1930s, starving itself great. As Hitler and Mussolini also showed, this is a policy to which totalitarian states are particularly prone. Yet China’s leaders seem dedicated to augmenting prosperity in order to secure stability. Having been racked by internal convulsions for generations, the country evidently prefers tyranny to anarchy, even to democracy. Anything is better than a return to the bloody turmoil of the Taiping or the warlord era or to the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. As Deng Xiaoping insisted, “Stability supersedes all.”

The ideal of harmony is quintessentially Confucian. The philosopher stressed that good order is the basis of prosperity and security. **Violence is a last resort** and will probably be ineffective. Historically, China has assimilated aggression, rolling with punches, overcoming hardness with softness. Where possible it has avoided taking the offensive. This is not to say, of course, that the Beijing government avoids coercion close to home, as became tragically clear in the suppressing of the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and the crushing of resistance in Tibet. But it is to suggest that China prefers, particularly in a nuclear age, to use “soft power” and “smile diplomacy” abroad.

**THERE IS little evidence** that China wishes to jeopardize its burgeoning affluence by adventurist attempts to contest American hegemony. On the contrary, the Chinese leadership is all too conscious that the Soviet Union’s endeavor to compete militarily with the United States was a major factor in its collapse. Prosperity breeds contentment. As Jonathan Swift noted in The Battle of the Books, quarrels usually stem from want rather than plenty, and “we may observe in the republic of dogs . . . that the whole state is ever in the profoundest peace after a full meal.”

Needless to say, accidents do happen, and when American bombers destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, a wave of spontaneous fury engulfed the People’s Republic. The bombing was said to be a “barbarian” act of aggression comparable to the imperialist invasion of China after the Boxer Rebellion. It was even compared to a Nazi war crime. Fearing domestic and international damage, however, the authorities did their best to calm the storm. The kept press assuaged popular passions. Television reports were emollient. Censorship of the Internet was tightened via a list of some thousand taboo words, the building blocks of the Great Firewall of China.

There was a similar response to George W. Bush’s disastrous invasion of Iraq, which replaced Chinese sympathy for the United States in the wake of 9/11 with feelings of anxiety and mistrust—feelings exacerbated by President Obama’s failure to pull America out of the Afghan quagmire. Just as England’s difficulty was once Ireland’s opportunity, so America’s difficulty might have been China’s. But, no. The Chinese media tamped down outbursts of chauvinism which might have led to public protests. One result, according to Susan Shirk’s excellent book China: Fragile Superpower, was that the American abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib was condemned much more vehemently in the Great Republic than in the People’s Republic.

Perhaps nationalism has succeeded Communism as the creed of Red China, but its rulers show signs of wanting to make their country a good citizen of the world. They have signally reduced the number of land-border disputes with their fourteen neighbors. They have participated eagerly in international forums such as the World Trade Organization. They have eased relations with Japan and, horrified by the nuclear brinkmanship of Kim Jong Il, mediated with Korea. They have muted criticisms of the United States, even when Jiang Zemin’s Boeing 767 was found to contain twenty-seven sophisticated bugging devices after being refitted in Texas in 2001—a covert operation which might have been designed to demonstrate that the term “intelligence agency” is an oxymoron.

Wang Jisi articulates the official Chinese position: since Mao’s victory in 1949 the Communist elite has generally believed that America and other hostile outside forces have been intent on conquering and destabilizing China. But **globalization has increased the cost of conflict and reduced the danger of war.** It has also magnified many of the problems from which China suffers, such as pollution, urban overcrowding and huge disparities of wealth—100 million people live on less than a dollar a day and a quarter of the population lacks access to clean drinking water. So China’s priority is to tackle these problems. It aims to build a rich and great society, dedicated to peace, progress, harmony, sustainable development and international cooperation.

**Miscalc is a cheap trick—our defense still applies**

Robert J. Art, Fall 2010 Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at Brandeis University and Director of MIT's Seminar XXI Program The United States and the rise of China: implications for the long haul Political Science Quarterly 125.3 (Fall 2010): p359(33).

If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power-rising power competitions of the last 100 years, then, the U.S.-China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible, because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on each by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one). Apart from the Taiwan issue or some serious incident at sea, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction.

### at: re-arm

**Re-arm is literally impossible**

**Mochizuki 2007**  Mike M., July 2007. Senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program @ Brookings, formerly co-director of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy and associate professor of international relations at the University of Southern California. “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo,” Nonproliferation Review 14.2, cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/142mochizuki.pdf.

