### T

**Interpretation: energy production is not exploration and drilling**

GDF SUEZ, no date global gas and lng division (GDS SUEZ, Global Gas & LNG Division, “Exploration and production of natural gas,” <http://www.gdfsuez.com/en/businesses/gas/natural-gas-prospection-production/>)//CC

Exploration is the first stage of the gas chain. At the core of this essential activity, GDF SUEZ specialists (geologists, geophysicists, engineers, etc.) analyze the structure of the soil to detect areas liable to contain hydrocarbons. They carry out specific tests, such as seismic analyses, to confirm their initial studies. When there is a high probability of discovering gas (or oil), wells are drilled. If those wells prove successful, production (extraction and processing of the natural gas or oil) can start. Exploration-production activities also include the acquisition of licenses (the right to explore then exploit a field) from the authorities of the countries in which those fields are located.

**Violation—the aff removes a restriction on leasing not production**

**Voting issue –**

**A. Limits – allows any minute combination of leasing restriction modification, subverts substantially because it affects all production**

**B. Ground – can’t get links to things that aren’t *production* restrictions, but *exploration* restrictions. Also can no link out of DAs by not creating production.**

### Elections

**Obama will win but it will be close and is reversible**

**Bouie, 9/10**/12 - staff writer at [The American Prospect](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/the-fundamentals-still-favor-obama/2012/09/10/d67db19e-fb6d-11e1-98c6-ec0a0a93f8eb_blog.html) (Jamelle, “The fundamentals still favor Obama,” Washington Post,[ht tp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/the-fundamentals-still-favor-obama/2012/09/10/d67db19e-fb6d-11e1-98c6-ec0a0a93f8eb\_blog.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/the-fundamentals-still-favor-obama/2012/09/10/d67db19e-fb6d-11e1-98c6-ec0a0a93f8eb_blog.html)

Since the Democratic National Convention ended, there has been clear movement in the polls, and President Obama is winning. Nate Silver, who usually urges caution when reading poll results, made this point earlier today, when he [wondered if observers were understating the degree to which there’s been clear movement in the presidential race](http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/sept-9-call-it-as-you-see-it/):

[T]he polling movement that we have seen over the past three days represents the most substantial shift that we’ve seen in the race all year, with the polls moving toward Mr. Obama since his convention.

How far will Mr. Obama’s numbers rise, and how long will his bounce last? We don’t know that, of course. But the range of possible outcomes reads pretty favorably for him.

None of this is to say that Obama will win in November, but it’s increasingly clear that he’s winning. And while it may not seem like it — given the ups and downs of the campaign season — this has been true for most of the year. Yes, the race has been close since April, when Mitt Romney wrapped up the Republican presidential primary and consolidated the bulk of GOP voters. But since then, Obama has maintained a small but persistent lead over the former Massachusetts governor. Indeed, Romney has never held a lead in the averages calculated by [Pollster](http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2012-general-election-romney-vs-obama#!mindate=2012-04-01&amp;smoothing=more&amp;hiddenpollsters=rasmussen,zogby-internet) or [Real Clear Politics](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/us/general_election_romney_vs_obama-1171.html). It’s possible that this will change — Obama’s convention bounce could dissipate and voters could finally move to Romney — but given the contours of the race, that seems unlikely.

As [Greg has been pointing out](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/why-wont-obama-voters-break-up-with-him/2012/09/06/e4831e06-f84c-11e1-8398-0327ab83ab91_blog.html), it’s clear that the Romney campaign is governed by a crude economic determinism — “as long as the economy is bad, all we have to do is show up, and voters will reward us with the presidency.” Hence Romney pollster Neil Newhouse’s [declaration](http://www.mittromney.com/news/press/2012/09/memorandum-state-race1) that “the basic structure of the race hasn’t changed.” This is true, but not in a way that helps Romney. Simply put, the “basic structure of the race” still favors President Obama. The economy is poor and job creation is sluggish, but growth is on an upward trajectory, and according to most election models, this makes Obama a slight favorite for reelection. That the Romney campaign fails to see this explains everything from Romney’s refusal to provide policy detail to his team’s inexplicable decision to cede summer advertising to the Obama campaign.

#### Unique link – Obama is holding off on controversial decisions about energy policy – any move is politically controversial, only maintaining the status quo policy of environmental deference is key to re-election

Schnur 12 – director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California; he served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000. (Dan, April 9, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline” <http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/>) Jacome

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the [anti-drilling demands of the environmental community](http://www.credoaction.com/campaign/keystone_obama/index.html) and the [thirst for more affordable gasoline](http://www.people-press.org/2012/02/23/auto-bailout-now-backed-stimulus-divisive/) from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his [support for building half of an oil pipeline](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/in-oklahoma-obama-declares-pipeline-support.html).

The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor.

As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the [benefits of wind and solar power](http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/obama-signs-stimulus-packed-with-clean-energy-provisions/) while also [boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces](http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/03/obama-oil-drilling-up-on-my-watch/1#.T4I5A45btFU) under his leadership.

There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for [increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast](http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/03/obama-oks-oil-exploration-along-atlantic-coast-but-not-drilling/) but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an [experiment with marijuana but not inhaling](http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/30/news/30iht-bill_1.html).

Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed [XL Keystone Pipeline](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/keystone_pipeline/index.html) that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white.

Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the [job-creation potential of the pipeline](http://www.tauc.org/blog/?fa=article&id=1654).

The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway.

He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to [drilling opponents](http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/study-warns-of-economic-damage-in-a-keystone-spill/), but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships [Canadian oil to China](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/opinion/nocera-the-poisoned-politics-of-keystone-xl.html) instead of into this country.

