### 2NC – A2 Perm Do Both

#### Links to politics – Only PRIOR court action solves

Garrett and Stutz, 2005 (Robert T. Garrett and Terrence Stutz, Dallas Morning News, “School finance now up to court Justices to decide if overhaul needed after bills fail in Legislature” lexis)

That could foreshadow the court's response to a chief argument by state attorneys – that the court should butt out and leave school finance to the Legislature. A court finding against the state would put the ball back in the hands of lawmakers, who have tended to put off dealing with problems in schools, prisons and mental health facilities until state or federal judges forced them to act. "It's the classic political response to problems they don't want to deal with," said Maurice Dyson, a school finance expert and assistant law professor at Southern Methodist University. "There is no better political cover than to have a court rule that something must be done, which allows politicians to say their hands are tied."

#### Mootness – the CP wont happen in a world of the perm

Lee, 1992 (Evan Tsen Lee, Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Harvard Law Review, January, lexis)

ONE of the major impediments to the judicial protection of collective rights 1 is the group of doctrines falling under the rubric [\*606] of "justiciability" -- standing, ripeness, and mootness. 2 These are the gatekeeper doctrines; each regulates a different dimension of entrance to the federal courts. The law of standing considers whether the plaintiff is the proper person to assert the claim, the law of ripeness ensures that the plaintiff has not asserted the claim too early, 3 and the law of mootness seeks to prevent the plaintiff from asserting the claim too late. 4 By keeping certain public-minded plaintiffs and public-law claims out of federal court, these doctrines have shifted much of the battle for collective rights to the more steeply pitched fields of state courts or the political process. 5 In particular, defendants in public law litigation have had considerable success keeping such cases out of the federal courts by invoking the "case or controversy" requirement [\*607] of Article III. 6 Under current Supreme Court precedent, if a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that she possesses an ongoing "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation, a federal court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on the merits. 7 No amount of judicial discretion can overcome this jurisdictional defect, because Article III demarcates the outer limit of federal court power. 8 As a result, many attempts to establish entitlements to important collective rights fail before courts can give them full consideration.

#### Even if the ruling happens, it would not make a constitutional claim.

Lee, 1992 (Evan Tsen Lee, Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Harvard Law Review, January, lexis)

### Doubtless some will point to Supreme Court opinions characterizing decisions in moot cases as advisory opinions and stating that the [\*651] court has no jurisdiction to proceed in moot cases. A few such opinions exist, 270 although many more imply that the mootness and advisory opinions doctrines are distinct (but related) ideas. 271 The most satisfying way to view the present doctrinal relationship of mootness, advisory opinions, and Article III is as follows: decisions in moot cases are currently prohibited because they are said to exceed the jurisdictional grants of Article III; additionally, decisions in moot cases implicate the prudential component of the advisory opinions doctrine, but they do not implicate the doctrine's constitutional core. Thus, the constitutional dimension to the prohibition against deciding moot cases stems directly from Article III and not from an analogy to advisory opinions. If the Court were to repudiate its position that the mootness doctrine is constitutionally compelled, the analogy to advisory opinions would pose no independent constitutional obstacle to deciding moot cases on the merits

### 2NC – A2 Perm Do the CP

#### First, it severs the agent. “The” means whole [USFG].

Merriam-Websters, 2010 (Online dictionary)

used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

#### Courts can’t reduce—they rely on acquiescence.

Hanson et al, 2006 (Jon D. Hanson, professor at Harvard Law School; and Adam Benforado, Frank Knox Fellow at Cambridge University, “The drifters: Why the supreme court makes justices more liberal” January/February, online)

It would be a mistake to believe that the only situation that influences justices comes from within the Supreme Court building or individual judges’ limited spheres of interaction. The mechanisms designed to keep the judiciary independent of the other branches of government are necessarily incomplete, and there is good evidence that judges frequently interpret laws in ways that align with the particular policy desires of sitting members of Congress and the current president. This is not surprising given the forces that Congress and the president can bring to bear on the judiciary—including limiting or even stripping jurisdiction in certain areas, altering the size of federal courts, and instituting impeachment hearings. Just as important is the fact that the court cannot implement its orders without the acquiescence and assistance of other government actors. In addition, lower-court judges may be constrained by pressures not to be overruled by higher courts or the need to stake out particular positions in order to improve their chances of promotion within the judiciary.

