### 1nc

**Incentives for and restrictions on energy production beg the question of what it means to produce energy from nature in the first place. Modern technology puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored up as such. This challenging-forth is indicative of the essence of modern technology.**

Condella 2k1(Craig A, “Overcoming the Destining Of Technological Being” http://www.fordham.edu/philosophy/fps/symposia/2001fall/condella.htm)

What, then, is the essence of technology? In searching for an answer to this all-important question, Heidegger (as he so often does) looks back to the ancient Greeks to locate techne as a form of poiesis, i.e. a bringing-forth. It is a way of bringing something forth from concealment to unconcealment. Technology, simply put, is a mode of revealing which brings something into presence. As a form of revealing or unconcealment, technology evinces itself fundamentally as a happening of truth – an occurrence referred to by the Greeks as aletheia. In sum, the essence of technology is a bringing-forth from concealment to unconcealment and, consequently, an occasioning of truth. Curiously enough, nothing overtly dangerous emerges from the essence of technology as identified by Heidegger, but then again why should it? After all, nothing about the ancient Greek notion of techne, which included the fine arts no less than the works of the craftsman, strikes us as straightaway threatening. For Heidegger, then, the Greek notion of techne allows us to grasp technology’s essence, but not the danger which we presently encounter. To find the latter, we must determine what it is exactly that makes the technology of modernity so unique.

 According to Heidegger, “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.” Herein we encounter the essence of modern technology as a challenging-forth, along with its rendering of nature as standing-reserve. With modern technology, the bringing-forth of techne is fundamentally transformed into a challenging-forth. What modern technology challenges can be see as twofold. First, and perhaps more obvious, is its challenging of nature. Modern technology essentially transforms nature into an energy source which it manipulates and uses at its own discretion. Nature, at the hands of modern technology, is reduced to Bestand (standing-reserve). Beyond even this challenging, however, are the demands placed upon man who, put simply, is challenged-forth into the challenging of nature. Heidegger calls this challenging-forth of man to order nature as standing-reserve Ge-stell (enframing) and thus locates the essence of modern technology outside of human control.

Modern technology, as a revealing that orders, is thus no mere human doing. Therefore we must take the challenging that sets upon man to order the actual as standing-reserve in accordance with the way it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon ordering the actual as standing-reserve.

 In the end, modern technology as Ge-stell creates a situation in which man orders nature and thus posits himself as “lord of the earth” when, in all reality, he himself is being ordered in just the same way. Within such a situation, man becomes blind to all other modes of revealing outside of the technological. He sees nature as existing fundamentally for him while being driven by a power greater than himself, a power which not only distorts nature but obfuscates man’s understanding of his own self. With modern technology, man is hoodwinked into believing that he fulfills his true essence to the very extent that he dominates his surroundings. Whereas man prides himself on using technology to his own advantage, it is modern technology which, in all reality, uses man. Not until we see modern technology as something outside of our control can we even begin to overcome the danger harbored within its very essence.

*We do not endorse the gendered language in this card*

**Energy production brings nature to serve, turning the world into a global gas station, eviscerating and erasing being. The ultimate result is nuclear annihilation and meaninglessness—comparatively outweighs**

Callister 2007 (Paul, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Leon E. Bloch Law Library, University of Missouri‑Kansas City School of Law. Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology: Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship Law Library Journal [Vol. 99:2)