Even in deep-blue California, where Obama wins hypothetical general election [match ups against the Republican candidates](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-poll-presidential-20120325,0,7993161.story) by margins approaching voice vote, this is an issue that points to potential difficulties for the president’s re-election campaign. Californians who swooned for Obama in 2008, and who seem poised for a re-swoon this fall, told a recent [USC Dornsife/LA Times statewide poll](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-poll-presidential-20120325,0,7993161.story) that they were dissatisfied with the president’s handling of the issue of the cost of gasoline by a 29-62 margin. California’s unemployment rate remains around 11 percent, but the state’s residents still give Obama positive marks on his work on job creation, the economy and taxes. They approve of his work on health care and by even larger margins on women’s health issues. But highway-dependent West Coasters, even while they advocate for broader use of solar, wind and other alternative energies, don’t like $4 per gallon gasoline and they will like paying $5 per gallon even less.

Obama won’t actually lose California in November, of course. Gas prices would have to hit $10 a gallon for Mitt Romney to win the state this fall. And the [same poll](http://dornsife.usc.edu/usc-dornsife-los-angeles-times-poll/) shows that voters blame oil companies, rather than either the president or Congress, for those high prices. However, the dissatisfaction that emanates from even a heavily Democratic patch of electoral turf such as California carries much more significant consequences in Ohio, Florida and other swing states. For the time being, Obama is gambling that [directing popular anger toward the oil companies](http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/obama-repeats-his-call-to-end-oil-subsidies/) — a convenient villain if there ever was one — will allow him to keep the price of gasoline from becoming a roadblock for his campaign.

But if gas prices keep rising and voter unhappiness continues to build, look for the administration to find a way to accelerate the review process that would allow the northern leg of Keystone to move forward more quickly. Obama has been careful not to come out in absolute opposition to the pipeline, but only to call for a more meticulous examination of its possible environmental impact. A more closely competitive election than what is now expected, though, could easily lead the president to decide that his administration’s review has been quite thorough enough and that the time for additional drilling has arrived.

An [energy strategy](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/us/politics/obama-will-try-to-blunt-attacks-on-gas-prices.html) that Obama now refers to as an “all of the above” approach is unlikely to turn into a “[drill, baby drill](http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-scranton-palin-talks-of-coal/)” refrain between now and November. But maintaining a balance between dissatisfied but docile environmentalists on one hand and drivers whose unhappiness stops just short of violence on the other will be a key to his re-election. If his poll margins begin to narrow, a somewhat longer pipeline than the one he has already endorsed could become a very tempting insurance policy.

#### Romney’s foreign policy starts nuclear wars and blowback around the globe – includes Pakistan collapse, US-Russia, US-China, Iran prolif and strikes, US-Arab relations, peace process, economic collapse

Doug Bandow 5-15-2012; Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan. “Mitt Romney: The Foreign Policy of Know-Nothingism” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/mitt-romney-foreign-policy-knownothingism

