#### More than particles

Myers 09 – P. Z., biologist and associate professor at the University of Minnesota, Morris, The Dead are Dead, <http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2009/12/the_dead_are_dead.php>

I have heard that first argument so many times, and it is facile and dishonest. We are not just "energy". We are a pattern of energy and matter, a very specific and precise arrangement of molecules in movement. **That can be destroyed**. When you've built a pretty sand castle and the tide comes in and washes it away, the grains of sand are still all there, but what you've lost is the arrangement that you worked to generate, and which you **appreciated**. Reducing a complex functional order to nothing but the constituent parts is an insult to the work. If I were to walk into the Louvre and set fire to the Mona Lisa, and afterwards take a drive down to Chartres and blow up the cathedral, would anyone defend my actions by saying, "well, science says matter and energy cannot be created or destroyed, therefore, Rabid Myers did no harm, and we'll all just enjoy viewing the ashes and rubble from now on"? No. **That's crazy** talk. We also wouldn't be arguing that the painting and the architecture have transcended this universe to enter another, nor would such a pointless claim ameliorate our loss in this universe. The rest of his argument is quantum gobbledy-gook. The behavior of subatomic particles is not a good guide to what to expect of the behavior of large bodies. A photon may have no rest mass, but I can't use this fact to justify my grand new weight loss plan; quantum tunnelling does not imply that I can ignore doors when I amble about my house. **People are not particles**! We are the product of the aggregate behavior of the many particles that constitute our bodies, and you cannot ignore the importance of these higher-order relationships when talking about our fate. The rational atheist view is simpler, clearer, and I think, more true. Lanza's sister is dead, and so is mine; that means the features of their independent existence that were so precious to us, that made them interesting, thinking, behaving human beings, have **ceased to exist**. The 20-watts of energy are dissipating as heat, and can't be brought back. They are lost to us, and someday we will end, too. We should feel grief. Pretending that they have 'transcended' into some novel quantum mechanical state in which their consciousness persists, or that they are shaking hands with some anthropomorphic spiritual myth in never-never land, does a disservice to ourselves. The pain is real. Don't deny it. Use it to look at the ones you love who still live and see what you can do to make our existence now a little better, and perhaps a little more conducive to keeping our energies patterned usefully a little longer.

#### Death is when body has no signs of life. i.e no pulse or brain activity.

#### Affirming survival doesn’t devalue life – life is complex and malleable and can be celebrated even when it seems oppressive

**Fassin, 10** - James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d’études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. (Didier, Fall, “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)

Conclusion

Survival, in the sense Jacques Derrida attributed to the concept in his last interview, not only shifts lines that are too often hardened between biological and political lives: it **opens an ethical space for** reflection **and** action. Critical thinking in the past decade has often taken biopolitics and the politics of life as its objects. It has thus unveiled the way in which individuals and groups, even entire nations, have been treated by powers, the market, or the state, during the colonial period as well as in the contemporary era.

However, through indiscriminate extension, this powerful instrument has lost some of its analytical sharpness and heuristic potentiality. On the one hand, the binary reduction of life to the opposition between nature and history, bare life and qualified life, when systematically applied from philosophical inquiry in sociological or anthropological study, erases much of the complexity and richness of life in society as it is in fact observed. On the other hand, the normative prejudices which underlie the evaluation of the forms of life and of the politics of life, when generalized to an undifferentiated collection of social facts, end up by depriving social agents of legitimacy, voice, and action. The risk is therefore both scholarly and political. It calls for ethical attention.

In fact, the genealogy of this intellectual lineage reminds us that the main founders of these theories expressed tensions and hesitations in their work, which was often more complex, if even sometimes more obscure, than in its reduced and translated form in the humanities and social sciences today. And also biographies, here limited to fragments from South African lives that I have described and analyzed in more detail elsewhere, suggest the necessity of complicating the dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives. Certainly, powers like the market and the state do act sometimes as if human beings could be reduced to “mere life,” but democratic forces, including from within the structure of power, tend to produce alternative strategies that escape this reduction. And people themselves, even under conditions of domination, [End Page 93] manage subtle tactics that transform their physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression.

But let us go one step further: ethnography invites us to reconsider what life is or rather what human beings make of their lives, and reciprocally how their lives permanently question what it is to be human. “The blurring between what is human and what is not human shades into the blurring over what is life and what is not life,” writes Veena Das. In the tracks of Wittgenstein and Cavell, she underscores that the usual manner in which we think of forms of life “not only obscures the mutual absorption of the natural and the social but also emphasizes form at the expense of life.”22 It should be the incessant effort of social scientists to return to this inquiry about life in its multiple forms but also in its everyday expression of the human.

### Impact Ext

**Framework -- Aff should win the debate if the plan is better than the status quo or a competitive policy option—anything else moots the 1AC which is the most predictable locus of offense**

**Calculus -- Desirability of the plan should be assessed on the basis of its efficacy in preventing the destruction of life**

**Logical Priority -- Human extinction outweighs and includes any impact of human suffering, violence or exclusion—suffering is inevitable but extinction is forever and survival is a precondition to any possibility of meaningful existence**

#### Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support our hegemony advantage, prefer our advantage because it is interdisciplinary

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### a) human nature – anarchic worlds from the dawn of time to today created an impetus for realist thought.

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76 //adi]

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. This environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

#### b) Neuroscience

Eisner 9—prof of Comparative & Developmental Criminology, Deputy Director of the Institute, Cambridge. Work revolves around macro-level historical patterns of violence and research on individual development and the causes and prevention of aggressive behavior. PhD in sociology, U Zurich (Manuel, The Uses of Violence: An Examination of Some Cross-Cutting Issues, http://www.ijcv.org/index.php/ijcv/article/viewArticle/47)

Research from all angles has produced **convincing evidence** that some features of violence are remarkably similar across time and space. These commonalities comprise: the sex distribution of people involved in fighting (mostly men); the approximate age at which people are most likely to engage in violence (about &' to 0)); essential goals over which fights are fought (material resources, power, and sex); situations that are prone to violence (e.g. humiliations in the presence of others); individual characteristics associated with violence (e.g. courage and risk-seeking); and emotional processes involved in violent encounters (e.g. arousal and anger). Such commonalities are difficult to understand from a purely cultural perspective. Rather, it is becoming increasingly clear that **any general theory of violence will need to integrate an evolutionary perspective** on human nature (Pinker +,,+). In an insightful paper, Wood (+,,/) has recently laid out how and why an evolutionary perspective is an essential element for the way social scientists understand violence both historically and across societies. On the most general level, an evolutionary perspective serves as a corrective to the view, long cherished amongst social scientists, that the human mind is essentially a blank slate, ready to store and retrieve whatever happens to characterize a given culture (Pinker +,,+). In contrast, evolutionary psychologists emphasize that the “hardwired” architecture of our brain evolved over long periods of time as a solution to the adaptive problems posed by the environmental conditions and problems in the ancestral world (Tooby and Cosmides &((+). Hence the human brain is theorized to be a network of “regulatory circuits” that “organize the way we interpret our experiences, inject certain recurrent concepts and motivations into our mental life, and provide universal frames of meaning that allow us to understand the actions and intentions of others” (Tooby and Cosmides &((/). In developing answers to these questions Buss and Shackelford (&((/) suggest that aggression is a highly context-specific collection of strategies that have evolved as an adaptation to recurrent problems that humans were confronted with during the history of human evolution. They may be grouped into strategies of proactive aggression developed to in#ict costs on rivals and reactive **strategies that have developed to deter rivals and to defend one’s interests.** The proactive use of aggression entails violence as means to gain access to resources that are valuable for reproduction (land, water, food); as a strategy to win in competitions against intrasexual rivals; and a way to negotiate status and power hierarchies. Reactive uses include strategies where violence is used to defend against attack, situations where it serves as a way to gain a reputation as aggressive in order to deter rivals from future aggression, and reactions that deter longterm mates from sexual infidelity (jealousy).

