### 1AC Plan – with S-PRISM

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase loan guarantees for integral fast reactors using the S-PRISM design.

### Proliferation

#### Advantage 1: Prolif

#### Nuclear power is inevitable – Inaction on IFRs is killing US leadership and ability to influence prolif

**Shuster 11** [Joseph Shuster, founder of Minnesota Valley Engineering and Chemical Engineer, 9-8-2011, "Response to Draft Report From Obama’s Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on America’s Nuclear Future dated July 29, 2011," Beyond Fossil Fools]

Contrary to the commission’s declarations on the matter, the U.S. is in danger of losing its once ¶ strong nuclear leadership. As a result we would have less to say about how nuclear materials are ¶ to be managed in the world and that could expose the U.S. to some inconvenient if not downright ¶ dangerous consequences. China is now building a large pilot plant said to be identical to our ¶ successful EBR-II plant that proved the design of the IFR. Meanwhile in the U.S. after complete ¶ success, EBR II was shut down, not for technical reasons but for political reasons during the ¶ Clinton administration, a decision destined to be one of the worst in our nation’s history.¶ Much of the world is already committed to a nuclear future with some countries eagerly waiting ¶ to license the American version of Generation IV Fast Reactors—the IFR. We still have the best ¶ IFR technology in the world but have squandered much of our lead, partly by allowing a largely ¶ unqualified commission two years of useless deliberation. What we really did was give our ¶ competitors an additional two years to catch up.

#### IFR restores leadership on nuclear issues – key to contain proliferation

**Stanford 10** (Dr George S. Stanford, nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, "IFR FaD context – the need for U.S. implementation of the IFR," 2/18/10) http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/02/18/ifr-fad-context/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/02/18/ifr-fad-context/

ON THE NEED FOR U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTEGRAL FAST REACTOR¶ The IFR ties into a very big picture — international stability, prevention of war, and avoiding “proliferation” (spread) of nuclear weapons.¶ – The need for energy is the basis of many wars, including the ones we are engaged in right now (Iraq and Afghanistan). If every nation had enough energy to give its people a decent standard of living, that reason for conflict would disappear.¶ – The only sustainable energy source that can provide the bulk of the energy needed is nuclear power.¶ – The current need is for more thermal reactors — the kind we now use.¶ – But for the longer term, to provide the growing amount of energy that will be needed to maintain civilization, the only proven way available today is with fast-reactor technology.¶ – The most promising fast-reactor type is the IFR – metal-fueled, sodium-cooled, with pyroprocessing to recycle its fuel.¶ – Nobody knows yet how much IFR plants would cost to build and operate. Without the commercial-scale demo of the IFR, along with rationalization of the licensing process, any claims about costs are simply hand-waving guesses.¶ \* \* \* \*¶ Background info on proliferation (of nuclear weapons). Please follow the reasoning carefully.¶ – Atomic bombs can be made with highly enriched uranium (90% U-235) or with good-quality plutonium (bomb designers want plutonium that is ~93% Pu-239).¶ – For fuel for an LWR, the uranium only has to be enriched to 3 or 4% U-235.¶ – To make a uranium bomb you don’t need a reactor — but you do need access to an enrichment facility or some other source of highly enriched uranium…¶ – Any kind of nuclear reactor can be used to make weapons-quality plutonium from uranium-238, but the uranium has to have been irradiated for only a very short period. In other words, nobody would try to make a plutonium weapon from ordinary spent fuel, because there are easier ways to get plutonium of much better quality.¶ – Plutonium for a weapon not only has to have good isotopic quality, it also has to be chemically uncontaminated. Thus the lightly irradiated fuel has to be processed to extract the plutonium in a chemically pure form. But mere possession of a reactor is not sufficient for a weapons capability — a facility using a chemical process called PUREX is also needed.¶ – Regardless of how many reactors a country has, it cannot have a weapons capability unless it has either the ability to enrich uranium or to do PUREX-type fuel reprocessing.¶ – Therefore, the spread of weapons capability will be strongly inhibited if the only enrichment and reprocessing facilities are in countries that already have a nuclear arsenal.¶ – But that can only happen if countries with reactors (and soon that will be most of the nations of the world) have absolutely ironclad guarantees that they can get the fuel they need even if they can’t make their own, regardless of how obnoxious their political actions might be.¶ – Such guarantees will have to be backed up by some sort of international arrangement, and that can only come to pass if there is effective leadership for the laborious international negotiations that will have to take place. (For a relevant discussion, see here)¶ – At present, the only nation that has a realistic potential to be such a leader is the United States.¶ – But a country cannot be such a leader in the political arena unless it is also in the technological forefront.¶ – The United States used to be the reactor-technology leader, but it abandoned that role in 1994 when it terminated the development of the IFR.¶ – Since then, other nations — China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, France — have proceeded to work on their own fast-reactor versions, which necessarily will involve instituting a fuel-processing capability.¶ – Thus the United States is being left behind, and is rapidly losing its ability to help assure that the global evolution of the technology of nuclear energy proceeds in a safe and orderly manner.¶ – But maybe it’s not too late yet. After all, the IFR is the fast-reactor technology with the post promise (for a variety of reasons), and is ready for a commercial-scale demonstration to settle some uncertainties about how to scale up the pyroprocess as needed, to establish better limits on the expected cost of production units, and to develop an appropriate, expeditious licensing process.¶ – Such a demo will require federal seed money. It’s time to get moving.

#### Transition to IFRs create a global proliferation resistant fuel cycle

**Stanford 10** (Dr George S. Stanford, nuclear reactor physicist, retired from Argonne National Laboratory, "Q%26A on Integral Fast Reactors – safe, abundant, non-polluting power," 9/18/10) [http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/18/ifr-fad-7/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/18/ifr-fad-7/](http://bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/18/ifr-fad-7/-http%3A//bravenewclimate.com/2010/09/18/ifr-fad-7/)

Thermal reactors with reprocessing would do at least a little better.¶ Recycling (it would be with the PUREX process, or an equivalent) could stretch the U-235 supply another few decades—but remember the consequences: growing stockpiles of plutonium, pure plutonium streams in the PUREX plants, and the creation of 100,000-year plutonium mines.¶ If you’re going to talk about “PUREX” and “plutonium mines” you should say what they are. First, what’s PUREX?¶ It’s a chemical process developed for the nuclear weapons program, to separate plutonium from everything else that comes out of a reactor. Weapons require very pure plutonium, and that’s what PUREX delivers. The pyroprocess used in the IFR is very different. It not only does not, it cannot, produce plutonium with the chemical purity needed for weapons.¶ Why do you keep referring to “chemical” purity?¶ Because chemical and isotopic quality are two different things. Plutonium for a weapon has to be pure chemically. Weapons designers also want good isotopic quality—that is, they want at least 93% of their plutonium to consist of the isotope Pu- 239. A chemical process does not separate isotopes.¶ I see. Now, what about the “plutonium mines?”¶ When spent fuel or vitrified reprocessing waste from thermal reactors is buried, the result is a concentrated geological deposit of plutonium. As its radioactivity decays, those deposits are sources of raw material for weapons, becoming increasingly attractive over the next 100,000 years and more (the half-life of Pu-239 being 24,000 years).¶ You listed, back at the beginning, some problems that the IFR would ameliorate. A lot of those problems are obviously related to proliferation of nuclear weapons.¶ Definitely. For instance, although thermal reactors consume more fuel than they produce, and thus are not called “breeders,” they inescapably are prolific breeders of plutonium, as I said. And that poses serious concerns about nuclear proliferation. And proliferation concerns are even greater when fuel from thermal reactors is recycled, since the PUREX method is used. IFRs have neither of those drawbacks.¶ Why does it seem that there is more proliferation-related concern about plutonium than about uranium? Can’t you make bombs from either?¶ Yes. The best isotopes for nuclear explosives are U-235, Pu- 239, and U-233. Only the first two of those, however, have been widely used. All the other actinide isotopes, if present in appreciable quantity, in one way or another complicate the design and construction of bombs and degrade their performance. Adequate isotopic purity is therefore important, and isotopic separation is much more difficult than chemical separation. Even so, with plutonium of almost any isotopic composition it is technically possible to make an explosive (although designers of military weapons demand plutonium that is at least 93% Pu-239), whereas if U-235 is sufficiently diluted with U-238 (which is easy to do and hard to undo), the mixture cannot be used for a bomb.¶ High-quality plutonium is the material of choice for a large and sophisticated nuclear arsenal, while highly enriched uranium would be one of the easier routes to a few crude nuclear explosives.¶ So why the emphasis on plutonium?¶ You’re asking me to read people’s minds, and I’m not good at that. Both uranium and plutonium are of proliferation concern.¶ Where is the best place for plutonium?¶ Where better than in a reactor plant—particularly an IFR facility, where there is never pure plutonium (except some, briefly, when it comes in from dismantled weapons), where the radioactivity levels are lethal, and where the operations are done remotely under an inert, smothering atmosphere? Once enough IFRs are deployed, there never will need to be plutonium outside a reactor plant—except for the then diminishing supply of plutonium left over from decades of thermal-reactor operation.¶ How does the IFR square with U.S. policy of discouraging plutonium production, reprocessing and use?¶ It is entirely consistent with the intent of that policy—to render plutonium as inaccessible for weapons use as possible. The wording of the policy, however, is now obsolete.¶ How so?¶ It was formulated before the IFR’s pyroprocessing and electrorefining technology was known—when “reprocessing” was synonymous with PUREX, which creates plutonium of the chemical purity needed for weapons. Since now there is a fuel cycle that promises to provide far-superior management of plutonium, the policy has been overtaken by events.¶ Why is the IFR better than PUREX? Doesn’t “recycling” mean separation of plutonium, regardless of the method?¶ No, not in the IFR—and that misunderstanding accounts for some of the opposition. The IFR’s pyroprocessing and electrorefining method is not capable of making plutonium that is pure enough for weapons. If a proliferator were to start with IFR material, he or she would have to employ an extra chemical separation step.¶ But there is plutonium in IFRs, along with other fissionable isotopes. Seems to me that a proliferator could take some of that and make a bomb.¶ Some people do say that, but they’re wrong, according to expert bomb designers at Livermore National Laboratory. They looked at the problem in detail, and concluded that plutonium-bearing material taken from anywhere in the IFR cycle was so ornery, because of inherent heat, radioactivity and spontaneous neutrons, that making a bomb with it without chemical separation of the plutonium would be essentially impossible—far, far harder than using today’s reactor-grade plutonium.¶ So? Why wouldn’t they use chemical separation?¶ First of all, they would need a PUREX-type plant—something that does not exist in the IFR cycle.¶ Second, the input material is so fiendishly radioactive that the processing facility would have to be more elaborate than any PUREX plant now in existence. The operations would have to be done entirely by remote control, behind heavy shielding, or the operators would die before getting the job done. The installation would cost millions, and would be very hard to conceal.¶ Third, a routine safeguards regime would readily spot any such modification to an IFR plant, or diversion of highly radioactive material beyond the plant.¶ Fourth, of all the ways there are to get plutonium—of any isotopic quality—this is probably the all-time, hands-down hardest.¶ The Long Term¶ Does the plutonium now existing and being produced by thermal reactors raise any proliferation concerns for the long term?¶ It certainly does. As I said earlier, burying the spent fuel from today’s thermal reactors creates geological deposits of plutonium whose desirability for weapons use is continually improving. Some 30 countries now have thermal-reactor programs, and the number will grow. To conceive of that many custodial programs being maintained effectively for that long is a challenge to the imagination. Since the IFR can consume plutonium, it can completely eliminate this long-term concern.¶ Are there other waste-disposal problems that could be lessened?¶ Yes. Some constituents of the waste from thermal reactors remain appreciably radioactive for thousands of years, leading to 10,000-year stability criteria for disposal sites. Waste disposal would be simpler if that time frame could be shortened. With IFR waste, the time of concern is less than 500 years.¶ What about a 1994 report by the National Academy of Sciences? The Washington Post said that the NAS report “denounces the idea of building new reactors to consume plutonium.”¶ That characterization of the report is a little strong, but it is true that the members of the NAS committee seem not to have been familiar with the plutonium-management potential of the IFR. They did, however, recognize the “plutonium mine” problem. They say (Executive Summary, p.3):¶ Because plutonium in spent fuel or glass logs incorporating high-level wastes still entails a risk of weapons use, and because the barrier to such use diminishes with time as the radioactivity decays, consideration of further steps to reduce the long-term proliferation risks of such materials is required, regardless of what option is chosen for [near-term] disposition of weapons plutonium. This global effort should include continued consideration of more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles, including concepts that might offer a long-term option for nearly complete elimination of the world’s plutonium stocks. The IFR, obviously, is just such a fuel cycle—a prime candidate for “continued consideration.”