Romney’s overall theme is American exceptionalism and greatness, slogans that win public applause but offer no guidance for a bankrupt superpower that has squandered its international credibility. “This century must be an American century,” Romney proclaimed. “In an American century, America leads the free world and the free world leads the entire world.” He has chosen a mix of advisers, including the usual neocons and uber-hawks — Robert Kagan, Eliot Cohen, Jim Talent, Walid Phares, Kim Holmes, and Daniel Senor, for instance — that gives little reason for comfort. Their involvement suggests Romney’s general commitment to an imperial foreign policy and force structure. Romney is no fool, but he has never demonstrated much interest in international affairs. He brings to mind George W. Bush, who appeared to be largely ignorant of the nations he was invading. Romney may be temperamentally less likely to combine recklessness with hubris, but he would have just as strong an incentive to use foreign aggression to win conservative acquiescence to domestic compromise. This tactic worked well for Bush, whose spendthrift policies received surprisingly little criticism on the right from activists busy defending his war-happy foreign policy. The former Massachusetts governor has criticized President Obama for “a naked political calculation or simply sheer ineptitude” in following George W. Bush’s withdrawal timetable in Iraq and for not overriding the decision of a government whose independence Washington claims to respect. But why would any American policymaker want to keep troops in a nation that is becoming ever more authoritarian, corrupt, and sectarian? It is precisely the sort of place U.S. forces should not be tied down. In contrast, Romney has effectively taken no position on Afghanistan. At times he appears to support the Obama timetable for reducing troop levels, but he has also proclaimed that “Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.” Indeed, he insisted: “To defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, the United States will need the cooperation of both the Afghan and Pakistani governments — we will only persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolute if they are convinced that the United States will itself be resolute,” and added, “We should not negotiate with the Taliban. We should defeat the Taliban.” Yet it’s the job of the president, not the military, to decide the basic policy question: why is the U.S. spending blood and treasure trying to create a Western-style nation state in Central Asia a decade after 9/11? And how long is he prepared to stay — forever? On my two trips to Afghanistan I found little support among Afghans for their own government, which is characterized by gross incompetence and corruption. Even if the Western allies succeed in creating a large local security force, will it fight for the thieves in Kabul? Pakistan is already resolute — in opposing U.S. policy on the ground. Afghans forthrightly view Islamabad as an enemy. Unfortunately, continuing the war probably is the most effective way to destabilize nuclear-armed Pakistan. What will Romney do if the U.S. military tells him that American combat forces must remain in Afghanistan for another decade or two in order to “win”? The ongoing AfPak conflict is not enough; Romney appears to desire war with Iran as well. No one wants a nuclear Iran, but Persian nuclear ambitiions began under America’s ally the Shah, and there is no reason to believe that the U.S. (and Israel) cannot deter Tehran. True, Richard Grenell, who briefly served as Romney’s foreign-policy spokesman, once made the astonishing claim that the Iranians “will surely use” nuclear weapons. Alas, he never shared his apparently secret intelligence about the leadership in Tehran’s suicidal tendencies. The Iranian government’s behavior has been rational even if brutal, and officials busy maneuvering for power and wealth do not seem eager to enter the great beyond. Washington uneasily but effectively deterred Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, the two most prolific mass murderers in history. Iran is no substitute for them. Romney has engaged in almost infantile ridicule of the Obama administration’s attempt to engage Tehran. Yet the U.S. had diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia. Washington came to regret not having similar contact with Mao’s China. Even the Bush administration eventually decided that ignoring Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea only encouraged it to build more nuclear weapons faster. Regarding Iran, Romney asserted, “a military option to deal with their nuclear program remains on the table.” Building up U.S. military forces “will send an unequivocal signal to Iran that the United States, acting in concert with allies, will never permit Iran to obtain nuclear weapons... Only when the ayatollahs no longer have doubts about America’s resolve will they abandon their nuclear ambitions.” Indeed, “if all else fails... then of course you take military action,” even though, American and Iranian military analysts warn, such strikes might only delay development of nuclear weapons. “Elect me as the next president,” he declared, and Iran “will not have a nuclear weapon.” Actually, if Tehran becomes convinced that an attack and attempted regime change are likely, it will have no choice but to develop nuclear weapons. How else to defend itself? The misguided war in Libya, which Romney supported, sent a clear signal to both North Korea and Iran never to trust the West. Iran’s fears likely are exacerbated by Romney’s promise to subcontract Middle East policy to Israel. The ties between the U.S. and Israel are many, but their interests often diverge. The current Israeli government wants Washington to attack Iran irrespective of the cost to America. Moreover, successive Israeli governments have decided to effectively colonize the West Bank, turning injustice into state policy and making a separate Palestinian state practically impossible. Perceived American support for this creates enormous hostility toward the U.S. across the Arab and Muslim worlds. Yet Romney promises that his first foreign trip would be to Israel “to show the world that we care about that country and that region” — as if anyone anywhere, least of all Israel’s neighbors, doesn’t realize that. He asserted that “you don’t allow an inch of space to exist between you and your friends and allies,” notably Israel. The U.S. should “let the entire world know that we will stay with them and that we will support them and defend them.” Indeed, Romney has known Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for nearly four decades and has said that he would request Netanyahu’s approval for U.S. policies: “I’d get on the phone to my friend Bibi Netanyahu and say, ‘Would it help if I say this? What would you like me to do?’” Americans would be better served by a president committed to making policy in the interests of the U.S. instead. Romney’s myopic vision is just as evident when he looks elsewhere. For instance, he offered the singular judgment that Russia is “our number one geopolitical foe.” Romney complained that “across the board, it has been a thorn in our side on questions vital to America’s national security.” The Cold War ended more than two decades ago. Apparently Romney is locked in a time warp. Moscow manifestly does not threaten vital U.S. interests. Romney claimed that Vladimir “Putin dreams of ‘rebuilding the Russian empire’.” Even if Putin has such dreams, they don’t animate Russian foreign policy. No longer an ideologically aggressive power active around the world, Moscow has retreated to the status of a pre-1914 great power, concerned about border security and international respect. Russia has no interest in conflict with America and is not even much involved in most regions where the U.S. is active: Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Moscow has been helpful in Afghanistan, refused to provide advanced air defense weapons to Iran, supported some sanctions against Tehran, used its limited influence in North Korea to encourage nuclear disarmament, and opposes jihadist terrorism. This is curious behavior for America’s “number one geopolitical foe.” Romney’s website explains that he will “implement a strategy that will seek to discourage aggressive or expansionist behavior on the part of Russia,” but other than Georgia where is it so acting? And even if Georgia fell into a Russian trap, Tbilisi started the shooting in 2008. In any event, absent an American security guarantee, which would be madness, the U.S. cannot stop Moscow from acting to protect what it sees as vital interests in a region of historic influence. Where else is Russia threatening America? Moscow does oppose NATO expansion, which actually is foolish from a U.S. standpoint as well, adding strategic liabilities rather than military strengths. Russia strongly opposes missile defense bases in Central and Eastern Europe, but why should Washington subsidize the security of others? Moscow opposes an attack on Iran, and so should Americans. Russia backs the Assad regime in Syria, but the U.S. government once declared the same government to be “reformist.” Violent misadventures in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that America has little to gain and much to lose from another attempt at social engineering through war. If anything, the Putin government has done Washington a favor keeping the U.S. out of Syria. This doesn’t mean America should not confront Moscow when important differences arise. But treating Russia as an adversary risks encouraging it to act like one. Doing so especially will make Moscow more suspicious of America’s relationships with former members of the Warsaw Pact and republics of the Soviet Union. Naturally, Romney wants to “encourage democratic political and economic reform” in Russia — a fine idea in theory, but meddling in another country’s politics rarely works in practice. Just look at the Arab Spring. Not content with attempting to start a mini-Cold War, Mitt Romney dropped his nominal free-market stance to demonize Chinese currency practices. He complained about currency manipulation and forced technology transfers: “China seeks advantage through systematic exploitation of other economies.” On day one as president he promises to designate “China as the currency manipulator it is.” Moreover, he added, he would “take a holistic approach to addressing all of China’s abuses. That includes unilateral actions such as increased enforcement of U.S. trade laws, punitive measures targeting