### Russia

**Relations are impossible and won’t result in cooperation**

**LaFranchi, 3/3/12** [Christian Science Monitor, “A cold-war chill US-Russia relations falter over Libya and Syria”, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0303/A-cold-war-chill-US-Russia-relations-falter-over-Libya-and-Syria/%28page%29/2]

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton doffed her diplomatic gloves after Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. Calling the February veto "despicable," she laid at Moscow's feet the "murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men."

Not to be outdone, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin railed against the United States for indulging its "bellicose itch" to get involved in other countries' internal affairs. And he vowed that Russia will thwart American designs in the Middle East.

Whatever happened to the "reset," President Obama's ballyhooed reorientation of US-Russia relations to a more cooperative path focused on common interests?

Russia would say Libya happened – the conflict where the West and the US in particular demonstrated a zeal for intervention that struck at Russia's sense of sovereignty and of what the UN should and shouldn't do. The US would say Syria happened – revealing Russia's revived obstructionist tendencies on the Security Council and demonstrating Russia's determination to protect an old ally at the expense of the Syrian people.

Both countries might say that what happened is this: The common interests that the "reset" was meant to emphasize – arms control, counterterrorism, the global economy – have taken a back seat to awakened geopolitical rivalries and **diverging** international **visions**.

Add to this the fact that Mr. Putin is expected to return to Russia's presidency in elections Sunday, bringing with him a blame-the-west perspective for explaining many of Russia's ills.

The result is that stormy days lie ahead for US-Russia relations, many say. Progress on issues like missile defense and NATO-Russia relations is likely to remain stalled – and could suffer serious setbacks if the Syria and Iran crises deteriorate further.

"I foresee a tough year for US-Russia relations," says Andrew Weiss, a former director for Russian affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton who is now a Russia analyst at the RAND Corp. in Arlington, Va. With little prospect for advances, he adds, the Obama administration is likely to focus on preventing backsliding. "The emphasis will be on ensuring that these fast-moving conflicts don't put the remaining areas of cooperation at risk," he says.

Others say the current frictions demonstrate how relations, despite the efforts of three administrations, have never overcome cold-war mistrusts to progress to a deeper level.

"Under both Clinton and Bush, the US made it look like things were moving forward with Russia by focusing on things that were easier to do and that didn't require sacrifice from either side," says Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest in Washington.

Three years ago this month, President Obama said he **hoped to promote** more **cooperation** between the U.S. and Russia. It would be hard to see how that may happen as Vladimir Putin approaches power once again. Host Scott Simon speaks with the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, about Sunday's elections in Russia.

**Too late to solve—Russia no longer trusts anything we do**

**Cohen, 2/28/12** [Professor, Russian Studies at New York University, America's Failed (Bi-Partisan) Russia Policy, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-f-cohen/us-russia-policy_b_1307727.html?ref=politics&ir=Politics>]

In short, the United States is farther from a partnership with Russia today than it was more than twenty years ago.

Third: Who, it must be asked, is to blame for this historic failure to establish a partnership between America and post-Soviet Russia? In the United States, Moscow alone is almost universally blamed. The facts are different. There have been three compelling opportunities to establish such a partnership. All three were lost, or are being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.

- The first opportunity was following the end of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s. Instead, the Clinton administration adopted an aggressive triumphalist approach to Moscow. That administration tried to dictate Russia's post-Communist development and to turn it into a U.S. client state. It moved the U.S.-led military alliance, NATO, into Russia's former security zone. It bombed Moscow's remaining European ally, Serbia. And along the way, the Clinton administration broke strategic promises made to Moscow.

- The second opportunity for partnership was after 9/11, when the Bush administration repaid Russian President Vladimir Putin's extraordinary assistance in the U.S. war against the Taliban in Afghanistan by further expanding NATO to Russia's borders and by unilaterally withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the linchpin of its nuclear security.