#### Also, unenforceability.

Treanor and Sperling, 1993 (William Michael Treanor, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University; and Gene B. Sperling, J.D., Yale Law School, Columbia Law Review, December, lexis)

Commentators have generally agreed with the overwhelming majority of courts that an overruling decision has the effect of automatically reviving statutes. For example, Erica Frohman Plave observed that revival was a necessary function of the limited scope of a judicial determination of unconstitutionality: "Such laws found unconstitutional are merely unenforceable until such time as they are found valid." 54 Professor Gerald Gunther has pronounced Attorney General Cummings's conclusion that Adkins "simply "suspended' enforcement" 55 of the District of Columbia minimum wage statute "persuasive," 56 and Professor Melville Nimmer similarly declared that "it seems clear that Attorney General Homer Cummings' opinion was correct." 57 Finally, Professor Oliver Field noted that a statute that has been found unconstitutional becomes enforceable when the case in which it was held unconstitutional is reversed because "a declaration of unconstitutionality does not operate as a repeal of a statute." 58 [\*1916]

#### ‘reduce’ modifies ‘restriction’ – means there must be legislative action

Hill and Hill (Gerald, Executive Director of the California Governor’s Housing Commission, Practice law for more than four decades, Kathleen, M.A. in political psychology from California State University. She was also a Fellow in Public Affairs with the prestigious Coro Foundation) 2005 “restriction” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/restriction

restriction n. any limitation on activity, by statute, regulation or contract provision. In multi-unit real estate developments, condominium and cooperative housing projects, managed by homeowners' associations or similar organizations are usually required by state law to impose restrictions on use. Thus, the restrictions are part of the "covenants, conditions and restrictions," intended to enhance the use of common facilities and property, recorded and incorporated into the title of each owner.

### 2NC Solvency – Offshore Moratorium

#### Courts solve offshore drilling moratoria

Edward W. Thrasher (J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School) Spring 2012 “Cleaning Up the Muck: A TAKINGS ANALYSIS OF THE MORATORIUM ON DEEPWATER DRILLING FOLLOWING THE BP OIL SPILL” 77 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1285, Lexis