products and industries that rely on misappropriations of our intellectual property, reciprocity in government procurement, and countervailing duties against currency manipulation. It also includes multilateral actions to block technology transfers into China and to create a trading bloc open only for nations genuinely committed to free trade.” Romney’s apparent belief that Washington is “genuinely committed to free trade” is charming nonsense. The U.S. has practiced a weak dollar policy to increase exports. Washington long has subsidized American exports: the Export-Import Bank is known as “Boeing’s Bank” and U.S. agricultural export subsidies helped torpedo the Doha round of trade liberalization through the World Trade Organization. Of course, Beijing still does much to offend Washington. However, the U.S. must accommodate the rising power across the Pacific. Trying to keep China out of a new Asia-Pacific trade pact isn’t likely to work. America’s Asian allies want us to protect them — no surprise! — but are not interested in offending their nearby neighbor with a long memory. The best hope for moderating Chinese behavior is to tie it into a web of international institutions that provide substantial economic, political, and security benefits. Beijing already has good reason to be paranoid of the superpower which patrols bordering waters, engages in a policy that looks like containment, and talks of the possibility of war. Trying to isolate China economically would be taken as a direct challenge. Romney would prove Henry Kissinger’s dictum that even paranoids have enemies. Naturally, Romney also wants to “maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors.” However, 67 years after the end of World War II, it is time for Beijing’s neighbors to arm themselves and cooperate with each other. Japan long had the second largest economy on earth. India is another rising power with reason to constrain China. South Korea has become a major power. Australia has initiated a significant military build-up. Many Southeast Asian nations are constructing submarines to help deter Chinese adventurism. Even Russia has much to fear from China, given the paucity of population in its vast eastern territory. But America’s foreign-defense dole discourages independence and self-help. The U.S. should step back as an off-shore balancer, encouraging its friends to do more and work together. It is not America’s job to risk Los Angeles for Tokyo, Seoul, or Taipei. Romney similarly insists on keeping the U.S. on the front lines against North Korea, even though all of its neighbors have far more at stake in a peaceful peninsula and are able to contain that impoverished wreck of a country. The Romney campaign proclaims: “Mitt Romney will commit to eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and its nuclear-weapons infrastructure.” Alas, everything he proposes has been tried before, from tougher sanctions to tighter interdiction and pressure on China to isolate the North. What does he plan on doing when Pyongyang continues to develop nuclear weapons as it has done for the last 20 years? The American military should come home from Korea. Romney complained that the North’s nuclear capability “poses a direct threat to U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia.” Then withdraw them. Manpower-rich South Korea doesn’t need U.S. conventional support, and ground units do nothing to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Pull out American troops and eliminate North Korea’s primary threat to the U.S. Then support continuing non-proliferation efforts led by those nations with the most to fear from the North. That strategy, more than lobbying by Washington, is likely to bring China around. Romney confuses dreams with reality when criticizing President Obama over the administration’s response to the Arab Spring. “We’re facing an Arab Spring which is out of control in some respects,” he said, “because the president was not as strong as he needed to be in encouraging our friends to move toward representative forms of government.” Romney asked: “How can we try and improve the odds so what happens in Libya and what happens in Egypt and what happens in other places where the Arab Spring is in full bloom so that the developments are toward democracy, modernity and more representative forms of government? This we simply don’t know.” True, the president doesn’t know. But neither does Mitt Romney. The latter suffers from the delusion that bright Washington policymakers can remake the world. Invade another country, turn it into a Western-style democracy allied with America, and everyone will live happily every after. But George W. Bush, a member of Mitt Romney’s own party, failed miserably trying to do that in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The Arab Spring did not happen because of Washington policy but in spite of Washington policy. And Arabs demanding political freedom — which, unfortunately, is not the same as a liberal society — have not the slightest interest in what Barack Obama or Mitt Romney thinks. Yet the latter wants “convene a summit that brings together world leaders, donor organizations, and young leaders of groups that espouse” all the wonderful things that Americans do. Alas, does he really believe that such a gathering will stop, say, jihadist radicals from slaughtering Coptic Christians? Iraq’s large Christian community was destroyed even as the U.S. military occupied that country. His summit isn’t likely to be any more effective. Not everything in the world is about Washington. Which is why Romney’s demand to do something in Syria is so foolish. Until recently he wanted to work with the UN, call on the Syrian military to be nice, impose more sanctions, and “increase the possibility that the ruling minority Alawites will be able to reconcile with the majority Sunni population in a post-Assad Syria.” Snapping his fingers would be no less effective. Most recently he advocated arming the rebels. But he should be more cautious before advocating American intervention in another conflict in another land. Such efforts rarely have desirable results. Iraq was a catastrophe. Afghanistan looks to be a disaster once American troops come home. After more than a decade Bosnia and Kosovo are failures, still under allied supervision. Libya is looking bad. Even without U.S. “help,” a full-blown civil war already threatens in Syria. We only look through the glass darkly, observed the Apostle Paul. It might be best for Washington not to intervene in another Muslim land with so many others aflame. Despite his support for restoring America’s economic health, Romney wants to increase dramatically Washington’s already outsize military spending. Rather than make a case on what the U.S. needs, he has taken the typical liberal approach of setting an arbitrary number: 4 percent of GDP. It’s a dumb idea, since America already accounts for roughly half the globe’s military spending — far more if you include Washington’s wealthy allies — and spends more in real terms than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War, and real outlays have nearly doubled since 2000. By any normal measure, the U.S. possesses far more military resources than it needs to confront genuine threats. What Romney clearly wants is a military to fight multiple wars and garrison endless occupations, irrespective of cost. My Cato colleague Chris Preble figured that Romney's 4 percent gimmick would result in taxpayers spending more than twice as much on the Pentagon as in 2000 (111 percent higher, to be precise) and 45 percent more than in 1985, the height of the Reagan buildup. Over the next ten years, Romney's annual spending (in constant dollars) for the Pentagon would average 64 percent higher than annual post-Cold War budgets (1990-2012), and 42 percent more than the average during the Reagan era (1981-1989). If Mitt Romney really believes that the world today is so much more dangerous than during the Cold War, he should spell out the threat. He calls Islamic fundamentalism, the Arab Spring, the impact of failed states, the anti-American regimes of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, rising China, and resurgent Russia “powerful forces.” It’s actually a pitiful list — Islamic terrorists have been weakened and don’t pose an existential threat, the Arab Spring threatens instability with little impact on America, it is easier to strike terrorists in failed states than in nominal allies like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, one nuclear-armed submarine could vaporize all four hostile states, and Russia’s modest “resurgence” may threaten Georgia but not Europe or America. Only China deserves to be called “powerful,” but it remains a developing country surrounded by potential enemies with a military far behind that of the U.S. In fact, the greatest danger to America is the blowback that results from promiscuous intervention in conflicts not our own. Romney imagines a massive bootstrap operation: he wants a big military to engage in social engineering abroad which would require an even larger military to handle the violence and chaos that would result from his failed attempts at social engineering. Better not to start this vicious cycle**.** America faces international challenges but nevertheless enjoys unparalleled dominance. U.S. power is buttressed by the fact that Washington is allied with every industrialized nation except China and Russia. America shares significant interests with India, the second major emerging power; is seen as a counterweight by a gaggle of Asian states worried about Chinese expansion; remains the dominant player in Latin America; and is closely linked to most of the Middle East’s most important countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. If Mitt Romney really believes that America is at greater risk today than during the Cold War, he is not qualified to be president. In this world the U.S. need not confront every threat, subsidize every ally, rebuild every failed state, and resolve every problem. Being a superpower means having many interests but few vital ones warranting war. Being a bankrupt superpower means exhibiting judgment and exercising discretion. President Barack Obama has been a disappointment, amounting in foreign policy to George W. Bush-lite. But Mitt Romney sounds even worse. His rhetoric suggests a return to the worst of the Bush administration. The 2012 election likely will be decided on economics, but foreign policy will prove to be equally important in the long-term. America can ill afford another know-nothing president.