- Now, since 2008, the Obama administration is squandering the third opportunity, its own "re-set," by refusing to respond to Moscow's concessions on Afghanistan and Iran with reciprocal agreements on Russia's top priorities, NATO expansion and missile defense.

In short, every opportunity for a U.S.-Russian partnership during the past twenty years was lost, or is being lost, in Washington, not in Moscow.

Fourth: How to explain, we must also ask, such unwise U.S. policies over such a long period? The primary explanation is a policy-making outlook, or ideology, that has combined the worst legacy of the Cold War with the worst American reaction to the end of the Soviet Union.

- Washington's two most consequential (and detrimental) decisions regarding post-Soviet Russia have **continued the militarized approach** of the Cold War: to move NATO eastward; and to build missile defense installations near Russia's borders.

- At the same time, Washington's triumphalist reaction to the end of the Soviet state produced a winner-take-all diplomatic approach that has been almost as aggressive. Consider the three primary components of this so-called diplomacy:

1. Presumably on the assumption that Russia's interests abroad are less legitimate than America's, Washington has acted on a double-standard in relations with Moscow. The unmistakable example is that while creating a vast U.S.-NATO sphere of military and political influence around Russia, Washington adamantly denounces Moscow's quest for any zone of security, even on its own borders.

2. Similarly, U.S. negotiations on vital issues have been based on the premise (called "selective cooperation") that Moscow should make all major concessions while Washington makes none. And on rare occasions when Washington did promise major concessions, it reneged on them, NATO's eastward expansion being only the first instance. (Can anyone who doubts this generalization cite a single meaningful concession -- any substantive reciprocity -- that Moscow has actually gotten from the United States since 1992?)

3. Meanwhile, presumably on the assumption that Russia's political sovereignty at home is less than our own, Washington has pursued intrusive "democracy-promotion" measures that flagrantly trespass on Moscow's internal affairs. This practice began in the 1990s with actual directives from Washington to Moscow ministries and with legions of onsite U.S. "advisers" and it continues today -- recently, for example, with the American vice president lobbying in Moscow against Putin's return to the Russian presidency and with the new U.S. ambassador's profoundly ill-timed meeting with leaders of Moscow's street protests.

In short, blaming Putin for anti-Americanism in Russia, as the U.S. State Department and media do, ignores the real cause: Twenty years of American military and diplomatic policies have convinced a large part of **Russia's political class** (and intelligentsia) that Washington's intentions are aggressive, aggrandizing and deceitful -- anything but those of a partner. (In that context, part of the Russian elite has criticized Putin for being "pro-American.")

### Iran

**Iran prolif isn’t a threat – they don’t want the bomb and if they get it they won’t use it**

**Pinker, 11** [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, *The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined*, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