II. Legal Fallout The moratorium also sparked significant legal debate. On the extreme end of the spectrum, the moratorium was condemned as everything from a blatant executive overreach lacking reason and spurred by fear, 50 to an unconstitutional regulation of commerce by the executive branch in violation of the separation of powers. 51 Armchair debaters aside, there are real and tangible legal issues stemming from the actions of the federal government in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon accident. On June 7, 2010, Hornbeck Offshore Services, L.L.C. (Hornbeck) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Secretary, the Department of the Interior, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), and the Director of the MMS seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to end the moratorium. 52 Subsequently, additional plaintiffs joined the litigation. 53 Judge Martin Feldman, presiding over the case, issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the moratorium. 54 The court held that, based on the administrative record, the blanket moratorium on all drilling wells of more than five hundred feet of water was likely to be found "arbitrary and capricious" and was thus invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (OCSLA) and its implementing regulations. 55 The following section will further explore that decision. A. The Hornbeck Decision Judge Feldman framed the issue to be decided in Hornbeck as "whether the federal government's imposition of a general moratorium on deepwater drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico was imposed contrary to law." 56 The statutes governing the [\*1294] outcome were OCSLA, which provides authority to the Secretary to suspend leases in the Gulf under certain circumstances, 57 and the APA, which authorizes the federal courts to review final agency action. 58 The plaintiffs generally alleged that the moratorium by the Secretary as well as the Notice to Lessees (NTL) implementing the moratorium were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and otherwise not in accordance with the APA, OCSLA and its implementing regulations." 59 Additionally, they made a brief allegation that the moratorium was an impermissible "'taking' of . . . property rights in violation of the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution." 60 The focus of the plaintiffs' complaint was directed at the arbitrary and capricious claim. 61 They claimed that the moratorium was unwarranted based on the Report provided to the Secretary by a panel of experts. 62 They alleged that the Secretary had exaggerated or entirely invented the experts' support and recommendations for the moratorium. 63 Further, they alleged the Secretary had failed to adequately explain the reasons behind the suspension of operations 64 or why he had chosen a general depth limit of five hundred feet for the drilling ban. 65 The plaintiffs pointed to a lack of individualized justification for the moratorium, stating, The Report itself does not contain any facts, data, analysis or risk assessment concerning why the Secretary imposed a Moratorium on further drilling by the "33 existing wells." Twenty-nine of these [\*1295] wells had been subjected to additional inspections following the Incident. According to the "MMS Deepwater Drilling Rig Inspection Report" . . . , issued on May 11, 2010, MMS found no violations of governing regulations or existing permit terms on 27 of the 29 drilling rigs inspected and only minor violations on the two others. Further, each of the 33 rigs had previously satisfied the rigors of the MMS permitting process. 66 Additionally, they expressed concern about the injurious economic effects of the moratorium, exclaiming that "lost wages for direct and indirect jobs lost could be over $ 165 million to $ 330 million per month for every month the 33 platforms are idle." 67 The long-term effects were viewed as similarly alarming. The Report stated that the offshore operations provide employment for approximately 150,000 people. 68 The moratorium put many of these jobs at risk. Further, without robust and continuous drilling activities, this labor force would lack incentive to remain in the region, thus reducing the ability of companies like the Hornbeck plaintiffs to find workers. 69 Finally, the plaintiffs also pointed to the possibility that the moratorium might actually last substantially longer than six months, 70 an unacceptable possibility for an industry that relied on contracts and equipment with a limited useful life. 71 The government countered by citing the relevant portions of OCSLA that specifically authorize the Secretary to direct a suspension of drilling whenever it determines that "'activities pose a threat of serious, irreparable, or immediate harm or damage' to human or animal 'life, property, [] mineral deposit, or the marine, coastal, or human environment.'" 72 The Secretary highlighted that the moratorium was needed to "address critical [\*1296] spill containment and response deficiencies" and warned that there were "insufficient available response resources should another deepwater spill occur while the containment and clean up efforts [were ongoing] . . . ." 73 The government pointed out that courts must defer to agency decisions that are supported by a thorough administrative record, and in this case, "the interim safety measures in the Safety Report and the corresponding suspension of deepwater drilling were appropriately supported by the Administrative Record." 74 The defendants spent little time addressing the Fifth Amendment takings claim, asserting only that it was "both wholly without merit and outside of the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate." 75 Judge Feldman issued his decision on June 22, 2010, holding that the moratorium was contrary to law and that he was "unable to divine or fathom a relationship between the findings and the immense scope of the moratorium." 