#### That institutional support manages global nonproliferation

**Bengelsdorf and McGoldrick**, **07** [currently a Principal with the consulting firm of Bengelsdorf, McGoldrick, and Associates, held numerous senior positions in the U.S. government, including the Energy Department and its predecessor agencies, the State Department, and the U.S. Mission to the IAEA. Among his appointments, he served as the director of both key State and Energy Department offices that are concerned with international nuclear and nonproliferation affairs. Throughout his career, Mr. Bengelsdorf contributed significantly to the development and implementation of U.S. international fuel cycle and nonproliferation policies, having participated in several White House and National Security Council studies. He was involved in the negotiation of numerous bilateral and multilateral nuclear and nonproliferation agreements, including the development of full-scope IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/153) to implement the Nuclear, THE U.S. DOMESTIC CIVIL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY A White Paper Presented by the American Council on Global Nuclear Competitiveness May 2007, <http://www.nuclearcompetitiveness.org/images/COUNCIL_WHITE_PAPER_Final.pdf>]

The health of the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure can have an important bearing in a variety of ways on the ability of the United States to advance its nonproliferation objectives. During the Atoms for Peace Program and until the 1970s, the U.S. was the dominant supplier in the international commercial nuclear power market, and it exercised a strong leadership role in shaping the global nonproliferation regime. In those early days, the U.S. also had what was essentially a monopoly in the nuclear fuel supply market. This capability, among others, allowed the U.S. to promote the widespread acceptance of nonproliferation norms and restraints, including international safeguards and physical protection measures, and, most notably, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United States concluded agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with other states, which require strict safeguards, physical protection and other nonproliferation controls on their civil nuclear programs. Today due to its political, military and economic position in the world, the United States continues to exercise great weight in nonproliferation matters. However, the ability of the United States to promote its nonproliferation objectives through peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries has declined**.** The fact that no new nuclear power plant orders have been placed in over three decades has led to erosion in the capabilities of the U.S. civil nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, during the same period, the U.S. share of the global nuclear market has declined significantly, and several other countries have launched their own nuclear power programs and have become major international suppliers in their own right. It is highly significant that all but one of the U.S. nuclear power plant vendors and nuclear fuel designers and manufactures for light water reactors have now been acquired by their non-U.S. based competitors. Thus, while the U.S. remains a participant in the international market for commercial nuclear power, it no longer enjoys a dominant role as it did four decades ago. To the extent that U.S. nuclear plant vendors and nuclear fuel designers 2 and manufacturers are able to reassert themselves on a technical and commercial basis, opportunities for U.S. influence with respect to nuclear nonproliferation can be expected to increase. However, the fact that there are other suppliers that can now provide plants and nuclear fuel technology and services on a competitive commercial basis suggests that the U.S. will have to work especially hard to maintain and, in some cases, rebuild its nuclear infrastructure, if it wishes to exercise its influence in international nuclear affairs. The influence of the United States internationally could be enhanced significantly if the U.S. is able to achieve success in its Nuclear Power 2010 program and place several new orders in the next decade and beyond. There is a clear upsurge of interest in nuclear power in various parts of the world. As a consequence, if the U.S. aspires to participate in these programs and to shape them in ways that are most conducive to nonproliferation, it will need to promote the health and viability of the American nuclear infrastructure. Perhaps more importantly, if it wishes to exert a positive influence in shaping the nonproliferation policies of other countries, it can do so more effectively by being an active supplier to and partner in the evolution of those programs. Concurrent with the prospective growth in the use of nuclear power, the global nonproliferation regime is facing some direct assaults that are unprecedented in nature. International confidence in the effectiveness of nuclear export controls was shaken by the disclosures of the nuclear operations of A.Q. Khan. These developments underscore the importance of maintaining the greatest integrity and effectiveness of the nuclear export conditions applied by the major suppliers. They also underscore the importance of the U.S. maintaining effective policies to achieve these objectives. Constructive U.S. influence will be best achieved to the extent that the U.S. is perceived as a major technological leader, supplier and partner in the field of nuclear technology. As the sole superpower, the U.S. will have considerable, on-going influence on the international nonproliferation regime, regardless of how active and successful it is in the nuclear export market. However, the erosion of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure has begun to weaken the ability of the U.S. to participate actively in the international nuclear market. If the U.S. becomes more dependent on foreign nuclear suppliers or if it leaves the international 3 nuclear market to other suppliers, the ability of the U.S. to influence nonproliferation policy will diminish. It is, therefore, essential that the United States have vibrant nuclear reactor, enrichment services, and spent fuel storage and disposal industries that can not only meet the needs of U.S. utilities but will also enable the United States to promote effective safeguards and other nonproliferation controls through close peaceful nuclear cooperation with other countries. U.S. nuclear exports can be used to influence other states’ nuclear programs through the nonproliferation commitments that the U.S. requires. The U.S. has so-called consent rights over the enrichment, reprocessing and alteration in form or content of the nuclear materials that it has provided to other countries, as well as to the nuclear materials that are produced from the nuclear materials and equipment that the U.S. has supplied. Further, the ability of the U.S. to develop improved and advanced nuclear technologies will depend on its ability to provide consistent and vigorous support for nuclear R&D programs that will enjoy solid bipartisan political support in order that they can be sustained from one administration to another. As the U.S. Government expends taxpayer funds on the Nuclear Power 2010 program, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the Generation IV initiative and other programs, it should consider the benefit to the U.S. industrial base and to U.S. non-proliferation posture as criteria in project design and source selection where possible. Finally, the ability of the United States to resolve its own difficulties in managing its spent fuel and nuclear wastes will be crucial to maintaining the credibility of the U.S. nuclear power program and will be vital to implementing important new nonproliferation initiatives designed to discourage the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities to other countries.

#### We’re on the brink of rapid prolif – access to tech is inevitable and multilateral institutions fail

**CFR 12** [CFR 7-5-2012, "The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Council on Foreign Relations]

Nuclear weapons proliferation, whether by state or nonstate actors, poses one of the greatest threats to international security today. Iran's apparent efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, what amounts to North Korean nuclear blackmail, and the revelation of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network all underscore the far-from-remote possibility that a terrorist group or a so-called rogue state will acquire weapons of mass destruction or materials for a dirty bomb.¶ The problem of nuclear proliferation is global, and any effective response must also be multilateral. Nine states (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are known or believed to have nuclear weapons, and more than thirty others (including Japan, Germany, and South Korea) have the technological ability to quickly acquire them. Amid volatile energy costs, the accompanying push to expand nuclear energy, growing concerns about the environmental impact of fossil fuels, and the continued diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge, access to dual-use technologies seems destined to grow.¶ In the background, a nascent global consensus regarding the need for substantial nuclear arms reductions, if not complete nuclear disarmament, has increasingly taken shape. In April 2009, for instance, U.S. president Barack Obama reignited global nonproliferation efforts through a landmark speech in Prague. Subsequently, in September of the same year, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 1887, which called for accelerated efforts toward total nuclear disarmament. In February 2012, the number of states who have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty increased to 157, heightening appeals to countries such as the United States, Israel, and Iran to follow suit.¶ Overall, the existing global nonproliferation regime is a highly developed example of international law. Yet, despite some notable successes, existing multilateral institutions have failed to prevent states such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea from "going nuclear," and seem equally ill-equipped to check Iran as well as potential threats from nonstate, terrorist groups. The current framework must be updated and reinforced if it is to effectively address today's proliferation threats, let alone pave the way for "the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."

#### New proliferators will be uniquely destabilizing -- guarantees conflict escalation.

Cimbala, ‘8

[Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Comparative Strategy, “Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia”, 27, InformaWorld]

If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies, including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or nonstate actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural crosscurrents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.12 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues.13 The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with China and NorthKorea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike–vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policymakers and academic theorists. For policymakers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).14 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passe, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.15 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.16 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

#### Extinction.

Krieger, ‘9

[David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04\_krieger\_newsweek\_response.php?krieger]

Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious. Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future. Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman?

### Warming

#### Warming is real and anthropogenic – carbon dioxide increase, polar ice records, melting glaciers, sea level rise

**Prothero 12** [Donald R. Prothero, Professor of Geology at Occidental College and Lecturer in Geobiology at the California Institute of Technology, 3-1-2012, "How We Know Global Warming is Real and Human Caused," Skeptic, vol 17 no 2, EBSCO]

Converging Lines of Evidence¶ How do we know that global warming is real and primarily human caused? There are numerous lines of evidence that converge toward this conclusion.¶ 1. Carbon Dioxide Increase.¶ Carbon dioxide in our atmosphere has increased at an unprecedented rate in the past 200 years. Not one data set collected over a long enough span of time shows otherwise. Mann et al. (1999) compiled the past 900 years' worth of temperature data from tree rings, ice cores, corals, and direct measurements in the past few centuries, and the sudden increase of temperature of the past century stands out like a sore thumb. This famous graph is now known as the "hockey stick" because it is long and straight through most of its length, then bends sharply upward at the end like the blade of a hockey stick. Other graphs show that climate was very stable within a narrow range of variation through the past 1000, 2000, or even 10,000 years since the end of the last Ice Age. There were minor warming events during the Climatic Optimum about 7000 years ago, the Medieval Warm Period, and the slight cooling of the Little Ice Age in die 1700s and 1800s. But the magnitude and rapidity of the warming represented by the last 200 years is simply unmatched in all of human history. More revealing, die timing of this warming coincides with the Industrial Revolution, when humans first began massive deforestation and released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by burning an unprecedented amount of coal, gas, and oil.¶ 2. Melting Polar Ice Caps.¶ The polar icecaps are thinning and breaking up at an alarming rate. In 2000, my former graduate advisor Malcolm McKenna was one of the first humans to fly over the North Pole in summer time and see no ice, just open water. The Arctic ice cap has been frozen solid for at least the past 3 million years (and maybe longer),4 but now the entire ice sheet is breaking up so fast that by 2030 (and possibly sooner) less than half of the Arctic will be ice covered in the summer.5 As one can see from watching the news, this is an ecological disaster for everything that lives up there, from the polar bears to the seals and walruses to the animals they feed upon, to the 4 million people whose world is melting beneath their feet. The Antarctic is thawing even faster. In February-March 2002, the Larsen B ice shelf - over 3000 square km (the size of Rhode Island) and 220 m (700 feet) thick- broke up in just a few months, a story typical of nearly all the ice shelves in Antarctica. The Larsen B shelf had survived all the previous ice ages and interglacial warming episodes over the past 3 million years, and even the warmest periods of the last 10,000 years- yet it and nearly all the other thick ice sheets on the Arctic, Greenland, and Antarctic are vanishing at a rate never before seen in geologic history.¶ 3. Melting Glaciers.¶ Glaciers are all retreating at the highest rates ever documented. Many of those glaciers, along with snow melt, especially in the Himalayas, Andes, Alps, and Sierras, provide most of the freshwater that the populations below the mountains depend upon - yet this fresh water supply is vanishing. Just think about the percentage of world's population in southern Asia (especially India) that depend on Himalayan snowmelt for their fresh water. The implications are staggering. The permafrost that once remained solidly frozen even in the summer has now Üiawed, damaging the Inuit villages on the Arctic coast and threatening all our pipelines to die North Slope of Alaska. This is catastrophic not only for life on the permafrost, but as it thaws, the permafrost releases huge amounts of greenhouse gases which are one of the major contributors to global warming. Not only is the ice vanishing, but we have seen record heat waves over and over again, killing thousands of people, as each year joins the list of the hottest years on record. (2010 just topped that list as the hottest year, surpassing the previous record in 2009, and we shall know about 2011 soon enough). Natural animal and plant populations are being devastated all over the globe as their environments change.6 Many animals respond by moving their ranges to formerly cold climates, so now places that once did not have to worry about disease-bearing mosquitoes are infested as the climate warms and allows them to breed further north.¶ 4. Sea Level Rise.¶ All that melted ice eventually ends up in the ocean, causing sea levels to rise, as it has many times in the geologic past. At present, the sea level is rising about 3-4 mm per year, more than ten times the rate of 0.10.2 mm/year that has occurred over the past 3000 years. Geological data show Üiat ttie sea level was virtually unchanged over the past 10,000 years since the present interglacial began. A few mm here or there doesn't impress people, until you consider that the rate is accelerating and that most scientists predict sea levels will rise 80-130 cm in just the next century. A sea level rise of 1.3 m (almost 4 feet) would drown many of the world's low-elevation cities, such as Venice and New Orleans, and low-lying countries such as the Netherlands or Bangladesh. A number of tiny island nations such as Vanuatu and the Maldives, which barely poke out above the ocean now, are already vanishing beneath the waves. Eventually their entire population will have to move someplace else.7 Even a small sea level rise might not drown all these areas, but they are much more vulnerable to the large waves of a storm surge (as happened with Hurricane Katrina), which could do much more damage than sea level rise alone. If sea level rose by 6 m (20 feet), most of die world's coastal plains and low-lying areas (such as the Louisiana bayous, Florida, and most of the world's river deltas) would be drowned.¶ Most of the world's population lives in lowelevation coastal cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Miami, and Shanghai. All of those cities would be partially or completely under water with such a sea level rise. If all the glacial ice caps melted completely (as they have several times before during past greenhouse episodes in the geologic past), sea level would rise by 65 m (215 feet)! The entire Mississippi Valley would flood, so you could dock an ocean liner in Cairo, Illinois. Such a sea level rise would drown nearly every coastal region under hundreds of feet of water, and inundate New York City, London and Paris. All that would remain would be the tall landmarks such as the Empire State Building, Big Ben, and the Eiffel Tower. You could tie your boats to these pinnacles, but the rest of these drowned cities would lie deep underwater.

