## Warming

### Climate Change

#### Our aff is the process of informing people about the details of climate change – that allows us to take the debate away from the elites and put it in the hands of ordinary people – closing the gap about climate change between citizens and policy makers is essential to solving extinction

Chhreti and Grossman 2010 (Netra and Gary, “POLICY MAKERS VERSUS PEOPLE” <http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=171>)

Climate change has become a major environmental issue of the twenty-first century, a threat in which humans are implicated both as perpetrators and as victims. It is a complex issue requiring thorough study. The political decisions being taken in response to climate change will affect everything from global economic development to the lifestyles and livelihoods of ordinary citizens everywhere—in short, the future of the planet and its inhabitants. Yet, much of the climate change policy debate is limited to an elite set of people—politicians, scientists, and special interest groups. For the general public, questions and debates regarding climate change are framed as just too complex and technical. Ordinary citizens supposedly find it difficult to understand the aspects of climate change and the politics surrounding the issue. These citizens, though, will have to live with the consequences of climate change policy. The distance between citizens and policy makers on the issue of climate change is ever widening. There must be a goal to close this gap and enable ordinary people to feel they have some stake in climate change policy. Failure to do so will make it less likely that citizens will eventually buy into behavior changes that policy to address climate change may entail. In the case of climate change, democracy is not merely the preferred approach on principle; it is a pragmatic necessity if policy is to achieve results. World Wide Views on Global Warming, or WWViews, was a project aimed at giving a broad sample of citizens from across the world the opportunity to engage in global climate policy debates. Initiated by the Danish Board of Technology, a group overseen by Denmark’s Ministry of Science, Technology, and Development, WWViews organized discussion groups on a single day in September 2009 in thirty-eight countries across six continents. In the first global citizen consultation of its kind, the participants debated and voted on recommendations for policy makers on issues already on the agenda at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit in Copenhagen, also known as COP15, which took place in December 2009. Citizen forums became a part of the formal policy process in the United States in the 1970s as one of the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. Citizen forums have been conducted in many countries throughout the world on such topics as genetically modified food, nanotechnology, electronic surveillance, and, of course, climate change. WWViews proved to be a project with ambitions not only to promote greater citizen awareness of climate change but also to channel citizen views toward policy makers with the intention of influencing policy decisions. WWViews demonstrated that ordinary citizens can indeed comprehend the complexity of the climate change issue and make intelligent contributions to the debate. The project brought together a diverse set of forty-four regional and national partners ranging from some with significant experience in organizing deliberative processes to others with none. Some four thousand citizens participated at forty-four individual sites, and spent the day together deliberating and voting on twelve questions in four thematic areas—climate change consequences, long-term climate goals, greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), and technology—then formulating concrete recommendations for COP15 delegates. Overall, the WWViews participants concluded that climate change is a serious issue that affects everyone, that the negative effects of climate change are being exacerbated by a lack of action, and that immediate steps are now required to address climate change. According to the organizers, the WWViews on Global Warming produced nine clear policy recommendations to address climate change: –Make a deal at COP15. –Keep any temperature increase below 2 degrees. –Annex 1 countries [thirty-seven industrialized nations including the U.S.] should reduce emissions by 25−40 percent or more by 2020. –Fast-growing economies should also reduce emissions by 2020. –Low-income developing countries should limit emissions. –Give high priority to an international financial mechanism. –Punish non-complying countries. –Make technology available to all. –Strengthen or supplement international institutions.

**Institutions are the residues of the movements that helped create them. Ecological politics can inform the possibility of articulating a green state in the same way that the political organizing of the working class once helped create the modern welfare state, but only if it focuses on establishing and reforming enduring institutions**