76 He noted that the Report-supposedly the supporting basis for the moratorium-focused narrowly on the Deepwater Horizon incident alone. 77 In contrast, the resulting moratorium was exceedingly broad, applying to rigs that had exemplary safety records and that drilled in significantly shallower water than the Deepwater Horizon. 78 Judge Feldman found it hard to believe that such a suspension would be deemed appropriate in other contexts, asking, "If some drilling equipment parts are flawed, is it rational to say all are? Are all airplanes a danger because one was? All oil tankers like Exxon Valdez? All trains? All mines? That sort of thinking seems heavy-handed, and [\*1297] rather overbearing." 79 Accordingly, the court held that the government's actions in implementing the moratorium had been "arbitrary and capricious" and were thus contrary to the requirements of the APA and OSCLA. 80 Therefore, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the moratorium from being enforced. 81 Because the parties had failed to fully argue it, and perhaps to avoid entering the difficult and muddled jurisprudence of takings analysis, the court did not analyze or even mention the merits of the plaintiffs' takings claim. 82 B. The Government's Response to the Injunction The decision by Judge Feldman led to additional controversy surrounding the moratorium. Only days after the ruling, the Secretary publicly announced that the government was working on passing a second moratorium. 83 The government reiterated this intention when-just hours before the district court's decision was appealed before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit-a senior administration official announced that the government "would immediately issue a new moratorium" regardless of the outcome of the appeal. 84 The maneuver sparked outrage from critics who claimed that the statements were made in a brazen attempt to intimidate the court. 85 Nevertheless, on July 12, 2010, the Secretary issued a [\*1298] memorandum rescinding the first moratorium but ordering a new-yet similar-blanket suspension on offshore oil drilling. 86 Additionally, the government moved to dismiss the original suit on the grounds of mootness since the original moratorium was no longer in effect. 87 Counsel for the plaintiffs, incensed by the government's actions, invoked Marbury v. Madison and exclaimed that the decision to pass a new moratorium with the same practical effects as the now enjoined original one constituted executive interference with the judicial branch and the judicial review process. 88 The motion for dismissal was addressed on September 1, 2010, when Judge Feldman again ruled against the government, holding that mootness did not apply and stating that the second moratorium was essentially the same as the first one. 89 In addressing the issue of whether the Secretary had the authority to rescind the first moratorium, he noted that the proper procedure for an agency seeking to reconsider a decision that is under judicial review is for the agency to move the court to remand. 90 The court voiced its concern that "if agencies are not required to move to remand, they may use rescission and reissuance of their decisions as a way to manipulate the federal jurisdiction of U.S. courts." 91 Ultimately, Judge Feldman concluded the rescission did have "some administrative force," 92 but this was not enough to save the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court criticized their maneuvering, expressing that, "In reality, the new moratorium covers precisely the same rigs and precisely the same deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico as did the first moratorium." 93 The court did not specifically decide whether the second moratorium was again [\*1299] arbitrary and capricious (the sole issue before the court was whether the case surrounding the first moratorium was now moot), but instead focused on whether the harm imposed by the first moratorium would also be imposed by the second. 94 Under the voluntary cessation exception to mootness claims, a federal court will only find a case to be moot if the subsequent government action makes it clear that the initial harm could not reasonably be expected to recur. 95 Judge Feldman noted that the government's public announcements immediately following his initial ruling sharply undermined their argument that the second moratorium was based on a significantly supplemented administrative record. 96 More importantly, these public announcements and posturing indicated that there was a reasonable expectation the harm to the plaintiffs could recur and thus the government's repeal of the first moratorium did not render the action moot. 97 Accordingly, Judge Feldman denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. 98 For some time, while the Hornbeck suit was underway, new litigation continued to emerge as a result of the moratorium. Additional plaintiffs brought claims that the moratorium had effectively ended drilling in shallow water located in entirely different parts of the country. 99 But it now [\*1300] appears that any formal need for the courts to enjoin the moratorium has largely passed; the moratorium was lifted on October 12, 2010, several weeks before it was scheduled to terminate. 100 Following the lifting of the moratorium, the Hornbeck plaintiffs continued to evaluate their legal options, but it was generally believed that "this was a dispute that had run its course." 101 There was lingering concern, however, that a de facto moratorium remained in place. 102 Todd Hornbeck (CEO of Hornbeck) stated, The industry hasn't seen the final requirements for what we would have to do to be able to actually get a permit issued. . . . Until that is done, lifting the moratorium may be just a moot or perfunctory act. . . . I'm skeptical that it will be anytime soon that permits will be issued . . . . 103