#### C. Social identity theory

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Archives regarding this war have long been open and the historiography is vast.50 What the documents say could not be clearer: the [End Page 45] war was about status.51 The issue at stake became whether Russia could obtain rights in the Ottoman Empire that the other powers lacked. The diplomats understood well that framing the issue as one of status made war likely, and they did everything they could in the slow run-up to military hostilities to engineer solutions that separated the issues on the ground from matters of rank. But no proposed solution (eleven were attempted) promised a resolution of the Russians’ status dissonance. The draft compromises accepted by Russia yielded on all points—except they included language that, however vaguely, codified Russia’s rights vis-à-vis its coreligionists that the tsar and his ministers had demanded at the outset. For Russia, these clauses symbolized the restoration of the status quo ante. For Turkey, France, and Britain, they implied a dramatic increase in Russia’s status unwarranted by any increase in its capabilities. Nicholas escalated the situation to what he called “a crisis of coercion” in order to eliminate a perceived threat to his empire’s identity as second to none, including Britain.52 Confident of Russia’s material power, dismissive of the salience of British sea power, and ignorant of the military implications of the industrial revolution, he expected London to acquiesce.53 But Britain’s cabinet saw the tsar’s demand as an unwarranted presumption considering their assessment of Russia’s real capabilities. Accepting that demand meant accepting a degradation in Britain’s own position. The more the Russians sensed a refusal to acknowledge their status, the more strident they became; and the more they insisted on tangible signs of recognition, the more the British supported France and the Turks, the less willing the latter were to compromise, and the greater the status dissonance in St. Petersburg. What the documents do not say is equally important. There is scant evidence of the main causal mechanisms of major contemporary theories of war. Theories based on security scarcity find little support. Russia escalated the crisis in full confidence that the Western powers had no credible military option in the theater.54 Before the combat operations began, neither the British nor the French appeared concerned about the threat Russia posed to their security. Indeed, even after the war began, Palmerston insisted that Britain had little to fear militarily [End Page 46] from Russia.55 There is scant evidence that British worries over access to India figured in prewar decision making, while concerns about Russian naval deployments in the Black Sea postdated the war and, in any case, had nothing to do with the security of the empire’s sea lines. Nor is there evidence that Russia’s dissatisfaction had anything to do with the material costs and benefits of the status quo. On the contrary, Russian decision makers saw their revisionism as a defense of their identity as a bulwark of the existing order. And there is no evidence concerning key implications of the bargaining model of war: that the parties saw themselves as disputing the allocation of a flow of goods that would be diminished by the costs of war; that negotiated bargains were frustrated by the inability to get commitments not to renege on agreements in the future; and that a resolution of the commitment problem is what allowed an agreement to end the war. Again and again, what frustrated intermediate bargaining involving issue linkage was the connection to status.56

#### E. Psychology- bias runs towards threat deflation- we are the opposite of paranoid

Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

#### Prefer our arguments- only we employ a falsifiable methodology

Thayer 2004 – Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota [*Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 68 //adi]

Evolution provides a better ultimate causal foundation according to the D-N model because it tightly fits this model on two levels. First, it explains how life evolves through the evolutionary processes (natural selection, gene mutation, etc.) described in chapter 1 that provide the general laws of evolution and specific antecedent conditions affecting these laws. This theory of how nature evolves may be applied and tested against specific evidence, for example, about how early primates and humans lived and continue to do so, which may confirm evolutionary processes. Second, proximate causes of human (or other animal) behavior may be deduced from it. That is, if the evolutionary process is valid, then much of human behavior must have evolved because the behavior contributed to fitness in past environments. Accordingly, evolutionary theory provides an adequate causal explanation for realism because if the antecedent conditions arc provided the ultimate cause logically produces the proximate causes (egoism and domination) of realism. Measured by Poppers method of falsification, evolutionary theory is also superior to the ultimate causes of Niebuhr and Morgenthau because it is fal-sifiable.41 That is, scholars know what evidence would not verify the theory. Popper argued that if a theory is scientific, then we may conceive of observations that would show the theory to be false. His intent was to make precise the idea that scientific theories should be subject to empirical test. In contrast to good scientific theories that can be falsified, Popper suggested that no pattern of human behavior could falsify Marxism or Freudian psychoanalytic theory. More formally, Poppers criterion of falsifiability requires that a theory contain "observation sentences," that is, "proposition P is falsifiable if and only if P deductively implies at least one observation sentence O"2 Falsifiable theories contain predictions that may be checked against empirical evidence. So according to Popper, scientists should accept a theory\* only if it is falsifiable and no observation sentence has falsified it.

### No Prior Questions

#### No prior questions – prefer rational choice theory

**Owen, 02** [David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that **‘[a] frenzy for** words like “**epistemology**” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it **has an** inbuilt **tendency to prioritise** issues of ontology and **epistemology** over **explanatory** and/or interpretive **power** as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitme

nts. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical **weakness**—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide **the best account** available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the **most important** kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than **problem-driven approach** to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous **grip on** the **action**, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of **empirical validity**. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially **vicious circle arises**.

### Imperialsim Good

**Presume Materialism -- Value to life changes over time while death is a permanent end to the material conditions necessary for conscious experience. Value is situated relative to the valuer, impossible to rigorously measure and logically incoherent to universalize for others. Vote to preserve the material conditions for experience as a prior condition to the ability to value which physical embodiment enables.**

**Only Evaluate Unique Impacts – Only unique impacts which specify the conditions of their possibility can be falsified, since they must demonstrate assumptions which can be generalized to make predictions about behavior which can either be true or false. Impact claims which lack a trigger element, brink, and specified causal probability are non-falsifiable. Non-falsifiable claims cannot be debated because they are in principle impossible to disprove and should not be evaluated.**

**Reject ‘root cause’ arguments -- there is no falsifiable thesis capable of revealing a particular organizational structure at the origin of social violence**

**Permutation -- plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative**

**The US does not engage in the same kind of historical imperialism your authors deplore – US imperialism is key to security agreements and the global economy.**

**Boot, 2006** (Max, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Power for Good”, The Weekly Standard, 10 April, Vol. 11, Issue 28, Factiva)

His case for labeling the United States a global government, rather than a global empire, rests on a rickety foundation. "Traditionally," he notes, "the imperial power has been seen as a predator, drawing economic profit and political gain from its control of the imperial possession, while the members of the society it controls suffer." The United States, he correctly notes, does not exploit any states in this way. Instead, it provides the whole world with valuable "public goods"--principally protection from predators--that are welcomed by most of the world's states. But that hardly makes it that different from the British Empire, which also performed all sorts of public services, such as stamping out the slave trade and piracy. Mandelbaum may see the United States as a particularly benign great power, and he is not wrong to do so; but most empires of the past also saw themselves as advancing a mission civilisatrice.