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**The modern state embodies residues of the social movements that gave it form. In Europe, the social movement of the bourgeoisie against aristocracy, monarchy, and theocracy helped create the liberal state. Later, the social movement of the organized working class against unrestrained capitalism helped create the welfare state**. We investigate the prospects for a third transformation: **the development of a green state made possible by the incorporation of environmentalism. At present there are no green states in the terms we define**. But our inquiry is not merely speculative. It is grounded in a comparative history of the environmental movement since its emergence in the late 1960s and its relation to the state in the USA, Norway, Germany, and the UK. These four states are selected because each represents the best approximation to an ideal type of orientation to civil society. Our classification of states has two dimensions. On the first, states are either *exclusive* or *inclusive* towards social interests. Exclusive states limit effective representation to a chosen few, denying access to others. Represented interests might cover substantial numbers – for example, a union federation – but their ordinary members have little voice. Here we are concerned only with open and developed societies, where exclusive states find it necessary to welcome at least some actors, if only large corporations. Inclusive states are open to a wider range of interests, though equality of access and influence is not required. On the second dimension, states are either *passive* or *active* in their orientation to who gets represented. An active state is prescriptive when it comes to the character of interests that are organized in civil society and take political force. Thus an active state tries to affect both the content and power of political interests. In contrast, a passive state is agnostic when it comes to the range of organizations and movements active in civil society, and does not try either to promote or impede the capacities of particular groups. Combining the two dimensions produces four ideal state types, as shown in Table 1.1 **A *passively inclusive* state accepts any mix of groups and movements generated by social forces. This acceptance might involve access for interest group lobbyists to legislatures and administrative agencies, or the ability of a movement to organize as a party to contest and win seats in elections, or integration of activists into established party organizations, or receptiveness on the part of the legal system.** The most pervasive contemporary kind of passive inclusion is a pluralism in which a variety of interest groups can utilize multiple points of access to the state. An *actively inclusive* state, in contrast, does not simply accept the mix of interests generated by social forces. Rather, government officials anticipate and organize interests into the state to secure a desired pattern of interest articulation. Among developed states, active inclusion is associated with expansive corporatism. Traditionally, corporatism involved tripartite concertation in policy making by the executive branch of government along with encompassing business and labor federations (see Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979), which rein in their members in exchange for a share in policy making. Expansive corporatism moves beyond the traditional form to include in addition groups such as women’s and environmental organizations. Traditional corporatism exemplifies the *passively exclusive* state form, in that once labor and business have been organized into the state, other interests are left out. Exclusion is passive because the state simply leaves these interests alone, providing few channels of influence but otherwise doing nothing to undermine them. Parliament is often inconsequential, so public policy does not respond to election results. An *actively exclusive* state attempts to prevent the formation and impede the operation of social movements that oppose its agenda. Within developed open societies, the best examples are states under the influence of market liberal ideology. (Obviously, dictatorships in less developed societies are mostly actively exclusive.) Market liberalism supplies a public choice theory of politics that interprets motivation in self-interested material terms. Thus organized interests are believed to seek benefits for themselves at high cost to taxpayers or to the efficiency of the economy, and so merit destruction. The initial targets are normally trades unions, but attacks can be extended to other movements and organizations. **The USA is the best example of a passively inclusive state, its pluralism presenting comparatively few obstacles to, and every incentive for, social movements to organize as interest groups to lobby government.** (The radical literature by authors such as Connolly, 1969, claiming that the USA falls far short of pluralist ideals, leaves our comparative classification unmoved.) Norway is an actively inclusive state that organizes concerns that in other countries would motivate social movements. Germany is passively exclusive. While some countries are more corporatist than Germany, there are no better approximations to passive exclusion, which in Germany is buttressed by administrative secrecy and a legalistic, organic, unitary notion of the public interest that sees opposition as illegitimate obstruction. The UK in the 1980s is the best example of an actively exclusive state, where government deliberately tried to undermine the conditions for association in civil society. These categorizations are enduring but not immutable. The USA and Norway are unchanging since the 1960s. Germany’s passive exclusion changed somewhat in the 1990s, though limited increases in points of access and the Greens’ entry into the federal governing coalition in 1998 actually left most of the apparatus of legal corporatism intact. The UK sees more significant changes with time, becoming in the 1990s something of a dual state with both actively exclusive and passively inclusive faces. We will attend to such changes, which complicate but do not vitiate our analysis. We use this framework to explain why the USA was around 1970 an environmental pioneer, but has now lost that status; why Norway is among the greenest of states, but unlikely to become any greener; why transformation to a green state is now most plausible in Germany; and why the UK was long not in the running (though that may finally be changing). These comparative performance judgments require empirical corroboration. The problem is that there are no widely accepted summary indicators of environmental performance (of the sort we can use, for example, to measure welfare state development). Countries face different sorts of environmental problems, and some (for example, Japan) are adept at exporting environmental stress in a way that would not show up in summary indicators. That said, our ranking of the four countries in the 1990s is corroborated by three recent summary assessments. Jahn (1998) computes an ‘index of environmental performance’ based on pollution levels (air, water, soil, and solid waste) and changes in these levels over a previous decade. For 1990, out of 18 OECD countries, Germany ranks second, while Norway, the UK, and USA rank tenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth respectively. Scruggs (2001) computes a performance index based on rates of change in pollution levels between 1980 and 1995. Among 17 OECD countries, Germany ranks first, while Norway, the USA, and UK rank tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth. Using more in-depth and nuanced comparisons of government engagement with the idea of sustainable development over the 1987–98 period, Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000, p. 412) classify Norway’s response as ‘enthusiastic’, Germany and the UK as ‘cautiously supportive’, and the USA as ‘disinterested’ (they mean ‘uninterested’). They recognize that in 1990 Germany was a pioneer, but that a rigid statist approach to policy and a preoccupation with the consequences of unification in the 1990s meant that it slipped back. However, they believe Germany was on the comeback trail in the late 1990s ‘even before the formation of the SDP/Green coalition in the fall of 1998’ (p. 419). We agree with Lafferty and Meadowcroft that the assessment of performance – and, we would add, potential – must be done in a way that goes beyond summary indices to look at policy commitments (and, we believe, problem solving beyond the state). **The USA was a pioneer in the 1970s because of the content of its policies, irrespective of immediate improvements in quantitative performance.**

### XT: Transition

#### Natural gas transition solves renewables

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Renewables, despite recent rapid growth and development, still require time to scale from their current levels to a leading role in the provision of energy for humanity. They currently lack the flexibility necessary to optimize energy system efficiency in the near-term and scale to account for significant portion of primary energy in the medium-term. Natural gas is already well developed and integrated into the contemporary energy system but will additionally support the transition to a more efficient system in its new role. This role comes in the form of a flexible, clean, and reliable energy carrier in the supporting a sustainable energy transition based on renewables, energy efficiency, and clean fossil generation technology. Thus, although its function will evolve, natural gas has an increasing role to play in the provision of a sustainable energy supply for the continued advancement of humanity. inquiry

### AT: Methane Leakage

#### Leakage irrelevant – newest data proves

**Chronicle, 7/11** (Chronicle Online, Cornell University, “Natural gas is much-needed tool in battle to slow global warming, researcher says,” http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/July12/cathlesGas.html)//CC

▪ Although some critics of natural gas as a transition fuel have cited leakage rates as high as 8 percent or more of total production during drilling -- particularly hydraulic fracturing extraction -- more recent industry data and a critical examination of Environmental Protection Agency data supports leakage rates closer to 1.5 percent for both conventional and hydrofractured wells. ▪ Even at higher leakage rates, using natural gas as a transition to low-carbon energy sources is still a better policy than "business as usual" with coal and oil, due to the different rates of decay (and hence long-term global warming effect) of carbon dioxide released in greater amounts by burning coal and oil and any methane released during natural gas extraction.