### 2NC Oil Dependency

1. DA OW THE CASE WITH THE IMPACTS GOING FOR

AND turns the case a. heg key to sustaining it

b. key to solve

First is the ME Leadership - Oil dependence is the only thing that guarantees US middle east presence That’s key to check regional collapse which destroys trade and overall leadership outweighs the case happens faster and critical to solving turns the economy because descimates global trade – that’s mead

A2 Presence Resilient/Israel

#### It’s reverse causal – perception of oil interests is key

Mark Delucchi and James Murphy 2008 Mark, Institute of Transportation Studies @ UC Davis, and James, Dept. Econ @ Alaska Anchorage, “U.S. MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO PROTECT THE USE OF PERSIAN-GULF OIL FOR MOTOR VEHICLES”, Report #15 in the series: The Annualized Social Cost of Motor-Vehicle Use in the United States, based on 1990-1991 Data”, First Published April 1996, Last updated in 2008, [http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-03(15)\_rev3.pdf)](http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-03%2815%29_rev3.pdf%29)

The end of the Cold War essentially eliminated any Soviet threats to U.S. interests, including those in the Middle East, and made the U.S. reformulate its military strategy to focus on regional, rather than global conflicts. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “In the past, force requirements were generated by focusing attention on global conflict...Today, the probability of such a conflict is greatly reduced. Thus, our focus has shifted to regional hot spots where the probability of occurrence may now be greater than in the past” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992, p. 2-9) 10 . Now that there no longer is a Soviet threat to contain, protecting free-world access to oil clearly is the paramount if not virtually sole concern of the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf. In March, 1992, the New York Times published a story regarding the February 18, 1992, draft of a classified Pentagon document titled “Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999” (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992; in Tyler, 1992). The document states the U.S. military objective in the Persian Gulf unequivocally: In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil (U.S. Department of Defense, 1992; cited in Tyler, 1992). Three years later, the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Economic Security reiterated the DoD’s position to a Senate hearing on U.S. dependence on foreign oil: “…protecting against military threats to global oil supplies is an important factor for which we must be prepared” (cited in Koplow and Martin, 1998, . 4-2). Finally, Fuller and Lesser (1997), in a discussion of U.S. policy towards the Persian Gulf, state that “Gulf policy is founded on the principal that acess to the region’s oil is critical to Western – indeed global – prosperity” (p. 42). 15.1.3.3 Counter arguments and summary We have made the case that the U.S. spends money on defense of the Persian Gulf mainly because of the oil there. However, not everyone would agree with this. In an analysis of the external costs of oil use in transportation, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) (1992) argues that concern about oil has been but one of many reasons that the U.S. military has cared about the Persian Gulf. The CRS (1992) even implies that oil security is a minor concern. In this section we review and rebut the CRS’ arguments. First, the CRS (1992) claims that throughout the Cold War, the U.S. military was concerned more with the Soviet threat (per se) in the Persian Gulf than with U.S. oil interests. But the CRS does not offer any evidence in support of this claim, which is directly refuted by statements in the Military Posture documents that we have cited. Next, the CRS (1992) claims that the U.S. military salso is concerned with the security of Israel. But we see no evidence of a major military concern for Israel per se, independent of concern about energy security. In the first place, the Military Posture statements cited above make it clear that the JCS cares about Israel only in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On account of its oil interests in the Gulf, the U.S. does want the region to be stable, and to forestall and resolve Arab-Israeli conflicts. As cited above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are clear on this. Thus, U.S. military planners care mainly about regional stability – because of the region’s oil – and not so much about Israel per se. We believe that, if the Middle East had neither oil nor strategic importance, the U.S. would not maintain a significant military presence in the region solely to help protect Israel. Fuller and Lesser (1997) agree, stating that “at this point, Israel’s security, however important, does not represent an extra dimension of U.S. Gulf Policy” (p. 45). 11 Third, the CRS suggests that another “major” interest is the protection of U.S. citizens. But we are hard pressed to conceive of this as a “major” interest. In 1992, there probably were on the order of 20 thousand tourists in the Middle East, including Israel and Egypt, and fewer than 10 thousand in the oil-rich countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates -- out of a total of nearly 7 million U.S. tourists abroad (Bureau of the Census, 1992). About 50,000 U.S. citizens were residents (as opposed to tourists) in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, but it is likely that most of them worked for oil companies or related ventures, the U.S. Government, or the U.S. military. There is little doubt that, were there no oil in the Middle East, there would be very few U.S. citizens there, and the U.S. would not spend billions of dollars to protect the few that were there. Fourth, and in its view most definitively, the CRS (1992) claims that the failure of the U.S. to go to war after the 1973-74 and 1979 supply disruptions suggests that the U.S. military really wasn’t concerned with protecting oil supplies until perhaps the Gulf War. This claim is weak. There is no parallel between the 1973-74 and 1979 crises and the situation that led to the 1991 Gulf War, which the CRS does agree was motivated at least in part by a desire to protect oil interests. The 1973-74 disruption was the culmination of a politically motivated series of price increases and a trade embargo gainst the U.S. and the Netherlands, which were an Arab retaliation for the U.S.’ support of Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli “Yom Kippur” war . It would have been outrageous for the U.S. to have attacked the Arab embargoers just because they had decided that they did not wish to sell oil to the U.S. In fact, it would have been just as outrageous to have attacked Iraq in 1991 if Iraq had done nothing other than refuse to sell oil to the U.S. Conversely, the U.S. surely would have attacked Iraq or any other Gulf state, at any time during the 1980s, had the country done what Iraq actually did in 1990, and had the Soviet Union been out of the equation. The 1979-1980 “disruption” was the result of another major price rise and of the shutting down of Iranian production due to the Iranian revolution, and it would have been almost as unreasonable (and foolish, given the attitude of the Soviet Union at the time) to have intervened in the internal affairs of Iran as it would have been earlier to have attacked Arab nations on account of their political stance. In short, it hardly is reasonable to proffer lack of outrageous and provocative military behavior as evidence of lack of military interest. Consequently, the CRS’ (1992) speculation about military impassiveness in the face of earlier oil “disruptions” does not stand against the unequivocal and steadfast mission statements by the U.S. military cited in this report. 12 The CRS also implies that the Reagan administration’s refusal to institute emergency price and supply controls in the aftermath of a severe price shock is evidence that the military was not charged with protecting oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. We fail to see the connection between pricing policy and military policy. Somewhat more to the point, the CRS states that the Reagan administration refused to “acknowledge” that it had any plan to use military force to prevent a price shock. This fact, though, has no import. In the first place, the Reagan administration might well have had such a plan, but have kept it secret. In any event, reluctance to start a war to keep oil cheap in no way implied that in the Persian Gulf the U.S. military was not primarily concerned with oil. Most likely, what the administration was “acknowledging” was the outrageousness of going to war over any price shock that was like the two previous ones. Had something like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait happened, the Reagan administration most likely would have responded the way that the Bush administration did. Summary. It is clear to us that the U.S. military cares (and always has cared) about the Middle East mainly because of the oil there. The United States believes that oil in the Persian Gulf is vital and often at risk, and hence demanding of a considerable commitment of U.S. military manpower, hardware, and planning. In the next section, we estimate the magnitude of this commitment.