His assurance that the United States means it--honestly!--is not likely to mollify America's critics. Nor is his choice of terminology particularly reassuring. I can't see some mandarin at the Quai d'Orsay (the French foreign ministry) slapping himself on the forehead and exclaiming, "So they are not an empire after all. They're only the world's government. What a relief. Vive les Etats-Unis!"

The value of The Case for Goliath does not lie in its central conceit--the United States as the world's government--but in the arguments Mandelbaum advances for why American power serves the interests of other countries. The case he makes is not particularly novel (William Odom and Robert Dujarric made similar points in their 2004 book, America's Inadvertent Empire), but it bears repeating at a time when the publishing industry is churning out reams of paranoid tomes with titles like Rogue Nation, The Sorrows of Empire, and The New American Militarism.

Mandelbaum begins by listing five security benefits the United States offers the world.

First, the continuing deployment of American troops in Europe is a reassurance that "no sudden shifts in Europe's security arrangements would occur." Second, the United States has "reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they otherwise have reached," both by attempting to stop rogue states from acquiring nukes and by providing nuclear protection to countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that would otherwise go nuclear.

Third, the United States has fought terrorists across the world and waged preventive war in Iraq to remove the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Fourth, the United States has undertaken humanitarian interventions in such places as Bosnia and Kosovo, which Mandelbaum likens to the "practice, increasingly common in Western countries, of removing children from the custody of parents who are abusing them." Fifth, the United States has attempted to create "the apparatus of a working, effective, decent government" in such dysfunctional places as Haiti and Afghanistan.

Mandelbaum also points to five economic benefits of American power. First, the United States provides the security essential for international commerce by, for instance, policing Atlantic and Pacific shipping lanes. Second, the United States safeguards the extraction and export of Middle Eastern oil, the lifeblood of the global economy. Third, in the monetary realm, the United States has made the dollar "the world's 'reserve' currency" and supplied loans to "governments in the throes of currency crises."

Fourth, the United States has pushed for the expansion of international trade by midwifing the World Trade Organization, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and other instruments of liberalization. And fifth, by providing a ready market for goods exported by such countries as China and Japan, the United States "became the indispensable supplier of demand to the world."

Naturally, the United States gets scant thanks for all these services provided gratis. But Mandelbaum points out that for all their griping, other countries have not pooled "their resources to confront the enormous power of the United States because, unlike the supremely powerful countries of the past, the United States [does] not threaten them." Instead, the United States actually helps other nations achieve shared goals such as democracy, peace, and prosperity.,

**If you think America was bad, then you don’t know our enemies**

**Jacoby 2K** – Boston Globe Staff, May (Jeff, “Why we Fought in Vietnam”, HighBeam Research)

America had no business fighting in Vietnam; our long struggle there was misguided at best, criminal at worst. So runs the conventional wisdom on the Vietnam War, and much of the commentary marking the 25th anniversary of Saigon's fall made a point of reinforcing that bleak view.

But we were not wrong to fight in Vietnam. If our allies were far from perfect, our enemies - Hanoi and the Viet Cong - were homicidal fanatics. Like all Stalinists, they were prepared to shed rivers of blood for the sake of power and ideological orthodoxy. Communists are mass murderers, and Ho Chi Minh was an ardent communist.

Long before we arrived in South Vietnam, Ho had turned the North into an abattoir. In the 1940s, his noncommunist competitors were savagely cut down. After he won power in 1954, the slaughter increased. "Better 10 innocent deaths," Ho's Communist Party taught, "than one enemy survivor." Hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese were killed as "class enemies" and "counterrevolutionaries." During Hanoi's brief occupation of Hue in 1968, thousands of citizens - priests, doctors, bureaucrats - were butchered. It was not to satisfy some imperial craving that America went to war in Vietnam. It went to save the South from murder.

**Reality Shapes Discourse– Our impacts are a worst-case scenario for all of their link arguments; war produces problematic discourse about war. If the kritik would link harder to representations and structural violence produced in a world absent the plan, then voting aff is still preferable even in their framework; the discursive effects of the plan action outweigh the discursive effects of the plan justification**

**Utopian alts abusive:**

**We can’t be responsible for defending everything that is wrong with the system, as long as we don’t make things worse you should vote aff, otherwise it proves that their alternative moots the 1ac action**

**Think about it this way—the status quo is a 1985 Yugo with a broken wheel, the affirmative proposes a way to fix the wheel while the kritik alternative trades in the whole car for a brand new Lexus. This isn’t reciprocal with our advocacy which is the only way to evaluate fairness, this is a voting issue and justifies perm do the alt**

#### Kritik leads to paralysis – blurs the line between atrocities and the plan

**Sikkink 08** Kathryn, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. “The Role of Consequences, Comparison, and Counterfactuals in Constructivist