 1 Following World War II, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger offered one of the most potent criticisms of technology and modern life. His nightmare is a world whose essence has been reduced to the functional equivalent of “a giant gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man to the world [is] in principle a technical one. . . . [It is] altogether alien to former ages and histories.”2 For Heidegger, the problem is not technology itself, but the technical mode of thinking that has accompanied it. Such a viewpoint of the world is a useful paradigm to consider humanity’s relationship to law in the current information environment, which is increasingly technical in Heidegger’s sense of the term. 2 Heidegger’s warning that a technical approach to thinking about the world obscures its true essence is directly applicable to the effects of the current (as well as former) information technologies that provide access to law. The thesis of this article is that Heidegger provides an escape, not only for libraries threatened by obsolescence by emerging technologies, but for the law itself, which is under the same risk of subjugation. This article explains the nature of Heidegger’s criticisms of technology and modern life, and explores the threat specifically identified by such criticism, including an illustration based upon systematic revision of law in Nazi Germany. It applies Heidegger’s criticisms to the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo-American traditions. Finally, the article considers the implications for law librarianship in the current information environment. Heidegger’s Nightmare: Understanding the Beast Calculative Thinking and the Danger of Subjugation to a Single Will 3 The threat is not technology itself; it is rather a danger based in the essence of thinking, which Heidegger describes as “enframing”3 or “calculative thinking.”4 For Heidegger, the problem is that mankind misconstrues the nature of technology as simply “a means to an end.”5 4 Heidegger’s articulation of the common conception of technology as a “means” applies equally well to information technologies, including legal databases. True, it is hard to think of technology in any other way, but what Heidegger argues is that this failure to consider the essence of technology is a threat to humanity.6 5 He defines the threat in two ways. First, humans become incapable of seeing anything around them as but things to be brought into readiness to serve some end (a concept he refers to as “standing reserve”).7 They are thereby cut off from understanding the essence of things and, consequently, their surrounding world.8 Second, man is reduced to the role of “order-er” of things, specifically to some purpose or end, and, as a result, risks becoming something to be ordered as well.9 Heidegger illustrates these concerns as follows: The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profitmaking in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.10 In other words, the trees, the wood, the paper, and even the forester (whose ancestors once understood the sanctity of the woods) are ultimately subordinated to the will to establish orderly public opinion. The forester, in proverbial fashion, “cannot see the forest for the trees.” Instead of appreciating the majesty and mystery of the living forest, he sees only fodder for the paper mill, which will pay for his next meal. 6 The same cynicism might be applied to legal publishing. Whole forests have given their lives to the publication of legal information in order to provide a stable basis for society—after all, the “law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still,”11 or as our comrades from Critical Legal Studies might put it, law is simply a tool “to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic status quo.”12 Cadres of West editors (commonly referred to in generic fashion as human resources, ironically making them all the less human)13 work feverishly to digest points of law and assign 55,000 cases into a taxonomy with more than 100,000 class distinctions,14 all for the sake of a predictable legal system and stable society. 7 For Heidegger, the threat is revealed in mankind’s perpetual quest to gain mastery over technology. “Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually in hand.’ We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.”15 When Heidegger published these words (first in 1962, but based on lectures from 1949 and 1950),16 the implications of nuclear energy and atomic warfare occupied much academic discussion. Heidegger points out that the popular question of this period did not concern how to find sufficient energy resources, but “[i]n what way can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly—even without military actions— break out somewhere, ‘run away’ and destroy everything?”17 The modern question is about our mastery over technology, not about sufficiency of resources. 8 Similar concerns are apparent with respect to information technologies, where the primary problem is not lack of access, but too much access: for example, illegal music file swapping,18 the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),19 and trends to use licensing to control and preserve the economic value of information (and to prohibit otherwise lawfully competitive practices, such as reverse engineering).20 With respect to law and government, we see such examples as retraction of government documents,21 the Patriot Act,22 the furor over unpublished electronic precedent,23 and the recent frenzy of e-discovery.24 Some stakeholders seem to have liked things better when information resources were scarce.25 Universal access is destabilizing—hence, the considerable interest in getting a “handle” on technology through legal sanction and yet additional technological innovation (the so-called “access control” technologies). 26 9 Heidegger’s genius is in recognizing that all the fuss about mastering technologies, although close to the mark, concerns the wrong issue. The more insidious threat is not nuclear fallout or economic devaluation of intellectual property, but the worldview of “calculative” thinking that accompanies rapid technological change: “The world now appears as an object open to attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist.”27 For Heidegger, calculative thought is not limited to the manipulation of machine code or numbers. Rather, the concept is grounded in “Machiavellian scheming” and the pursuit of power. “Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next.”28 The threat Heidegger envisions to human thought is even more dangerous than nuclear warfare.29 10 Heidegger’s threat is based on the separation of man from his or her nature. By pursuing economic calculation, man is cut off from the transformative powers of his or her environment. In such a world, law does not have the capacity to educate or to provide the basis for social harmony;30 rather, like any resource, law must be employed to more economic ends. The implication is that calculative thinking mandates that everything (including law) be subjected to a single will. While Heidegger recognized the danger of subjecting everything to a single will, the issue of whether, and when, he equated the danger with Nazi totalitarianism, which he had originally supported, would require a line of historical inquiry far beyond the scope of this article.31 Regardless of Heidegger’s own political and moral journey, Nazism effectively illustrates Heidegger’s philosophical fear—that technological thinking risks the “ordering” of all the world, including humanity, as resources subject to a singular will.

*We do not endorse the gendered language in this card*

**Hence, our alternative: do nothing in the face of the 1AC and the topic.**

**Rejecting the call to action in the face of crisis opens space for solidarity to emerge through deep reflection on our relationship with the Earth.**

**McWhorter 92,** Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State, 92 (LaDelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed: McWhorter, p. vii-viii)

Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do - nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; **how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to *do nothing****?* The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. **The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that** the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question." Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human.

**Debates about the way that we exist are a prior condition to considerations of concrete action; we are powerless as long as we seek solutions as our first step. Changing the way that we interact with the world allows for the possibility of real change in the future**