#### 2NC Impact Overview

#### Middle East instability outweighs – draws in great powers

Reuters quoting Zalmay Khalilzad 8-27-2007; former US ambassador to the UN, possibly God, “Middle East turmoil could cause world war: U.S. envoy” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/27/us-mideast-khalilzad-idUSL2719552620070827>

(Reuters) - Upheaval in the Middle East and Islamic civilization could cause another world war, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was quoted as saying in an Austrian newspaper interview published on Monday. Zalmay Khalilzad told the daily Die Presse the Middle East was now so disordered that it had the potential to inflame the world as Europe did during the first half of the 20th century. "The (Middle East) is going through a very difficult transformation phase. That has strengthened extremism and creates a breeding ground for terrorism," he said in remarks translated by Reuters into English from the published German. "Europe was just as dysfunctional for a while. And some of its wars became world wars. Now the problems of the Middle East and Islamic civilization have the same potential to engulf the world," he was quoted as saying. Khalilzad, interviewed by Die Presse while attending a foreign policy seminar in the Austrian Alps, said the Islamic world would eventually join the international mainstream but this would take some time.

#### 2NC Presence Good

#### Solves prolif, democracy, and terrorism

John Deutsch et al 2006; Former Director of the CIA and Former Undersecretary of Energy, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, “national security consequences of u.s. oil dependency”

At least for the next two decades, the Persian Gulf will be vital¶ to U.S. interests in reliable oil supply, nonproliferation, combating¶ terrorism, and encouraging political stability, democracy, and public¶ welfare. Accordingly, the United States should expect and support a¶ strong military posture that permits suitably rapid deployment to the¶ region, if required.¶ It is worthwhile to explain what should and should not be expected¶ from this military force, and how it serves U.S. interests. Most importantly,¶ the conventional force of the United States deters aggression in¶ the region.Any nation (or subnational group) that contemplates violence¶ on any scale must take into account the possibility of U.S. preemption,¶ intervention, or retaliation. Deterrence is powerful, but it does not¶ always work (especially if the possibility of a military response is not¶ raised). For example, deterrence did not prevent the Iran-Iraq war of¶ the early 1980s. Because no clear and credible signal was sent of a¶ possible response in 1990, Saddam Hussein was not deterred from¶ invading Kuwait. Nevertheless, theU.S.military posture with its capacity¶ to intervene, if managed wisely, can play a role in stabilizing this¶ highly fragile region and make many countries in the region more¶ secure from hostile action by their neighbors.¶ Several standard operations of U.S. regionally deployed forces have¶ made important contributions to improving energy security, and the¶ continuation of such efforts will be necessary in the future. U.S. naval¶ protection of the sea-lanes that transport oil is of paramount importance.¶ Joint training and exercises with local military units and military-tomilitary¶ exchanges and support programs alsomake an important contribution—¶ such as in West Africa, where U.S. naval and Coast Guard¶ units have assisted local authorities in suppressing piracy of crude oil.

#### 2NC Defense Manufacturing

#### Middle East presence key to US defense manufacturing

Keyhan 8(BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, “Iran paper outlines America's "true objectives, intentions" in Iraq, Afghanistan”, 10-1, L/N)

5- The sale of weapons. With America's physical and military presence, the Middle East region becomes more security-orientated and an atmosphere of fear, intimidation and insecurity is created and this issue will lead to the oil dollars of the region's countries, especially those of the Persian Gulf Sheykh controlled littoral states, slipping into the pockets of huge American weapons and munitions manufacturing factories.