### 1NC Courts Shell

#### The United States Supreme Court should rule compliance orders from federal enforcement agencies regarding restrictions on oil drilling in the Outer Continental Shelf unconstitutional.

#### The Court has this authority

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With stunning alacrity, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion [PDF] today in Sackett v. EPA (roughly two months since oral argument), resolutely and unanimously striking down EPA’s position that the Clean Water Act (CWA) does not provide pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance orders. This blog has covered the Sackett case and explored the potential ramifications for EPA’s pursuit of regulatory authority over hydraulic fracturing. In this respect, the opinion is surprisingly broad and is not grounded in distinctions between a non-emergency administrative order (like the CWA order at issue in Sackett) and an emergency-type administrative order under other statutes (e.g., the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or CERCLA). Accordingly, following Sackett, EPA’s ability to regulate hydraulic fracturing under the guise of emergency SDWA authority appears less clear. Justice Scalia’s opinion avoids the merits of whether EPA actually had CWA jurisdiction over the Sackett’s property, and instead focuses on whether EPA violated the Sackett’s due process rights by issuing a compliance order without a hearing or judicial review. In essence, the Sackett’s had two options: (1) comply with the order, thus acceding that EPA had jurisdictional authority; or (2) wait to be sued by the Agency meanwhile accruing $75,000/day in penalties for non-compliance. On the issue of whether the compliance order was a “final agency action” subject to judicial review the Court was clear. Justice Scalia writes “[t]here is no doubt [the compliance order] is agency action” and further, “[i]t has all the hallmarks of APA finality that our opinions establish.” Many of the core hallmarks or factors relied on by the Court would also apply in the emergency SDWA order issued by EPA in the Range Resources case. These include the imposition of future obligations (the Range Resources order imposes extensive obligations, including testing and work plans), an obligation to allow Agency access to the site, the imposition of penalties for non-compliance, and Agency conclusions regarding whether the party is in compliance (both orders contain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The Court also held that nothing in the CWA expressly precludes judicial review. With the important caveat that the SDWA scheme differs from the CWA scheme, and that emergency power is different from general CWA jurisdictional authority, the Sackett opinion carries some potentially important implications for the Range Resources matter. First, Justice Scalia prominently noted and relied on the Administrative Procedure Act’s “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” This presumption carries across all federal statutes, including the SDWA. Second, the Court eschewed EPA’s argument that because the CWA gives the Agency a choice between a judicial proceeding and an administrative action, choosing the latter precludes judicial review. The SDWA provides a similar choice. Finally, the Court did not agree with the Government’s policy argument that providing pre-enforcement judicial review of CWA compliance orders would make EPA less likely to use such orders. Acknowledging “that might be true,” Justice Scalia essentially signaled that the Court thinks there is a substantial question about the merits of EPA’s order in Sackett, stating “[c]ompliance orders will remain an effective means of securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial basis to question their validity.” This same policy would arguably cut against EPA in favor of full substantive judicial review in the Range Resources matter. The strongest words were penned by Justice Alito. In the opening salvo of his concurring opinion, he asserted that the position taken by EPA “would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of [EPA] and its employees.” Justice Alito went on to say “[i]n a nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.” In sum, the Court’s decision is a stunning rebuke of an EPA that many feel has overreached. The decision likely has much to do with the broader ongoing issues of EPA’s CWA jurisdiction and the meaning of “navigable waters.” In fact, Justice Alito’s concurrence expressly notes that the only true remedy to aggrieved property owners is Congressional clarification of the reach of EPA’s CWA jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the implications for the Range Resources case (and the broader issue of EPA’s mission to regulate hydraulic fracturing in the absence of clear statutory authority) are potentially significant.