#### Warming is real and causes extinction

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As horrifying as the scenario of human extinction by sudden, fast-burning nuclear fire may seem, the one consolation is that this future can be avoided within a relatively short period of time if responsible world leaders change Cold War thinking to move away from aggressive wars over natural resources and towards the eventual dismantlement of most if not all nuclear weapons. On the other hand, another scenario of human extinction by fire is one that may not so easily be reversed within a short period of time because it is not a fast-burning fire; rather, a slow burning fire is gradually heating up the planet as industrial civilization progresses and develops globally. This gradual process and course is long-lasting; thus it cannot easily be changed, even if responsible world leaders change their thinking about ‘‘progress’’ and industrial development based on the burning of fossil fuels. The way that global warming will impact humanity in the future has often been depicted through the analogy of the proverbial frog in a pot of water who does not realize that the temperature of the water is gradually rising. Instead of trying to escape, the frog tries to adjust to the gradual temperature change; finally, the heat of the water sneaks up on it until it is debilitated. Though it finally realizes its predicament and attempts to escape, it is too late; its feeble attempt is to no avail— and the frog dies. Whether this fable can actually be applied to frogs in heated water or not is irrelevant; it still serves as a comparable scenario of how the slow burning fire of global warming may eventually lead to a runaway condition and take humanity by surprise. Unfortunately, by the time the politicians finally all agree with the scientific consensus that global warming is indeed human caused, its development could be too advanced to arrest; the poor frog has become too weak and enfeebled to get himself out of hot water. The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme to ‘‘assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of humaninduced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.’’[16]. Since then, it has given assessments and reports every six or seven years. Thus far, it has given four assessments.13 With all prior assessments came attacks fromsome parts of the scientific community, especially by industry scientists, to attempt to prove that the theory had no basis in planetary history and present-day reality; nevertheless, as more andmore research continually provided concrete and empirical evidence to confirm the global warming hypothesis, that it is indeed human-caused, mostly due to the burning of fossil fuels, the scientific consensus grew stronger that human induced global warming is verifiable. As a matter of fact, according to Bill McKibben [17], 12 years of ‘‘impressive scientific research’’ strongly confirms the 1995 report ‘‘that humans had grown so large in numbers and especially in appetite for energy that they were now damaging the most basic of the earth’s systems—the balance between incoming and outgoing solar energy’’; ‘‘. . . their findings have essentially been complementary to the 1995 report – a constant strengthening of the simple basic truth that humans were burning too much fossil fuel.’’ [17]. Indeed, 12 years later, the 2007 report not only confirms global warming, with a stronger scientific consensus that the slow burn is ‘‘very likely’’ human caused, but it also finds that the ‘‘amount of carbon in the atmosphere is now increasing at a faster rate even than before’’ and the temperature increases would be ‘‘considerably higher than they have been so far were it not for the blanket of soot and other pollution that is temporarily helping to cool the planet.’’ [17]. Furthermore, almost ‘‘everything frozen on earth is melting. Heavy rainfalls are becoming more common since the air is warmer and therefore holds more water than cold air, and ‘cold days, cold nights and frost have become less frequent, while hot days, hot nights, and heat waves have become more frequent.’’ [17]. Unless drastic action is taken soon, the average global temperature is predicted to rise about 5 degrees this century, but it could rise as much as 8 degrees. As has already been evidenced in recent years, the rise in global temperature is melting the Arctic sheets. This runaway polar melting will inflict great damage upon coastal areas, which could be much greater than what has been previously forecasted. However, what is missing in the IPCC report, as dire as it may seem, is sufficient emphasis on the less likely but still plausible worst case scenarios, which could prove to have the most devastating, catastrophic consequences for the long-term future of human civilization. In other words, the IPCC report places too much emphasis on a linear progression that does not take sufficient account of the dynamics of systems theory, which leads to a fundamentally different premise regarding the relationship between industrial civilization and nature. As a matter of fact, as early as the 1950s, Hannah Arendt [18] observed this radical shift of emphasis in the human-nature relationship, which starkly contrasts with previous times because the very distinction between nature and man as ‘‘Homo faber’’ has become blurred, as man no longer merely takes from nature what is needed for fabrication; instead, he now acts into nature to augment and transform natural processes, which are then directed into the evolution of human civilization itself such that we become a part of the very processes that we make. The more human civilization becomes an integral part of this dynamic system, the more difficult it becomes to extricate ourselves from it. As Arendt pointed out, this dynamism is dangerous because of its unpredictability. Acting into nature to transform natural processes brings about an . . . endless new change of happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is entirely incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand. The moment we started natural processes of our own - and the splitting of the atom is precisely such a man-made natural process -we not only increased our power over nature, or became more aggressive in our dealings with the given forces of the earth, but for the first time have taken nature into the human world as such and obliterated the defensive boundaries between natural elements and the human artifice by which all previous civilizations were hedged in’’ [18]. So, in as much as we act into nature, we carry our own unpredictability into our world; thus, Nature can no longer be thought of as having absolute or iron-clad laws. We no longer know what the laws of nature are because the unpredictability of Nature increases in proportion to the degree by which industrial civilization injects its own processes into it; through selfcreated, dynamic, transformative processes, we carry human unpredictability into the future with a precarious recklessness that may indeed end in human catastrophe or extinction, for elemental forces that we have yet to understand may be unleashed upon us by the very environment that we experiment with. Nature may yet have her revenge and the last word, as the Earth and its delicate ecosystems, environment, and atmosphere reach a tipping point, which could turn out to be a point of no return. This is exactly the conclusion reached by the scientist, inventor, and author, James Lovelock. The creator of the wellknown yet controversial Gaia Theory, Lovelock has recently written that it may be already too late for humanity to change course since climate centers around the world, . . . which are the equivalent of the pathology lab of a hospital, have reported the Earth’s physical condition, and the climate specialists see it as seriously ill, and soon to pass into a morbid fever that may last as long as 100,000 years. I have to tell you, as members of the Earth’s family and an intimate part of it, that you and especially civilisation are in grave danger. It was ill luck that we started polluting at a time when the sun is too hot for comfort. We have given Gaia a fever and soon her condition will worsen to a state like a coma. She has been there before and recovered, but it took more than 100,000 years. We are responsible and will suffer the consequences: as the century progresses, the temperature will rise 8 degrees centigrade in temperate regions and 5 degrees in the tropics. Much of the tropical land mass will become scrub and desert, and will no longer serve for regulation; this adds to the 40 per cent of the Earth’s surface we have depleted to feed ourselves. . . . Curiously, aerosol pollution of the northern hemisphere reduces global warming by reflecting sunlight back to space. This ‘global dimming’ is transient and could disappear in a few days like the smoke that it is, leaving us fully exposed to the heat of the global greenhouse. We are in a fool’s climate, accidentally kept cool by smoke, and before this century is over billions of us will die and the few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in the Arctic where the climate remains tolerable. [19] Moreover, Lovelock states that the task of trying to correct our course is hopelessly impossible, for we are not in charge. It is foolish and arrogant to think that we can regulate the atmosphere, oceans and land surface in order to maintain the conditions right for life. It is as impossible as trying to regulate your own temperature and the composition of your blood, for those with ‘‘failing kidneys know the never-ending daily difficulty of adjusting water, salt and protein intake. The technological fix of dialysis helps, but is no replacement for living healthy kidneys’’ [19]. Lovelock concludes his analysis on the fate of human civilization and Gaia by saying that we will do ‘‘our best to survive, but sadly I cannot see the United States or the emerging economies of China and India cutting back in time, and they are the main source of emissions. The worst will happen and survivors will have to adapt to a hell of a climate’’ [19]. Lovelock’s forecast for climate change is based on a systems dynamics analysis of the interaction between humancreated processes and natural processes. It is a multidimensional model that appropriately reflects the dynamism of industrial civilization responsible for climate change. For one thing, it takes into account positive feedback loops that lead to ‘‘runaway’’ conditions. This mode of analysis is consistent  with recent research on how ecosystems suddenly disappear. A 2001 article in Nature, based on a scientific study by an international consortium, reported that changes in ecosystems are not just gradual but are often sudden and catastrophic [20]. Thus, a scientific consensus is emerging (after repeated studies of ecological change) that ‘‘stressed ecosystems, given the right nudge, are capable of slipping rapidly from a seemingly steady state to something entirely different,’’ according to Stephen Carpenter, a limnologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (who is also a co-author of the report). Carpenter continues, ‘‘We realize that there is a common pattern we’re seeing in ecosystems around the world, . . . Gradual changes in vulnerability accumulate and eventually you get a shock to the system - a flood or a drought - and, boom, you’re over into another regime. It becomes a self-sustaining collapse.’’ [20]. If ecosystems are in fact mini-models of the system of the Earth, as Lovelock maintains, then we can expect the same kind of behavior. As Jonathon Foley, a UW-Madison climatologist and another co-author of the Nature report, puts it, ‘‘Nature isn’t linear. Sometimes you can push on a system and push on a system and, finally, you have the straw that breaks the camel’s back.’’ Also, once the ‘‘flip’’ occurs, as Foley maintains, then the catastrophic change is ‘‘irreversible.’’ [20]. When we expand this analysis of ecosystems to the Earth itself, it’s frightening. What could be the final push on a stressed system that could ‘‘break the camel’s back?’’ Recently, another factor has been discovered in some areas of the arctic regions, which will surely compound the problem of global ‘‘heating’’ (as Lovelock calls it) in unpredictable and perhaps catastrophic ways. This disturbing development, also reported in Nature, concerns the permafrost that has locked up who knows how many tons of the greenhouse gasses, methane and carbon dioxide. Scientists are particularly worried about permafrost because, as it thaws, it releases these gases into the atmosphere, thus, contributing and accelerating global heating. It is a vicious positive feedback loop that compounds the prognosis of global warming in ways that could very well prove to be the tipping point of no return. Seth Borenstein of the Associated Press describes this disturbing positive feedback loop of permafrost greenhouse gasses, as when warming ‘‘. already under way thaws permafrost, soil that has been continuously frozen for thousands of years. Thawed permafrost releases methane and carbon dioxide. Those gases reach the atmosphere and help trap heat on Earth in the greenhouse effect. The trapped heat thaws more permafrost and so on.’’ [21]. The significance and severity of this problem cannot be understated since scientists have discovered that ‘‘the amount of carbon trapped in this type of permafrost called ‘‘yedoma’’ is much more prevalent than originally thought and may be 100 times [my emphasis] the amount of carbon released into the air each year by the burning of fossil fuels’’ [21]. Of course, it won’t come out all at once, at least by time as we commonly reckon it, but in terms of geological time, the ‘‘several decades’’ that scientists say it will probably take to come out can just as well be considered ‘‘all at once.’’ Surely, within the next 100 years, much of the world we live in will be quite hot and may be unlivable, as Lovelock has predicted. Professor Ted Schuur, a professor of ecosystem ecology at the University of Florida and co-author of the study that appeared in Science, describes it as a ‘‘slow motion time bomb.’’ [21]. Permafrost under lakes will be released as methane while that which is under dry ground will be released as carbon dioxide. Scientists aren’t sure which is worse. Whereas methane is a much more powerful agent to trap heat, it only lasts for about 10 years before it dissipates into carbon dioxide or other chemicals. The less powerful heat-trapping agent, carbon dioxide, lasts for 100 years [21]. Both of the greenhouse gasses present in permafrost represent a global dilemma and challenge that compounds the effects of global warming and runaway climate change. The scary thing about it, as one researcher put it, is that there are ‘‘lots of mechanisms that tend to be self-perpetuating and relatively few that tend to shut it off’’ [21].14 In an accompanying AP article, Katey Walters of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks describes the effects as ‘‘huge’’ and, unless we have a ‘‘major cooling,’’ - unstoppable [22]. Also, there’s so much more that has not even been discovered yet, she writes: ‘‘It’s coming out a lot and there’s a lot more to come out.’’ [22]. 4. Is it the end of human civilization and possible extinction of humankind? What Jonathon Schell wrote concerning death by the fire of nuclear holocaust also applies to the slow burning death of global warming: Once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction**, we have no right to gamble**, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species [23].15 When we consider that beyond the horror of nuclear war, another horror is set into motion to interact with the subsequent nuclear winter to produce a poisonous and super heated planet, the chances of human survival seem even smaller. Who knows, even if some small remnant does manage to survive, what the poisonous environmental conditions would have on human evolution in the future. A remnant of mutated, sub-human creatures might survive such harsh conditions, but for all purposes, human civilization has been destroyed, and the question concerning human extinction becomes moot. Thus, **we have no other choice but to consider the finality of it all**, as Schell does: ‘‘Death lies at the core of each person’s private existence, but part of death’s meaning is to be found in the fact that it occurs in a biological and social world that survives.’’ [23].16 But what if the world itself were to perish, Schell asks. Would not it bring about a sort of ‘‘second death’’ – the death of the species – a possibility that the vast majority of the human race is in denial about? Talbot writes in the review of Schell’s book that it is not only the ‘‘death of the species, not just of the earth’s population on doomsday, but of countless unborn generations. They would be spared literal death but would nonetheless be victims . . .’’ [23]. That is the ‘‘second death’’ of humanity – the horrifying, unthinkable prospect that there are no prospects – that there will be no future. In the second chapter of Schell’s book, he writes that since we have not made a positive decision to exterminate ourselves but instead have ‘‘chosen to live on the edge of extinction, periodically lunging toward the abyss only to draw back at the last second, our situation is one of uncertainty and nervous insecurity rather than of absolute hopelessness.’’ [23].17 In other words, the fate of the Earth and its inhabitants has not yet been determined. Yet time is not on our side. Will we relinquish the fire and our use of it to dominate the Earth and each other, or will we continue to gamble with our future at this game of Russian roulette while **time** increasingly **stacks the cards against** our chances of **survival**?

#### The IFR is the only way to reduce coal emissions sufficiently to avert the worst climate disasters

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To prevent a climate disaster, we must eliminate virtually all coal plant emissions worldwide in 25 years. The best way and, for all practical purposes, the only way to get all countries off of coal is not with coercion; it is to make them want to replace their coal burners by giving them a plug-compatible technology that is less expensive. The IFR can do this. It is plug-compatible with the burners in a coal plant (see Nuclear Power: Going Fast). No other technology can upgrade a coal plant so it is greenhouse gas free while reducing operating costs at the same time. In fact, no other technology can achieve either of these goals. The IFR can achieve both.¶ The bottom line is that without the IFR (or a yet-to-be-invented technology with similar ability to replace the coal burner with a cheaper alternative), it is unlikely that we’ll be able to keep CO2 under 450 ppm.¶ Today, the IFR is the only technology with the potential to displace the coal burner. That is why restarting the IFR is so critical and why Jim Hansen has listed it as one of the top five things we must do to avert a climate disaster.[4]¶ Without eliminating virtually all coal emissions by 2030, the sum total of all of our other climate mitigation efforts will be inconsequential. Hansen often refers to the near complete phase-out of carbon emissions from coal plants worldwide by 2030 as the sine qua non for climate stabilization (see for example, the top of page 6 in his August 4, 2008 trip report).¶ To stay under 450ppm, we would have to install about 13,000 GWe of new carbon-free power over the next 25 years. That number was calculated by Nathan Lewis of Caltech for the Atlantic, but others such as Saul Griffith have independently derived a very similar number and White House Science Advisor John Holdren used 5,600 GWe to 7,200 GWe in his presentation to the Energy Bar Association Annual Meeting on April 23, 2009. That means that if we want to save the planet, we must install more than 1 GWe per day of clean power every single day for the next 25 years. That is a very, very tough goal. It is equivalent to building one large nuclear reactor per day, or 1,500 huge wind turbines per day, or 80,000 37 foot diameter solar dishes covering 100 square miles every day, or some linear combination of these or other carbon free power generation technologies. Note that the required rate is actually higher than this because Hansen and Rajendra Pachauri, the chair of the IPCC, now both agree that 350ppm is a more realistic “not to exceed” number (and we’ve already exceeded it).¶ Today, we are nowhere close to that installation rate with renewables alone. For example, in 2008, the average power delivered by solar worldwide was only 2 GWe (which is to be distinguished from the peak solar capacity of 13.4GWe). That is why every renewable expert at the 2009 Aspen Institute Environment Forum agreed that nuclear must be part of the solution. Al Gore also acknowledges that nuclear must play an important role.¶ Nuclear has always been the world’s largest source of carbon free power. In the US, for example, even though we haven’t built a new nuclear plant in the US for 30 years, nuclear still supplies 70% of our clean power!¶ Nuclear can be installed very rapidly; much more rapidly than renewables. For example, about two thirds of the currently operating 440 reactors around the world came online during a 10 year period between 1980 and 1990. So our best chance of meeting the required installation of new power goal and saving the planet is with an aggressive nuclear program.¶ Unlike renewables, nuclear generates base load power, reliably, regardless of weather. Nuclear also uses very little land area. It does not require the installation of new power lines since it can be installed where the power is needed. However, even with a very aggressive plan involving nuclear, it will still be extremely difficult to install clean power fast enough.¶ Unfortunately, even in the US, we have no plan to install the clean power we need fast enough to save the planet. Even if every country were to agree tomorrow to completely eliminate their coal plant emissions by 2030, how do we think they are actually going to achieve that? There is no White House plan that explains this. There is no DOE plan. There is no plan or strategy. The deadlines will come and go and most countries will profusely apologize for not meeting their goals, just like we have with most of the signers of the Kyoto Protocol today. Apologies are nice, but they will not restore the environment.¶ We need a strategy that is believable, practical, and affordable for countries to adopt. The IFR offers our best hope of being a centerpiece in such a strategy because it the only technology we know of that can provide an economically compelling reason to change.¶ At a speech at MIT on October 23, 2009, President Obama said “And that’s why the world is now engaged in a peaceful competition to determine the technologies that will power the 21st century. … The nation that wins this competition will be the nation that leads the global economy. I am convinced of that. And I want America to be that nation, it’s that simple.”¶ Nuclear is our best clean power technology and the IFR is our best nuclear technology. The Gen IV International Forum (GIF) did a study in 2001-2002 of 19 different reactor designs on 15 different criteria and 24 metrics. The IFR ranked #1 overall. Over 242 experts from around the world participated in the study. It was the most comprehensive evaluation of competitive nuclear designs ever done. Top DOE nuclear management ignored the study because it didn’t endorse the design the Bush administration wanted.¶ The IFR has been sitting on the shelf for 15 years and the DOE currently has no plans to change that.¶ How does the US expect to be a leader in clean energy by ignoring our best nuclear technology? Nobody I’ve talked to has been able to answer that question.¶ We have the technology (it was running for 30 years before we were ordered to tear it down). And we have the money: The Recovery Act has $80 billion dollars. Why aren’t we building a demo plant?¶ IFRs are better than conventional nuclear in every dimension. Here are a few:¶ Efficiency: IFRs are over 100 times more efficient than conventional nuclear. It extracts nearly 100% of the energy from nuclear material. Today’s nuclear reactors extract less than 1%. So you need only 1 ton of actinides each year to feed an IFR (we can use existing nuclear waste for this), whereas you need 100 tons of freshly mined uranium each year to extract enough material to feed a conventional nuclear plant.¶ Unlimited power forever: IFRs can use virtually any actinide for fuel. Fast reactors with reprocessing are so efficient that even if we restrict ourselves to just our existing uranium resources, we can power the entire planet forever (the Sun will consume the Earth before we run out of material to fuel fast reactors). If we limited ourselves to using just our DU “waste” currently in storage, then using the IFR we can power the US for over 1,500 years without doing any new mining of uranium.[5]¶ Exploits our largest energy resource: In the US, there is 10 times as much energy in the depleted uranium (DU) that is just sitting there as there is coal in the ground. This DU waste is our largest natural energy resource…but only if we have fast reactors. Otherwise, it is just waste. With fast reactors, virtually all our nuclear waste (from nuclear power plants, leftover from enrichment, and from decommissioned nuclear weapons)[6] becomes an energy asset worth about $30 trillion dollars…that’s not a typo…$30 trillion, not billion.[7] An 11 year old child was able to determine this from publicly available information in 2004.