#### Key to heg and econ

UPI 7(Stefan Nicola, “Analysis: The deja-vu arms race”, 6-12, L/N)

"The United States has a global leadership demand, and the military expenditures reflect that," Sascha Lange, military expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told United Press International Tuesday in a telephone interview. "The American arms industry, with its many big firms responsible for a large amount of jobs, not only carries security importance, but also economic importance."

2 – Turns the case – dependence allows us to have political leverage and a bargaining chip – export power is our only leverage to curb the nuclear ambitions of Iran – Howard

3. Oil dependence kills dollar reserve status – the dollar would no longer be important on the market that kills US military superiority and hegemony

#### 2NC Impact Overview

**Dollar heg turns the case --**

#### Dollar hegemony status is key to overall US economic and military leadership

William Clark, 2003; economic consultant and journalist, January (revised March 2003), “The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War with Iraq”, <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/RRiraqWar.html>

This unique geo-political agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1974 has worked to our favor for the past 30 years, as this arrangement has eliminated our currency risk for oil, raised the entire asset value of all dollar denominated assets/properties, and allowed the Federal Reserve to create a truly massive debt and credit expansion (or `credit bubble' in the view of some economists). These structural imbalances in the U.S. economy are sustainable as long as: 1. Nations continue to demand and purchase oil for their energy/survival needs 2. the world's monopoly currency for global oil transactions remains the US dollar 3. the three internationally traded crude oil markers remain denominated in US dollars These underlying factors, along with the `safe harbor' reputation of U.S. investments afforded by the dollar's reserve currency status propelled the U.S. to economic and military hegemony in the post-World War II period. However, the introduction of the euro is a significant new factor, and appears to be the primary threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Moreover, in December 2002 ten additional countries were approved for full membership into the E.U. Barring any surprise movements, in 2004 this will result in an aggregate E.U. GDP of $9.6 trillion and 450 million people, directly competing with the U.S. economy ($10.5 trillion GDP, 280 million people).

#### And dollar reserve status change would cause instant economic collapse

Robert Looney, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Otherwise, the effect of an OPEC switch to the euro would be that oil-consuming nations would have to flush dollars out of their (central bank) reserve funds and replace these with euros. The dollar would crash anywhere from 20-40% in value and the consequences would be those one could expect from any currency collapse and massive inflation (think Argentina currency crisis, for example). You'd have foreign funds stream out of the U.S. stock markets and dollar denominated assets, there'd surely be a run on the banks much like the 1930s, the current account deficit would become unserviceable, the budget deficit would go into default, and so on. Your basic 3rd world economic crisis scenario. "The United States economy is intimately tied to the dollar's role as reserve currency. This doesn't mean that the U.S. couldn't function otherwise, but that the transition would have to be gradual to avoid such dislocations (and the ultimate result of this would probably be the U.S. and the E.U. switching roles in the global economy)."

#### Collapse of US economic leadership would escalate every impact

Mandelbaum2005 – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224]

At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, the potential for economic calamity and wartime destruction is greater at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.

4. Russia is the only nuclear state that has revenues from oil the economy is to fragile for them to lose it if they do there is a risk of miscalculation the will harm the US and russias neighbors – that’s Miller

#### US-Russia nuclear war causes extinction and outweighs

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A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

5. Bio –d outweighs on probability oil consumption causes deforestation – direct correlation of increasing domestic production – oil lis comparatively the worst. And that causes immediate extinction – kills food supplies and makes humans unable to adjust

### 2NC Economy

1. Extend the levi and Alic in 12 evidence indicates that unemployment is determined by firing and hiring and work skills – not oil industry . Additionally these jobs the aff “creates” come at the cost of jos in sectors like solar, and off the grid

2. Is the trade deficit defense first the Pecquet and Fisher evidence indicates that the trade deficit has it its lowest level since 2010 because of record high exports in industries external to oil and the trade gap is not a description of US economic conditions – more a relation of imports that make economics look bad and not the expot

3. Domestic gas production doesn’t solve prices - because its set on a global market that the US doesn’t influence, other coutries would just adjust accordingly to the US increase not let prices fall - That’s Levi and Menenburg 12

4. Manufacturing isn’t declining in meaningful ways – it has declined in every recent year manufacturing is a shrinking portion of the economy because we are not using our physical products

5. Miller evidence indicates that there is not impact to war economic crisis has bore no correlation to violence after studying 93 instances of economic crisis

6. Barnett indicates that since the great crisis three new conflicts have come out but none have any correlation on the global economy