## Prices

### Heg Good

**Studies prove conflicts have been decreasing – primacy is THE reason.**

**Drezner, 2005**

[Daniel, Gregg Easterbrook, Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “War, and the dangers of extrapolation,” may 25]

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas smakestaring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history.  Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers:  The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991.  Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent andintensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago.  Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations.  Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out.  First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand *why*it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes.[*If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed*. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago:  We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread ofdemocracy are right out the window.  UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters:  1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfectconstraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot of them. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging theU.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of thesecountries waged a war with each other, the

## First

#### Psychoanalysis is reductive and ignores difference

--means not root cause, their theory is not predictive and we should look at different places (culture, biology, sociology, etc.) to determine policy

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Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies**.** In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **a**lways in danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

#### Threats aren’t psychological projections and the alt fails

#### Hoffman, 86 [Stanley, Center for European Studies at Harvard,  “On the Political Psychology of Peace and War: A Critique and an Agenda,” Political Psychology 7.1 JSTOR]

The traditionalists, even when, in their own work, they try scrupulous-ly to transcend national prejudices and to seek scientific truth, believe that it is unrealistic to expect statesmen to stand above the fray: By definition, the statesmen are there to worry not only about planetary survival, but — first of all—about national survival and safety. To be sure, they ought to be able to see how certain policies, aimed at enhancing security, actually increase in-security all around. But there are sharp limits to how far they can go in their mutual empathy or in their acts (unlike intellectuals in their advice), as long as the states' antagonisms persist, as long as uncertainty about each other's intentions prevails, and as long as there is reason to fear that one side's wise restraint, or unilateral moves toward "sanity," will be met, not by the rival's similar restraint or moves, but either by swift or skillful political or military exploitation of the opportunity created for unilateral gain, or by a for-midable domestic backlash if national self-restraint appears to result in ex-ternal losses, humiliations or perceptions of weakness. There is little point in saying that the state of affairs which imposes such limits is "anachronistic" or "unrational." To traditionalists, the radicals' stance — condemnation from the top of Mount Olympus — can only impede understanding of the limits and possibilities of reform. To be sure, the fragmentation of mankind is a formidable obstacle to the solution of many problems that cannot be handled well in a national framework, and a deadly peril insofar as the use of force, the very distinctive feature of world politics, now entails the risk of nuclear war. But one can hardly call anachronistic a phenomenon—the assertion of national identity — that, to the bulk of [HU]mankind, appears not only as a necessity but also as a positive good, since humanity's fragmentation results from the very aspiration to self-determination. Many people have only recently emerged from foreign mastery, and have reason to fear that the alternative to national self-mastery is not a world government of assured fairness and efficiency, but alien domination. As for "unrationality," the drama lies in the contrast between the ra-tionality of the whole, which scholars are concerned about—the greatest good of the greatest number, in utilitarian terms — and the rationality or greatest good of the part, which is what statesmen worry about and are responsible for. What the radicals denounce as irrational and irresponsible from the viewpoint of mankind is what Weber called the statesman's ethic of responsibility. What keeps ordinary "competitive conflict processes" (Deutsch, 1983)— the very stuff of society — from becoming "unrational" or destructive, isprecisely what the nature of world politics excludes: the restraint of the partners either because of the ties of affection or responsibility that mitigate the conflict, or because of the existence of an outsider — marriage counselor, arbitrator, judge, policeman or legislator— capable of inducing or imposing restraints. Here we come to a third point of difference. The very absence of such safeguards of rationality, the obvious discrepancy between what each part intends, and what it (and the whole world) ends with, the crudeness of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in international affairs—as one can see from the statements of leaders, or from the media, or from inflamed publics—have led many radicals, especially among those whose training or profession is in psychoanalysis or mental health, to treat the age-old contests of states in terms, not of the psychology of politics, but of individual psychology and pathology. There are two manifestations of this. One is the tendency to look at nations or states as individuals writ large, stuck at an early stage of development (similarly, John Mack (1985) in a recent paper talks of political ideologies as carrying "forward the dichotomized structures of childhood"). One of my predecessors writes about "the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation," and concludes "that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically" (Volkan, 1985). Robert Holt, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, finds "the largest part of the American public" immature, in a "phase of development below the Conscientious" (Holt, 1984). The second related aspect is the tendency to look at the notions statesmen or publics have of "the enemy," not only as residues of childhood or adolescent phases of development, but as images that express "disavowed aspects of the self" (Stein, 1985), reveal truths about our own fears and hatreds, and amount to masks we put on the "enemy," because of our own psychological needs. Here is where the clash between traditionalists and radicals is strongest. Traditionalists do not accept a view of group life derived from the study of individual development or family relations, or a view of modern society derived from the simplistic Freudian model of regressed followers identifying with a leader. They don't see in ideologies just irra-tional constructs, but often rationally selected maps allowing individuals to cope with reality. They don't see national identification as pathological, as an appeal to the people's baser instincts, more aggressive impulses or un-sophisticated mental defenses; it is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau so well understood, the competition of sovereign states that frequently pushes people from "sane" patriotism to "insane" nationalism (Rousseau's way of preventing the former from veering into the latter was, to say the least, im-practical: to remain poor in isolation). Nor do they see anything "primitive" in the nation's concern for survival: It is a moral and structural requirement. Traditionalists also believe that the "intra-psychic" approach distorts reality. Enemies are not mere projections of negative identities; they are often quite real. To be sure, the Nazis' view of the Jews fits the metaphor of the mask put on the enemy for one's own needs. But were, in return, those Jews who understood what enemies they had in the Nazis, doing the same? Is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is the Soviet regime's treatment of dissidents, was the Gulag merely a convenient projection of our intrapsychic battles? Clichés such as the one about how our enemy "understands only force" may tell us a great deal about ourselves; but sometimes they contain half-truths about him, and not just revelations about us. Our fears flow not only from our private fantasies but also from concrete realities and from the fantasies which the international state of nature generates. In other words, the psychology of politics which traditionalists deem adequate is not derived from theories of psychic development and health; it is derived from the logic of the international milieu, which breeds the kind of vocabulary found in the historians and theorists of the state of nature: fear and power, pride and honor, survival and security, self-interest and reputation, distrust and misunderstanding, commitment and credibility. It is also derived from the social psychology of small or large groups, which resorts to the standard psychological vocabulary that describes mental mechanisms or maneuvers and cognitive processes: denial, projection, guilt, repression, closure, rigidity, etc.... But using this vocabulary does not imply that a group whose style of politics is paranoid is therefore composed of people who, as private individuals, are paranoid. Nor does it relieve us of the duty to look at the objective reasons and functions of these mental moves, and of the duty to make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes a "healthy," wise, or proper social process. Altogether, traditionalists find the mental health approach to world affairs unhelpful. Decisions about war and peace are usually taken by small groups of people; the temptation of analyzing their behavior either, literal-ly, in terms of their personalities, or, metaphysically, in terms borrowed from the study of human development, rather than in those of group dynamics or principles of international politics is understandable. But it is misleading. What is pathological in couples, or in a well-ordered community, is, alas, frequent, indeed normal, among states, or in a troubled state. What is malignant or crazy is usually not the actors or the social process in which they are engaged: it is the possible results. The grammar of motives which the mental health approach brands as primitive or immature is actually rational for the actors. to the substitution of labels for explanations, to bad analysis and fanciful prescriptions. Bad analysis: the tendency to see in group coherence a regressive response to a threat, whereas it often is a rational response to the "existential" threats entailed by the very nature of the international milieu. Or the tendency to see in the effacement or minimization of individual differences in a group a release of unconscious instincts, rather than a phenomenon that can be perfectly adaptive—in response to stress or threats—or result from governmental manipulation or originate in the code of conduct inculcated by the educational system, etc.. . The habit of comparing the state, or modern society, with the Church or the army, and to analyze human relations in these institutions in ways that stress the libidinal more than the cognitive and superego factors, or equate libidinal bonds and the desire for a leader. The view that enemies are above all products of mental drives, rather than inevitable concomitants of social strife at every level. Or the view that the contest with the rival fulfills inter-nal needs, which may be true, but requires careful examination of the nature of these needs (psychological? bureaucratic? economic?), obscures the objective reasons of the contest, and risks confusing cause and function. Indeed, such analysis is particularly misleading in dealing with the pre-sent scene. The radicals are so (justifiably) concerned with the nuclear peril that the traditional ways in which statesmen and publics behave seem to vindicate the pathological approach. But this, in turn, incites radicals to overlook the fundamental ambiguity of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, there is a nuclear revolution—the capacity for total destruction. On the other hand, many states, without nuclear weapons, find that the use of force remains rational (in terms of a rationality of means) and beneficial at home or abroad—ask the Vietnamese, or the Egyptians after October 1973, or Mrs. Thatcher after the Falklands, or Ronald Reagan after Grenada. The superpowers themselves, whose contest has not been abolished by the nuclear revolution (it is the stakes, the costs of failure that have, of course, been transformed), find that much of their rivalry can be conducted in traditional ways — including limited uses of force —below the level of nuclear alarm. They also find that nuclear weapons, while—perhapsunusable rationally, can usefully strengthen the very process that has been so faulty in the prenuclear ages: deterrence (this is one of the reasons for nuclear proliferation). The pathological approach interprets deterrence as expressing the deterrer's belief that his country is good, the enemy's is bad. This is often the case, but it need not be; it can also reflect the conviction that one's country has interests that are not mere figments of the imagination, and need to be protected both because of the material costs of losing them, and because of the values embedded in them. As for war planning, it is not a case of "psychological denial of unwelcome reality" (Montville, 1985). but a — perhaps futile, perhaps dangerous—necessity in a world where deterrence may once more fail. The prescriptions that result from the radicals' psychological approach also run into traditionalist objections. Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the "cure" can only be provided by politics. All too often, the radicals' cures consist of perfectly sensible recommendations for lowering tensions, but fail to tell us how to get them carried out —they only tell us how much better the world would be, if only "such rules could be established" (Deutsch, 1983). Sometimes, they express generous aspirations — for common or mutual security—without much awareness of the obstacles which conflict-ing interests, fears about allies or clients, and the nature of the weapons themselves, continue to erect. Sometimes, they too neglect the ambiguity of life in a nuclear world: The much lamented redundancy of weapons, a calamity if nuclear deterrence fails, can also be a cushion against failure. Finally, many of the remedies offered are based on an admirable liberal model of personality and politics: the ideal of the mature, well-adjusted, open-minded person (produced by liberal education and healthy family relations) transposed on the political level, and thus accompanied by the triumph of democracy in the community, by the elimination of militarism and the spread of functional cooperation abroad. But three obstacles remain unconquered: first, a major part of the world rejects this ideal and keeps itself closed to it (many of the radicals seem to deny it, or to ignore it, or to believe it doesn't matter). Second, the record shows that real democracies, in their behavior toward non-democratic or less "advanced" societies, do not conform to the happy model (think of the US in Central America). Third, the task of reform, both of the publics and of the statesmen, through consciousness raising and education is hopelessly huge, incapable of being pursued equally in all the important states, and — indeed — too slow if one accepts the idea of a mortal nuclear peril. These, then, are the dimensions of a split that should not be minimized or denied

## Second

#### Death precedes all other impacts – it ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world

**Paterson, 03** - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unin- tentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81

In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

**Industrialization is inevitable globally – expanding economic opportunity solves extinction**

**Barker, 2k** – electrical engineer, and manager of corporate communications for the Electric Power Research Institute and former industrial economist and staff author at SRI International and as a commercial research analyst at USX Corporation (Brent, “Technology and the Quest for Sustainability.” EPRI Journal, Summer, infotrac)

From a social standpoint, accelerating productivity is not an option but rather an imperative for the future. It is necessary in order to provide the wealth for environmental sustainability, to support an aging population in the industrialized world, and to provide an economic ladder for developing nations.