#### Inventing something cheaper is key – alternative methods can’t solve warming

**Kirsch 9** (Steve Kirsch, Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, American serial entrepreneur who has started six companies: Mouse Systems, Frame Technology, Infoseek, Propel, Abaca, and OneID, "How Does Obama Expect to Solve the Climate Crisis Without a Plan?" 7/16/9) [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/how-does-obama-expect-to\_b\_236588.html-http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/how-does-obama-expect-to\_b\_236588.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/how-does-obama-expect-to_b_236588.html-http%3A//www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-kirsch/how-does-obama-expect-to_b_236588.html)

The ship is sinking slowly and we are quickly running out of time to develop and implement any such plan if we are to have any hope of saving the planet. What we need is a plan we can all believe in. A plan where our country's smartest people all nod their heads in agreement and say, "Yes, this is a solid, viable plan for keeping CO2 levels from touching 425ppm and averting a global climate catastrophe."¶ ¶ At his Senate testimony a few days ago, noted climate scientist James Hansen made it crystal clear once again that the only way to avert an irreversible climate meltdown and save the planet is to phase out virtually all coal plants worldwide over a 20 year period from 2010 to 2030. Indeed, if we don't virtually eliminate the use of coal worldwide, everything else we do will be as effective as re-arranging deck chairs on the Titanic.¶ ¶ Plans that won't work¶ ¶ Unfortunately, nobody has proposed a realistic and practical plan to eliminate coal use worldwide or anywhere close to that. There is no White House URL with such a plan. No environmental group has a workable plan either.¶ ¶ Hoping that everyone will abandon their coal plants and replace them with a renewable power mix isn't a viable strategy -- we've proven that in the U.S. Heck, even if the Waxman-Markey bill passes Congress (a big "if"), it is so weak that it won't do much at all to eliminate coal plants. So even though we have Democrats controlling all three branches of government, it is almost impossible to get even a weak climate bill passed.¶ ¶ If we can't pass strong climate legislation in the U.S. with all the stars aligned, how can we expect anyone else to do it? So expecting all countries to pass a 100% renewable portfolio standard (which is far far beyond that contemplated in the current energy bill) just isn't possible. Secondly, even if you could mandate it politically in every country, from a practical standpoint, you'd never be able to implement it in time. And there are lots of experts in this country, including Secretary Chu, who say it's impossible without nuclear (a point which I am strongly in agreement with).¶ ¶ Hoping that everyone will spontaneously adopt carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is also a non-starter solution. First of all, CCS doesn't exist at commercial scale. Secondly, even if we could make it work at scale, and even it could be magically retrofitted on every coal plant (which we don't know how to do), it would require all countries to agree to add about 30% in extra cost for no perceivable benefit. At the recent G8 conference, India and China have made it clear yet again that they aren't going to agree to emission goals.¶ ¶ Saying that we'll invent some magical new technology that will rescue us at the last minute is a bad solution. That's at best a poor contingency plan.¶ ¶ The point is this: It should be apparent to us that we aren't going to be able to solve the climate crisis by either "force" (economic coercion or legislation) or by international agreement. And relying on technologies like CCS that may never work is a really bad idea.¶ ¶ The only remaining way to solve the crisis is to make it economically irresistible for countries to "do the right thing." The best way to do that is to give the world a way to generate electric power that is economically more attractive than coal with the same benefits as coal (compact power plants, 24x7 generation, can be sited almost anywhere, etc). Even better is if the new technology can simply replace the existing burner in a coal plant. That way, they'll want to switch. No coercion is required.

#### IFRs solve massive energy and overpopulation crunches that spark resource wars and water scarcity – no alternatives can solve

**Blees et al 11** (Tom Blees1, Yoon Chang2, Robert Serafin3, Jerry Peterson4, Joe Shuster1, Charles Archambeau5, Randolph Ware3, 6, Tom Wigley3,7, Barry W. Brook7, 1Science Council for Global Initiatives, 2Argonne National Laboratory, 3National Center for Atmospheric Research, 4University of Colorado, 5Technology Research Associates, 6Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences, 7(climate professor) University of Adelaide, "Advanced nuclear power systems to mitigate climate change (Part III)," 2/24/11) http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/

The global threat of anthropogenic climate change has become a political hot potato, especially in the USA. The vast majority of climate scientists, however, are in agreement that the potential consequences of inaction are dire indeed. Yet even those who dismiss concerns about climate change cannot discount an array of global challenges facing humanity that absolutely must be solved if wars, dislocations, and social chaos are to be avoided.¶ Human population growth exacerbates a wide range of problems, and with most demographic projections predicting an increase of about 50% to nine or ten billion by mid-century, we are confronted with a social and logistical dilemma of staggering proportions. The most basic human morality dictates that we attempt to solve these problems without resorting to forcible and draconian methods. At the same time, simple social justice demands that the developed world accept the premise that the billions who live today in poverty deserve a drastic improvement in their standard of living, an improvement that is being increasingly demanded and expected throughout the developing countries. To achieve environmental sustainability whilst supporting human well-being will require a global revolution in energy and materials technology and deployment fully as transformative as the Industrial Revolution, but unlike that gradual process we find ourselves under the gun, especially if one considers climate change, peak oil and other immediate sustainability problems to be bona fide threats.¶ It is beyond the purview of this paper to address the question of materials disposition and recycling [i], or the social transformations that will necessarily be involved in confronting the challenges of the next several decades. But the question of energy supply is inextricably bound up with the global solution to our coming crises. It may be argued that energy is the most crucial aspect of any proposed remedy. Our purpose here is to demonstrate that the provision of all the energy that humankind can possibly require to meet the challenges of the coming decades and centuries is a challenge that already has a realistic solution, using technology that is just waiting to be deployed.¶ Energy Realism¶ The purpose of this paper is not to exhaustively examine the many varieties of energy systems currently in use, in development, or in the dreams of their promoters. Nevertheless, because of the apparent passion of both the public and policymakers toward certain energy systems and the political influence of their advocates, a brief discussion of “renewable” energy systems is in order. Our pressing challenges make the prospect of heading down potential energy cul de sacs – especially to the explicit exclusion of nuclear fission alternatives – to be an unconscionable waste of our limited time and resources.¶ There is a vocal contingent of self-styled environmentalists who maintain that wind and solar power—along with other technologies such as wave and tidal power that have yet to be meaningfully developed—can (and should) provide all the energy that humanity demands. The more prominent names are well-known among those who deal with these issues: Amory Lovins, Lester Brown and Arjun Makhijani are three in particular whose organizations wield considerable clout with policymakers. The most recent egregious example to make a public splash, however, was a claim trumpeted with a cover story in Scientific American that all of our energy needs can be met by renewables (predominantly ‘technosolar’ – wind and solar thermal) by 2030. The authors of this piece—Mark Jacobson (Professor, Stanford) and Mark A. Delucchi (researcher, UC Davis)—were roundly critiqued [ii] online and in print.¶ An excellent treatment of the question of renewables’ alleged capacity to provide sufficient energy is a book by David MacKay [iii] called Sustainable Energy – Without the Hot Air. [iv] MacKay was a professor of physics at Cambridge before being appointed Chief Scientific Advisor to the Department of Energy and Climate Change in the UK. His book is a model of scientific and intellectual rigor.¶ Energy ideologies can be every bit as fervent as those of religion, so after suggesting Dr. MacKay’s book as an excellent starting point for a rational discussion of energy systems we’ll leave this necessary digression with a point to ponder. Whatever one believes about the causes of climate change, there is no denying that glaciers around the world are receding at an alarming rate. Billions of people depend on such glaciers for their water supplies. We have already seen cases of civil strife and even warfare caused or exacerbated by competition over water supplies. Yet these are trifling spats when one considers that the approaching demographic avalanche will require us to supply about three billion more people with all the water they need within just four decades.¶ There is no avoiding the fact that the water for all these people—and even more, if the glaciers continue to recede, as expected—will have to come from the ocean. That means a deployment of desalination facilities on an almost unimaginable scale. Not only will it take staggering amounts of energy just to desalinate such a quantity, but moving the water to where it is needed will be an additional energy burden of prodigious proportions. A graphic example can be seen in the case of California, its state water project being the largest single user of energy in California. It consumes an average of 5 billion kWh/yr, more than 25% of the total electricity consumption of the entire state of New Mexico [v].¶ Disposing of the salt derived from such gargantuan desalination enterprises will likewise take a vast amount of energy. Even the relatively modest desalination projects along the shores of the Persian Gulf have increased its salinity to the point of serious concern. Such circumscribed bodies of water simply won’t be available as dumping grounds for the mountains of salt that will be generated, and disposing of it elsewhere will require even more energy to move and disperse it. Given the formidable energy requirements for these water demands alone, any illusions about wind turbines and solar panels being able to supply all the energy humanity requires should be put to rest.¶ Energy Density and Reliability¶ Two of the most important qualities of fossil fuels that enabled their rise to prominence in an industrializing world is their energy density and ease of storage. High energy density and a stable and convenient long-term fuel store are qualities that makes it practical and economical to collect, distribute, and then use them on demand for the myriad of uses to which we put them. This energy density, and the dispatchability that comes from having a non-intermittent fuel source, are the very things lacking in wind and solar and other renewable energy systems, yet they are crucial factors in considering how we can provide reliable on-demand power for human society.¶ The supply of fossil fuels is limited, although the actual limits of each different type are a matter of debate and sometimes change substantially with new technological developments, as we’ve seen recently with the adoption of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) methods to extract natural gas from previously untapped subterranean reservoirs. The competition for fossil fuel resources, whatever their limitations, has been one of the primary causes of wars in the past few decades and can be expected to engender further conflicts and other symptoms of international competition as countries like India and China lead the developing nations in seeking a rising standard of living for their citizens. Even disregarding the climatological imperative to abandon fossil fuels, the economic, social, and geopolitical upheavals attendant upon a continuing reliance on such energy sources demands an objective look at the only other energy-dense and proven resource available to us: nuclear power.¶ We will refrain from discussing the much hoped-for chimera of nuclear fusion as the magic solution to all our energy needs, since it is but one of many technologies that have yet to be harnessed. Our concern here is with technologies that we know will work, so when it comes to harnessing the power of the atom we are confined to nuclear fission. The splitting of uranium and transuranic elements in fission-powered nuclear reactors is a potent example of energy density being tapped for human uses. Reactor-grade uranium (i.e. uranium enriched to about 3.5% U-235) is over 100,000 times more energy-dense than anthracite coal, the purest form of coal used in power generation, and nearly a quarter-million times as much as lignite, the dirty coal used in many power plants around the world. Ironically, one of the world’s largest producers and users of lignite is Germany, the same country whose anti-nuclear political pressure under the banner of environmentalism is globally infamous.¶ The vast majority of the world’s 440 commercial nuclear power plants are light-water reactors (LWRs) that use so-called enriched uranium (mentioned above). Natural uranium is comprised primarily of two isotopes: U-235 and U-238. The former comprises only 0.7% of natural uranium, with U-238 accounting for the remaining 99.3%. LWR technology requires a concentration of at least 3.5% U-235 in order to maintain the chain reaction used to extract energy, so a process called uranium enrichment extracts as much of the U-235 as possible from several kilos of natural uranium and adds it to a fuel kilo in order to reach a concentration high enough to enable the fission process. Because current enrichment technology is capable of harvesting only some of the U-235, this results in about 8-10 kilos of “depleted uranium” (DU) for every kilo of power plant fuel (some of which is enriched to 4% or more, depending on plant design). The USA currently has (largely unwanted) stockpiles of DU in excess of half a million tons, while other countries around the world that have been employing nuclear power over the last half-century have their own DU inventories.¶ Technological advances in LWR engineering have resulted in new power plants that are designated within the industry as Generation III or III+ designs, to differentiate them from currently-used LWRs normally referred to as Gen II plants. The European Pressurized Reactor (EPR), currently being built by AREVA in Finland, France and China, is an example of a Gen III design. It utilizes multiple-redundant engineered systems to assure safety and dependability. Two examples of Gen III+ designs are the Westinghouse/Toshiba AP-1000, now being built in China, and GE/Hitachi’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), expected to be certified for commercial use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the end of 2011. The distinguishing feature of Gen III+ designs is their reliance on the principle of passive safety, which would allow the reactor to automatically shut down in the event of an emergency without operator action or electronic feedback, due to inherent design properties. Relying as they do on the laws of physics rather than active intervention to intercede, they consequently can avoid the necessity for several layers of redundant systems while still maintaining ‘defense in depth’, making it possible to build them both faster and cheaper than Gen III designs—at least in theory. As of this writing we are seeing this playing out in Finland and China. While it is expected that first-of-a-kind difficulties (and their attendant costs) will be worked out so that future plants will be cheaper and faster to build, the experience to date seems to validate the Gen III+ concept. Within a few years both the EPR and the first AP-1000s should be coming online, as well as Korean, Russian and Indian designs, at which point actual experience will begin to tell the tale as subsequent plants are built.¶ The safety and economics of Gen III+ plants seem to be attractive enough to consider this generation of nuclear power to provide reasons for optimism that humanity can manage to provide the energy needed for the future. But naysayers are warning (with highly questionable veracity) about uranium shortages if too many such plants are built. Even if they’re right, the issue can be considered moot, for there is another player waiting in the wings that is so superior to even Gen III+ technology as to render all concerns about nuclear fuel shortages baseless.¶ The Silver Bullet¶ In the endless debate on energy policy and technology that seems to increase by the day, the phrase heard repeatedly is “There is no silver bullet.” (This is sometimes rendered “There is no magic bullet”, presumably by those too young to remember the Lone Ranger TV series.) Yet a fission technology known as the integral fast reactor (IFR), developed at Argonne National Laboratory in the 80s and 90s, gives the lie to that claim.¶ Below is a graph [vi] representing the number of years that each of several power sources would be able to supply all the world’s expected needs if they were to be relied upon as the sole source of humanity’s energy supply. The categories are described thusly:¶ Conventional oil: ordinary oil drilling and extraction as practiced today¶ Conventional gas: likewise¶ Unconventional oil (excluding low-grade oil shale). More expensive methods of recovering oil from more problematic types of deposits¶ Unconventional gas (excluding clathrates and geopressured gas): As with unconventional oil, this encompasses more costly extraction techniques¶ Coal: extracted with techniques in use today. The worldwide coal estimates, however, are open to question and may, in fact, be considerably less than they are ordinarily presented to be, unless unconventional methods like underground in situ gasification are deployed. [vii]¶ Methane Clathrates & Geopressured Gas: These are methane resources that are both problematic and expensive to recover, with the extraction technology for clathrates only in the experimental stage.¶ Low-grade oil shale and sands: Very expensive to extract and horrendously destructive of the environment. So energy-intensive that there have been proposals to site nuclear power plants in the oil shale and tar sands areas to provide the energy for extraction!¶ Uranium in fast breeder reactors (IFRs being the type under discussion here) Integral fast reactors can clearly be seen as the silver bullet that supposedly doesn’t exist. The fact is that IFRs can provide all the energy that humanity requires, and can deliver it cleanly, safely, and economically. This technology is a true game changer.