**Seckinelgin** lecturer int’l social policy @ LSE **2k6** (Hakan, The Environment and International Politics Page 111)

In this discussion I am doing two things at the same time. First, I am giving a summary of Heideggerian thinking through the formulation of Dasein and its relationality.29 Second, I am constantly alluding to an ecological understanding. It is important to realise that the ecological aspect of Heideggerian thinking can only be exposed if the understanding of Dasein is demonstrated in its in-built constitutive relationality; it is the ecological aspect. The relationship between Dasein’s structure and ecological context is interwoven. Therefore, Twill distil the ecological discussion towards the end of this chapter after the structure of Dasein is clarified. In his reversal of being an autonomous human, Heidegger constitutes his understanding on a level which may seem very distant from the political concerns that are expressed in this volume. None the less, it is the pre-ontological importance of this reconstitution of distinctive human being which allows me to conclude by politicising nature and thinking the political in terms of ecological ethics.
The homeless and ever-forgetful being is at the heart of Heideggerian thought. The being (i.e. humankind defined and totalised by the modem age) is no doubt considered to be the final point in the long evolution of being. This standpoint is questioned by Heidegger as missing the real essence of being, which cannot be historicised. It is an attempt to find out the essence of being, which is hidden, concealed and cannot be reduced to an understanding of an epoch, from the modem human being in the age of technology.36 One of the important components of this problematisation is a call for thinking which is different from the thinking that is eventually geared to control and managing things:
That thinking is concerned unceasingly with one single happening: In the history of Western thinking, indeed continually from the beginning, what is, is thought in reference to Being; yet the truth of being remains unthought, and not only is that truth denied to thinking as a possible experience, but Western thinking itself, and indeed in the form of metaphysics, expressly, but nevertheless unknowingly, veils the happening of that denial.
(Heidegger 1977b: 57)
The potential implication of this new proposal for the established concept of thinking is profound. It suggests that thinking is an experience, **and in order to reach a truth through thinking it must be experienced**. Therefore, it is not ‘thinking of something’ any more but ‘thinking through’ something, as in living through, being involved with. It is a call to understand being by turning to it, getting into it, rather than objectifiing, distancing it.3’ Surely, here, a process is implied in which the other sides involved in the process have to ‘be’ as well. As argued by Ladelle McWhorter, Heidegger sees this thinking as one which ‘disciplines itself to allow things to show themselves on their own terms’ (1992: 2). The question of self- disciplined thought indeed sounds rather frustrating, as compared to modern ‘free thinking’ 32 This frustration is actually the challenge and eventually the threat of Heidegger to Western metaphysics and the modern man created therein. Moreover, it implies an ethic which is different insofar as it cares about the others in their being.
Within this process of thinking about the possibility of self-disciplined thought lies the path to a new understanding of being and belonging. What is to be overcome is that the ‘new epoch of the withdrawal is one in which being adapts itself to the objectness of objects, but which, in its essence as being, thereby withdraws. This epoch characterises the innermost essence of the age we call modernity’ (Heidegger 1996: 55). The withdrawal refers to the condition of the modern ‘I’ which completed its abstraction through Descartes and finally with Kant, by arriving at an extra-natural stand as the ultimate truth. In order to dislocate this extreme anthropocentrism, Heidegger shows that ‘something that man himself is, and yet which exceeds him and extends beyond him, in each case comes into play for the purpose of determining entities as such as a whole’ (cited in Haar l993b: xxiii).34 Heidegger attempts to understand the essence and conditions of being human, and so turns to the beginning of the Western tradition and tries to understand the origins of the essence of being in Greek philosophy, where man is understood as being that pertains to something from within that is common to all beings in their connectedness and which binds it with the whole.
In the following section the essence of being as articulated by Heidegger is examined. Frustration and disbelief are the two dominant senses as one goes deeper into Heidegger because he seems to suggest powerfully, and passionately, **that nothing can be done in the face of problems**. One can only watch what is happening within a social time frame in which one is located.
None the less, behind this façade is the suggestion of a possibility for action that comes from the deep potential of human being. **This potential has its grounds in belonging to Being**. The existential condition of being opens up a new ethics! relationality with nature, within nature. The thinking process is not only about allowing things to reveal themselves, but also about human beings realising their own existential condition within nature. Therefore, it is a possibility of action presenting itself through the consciousness of human being.35 The action is the process of the realisation of self and its location in the greater existence which is supposed to result in the realisation of tension between the time-based existence of being and its ahistorical attribute of belonging to a specific time and place. Here the obvious dichotomy and existential condition of being are revealed.

### 1nc

**A) Our framework—you can defend prior questions but you have to defend implementation of a topical plan afterward. They can justify their plan any way they want, but floating Ks of disads or vague observations do not apply unless there’s a causal internal link from the plan.**

**B) Reject the team—**

**Stasis—the plan is a the only predictable point of clash, shifting to general criticism lets them choose the focus and keep us from engaging a core target. It hurts neg ground since they can shift the meaning of the plan to be “an epistemic lens” or “a way of viewing the world” instead of tangible action**

**Switch side debate – we need a topical plan to negate, they mix burdens, that kills fairness and topic specific education**

**Rez basis—substantially means in substance, not illusory**

**Merriam-Webster, 8** (“substantial”, 2008, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=substantially)

Main Entry: sub·stan·tial

1 a: consisting of or relating to substance b: not imaginary or illusory : real, true c: important, essential

**Turns case and destroys the meaning of critical theory**

**FEAVER 2001** (Peter, Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)

At the same time, virtually all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the ‘real world’, what can be ‘good’ about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered. Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing. The gap between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a reality–or at least create an undesirable kind of reality–where policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferation–a topic that raises interesting and important questions for both policy and theory–to bring the communities together. Happily, the best work in the proliferation field already does so.

**Independently, aff conditionality bad—if they shift explanation you should vote them down, even if we don’t extend framework we can’t debate when the role of the plan shifts. They had 9 minutes to explain before we could respond, if it wasn’t clear by then don’t cut them any slack.**

### 1nc

**Apocalypse of Nature is an obverse envisioning of humanity’s pure Eden -- we were cast out for the sin of our impurity. Their hysterical call to retreat from environmentally destructive practices foregrounds an artificially pure environmental state presided over by a moral narrative in which humans have violated some pre-existing "natural" order of ethical action. Hence, the self-righteous judgmentalism that infects their 1ac**

**Nothing could be more laughable; the natural world springs forth from chaos, and our moral regulations will never be able to restrict the desire for human consumption. Their morality play of environmental doom perversely casts us as fallen angels who have angered our god-Mother Nature and demand apocalyptic punishment to expiate our sins.**

**CRONON ‘96** [William; Frederick Jackson Turner Professor of History, Geography, and Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; Uncommon Ground; 1996; p. 47-51]