If current pundits are to be believed, then as you are reading these words the New Peace will already have been shattered by a major war, perhaps a nuclear war, with Iran. At the time of this writing, tensions have been rising over the country’s nuclear energy program. Iran is currently enriching enough uranium to fashion a nuclear arsenal, and it has defied international demands that it allow inspections and comply with other provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has taunted Western leaders, supported terrorist groups, accused the United States of orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, denied the Holocaust, called for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” and prayed for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the Muslim savior who would usher in an age of peace and justice. In some interpretations of Shi’a Islam, this messiah will show up after a worldwide eruption of war and chaos. All this is, to say the least, disconcerting, and many writers have concluded that Ahmadinejad is another Hitler who will soon develop nuclear weapons and use them on Israel or furnish them to Hezbollah to do so. Even in less dire scenarios, he could blackmail the Middle East into acceding to Iranian hegemony. The prospect might leave Israel or the United States no choice but to bomb its nuclear facilities preemptively, even if it invited years of war and terrorism in response. A 2009 editorial in the *Washington Times* spelled it out: “War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?”279 This chilling scenario of a nuclear attack by Iranian fanatics is certainly possible. But is it *inevitable*, or even highly likely? One can be just as contemptuous of Ahmadinejad, and just as cynical about his motives, while imagining less dire alternatives for the world ahead. John Mueller, Thomas Schelling, and many other foreign affairs analysts have imagined them for us and have concluded that **the Iranian nuclear program is not the end of the world**.280 Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for energy and medical research. In 2005 Supreme Leader Khameini (**who wields more power than Ahmadinejad**) issued a fatwa declaring that **nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam**.281 If the government went ahead and developed the weapons anyway, it would not be the first time in history that national leaders have lied through their teeth. But having painted themselves into this corner, the prospect of forfeiting all credibility in the eyes of the world (including major powers on whom they depend, like Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil) might at least give them pause. Ahmadinejad’s musings about the return of the Twelfth Imam do not necessarily mean that he plans to hasten it along with a nuclear holocaust. Two of the deadlines by which writers confidently predicted that he would set off the apocalypse (2007 and 2009) have already come and gone.282 And for what it’s worth, here is how he explained his beliefs in a 2009 television interview with NBC correspondent Ann Curry: *Curry:* You’ve said that you believe that his arrival, the apocalypse, would happen in your own lifetime. What do you believe that you should do to hasten his arrival? *Ahmadinejad:* I have never said such a thing.... I was talking about peace.... What is being said about an apocalyptic war and—global war, things of that nature. This is what the Zionists are claiming. Imam . . . will come with logic, with culture, with science. He will come so that there is no more war. No more enmity, hatred. No more conflict. He will call on everyone to enter a brotherly love. Of course, he will return with Jesus Christ. The two will come back together. And working together, they would fill this world with love. The stories that have been disseminated around the world about extensive war, apocalyptic wars, so on and so forth, these are false. 283 As a Jewish atheist, I can’t say I find these remarks completely reassuring. But with one obvious change they are not appreciably different from those held by devout Christians; indeed, they are milder, as many Christians do believe in an apocalyptic war and have fantasized about it in bestselling novels. As for the speech containing the phrase that was translated as “wiping Israel off the map,” the *New York Times* writer Ethan Bronner consulted Persian translators and analysts of Iranian government rhetoric on the meaning of the phrase in context, and they were unanimous that Ahmadinejad was daydreaming about regime change in the long run, not genocide in the days ahead.284 The perils of translating foreign bombast bring to mind Khrushchev’s boast “We will bury you,” which turned out to mean “outlive” rather than “entomb.” There is a parsimonious alternative explanation of Iran’s behavior. In 2002 George W. Bush identified Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as the “axis of evil” and proceeded to invade Iraq and depose its leadership. North Korea’s leaders saw the writing on the wall and promptly developed a nuclear capability, which (as they no doubt anticipated) has put an end to any musings about the United States invading them too. Shortly afterward Iran put its nuclear program into high gear, aiming to create enough ambiguity as to whether it possesses nuclear weapons, or could assemble them quickly, to squelch any thought of an invasion in the mind of the Great Satan. If Iran does become a confirmed or suspected nuclear power, the history of the nuclear age suggests that the most likely outcome would be nothing. As we have seen, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless for anything but deterrence against annihilation, which is why the nuclear powers have repeatedly been defied by their nonnuclear adversaries. The most recent episode of proliferation bears this out. In 2004 it was commonly predicted that if North Korea acquired a nuclear capability, then by the end of the decade it would share it with terrorists and set off a nuclear arms race with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.285 In fact, North Korea did acquire a nuclear capability, the end of the decade has come and gone, and nothing has happened. It’s also unlikely that any nation would furnish nuclear ammunition to the loose cannons of a terrorist band, thereby giving up control over how they would be used while being on the hook for the consequences.286 In the case of Iran, before it decided to bomb Israel (or license Hezbollah to do so in an incriminating coincidence), with no conceivable benefit to itself, its leaders would have to anticipate a nuclear reprisal by Israeli commanders, who could match them hothead for hothead, together with an invasion by a coalition of powers enraged by the violation of the nuclear taboo. Though the regime is detestable and in many ways irrational, one wonders whether its principals are so indifferent to continuing their hold on power as to choose to annihilate themselves in pursuit of perfect justice in a radioactive Palestine or the arrival of the Twelfth Imam, with or without Jesus at his side. As Thomas Schelling asked in his 2005 Nobel Prize lecture, “What else can Iran accomplish, except possibly the destruction of its own system, with a few nuclear warheads? Nuclear weapons should be too precious to give away or to sell, too precious to waste killing people when they could, held in reserve, make the United States, or Russia, or any other nation, hesitant to consider military action.”287 Though it may seem dangerous to consider alternatives to the worst-case scenario, the dangers go both ways. In the fall of 2002 George W. Bush warned the nation, “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof —the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” The “clear evidence” led to a war that has cost more than a hundred thousand lives and almost a trillion dollars and has left the world no safer. A cocksure certainty that Iran will use nuclear weapons, in defiance of sixty-five years of history in which authoritative predictions of inevitable catastrophes were repeatedly proven wrong, could lead to adventures with even greater costs.