#### Resource scarcity is the strongest impetus for global war.

**Klare 2006** – professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College

(Michael, Mar 6 2006, “The coming resource wars” http://www.energybulletin.net/node/13605)

It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that global climate change and **dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict** over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, “will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer”—and this will “make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely.” Although not unprecedented, Reid’s prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. “The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur,” he declared. “We should see this as a warning sign.” Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid’s speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain’s equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and resource effects—rather than political orientation and ideology—as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy.

#### Water scarcity causes extinction

**Coddrington 10** (7/1, http://www.tomorrowtoday.co.za/2010/07/01/a-looming-crisis-world-water-wars/

PhD-Business Adminstration & Guest lecturer at top business schools, including the London Business School, Duke Corporate Education and the Gordon Institute of Business Science.)

People go to war when their way of life is threatened. I have written before about the many issues we face in the coming years that threaten our way of life. These include global warming/climate change, pollution, pandemics, nuclear bombs, intelligent machines, genetics, and more. More and more I am becoming convinced that the next major regional/global conflict will be over water. We are much more likely to have water wars in the next decade than nuclear ones. And I were to guess, I’d say that it is most likely to happen in around North East Africa. This is a region with its own internal issues. But it also has the foreign involvement of America, China, the Middle Eastern Arab nations, and (increasingly) Israel. Quite a potent mix… Last week, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia hosted the 18th regular meeting of the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin countries. In the lead up to the conference, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya, the five countries that are all upstream of Egypt and Sudan concluded a water-sharing treaty – to the exclusion of Egypt and Sudan. This has obviously reignited the longstanding dispute over water distribution of the world’s longest river in the world’s driest continent. Egypt is currently the largest consumer of Nile water and is the main beneficiary of a 1929 treaty which allows it to take 55.5 billion cubic metres of water each year, or 87% of the White and Blue Nile’s flow. By contrast, Sudan is only allowed to draw 18.5 billion cubic metres. On attaining independence Sudan refused to acknowledge the validity of the Nile water treaty and negotiated a new bilateral treaty with Egypt in 1959. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda also expressly refused to be bound by the treaty when they attained independence, but have not negotiated a new treaty since then. Under the 1929 treaty, Egypt has powers over upstream projects: The Nile Waters Agreement of 1929 states that no country in the Nile basin should undertake any works on the Nile, or its tributaries, without Egypt’s express permission. This gives Egypt a veto over anything, including the building of dams on numerous rivers in Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and by implication Egypt has control over agriculture, industry and infrastructure and basic services such as drinking water and electricity in these countries. This is surely untenable. But if the other countries broke the treaty, would Egypt respond with force? Since the late 1990s, Nile Basin states have been trying unsuccessfully to develop a revised framework agreement for water sharing, dubbed the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). In May 2009, talks held in Kinshasa broke down because Egypt and Sudan’s historical water quotas were not mentioned in the text of the proposed agreement. Water ministers met again in July 2009 in Alexandria, where Egypt and Sudan reiterated their rejection of any agreement that did not clearly establish their historical share of water. This is an untenable position. Upstream states accuse Egypt and Sudan of attempting to maintain an unfair, colonial-era monopoly on the river. Egyptian officials and analysts, however, defend their position, pointing out that Egypt is much more dependent on the river for its water needs than its upstream neighbours. Egypt claims that Nile water accounts for more than 95% of Egypt’s total water consumption, although they appear to be working hard to reduce both their water usage (they’re stopping growing rice, for example) and their dependence on the Nile.

### ANL Leadership – Kentucky

#### Argonne National Lab has a severe shortfall of quality scientists now – replacements for retirees aren’t going there

Grossenbacher 08[CQ Congressional Testimony, April 23, 2008, John, Laboratory Director Idaho National Laboratory, “NUCLEAR POWER,” SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY, Statement of John J. Grossenbacher Laboratory Director Idaho National Laboratory, Committee on House Science and Technology, Lexis]

While all of the programs I've highlighted for you individually and collectively do much to advance the state of the art in nuclear science and technology, and enable the continued global expansion of nuclear power, there is a great area of challenge confronting nuclear energy's future. As with most other technologically intensive U.S. industries - it has to do with human capital and sustaining critical science and technology infrastructure. My laboratory, its fellow labs and the commercial nuclear power sector all face a troubling reality - a significant portion of our work force is nearing retirement age and the pipeline of qualified potential replacements is not sufficiently full. Since I'm well aware of this committee's interests in science education, I'd like to update you on what the Department and its labs are doing to inspire our next generation of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians. Fundamentally, the Office of Nuclear Energy has made the decision to invite direct university partnership in the shared execution of all its R&D programs and will set aside a significant amount of its funds for that purpose. Already, nuclear science and engineering programs at U.S. universities are involved in the Office of Nuclear Energy's R&D, but this move will enable and encourage even greater participation in DOE's nuclear R&D programs. In addition, all NE-supported labs annually bring hundreds of our nation's best and brightest undergraduate and graduate students on as interns or through other mechanisms to conduct real research. For example, at INL we offer internships, fellowships, joint faculty appointments and summer workshops that focus on specific research topics or issues that pertain to maintaining a qualified workforce. This year, we are offering a fuels and materials workshop for researchers and a 10-week training course for engineers interested in the field of reactor operations. Last year, DOE designated INL's Advanced Test Reactor as a national scientific user facility, enabling us to open the facility to greater use by universities and industry and to supporting more educational opportunities. ATR is a unique test reactor that offers the ability to test fuels and materials in nine different prototypic environments operated simultaneously. With this initiative, we join other national labs such as Argonne National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in offering nuclear science and engineering assets to universities, industry and the broader nuclear energy research community. Finally, national laboratories face their own set of challenges in sustaining nuclear science and technology infrastructure - the test reactors, hot cells, accelerators, laboratories and other research facilities that were developed largely in support of prior missions. To obtain a more complete understanding of the status of these assets, the Office of Nuclear Energy commissioned a review by Battelle to examine the nuclear science and technology infrastructure at the national laboratories and report back later this year on findings and recommendations on a strategy for future resource allocation that will enable a balanced, yet sufficient approach to future investment in infrastructure.

#### Successful demonstration projects and collaborative interdisciplinary research is necessary to attract the best and brightest scientists to Argonne and fully complete products

**ANL 8** [Argonne National Laboratory INSTITUTIONAL PLAN FY2004-FY2008, operated by The University of Chicago for the¶ United States Department of Energy’s Office of Science]

Our planning is based on five key¶ assumptions:¶ • DOE’s national laboratories must act¶ increasingly as a synergistic system, with the¶ laboratories managing their collective¶ competencies, increasing their overall costeffectiveness, and partnering on major¶ initiatives among themselves and with the¶ private and academic sectors.¶ • Sponsors, regulators, and the public will¶ continue to require that we demonstrate¶ responsible corporate citizenship. This¶ imperative includes being a good and trustworthy neighbor, conducting operations costeffectively and responsibly, and meeting or¶ exceeding regulatory requirements.¶ • Argonne must compete on its merits for¶ federal funding, for the “best and brightest”¶ employees, and for the modern infrastructure¶ needed for future success. Important factors in¶ this competition will be scientific and¶ technological excellence, cost-effectiveness,¶ mission contributions, record of performance,¶ and a working environment that enables high¶ performance from a diverse and talented¶ workforce.¶ • Robust links with universities, industry,¶ federal laboratories, and the general scientific¶ and technical community (within the¶ United States and abroad) are essential if we¶ are to maintain our leadership and fully¶ exploit advances made throughout the world.¶ • Computing, computational science, and¶ communications and information technology¶ will advance rapidly, will become seamlessly¶ intertwined with experimental science, and¶ will thereby revolutionize many fields of¶ research and applications that are central to¶ the missions of DOE and Argonne.

#### Restarting IFR project at ANL spurs R+D in all sectors – collaborative research utilizing nuclear science insight key to effective programs

Blees 8 [Tom Blees 2008 “Prescription for the Planet: The painless remedy for our energy and environmental crises” Pg. 367]

21. Restart nuclear power development research at national labs like Argonne, concentrating on small reactor designs like the nuclear battery ideas discussed earlier. Given the cost and difficulty of extending power grids over millions of square miles of developing countries, the advantages of distributed generation in transforming the energy environment of such countries can hardly be exaggerated. It is a great pity that many of the physicists and engineers who were scattered when the Argonne IFR project was peremptorily terminated chose to retire. Rebuilding that brain trust should be, well, a no-brainer. If one but looks at the incredible challenges those talented people were able to meet, it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that a focus on small sealed reactor development could likewise result in similar success. Some of those working on the AHTR and other seemingly unneeded projects could well transition to R&D that fits into the new paradigm. Japanese companies are already eager to build nuclear batteries, and there should be every effort to work in concert with them and other researchers as we develop these new technologies. The options this sort of collaborative research would open up for the many varied types of energy needs around the world would be incalculable.

#### Argonne is key – other labs lack key catalyst infrastructure like the APS

**Fischetti** et all **9** [“Proceedings of the¶ Advanced Photon Source Renewal Workshop”¶ Hickory Ridge Marriott Conference Hotel¶ Presentation to Department of Energy¶ October 20-21, 2008¶ February 2009¶ Robert F. Fischetti Argonne National Laboratory, Biosciences Division;¶ APS Life Sciences Council representative¶ Paul H. Fuoss Argonne National Laboratory, Materials Science Division;¶ APS Users Organization representative¶ Rodney E. Gerig Argonne National Laboratory, Photon Sciences, Denis T. Keane Northwestern University;¶ DuPont-Northwestern-Dow Collaborative Access Team;¶ APS Partner User Council representative¶ John F. Maclean Argonne National Laboratory, APS Engineering Division¶ Dennis M. Mills, Chair Argonne National Laboratory, Photon Sciences, Dan A. Neumann National Institute of Standards and Technology; APS Scientific Advisory Committee representative¶ George Srajer Argonne National Laboratory, X-ray Science Division]

Scientific Community¶ An enhanced catalyst research beamline with capabilities for in situ XAFS, powder¶ diffraction, and kinetics measurements would benefit the entire catalysis community,¶ i.e., government research laboratories, academia, and industry. The beamline and its¶ staff would also serve as a focal point for expanding catalyst research to other APS¶ beamlines using advanced techniques not routinely applied to catalyst systems, e.g.,¶ SAXS, XES, RIXS, and HERF spectroscopy. Development of these latter methods¶ would position the APS as a leader in this area and attract leading scientists from all¶ over the world. It is expected that new users would initially characterize their materials and identify appropriate systems for specialized techniques.¶ Fig. 4. Cell for in situ x-ray absorption studies of fuel cell¶ catalysts. Standard Fuel Cell Technologies cell hardware¶ was machined to allow x-ray fluorescence studies of cathode electrocatalysts in an operating membrane-electrode¶ assembly (fuel cell). (Argonne National Laboratory photograph)Throughout the U.S. and the world, there are countless research groups working to¶ develop the enabling material in fuel cell catalysis: an oxygen reduction electrocatalyst that is less expensive and more durable than platinum [36-38]. A few of these¶ groups utilize synchrotron-based x-ray techniques to characterize their electrocatalysts; however, these studies are almost exclusively in environments mimicking the¶ reactive environment or are ex situ. A notable exception is the catalyst development¶ effort being led by Los Alamos National Laboratory, which encompasses many approaches and involves many university and national laboratories. As part of this project, Argonne researchers have developed the capability to characterize catalysts¶ containing low-atomic-number elements in an operating fuel cell using XAFS at the¶ APS. Utilizing this cell (Fig. 4), Argonne scientists have determined the active site in¶ a cobalt-containing catalyst. This capability would be extremely useful to other catalyst development teams around the country and the world, and it is envisioned that a¶ dedicated APS electrocatalysis beamline could be designed and made available to¶ these teams. The neutron source at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a beamline dedicated to studies of water transport in fuel cells, which¶ has provided invaluable information for fuel cell materials design. The APS beamline¶ would be the catalyst counterpart to the NIST beamline.¶ A molecular-level understanding of the interactions and correlations that occur in solution and between solution phases is essential to building a predictive capability of a¶ metal ion’s solubility, reactivity, kinetics, and energetics. Until the recent availability¶ of tunable, high-energy x-rays this understanding has been significantly limited by¶ the absence of structural probes. The APS, with its high flux of high-energy x-rays, is¶ the ideal synchrotron source to provide this new information, which is critical to the¶ advancement of solution chemistry. The utility of high-energy x-rays is currently¶ being demonstrated as part of an APS Partner User Proposal (PUP-52), and has received high visibility, including an Inorganic Chemistry feature cover [34]. This effort¶ is interesting a cadre of solution chemists that, to date, have not been part of the user¶ base at synchrotron facilities. The extension of high-energy capabilities from simple¶ PDF experiments to more complex liquid-liquid interfaces is expected to significantly¶ broaden this new interest group into areas including soft-matter studies.