The second area of opportunity for technology lies in its potential to help stabilize global population at 10-12 billion sometime in the twenty-first century, possibly as early as 2075. The key is economics. Global communications, from television to movies to the Internet, have brought an image of the comfortable life of the developed world into the homes of the poorest people, firing their own aspirations for a better quality of life, either through economic development in their own country or through emigration to other countries. If we in the developed world can make the basic tools of prosperity--infrastructure, health care, education, and law--more accessible and affordable, recent history suggests that the cultural drivers for producing large families will be tempered, relatively quickly and without coercion.

But the task is enormous. The physical prerequisites for prosperity in the global economy are electricity and communications. Today, there are more than 2 billion people living without electricity, or commercial energy in any form, in the very countries where some 5 billion people will be added in the next 50 years. If for no other reason than our enlightened self-interest, we should strive for universal access to electricity, communications, and educational opportunity. We have little choice, because the fate of the developed world is inextricably bound up in the economic and demographic fate of the developing world.

A third, related opportunity for technology is in decoupling population growth from land use and, more broadly, decoupling economic growth from natural resource consumption through recycling, end-use efficiency, and industrial ecology. Decoupling population from land use is well under way. According to Grubler, from 1700 to 1850 nearly 2 hectares of land (5 acres) were needed to support every child born in North America, while in the more crowded and cultivated regions of Europe and Asia only 0.5 hectare (1.2 acres) and 0.2 hectare (0.5 acre) were needed, respectively. During the past century, the amount of land needed per additional child has been dropping in all areas of the world, with Europe and North America experiencing the fastest decreases. Both crossed the "zero threshold" in the past few decades, meaning that no additional land is needed to support additional children and that land requirements will continue to decrease in the future.

One can postulate that the pattern of returning land to nature will continue to spread throughout the world, eventually stemming and then reversing the current onslaught on the great rain forests. Time is critical if vast tracts are to be saved from being laid bare, and success will largely depend on how rapidly economic opportunities expand for those now trapped in subsistence and frontier farming. In concept, the potential for returning land to nature is enormous. Futurist and scholar Jesse Ausubel of the Rockefeller University calculates that if farmers could lift average grain yields around the world just to the level of today's average U.S. corn grower, one-half of current global cropland--an area the size of the Amazon basin--could be spared.

If agriculture is a leading indicator, then the continuous drive to produce more from less will prevail in other parts of the economy Certainly with shrinking agricultural land requirements, water distribution and use around the world can be greatly altered, since nearly two-thirds of water now goes for irrigation. Overall, the technologies of the future will, in the words of Ausubel, be "cleaner, leaner, lighter, and drier"--that is, more efficient and less wasteful of materials and water. They will be much more tightly integrated through microprocessor-based control and will therefore use human and natural resources much more efficiently and productively.

Energy intensity, land intensity, and water intensity (and, to a lesser extent, materials intensity) for both manufacturing and agriculture are already heading downward. Only in agriculture are they falling fast enough to offset the surge in population, but, optimistically, advances in science and technology should accelerate the downward trends in other sectors, helping to decouple economic development from environmental impact in the coming century. One positive sign is the fact that recycling rates in North America are now approaching 65% for steel, lead, and copper and 30% for aluminum and paper. A second sign is that economic output is shifting away from resource-intensive products toward knowledge-based, immaterial goods and services. As a result, although the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increased 200-fold (in real dollars) in the twentieth century, the physical weight of our annual output remains the same as it was in 1900. If anything, this trend will be accelerating. As Kevin Kelly, the editor of Wired magazine, noted, "The creations most in demand from the United States [as exports] have lost 50% of their physical weight per dollar of value in only six years.... Within a generation, two at most, the number of people working in honest-to-goodness manufacturing jobs will be no more than the number of farmers on the land--less than a few percent. Far more than we realize, the network economy is pulling us all in."

Even pollution shows clear signs of being decoupled from population and economic growth. Economist Paul Portney notes that, with the exception of greenhouse gases, "in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, the favorable experience [with pollution control] has been a triumph of technology That is, the ratio of pollution per unit of GDP has fallen fast enough in the developed world to offset the increase in both GDP per capita and the growing number of 'capitas' themselves."

The fourth opportunity for science and technology stems from their enormous potential to unlock resources not now available, to reduce human limitations, to create new options for policymakers and businesspeople alike, and to give us new levels of insight into future challenges. Technically resources have little value if we cannot unlock them for practical use. With technology, we are able to bring dormant resources to life. For example, it was only with the development of an electrolytic process late in the nineteenth century that aluminum--the most abundant metal on earth--became commercially available and useful. Chemistry unlocked hydrocarbons. And engineering allowed us to extract and put to diverse use untapped petroleum and gas fields. Over the course of history, technology has made the inaccessible accessible, and resource depletion has been more of a catalyst for change than a longstanding problem.

