### 2ac ks

#### good intentions are a prerequisite to action, this means the aff is a prior question and the permutation do both solves

**Scheer, ’12** Member of the German Parliament, President of the European Association for Renewable Energy EUROSOLAR, Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy WCRE (Hermann Scheer, Earthscan, 2012, “The energy imperative: 100 percent renewable now,” kindle reader so no page numbers)//CC

Cliched declarations of commitment to renewable energy reveal little about the significance this commitment is actually awarded: first, second, or third rate? For whom are such declarations simply a concession to a worried public? Have all those who denied renewable energy for so long really been converted? Will change be presented as compulsory or seen as deferrable? It was Mahatma Gandhi who said: “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.” In which of those first three phases we currently find ourselves varies according to country and the status of its public debate and development. More than half of the world's installed wind power generating capacity is based in only six countries (the US, Germany, China, Denmark, Spain and India). Around half of the worlds photovoltaic plants connected to electricity grids are installed in Germany alone. More than So per cent of the installed capacity for solar thermal energy supplies is concentrated in China and the countries of the European Union (EU). Obviously, far too many people in too many countries continue virtually to ignore renewable energy. Some excuse their reluctance by claiming that the shift to renewable energy takes “much time” and that overly ambitious and rapid steps in this direction represent an unreasonable strain on the economy. Some truly believe this, others use this as an excuse to gain time and carry on as usual for as long as possible. Some lack the courage to break with the structures of traditional energy supply; others are helpless and have no concept of how to implement energy change. Good intentions do not empower one to act; rather they are simply a prerequisite to action.

**The K’s blanket rejection causes paralysis – combine it with the affirmation of the aff**

**Scheer 7 –** Member of the German Parliament, President of the European Association for Renewable Energy EUROSOLAR, Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy WCRE

(Hermann, *Energy Autonomy: The economic, social, and technological case for renewable energy* pg 196, dml)

A movement is initially a ‘negative coalition’. Its ‘unity ’ arises from whatever is jointly rejected. But this conceals a variety of motives that make it hard or even impossible to create a ‘positive coalition’ with a consistent alternative programme. The variety of motives among the environmental movement’s comrades-in-arms reaches all the way from well thought-out critiques of individual technologies to diffuse reservations about technology in general; from a critique of the ecologically negative consequences of growth all the way to a critique of growth in general; from a paramount orientation towards local nature preservation to the struggle against global environmental destruction. Yet a movement that came together because of a joint series of ‘nos’ tends to let the different positions arising from these diverse motives simply rest. This guarantees successful mobilization, but it eventually leads to growing contradictions and signs of paralysis. Contentious views are readily played down so that the ‘social unity’ of the movement is not jeopardized. This is reflected in the way that a movement is often strong when it comes to criticizing but weak when it comes to demanding alternatives, either because it never goes beyond formulating some very general goals or because it restricts itself to the smallest common denominator.

#### We’re an ordoliberal approach – that’s the opposite of neoliberalism, puts highest value on protecting public welfare, and creates a SOCIAL ECONOMY; renewables are the key internal link, and socializing the industry fails