#### This solves and competes – it doesn’t ‘reduce’ a legal restriction – it just makes it unenforceable

William Treanor (associate professor of law at Fordham University) and Gene Sperling (Deputy assistant to the president for economic policy University of Minnesota) 1993 “Prospective overruling and the revival of Unconstitutional statutes” JSTOR

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is over- turned.42 With one exception, they have concluded that such statutes are immediately enforceable. The most noted instance in which the revival issue was resolved by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pro- nounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General HomerCummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded, The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a stat- ute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective.43 Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action.44 When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia inJawish v. Morlet 45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable, but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date.46 The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in ac- cord with the principle 'that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdic- tion overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' "47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, "'[J]ust about everybody was fooled.' "48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since the minimum wage law had always been valid, although for a period judicially unenforceable, there was no need to reenact it.49 Almost all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result as theJawish court, using a similar formalisticanalysis.50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jeferson,51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jeferson sought child sup- port and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Ap- peals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the ap- plicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated: Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial de- cree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to con- stitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court-an assumption of legislative power not dele- gated to it by the Constitution.52 The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival there- fore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making. Jefferson has little analytic appeal. Its view of the separation of pow- ers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jeferson rationale, a "re- vived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legis- lative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions.53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

### Neitzsche

The affirmative runs from the horror of existence – they do not confront suffering, and so mask it

Kain 7 (Philip J, Professor of philosophy at University of Santa Clara, "Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence," the Journal of Nietzsche Studies, muse, AD: 7/2/09) jl

One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria that are immune to those antibiotics. We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease. We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it. If that is so, then it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to toughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us, by continually hoping to overcome it. But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering. Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed. Nietzsche does not reject all forms of change. What he rejects is the sort of change necessary for a perfectible cosmos. He rejects the notion that science and technology can transform the essence of things—he rejects the notion that human effort can significantly reduce physical suffering. Instead, he only thinks it possible to build up the power necessary to construct meaning in a meaningless world and thus to conceal the horror of existence, which cannot be eliminated. We cannot prove the opposite view, and I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to the assumptions of [End Page 52] Christianity, science, liberalism, socialism, and so forth. And we certainly cannot dismiss this view if we hope to understand Nietzsche. At any rate, for Nietzsche, we cannot eliminate suffering; we can only seek to mask it.

**They spend their lives trying to create a perfect world, so that they can live satisfied lives; it is in the product, and not the process that they find value. This engenders hatred for life.**

Paul **Saurette**, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, **in 96** "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzshce, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order •. I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."

According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, .therefore, that to understand the development of our modem conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and k competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this •incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger’. No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation. Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World\* of eternal and meaningful forms, in opposition to an 'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition *ressentiment*. and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World, As Nietzsche wrote, ‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered." Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

**The alternative is the demonic question – the ballot is an answer to the question “do you desire this innumerable times more” – do nothing in the case of the plan and vote neg to say yes**

**Nietzsche, ’87** (Friedrich Wilhelm, 1887, The Gay Science, “The greatest weight,” Aphorism 341)

What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would **change you** as you are **or** perhaps **crush you**. The question in each and every thing, **"Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?"** would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?

### Oil

#### Oil prices will stabilize now – prices will stick above OPEC break-even levels without significant changes

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### US oil production would cause a massive overproduction glut and collapse prices

Derek Brower July 2012; editor of Petroleum Economist, Saudi Arabia steps into the breach HIGHLIGHT: The kingdom's efforts to balance the market are working. It may herald a new era of oil abundance, writes Derek Brower, Lexis

An 'unprecedented' rise in supply North America's unconventional oil sector will lead a vast new swathe of global supply that could lead to a "glut of overproduction and a steep dip in oil prices" and make the Western hemisphere the new centre of gravity in the world's oil sector, according to a report from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. The field-by-field analysis of oil exploration and production projects around the world says that output could rise by 49 million b/d by 2020, or more than twice world demand in 2011, an "unprecedented" increase that has got underway "quite unnoticed". The revival has been "driven by high oil prices, booming investments, private companies' desperate need to restore their reserves, and the misguided but still prevalent perception that oil must become a rare commodity". In 2012 alone, more than $600 billion will be spent worldwide in oil and gas exploration and production, calculates the report's author, Leonardo Maugeri, a former Eni executive. Even after adjusting the potential production growth to account for risk, up to 29 million b/d could be added. Including depletion rates, which Maugeri says have been overestimated and are typically no more than 2-3%, net additions to production could reach 17.6 million b/d by 2020, yielding output of 110.6 million b/d - "the most significant increase in any decade since the 1980s."

#### Oil futures are overshot by speculation – lowering demand would set off a price collapse

Alexei Bayer 7-26-2012; Alexei Bayer is head of KAFAN FX Information Services. His monthly “Global Economy” column in Research has received an excellence award from the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants for the past six years, 2004-2009 “Pop That Bubble Policies should aim at pushing oil prices down” http://www.advisorone.com/2012/07/26/pop-that-bubble?page=3

A Soft Market Demand for oil, then, is softening because the global economy is weakening and consumers are reducing their oil use on a more lasting basis, even as greater supply is coming on line, from projects begun before 2008 and from producers eager to protect their market shares. Oil prices are set by futures markets and therefore fluctuate with traders’ psychology, speculation and liquidity. That means oil prices tend to overshoot. Just as they rocketed prior to 2008 and again in early 2012, driven by rising demand as well as various political concerns and fears, so a softening demand could push oil even below its long-term inflation-adjusted equilibrium price range of around $20-40 per barrel.