Technology provides us with last-ditch methods (what economists would call substitutions) that allow us to circumvent or leapfrog over crises of our own making. Agricultural technology solved the food crisis of the first half of the nineteenth century. The English "steam crisis" of the 1860s, triggered by the rapid rise of coal-burning steam engines and locomotives, was averted by mechanized mining and the discovery and use of petroleum. The U.S. "timber crisis" that Teddy Roosevelt publicly worried about was circumvented by the use of chemicals that enabled a billion or so railroad ties to last for decades instead of years. The great "manure crisis" of the same era was solved by the automobile, which in a few decades replaced some 25 million horses and freed up 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of farmland, not to mention improving the sanitation and smell of inner cities. Oil discoveries in Texas and then in the Middle East pushed the pending oil crisis of the 1920s into the future. And the energy crisis of the 1970s stimulated the development of new sensing and drilling technology, sparked the advance of non--fossil fuel alternatives, and deepened the penetration of electricity with its fuel flexibility into the global economy Thanks to underground imaging technology, today's known gas resources are an order of magnitude greater than the resources known 20 years ago, and new reserves continue to be discovered.

Technology has also greatly extended human limits. It has given each of us a productive capability greater than that of 150 workers in 1800, for example, and has conveniently put the power of hundreds of horses in our garages. In recent decades, it has extended our voice and our reach, allowing us to easily send our words, ideas, images, and money around the world at the speed of light.

But global sustainability is not inevitable. In spite of the tremendous promise that technology holds for a sustainable future, there is the potential for all of this to backfire before the job can be done. There are disturbing indications that people sometimes turn in fear and anger on technologies, industries, and institutions that openly foster an ever-faster pace of change. The current opposition to nuclear power genetically altered food, the globalization of the economy and the spread of American culture should give us pause. Technology has always presented a two-edged sword, serving as both cause and effect, solving one problem while creating another that was unintended and often unforeseen. We solved the manure crisis, but automotive smog, congestion, and urban sprawl took its place. We cleaned and transformed the cities with all-electric buildings rising

thousands of feet into the sky. But while urban pollution was thereby dramatically reduced, a portion of the pollution was shifted to someone else's sky.

Breaking limits

"Limits to growth" was a popular theme in the 1970s, and a best-selling book of that name predicted dire consequences for the human race by the end of

the century. In fact, we have done much better than those predictions, largely because of a factor the book missed--the potential of new technology to break limits. Repeatedly, human societies have approached seemingly insurmountable barriers only to find the means and tools to break through. This ability has now become a source of optimism, an article of faith, in many parts of the world.

Today's perceived limits, however, look and feel different. They are global in nature, multicultural, and larger in scale and complexity than ever before. Nearly 2 billion people in the world are without adequate sanitation, and nearly as many are without access to clean drinking water. AIDS is spreading rapidly in the regions of the world least able to fight it. Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are more than 30% greater than preindustrial levels and are climbing steadily. Petroleum reserves, expected to be tapped by over a billion automobiles worldwide by 2015, may last only another 50-100 years. And without careful preservation efforts, the biodiversity of the planet could become as threatened in this coming century as it was at the end of the last ice age, when more than 70% of the species of large mammals and other vertebrates in North America disappeared (along with 29% in Europe and 86% in Australia). All these perceived limits require innovation of a scope and intensity surpassing humankind's current commitment.

The list of real-world problems that could thwart global sustainability is long and sobering. It includes war, disease, famine, political and religious turmoil, despotism, entrenched poverty, illiteracy, resource depletion, and environmental degradation. Technology can help resolve some of these issues--poverty and disease, resource depletion, and environmental impact, for example--but it offers little recourse for the passions and politics that divide the world. The likelihood is that we will not catch up and overtake the moving target of global sustainability in the coming century, but given the prospects for technology, which have never been brighter, we may come surprisingly close. We should put our technology to work, striving to lift more than 5 billion people out of poverty while preventing irreversible damage to the biosphere and irreversible loss of the earth's natural resources.

**Constant innovation ensures resources are infinite**
**Geddes 4** – Writer and Libertarian Analyst (Marc, “The monster non-socialist FAQ”, 2/12, http://rebirthofreason.com/War/MonsterFAQ.shtml)

A significant disruption to supplies of critical resources can cause temporary problems, but in a free market, if resources start to become scarce, prices rise, leading

to a search of substitutes and improved conservation efforts. The pool of resources is not fixed, because human ingenuity can find substitutes or new sources of resources. Supplies of most raw materials have been increasing throughout the 20th century, and the cost has been falling (See the entry on Natural resources). For instance, between 1950 and 1970, bauxite (aluminium source) reserves increased by 279 per cent, copper by 179 per cent, chromite (chromium source) by 675 per cent, and tin reserves by 10 per cent. In 1973 experts predicted oil reserves stood at around 700 billion barrels, yet by 1988 total oil reserves had actually increased to 900 billion barrels. Production of certain kinds of resources such as fossil fuels may finally be beginning to peak but there are renewable energy sources in development which can serve as substitutes. Simplistic thermodynamic analysis of energy production is misleading, because it's not the quantities of energy used or produced that determine economic value, but the utility, or usefulness if that energy to humans. If energy is being used more efficiently you don't need as much of it, and some forms of energy are more valuable than others- for instance kinetic energy in the form of wind power is less valuable than the same quantity of latent energy in the form of oil. Solar power is a virtually inexhaustible supply of new energy for stationary sources and the hydrogen fuel cell can serve for transportation in place of fossil fuels. Developing these technologies costs money, so to avoid resource shortages a good economy is essential. Libertarian capitalism is the system which generates wealth the fastest.

#### No offense, every problem with capitalism is magnified by other systems—cap is the only moral way to improve material conditions, socialism uses violence to try in vain to alter human nature.

**Nash 2005** – PhD, Professor of Philosophy, Southern Baptists Theological Seminary (Ronald H., The Schwartz Report Volume 29, Number 3, “In defense of capitalism”, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352736/posts, WEA)

Capitalism is not economic anarchy. When properly defined, it recognizes several necessary conditions for the kinds of voluntary relationships it supports.

One of these is the existence of inherent human rights, such as the right to make decisions, the right to be free, the right to hold property, and the right to exchange peacefully what one owns for something else.