But theme parks and shopping malls are by no means the only ways in which the virtual and the natural are converging in our time. It is well worth remembering that **some of the most dramatic environmental problems** we appear to be facing as we enter the twenty-first century **exist mainly as simulated representations in complex computer models** of natural systems. **Our awareness of the ozone hole** over the Antarctic, for instance, **depends** very much **on the ability of machines to process** large amounts of **data to produce maps of atmospheric phenomena that we ourselves could never witness at first hand.** No one has ever seen the ozone hole.However real the problem may be, our knowledge of it cannot help being virtual. **The same is** **even more** **true of** the phenomenon called **global warming, which many** people now **take to be an absolute fact of nature.** Like the ozone hole, **it too is probably real, but our knowledge** of it **could hardly be more simulated**. The computer models on which we base our **predictions** of what will happen as concentrations of greenhouse gases rise **are** in fact still **so unsophisticated that they cannot even do an accurate job of predicting past climatic change, let alone** change in **the future. Load** into them the **data for 1900, and the weather they will predict** for our present time **bears little resemblance to what we are now experiencing**. Given this rather awkward weakness in their software, the modelers have had to resort to a less trouble-some forecasting technique. They run their programs forward in time, once using the data for today's mixture of atmospheric gases, and once with doubled levels of carbon dioxide. After the computer has done its job, they compare the two runs and describe what will happen when we double the carbon dioxide. The only trouble is that this description is of the simulated doubling of a modeled gas in a virtual atmosphere, all of which bears only the most hypothetical relationship to the future world, for which we of course have no empirical data whatsoever. The model's ability to predict the future is no more assured than its proven inability to predict the past.18 But <48> because the phenomenon being predicted is so complex, because its consequences could be so catastrophic, and because we have no better way to investigate it, we have no choice but to rely on these flawed tools. In a very real sense, **global warming is the ultimate example of a virtual crisis in virtual nature—which is far from saying that it is unreal.** Instead, it is proof that **the virtual and the natural can converge in surprising ways**. None of this is very reassuring for environmentalists and others who look to nature as the ultimate foundation for their moral vision. In the face of culturally constructed landscapes and increasingly virtual experiences of the world, **many** of us **would not be at all unhappy if nature would reassert its own authority over all this** human **unreality. This may be** one reason **why environmentalists so often seem drawn to prophecies of ecological doom that offer elaborate descriptions of the disasters that will soon occur because of our misdeeds against the earth.** The genre is familiar enough to constitute yet another nature for our list. **It is the nightmare inversion of Eden** to which that eloquent U-Haul sign bore witness**: nature as demonic other**, nature as **avenging angel,** nature as **the return of the repressed. It can range from something as trivial as** those uncooperative **snails in our** Irvine **garden,** to natural disasters like earthquakes or floods, **to the hypothetical horrors of global warming.** At whatever scale we experience them, these things represent a nonhuman world that despite our best efforts **we** never quite succeed in fully controlling. Often we come close enough that we congratulate ourselves prematurely for our own triumph—and then **are surprised when** the long-silent fault or **the hundred-year flood suddenly reveals our hubris. As one man wrote to Time magazine** following the Northridge quake, "**If Mother Nature has proved one thing, it is that she can be a real ~~bitch."~~**19 Even beyond the earthquake and the fires, **California offered numerous examples of nature in apparent rebellion during our stay.** Early in the year reports surfaced of a high school in nearby Westminster where 292 **students** had been **infected with tuberculosis by a single classmate,** twelve of them with drug-resistant forms that would respond slowly to treatment if they responded at all. A little later the newspapers announced that the first **killer bees** had finally **made it to California, and** offered dire predictions of what this would mean for people who would now have to worry about being stung by them.20 More dramatically, **in April a young woman jogging near her home** in the Sierra Nevada foothills **was stalked and pulled from the trail by a female mountain lion and** then quickly **mauled to death. The lioness was hunted down and shot**, lest she kill again. **The woman left behind two small children; the lion, a seven-week-old cub. It undoubtedly says something about** people's **ideas of nature,** perhaps even their ideas of human nature, **that public appeals on behalf of these young orphans** soon **yielded $9,000 for the two children ... and $21,000 for the cub.**21**What is interesting about such events is** not that they occur. After all, what could be more natural than a mountain lion killing its prey or a great fault relieving its pent-up strain? What is really intriguing is **the meaning we** <50> **assign to them,** for we have an inveterate habit of **turning them into moral fables.** The snails in my Irvine garden become small gruesome symbols of the limits to human control. The earthquakes exemplify nature's terrifying randomness—and also people's hubris in pretending that rare, irregular events can safely be ignored simply because they cannot be predicted. **The mountain lion can serve as** a token of nature's savagery—or as the **innocent victim of human beings who** in their efforts to live closer to nature unthinkingly **invade the lion's home. Every environmental disaster,** all the way up to global warming**, stands as a potential indictment of the ignorant or culpable human actions that contributed to it. The human inclination is to transform all such events into**