### India

**Relations are inevitable regardless of government ties**

**Mathai 12** (Ranjan is the Foreign Secretary of India, 2012, “India's foreign secretary addresses Washington,”http://www.indusbusinessjournal.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=E3E6AF44D3C44BED9F987F95ECDD2066)

However, given our different circumstances, history, location and levels of development, we will occasionally have differing perspectives and policies. But, this can be a source of great value and strength in our dialogue; and, it also enables us to work together for a broad global consensus on issues of common interest. But, for that, we should attach real value to each other's perspectives and appreciate each other's interest and sensitivities; and, when we differ, we should be able to speak candidly and respectfully to each other, and **insulate the vast common ground** between us **from** the **differences in our relationship**. We must remember that while we may have occasionally different perspectives, **we are also united by a fundamental stake in each other’s success**, because in succeeding individually, we can advance our common interests and inspire a world mirrored in our ideals. And, **even if our** two **governments did nothing**, it would still be an extraordinary relationship, because of the growing ties of kinship between our people and the vitality of private partnerships of enterprise, innovation, research and education across every field of human endeavor. But, I believe that we have the political momentum, public goodwill, a comprehensive architecture of engagement, comfort and confidence in the relationship, the experience of bold and ambitious undertakings, a proven capacity to work through challenges and, as we have seen in recent years, a growing habit of taking tangible steps on a regular basis to advance our cooperation. So, as I look ahead, we will continue to consolidate and affirm our strategic partnership, by completing existing projects and focusing on the wealth of new opportunities that we have. We should continue to stay in close touch on the current challenges in the world, in our neighborhood and beyond. And, we should, above all, continue to strengthen and expand the long-term strategic framework of our relationship, so that we can fully harness the boundless opportunities that this relationship has for our people and the substantial benefit that it can bring to this world.

**Relations are useless**

**Tellis 5** (Ashley, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. 11/16/05 “The U.S.-India ''Global Partnership'': How Significant for American Interests? ““<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17693>)

Several practical implications, which ought to be of significance to the Congress as it ponders the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear agreement, flow from these realities. To begin with, the strengthening U.S.-Indian relationship does not imply that New Delhi will become a formal alliance partner of Washington at some point in the future. It also does not imply that India will invariably be an uncritical partner of the United States in its global endeavors. India’s large size, its proud history, and its great ambitions, ensure that it will likely march to the beat of its own drummer, at least most of the time. The first question, for the Congress in particular and for the United States more generally, therefore, ought not to be, “What will India do for us?”—as critics of the civilian nuclear agreement often assert. Rather, the real question ought to be, “Is a strong, democratic, (even if perpetually) independent, India in American national interest?” If, as I believe, this is the fundamental question and if, as I further believe, the answer to this question is “Yes,” then the real discussion about the evolution of the U.S.-Indian relationship ought to focus on how the United States can assist the growth of Indian power, and how it can do so at minimal cost (if that is relevant) to any other competing national security objectives.