Ethical Thought” 2008 http://www.polisci.umn.edu/centers/theory/pdf/sikkink.pdf

Ethical arguments of these different types are ubiquitous and necessary. But because they are also slippery and open to manipulation and misuse, we also need to be very careful and precise about how we go about using them. I would recommend that first we distinguish very carefully between the comparison to ideals and historical empirical comparison. I believe that many critical constructivist accounts rely on the comparison to the ideal or to the conditions of possibility counterfactual argument. In almost every critical constructivist work there is an implicit ideal ethical argument. This argument is implicit because it is rarely clearly stated, but it is found in the nature of the 36 critique. So, for example, in her discussion of U.S. human rights policy, Roxanne Doty critiques a human rights policy carried out by actors who sometimes use it for their own self aggrandizement and to denigrate others. 42 The implicit ideal this presents is a human rights policy that is not used for denigration or surveillance or othering those it criticizes or conversely, of elevating those who advocate it. What would be examples of such a policy? The book does not provide examples. We do not know if examples exist in the world. So the implicit comparison is a comparison to an ideal – a never fully stated ideal, but one present in the critique of what is wrong with the policies discussed. Nicolas Guilhot makes a similar argument in his recent book. The promotion of democracy and human rights, he argues, are increasingly used in order to extend the power they were meant to limit. “The promotion of democracy and human rights defines new forms of administration on a global scale and generates a new political science.” He historically examines how progressive movements for democracy and human rights have become hegemonic because they “systematically managed to integrate emancipatory and progressive forces in the construction of imperial policies.” But once again, **the book offers no alternative political scenario.** In the final sentence of the book, the author clarifies that “this book has no other ambition than to contribute to the democratic critique of democracy.” 43 In the introduction, he clarifies, “This book does not provide answers to these dilemmas. At most, its only ambition is to highlight them, in the hope that a proper understanding constitutes a first step toward the invention of new courses of action.”44 Ethically, I believe this is a cop-out. Politically and intellectually, I find it too comfortable and too easy. This critique has a crucial role to play in pointing to hypocrisy (as Price highlights in the introduction). It could also serve as a catalyst for policy change in the direction of policy that would include less surveillance or less cooptation of human rights discourse. **But it is unlikely to serve as a catalyst for new action or policy change unless it ventures something more than pure critique, unless it risks a political or ethical proposal**. Without that, it has the impact of delegitimizing any human rights policy without suggesting any alternative. Any policy to promote human rights of democracy policy is shown to be deeply flawed or even pernicious. It is portrayed as part of the problem, certainly not as offering any kind of solution. Human rights policy appears to make the situation worse, not better. The critique has the effect of telling us clearly what we do not want, what we can not support—human rights policies by imperfect and hypocritical actors like the U.S. In its historical comparisons, it also lumps human rights policy together with colonialism and does not provide any elements to distinguish between one policy of surveillance and other. All are equally flawed. The ethical effect is to remove normative support from existing policies without producing any alternatives. This is similar to what Price means when he says that “critical accounts which do not in fact offer constructive normative theorizing to follow critique ironically lend themselves to being complicit with the conservative agenda opposing erstwhile progressive change in world politics.” Neither Doty nor Guilhot, for example, contrast two human rights policies to give examples of policies that are more of less hypocritical or where there has been more or 44 Guilhot, p. 14. 38 less surveillance. **They don’t contrast human rights policies or democracy promotion policies to previous policies that were also hypocritical and self aggrandizing, but more pernicious** – e.g. national security ideology and support for authoritarian regimes in the third world. By presenting no contrasts, **the critique would appear to say that there is no ethical or political difference between a policy that supports coups and funds repressive military regimes and a policy that critiques coups and cuts military aid to repressive regimes.** These policies would appear to be ethically indistinguishable. Indeed, by these standards, a realist policy (a la Kissinger) might be preferable. Kissinger didn’t denigrate his authoritarianism allies. He took regimes as they were. He treated them as valuable allies. He didn’t lecture them on how they should change. He also, in doing so, encouraged, in some cases, coups and mass murder. **But at least he didn’t “Other”.** Doty and Guilhot give me no ethical criteria to distinguish between the policies of the Kissinger administration, the Carter administration, and current Bush administration policy. Because the comparison is an implicit ideal, never an empirical real world example, the critique is very telling and can delegitimize the critiqued policy. But nothing is put in its place. So, **it demobilizes any support we might have for any human rights policy**. **It puts the analyst in an ethically comfortable position, but by not proposing any explicit comparison, it demobilizes the reader**. We learn what to oppose, to critique, but we don’t learn explicitly what to support in its stead. **The result can be political paralysis.** One finds it difficult to act.

### AT: Fossil Fuel Turns

#### Globalization/capitalist coding of the environment is good

Norberg 3 – Cato Institute Senior Fellow (Johan, In Defense of Global Capitalism, p 225-37

Although multinational corporations and free trade are proving good for development and human rights in the Third World, there still remains the objection that globalization harms the environment. Factories in the Western world, the argument runs, will relocate to poorer countries with no environmental legislation, where they can pollute with impunity. The West has to follow suit and lower its own environmental standards in order to stay in business. That is a dismal thesis, with the implication that when people obtain better opportunities, resources, and technology, they use them to abuse nature. Does there really have to be a conflict between development and the environment?

The notion that there has to be a conflict runs into the same problem as the whole idea of a race to the bottom: it doesn't tally with reality. There is no exodus of industry to countries with poor environmental standards, and there is no downward pressure on the level of global environmental protection. Instead, the bulk of American and European investments goes to countries with environmental regulations similar to their own. There has been much talk of American factories moving to Mexico since NAFTA was signed. Less well known, however, is that since free trade was introduced Mexico has tightened up its environmental regulations, following a long history of complete nonchalance about environmental issues. This tightening up is part of a global trend. All over the world, economic progress and growth are moving hand in hand with intensified environmental protection. Four researchers who studied these connections found “a very strong, positive association between our [environmental] indicators and the level of economic development.” A country that is very poor is too preoccupied with lifting itself out of poverty to bother about the environment at all. Countries usually begin protecting their natural resources when they can afford to do so. When they grow richer, they start to regulate effluent emissions, and when they have still more resources they also begin regulating air quality. 19

A number of factors cause environment protection to increase with wealth and development. Environmental quality is unlikely to be a top priority for people who barely know where their next meal is coming from. Abating misery and subduing the pangs of hunger takes precedence over conservation. When our standard of living rises we start attaching importance to the environment and obtaining resources to improve it. Such was the case earlier in western Europe, and so it is in the developing countries today. Progress of this kind, however, requires that people live in democracies where they are able and allowed to mobilize opinion; otherwise, their preferences will have no impact. Environmental destruction is worst in dictatorships. But it is the fact of prosperity no less than a sense of responsibility that makes environmental protection easier in a wealthy society. A wealthier country can afford to tackle environmental problems; it can develop environmentally friendly technologies—wastewater and exhaust emission control, for example—and begin to rectify past mistakes.

Global environmental development resembles not so much a race for the bottom as a race to the top, what we might call a “California effect.” The state of California's Clean Air Acts, first introduced in the 1970s and tightened since, were stringent emissions regulations that made rigorous demands on car manufacturers. Many prophets of doom predicted that firms and factories would move to other states, and California would soon be obliged to repeal its regulations. But instead the opposite happened: other states gradually tightened up their environmental stipulations.

Because car companies needed the wealthy California market, manufacturers all over the United States were forced to develop new techniques for reducing emissions. Having done so, they could more easily comply with the exacting requirements of other states, whereupon those states again ratcheted up their requirements. Anti-globalists usually claim that the profit motive and free trade together cause businesses to entrap politicians in a race for the bottom. The California effect implies the opposite: free trade enables politicians to pull profit-hungry corporations along with them in a race to the top.

This phenomenon occurs because compliance with environmental rules accounts for a very small proportion of most companies' expenditures. What firms are primarily after is a good business environment—a liberal economy and a skilled workforce— not a bad natural environment. A review of research in this field shows that there are no clear indications of national environmental rules leading to a diminution of exports or to fewer companies locating in the countries that pass the rules. 20 This finding undermines both the arguments put forward by companies against environmental regulations and those advanced by environmentalists maintaining that globalization has to be restrained for environmental reasons.

Incipient signs of the California effect's race to the top are present all over the world, because globalization has caused different countries to absorb new techniques more rapidly, and the new techniques are generally far gentler on the environment. Researchers have investigated steel manufacturing in 50 different countries and concluded that countries with more open economies took the lead in introducing cleaner technology. Production in those countries generated almost 20 percent less emissions than the same production in closed countries. This process is being driven by multinational corporations because they have a lot to gain from uniform production with uniform technology. Because they are restructured more rapidly, they have more modern machinery. And they prefer assimilating the latest, most environmentally friendly technology immediately to retrofitting it, at great expense, when environmental regulations are tightened up.

Brazil, Mexico, and China—the three biggest recipients of foreign investment—have followed a very clear pattern: the more investments they get, the better control they gain over air pollution. The worst forms of air pollution have diminished in their cities during the period of globalization. When Western companies start up in developing countries, their production is considerably more environment-friendly than the native production, and they are more willing to comply with environmental legislation, not least because they have brand images and reputations to protect. Only 30 percent of Indonesian companies comply with the country's environmental regulations, whereas no fewer than 80 percent of the multinationals do so. One out of every 10 foreign companies maintained a standard clearly superior to that of the regulations. This development would go faster if economies were more open and, in particular, if the governments of the world were to phase out the incomprehensible tariffs on environmentally friendly technology. 21

Sometimes one hears it said that, for environmental reasons, the poor countries of the South must not be allowed to grow as affluent as our countries in the North. For example, in a compilation of essays on Environmentally Significant Consumption published by the National Academy of Sciences, we find anthropologist Richard Wilk fretting that:

If everyone develops a desire for the Western high-consumption lifestyle, the relentless growth in consumption, energy use, waste, and emissions may be disastrous. 22

But studies show this to be colossal misapprehension. On the contrary, it is in the developing countries that we find the gravest, most harmful environmental problems. In our affluent part of the world, more and more people are mindful of environmental problems such as endangered green areas. Every day in the developing countries, more than 6,000 people die from air pollution when using wood, dung, and agricultural waste in their homes as heating and cooking fuel. UNDP estimates that no fewer than 2.2 million people die every year from polluted indoor air. This result is already “disastrous” and far more destructive than atmospheric pollution and industrial emissions. Tying people down to that level of development means condemning millions to premature death every year.

It is not true that pollution in the modern sense increases with growth. Instead, pollution follows an inverted U-curve. When growth in a very poor country gathers speed and the chimneys begin belching smoke, the environment suffers. But when prosperity has risen high enough, the environmental indicators show an improvement instead: emissions are reduced, and air and water show progressively lower concentrations of pollutants. The cities with the worst problems are not Stockholm, New York, and Zürich, but rather Beijing, Mexico City, and New Delhi. In addition to the factors already mentioned, this is also due to the economic structure changing from raw-material-intensive to knowledge-intensive production. In a modern economy, heavy, dirty industry is to a great extent superseded by service enterprises. Banks, consulting firms, and information technology corporations do not have the same environmental impact as old factories.

According to one survey of available environmental data, the turning point generally comes before a country's per capita GDP has reached $8,000. At $10,000, the researchers found a positive connection between increased growth and better air and water quality. 23 That is roughly the level of prosperity of Argentina, South Korea, or Slovenia. In the United States, per capita GDP is about $36,300. Here as well, the environment has consistently improved since the 1970s, quite contrary to the picture one gets from the media. In the 1970s there was constant reference to smog in American cities, and rightly so: the air was judged to be unhealthy for 100–300 days a year. Today it is unhealthy for fewer than 10 days a year, with the exception of Los Angeles. There, the figure is roughly 80 days, but even that represents a 50 percent reduction in 10 years. 24 The same trend is noticeable in the rest of the affluent world—for example, in Tokyo, where, a few decades ago, doomsayers believed that oxygen masks would in the future have to be worn all around the city because of the bad air.

Apart from its other positive effects on the developing countries, such as ameliorating hunger and sparing people the horror of watching their children die, prosperity beyond a certain critical point can improve the environment. What is more, this turning point is now occurring progressively earlier in the developing countries, because they can learn from more affluent countries' mistakes and use their superior technology. For example, air quality in the enormous cities of China, which are the most heavily polluted in the world, has steadied since the mid-1980s and in several cases has slowly improved. This improvement has coincided with uniquely rapid growth.

Some years ago, the Danish statistician and Greenpeace member Bjørn Lomborg, with about 10 of his students, compiled statistics and facts about the world's environmental problems. To his astonishment, he found that what he himself had regarded as self-evident, the steady deterioration of the global environment, did not agree at all with official empirical data. He found instead that air pollution is diminishing, refuse problems are diminishing, resources are not running out, more people are eating their fill, and people are living longer. Lomborg gathered publicly available data from as many fields as he could find and published them in the book The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. The picture that emerges there is an important corrective to the general prophesies of doom that can so easily be imbibed from newspaper headlines.

Lomborg shows that air pollution and emissions have been declining in the developed world during recent decades. Heavy metal emissions have been heavily reduced; nitrogen oxides have diminished by almost 30 percent and sulfur emissions by about 80 percent. Pollution and emission problems are still growing in the poor developing countries, but at every level of growth annual particle density has diminished by 2 percent in only 14 years. In the developed world, phosphorus emissions into the seas have declined drastically, and E. coli bacteria concentrations in coastal waters have plummeted, enabling closed swimming areas to reopen.

Lomborg shows that, instead of large-scale deforestation, the world's forest acreage increased from 40.24 million to 43.04 million square kilometers between 1950 and 1994. He finds that there has never been any large-scale tree death caused by acid rain. The oft-quoted, but erroneous statement about 40,000 species going extinct every year is traced by Lomborg to its source—a 20-year-old estimate that has been circulating in environmentalist circles ever since. Lomborg thinks it is closer to 1,500 species a year, and possibly a bit more than that. The documented cases of extinction during the past 400 years total just over a thousand species, of which about 95 percent are insects, bacteria, and viruses. As for the problem of garbage, the next hundred years worth of Danish refuse could be accommodated in a 33-meter-deep pit with an area of three square kilometers, even without recycling. In addition, Lomborg illustrates how increased prosperity and improved technology can solve the problems that lie ahead of us. All the fresh water consumed in the world today could be produced

y a single desalination plant, powered by solar cells and occupying 0.4 percent of the Sahara Desert.

It is a mistake, then, to believe that growth automatically ruins the environment. And claims that we would need this or that number of planets for the whole world to attain a Western standard of consumption—those “ecological footprint” calculations—are equally untruthful. Such a claim is usually made by environmentalists, and it is concerned, not so much with emissions and pollution, as with resources running out if everyone were to live as we do in the affluent world.

Clearly, certain of the raw materials we use today, in presentday quantities, would not suffice for the whole world if everyone consumed the same things. But that information is just about as interesting as if a prosperous Stone Age man were to say that, if everyone attained his level of consumption, there would not be enough stone, salt, and furs to go around. Raw material consumption is not static. With more and more people achieving a high level of prosperity, we start looking for ways of using other raw materials. Humanity is constantly improving technology so as to get at raw materials that were previously inaccessible, and we are attaining a level of prosperity that makes this possible. New innovations make it possible for old raw materials to be put to better use and for garbage to be turned into new raw materials. A century and a half ago, oil was just something black and sticky that people preferred not to step in and definitely did not want to find beneath their land. But our interest in finding better energy sources led to methods being devised for using oil, and today it is one of our prime resources. Sand has never been all that exciting or precious, but today it is a vital raw material in the most powerful technology of our age, the computer. In the form of silicon—which makes up a quarter of the earth's crust— it is a key component in computer chips.

There is a simple market mechanism that averts shortages. If a certain raw material comes to be in short supply, its price goes up. This makes everyone more interested in economizing on that resource, in finding more of it, in reusing it, and in trying to find substitutes for it. The trend over the last few decades of falling raw material prices is clear. Metals have never been as cheap as they are today. Prices are falling, which suggests that demand does not exceed supply. In relation to wages, that is, in terms of how long we must work to earn the price of a raw material, natural resources today are half as expensive as they were 50 years ago and one-fifth as expensive as they were a hundred years ago. In 1900 the price of electricity was eight times higher, the price of coal seven times higher, and the price of oil five times higher than today. 25 The risk of shortage is declining all the time, because new finds and more efficient use keep augmenting the available reserves.

In a world where technology never stops developing, static calculations are uninteresting, and wrong. By simple mathematics, Lomborg establishes that if we have a raw material with a hundred years' use remaining, a 1 percent annual increase in demand, and a 2 percent increase in recycling and/or efficiency, that resource will never be exhausted.

If shortages do occur, then with the right technology most substances can be recycled. One-third of the world's steel production, for example, is being reused already. Technological advance can outstrip the depletion of resources. Not many years ago, everyone was convinced of the impossibility of the whole Chinese population having telephones, because that would require several hundred million telephone operators. But the supply of manpower did not run out; technology developed instead. Then it was declared that nationwide telephony for China was physically impossible because all the world's copper wouldn't suffice for installing heavy gauge telephone lines all over the country. Before that had time to become a problem, fiber optics and satellites began to supersede copper wire. The price of copper, a commodity that people believed would run out, has fallen continuously and is now only about a tenth of what it was 200 years ago.

People in most ages have worried about important raw materials becoming exhausted. But on the few occasions when this has happened, it has generally affected isolated, poor places, not open, affluent ones. To claim that people in Africa, who are dying by the thousand every day from supremely real shortages, must not be allowed to become as prosperous as we in the West because we can find theoretical risks of shortages occurring is both stupid and unjust.

The environmental question will not resolve itself. Proper rules are needed for the protection of water, soil, and air from destruction. Systems of emissions fees are needed to give polluters an interest in not damaging the environment for others. Many environmental issues also require international regulations and agreements, which confront us with entirely new challenges. Carbon dioxide emissions, for example, tend to increase rather than diminish when a country grows more affluent. When talking about the market and the environment, it is important to realize that efforts in this quarter will be facilitated by a freer, growing economy capable of using the best solutions, from both a natural and a human viewpoint. In order to meet those challenges, it is better to have resources and advanced science than not to have them.

Very often, environmental improvements are due to the very capitalism so often blamed for the problems. The introduction of private property creates owners with long-term interests. Landowners must see to it that there is good soil or forest there

tomorrow as well, because otherwise they will have no income later on, whether they continue using the land or intend to sell it. If the property is collective or government-owned, no one has any such long-term interest. On the contrary, everyone then has an interest in using up the resources quickly before someone else does. It was because they were common lands that the rain forests of the Amazon began to be rapidly exploited in the 1960s and 1970s and are still being rapidly exploited today. Only about a 10th of forests are recognized by the governments as privately owned, even though in practice Indians possess and inhabit large parts of them. It is the absence of definite fishing rights that causes (heavily subsidized) fishing fleets to try to vacuum the oceans of fish before someone else does. No wonder, then, that the most large-scale destruction of environment in history has occurred in the communist dictatorships, where all ownership was collective.

A few years ago, a satellite image was taken of the borders of the Sahara, where the desert was spreading. Everywhere, the land was parched yellow, after nomads had overexploited the common lands and then moved on. But in the midst of this desert environment could be seen a small patch of green. This proved to be an area of privately owned land where the owners of the farm prevented overexploitation and engaged in cattle farming that was profitable in the long term. 26

Trade and freight are sometimes criticized for destroying the environment, but the problem can be rectified with more efficient transport and purification techniques, as well as emissions fees to make the cost of pollution visible through pricing. The biggest environmental problems are associated with production and consumption, and there trade can make a positive contribution, even aside from the general effect it has on growth. Trade leads to a country's resources being used as efficiently as possible. Goods are produced in the places where production entails least expense and least wear and tear on the environment. That is why the amount of raw materials needed to make a given product keeps diminishing as productive efficiency improves. With modern production processes, 97 percent less metal is needed for a soft drink can than 30 years ago, partly because of the use of lighter aluminum. A car today contains only half as much metal as a car of 30 years ago. Therefore, it is better for production to take place where the technology exists, instead of each country trying to have production of its own, with all the consumption of resources that would entail. It is more environmentally friendly for a cold northern country to import meat from temperate countries than to waste resources on concentrated feed and the construction and heating of cattle pens for the purpose of native meat production.

**Resources are infinite**

**Geddes 4** – Writer and Libertarian Analyst (Marc, “The monster non-socialist FAQ”, 2/12, http://rebirthofreason.com/War/MonsterFAQ.shtml) MGM

A significant disruption to supplies of critical resources can cause temporary problems, but in a free market, if resources start to become scarce, prices rise, leading to a search of substitutes and improved conservation efforts. The pool of resources is not fixed, because human ingenuity can find substitutes or new sources of resources. Supplies of most raw materials have been increasing throughout the 20th century, and the cost has been falling (See the entry on Natural resources). For instance, between 1950 and 1970, bauxite (aluminium source) reserves increased by 279 per cent, copper by 179 per cent, chromite (chromium source) by 675 per cent, and tin reserves by 10 per cent. In 1973 experts predicted oil reserves stood at around 700 billion barrels, yet by 1988 total oil reserves had actually increased to 900 billion barrels. Production of certain kinds of resources such as fossil fuels may finally be beginning to peak but there are renewable energy sources in development which can serve as substitutes. Simplistic thermodynamic analysis of energy production is misleading, because it's not the quantities of energy used or produced that determine economic value, but the utility, or usefulness if that energy to humans. If energy is being used more efficiently you don't need as much of it, and some forms of energy are more valuable than others- for instance kinetic energy in the form of wind power is less valuable than the same quantity of latent energy in the form of oil. Solar power is a virtually inexhaustible supply of new energy for stationary sources and the hydrogen fuel cell can serve for transportation in place of fossil fuels. Developing these technologies costs money, so to avoid resource shortages a good economy is essential. Libertarian capitalism is the system which generates wealth the fastest.

#### Scholarship on neoliberalism is sloppy – it’s narrow terms create the problems that it attempts to solve – their very conceptualization of neoliberalism turns itself and makes the impact inevitable – refuse their simplistic view the world

**Barnett 2k9** (Clive, prof social sciences @ the open U “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?” <http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf>

This chapter has suggested various conceptual limitations of theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization. These theories are characterised by static idealizations of the contradictions between ‘the state’ and ‘the market’ which actually reiterate the simplistic views they ascribe to neoliberal purists. They tend to suppose that changes in state activities are the outcome of ‘ideational projects’, a view sustained by invoking expressive concepts of ideology, culturalist conceptions of hegemony, and instrumental conceptions of discourse. They tend in turn to project a distinctive geographical imaginary of cascading scales and spaces of diffusion, enabling highly abstract deductions about capital accumulation to be articulated with more concrete notions of the state, gender relations, racial formations, and other ‘contextual’ factors. And it is assumed that social formations are reproduced functionally through various mechanisms of naturalization, whether ideological or, in the Foucauldian inflection, through processes of subjectification. Theories of neoliberalism render ‘the social’ a residual aspect of more fundamental processes in three ways. Firstly, social practices are reduced to residual, more-or-less resistant effects of restructuring processes shaped by the transparent class interests of capital. This means that social relations of gender, ethnicity, or race, for example, are considered as contextual factors shaping the geographically variable manifestations of general neoliberalizing tendencies. Secondly, ‘the social’ is also reduced to a residual effect by being considered only in so far as it is the object of state administration in the interests of economic efficiency, or to strategies of ‘governmental rationality’. Thirdly, and related to this, ‘the social’ is construed as the more-or-less manipulable surface for ideological normalization or discursive subjectification. This final section throws into relief the normative limitations of theories of neoliberalism. If neoliberalism is a critics’ term, what are the terms of criticism invoked by these theories: what is wrong with neoliberalism? The concept of neoliberalization implies that neoliberalism is both parasitic on and corrosive of other social processes, but as already suggested, the source of this doubly destructive energy is never quite specified in these theories. The immediate objects of criticism are a range of substantive and observable social harms: rising levels of socio-economic inequality, authoritarianism, corrupt government, the concentration of wealth. But these immediate objects of criticism are seen as inevitable outcomes of a system which has encouraged the disembedding of economic relations from broader structures of normative steering. It is the imputed content of neoliberalism as a narrowly individualistic, egoistic rationality that is the source of the status ascribed to it as a ‘strong discourse’, at once parasitic and corrosive. It is on these grounds that it neoliberalism is viewed as nothing short of “a programme of the methodical destruction of collectives” (Bourdieu 1998). The view that neoliberalism unleashes pathological human tendencies otherwise properly held in check by collective conventions is a distinctive updating of Polanyi’s view of market capitalism as an unnatural formation. What is at work here is a theoretical imaginary in which the extension of accumulation by market exchange is understood to necessarily undermine forms of social integration previously knitted together through the state. Theories of neoliberalism display an intense ambivalence towards ‘the state’. On the one hand, they follow a classical Marxist view in which the state is a territorial sovereign systematically involved in the reproduction of capital accumulation. On the other, they hark back almost nostalgically to a social democratic view in which the state stands opposed to the market as a counterweight, representing an opposing principle of social integration and political legitimacy. In accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting highly moralistic forms of analysis of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing an equally idealized view of the forum as the alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character ofneoliberalism that should be the focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206). But it is far from clear whether the theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey’s analysis, the withdrawal of the state is taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality (ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the “movement society”, expressed in the proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back “[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narco-trafficking networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious sects proliferate” (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms “that fill the void left behind as state powers, political parties, and other institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding” (ibid.). Harvey suggests his own bundle of rights as an alternative to the neoliberal regime of rights. These include ‘the right to life chances’, ‘control over production by the direct producers’, ‘to a decent and healthy living environment’, and ‘to collective control of common property resources’ (ibid. 204). He provides little sense of how the inevitable tensions and trade-offs between these sorts of rights would be negotiated and decided in practice (beyond the reiteration of Marx’s comment that ‘Between equal rights, force decides’ as if this were both a matter of fact and of principle). Harvey’s preference for ‘substantive’ democracy and social justice is associated with a persistent denigration of procedural issues without which any meaningful practice of democracy is unimaginable. Harvey casts struggles for cultural, civil, sexual or reproductive rights since the 1960s as inevitably complicit with the ‘neoliberal frame’ favouring ‘individual freedoms’ over ‘social justice’ (ibid., 41-43). Likewise the emergence of international human rights movements and the development of non-governmental politics is damned as complicit with the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individual rights and privatization (ibid. 176-177). This is a travesty of complex political movements that have pioneered struggles for social justice along diverse fronts, not least when Harvey claims that these movements have not focussed on developing “substantive and open democratic governance structures” (ibid., 176). What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a longer tradition of liberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’ covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of self-ownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual rights. Any serious consideration of democracy, rights and social justice cannot afford to ignore the fields of social science in which issues of rationality, motivation, and agency are most fully theorized. These often turn out to be fields normally considered too ‘liberal’ for the tastes of critical human geographers (cf. Sayer 1995). These fields can serve as potential sources for revised understandings of the tasks of critical theory, ones which do not fall back into ahistorical, overly sociologized criticisms of any appearance of individualism or self-interest as menacing the very grounds of public virtue and the common good. Problems of coordination, institutional design, and justification are central to any normatively persuasive and empirically grounded critical theory of democracy. For example, the problem central to social choice theory – the difficulty of arriving at collective preference functions by aggregating individual preferences – is a fundamental issue in democratic theory, around which contemporary theories of deliberative democracy are increasingly focussed (Goodin 2003). Likewise, Amartya Sen’s (2002) critique of public choice theory’s assumption that people are ‘rational fools’ provides the most compelling criticism of the one-dimensional understanding of rationality, motivation, and agency upon which orthodox economic and public policy depends. This critique informs the “capabilities approach” which connects key problems in welfare economics to a theory of egalitarian rights and political democracy (Sen 1999; Corbridge 2002). These are just two examples of work which takes seriously the problematization of agency, motivation and rationality in ‘rational choice’ social science in order to move social theory beyond the consoling idea that rampant individualism can be tamed by moral injunctions of the public good and weak claims about social construction. The ascendancy of ‘neoliberalism’ as a theoretical object of approbation is symptomatic of the negative interpretation of ‘critical’ in contemporary critical human geography. Being critical, on this view, requires that one has a clear-sighted view of an object that one is critical of. Theories of neoliberalism provide a compelling picture of such an object, by providing an account of the displacement of socially embedded practices of reciprocity and redistribution by the pathological rationalities of market exchange. This style of theorizing leads to a mode of critical analysis in which change is always interpreted in zero-sum terms, as the encroachment of neoliberal rationalities into realms of social solidarity. It is a style of analysis that makes it impossible to acknowledge diverse dynamics of change, and in turn remains blind to emergent public rationalities: “If you believe in the implacable domination of economic forces, you cannot believe in the possibility of social movements; at the very best, you will see the movement of society as an expression of the systems’ internal contradictions, or as a manifestation of objective suffering and poverty” (Touraine 2001, 3). Neoliberalism as an object of analysis is certainly a critics’ term. The explicit formulation of neoliberalism into an object of theoretical analysis in critical human geography has been associated with the turning-in of intellectual curiosity around a very narrow space, bounded by Marxist political-economy on the one side and poststructuralist political ontologies on the other. As long as this remains the horizon of normative reflection, critical human geographers will continue to always know in advance what they are expected to be critical of but will remain unable to articulate convincingly what they are being critical for.

### Enviro Sec

#### Environmental reps good

**Kurasawa 4** – Prof Sociology, York (Fuyuki, Cautionary Tales, Constellations 11.4, AG)

And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts. Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### Eco-securitization opens space for pluralist debate to foster support for effective solutions

**Dabelko 97** – director, Environmental Change and Security Project (Geoffrey, Environment and Security, SAIS Review 17.1, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v017/17.1dabelko.html)

Undoubtedly, environment and security research, rhetoric, and activities--and the sobering statistics and trenchant analyses of environment and population dynamics that accompany them--have significantly raised the profile of many environmental concerns. They have also generated many useful discussions and new ways of thinking among a diverse set of experts, including those who previously considered the environment peripheral or unimportant to their interests. At the same time, there are serious limitations to the environment and security conceptual and linguistic framework. As convincing as certain security-related arguments may be, they are not the only reasons why the American public, decisionmakers, and other nations should care about the environment. Value-oriented considerations about the aesthetics of nature, human responsibility for global stewardship, and humanitarian concerns are also important. These considerations [End Page 141] can greatly enhance the process of **formulating effective solutions and winning sustained public attention** **and support for** international **environmental action**. Policymakers might therefore be best served by framing international environmental priorities in terms of a broad set of interests, including, but not limited to, security concerns. They should resist the temptation, common in security analyses, to examine environmental problems solely in terms of crises and "threats." Though helpful in setting priorities, threat-based analyses can have the unintentional effect of encouraging decisionmakers to pay attention to issues only when crises are imminent, by which time it is often too late for effective interventions and corrective measures. Examining how environmental preservation will enhance security and other interests over time might lead decisionmakers to adopt more appropriate long-term strategies to address the underlying causes of problems. International environmental issues will be most effectively addressed in the decades to come through a combination of conceptual clarity, a pragmatic and multidisciplinary approach to problem solving, an emphasis on long-term strategies, and an improved willingness and ability among leaders to explain the complexity of environmental change. As the debates on environment and security continue, environmentalists' arguments will be strengthened if they resist the temptation to place all their priorities under the attention-grabbing security rubric. Meanwhile, skeptical foreign policy experts will benefit from recognizing the real and potential effects of environmental change and their relevance to many critical interests. As the United States considers security expenditures and priorities for the twenty-first century, the vibrant debates concerning environment and security matters will continue to be instructive.

#### Environmental securitization fosters international cooperation, accountability, and peace

**Ehrlich 2k** – Center for Conservation Biology, Stanford(Anne, Resources and Environmental Degradation as Sources of Conflict, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG5draft.htm, AG)

Clearly, however, it is not enough to render states less wary and suspicious of one another, important though that task may be. Beyond tweaking the incentives governments and other actors perceive in the direction of peaceful interactions, peace demands the broader transformation of existing institutions and practices, particularly those that reproduce the zero-sum logic of the national security state. An international system based on anarchy is not an immutable property of global human affairs but rather, to quote Alexander Wendt, “what states make of it.”49 What they have made of it, far too often, is a domain of violence and insecurity that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in interstate relations and a justification for violence and repression in the domestic sphere. The challenge is thus to transform institutions of governance and forge healthier, cooperative trans-societal relationships. Here too, environmental cooperation may have an important role to play: incorporating norms of peaceful dispute resolution, softening understandings of sovereign prerogatives to also include notions of sovereign responsibility, stimulating an increasingly robust global civil society, and drawing closed institutions into processes of informational exchange, greater transparency, and performance-based accountability. Again, not all forms of environmental cooperation have these effects. But it suggests once again that environmental cooperation may be well positioned to generate positive spin-offs for peace. Skeptics might suggest that the very problems targeted by this notion of environmental peace making - suspicion, mistrust, uncertainty, short planning horizons, and a zero-sum logic of traditional **security thinking** - are likely to prevent peace-enhancing forms of environmental collaboration from getting off the ground. The rejoinder to this pessimistic view is the enormity of the stakes. Environmental problems may be the first genuinely global test case in which the stakes are high enough and the logic of cooperation strong enough to promote the sort of positive, cooperative spillover envisioned by global-governance advocates since the end of World War II.

#### Representations of ecological crisis are good – rejecting apocalyptic rhetoric would destroy the environmental movement. True, Earth won’t cease to exist, but all of humanity actually could die.

**Foster 98** (1998, John Bellamy Foster, a member of the Board of the Monthly Review Foundation, teaches sociology at the University of Oregon and is coeditor of Organization & Environment, Monthly Review, April, findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m1132/is\_/ai\_20931195, da 2/10, mat)

[T]he postulation of a planetary ecological crisis, the very idea that the planet is somehow `vulnerable' to human action or that we can actually destroy the earth, repeats in negative form the hubristic claims of those who aspire to planetary domination. The subtext is that the earth is somehow fragile and that we need to become caring managers or caring physicians to nurse it back from sickness into health.... Against this it is crucial to understand that it is materially impossible for us to destroy the planet earth, that the worst we can do is to engage in material transformations of our environment so as to make life less rather than more comfortable for our own species being, while recognizing that what we do also does have ramifications (both positive and negative) for other living species....Politically, the millenarian and apocalyptic proclamation that ecocide is imminent has had a dubious history. It is not a good basis for left politics and it is very vulnerable to the arguments long advanced by [Julian] Simon and now by [Greg] Easterbrook, that conditions of life (as measured, for example, by life expectancy) are better now than they have ever been and that the doomsday scenario of the environmentalists is far-fetched and improbable.1 Aside from the purely rhetorical flourishes—the use of such terms as "millenarian" and "apocalyptic" which because of the sense of religious fatalism associated with them imply something irrational in character (the wrath of God, the second coming) which has little to do with the arguments of most environmentalists—this can be taken as a serious criticism not only of The Vulnerable Planet but of ideas that have common currency in environmental circles. It is noteworthy that this same criticism, of being "apocalyptic," has frequently been leveled at such figures as Henry David Thoreau, George Perkins Marsh, Rachel Carson, Paul Ehrlich and Barry Commoner—indeed at almost all figures who have contributed anything of importance to understanding the modern ecological crisis.2 Naturally, some phrases utilized in the environmental discussion—such as Silent Spring, The Closing Circle, Earth in the Balance, The End of Nature, and The Vulnerable Planet—are metaphorical, and while pointing to real concerns are not to be taken too literally. When it comes to actual argument, though, most analysts attempt to present an accurate portrayal of the real dimensions of the problem. Thus the opening sentences of Chapter One of The Vulnerable Planet convey the exact sense in which the title of that work is to be understood: "Human society has reached a critical threshold in its relation to the environment. The destruction of the planet, in the sense of making it unusable for human purposes, has grown to such an extent that it now threatens the continuation of much of nature, as well as the survival and development of society itself." It might have been added that the survival of the human species was also in doubt as a result of these very same processes.