If Japan wanted to move toward the development and possession of nuclear weapons, the formal procedure for withdrawing from the NPT is not difficult. But given the rhetorical and policy investment that Japan has made in support of the NPT and Japan’s international image as a non-nuclear weapon state, the reputational consequences would be severe. For Japan, it would not just be a matter of dropping out of the NPT, but rather reversing and repudiating a diplomatic track record that it has laid out over three decades. Such a move would also violate bilateral agreements that enable Japan to continue its nuclear energy programs. According to Kaneko Kumao, a retired career diplomat who once directed the Foreign Ministry’s Nuclear Energy Policy Division, Japan has bilateral nuclear agreements with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia that stipulate that ‘‘everything Japan has imported from these countries, including reactors, related equipment, nuclear fuel (natural and enriched uranium), and nuclear technology, must be used only for the non-military purposes specified in the agreement.’’ If Japan were to renege on these agreements, then it would face stringent sanctions ‘‘including the immediate return of all imported materials and equipment to the original exporting country.’’ Kaneko writes: ‘‘Should that ever happen, nuclear power plants in Japan will come to a grinding halt, crippling economic and industrial activities. It is simply unthinkable that the nation would be willing to make such a heavy sacrifice\* unless it were really prepared to start a war. In this sense, the bilateral nuclear energy agreements provide a rather effective deterrent, certainly more effective than the NPT.’’36 More recently, former Japanese Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru made a similar point about the negative ramifications on its nuclear energy programs should Japan decide to develop nuclear weapons.37 Japan’s lack of indigenous natural uranium sources further constrains a nuclear weapons breakout. For example, Australia, which supplies about 33 percent of Japan’s uranium imports, will sell uranium only to NPT member states.38 To reduce its dependence on imported uranium, Japan has been especially attracted to the development of a complete nuclear energy cycle including breeder reactors.39 Nevertheless, it remains keenly interested in maintaining long-term, reliable sources of natural uranium.

### AT: Solve All Wars

Deterrence doesn’t solve power wars-multiple factors overwhelm

**Hanson, Director, Rotary Centre for International Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution University of Queensland, 2002** (Marianne, “Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security”, International Relations 2002, pg 361-379, ebsco, ldg)

Moreover, it is by no means accepted universally that it was nuclear weapons and their deterrent qualities that kept the peace between the Great Powers after 1945. The avoidance of war between those states can be attributed to a number of factors other than deterrence. It is salutary also to remember that there are numerous documented instances during the Cold War period which record a perilously close descent into a nuclear exchange because of miscalculation or misperception. There is no guarantee that we will be as lucky in preventing accidental war in the future. To use the Cold War experience to argue a usefulness of nuclear weapons at once attributes too much to their deterrent qualities and pay s not enough attention to the dangers attendant on their very existence. As the above points have argued, nuclear weapons would appear to have no real utility in the maintenance of international security. When considered against the range of threats facing national, region and global actors today, it is hard to find a compelling reason for their continued retention that outweighs the moral costs, strategic limitations, the danger of accidental use or the growth of nuclear proliferation. As the Canberra Commission has pointed out, nuclear weapons have no relevance in a world where threats to security increasingly come in the form of ethnic conflict, weak or failed states, humanitarian disasters economic crises, environmental degradation or as we saw in 2001, terrorism. Given this international security can best be served by their elimination.

### Bioweapons

**And, even bio-engineered diseases can’t cause extinction**

**Space.com 1** (10/30, Survival of the Elitist: Bioterrorism May Spur Space Colonies, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/generalscience/colonize\_now\_011030-2.html, AG)

Many scientists argue that there is no need to worry about the mortality of civilization right now. Eric Croddy is an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Croddy said the threat of a virus wiping out the entire human species is simply not real. Even the most horrific virus outbreak in history, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic that killed between 20 million and 40 million people, including hundreds of thousands in the United States, eventually stopped. Experts say new strains of the influenza virus emerge every few decades and catch the human immune system unprepared, but prevention measures and ever-evolving medical treatments overcome the outbreaks. "I'd be much more concerned about an asteroid hitting the planet," Croddy said.

**And, their evidence assumes worst case scenarios—they have to provide evidence that all the conditions would be right**

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A 2003 report for the Century Foundation nevertheless noted, that the 2001 “Amerithrax” events demonstrated that “. . . bioterrorism could have an uncertain, far reaching, and potentially devastating impact.”42 The statement that the release of a biological pathogen by a terrorist group should be considered as an occurrence of “low probability but high impact” is correct, but only with important qualifications. It does not mean any release of any agent formulation under any circumstances. Rather, it presumes the release of a very high quality product, efficiently distributed under optimum conditions. Later sections of this monograph return to this question in more detail.