stories that carry **a moral lesson.** Nature as demonic other is Job's whirlwind, the horror of random suffering that is all the more terrifying because it offers no discernible justification for the pain it inflicts on the innocent and the guilty alike. **Nature as the avenging angel is the dark side of the Eden story, the punishment** that follows **in the wake of** our having listened to **Satan's seductive advice.** It is this story that makes us shake our heads so knowingly even as we sympathize with the families that lost their homes in the Laguna Can-yon fire. It's too bad, we say, but they brought it on themselves by building there. What did they expect? After all, the fires are only natural. We do this even though we ourselves have almost surely made similar bargains with nature, whether we live in the fault zone or the floodplain or the path of great storms. When we become victims, these things are never our fault, though it is easy enough for us to see how others have foolishly placed themselves in harm's way. **People are drawn to nature as avenging angel for much the same reason that they are drawn to nature as Eden**. It should by now be clear that **the two are** in fact **opposite sides of the same moral coin. The one represents** our vision of **paradise:** the good that is so utterly compelling that we feel no hesitation in claiming nature as our authority for embracing it. **The other is our vision of hell: the place where those who transgress against nature will finally endure the pain and retribution they so justly deserve.** There is a wonderfully attractive clarity in this way of thinking about nature, for **it turns the non-human world into a moral universe** whose parables and teachings are strikingly **similar to those of a religion. We need such teachings, for they give meaning and value to our lives.** To the extent that **environmentalism serves as a kind of secular religion for many people in the modern world,** it is capable of doing great good if **it can teach us the stories**, as religions often try to do, **that will help us to live better, more responsible lives.** **And yet:** we must never forget that **these stories are ours, not nature's.** The natural world does not organize itself into parables. Only people do that, because **this is our peculiarly human method for making the world make sense.** And because people differ in their beliefs, because their visions of the true, the good, and the beautiful are not always the same, they <51> inevitably differ as well in their understanding of what nature means and how it should be used—because nature is so often the place where we go searching for the fulfillment of our desires. This points to one final vision of nature that recurs everywhere in this book: nature as contested terrain. Over and over again in these essays, we encounter the central paradox of this complex cultural construct. On the one hand, **people in Western cultures use the word "nature" to describe a universal reality, thereby implying that it is and must be common to all people. On the other hand, they also pour into that word all their most personal and culturally specific values: the essence of who they think they are, how and where they should live, what they believe to be good and beautiful, why people should act in certain ways. All these things are described as natural, even though everything we know about human history and culture flies in the face of that description. The § Marked 18:34 § result is a human world in which these many human visions of nature are always jostling against each other, each claiming to be universal and each soon making the unhappy discovery that even its nearest neighbors refuse to acknowledge that claim.**

**This understanding of nature are revealing itself to us abstracts our own role in consumptive practices- divorcing political solutions from personal economic choices and re-entrenching destructive practices at the level of everyday social practices, turning case**

**SMITH ‘1** [Daniel Somers; Assistant Professor at Ramapo College, Carnegie Council Fellow; Place-Based Environmentalism and Global Warming: Conceptual Contradictions of American Environmentalism;*Ethics & International Affairs*; Volume 15, No. 2; 2001; http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108]

Given the long and continuing migration of political and economic power to urban and corporate centers, these views have had serious implications for people living in economically and politically marginal rural areas. If the best nature is pristine and endangered, then it must be "protected," which often means excluding materially productive land uses. In some cases, as in the Northern Forest, protection may also involve allowing certain prescribed land uses (usually those that are aesthetically pleasing) to continue in a similarly idealized vision of "traditional" working landscapes. Either way, the process of objectification is a form of conceptual power that helps to make this assertion of control over the places where others live politically feasible and morally palatable. This situation is by no means restricted to the United States or other developed countries. In places like the rainforests of Amazonia and Indonesia, or the Himalayas of Nepal, indigenous and other rural inhabitants who have little political clout are frequently overwhelmed by internationally funded conservation initiatives that, fueled by well-meaning desires to protect forests, mountains, and biodiversity, can be ignorant of or even hostile toward local subsistence needs and cultures[15](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote15#footnote15). Equally important is how these popular views of nature shape the awareness and definition of environmental problems. **Infatuation with wild**, **pristine nature tends to steer our attention away from our own impacts on the larger "nature" that surrounds us, especially where these impacts are indirect or subtle, as is the case with climate change.** As William Cronon points out, **"To the extent that we live in an urban-industrial civilization but** at the same time **pretend** to ourselves **that our *real* home is in the wilderness,** to just that extent **we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead"** [2](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote2#footnote2). Thus, we "get back to nature" by driving on the interstate or flying in a plane and then using the latest high-tech outdoor gear. **We "get away from it all" by making a flurry of commercial transactions with travel agents, adventure outfitters, and ecotourism guides. Meanwhile, we define as "problems" those activities**, like development and clear-cutting, **that have obvious effects and can be attributed to others.** If our principal goal is to keep roads out of wilderness or protect scenery from rapacious timber corporations, **it becomes much easier to ignore the implications of our own personal and seemingly insignificant actions. Instead of emphasizing the role of consumer demand in driving the** degradation of wilderness, resource extraction in more mundane landscapes, and the **buildup of greenhouse gases that threaten rare and common places alike, we can point at the proximate destroyers of pristine nature** and confirm our personal sense of virtue by supporting environmental groups that seek to stop them. **Lost is consideration of the extraordinary amount of resources used and waste generated by Americans per capita.** Mathis **Wackernagel and** William **Rees** have developed a method for calculating the "ecological footprint" of individuals and communities based on the land area required to produce various goods, and including the estimated forest land that would be required to sequester carbon emitted from burning fossil fuels. They **estimate that there are approximately 1.5 hectares of productive land available for each human, and that the average North American uses the equivalent of between four and five hectares. "If everyone** on Earth **lived like the average** Canadian or **American, we would need** at least **three** such **planets to live sustainably"** [17](http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php?prmTemplateID=8&prmID=108#footnote17#footnote17). Moreover, there is little reason to expect that middle- and upper-class environmentalists contribute any less to the problem than do others. Those who live in large homes on biologically impoverished suburban plots of land and travel to the mountains on weekends or to exotic "ecotourism" destinations for vacation, undoubtedly have a greater negative impact on the environment than do average citizens.