#### High prices are key to the Russian economy and domestic stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, **civil war is likely**.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. **A major power** like Russia -- even though in decline -- **does not suffer civil war quietly or alone**. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke **opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### 1NC Econ

#### No double dip – employment and consumer confidence are increasing

Gautam Godhwani 8-15-2012; CEO, SimplyHired.com “Signs Of Resilience In Our Economy” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gautam-godhwani/us-economy-jobs\_b\_1778664.html

These days, it's rare to see a day pass without hearing some sort of negative commentary or sentiment towards today's economy. But, there's one characteristic about our nation's economy that folks tend to overlook -- resiliency. By definition, resiliency is "an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change." Today's economy is proving to be rather resilient - the growth is slow, but we continue to head in the right direction, even at a time when economies across the globe continue to struggle. With the prospect of a modest, steady recovery in our future, employer confidence continues to rise. In Simply Hired's monthly U.S. Employment Outlook, we've seen job openings increase in each of the last three months. Nationwide job openings increased 4.5 percent in July, while June saw a 9.2 percent jump and May had a 3.3 percent increase. In addition, every one of the top 50 metropolitan areas experienced growth in job openings for the second month in a row. Nationwide, we're looking at a total of 4.3 million job openings right now. That's nearly a 10 percent increase from last year. Sounds promising, right?

#### Energy production doesn’t solve jobs

Levi 12 – Senior Fellow (at CFR) for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Michael, July/August, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=full>) Jacome

"The U.S. Energy Boom Will Create Millions of New Jobs."

**Overstated**. The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA.

It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more normal economy. Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. The oil and gas boom won't change these much.

That's why we should be skeptical about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, these will mostly come **at the expense of jobs elsewhere.**

#### Lowering energy costs wouldn’t lead to a manufacturing boom

Levi 5-7 – Senior Fellow (at CFR) for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Michael, July/August, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom (Michael, “Oil and Gas Euphoria Is Getting Out of Hand” <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/07/oil-and-gas-euphoria-is-getting-out-of-hand/>) Jacome

But there is more. Ignatius’s column isn’t just about energy; it’s also about the resurgence of U.S. manufacturing. Here’s how he links the two:

“Energy security would be one building block of a new prosperity. The other would be the revival of U.S. manufacturing and other industries. This would be driven in part by the low cost of electricity in the United States, which West forecasts will be relatively flat through the rest of this decade, and one-half to one-third that of economic competitors such as Spain, France or Germany.”

Once again, these sorts of claims have become increasingly common. Indeed the quantitative assertions are perfectly plausible. But the big picture implications don’t make sense. As of 2010, total sales of U.S. manufactured goods were about five trillion dollars. At the same time, the sector spent about 100 billion dollars on energy. That’s a mere two percent of total sales. You could slash energy costs to zero, and it would barely move the needle for most U.S. manufacturers. There are, of course, exceptions, like some iron, steel, cement, and paper makers. But even these industries care about much more than their electricity prices. Will lower energy costs move things at the margin? Of course they will, and that’s good news. But they are nowhere close to what’s needed for U.S. manufacturing to broadly thrive.

#### No impact to the trade deficit – doesn’t affect or correlate negatively with growth

Fisher Investments 9-15-2011; Trade Gap Irrelevant for U.S. Economic Growth <http://www.thestreet.com/story/11250198/1/trade-gap-irrelevant-for-us-economic-growth.html>

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- International trade is an important and volatile component of global economic growth, one that's commonly misunderstood. For example, last Thursday's U.S. Commerce Department report on trade led off with a discussion of a $6.8 billion reduction in our trade deficit, to a minus $44.8 billion. And, as is customary, the trade gap is what led off most coverage of the report. Some argue an expanding trade gap is bad. And counterintuitively, last week some argued the shrinking trade gap was also bad -- supposedly as a sign of a slowing economy. But in reality, the trade gap simply doesn't describe U.S. economic conditions. (Although the trade deficit does affect GDP, it's mostly a statistical anomaly. As discussed in our recent article, "What GDP Doesn't Say ," it's a reason why GDP isn't completely synonymous with economic health.) The more telling metric is total trade. Calculating total trade calls for adding exports and imports but it is rarely done. However, in our view, this is the most correct way to view trade. Imports can detract from a nation's GDP calculation, but rising imports can be sign of strong demand. Imports can also create massive economic value for consumers and businesses -- by helping firms stay competitive and even resulting in lower prices. Moreover, over half of U.S. imports aren't children's toys, cars or food, but equipment and components U.S. businesses use to produce or reassemble goods for final sale or re-export. For example, in the first seven months of this year (the latest data available), one category -- industrial supplies -- outweighed foodstuffs, vehicles and consumer goods combined, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Since imports have a positive economic value and can be indicative of healthy demand, it makes little sense to us to statistically account for them as a negative. And it reinforces the point that total trade can be more instructive regarding overall economic health than the trade deficit.

**Studies and empirics prove no war impact**

**Miller, 2k** (Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the **conventional wisdom** about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

### 1NC Oil Dependence

#### Increasing domestic oil production doesn’t solve the reasons dependence is bad

Aaron Menenburg 9-6-2012; graduate student in international relations at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University. “Let’s Get Real: Energy Independence is an Unrealistic and Misleading Myth” http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/06/lets-get-real-energy-independence-is-a-unrealistic-and-misleading-myth/

Thus far, when energy has been discussed, the foci are “energy independence” and “alternative energy.” Although far from dominating energy markets, the latter is quickly becoming a significant source of US energy consumption and will likely to continue to gain market share. The concept of energy independence, however, is unrealistic, largely undesirable, and misleading. I am going to tackle the façade of the energy independence argument in this piece and in doing so will try to explain the issues actually affecting national energy policy. This piece will focus on oil because (1) it is our most used source of energy and (2) it is our major energy import. At the heart of the energy independence idea is the rationale that achieving energy independence will unhook us from world energy prices and disengage us from the geopolitical consequences Americans find unpalatable, namely massive engagement in the Middle East. Neither is true, and in fact they’re not even remotely plausible outcomes. If there is one take-away I want the reader to remember, it is this: the goal of self-sufficiency in energy supplies – especially in oil – misdiagnoses the problem as one characterized largely by importation of oil. Rather, energy security, the implications of energy on the economy, and America’s reliance on imported oil is a function of the importance of oil consumption in the domestic economy regardless of its source. The only way to reduce the cost of gasoline is by consuming significantly less of it, while the only way to ensure minimal political and security insulation from oil is to stop using it.