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A definition of energetic/ethical ordoliberalism Making the primacy of renewable energy a political norm is not a form of planned economy or economic statism. Indeed, nationalizing large power companies w7ould be anything but a progressive step on the path to energy change. State-owned conventional power companies such as those in France, Italy, Greece or Austria, whether in the electricity, oil or gas sector, have proven every bit as negative in their attitude to renew-able energy as privately-run power companies. State-owned power companies also have a direct influence on their national governments, and these can have no interest in rapid energy change if this renders their own revenue-generating power companies uneconomic. To nationalize pow-er companies which own nuclear and coal-fired powder stations would be like creating a public “bad bank”, in which all the bad risks were bundled together. Thus prioritizing renewable energy does not mean greater state involvement in energy production. If nothing else, the statutory7 primacy of renewable energy constitutes a regulatory7 market framework, one which is not arbitrary7 but instead is legitimized by its goal of protecting public welfare. This is the central tenet of ordoliberalism, and the exact opposite of neo-liberalism, whose social “damage potential” has been proven in recent years. An ordoliberal economic approach sets standards applicable to all businesses while avoiding micro-economic political interventions unless there is a compelling systemic interest in doing so. In particular, it reflects the indispensability of public infrastructure which must be equally accessible to all economic participants, producers as well as consumers, and under the same conditions, thus ensuring the economic principle of competitive and consumer equality7. This is what Jan Tinbergen, winner of the first-ever Nobel Prize for economics in 1969, calls “social overhead capital”. This was a basic principle common to all economic theories before neo-liberalism levered it out and forced public infrastructures to meet target yields. Classic features of ordoliberalism are the prevention of economic monopolies, the principle of competitive equality, and social obligations which must be met by all economic participants equally - principles which lead to a social economy. That these social obligations must also be ecological obligations is now evident, thanks to the high social cost of using environmentally damaging resources. And for just this reason, the statutory primacy awarded renewable energy must be permanent. An economic order in which pollutedwater has the same market value as clean drinking water is an indication of social neglect. The general, statutory primacy of renewable energy would have a more resounding effect than all other political approaches and thus will need to be enforced in the face of massive resistance. Yet with resolute action this is easier to achieve, for it is a simpler message to convey to the public. It offers greater transparency and equality and enjoys a decisive psychological advantage: a major political step such as this w7ould meet the growing social need for a big solution and a quick way out of the current energy trap. It achieves what large- scale technical projects only promise. Political initiatives for energy change, which one knows from the outset cannot be fulfilled because of the scale of the challenges, are not enough to shake people out of their lethargy. By giving renewable energy social priority7 we provide a new basis for energy supply. This activates innumerable social initiatives for investment into renewable energy and encourages joint responsibility.

#### The aff isn’t a green reform – it’s a total societal overhaul consistent with the socialist movement

**Foster 11** – professor of sociology at the University of Oregon (John Bellamy, “Capitalism and Environmental Catastrophe”, <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/foster291011.html>, dml)

The other approach is to demand changes in society itself; to move away from a system directed at profits, production, and accumulation, i.e., economic growth, and toward a sustainable steady-state economy. This would mean reducing or eliminating unnecessary and wasteful consumption and reordering society -- from commodity production and consumption as its primary goal, to sustainable human development. This could only occur in conjunction with a move towards substantive equality. It would require democratic ecological and social planning. It therefore coincides with the classical objectives of socialism.

Such a shift would make possible the reduction in carbon emissions we need. After all, most of what the U.S. economy produces in the form of commodities (including the unnecessary, market-related costs that go into the production of nearly all goods) is sheer waste from a social, an ecological -- even a long-term economic -- standpoint. Just think of all the useless things we produce and that we are encouraged to buy and then throw away almost the moment we have bought them. Think of the bizarre, plastic packaging that all too often dwarfs the goods themselves. Think of military spending, running in reality at $1 trillion a year in the United States. Think of marketing (i.e. corporate spending aimed at persuading people to buy things they don't want or need), which has reached $1 trillion a year in this country alone. Think of all the wasted resources associated with our financial system, with Wall Street economics. It is this kind of waste that generates the huge profits for the top 1 percent of income earners, and that alienates and impoverishes the lives of the bottom 99 percent, while degrading the environment.8

What we need therefore is to change our economic culture. We need an ecological and social revolution. We have all the technologies necessary to do this. It is not primarily a technological problem, because the goal here would no longer be the impossible one of expanding our exploitation of the earth beyond all physical and biological limits, ad infinitum. Rather the goal would be to promote human community and community with the earth. Here we would need to depend on organizing our local communities but also on creating a global community -- where the rich countries no longer imperialistically exploit the poor countries of the world. You may say that this is impossible, but the World Occupy Movement would have been declared impossible only a month ago. If we are going to struggle, let us make our goal one of ecological and social revolution -- in defense of humanity and the planet.

#### We are the break away from capital reproduction

**Schwartzman 8** – Professor of Biology at Howard University (David, “Ecosocialism or Ecocatastrophe”, <http://dccofc.org/Documents/David/Ecosocialism/Ecosocialism%20or%20Ecocatast.pdf>, dml)

Solar utopia is that "other world possible" when every child born on Earth has the right to a full life of creative fulfillment, to an environment free of hatred and pollution, and to a world with our planet's full complement of biodiversity intact, or at least what is left of it when the present global regime prioritizing capital reproduction over human and nature’s needs is ended.