**Our criticism is the alternative -- our argument is that the 1AC's flawed approach to the politics of ecology make their speech act a step in the wrong direction. Voting negative entails an acknowledgement of the hybrid quality of ecology as interlocking form within cultural politics rather than separate from it -- their idealized mythos of nature is wholly incompatible with making cultural analysis a starting point for ecology**

**Proctor and Pincetl '96** James D Proctor, Department of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Stephanie Pincetl, independent conservation researcher. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 1996, volume 14, pages 683-708 "Nature and the reproduction of endangered space: the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest and southern California" [http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~jproctor/pdf/E&P1996.pdf](http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~jproctor/pdf/E%26P1996.pdf)

Our intent in this paper is to examine how **nature is being literally and figuratively constructed in the context of the nationally significant biodiversity-conservation efforts** taking place in the Far West of the USA. **These efforts are largely built on a crude realist premise that nature is some biophysical entity under siege by humans**. Yet the threads of nature and culture are somewhat more entangled than many conservationists are willing to admit; as Raymond Williams observed, "The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history" (1980, page 67). In the last decade scholars from geography and other fields have explored the notion of nature as a social construct (Bennett and Chaloupka, 1993; Burgess, 1990; Cosgrove, 1984; Cronon, 1995; Demeritt, 1994; Evernden, 1993; FitzSimmons, 1989; Harrison and Burgess, 1994; Lynch, 1993; Milton, 1993; Oeschlaeger, 1991; Olwig, 1984; Simmons, 1993; Smith, 1990). Throughout this literature, emphasis has generally been placed on a **postempiricist epistemology, on nature as more than a set of plainly evident facts**. This position has become so diffuse in contemporary critical inquiry into questions of nature and environment that the epistemological gap between the literature of social constructivism and that of conservationism appears impossible to bridge. **Without further development the postempiricist position of social constructivism becomes problematic in its flirtation with epistemological relativism as well as in its ontological silence**. In its strong (and patently self-contradictory) form, relativism asserts that all truth is a matter of context, and that context is sufficiently heterogeneous to mitigate against any possibility of intersubjectively approved truth claims (Krausz, 1989; Margolis, 1986). Though not always explicitly addressed, **epistemological relativism is operationally denied in part, or at least cordoned off to less troublesome territory, by virtually all social theoretical accounts (save perhaps those advancing nihilist platforms).** Yet the social construction of nature literature is rarely clear in this regard. An epistemological position that is a refinement of the social construction of nature argument is Katherine Hayles's (1995) constrained constructivism. Hayles accepts social constructivism, but argues that constructivism occurs within a bounded set of possibilities, where the bounds are comprised of biophysical constraints: "No matter how gravity is conceived, no viable model could predict that when someone steps off a cliff on earth, she will remain spontaneously suspended in midair. Although the constraints that lead to this result are interpreted differently in different paradigms, they operate universally to eliminate certain configurations from the realm of possible answers" (page 52). Hayles's position provides a means to consider biophysical processes as actors in shaping knowledges of nature, and in responding to schemes of human practice based on these knowledges. Nonhuman species, for example, cannot adapt to all biodiversity-management schemes with equal success-though any judgment of success is also mediated through particular knowledges, which may highlight or obscure the status of certain species. **Biological science thus plays the paradoxical role in biodiversity conservation of interpreting the realities of threatened species and their habitats via an epistemological language of thoroughly human origin. The social construction of nature is more than an epistemological project**, of course. Differentiated human forces have transformed the earth (Turner et ai, 1990) with biophysical impacts that are increasingly becoming a focus of concern, leading to widespread conservation efforts. Yet again, **these impacts are not understood outside of socially constructed knowledges of nature**. § Marked 18:35 § The ontological (realitytransforming) and epistemological (knowledge-creating) dimensions of the social construction of nature are linked in complex ways. Bruno Latour (1993) weaves together these dimensions of the social construction of nature through his position that the mixing of the human and the nonhuman in reality-a process he terms 'translation'-has resulted not merely in altered 'natures' but in nature -culture hybrids, joint biophysical- human networks. **Latour cites ozone depletion as an example; this is typically considered a biophysical phenomenon of anthropogenic origin**. **His account**, however, **of the discourse surrounding ozone depletion suggests that the ontological elements of culture and nature are more inalienably interwoven**: "On page four of my daily newspaper, I learn that **the measurements taken above the Antarctic are not good this year**: the hole in the ozone layer is growing ominously larger. Reading on, I turn from upper-atmosphere chemists to Chief Executive Officers of Atochem and Monsanto, **companies** that **are modifying their assembly lines in order to replace the innocent chlorofluorocarbons, accused of crimes against the ecosphere**. A few paragraphs later, I come across **heads of state of major industrialized countries who are getting involved with chemistry, refrigerators**, aerosols and inert gases ... Toward the bottom of the page, **Third World countries and ecologies add their grain of salt and talk about international treaties, moratoriums, the rights of future generations**, and the right to development. **The same article mixes together chemical reactions and political reactions. A single thread links the most esoteric sciences and the most sordid politics, the most distant sky and some factory in the Lyon suburbs, danger on a global scale and the impending local elections or the next board meeting"** (1993, page 1). Latour argues that modernity is characterized not only by the proliferation of nature - culture hybrids, but by the contradictory epistemological practices of purification, of radical distancing of objects from subjects, of 'nature' from 'culture', thus hyperpolarizing the discourses between, for instance, the natural sciences and cultural studies: "Our intellectual life is out of kilter. Epistemology, the social sciences, the sciences of texts-all have their privileged vantage point, provided that they remain separate. If the creatures we are pursuing cross all three spaces, we are no longer understood. Offer the established disciplines some fine sociotechnological network, some lovely translations, and the first group will extract our concepts and pull out all the roots that might connect them to society or to rhetoric; the second group will erase the social the political dimensions, and purify our network of any object; the third group, finally, will retain our discourse and rhetoric but purge our work of any undue references to reality*horresco referens*-or to power play. In the eyes of our critics the ozone hole above our heads, the moral law in our hearts, the autonomous text, may each be of interest, but only separately" (1993, page 5). It is thus not surprising, following Latour's argument, that there has been so little engagement of the social-construction-of-nature thesis by natural scientists, as both sides have each attempted to stake their contrary epistemological claims on the same reality. In recent times, in fact, natural-**science-based conservationists have strongly rejected social constructivism because of what they perceive to be its nihilist leanings** (Soule and Lease, 1995). **The irony of this rejection, by some natural scientists and others, is that it is predicated on a particular social construction of nature-one which is purified of its embeddedness in cultural schemes of knowledge and transformative practices, and hence stakes out this pure nature as worthy of protection from adverse human influence**. The close association of biodiversity-protection efforts with applied natural science (for example, conservation biology), coupled with the predominant objective of these efforts in the preservation of more quintessentially natural places, is thus understandable in this light.

### 1nc

#### Fiscal cliff will be top of the docket in the lame duck and will barely pass now

Bruce Krasting (writer or Business Insider) October 1, 2012 “The BEST Case Scenario For The Fiscal Cliff Is Still Ugly” http://www.businessinsider.com/war-headlines-after-the-november-election-will-prevent-cutbacks-in-military-spending-2012-10

Absent some earth shaking event between now and November, Obama is going to win, the House will remain in the hands of the Republicans and the Senate will continue to be equally divided. The war between Reds and Blues will be just as bad as it was a year ago. The day after the election, the fight over the fiscal cliff will commence. I expect it will be ugly. -I think there is zero probability that all of the issues now on the cliff will be pushed off to some future period. (Ultimate-can-kicking) Some of the cutbacks/tax increases that are now scheduled, will happen. -I put the odds on falling off the cliff without any compromises at 40%. This scenario comes about if the Reps and Dems can’t agree on anything. If that is the case, we fall very hard on January 2. (No-can-kicking) -Therefore, I see a 60% chance of a compromise that softens the consequences of the fiscal cliff, but does not eliminate it entirely. (Semi-can-kicking, but still kicking ourselves in the face) If there is to be a compromise, it will be interesting to see who gets what, and who gives up what. It might play out with the following results: I) The 2% reduction in FICA taxes is history. As of 1/1/13 every worker is getting hit with a 2% tax increase. This is a very regressive tax increase. II) The Bush tax cuts for those making more than $250k are gone. This is a very Progressive tax increase. III) The Bush tax cuts for those making less than $250k will be retained. This “centrist” compromises is the result of the “give” on #s I and II. Both sides will be able to claim that they did their best for “Middle Class Workers”. IV) The Alternative Minimum Tax will be adjusted for inflation and will be fully phased in over a period of three years. This tax will hit 40m taxpayers (up from only 4m today). This is most definitely a middle class tax increase. V) The capital gains tax rate is going to go up to at least 25%. The result of I – V is that everyone who works, or has investment income is going to be paying more. No one will escape higher taxes. Then there is the spending side of the ledger. The so-called, “sequestered” amounts. Here is where the real horse-trading will happen. Keep in mind that the timing of this critical argument debate will be in November and December. What else will be happening in those months that will influence the budget compromises? Talk of War.

#### Plan causes backlash

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go until he faces re-election, US President Barack Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels and tackling climate change have not passed muster with Congress, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but the White House has been unable to repeat this success in other energy policy areas ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Obama’s political capital will give him leverage in the ‘fiscal cliff’ negotiations now – brokers a deal

Andrew Sprung (he is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor) September 21, 2012 “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html)

In my view, Klein is viewing this question too narrowly. Obama is well aware of the limitations of the bully pulpit, and he's got to know better than any person on the planet that presidential advocacy polarizes, entrenching the opposing party in implacable opposition to whatever the president proposes. Yet, in presenting a revamped theory of how the presidency works, he's not just feeding us a line of BS. And if Obama wins reelection, I believe that we will look back five or ten or twenty years from now and recognize that yes, Obama did change the way Washington works. Or at the very least, he kept the US on a sane policy course in a time of extreme polarization and thus gave (will have given...) the system space to self-correct, as it has in the past. Let's start with Klein's objection to Obama's characterization of how healthcare reform got done: The health-care process, which I reported on extensively, was a firmly “inside game” strategy. There were backroom deals with most every major interest group and every swing legislator.... By the time the law passed, many more Americans viewed it unfavorably than viewed it favorably — exactly the opposite of what you’d expect if health care had passed through an “outside game” strategy in which, as Obama put it, “the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” And yet, health care passed. The inside game worked. All true, laddie. And yet, in claiming that the impetus for healthcare reform came from the outside, I don't think Obama is attempting to whitewash this long and messy process -- or is even referring to it. He is alluding to the marshaling or channeling of popular will that got him elected. The essence of Obama's primary election argument against Hillary Clinton was that he was better equipped to marshal the popular will for fundamental change -- with healthcare reform as the centerpiece -- than she was. I well remember the moment when that argument first impressed itself on me. It was in a debate in the immediate aftermath of the Iowa caucuses, on Jan. 5, 2008: Look, I think it's easier to be cynical and just say, "You know what, it can't be done because Washington's designed to resist change." But in fact there have been periods of time in our history where a president inspired the American people to do better, and I think we're in one of those moments right now. I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobilized around big changes -- not incremental changes, not small changes. I actually give Bill Clinton enormous credit for having balanced those budgets during those years. It did take political courage for him to do that. But we never built the majority and coalesced the American people around being able to get the other stuff done. And, you know, so the truth is actually words do inspire. Words do help people get involved. Words do help members of Congress get into power so that they can be part of a coalition to deliver health care reform, to deliver a bold energy policy. Don't discount that power, because when the American people are determined that something is going to happen, then it happens. And if they are disaffected and cynical and fearful and told that it can't be done, then it doesn't. I'm running for president because I want to tell them, yes, we can. And that's why I think they're responding in such large numbers.

Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance. But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support. Obama also used the bully pulpit at crucial points, if not to rally public opinion, at least to re-commit wavering Democrats -- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a good faith negotiator, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals. In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. Savvy politicians channel public opinion; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually § Marked 18:36 § in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he amassed the political capital, and he spent it, and we got what he paid for. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey: But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered. Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said: I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message. So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes. Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts. First, he understates Obama's (and the Democrats') successes in the year of confrontation that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition. Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced" approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. But that battle ain't over yet, and popular support for Obama's position is political capital that's still in the bank. In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama, if he wins reelection, will have the whip hand, given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes banked him further capital in this upcoming fight. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side. Third, it's rational for Obama to recast his bid for change in election season, because of course he's seeking further "change" from the outside, i.e., more Democrats elected to Congress. He's not going to win a mandate as in 2008, or, most likely, majorities in both houses of Congress. But he has to make the pitch for being granted renewed tools to advance his agenda. Finally, a key part of Obama's "you are the change" pitch in his convention speech was a frank call to play defense -- to protect the changes wrought in his first term and fend off the further capture of the electoral process and the nation's resources by the oligarchy the GOP represents: If you turn away now – if you buy into the cynicism that the change we fought for isn’t possible … well, change will not happen. If you give up on the idea that your voice can make a difference, then other voices will fill the void: lobbyists and special interests; the people with the $10 million checks who are trying to buy this election and those who are making it harder for you to vote; Washington politicians who want to decide who you can marry, or control health-care choices that women should make for themselves.

#### Impact is global econ collapse

Harold Mandel (writer for the Examiner) September 27, 2012 “Fitch says fiscal cliff could set off global recession (Video)” http://www.examiner.com/article/fitch-says-fiscal-cliff-could-set-off-global-recession

The ratings agency stated, "The U.S. fiscal cliff represents the single biggest near-term threat to a global economic recovery." Fitch has gone on to warn, “A U.S. fiscal shock would be exported to the rest of the world via a sharply weaker U.S. dollar and asset prices, lower U.S. price and wage inflation and heightened risk of deflation, and the impact on commodity prices.” In the meantime leading U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years, with a primary reason being fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. And so unless the fiscal cliff is confronted and avoided this could be bad news for everyone.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### Case

#### Our impact includes their impact- human consciousness is a prerequisite to value judgments that allow the world to be ontologically significant

**Kyung-Sig ‘3** Prof. Hwang, Kyung-sig, Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Korea “10.1 Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism” Eubios Ethics Institute

http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm

Anyway, it is very difficult for us to deny that **we philosophers live in a humanistic age.** The dominant philosophical doctrine of our time, today's intellectual Zeitgeist, is that **the world is a world structured by us and forged by the architectural propensities of our mind.** This is the Kantian turn in philosophy. Reality as it is in itself, noumenal reality, is essentially unknowable, and philosophy, accordingly, shifts from the study of being- qua-being to the study of being-qua-known. Philosophy as first philosophy is the study of the structuring activities of the human mind and the philosophy of thought. This much has been the orthodoxy ever since Kant. Just think how much of philosophy in the twentieth century has been shaped by, and makes little sense without, this tenet.[[23]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#23) The so called linguistic turn, until quite recently, dominated philosophy in the Anglo-American world, was essentially a linguistic form of Kantianism, constituted by appending to the Kantian turn one of the two claims; either the structure of language determines the structure of cognition, or the structure of language mirrors the structure of cognition. In a similar view, **much of the twentieth century Philosophy of Science has been exercised by the question of the so-called theory impregnation of observation. And, in accordance with the Kantian spirit of our time, this claim about the content of observation becomes translated into a claim about the content of reality. It is not just observation but the reality observed that is laden with theory. And if we switch from so called Analytic Philosophy to the allegedly antagonistic *continental* alternative, the essentially Kantian organizing vision remains. Even Heidegger,** who is in many respects a very unKantian thinker, and who in fact explicitly describes his position as anti-humanist, **tells us that man is the lightening up place of being, the place where beings come to be. And in the structuralist and post- structuralist tradition, one § Marked 18:37 § could say, without an inordinate amount of oversimplification, that the role played by the mind in Kant's worldview is played by 'the text'.**[[24]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#24) The term 'humanism', we may say, denotes the neo-Kantian, neo-idealist, view that the world depends for its existence, nature and properties on the human mind. A typical accompaniment is this claim of ontological dependence, an accompaniment clearly expressed in Kant's conception of philosophy as the philosophy of the thought is that **the world is epistemologically dependent on human consciousness.** If we want to know philosophically the world, we must study the products of this consciousness - language, theory, text or whatever that constitutes it as such. But **if the world is ontologically and epistemologically dependent on human consciousness, then it is very difficult to see how it can be anything other than axiologically depends on this consciousness also. If the world dependents its reality on the activities of human consciousness, then it must almost certainly depend for its worth on human consciousness too.** Hence, here is the dilemma of environmental philosophy. Environmental philosophy is the branch of philosophy concerned with the worth, the value, of the environment.

s