#### And, voting neg is a vote to keep harmful laws on the books – when faced with the choice of keeping crack cocaine sentencing laws, the Jim Crowe laws, Plessy v. Ferguson, the 3/5ths clause and a host of other harmful policies we should stand resolved against them –refusing to participate in governmental action is worse for everyone -- the way that revolutions and insurrections are successful is by having actions come after them.

APA, 04 [American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality, American Political Science Association, <http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf>]

What government does not do is just as important as what it does.35 What our government does these days is especially responsive to the values and interests of the most privileged Americans. Harder to pin down is the effect of disparities of influence on what government fails to do. Through much of U.S. history, our government has responded to the life circumstances of ordinary Americans by enacting major policies to spread opportunities and provide security to millions of individuals and families. Public education, Social Security and Medicare, the G.I. Bill, home-mortgage programs, certain farm programs, and many other efforts have **enhanced the quality of life for millions** of regular Americans.

What is particularly relevant for understanding political inequality in America today is that many these broadly inclusive government programs also encouraged ordinary citizens to become more active participants in our democracy — they helped equalize the voice of citizens in the halls of government. The United States pioneered schooling for all, spending about as much or more than many advanced industrialized countries. Promotion of education has helped to open the door to opportunity for students who work hard, to propel the country’s economy, and to lower economic disparities. It has also boosted participation in volunteer organizations and democratic life. In higher education, the G.I. Bill extended generous assistance to attend universities, community colleges, and vocational schools for millions of veterans of World War II and the Korean War.36 Since the 1970s, federal programs like the Pell Grants and state initiatives have allowed millions of lower- and middle-income students to pursue post-secondary schooling.

Similarly, Social Security, which provides protection against low income in retirement to employees who contribute to the system, has helped to foster an extraordinary level of participation by the elderly in the electoral process and civic life. Social Security has encouraged participation by low- and moderate-income seniors, which means that the elderly are less subject to the skew in favor of the affluent and better educated that generally characterizes political participation in the United States.37

### Debate good

#### The normative ethical debate over resolving these problems is a vital form of oppositional education that it should be the goal of policy debate to foster. Their attempt to shirk this obligation through a localist model of education that focuses on this debate renders us as passive spectators to global oppression – this prevents us from honoring our ethical obligation to others

**Ruiz and Minguez ‘1** Prof. Dr Pedro Ortega Ruiz, Facultad de Educacio´ n, Campus de Espinardo, Universidad de Murcia, “Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral and political education” *Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2001*

In addition to the reality of the dominant presence of instrumental reason in modern society, another closely linked phenomenon is shaping life at the level of the individual and society, individuals and peoples. **We refer to the phenomenon of the increasing globalisation of ways of life in our complex societies which derive as much from the new forms of production as from the influence of science and technology upon life and social organisation (Waters, 1995). This explains the problems we find in guaranteeing a base of social solidarity in a general sense and the provision of forms of identity sufficiently strong for the social agents.** It is difficult to represent the society in which we live in a unified manner. As individuals we belong to diverse communities, at times mutually contradictory. It is difficult to escape the need of having to choose between diverse forms of identity and belonging (Bafircena, 1997). **The phenomenon of globalisation has invalidated the autistic, localist-focused procedures for highlighting and resolving problems because the great part of our social life is determined by global processes; that is to say, in those processes in which the influence of cultures, political economies, media and national frontiers are all weakened. The emergence of globalisation has made it possible to overcome the concept of nation states, giving way to another, wider reality: humanity, world citizenship or human family to foster the birth of new areas of identity beyond that of the nation state** (Luhmann, 1997). During the last few decades it could be thought that the relationships and obligations of the citizen started and finished in their local community, in their *polis*, or at most in their national community. Now, on the other hand, we are concerned by problems occurring far from our frontiers or the conventional established limits. **We have become aware that we are immersed in problems of such magnitude (environmental pollution, poverty and marginalisation of a large part of the world’s population, ethnic–cultural conflicts, etc.) that we seriously question localist attempts and have thrown to the winds the recipes so long applied to solve our problems. A new concept of citizenship and the citizen has been imposed on us. Our *polis* has become too small. The diversity of cultures and national frontiers are no longer barriers to the recognition of our inter-dependency and implication in problems which we now must share. These features (primacy of instrumental reason and globalisation) cannot go unnoticed in our pedagogy. Youth cannot be educated according to out-dated localist schemes already undermined by the real situation; nor offer educational models which place the learners in the position of open-mouthed spectators at what happens around them, distanced from the social reality which is supposedly impossible to change, governed by the implacable laws of market forces.** **To educate**, as we understand it, **is above all a praxis orientated towards enabling the learners to “read” and interpret reality and furthermore to take responsibility in the face of this reality. It is to help them grow in responsibility, to honour our obligations toward others.**

### AT: State Bad

#### The process of deliberating about what might be possible makes the process more intelligent and creates the possibility for us to actively engage with external venues for action

**Hanghoj, 08** [Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 , PhD project, University of Aarhus, an assistant professor., <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>]

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansendsschemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that *by definition* are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual *doings* of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsalThe two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of *dramatic rehearsal*, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in *Human Nature and Conduct*: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (**in imagination**) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). 86 This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative *drama* metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important *phase* of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the *process* of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing **more intelligent** than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously *real* and *imagined* inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and **resolve scenario-specific problems** (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual *consequences* that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but *without* all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in *realism* between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and 87 risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of *The Power Game*. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can *stage* particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for *educational purposes*. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are *relevant* to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios