### phantasie natura overview

**this re-creates their harms in the real-world and damns the type of pedagogy that their discourse endorses—if we win that unified solutions are impossible then this turn outweighs their case**

**SMITH ‘98** [Gregory Bruce Smith, “Environmentalism, postmodernity, and political philosophy”, Perspectives on Political Science; 1/1/1998; elibrary]

**We must eschew faith in the totalitarian belief that it would be efficacious to impose a new, culture, one which, according to our theoretical lights, is more in line with the prospering of either humanity or some presumably autonomous, nonhuman, natural whole at the expense of humanity. If we are to have a future reality that is not**, for example, **totally a consumer culture, we must step back from the willful modem attempts that have transformed humanity into an increasingly uniform herd of laborer-consumers, which rests on the distinctively modem attempt to suppress and ultimately transform the natural diversity of types of human beings that present themselves when we step back from revengeful projects for their suppression. If we are to unleash the natural from the revengeful theoretical transformations of modernity we cannot do it selectively-according to our various ideological priorities and agendas**--which, both Right and Left, as products of the modern will, are equally counterproductive. Under the rubric "the Tragedy of the Commons," environmentalism has argued that individualism in an environment of consumerism leads to ruin. Hence it is concluded that individualism must be limited by elite cadres. By this argument, popular sovereignty must likewise be limited, if The mechanics of these limitations are never made entirely clear, but the specter of self-selected and self-appointed elites is never far from the surface. The specter becomes even more menacing when it is asserted that the primary problems confronting us are global and hence will require global administration beyond the sovereignty of the nation-state. In that regard, the name of Greenpeace is often repeated with almost religious reverence.(16) **The need for radical transformations imposed by an elite is assumed by many to be the only available option, given that present manifestations of individualism and popular sovereignty will lead to universal consumerism, which it is assumed will in turn make accelerated demands for economic growth, requiring the transformation and depletion of limited natural resources. It is argued that there is no other way out of the vicious cycle that leads to inevitable ruin than through elite-imposed limitations on freedom and consumption. But there is another way out of this presumed impasse that is consistent with individualism and popular sovereignty, but which the antidemocratic strains of contemporary environmentalism never consider because of their modem frame of reference. Further, the anti-growth bias of environmentalism overlooks possibilities that can quite plausibly allow for economic growth without environmental ruin. We need not turn to the frequently mentioned palliative of enforced equality of possessions--again implying greater centralized bureaucratic oversight and administration. If overconsumption is the primary problem, then what is required is that we give modem individuals something to love other than consumption, not that we forcibly constrain and administer their patterns of consumption.**

**Even progressive strategies replicate the ecological failures of the status quo by relying on a Cartesian ontology that stands over Nature and acts to protect it. This subject/object dichotomy is the root of environmental crises – no progress is possible in their framework**

DeLuca 05 – PhD, Dept. of Communication Studies, University of Iowa (Kevin, “Thinking with Heidegger”, Ethics and the Environment, Project Muse)

The first stasis point revolves around humanity’s relation to nature. To put it plainly, in environmental circles it is still a Cartesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking (cogito ergo sum) and the earth is object to humanity’s subject. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the object earth and, fundamentally, this action is motivated by the subject’s self-interest. So, we must save the rain forests because they contain potential medical resources and because they alleviate global warming. Now certainly this base anthropocentrism has come under attack from various radical environmentalisms that posit biocentrism or ecocentrism. I would argue, however, that these anti-anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravity of Cartesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the effort to avoid the stain of anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having equal intrinsic worth/value and difference is leveled. The banana slug is equal to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. Most obviously, the concept of intrinsic worth/value is philosophically incoherent—worth/value by definition is always relational. More significantly for this discussion, to posit intrinsic worth/value is to deny the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Further, to deny difference is to blunt analysis of our current situation and to deny the differential levels of effects different species have. Homo sapiens is not another type of slug and must be analyzed with that awareness. In practice, radical groups, most notably Earth First!, often demonize humans as a cancer on the planet. As the metaphor suggests, humans are seen as somehow different from all other forms of life, an alien other, not a part but apart. Even more significantly, the metaphor of cancer suggests humans to be active subjects preying on the object earth. Indeed, the problem with humanity, as with the cancer cell, is that it is too active. Although radical groups offer a different valuation, note that this position does not trouble the terms of Cartesianism. The dichotomies subject-object, human-animal, culture-nature, civilization-wilderness, remain intact. The active subject humanity threatens the object earth. The stasis point in actual environmental debates revolves around reform and radical environmental groups dismissing each other’s seemingly oppositional positions as, respectively, anthropocentic and compromised versus misanthropic and unrealistic, while remaining oblivious to the underlying Cartesian presuppositions they both share. In other words, reform environmentalists privilege humanity while radical environmentalists demonize humanity. In this morality play on the fate of the planet, humanity, whether hero or villain, is the actor. Heidegger’s thinking on the subject-object dichotomy, Descartes, and the phenomenology of the structure of reality offer a useful lever with which to displace these dichotomies and challenge the traditional ontology that undergirds and girdles environmental thinking. Citing the Cartesian ontology of the world as dominant, Heidegger in Being and Time works to “demonstrate explicitly not only that Descartes’ conception of the world is ontologically defective, but that his Interpretation and the foundations on which it is based have led him to pass over both the phenomenon of the world and the Being of those entities withinthe- world which are proximally ready-to-hand” (1962, 128). Briefly, Heidegger critiques Descartes for positing a “bare subject without a world” (1962, 192) and for relying on mathematics, which produces the sort of Reality it can grasp, thus “the kind of Being which belongs to sensuous perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being” (1962, 130). Descartes’ ontology presumes the dynamic of an isolated subject grasping mathematically world as object. Arguably, it is this perspective that is at the root of the environmental crisis, for the world is reduced to an object laid out before me and I am reduced to a detached subject that has only a use-relation to a dead world. Heidegger disdains “the Cartesian approach of positing a subject one can come across in isolation” (1962, 248) and rejects the “perennial philosophical quest to prove that an ‘external world’ is present-at-hand” (1962, 250).

### our argument first

**Our criticism is a prerequisite to ontology -- use it as a starting point to reconsider the affirmative's engagement with nature/culture. Only by prioritizing our analysis can we ground politically productive change**

**Proctor and Pincetl '96** James D Proctor, Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Stephanie Pincetl, independent conservation researcher. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1996, volume 14, pages 683-708 "Nature and the reproduction of endangered space: the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest and southern California" [http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~jproctor/pdf/E&P1996.pdf](http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~jproctor/pdf/E%26P1996.pdf)

**There can be other approaches to biodiversity protection, but they will necessitate a critical engagement with the entrenched ethics and politics of contemporary environmentalism** and the dominant capitalist paradigm. **One fundamental step involves rethinking what biodiversity is and why people should care about it-in particular, what sense of nature is implied in our notion of biodiversity.** Is biodiversity just spectacular plants and animals, or is it more a symbol of life itself as it has unfolded on earth? And if the latter, what is the place for humans in this tapestry of life on earth? How do we redefine natural spaces? Ultimately, then, **rethinking biodiversity/nature conservation requires the problematization of the ideological and spatial gap between humans and the natural world implicit in contemporary social constructions of nature**. As Williams concluded in his seminal essay, "Ideas of nature, but these are the projected ideas of [humans]. And I think nothing much can be done, nothing much can even be said, until we are able to see the causes of this alienation of nature, this separation of nature from human activity" (1980, page 82). Williams speaks of the separation of nature from human activity in two forms: as an irretrievably human construct that nonetheless is typically posited to be the antithesis of human creation; and as an entity into which we all are materially enmeshed, despite our attempts to define it as an other. **Nature and culture are, as Latour argued, inextricably linked; to acknowledge so is ironicallythe first step toward saving nature.**

**Environmental discourse pre-figures policy outcomes**

**Bailey, Prof Env’t @ York University, 2000**

(Peter David, “Discourse and the Regulation of the Environment and Technology”, Inst for

Fisheries Management Rsrch Report No 54, June, http://www.ifm.dk/reports/54.pdf)

Discourse analysis suggests that actors’ conceptualisation of technology depends upon the stories that are told about the technology and the imposition of a technology is likely to lead to the telling of different accounts in comparison to the accounts that might have been told about a jointly developed technology. In the absence of multiple official access points into a policy arena, actors are likely to find other access points ‘for dissenting views and unorthodox perspectives’. The environmental NGOs and other actors such as governmental environmental administrations have managed to influence the development of fisheries policies through two main routes. The first is by claiming the relevance of international environmental agreements for fisheries, for example, the agreements of the 1992 Rio Summit. The second, and related route, is the promotion of a different kind of science in fisheries discourse – ecology. Both within the scientific organisation of ICES and via international agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the existing science of population biological has been complemented and even questioned by the ecological conceptualisation of fisheries. This conceptualisation is favoured by environmental groups, such as the RSPB, as it places fish in the sea on a similar level as other creatures (such as sea birds) instead of privileging fish as the main focus of attention. This example shows how some actors can be sophisticated in finding ways of challenging the discursive framings in the fisheries policy arena. Discourse analysis potentially provides actors with a tool to develop this strategy in a more systematic manner as it can be used to reveal the dominant framings of existing policy arenas. It thus has many other applications beyond Myers’ (1990) study of scientific writings, Hajer’s (1995) study of ecological modernisation, Jasanoff’s (1999) paper on risk and this present study of overfishing and vessel monitoring. The discourse analytical methodology of the type presented here is appropriate for revealing how different policy arenas fashion issues into particular forms and exclude other ways of understanding policy issues and acting upon them. Furthermore, it can be applied to track how the segmentation of policy arenas is achieved and what happens when they interact. **It is especially useful for examining how environmental concerns, originating from the environmental policy arena, are incorporated, modified or even rejected as they are translated into other sectoral arenas.** An understanding of discourse potential brings benefits to individuals and groups who are involved or wish to involve themselves in policy making processes. Nongovernmental actors, such as industrial representatives and environmental organisations, would benefit from the application of discourse analysis as a systematic tool for understanding their own contributions and the claims of other actors in the policy arenas in which they operate. In particular, because it **reveals how present policies and positions are framed, it provides a route for challenging and reinterpreting the positions of others.** Scientists are also potential beneficiaries of the interpretations and findings provided by an analysis of discourse. Such analysis can reveal the interrelationships between scientific and political procedures and enable scientists to develop a greater appreciation of how their work shapes and is shaped by social and political considerations. This could benefit scientists by helping them to better understand the needs of regulators in particular, and the public in general. And finally, regulators would find discourse analysis useful for not only understanding the arguments and challenges from individuals and groups that oppose their policies (something that they typically have a fairly good knowledge of already) but, and perhaps more usefully, they could use it to understand their own positions better. By concentrating on how existing policies are framed and exclude other ways of thinking, discourse analysis potentially provides a methodology for reflecting upon how the existing situation is understood, what other understandings are systematically excluding, which courses of action are privileged and which are foregone. This may enable officials and politicians alike to develop new solutions to persistent old problems.

### a2: permutation

**THE QRITIQ TURNS CASE – the affirmative’s effort to restore the lost state of balance is a suicidal narrative that assumes we must sacrifice ourselves for a nature we really don’t have ANY control over**

**CRONON ‘96** [William; Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; Uncommon Ground; 1996; p. 82-83]

But such a perspective is possible only if we accept the wilderness premise that nature, to be natural, must also be pristine—remote from humanity and untouched by our common past. In fact, everything we know about environmental history suggests that people have been manipulating the natural world on various scales for as long as we have a record of their passing. Moreover, we have unassailable evidence that many of **the environmental changes we now face also occurred quite apart from human intervention at one time or another in the earth's past.**31 **The point is not that our current problems are trivial, or that our devastating effects on the earth's ecosystems should be accepted as inevitable or "natural." It is rather that we seem unlikely to make much progress in solving these problems if we hold up to ourselves as the mirror of nature a wilderness we ourselves cannot inhabit. To do so is merely to take to a logical extreme the paradox that was built into wilderness from the beginning: if nature dies because we enter it, then the only way to save nature is to kill ourselves. The absurdity of this proposition flows from the underlying dualism it expresses. Not only does it ascribe greater power to humanity than we in fact possess**—physical and biological nature will surely survive in some form or another long after we ourselves have gone the way of all flesh—**but in the end it offers us little more than a self-defeating counsel of despair. The tautology gives us no way out: if wild nature is the only thing worth saving, and if our mere presence destroys it, then the sole solution to our own unnaturalness, the only way to protect sacred wilderness from profane humanity, would seem to be sui-cide. It is not a proposition that seems likely to produce very positive or practical results.**

### a2: but we haz no plan...

**Our critique is simply a reason that the 1ac speech act shouldn't have happened -- your attempt to wiggle out of our links with plan-lessness is an act of desperation that shows how little you understand our argument**

**Luke, Prof Pol Sci @ Virginia Polytechnic Inst, 1999**

(Timothy W., “Placing Ecocritique in Context: Technology, Democracy and

Capitalism as Environment”, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim653.htm)

In this context, many ecocritiques remain stuck in modernist ruts, assuming an operational terrain in which humans intervene in their natural environments in ways—either intended or unanticipated—that **turn out to be disastrous.** Thus, technology, democracy, and capitalism are cast as anthropogenic forces that impinge, with deleterious effects, on the Earth’s theogenic, or, at least, autogenic environments. Whether they are nature laments or anti-industrial polemics, ecocritiques rarely reposition their analyses outside of modernity's constantly changing contexts. Why not reverse some of these rhetorical relations? Perhaps technology, democracy, and capitalism are now coevolving into forces that have many effects, some positive and some negative, including the fabrication of enduring anthropogenic environments. Instead of being seen as factors intruding upon the environment, their joint interaction effects can be seen as an environment in itself. If technology, democracy, and capitalism are recast as part and parcel of our environment, then their influence could be much greater and far different than what is attributed to them by other styles of ecocritique. Recognizing how the ensemble of technology/democracy/capitalism now exerts environing effects on a global scale and at a local level almost everywhere forces one to concede how thoroughly these social formations have become environmental in dimension and duration. Industrial production and by-production, popular democratization and structural undemocratization, market success and market failure all coexist as dense networks of interaction and fixed grids of inaction. Their net effects acquire a naturalized momentum and scope, turning them into an environment. As Beck (1992) notes, modernization must become reflexive at this juncture: a reality that has been reaffirmed implicitly by many environmental movements of the past generation.