#### APS key to safe nanotech development

**Lindsey 12** [“Scientist Uses Advance Photon Source to Study Nano-Scale Materials”, Laura, Director of Communications and Marketing, The College of Arts and Science, ¶ University of Missouri Columbia, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Jan 25, 2012]

Emerging new technologies utilize advanced materials that are assembled on exceedingly small scales of length. Because of their small size, these nano-scale materials often exhibit unique properties that can potentially be harnessed for applications and new science. In order to do this however, one needs a comprehensive understanding and characterization of their physical behavior on the atomic scale. Professor Paul Miceli is doing just that with the Advanced Photon Source (APS) at Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, Ill. The APS is the brightest source of x-rays in North America. This machine, which is one kilometer in circumference, allows scientists to collect data with unprecedented detail and in short time frames.¶ “The Advanced Photon Source’s x-ray beam is a billion times more intense than what I can see in my lab,” says Miceli.¶ He deposits thin layers, typically one atom thick, onto a surface from a vapor and then studies the structures by scattering the intense x-ray beam. By doing this, Miceli can determine how the atoms rearrange themselves on the surface so he can develop a better understanding of how nano-structures grow. Because of the unprecedented brightness of the x-ray beam, he is able to observe the materials as they grow in real time. In addition to the unique aspect of the x-ray beam, these studies are facilitated by an extensive ultra-high-vacuum growth-and-analysis chamber residing at the APS that was designed and developed by Miceli.¶ “My findings pertain to basic science about how atoms organize themselves,” says Miceli.¶ Because the x-ray beam can probe both the surface and the subsurface of the materials, Miceli’s research has made discoveries that could not be achieved by other techniques. For example, his research found that nano-clusters of missing atoms become incorporated into metallic crystals as they grow. This discovery is important because it brings new insight to theories of crystal growth, and it forces scientists to think about how atomic-scale mechanisms might lead to the missing atoms**.** Such effects, which also have practical implications for technological applications of nano-materials, have not been considered in current theories.¶ Other studies by Miceli have shown that the growth of some metallic nano-crystals cannot be explained by conventional theories of crystal growth. For example, quantum-mechanical effects on the conduction electrons in very small nano-crystals can change the energy of the crystal, and Miceli showed that the statistical mechanics of coarsening — when large crystals become larger while small crystals get smaller and vanish — does not follow the conventional theories that have worked successfully in materials science over the past 50 years. In fact, he has found that atoms can move over metallic nano-crystalline surfaces thousands of times faster than normal crystals, illustrating the many surprises and challenges that nano-scale materials present to scientists.

#### Successful analysis of nanotech creates disincentives competing R&D programs that culminate in arms races and grey goo

**Vandermolen, 2006** [Thomas D., BS, Louisiana Tech University; MA, Naval War College, officer in charge, Maritime Science and Technology Center, Yokosuka, Japan. He was previously assigned as a student at the Naval War College, Newport Naval Station, Rhode Island , http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/vandermolen.html]

Given the predilection of some hackers to create harmful computer viruses just for the thrill of it, it is not a great conceptual leap to imagine that “nanohackers” might decide to do the same with actual viruses. Perhaps the most frightening weapon of all—and thus no doubt a natural aspiration for potential nanohackers—is the infamous self-replicating gray-goo assemblers. Designing a gray-goo replicator would be an extra-ordinarily complex undertaking, however, and would require solving a multitude of extremely difficult engineering challenges; accordingly, some have argued that such an effort would be either impossible or highly unlikely.23 However, a dedicated and concerted attempt could conceivably fall short of the goal but still come up with something extremely dangerous and uncontrollable. To help ensure that the accidental creation of a gray-goo nanomachine remains a practical impossibility, Drexler’s Foresight Institute, a nonprofit organization he founded to “help prepare society for anticipated advanced technologies,” has prescribed guidelines for the safe development of NT. The institute recommends avoiding the use of replicators (i.e., assemblers) entirely, or at a minimum, designing them so that they cannot operate in a natural environment.24 Surveillance. An early application of MNT and NT will likely be inexpensive yet advanced microsurveillance platforms and tools. Mass produced, these disposable sensors could be used to blanket large areas, providing ubiquitous surveillance of the people within. Although obviously a battlefield concern, such surveillance could also be employed against any group or population, raising privacy and legality issues.25 Environmental Damage. MNT was originally perceived as a potential cure-all for a variety of environmental problems: nanobots in the atmosphere, for example, could physically repair the ozone layer or remove greenhouse gases. Recently, however, NT is increasingly seen as a potential environmental problem in its own right. Both NT and MNT are expected to produce large quantities of nanoparticles and other disposable nanoproducts, the environmental effects of which are currently unknown. This “nanolitter,” small enough to penetrate living cells, raises the possibility of toxic poisoning of organs, either from the nanolitter itself or from toxic elements attached to those nanoparticles.26 Indirect Threats We can expect severe disruptions from MNT since it gives “little or no advantage to the entrenched leader of an earlier technological wave.”27 Thus, it has the potential to radically upset the geopolitical playing field and pose powerful indirect threats to national security. Economic. Glimpsing the potential economic change triggered by MNT, Bill Joy has estimated that the wealth generated by fusing the information and physical worlds in the twenty-first century will equal a thousand trillion US dollars. As former US House Speaker Newt Gingrich observed, this is equivalent to “adding 100 US economies to the world market.”28 No one can be quite sure what an MNT-based economy would look like, but most speculations seem to agree that it would probably resemble the software economy with product design being the most difficult and expensive part of production—distribution and manufacturing being very inexpensive. A current analogy would be the millions of man-hours and dollars expended to create a computer word-processing program, compared to the ease with which users can “burn” copies of the program with their home computers and distribute them to friends. This analogy also points out the problems with piracy and intellectual property rights that would almost certainly plague an MNT economy.29 Essentially a highly advanced manufacturing process emphasizing distributed, low-cost manufacturing, MNT directly threatens economies that are heavily dependent on mass production. For example, China’s economic growth depends on using mass human labor to produce inexpensive, high-quality goods; in 2004 it provided over $18 billion worth of manufactured goods to the Wal-Mart department-store chain.30 But what will happen to China’s economy when Wal-Mart is able to use its own MNT-enabled fabrication facilities at home to produce higher-quality goods at even lower cost? For that matter, when consumers are able to produce their own high-quality, low-cost, custom-designed products in their own homes, who will need Wal-Mart? MNT is also expected to improve energy technologies such as solar energy by making solar cells tougher and much more efficient; combined with more efficient manufacturing and lighter but stronger vehicles (carbon-based materials can be up to 60 times as strong as steel), the requirements for petroleum--fueled energy supplies may decline rapidly. This would obviously have significant impact on oil companies and countries with oil-based economies; a correspondingly significant disruption is likely for the shipping industry, which last year ordered petroleum-shipping tankers valued at $77.2 billion.31 In addition, if distributed manufacturing were to allow most people or communities to construct what they need locally, international trade in physical items may also decrease, which casts some doubt as to whether globalization’s “peace through interdependence” effect will be as powerful in the future. Indeed, isolationism may become a more attractive policy option for many countries. Social. MNT’s medical applications may present some of the greatest social and ethical challenges in human history. Issues of cloning, genetically modified crops, abortion, and even cochlear implants have created political atomic bombs in recent years—MNT offers a completely new level of control over the human body and its processes. Accordingly, MNT has been embraced by the transhumanist movement, which advocates using technology to intellectually, physically, and psychologically improve the human form from its current “early” phase to a more advanced “posthuman” phase. Reactions to transhumanist concepts range from enthusiasm to indifference to outright fear and hostility. Historian Francis Fukuyama has declared transhumanism one of “the world’s most dangerous ideas.”32 Revolutionary. The final threat discussed here essentially results from a synergy of the other threats. Prof. Carlota Perez has advanced a model of technological revolution composed of two periods: (1) an installation period, during which the new techno-economic paradigm (TEP) gains increasing support from business, and (2) a deployment period, when the paradigm becomes the new norm. During the installation period, investor enthusiasm for the new TEP grows into a frenzy leading to an increasing gap between the “haves,” who are profiting from the new TEP, and the “have-nots,” who are still invested in the old TEP.33 Ultimately the investment frenzy forms a stock bubble, which bursts and brings on the turning point, usually a serious recession or even a depression. It is during the turning point that society and the judicial system are forced to reform and shift to meet the characteristics of the newly established TEP.34 If this model of technological revolution is correct—and it appears to match the last five technological revolutions well enough—then sometime during the development of MNT there will be a period of social, political, and economic unrest as the world system is pulled in two directions, embracing the new TEP versus clinging to the old. Given the staggering array of changes that MNT can bring, this period may be particularly stressful. Moreover, if MNT has already enabled some of its more dangerous potential applications—such as knowledge-based mass destruction—before proper political and social control structures have been established, this period could be catastrophic. What Strategy Should the United States Pursue? There are three basic strategy courses that the United States can pursue to deal with MNT: some form of deliberate international regulation and control, a “hands-off” approach that lets natural market forces dictate development and regulation, and a total ban on MNT development. International Regulation Two strategic approaches have relevance to international regulation of MNT: a hegemonic regulation imposed on the rest of the world by the United States, or a cooperative regulation overseen and enforced by an international organization. In either case, regulation will succeed—if it does—only by removing the majority of reasons nations will have to develop “uncontrolled” MNT. The basic premise in regulation should be to maximize public access to the benefits of MNT while eliminating independent (i.e., unregulated) development by minimizing access to, or interference with, the manufacturing technology itself. Ideally, freely providing the fruits of MNT to the world population will decrease the urge to develop unregulated alternative R&D programs and may simultaneously reduce the impetus for civil and/or resource-related conflicts by virtually eradicating the effects of poverty.35 The Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, a nonprofit think tank “concerned with the major societal and environmental implications of advanced nanotechnology,” has proposed a solution based around a nanofactory, a self-contained, highly secure MM system—in effect a highly advanced NT version of Gershenfeld’s desktop fab-lab apparatus.36 In this strategy, a closely guarded crash development program would be set up as soon as possible to develop the MM expertise required to build a nanofactory. It is essential that the nanofactory be developed before any possible competing MNT R&D program can come to fruition. Nanofactories would then be reproduced and distributed to nations and organizations (at some point possibly even to individuals) around the world, with emphasis placed on the most poverty-stricken regions. This “standard” nanofactory would be the only approved MNT manufacturing apparatus in the world and would even have internal limitations as to what could be constructed (no replicating assemblers, for example, except under very carefully controlled and monitored conditions). The advantages of this strategy are that it would offer a very large carrot—with the stick of regulation—in the form of the nanofactories. They could act as valid tools of humanitarian assistance, as leverage to prevent balking governments from pursuing their own rogue MNT development programs, or even as assurance that citizens’ needs are being met.37 The appeal of (and the demand for) the nanofactories would likely be enormous, particularly if they are produced for personal use. As Gershenfeld has noted about his conceptually similar fab-labs, “The killer app for personal fabrication is fulfilling individual desires rather than merely meeting mass-market needs.”38 By restricting nanofabrication methods to the standard nanofactory alone, the threat of gray-goo replicators would be minimized probably as much as is possible.39 Of course, there are disadvantages and risks in this strategy as well. Although widespread availability of nanofactories may reduce the desire for independent MNT R&D programs, “noncomplying” groups will try to hide their projects, thus making compliance even harder to verify. A significant risk is inherent in distributing the nanofactories; the units will require extensive, built-in security to protect both their inner physical workings and their operating software. Every hacker in the world (not to mention rogue organizations or governments) would be dying to crack nanofactory security. As a possible solution, the nanofactories must be programmed to destroy themselves if any attempt to access the classified areas of the unit occurs. This will lead to many, many broken nanofactories, but since they can be created relatively easily and cheaply, replacing them should not be an issue. In order for this strategy to have a decent chance of working, the United States should not attempt to assume a hegemonist stance and become the sole governing body of this system. Such a strategy would require a US‑only nanofactory development program. Furthermore, US efforts to dominate nanofactory technology will likely result in a “nanofactory race” that the United States could lose. Europe, Japan, Korea, China, and India are all conducting research into nanotechnology.40 However poorly the US national image is perceived throughout the world today, it could grow exponentially worse if the United States emerged as the sole MNT superpower. Therefore, for both technical and diplomatic reasons, the US primacy option is not the best solution. However, the United States should play a major role in establishing an international control organization to formulate and carry out the regulation strategy. Such an organization would have a better chance of actually developing a working nanofactory before competing efforts do so (although maintaining security would be horrendously difficult) as well as encouraging international legitimacy for the nanofactory plan, which in turn would likely result in greater buy-in by the world community. There are already some rumblings of international support for an arms-control-like containment structure for NT. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s special report on emerging technologies notes that “the need for control of these new technologies is more important now than in previous times of scientific development.”41 An organization like the one described here will be supremely difficult to establish and maintain and will require many years of diplomatic maneuvering to secure the proper agreements. As economist David Friedman notes, We don’t have a decent mechanism for centralized control on anything like the necessary scale. . . . Our decentralized mechanisms . . . depend on a world where there is some workable definition of property rights in which the actions that a person takes with his property have only slight external effects, beyond those that can be handled by contract. Technological progress might mean that no such definition exists—in which case we are left with zero workable solutions to the coordination problem.42 We must determine whether a workable solution exists and do so quickly. MNT could be 50 years away—then again, perhaps only 10. Do Nothing A valid alternative to the difficulties of regulation would be just letting the technology emerge as international-market and social forces dictate. Proponents of this strategy would rely on the involved parties (governments and multinational corporations conducting the majority of the R&D) to self--regulate the use and distribution of MNT. It is also possible that NT research will hit an intellectual brick wall and that the sheer difficulty of mastering nanoscience and its applications will slow the arrival of MNT such that a disruptive technological revolution never occurs or is drastically mitigated. This strategy holds the highest level of risk and is essentially a strategy of hopeful optimism. Multiple R&D programs will likely lead to multiple successes, which could very well lead to competition at the national military level as well as an MNT arms race. Multiple programs will mean varying levels of success, and the leading organization or state will be less likely to agree to regulation, particularly if such regulation would decrease or eliminate its lead. Given MNT’s tremendous potential for both peaceful and violent applications, controlling it with a “do nothing” strategy is analogous to providing nuclear reactors to every country under the assumption that none will use them to develop nuclear weapons. This strategy is unlikely to work and is in fact highly dangerous. Forbid Research and Development If MNT is so dangerous, then why allow it to be developed at all? Why invent another nuclear-bomb equivalent? Proponents of this strategy—such as the aforementioned Bill Joy—would advocate at a minimum the following: (1) adoption of a voluntary moratorium on the part of the scientific community against further MNT-related research, and ultimately, (2) the establishment of an international set of laws to forbid any R&D into MNT. Mr. Joy believes that the US unilateral abandonment of biological-warfare research is a “shining example” of the beginnings of such a strategy.43 In many ways this path is almost as dangerous as the do nothing strategy, except it might take longer for the dangers to emerge. There are two main problems with this strategy: verification and the dual-use nature of MNT. Even if every country agreed to the research ban, how would the other nations verify compliance? Unlike nuclear technology, MNT doesn’t require exotic materials that can be detected at a distance to create deadly weapons, and nuclear weapons can’t make millions of copies of themselves. Detecting non-state-actor programs would be even more difficult. We are left with the same problems faced by biological-weapons-control agencies, except that biological weapons are desired only by certain types of organizations. Virtually everyone—states, organizations, and individuals—will want NT. The potential benefits of MNT make it very attractive, particularly for poorer countries; it not only enables nations to make weapons easily, but also to purify and desalinate water, create inexpensive yet sturdy homes, provide distributed and reliable power, and possibly even expand or improve their food supplies. In short, MNT can help a poor country provide the basic necessities of life, which leaves no economic or military incentive to comply. In fact, such a strategy would only push development to noncomplying countries.44 This creates another problem: there would be no “complying” country capable of defending against a rogue, MNT-equipped nation unless complying countries maintained covert and illicit R&D programs. To paraphrase the National Rifle Association slogan, if nanotechnology is outlawed, only outlaws will have nanotechnology. Conclusion Based on the radically unprecedented direct and indirect threats to US national security posed by MNT, the United States should adopt a cooperative strategy of international regulation to control and guide R&D. The regulation should maximize the security of the processes but should not constrict innovation or liberal distribution of the technology’s benefits. The United States should immediately begin investigating forms of potential regulatory regimes for employment and begin laying the educational and diplomatic framework necessary to create the most appropriate international control group. As the most recent national defense strategy notes about disruptive technological advances, “As such breakthroughs can be unpredictable, we should recognize their potential consequences and hedge against them.”45 Whatever form US strategy takes to deal with MNT, it must not be reactive in nature. The threats enabled by MNT will likely evolve faster than bureaucratic solutions can cope.