India will do what we say because they need us

Das 11 – Premvir, former Director General, Defence Planning Staff, and member of the National Security Advisory Board (May 1, 2011 <http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/premvir-das-indo-us-engagement-atcrossroads/434038/>)

For more substance to be given to the relationship, a larger overview of national interest is needed. If a multipolar Asia is what India wants and a unipolar continent is what China seeks, then the US becomes a very important factor in our calculus. Its interests in Asia are enormous and it cannot let China assume a hegemonic role. Without **‘using’ the US**, it is not possible for India to secure the Asia that it wants. On another plane, **none of its** global **aspirations** can be met without the proactive support of the US — seats in the Security Council, on the high table of world trade, in groups controlling nuclear technology or in several other multilateral forums, fall in this category. The real question is whether a close engagement impacts adversely our relations with other countries — for example, Russia, Iran and Myanmar, even China, our core interests in South Asia and, indeed our concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. These cannot be easily brushed aside but close scrutiny will show that while all these are manageable by us, the larger canvas is not. In sum, close relations with the US are critical to India’s rise, first as an Asian power and then as a global player of consequence. If this is true, then defence cooperation between the two countries must be taken a few notches further. Its contours can be four-fold.

**Problems are compartmentalized**

**Jha 12** (Saurav studied economics at Presidency College, Calcutta, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes and researches on global energy issues and clean energy development in Asia. 2012, “U.S.-India Relations: Case-by-Case Basis, With No Guarantees,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11428/u-s-india-relations-case-by-case-basis-with-no-guarantees)

The defense relationship between the U.S. and India will also follow this pattern. When it came to India’s multirole combat fighter purchase, New Delhi simply did not find enough value in the U.S. offers, given Washington’s monitoring and support regimes. However, that did not rule out almost $10 billion in purchases of support and transport aircraft from Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Moving forward, the defense relationship will continue to see steady progress in many areas, coinciding with disappointments in others. By contrast, the nuclear relationship is proving to be the biggest hurdle to seamless dialogue. America’s mostly Japanese-owned nuclear industry is livid about the “poison pill” supplier liability clause built into India’s recent nuclear liability law. Unlike France and Russia’s state-owned nuclear suppliers, which enjoy sovereign guarantees, American companies have to pay closer attention to the letter of the law when engaging in overseas nuclear business. This led to American accusations that New Delhi has undermined U.S. nuclear companies, even though Washington took the lead in securing the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver that opened India’s civil nuclear sector to global trade. For India, these charges are juxtaposed against domestic public suspicion of U.S. suppliers, born out of the experience of the Bhopal disaster. Moreover, the recent introduction of a stricter enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) regime by the NSG is seen by the Indian side as a tactic by Washington to make it budge on the liability framework. Taken together, these factors trace the outlines an Indo-U.S. relationship that is not a single monolithic entity, but rather a **collection of interwoven interests**. In this context, rhetorical narratives portraying India as either an essential partner in balancing a rising China or a reflexive contrarian have little relevance. **The substance of the relationship will be found somewhere in between**, depending on both sides’ interests and the prevailing circumstances.

### Nuclear Leadership

No nuclear power expansion now – claims of a renaissance are overblown

**Becker, 7/23/12** [Becker is chairman of the Koeberg Alert Alliance, “PETER BECKER: Nuclear industry ‘rebirth’ is instead stillborn”, <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=176811>]