This optimistic, yes, frankly utopian vision of a global civilization will likely be achievable only if we can prevent climate change catastrophe by a timely transition to a global solarized economy. To be a “Leninist” now in our political practice is essential, i.e., to recognize the potentiality of the moment and act, else we lose the chance to change the future (13). But the vision itself and its realization cannot be a result of “expert” dictation, only as a product informed by the dialogue between a committed scientific/technological intelligentsia and communities of struggle, as embryos of the future are created within the womb of globalized capitalism, as global class struggle unfolds to achieve its full reality.

#### We need to resist the neoliberal construction of the current energy system – our utopian vision is critical to exposing the contradictions inherent in capitalism

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Neo-liberal market correctness Since the 1970s, there has been no lack of spectacular studies, known to all the decision-makers and pressuring them to undertake comprehensive political initiatives. They include “Limits to Growth” (1972), “Global 2000” (1981), “Our Common Future” (1987), world climate reports and others. However, almost no effective political initiatives have been subsequently taken, partly due to neo-liberal doctrine having become the national and international leit-motif for economic action, and despite growing recognition of the fundamental threats to resource and environmental security. During the 1990s, this doctrine of untrammelled economic liberalization, with its idolization of the “free market” and stigmatization of state-planned economic activity, rose to become the overriding political and economic school of thought. The “invisible hand of the market” was ascribed more rationality than politico-economic strategies. However, the neo-liberal school of thought unilaterally monopolizes the ideal of freedom for the benefit of business, equating the principle of an “open world” with “open world markets”. Since the 1990s, this principle, known as the “Washington consensus”, has become the key criterion forjudging politicoeconomic action. Strategies which ran contrary to this principle were listed in an index. Political actions, even when dealing with questions such as resource and environmental security which are fundamental to our survival, were measured in terms of free market principles, with political initiatives for overcoming resource and environmental crises becoming taboo. International economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), EU and others followed this doctrine as closely as national governments and political parties did. Even environmental institutes and organizations increasingly strove to come up with projects which did not fly in the face of this doctrine, it being apparent from the outset that anything else would be impossible to implement. A school of thought becomes dominant when everyone involved regards it as so self-evident that they no longer perceive its contradictions. Just how- great these contradictions can be was made particularly clear by the contradiction between two world conferences held just two years apart: at the first, the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 (the Earth Summit), the famed Agenda 21 was adopted, declaring sustainable development and ecological methods of production the central challenges for the 21st century; at the second, the April 1994 conference in Marrakech, the Marrakech Agreement was signed, thereby establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) and enacting the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This had the effect of declaring global free trade in commodities, capital and services a form of global economic constitution, according to which, henceforth, all political and economic activities should be oriented, enjoying priority even over international agreements on climate or employment protection. Nina Scheer's question “global free trade before environmental protection?” became codified and an “economic century” euphorically proclaimed.^ Once this order of precedence had been established, it was followed by the demand that political initiatives for the transition to renew-able energy adhere to this free market dogma, as if the dogma were more important than energy change itself. Thus the World Bank continued to view the German EEG negatively, even after it had long proved to be the most successful political approach for encouraging the transition to renew-able energy. As the same governments voted for both Agenda 21 and for global free trade, this appears to be a form of political schizophrenia. Claiming adherence to the criteria of market correctness, the dominant players in the power industry are acting as the guardians of the “Holy Grail” of the energy market. After energy markets were legally liberalized, these dominant players belatedly recognized their own unique head-start over any new-comers to the market. Since then they have been playing a duplicitous game: defending their own position, one achieved through political privilege, whilst loudly proclaiming market dogma every time a new-comer appears on the scene. The gigantic quantities of conventional energy with their economies of scale have a huge advantage over the limited volumes of renew-ables-based power. Yet a decisive economic difference is happily ignored: the more fossil fuels are used, the more their price rises, for these fuels cannot be regenerated and thus supplies become scarce. In contrast, a mass market for renew-able energy technologies lowers prices. A significant feature of neo-liberal economic philosophy is its context-free fixation on the efficiency of isolated products. These are, in turn, compared to other products (again with no regard for context) with the subsequent expectation that they will compete on the open market. Cost comparisons such as these create the impression of ideologically-free, independent precision. Questions regarding the origin, systemic relevance and various social, ecological and economic consequences of each product are suppressed, with the result that this monochrome market philosophy solidifies into an extremely short-sighted ideology , one which stultifies both itself and others and which is ultimately unsustainable. Pressing medium or long term considerations fall through the short-term market net of this ideology. Neo-liberal economic philosophy has the unmistakable touch of autism, and by following its partly rational theoretical conclusions we cannot help but produce irrational results. This has encouraged economists in France to found a “society for post-autistic economics”, a long overdue act of intellectual resistance. We need to resist more actively the myths of the energy market. Permitting like to compete with unlike within a single market runs contrary to the principle of a level playing field. Without a level playing field, free market principles are reduced to a caricature of themselves. Starting from the principle of market equality and the basic requirements of objective comparison, there are four market contradictions between traditional and renew-able forms of energy. These contradictions demonstrate that all attempts to promote renew-ables on the energy market in competition with conventional energy or even, after initial support, to leave it to the mercy of the free-market, effectively function as a brake on renew-able energy, and artificially prolong the existence of the traditional pow-er industry. They demonstrate why the criterion of energy cost alone is insufficient to lever traditional energy out of the market, even when renew-able energy is, or will be, cheaper.