#### Extinction

**CRN, 2004** [Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, “Disaster Scenarios,” 7-14, http://crnano.typepad.com/crnblog/2004/07/disaster\_scenar.html]

Now let's take a look at the dark side of advanced nanotechnology. This is the question posed by our recommended study #26: "What are the disaster/disruption scenarios?" (Note: We're not entirely dystopian -- see our earlier post on nano benefits.) This disaster/disruption topic is part of the third segment of CRN's thirty essential studies, on "Policies and Policymaking". Recommended in-depth studies in this section assume the existence of a general-purpose molecular manufacturing system. All preliminary answers are based on diamondoid nanofactory technology. Determine which of the following scenarios are plausible, and if so, whether they are survivable or preventable. Subquestion A: Massive war? Preliminary answer: Highly plausible. A nano arms race appears almost inevitable, and would probably be unstable as discussed in the military capabilities study (#20). A nano-enabled war would probably be lethal to many civilians. As pointed out by Tom McCarthy, "Military planners will seek a target that is large enough to find and hit, and that cannot be easily replaced. The natural choice, given the circumstances, will be civilian populations." Both full-scale war and unconventional/terroristic war will target civilians, who will be nearly impossible to defend without major lifestyle changes. It would be easy to deploy enough antipersonnel weapons to make the earth unsurvivable by unprotected humans. Subquestion B: Economic meltdown? Preliminary answer: It's easy to imagine a nanofactory package that allows completely self-sufficient living, off grid and without money, while retaining modern first-world comfort levels. However, a modest amount of advertising would make this unattractive to most people. As discussed elsewhere, we can expect a large fraction of jobs in a wide range of areas related to manufacturing, extraction, and supply to disappear. This problem is already appearing with increased automation and efficiency, but could rapidly get worse. The factors that lead to economic meltdown also provide increased self-sufficiency, so it ought to be survivable in the absence of oppressive policy (maintaining artificial scarcity while removing sources of income). Secondary effects from social disruption may be problematic but ought to be survivable. Attempts to subsidize dead-end jobs will probably be harmful in the long run. Some amount of economic disruption should be expected. Social engineering to reduce the stigma of unemployment (why should unearned income be good for the rich and bad for the poor?) and policy to allow displaced workers to share in the benefits of the new technology will be helpful. Subquestion C: Runaway self-replication? Preliminary answer: Also known as the 'gray goo' scenario, this is perhaps the earliest and most famous concern related to molecular manufacturing. Contrary to early statements by Drexler, this could not happen accidentally; manufacturing systems, even early lab versions, will not remotely have the capability to become self-contained free-range self-replicators. However, the deliberate combination of a very small nanofactory, a very small chemical plant to convert organic chemicals into feedstock, and some robotics, could be a substantial nuisance or even threat. Eventually, the technology will develop to the point where it will be easy to make a device that requires active cleanup to avoid widespread environmental damage. The prevalence of computer viruses implies that creating such devices will be attractive to certain personality types, and eventually within their capability. So, although runaway self-replication is not a first-rank concern, eventually it will need to be studied, and some combination of prevention and cleanup capability probably will have to be implemented. In theory, this could pose an existential threat.

### Solvency

#### Contention 4: Solvency

#### Current loan guarantees aren’t enough – more on new reactor types are key to catalyze nuclear construction and solve nuclear leadership

**Belogolova 12** [National Journal Daily, July 19, 2012, “U.S. Nuclear Industry Seen Needing a Boost”, Olga Belogolova, lexis, khirn]

A robust nuclear-energy industry should be a high priority for the country's energy and national-security policy given the importance of the sector to global nonproliferation, according to a new report released on Thursday by the Bipartisan Policy Center's Nuclear Initiative . Specifically, the United States needs to lead in the licensing and development **of new reactors** and on safety reforms, management of spent nuclear fuel, the nuclear-export market, and research and development in the nuclear sector, according to the report led by former Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M., and former Energy Department Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Warren (Pete) Miller. But leadership on nuclear issues could prove to be a challenge for the United States. Although the country has long led the charge on civilian nuclear power, the combination of a slowed electricity market, the lack of sweeping climate legislation, a natural-gas boom, and last year's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan have created obstacles for the development of new nuclear power in the United States in recent years. While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this year has approved four new reactors for the Vogtle and Summer nuclear plants in Georgia and South Carolina, respectively, there are likely to only be a few more plants licensed in the United States in the near future. The story is very different on the international level. After Fukushima, countries such as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and of course Japan have paused or slowed down their nuclear-energy development, but that hasn't stopped the rest of the world. Many other nations such as China, India, South Korea, and Russia have reaffirmed plans to expand their fleets of nuclear reactors, while some countries in the Middle East have even announced plans to develop nuclear energy for the first time. China alone, which has 26 new reactors under development, is expected to account for 40 percent of planned nuclear construction globally. The United States might be a leader now, accounting for nearly one-third of global nuclear generation, but it won't be long before others come out ahead of us, especially given how long it takes to construct new reactors, Domenici and Miller explained. "It will be increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain its technological leadership without some near-term domestic demand for new construction," they write in the report. In order to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States **needs to remain involved in everything** that happens to nuclear materials, from the export of nuclear fuel for energy use to the disposal of spent fuel. Given the global picture, Domenici and Miller suggest a shift in U.S. policies in order to ensure that the U.S. nuclear energy program is not stuck at a near-standstill. "Market signals alone are unlikely to result in a diverse fuel mix, so helping to maintain and improve a range of electricity supply options remains a role for federal policy," the two write in the report. "In particular, U.S. policy should be aimed at helping to preserve nuclear energy as an important technology option for near- or longer-term deployment." The vast shale-gas reserves in the United States and new technology to tap them will probably keep natural-gas prices low for the foreseeable future, making financing of more expensive nuclear power more difficult. **Federal loan guarantees have long been viewed as crucial to growing the nuclear industry**, but the Energy Department has dragged its feet on these conditional loans, especially after the bankruptcy of the federally funded solar firm Solyndra so much so that some companies have decided not to wait around and see what happens. Southern Company, which is building the first two new reactors to be approved in decades at its Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia, on Thursday said that it is now considering doing so without federal support. The company had been waiting for an $8.33 billion loan guarantee to build the two new reactors, but Southern CEO Tom Fanning told Reuters on Thursday that talks with DOE were going slowly and they might not be willing to wait any longer.

#### Loan guarantees attract private capital – increases are key

**Peskoe 12** [Ari Peskoe, associate in the law firm of McDermott Will and Emery LLP and focuses his practice on regulatory, legislative, compliance, and transactional issues related to energy markets, 4-20-2012, "A Solution Looking For a Problem: Building More Nuclear Reactors after Vogtle," The Electricty Journal, vol 25 issue 3, Science Direct]

Given the checkered history of reactor construction projects,56 private lenders are understandably skittish about lending billions of dollars to develop a new reactor. Construction of the Vogtle and SCANA reactors will be a critical test, and significant cost overruns on these two projects could doom the prospects for construction of additional reactors. Even if the construction of Vogtle and SCANA are on budget, it will likely still be difficult for future project developers to raise enough debt financing without government support.57 Federal loan guarantees shift “a large part of the learning costs and construction risks” from private lenders to the federal government by ensuring that lenders receive payment in the event that the developer defaults on repayments.58 Appropriations for the guarantees authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 will soon run out, so future guarantees will require congressional action.59¶ Loan guarantees cost the federal government little or nothing unless there is an event of default.60 Creating a long-term guarantee program would be entirely consistent with the government's historic role in accepting risks and liabilities of nuclear power. Although it has not been implemented effectively, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 requires the DOE to transport nuclear waste from privately owned reactors to permanent government storage facilities.61 Concerned about a “cloud of bankruptcy” hanging over its operations,62 the nascent nuclear industry pushed Congress to pass the Price-Anderson Act in 1957, which indemnifies the industry against claims arising from a nuclear incident. Both the NWPA and the Price-Anderson Act socialize costs of nuclear energy. In the case of the NWPA, the industry pays the DOE a tenth of a penny for each kilowatt-hour of nuclear energy sold to fund waste disposal activities.63 The Price-Anderson Act also requires generators to contribute to a fund, but the federal treasury would likely cover much of the liabilities associate with a nuclear disaster.64

#### And, loan guarantees reduce financial uncertainty and boost investment

Adams 10—Publisher of Atomic insights Was in the Navy for 33 years Spent time at the Naval Academy Has experience designing and running small nuclear plants (Rod, Concrete Action to Follow Strongly Supportive Words On Building New Nuclear Power Plants, atomicinsights.com/2010/01/concrete-action-to-follow-strongly-supportive-words-on-building-new-nuclear-power-plants.html)

Loan guarantees are important to the nuclear industry because the currently available models are large, capital intensive projects that need a stable regulatory and financial environment. The projects can be financed because they will produce a regular stream of income that can service the debt and still provide a profit, but that is only true if the banks are assured that the government will not step in at an inopportune time to halt progress and slow down the revenue generation part of the project. Bankers do not forget history or losses very easily; they want to make sure that government decisions like those that halted Shoreham, Barnwell’s recycling facility or the Clinch River Breeder Reactor program are not going to be repeated this time around. For the multi-billion dollar projects being proposed, bankers demand the reassurance that comes when the government is officially supportive and has some “skin in the game” that makes frivolous bureaucratic decisions to erect barriers very expensive for the agency that makes that decision. I have reviewed the conditions established for the guarantee programs pretty carefully – at one time, my company ([Adams Atomic Engines, Inc.](http://www.atomicengines.com)) was considering filing an application. The loan conditions are strict and do a good job of protecting government interests. They were not appropriate for a tiny company, but I can see where a large company would have less trouble complying with the rules and conditions. The conditions do allow low or no cost intervention in the case of negligence or safety issues, but they put the government on the hook for delays that come from bad bureaucratic decision making.