Capitalism also presupposes a system of morality. Under capitalism, there are definite limits, moral and otherwise, to the ways in which people can exchange.

Capitalism should be viewed as a system of voluntary relationships within a framework of laws that protect people’s rights against force, fraud, theft, and violations of contracts. “Thou shalt not steal” and “Thou shalt not lie” are part of the underlying moral constraints of the system. After all, economic exchanges can hardly be voluntary if one participant is coerced, deceived, defrauded, or robbed.

Deviations from the market ideal usually occur because of defects in **human nature**. Human beings naturally crave security and guaranteed success, values not found readily in a free market. Genuine competition always carries with it the possibility of failure and loss. Consequently, the human desire for security leads people to avoid competition whenever possible, encourages them to operate outside the market, and induces them to subvert the market process through behavior that is often questionable and dishonest.

This quest for guaranteed success often leads people to seek special favors from powerful members of government through such means as regulations and restrictions on free exchange.

One of the more effective ways of mitigating the effects of human sin in society is dispersing and decentralizing power. The combination of a free market economy and limited constitutional government is the most effective means yet devised to impede the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a small number of people.

The Religious Left should be aware that their opposition to amassing wealth and power is far more likely to bear fruit with a conservative understanding of economics and government than with the big-government approach of political liberalism.

Every person’s ultimate protection against coercion requires control over some private spheres of life where he or she can be free.

Private ownership of property is an important buffer against the exorbitant consolidation of power by government.

Liberal critics also contend that capitalism encourages the development of monopolies. The real source of monopolies, however, is not the free market but governmental intervention with the market.

The only monopolies that have ever attained lasting immunity from competition did so by governmental fiat, regulation, or support of some other kind.

Governments create monopolies by granting one organization the exclusive privilege of doing business or by establishing de facto monopolies through regulatory agencies whose alleged purpose is the enforcement of competition but whose real effect is the limitation of competition.

Economic interventionism and socialism are the real sources of monopolies.

This is illustrated, for example, in the success of the American robber barons of the nineteenth century. Without government aid such as subsidies, the robber barons would never have succeeded.

Liberals blame capitalism for every evil in contemporary society, including its greed, materialism, selfishness, the prevalence of fraudulent behavior, the debasement of society’s tastes, the pollution of the environment, the alienation and despair within society, and vast disparities of wealth. Even racism and sexism are treated as effects of capitalism.

Many of the objections to a market system result from a simple but fallacious two-step operation.

First, some undesirable feature is noted in a society that is allegedly capitalistic; then it is simply asserted that capitalism is the cause of this problem.

Logic texts call this the Fallacy of False Cause.

Mere coincidence does not prove causal connection. Moreover, this belief ignores the fact that these same features exist in interventionist and socialist societies.

The Issue of Greed

Liberal critics of capitalism often attack it for encouraging greed. The truth, however, is that the mechanism of the market actually neutralizes greed as it forces people to find ways of serving the needs of those with whom they wish to exchange.

As long as our rights are protected (a basic precondition of market exchanges), the greed of others cannot harm us.

As long as greedy people are prohibited from introducing force, fraud, and theft into the exchange process and as long as these persons cannot secure special privileges from the state under interventionist or socialist arrangements, their greed must be channeled into the discovery of products or services for which people are willing to trade.

§ Marked 19:12 § Every person in a market economy has to be other-directed. The market is one area of life where concern for the other person is required.

The market, therefore, does not pander to greed. Rather, it is a mechanism that allows natural human desires to be satisfied in nonviolent ways.

Does Capitalism Exploit People?

Capitalism is also attacked on the ground that it leads to situations in which some people (the “exploiters”) win at the expense of other people (the “losers”).

A fancier way to put this is to say that market exchanges are examples of what is called a zero-sum game, namely, an exchange where only one participant can win. If one person (or group) wins, then the other must lose. Baseball and basketball are two examples of zero-sum games. If A wins, then B must lose.

The error here consists in thinking that market exchanges are a zero-sum game. On the contrary, market exchanges illustrate what is called a positive-sum game, that is, one in which both players may win.

We must reject the myth that economic exchanges necessarily benefit only one party at the expense of the other. In voluntary economic exchanges, both parties may leave the exchange in better economic shape than would otherwise have been the case.

To repeat the message of the peaceful means of exchange, “If you do something good for me, then I will do something good for you.” If both parties did not believe they gained through the trade, if each did not see the exchange as beneficial, they would not continue to take part in it.

Most religious critics of capitalism focus their attacks on what they take to be its moral shortcomings.

In truth, the moral objections to capitalism turn out to be a sorry collection of claims that reflect, more than anything else, serious confusions about the real nature of a market system.

When capitalism is put to the moral test, it beats its competition easily.

Among all of our economic options, Arthur Shenfield writes:

"Only capitalism operates on the basis of respect for free, independent, responsible persons. All other systems in varying degrees treat ~~men~~ as less than this. Socialist systems above all treat ~~men~~ as pawns to be moved about by the authorities, or as children to be given what the rulers decide is good for them, or as serfs or slaves. The rulers begin by boasting about their compassion, which in any case is fraudulent, but after a time they drop this pretense which they find unnecessary for the maintenance of power. In all things they act on the presumption that they know best. Therefore they and their systems are morally stunted. Only the free system, the much assailed capitalism, is morally mature."

The alternative to free exchange is coercion and violence. Capitalism is a mechanism that allows natural human desires to be satisfied in a nonviolent way.

Little can be done to prevent people from wanting to be rich, Shenfield says. That’s the way things often are in a fallen world. But what capitalism does is channel that desire into peaceful means that benefit many besides those who wish to improve their own situation in life.

“The alternative to serving other men’s wants,” Shenfield concludes, “is seizing power of them, as it always has been. Hence it is not surprising that wherever the enemies of capitalism have prevailed, the result has been not only the debasement of consumption standards for the masses but also their reduction to serfdom by the new privileged class of Socialist rulers.”