#### Their revolution will be crushed by the boot of the government – violent overthrow fails and causes nuclear wars; prefer evolutionary over revolutionary strategies

Pritchard and Taylor, 78 (Colin, Director of Social Work Studies, University of Bath, Richard K. S., the Department of Adult and Continuing Education, *Social Work: Reform or Revolution*, pg. 105-106)

In our context the crucial questions for the Marxist social worker must be, first, whether social work is a potential vehicle for achieving a heightened socialist consciousness, and second, if it has this potential, how it can be fulfilled. Others on the Left have argued, though, that this radicalizing role is best fulfilled not through the heightening of conflict-oriented class consciousness and the consequent construction of alternative vehicles for socialist transformation, but rather through the adaptation of existing institutions and organizations. By further pressurizing the potentially socialist aspects of existing structures, it is argued, the system can be radicalized through mass, democratic pressure. This view certainly rejects the pluralist assumptions: the unacceptable nature of existing social structure is not disputed—and the need for radical change is as strongly held as it is by 'orthodox Marxists\*. It is the means of achieving this change that sharply differentiates these perspectives. The rationale of this approach is based both upon specific social analysis and upon wider political considerations. On the wider political front it can be argued that, whereas it may have been reasonable for Marx to talk prescriptively about the need for decades of civil war, following the clash of social classes, in order to establish a socialist system—to advocate violent conflict in the nuclear age is both irresponsible and unrealistic in socialist terms. Future conflict could not be confined to nationally based conflict but would inevitably involve intervention by the major power blocs. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons amongst some of the middle-range powers the dangers of a nuclear holocaust become even greater. There is thus a need for humanity as a whole to acknowledge its ability, technologically, to self-destruct. Once this has been accepted, the context of the argument for social change is drastically revised: at its extreme, the possibility of massive human annihilation through nuclear conflict may be precipitated by major class conflict. Can Marxists therefore afford to advocate violent revolution in the nuclear age? Such speculations may at first sight seem far removed from the tasks facing social work. But if, as we have argued, the political choice between ‘evolutionary’ and ‘revolutionary’ perspec-tives for social change is highly relevant to social work

#### Psychoanalysis can’t be scaled up to explain society or politics – they can’t explain our impacts and definitely can’t solve

Sharpe 10 – lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University

Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182-185

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Žižek’s political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra- extremism of Žižek’s political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate – which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan’s notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people’s subjective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands’ voluntary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option (*b*), Žižek’s option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose ‘traversal of the fantasy’ is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio- political system or Other. Hence, according to Žižek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Žižek’s resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject–object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Žižek’s decisive political- theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The substantive problem is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject–object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as Žižek now frankly avows (*IDLC* 412–19). We have seen that the ultra- political form of Žižek’s criticism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him – even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Žižek’s model of politics proper is modelled on a pre- critical analogy with the total transformation of a subject’s entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be? We have seen that Žižek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime’s ‘inherent transgressions’: at once subjects’ habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime’s myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete ‘traversal’ – in Hegel’s terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation – of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (*IDLC* 153; *OB* 144–8). But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

#### Psychoanalysis is reductive and ignores difference

--means not root cause, their theory is not predictive and we should look at different places (culture, biology, sociology, etc.) to determine policy

Sharpe 10 – lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University

Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism. Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method Jacques Derrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics, politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies**.** In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted political contemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also **a**lways in danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring at and enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account of absolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom today pointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

#### The divide only exists because of the stranglehold of the energy industry – the aff is crucial to fracture that divide and encourage responsible consumption

**Scheer, ’12** Member of the German Parliament, President of the European Association for Renewable Energy EUROSOLAR, Chairman of the World Council for Renewable Energy WCRE (Hermann Scheer, Earthscan, 2012, “The energy imperative: 100 percent renewable now,” kindle reader so no page numbers)//CC

As our power supply system is based on conventional energy, the entire business management sector sees the energy problem only from the perspective of the conventional power industry'. What the conventional power industry' defines as efficient, cost-effective or feasible has become the generally accepted definition of the terms efficiency, cost effectiveness and feasibility - and not just within the energy industry7 itself. The traditional power industry's systemic economic terms have become general economic terms and its claim to omni-competence part of its self-image. When the environmental movement of the 1970s made nuclear and fossil power supply a social issue for the first time, the traditional power industry7 reacted by demanding a “return to energy consensus”, by which they meant taking the politics out of energy. “Energy consensus” involved prohibiting political intervention and making all forms of criticism taboo. For decades both political institutions and “the economy” have respected, and accepted, the power industry's self-appointed position of authority. This has led to society’s division of roles between energy providers and energy consumers, and an economic division of labour between energy suppliers 011 the one hand and the producers of commodities and services 011 the other, divisions which exist right through to the present day.

#### Ontology doesn’t come first – it fractures the shift, and becomes unproductive tautology

Philip **Graham** School of Communication Queensland University of Technology, Heidegger’s Hippies Sep 15 **1999** http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html

To state their positions more succinctly: ‘Heraclitus maintained that everything changes: Parmenides retorted that nothing changes’ (Russell 1946: 66). Between them, they delineated the dialectical extremes within which the “problem of the subject” has become manifest: in the extremes of questions about ontology, the nature of “Being”, or existence, or ‘Existenz’ (Adorno 1973: 110-25). Historically, such arguments tend towards internalist hocus pocus: The popular success of ontology feeds on an illusion: that the state of the intentio recta might simply be chosen by a consciousness full of nominalist and subjective sediments, a consciousness which self-reflection alone has made what it is. But Heidegger, of course, saw through this illusion … beyond subject and object, beyond concept and entity. Being is the supreme concept –for on the lips of him who says “Being” is the word, not Being itself –and yet it is said to be privileged above all conceptuality, by virtue of moments which the thinker thinks along with the word “Being” and which the abstractly obtained significative unity of the concept does not exhaust. (Adorno 1973: 69) Adorno’s (1973) thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s ontological metaphysics plays itself out back and forth through the Heideggerian concept of a universalised identity –an essentialist, universalised being and becoming of consciousness, elided from the constraints of the social world. Adorno’s argument can be summed up thus: there can be no universal theory of “being” in and of itself because what such a theory posits is, precisely, non-identity. It obscures the role of the social and promotes a specific kind of politics –identity politics (cf. also Kennedy 1998): Devoid of its otherness, of what it renders extraneous, an existence which thus proclaims itself the criterion of thought will validate its decrees in authoritarian style, as in political practice a dictator validates the ideology of the day. The reduction of thought to the thinkers halts the progress of thought; it brings to a standstill would thought would need to be thought, and what subjectivity would need to live in. As the solid ground of truth, subjectivity is reified … Thinking becomes what the thinker has been from the start. It becomes tautology, a regressive form of consciousness. (Adorno 1973: 128). Identity politics – the ontological imperative – is inherently authoritarian precisely because it promotes regression, internalism, subjectivism, and, most importantly, because it negates the role of society. It is simplistic because it focuses on the thingliness of people: race, gender, ethnicity. It tries to resolve the tension of the social-individual by smashing the problem into two irreconcilable parts. Identity politics’ current popularity in sociological thought, most well-evidenced by its use and popularity in “Third Way” politics, can be traced back to a cohort I have called Heidegger’s Hippies –the failed, half-hearted, would-be “revolutionaries” of the 60s, an incoherent collection of middle-class, neo-liberal malcontents who got caught up in their own hyperbole, and who are now the administrators of a ‘totally administered’ society in which hyperbole has become both lingua franca and world currency (Adorno 1964/1973 1973).