#### Manhattan Project approach key to catalyze quick investment in IFRs – perception is non-unique, there is government investment now

**Kirsch 9** [Steve Kirsch, founder and CEO of multiple tech companies collectively worth over %241 billion and MS in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from MIT, November 2009, "Why We Should Build an Integral Fast Reactor Now,"]

Q. If this is really so good, how come GE isn't building S-PRISM on their own nickel?¶ Nobody wants to risk it since it isn't a slam dunk. You don't get a reward if you solve global warming. And government funding doesn't seem to be so easy. DOE tried to get funding for GNEP (which included IFR technology) and got shot down (so far).¶ GE is a large conservative corporation. They already service a fleet of lightwater reactors, are building more of them around the world, and have the promise of yet more. It's hard enough in this country to move into new levels of reactor technology without trying to leapfrog straight into the 4th generation. Their 3rd generation ESBWR is in the 5th round of NRC certification, whereas the S-PRISM (a souped up and more developed version of the PRISM) isn't at the starting gate. These things take years at the glacial pace of the NRC, though of course if President Obama decided to go all Manhattan project on it we could most definitely get there quickly enough. If GE started pushing 4th generation breeder reactors, can you imagine the hue and cry from the antie groups? What's their incentive to do that? If they're convinced that ultimately we'll end up at 4th generation reactors anyway and they can make plenty of dough and keep a low profile just taking the go slow approach, don't you imagine that's exactly what they'll do? Besides, conceivably another country with whom we have nuclear technology sharing agreements might very well certify and build it before the NRC ever gets out of the starting gate, which would make it much easier for the eventual NRC certification. Q. If this is really so good, how come someone in government isn't trying to get it restarted?¶ The DOE is attempting to resuscitate fast-reactor technology, as part of the GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) initiative. See¶ http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepPRs/gnepPR011007.html, and http://www.gnep.energy.gov/.¶ The IFR is one form of fast-reactor technology (metallic fuel with pyroprocessing), but there are others -- inferior, according to the IFR scientists. The important thing these days is to get the U.S. back into a leadership role in the development and management of nuclear power, recognizing that recycling in fast reactors is necessary if the long-lived waste is to be consumed, and if the full energy potential of the uranium is to be exploited. The GNEP would resuscitate fast-reactor technology in this country.

#### Plan is modeled internationally

**Blees et al** 11 (Tom Blees1, Yoon Chang2, Robert Serafin3, Jerry Peterson4, Joe Shuster1, Charles Archambeau5, Randolph Ware3, 6, Tom Wigley3,7, Barry W. Brook7, 1Science Council for Global Initiatives, 2Argonne National Laboratory, 3National Center for Atmospheric Research, 4University of Colorado, 5Technology Research Associates, 6Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences, 7(climate professor) University of Adelaide, "Advanced nuclear power systems to mitigate climate change (Part III)," 2/24/11) [http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/](http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/-http%3A//bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/)

There are many compelling reasons to pursue the rapid demonstration of a full-scale IFR, as a lead-in to a subsequent global deployment of this technology within a relatively short time frame. Certainly the urgency of climate change can be a potent tool in winning over environmentalists to this idea. Yet political expediency—due to widespread skepticism of anthropogenic causes for climate change—suggests that the arguments for rolling out IFRs can be effectively tailored to their audience. Energy security—especially with favorable economics—is a primary interest of every nation.¶ The impressive safety features of new nuclear power plant designs should encourage a rapid uptick in construction without concern for the spent fuel they will produce, for all of it will quickly be used up once IFRs begin to be deployed. It is certainly manageable until that time. Burying spent fuel in non-retrievable geologic depositories should be avoided, since it represents a valuable clean energy resource that can last for centuries even if used on a grand scale.¶ Many countries are now beginning to pursue fast reactor technology without the cooperation of the United States, laboriously (and expensively) re-learning the lessons of what does and doesn’t work. If this continues, we will see a variety of different fast reactor designs, some of which will be less safe than others. Why are we forcing other nations to reinvent the wheel? Since the USA invested years of effort and billions of dollars to develop what is arguably the world’s safest and most efficient fast reactor system in the IFR, and since several nations have asked us to share this technology with them (Russia, China, South Korea, Japan, India), there is a golden opportunity here to develop a common goal—a standardized design, and a framework for international control of fast reactor technology and the fissile material that fuels them. This opportunity should be a top priority in the coming decade, if we are serious about replacing fossil fuels worldwide with sufficient pace to effectively mitigate climate change and other environmental and geopolitical crises of the 21st century.

#### IFR’s S-PRISM design is really safe

**Blees et al 11** (Tom Blees1, Yoon Chang2, Robert Serafin3, Jerry Peterson4, Joe Shuster1, Charles Archambeau5, Randolph Ware3, 6, Tom Wigley3,7, Barry W. Brook7, 1Science Council for Global Initiatives, 2Argonne National Laboratory, 3National Center for Atmospheric Research, 4University of Colorado, 5Technology Research Associates, 6Cooperative Institute for Research in the Environmental Sciences, 7(climate professor) University of Adelaide, "Advanced nuclear power systems to mitigate climate change (Part III)," 2/24/11) http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/02/24/advanced-nuclear-power-systems-to-mitigate-climate-change/

Metal Fuel: The Ultimate Safety Valve¶ One of the most important of the many superlatives of the IFR is its use of a metal fuel comprised of uranium, plutonium and zirconium, and the ingenious manner in which the Argonne team solved the problems of fuel expansion and fuel fabrication, as well as the potentially dangerous overheating scenario. Unlike the fuel fabrication of oxide-fueled reactors that requires the dimensions of the fuel pellets to be uniform to very exacting tolerances, the metal fuel for the IFR can be simply injected into molds and then cooled and inserted into metal tubes (cladding) with a great deal of dimensional tolerance, with a sodium bond filling any voids. If an accident situation occurs that would cause the core to overheat, such as a loss of coolant flow accident, the metal fuel itself will expand, causing neutron leakage to terminate the chain reaction, relying on nothing but the laws of physics.¶ The passive safety characteristics of the IFR were tested in EBR-II on April 3, 1986, against two of the most severe accident events postulated for nuclear power plants. The first test (the Loss of Flow Test) simulated a complete station blackout, so that power was lost to all cooling systems. The second test (the Loss of Heat Sink Test) simulated the loss of ability to remove heat from the plant by shutting off power to the secondary cooling system. In both of these tests, the normal safety systems were not allowed to function and the operators did not interfere. The tests were run with the reactor initially at full power.¶ In both tests, the passive safety features simply shut down the reactor with no damage. The fuel and coolant remained within safe temperature limits as the reactor quickly shut itself down in both cases. Relying only on passive characteristics, EBR-II smoothly returned to a safe condition without activation of any control rods and without action by the reactor operators. The same features responsible for this remarkable performance in EBR-II will be incorporated into the design of future IFR plants, regardless of how large they may be [xi].¶ While the IFR was under development, a consortium of prominent American companies led by General Electric collaborated with the IFR team to design a commercial-scale reactor based upon the EBR-II research. This design, currently in the hands of GE, is called the PRISM (Power Reactor Innovative Small Module). A somewhat larger version (with a power rating of 380 MWe) is called the S-PRISM. As with all new nuclear reactor designs (and many other potentially hazardous industrial projects), probabilistic risk assessment studies were conducted for the S-PRISM. Among other parameters, the PRA study estimated the frequency with which one could expect a core meltdown. This occurrence was so statistically improbable as to defy imagination. Of course such a number must be divided by the number of reactors in service in order to convey the actual frequency of a hypothetical meltdown. Even so, if one posits that all the energy humanity requires were to be supplies solely by IFRs (an unlikely scenario but one that is entirely possible), the world could expect a core meltdown about once every 435,000 years [xii]. Even if the risk assessment understated the odds by a factor of a thousand, this would still be a reactor design that even the most paranoid could feel good about.

#### IFR fuel can be obtained from seawater – makes energy infinite

Archambeauet all 11 [The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR): An Optimized Source for Global Energy Needs, Charles Archambeau, Science Council for Global Initiatives, Randolph Ware, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, Tom Blees, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Barry Brook, University of Adelaide, Jerry Peterson, Argonne National Laboratory,¶ Yoon Chang, University of Colorado, February 2011]

The pyroprocessor unit can be used as a stand-alone system to process LWR waste from¶ any open cycle reactor into fuel for IFR closed cycle reactors. The depleted Uranium¶ produced by the enrichment of Uranium ore can also be processed to generate additional¶ IFR fuel. The current amount of LWR waste, plus the amount of depleted Uranium in¶ stock piles world-wide, is sufficient to supply fuel to all the IFR plants needed and in fact¶ to supply the world's required energy for about 1000 years.3 The problem of storage of¶ current LWR waste and depleted Uranium waste from refining of mined Uranium is¶ therefore solved by pyroprocessor generation of IFR fuel, along with a relatively small¶ mass of short-lived fission products which can be easily and safely stored. Uranium can¶ also be extracted from sea water using IFR power sources (see, for example, Cohen, 1983).¶ Because Uranium is constantly added to seawater by erosion processes, then the IFR fuel¶ source is effectively unlimited. Therefore, IFR power plants do not require fuel from¶ regular mining operations, as does a LWR powered plant, but can use pyroprocessor¶ generated fuel essentially indefinitely. In this sense the IFR is a "renewable" energy source¶ which can be expanded, essentially indefinitely, to meet demand.

#### Government support is vital-~--it overcomes financial barriers to nuclear that the market cannot

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Over the course of the last decade, it appeared that concerns about carbon emissions, aging coal fleets, and a desire for a diversified generation base were reviving the U.S. utility sector interest in building new nuclear plants. Government and companies worked closely on design certification for Generation III reactors, helping to streamline the licensing process. New loan guarantees from the federal government targeted for nuclear projects were created as part of the 2005 Energy Policy Act. Consequently, **dozens of projects entered the planning stages**. Following more than 30 years in which no new units were built, it looked as if the U.S. nuclear industry was making significant headway. However, it is yet to be seen how many new nuclear projects will actually make it beyond blueprints due to one of the largest barriers to new nuclear construction: financing risk. Large upfront capital costs, a complex regulatory process, uncertain construction timelines, and technology challenges result in a risk/return profile for nuclear projects that is unattractive for the capital markets without supplementary government or ratepayer support. To many investors, nuclear seems too capital-intensive. Nuclear energy has attractive qualities in comparison to other sources of electricity. A primary motivation to pursue the development of nuclear energy in the U.S. has been its low operating fuel costs compared with coal, oil, and gas-fired plants. Over the lifetime of a generating station, fuel makes up 78% of the total costs of a coal-fired plant. For a combined cycle gas-fired plant, the figure is 89%. According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, the costs for nuclear are approximately 14%, and include processing, enrichment, and fuel management/disposal costs. Today’s low natural gas prices have enhanced the prospects of gas-fired power, but utilities still remain cautious about over-investing in new natural gas generation given the historical volatility of prices. Furthermore, nuclear reactors provide baseload power at scale, which means that these plants produce continuous, reliable power to consistently meet demand. In contrast, renewable energies such as wind or solar are only available when the wind blows or the sun shines, and without storage, these are not suitable for large-scale use. Finally, nuclear energy produces no carbon emissions, which is an attractive attribute for utilities that foresee a carbon tax being imposed in the near future. Given nuclear’s benefits, one may wonder why no new nuclear units have been ordered since the 1970s. This hiatus is in great part due to nuclear’s high cost comparative to other alternatives, and its unique set of risks. As a result, financing nuclear has necessitated government involvement, as the cost of nuclear typically exceeds that of the cost of conventional generation technologies such as coal and natural gas fired generation on a levelized cost of energy (LCOE) basis. LCOE represents the present value of the total cost of building and operating a generating plant over its financial life, converted to equal annual payments and amortized over expected annual generation, and is used to compare across different power generation technologies. For both regulated utilities and independent power producers, nuclear is unattractive if the levelized cost exceeds that of other technologies, since state utility commissions direct regulated utilities to build new capacity using the technology with the lowest LCOE. Furthermore, capital costs are inherently high, ranging in the billions or tens of billions of dollars, and are compounded by financing charges during long construction times. **Without government support, financing nuclear is currently not possible in the capital markets**. Recently, Constellation Energy and NRG separately pulled the plug on new multi-billion dollar plants, citing financing problems. Projects, however, will get done on a one-off basis. Southern Company’s Vogtle Plant in Eastern Georgia is likely to be the sponsor of the first new generation to be constructed, taking advantage of local regulatory and federal support. Two new reactors of next-generation technology are in the permitting stage, which will bring online 2,200 megawatts (MW) of new capacity, and will cost $14 billion. The project will take advantage of tax credits and loan guarantees provided in the 2005 Energy Policy Act.

#### **IFR’s are really cheap – existing coal plants can be retrofitted – solves warming**

Archambeauet all 11 [The Integral Fast Reactor (IFR): An Optimized Source for Global Energy Needs, Charles Archambeau, Science Council for Global Initiatives, Randolph Ware, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, Tom Blees, National Center for Atmospheric Research, Barry Brook, University of Adelaide, Jerry Peterson, Argonne National Laboratory,¶ Yoon Chang, University of Colorado, February 2011]

The new features of the IFR systems with pyroprocessing are such that the cost of¶ electrical energy production is estimated to be quite low, in the range below $.01 per¶ kilowatt-hour for an IFR. (For comparison, natural gas fuel cost was at $.05 per kilowatthour,¶ and coal was at about $.03 per kilowatt-hour, while LWR nuclear power was at $.02¶ per kilowatt-hour.) The G.E. estimated building cost of the S-Prism reactor (Fletcher,¶ 2006) is $1300/kw, where this cost assumes some cost savings due to mass production and¶ modular construction. For a commercial level gigawatt reactor (using 3 modular S-Prism¶ reactors with 380 MW of power from each) the cost would total $1.3 billion dollars per¶ one gigawatt plant. These nuclear plants are essentially carbon dioxide emissions free, and¶ in general produce no atmospheric pollution. Further, all the Uranium fuel can be provided¶ from processing the stock piles of spent and depleted Uranium fuel. Therefore, no Uranium¶ mining and associated pollution will occur. Likewise, IFR waste material is minimal and¶ short-lived so that no pollution will occur from this source. Consequently, significant¶ reduction in greenhouse gases, and a variety of other dangerous pollutants, can be¶ immediately achieved if these IFR plants are used to replace the furnaces in coal burning¶ power plants which exist in profusion world-wide. Here the infrastructure at existing coal fueled plants, such as electric power lines, water sources and conduits, steam turbines, etc.,¶ can all be simply converted and used in the nuclear powered plant. Hence, costs of¶ building complete power plants and their electrical connections to the grid can be¶ minimized while the impact on global warming and pollution related diseases can be¶ maximized by replacing the worst of the polluters. Further, it is urgent that we move¶ quickly to strongly and immediately control CO2 gas emissions to drastically slow global¶ warming. Clearly, the costs are not prohibitive since construction of one large stand-alone¶ pyroprocessing plant, at about 6 billion dollars, and only about 10 of the large IFR¶ powered plants, costing under 20 billion dollars, will go a long way toward strongly¶ dampening the massive production of CO2 emissions from existing electricity power plants¶ in the U.S.