THE nuclear power industry is deeply troubled, with little cause for optimism. There is growing worldwide public resistance to nuclear power stations, US President Barack Obama has terminated government subsidies for nuclear power, and Germany and Switzerland have committed to shutting down all their reactors. While the renewable energy industry has seen dramatic growth and constantly falling costs, the nuclear industry grapples with spiralling costs, the seemingly intractable waste-disposal issue, and the huge economic and human costs of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. We have heard from the nuclear lobby that a "nuclear renaissance" is just around the corner and, as evidence of this, we are told 65 reactors are "under construction" worldwide. Examination of this list reveals some interesting details. The International Atomic Energy Association maintains a database of all commercial reactors, the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS). In March this year, it listed 65 reactors as "under construction". It is instructive to look at the number of years some of these have been "under construction". For example, Lungmen 1 and 2 in China were begun in 1997 and have so far taken 15 years to build. In the Slovak Republic, construction of Mochovce 3 and 4 was started in 1987, making 25 years so far. For Atucha 2 in Argentina, it’s 31 years. Moving from the disappointing to the ludicrous, Watts Bar 2 in the US has been "under construction" since 1972. It is likely these long-delayed projects will eventually be cancelled, and almost certainly they will never be an economic success. Even if they are ever completed, the designs will be frighteningly outdated and their safety features unlikely to satisfy current regulatory requirements or public concerns. It is therefore disingenuous to include these in a list of "success stories" about nuclear power. Eliminating the reactors that have been "under construction" for 15 years or more reduces the list of 65 to 52. Another item in the PRIS data is the estimated start-up year. It is interesting that for many of these reactors across South Korea, India, France, Brazil and China, the PRIS database does not list an estimated start-up year. It is unusual, to say the least, for a construction project to have no estimated completion date. This can be interpreted as either a lack of commitment to the project or a sign that problems have arisen that will delay construction. These can hardly be considered success stories and eliminating them from the list of 52 reactors leaves just 10 reactors. Of these 10, most are in pairs and they are spread over six different nuclear plants. And of these plants, only two (Vogtle in the US and Flamville in France) are in the West. What is more, Vogtle is likely to be the last nuclear plant built in the US and was viable only because of subsidies from the Bush administration. Another statistic offered by the World Nuclear Association is that nuclear power is being "considered" by 45 countries that do not currently use it. At first glance, this seems to be impressive evidence of the nuclear "renaissance". However, any country that is considering using nuclear power is, by definition of the word "considering", also considering not using it. An analysis of the 45 countries reveals interesting examples. It includes Namibia and Mongolia, which both consume about 3000GWh a year. A small nuclear power station such as Koeberg, if operated at 80% capacity, would produce more than 12000 GWh a year. Is it likely any country will pay for generating capacity that will produce more than four times the electricity they need? Including these countries in the "considering" list is a distortion of the facts by the World Nuclear Association, perhaps born of a desperation to conceal the decline of the industry. Nuclear power plants are very long-term commitments. It is therefore important to have a healthy global nuclear industry in place so that services such as maintenance, spare parts, decontamination after a leak, plant decommissioning and waste handling are available at reasonable prices when they are required, decades from now. The sad truth is that even according to the optimistic International Atomic Energy Agency data from the PRIS data, the number of reactors on which construction was started fell 75% from 2010 to last year, and again 75% from last year to this year. Far from a renaissance, this is a catastrophic collapse. SA would do well to wait a few years to see if this trend reverses before locking itself into the nuclear energy option.

### Prolif

#### US pressure won’t be effective without huge arsenal cuts.

Daalder & Lodal, ‘8
[Ivo, Brookings Institute Senior Fellow, Jan, US Atlantic Council Former President, Former White House and Defense Department Official to Nixon, Ford, Clinton, Foreign Affairs, "The Logic of Zero," Vol. 87, Issue 6, EBSCO]

As the United States works diplomatically to create a broad international coalition, it can use the emerging consensus to help convince nuclear aspirants and new nuclear powers that their drive for a nuclear option must come to an end. Active diplomacy with Iran and North Korea must of course continue, backed when necessary by additional pressure to convince both countries that the benefits of forgoing or ending the nuclear option outweigh those of building or retaining the bomb. The likelihood of success would be significantly enhanced if the United States and other nuclear powers were demonstrably committed to adhering to the same nonnuclear status and fissile-material oversight that they are demanding Iran, North Korea, and every other nuclear aspirant accept.