Once people realize that few things in life are free, that most things carry a price tag, and that therefore we have to work for most of the things we want, we are in a position to learn a vital truth about life. Capitalism helps teach this truth.

But under socialism, Arthur Shefield warns, “Everything still has a cost, but everyone is tempted, even urged to behave as if there is no cost or as if the cost will be borne by somebody else. This is one of the most corrosive effects of collectivism upon the moral character of people.”

And so, we see, capitalism is not merely the more effective economic system; it is also morally superior. When capitalism, the system of free economic exchange, is described fairly, it comes closer to matching the demands of the biblical ethic than does either socialism or interventionism.

These are the real reasons why Ron Sider and his friends in the Religious Left should have abandoned the statist economic policies they promoted in the past.

These are also the reasons why they should now end their advocacy of economic interventionism, which only encourages the consolidation of wealth and power in the hands of the few.

Christians who are sincere about wanting to help the poor should support the market system described in this chapter."

#### Capitalism is key to the value of life

**Saunders, 08** - Social Research Director at the Centre for Independent Studies, Australasia’s leading free-market think tank. (Peter, “Why Capitalism Is Good for the Soul,” http://www.insideronline.org/archives/2008/spring/chap3.pdf)

If we want to know if capitalism is bad (or good) for the “soul,” it probably makes more sense to approach the question metaphorically rather than theologically. Approached in this way, saying something is “good for the soul” implies simply that it enhances our capacity to live a good life. On this less literal and more secular interpretation of the “soul,” capitalism fares rather well.

We have known since the time of Adam Smith that capitalism harnesses self-interest to generate outcomes that benefit others. This is obvious in the relationship between producers and consumers, for profits generally flow to those who anticipate what other people want and then deliver it at the least cost. But it also holds in the relationship between employers and employees. One of Karl Marx’s most mischievous legacies was to suggest that this relationship is inherently antagonistic: that for employers to make profit, they must drive wages down. In reality, workers in the advanced capitalist countries thrive when their companies increase profits. The pursuit of profit thus results in higher living standards for workers, as well as cheaper and more plen- tiful goods and services for consumers.

The way this has enhanced people’s capacity to lead a good life can be seen in the spectacular reduction in levels of global poverty, brought about by the spread of capitalism on a world scale. In 1820, 85 percent of the world’s population lived on today’s equivalent of less than a dollar per day. By 1950, this proportion had fallen to 50 percent. Today it is down to 20 percent. World poverty has fallen more in the last 50 years than it did in the previous 500. This dramatic reduction in human misery and despair owes nothing to aging rock stars demanding that we “make poverty history.” It is due to the spread of global capitalism.§ Marked 19:12 §

Capitalism has also made it possible for many more people to live on Earth and to survive for longer than ever before. In 1900,the average life expectancy in the “less devel-oped countries” was just 30 years. By 1960,this had risen to 46 years. By 1998, it was 65years. To put this extraordinary achievement into perspective, the average life expectancy in the poorest countries at the end of the 20th century was 15 years longer than the average life expectancy in the richest country in the world—Britain—at the start of that century.

By perpetually raising productivity, capital-ism has not only driven down poverty rates and raised life expectancy, it has also released much of humanity from the crushing burden of physical labor, freeing us to pursue “higher” objectives instead. What Clive Hamilton airilydismisses as a “growth fetish” has resulted inone hour of work today delivering 25 times more value than it did in 1850. This has freed huge chunks of our time for leisure, art, sport, learning, and other “soul-enriching” pursuits. Despite all the exaggerated talk of an “imbalance” between work and family life, the aver-age Australian today spends a much greater

proportion of his or her lifetime free of work than he would had he belonged to any previous generation in history.

There is another sense, too, in which capitalism has freed individuals so they can pursue worthwhile lives, and that lies in its record of undermining tyrannies and dictatorships. As examples like Pinochet’s Chile and Putin’s Russia vividly demonstrate, a free economy does not guarantee a democratic polity or a society governed by the rule of law. But as Mil- ton Friedman once pointed out, these latter conditions are never found in the absence of a free economy. Historically, it was capitalism that delivered humanity from the “soul- destroying” weight of feudalism. Later, it freed millions from the dead hand of totalitarian socialism. While capitalism may not be a sufficient condition of human freedom, it is almost certainly a necessary one.

**The mindset shift would destroy the environment—hungry people would hunt animals to extinction and older, dirtier tech would be used again**.

**Lewis 92** – Professor, School of the Environment, Duke University – 1992 (Martin, GREEN DELUSIONS, p. 117)

If the most extreme version of the radical green agenda were to be fully enacted without truly *massive* human die-off first, forests would be stripped clean of wood and all large animals would be hunted to extinction by hordes of neo-primitives desperate for food and warmth. If, on the other hand, eco-extremists were to succeed only in paralyzing the economy’s capacity for further research, development, and expansion, our future could turn out to be reminiscent of the environmental nightmare of Poland in the 1980’s, with a stagnant economy continuing to rely on outmoded, pollution-belching industries. A throttled steady-state economy would simply lack the resources necessary to create an environment benign technological base for a populace that shows every sign of continuing to demand electricity, hot water, and other connivances. Eastern Europe shows well the environmental devastation that occurs when economic growth stalls out in an already industrialized society.

**Social causes for war are inevitable – deterrence is the only way to control them**

**Moore, 04** Walter L. Brown Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (John Norton Moore**, “**Solving the War Puzzle: beyond the democratic peace,” pg 41-43)

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of many traditional “causes” of war? Past and many contemporary, theories of war and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of “honor”, or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that are the key to most effectively controlling war….Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk.

**Democracy and liberalization check the impact**

**O’Kane, 97** (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.