**Their evidence is based on rhetoric but ignores intentions**

**Mueller 8**—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Terrorphobia our false sense of insecurity, May-June 2008, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=418, AMiles)

All this may help to explain why there have been no al-Qaeda attacks in the United States for so many years, contrary to almost all anticipations. Perhaps the group’s goal is not to destroy the United States with explosions, but to have the Americans destroy themselves by wallowing in fear and by engaging in counterproductive policy overreaction. Thus, shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden happily crowed that “America is full of fear, from its north to its south, from its west to its east. Thank God for that.” And in 2004 he proclaimed his policy to be “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy”, noting with consummate glee that, “It is easy for us to provoke and bait. . . . All that we have to do is . . . raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses.” The 9/11 attacks, he calculated, cost only $500,000 to carry out, “while the attack and its aftermath inflicted a cost of more than $500 billion on the United States.” There may be some danger that the fear and policy overreaction al-Qaeda finds so gratifying may actually have the perverse effect of tempting them into further efforts within the country. If it is so easy to make the Americans go crazy and harm themselves economically, and at such bargain basement prices, why not do more of it? American defenses may have improved since 9/11, but no one would maintain they are so effective as to prevent a persistent, devoted and clever group of conspirators from being able to accomplish limited feats. The ultimate nightmare of American scaremongers, setting off an atomic bomb, is well beyond al-Qaeda’s capacities and very likely always will be, but to be impressive, terrorism doesn’t have to be carried out at that level. Al-Qaeda or likeminded franchise affiliates need only infiltrate the country or locally recruit a handful of operatives to shoot up a few fast-food restaurants, set off a few forest fires, or explode a few small bombs in buses, shopping centers or highway overpasses. Look at what just two semi-sane “snipers” were able to do to the Washington, DC area in the summer of 2002. If al-Qaeda remains capable of carrying out attacks of at least that magnitude, it must be that its leaders lack the intent to do so. There may be a number of reasons for this, but one might be that they see little need to stir the pot further because fear levels remain high and because the United States, no matter which party is in the White House and despite the Iraq experience, can probably be counted upon to lash out counterproductively in any case. It was the “experienced” and judicious Hillary Clinton, after all, who last year declared that Iran must be prevented from getting a nuclear weapon “at all costs.” As Napoleon put it, “never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.” Accordingly, since Americans and their policymakers continue to fear and overreact so predictably, al-Qaeda may continue to confine its pot-stirring to ominous verbal threats—all of which are readily embraced with rapt seriousness by its distant enemy. If this perspective is correct, such cheap talk would constitute tactically useful lies, but bin Laden clearly has had no reticence about fictions in the service of terror. As America invaded Afghanistan in 2001, for example, he told a visiting Pakistani journalist that al-Qaeda possessed nuclear weapons, a claim that was either a blatant lie or a self-gratifying fantasy. He may have been indulging that same proclivity when he spouted in 2002 that “the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with terror”, or four years later that “operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished, God willing.” (On the other hand, maybe there have been no attacks simply because God has been unwilling.)

### China

**Disputes are compartmentalized**

**Weekend Australian 4** (2-21, Lexis)

Even as recently as last year, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Chinese firms accused of selling weapons technology to other nations, including Pakistan. But it seems the US right now is content to take on faith that Beijing means what it says over non-proliferation. There are timely reasons for that. Next week comes another round of six-nation talks aimed at getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear program convenes in Beijing. The US is relying heavily on China's influence with its recalcitrant neighbour to help bring about the desired result. The US is also trying to persuade China to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, a plan that seeks to halt the international trade in weapons of mass destruction by, among other measures, stopping and searching ships at sea. That is why Bolton was in Beijing. At the same time, China is seeking US assistance to rein in the independence proclivities of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian, who faces an election on March 20. So it is in China's interests to play ball by, for example, applying appropriate gravitas to the nuclear secrets allegations coming out of Washington. As the week's events showed, the US and China have built sufficient ballast in their once fragile relationship to weather the occasional battering and to **manage** multiple and sometimes **conflicting agendas**, from trade and human rights to arms proliferation and Taiwan.