**Iran proliferation wont spillover**

**Layne 6**—IR, A&M (Christopher, Iran: The Logic of Deterrence, http://www.amconmag.com/article/2006/apr/10/00007/, )

The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq say that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, three bad things could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable in the extreme. During the early 1960s, American policymakers had similar fears that China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger a proliferation stampede, but these fears did not materialize, and a nuclear Iran is no more likely to start a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power. The other three states that might be tempted to seek nuclear-weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

But as MIT professor Barry Posen points out, each of these three states would be under strong pressure not do to so. Egypt is particularly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its shaky economy depends on foreign—especially U.S.—economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or material on the black market, which is closely watched by the United States, and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously.

**Hegemony fails—cooperation is key to prevent terrorism, global warming, economic crises, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics.**

**Hachigan 10**—Senior Fellow at American Progress, Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation, Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations, National Security Council at the White House

(Nina, “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”, World Focus, January 22, 2010, http://worldfocus.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreign-policy/9372/)//AW

Robert Kagan now accuses President Obama of reorienting American foreign policy away from its WWII and Cold War roots, focusing on how “to adjust” to the decline in American primacy instead of trying to reverse it. He portrays administration officials as naïve ideologues, buttering up autocracies and forsaking our democratic allies. Kagan’s analyses fail to discuss two major developments that demand a new approach—the increased potency of transnational threats and the new salience of domestic policy in America’s world standing. Kagan writes as if the Obama administration is engaging with re-emerging powers to prove an ideological point that great power strife is a relic of history. Yet no staffer that I have ever spoken with would suggest that these relationships are beyond rivalry. More importantly, Kagan does not reveal the Obama administration’s reasons for pursuing strategic collaborations with China, Russia, India, and other pivotal powers. In fact, these partnerships are necessary to protect Americans from common threats in terrorists, global warming, economic crises, nuclear proliferation, and pandemics such as swine flu — the forces of disorder that can and do affect Americans right here at home. Kagan barely mentions these threats, but to keep its own people safe, America needs Russia to secure its loose nuclear materials so terrorists cant get it. America needs China — the world’s largest emitter — to cut down on its carbon. And America needs India to help track extremists. Moreover, America needs all of them to contain pandemics. How can we get these big, proud countries to take these steps? Aggressive diplomacy. Transnational threats also explain why the Obama administration is taking international institutions seriously. It’s not because the president is looking to attend more international meetings; it’s because international rules and institutions play a vital coordinating role when threats cross borders. The World Health Organization led the battle against swine flu last year just as the International Monetary Fund bailed out a slew of countries headed toward financial ruin. Fortunately, international architecture and traditional alliances are not mutually exclusive, as Kagan would imply. It’s still early days, but the Obama approach is paying dividends. China has agreed to limit its carbon intensity. And, for the first time last year, China not only voted for tough U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang; it also enforced them, in contrast to Kagan’s assertion that the administration has failed to gain “any meaningful Chinese help in North Korea.” Russia has allowed the United States to transport supplies through its territory into Afghanistan. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, co-chaired by the United States and Russia, is up and running again. A successor to the START treaty to reduce our arsenal of nuclear weapons is not yet complete, but it’s on the way. And these nations and others agreed during the darkest days of the financial crisis to coordinate their macroeconomic moves. Iran remains a challenge, but Beijing and Moscow did recently join in a harsh rebuke that the International Atomic Energy Agency issued. Of course, we continue to have differences with these pivotal powers, including on human rights and democracy. Kagan is simply wrong to suggest that administration officials have failed to “continue to press Russia and China for reform.” They have, just not in a grandstanding, provocative way that ends up being counterproductive. Here, for example, is what President Obama said in Moscow: The arc of history shows us that governments which serve their own people survive and thrive; governments which serve only their own power do not. Governments that represent the will of their people are far less likely to descend into failed states,

to terrorize their citizens, or to wage war on others. Governments that promote the rule of law, subject their actions to oversight, and allow for independent institutions are more dependable trading partners. And in our own history, democracies have been America’s most enduring allies, including those we once waged war with in Europe and Asia– nations that today live with great security and prosperity.

Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

Heg solves nothing- past two decades prove

Mearsheimer 2011 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and manageable

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html>

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

#### No production increase or sustained investment – not cost competitive

Aaron Menenburg 9-6-2012; graduate student in international relations at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University. “Let’s Get Real: Energy Independence is an Unrealistic and Misleading Myth” http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/06/lets-get-real-energy-independence-is-a-unrealistic-and-misleading-myth/

By 2030, the world is expected to consume over 100 million barrels of oil per day, and it is far from conclusive that the impact of the additional 10% of supply achieved by producing North America’s near-full capacity would have any meaningful effect on oil prices given the continued rise in demand up to and beyond 2035 expected by every projection, especially when US proven oil reserves are only the twelfth largest in the world.[17] Getting every little bit of additional supply from domestic reserves will require increasingly elaborate operations, many of which may be prohibitively expensive if proper environmental safeguards are factored in and if world prices sag, as they have repeatedly in the past 15 years. In a global market, it is hard to see how such projects could compete with various foreign sources where production costs are much lower. Most of the oil extracted by OPEC countries costs less than $5 per barrel to produce[18] with total upstream costs of Middle Eastern crude at $16.93 per barrel.[19] Conversely, the Department of Energy reports US average upstream costs of $74.20 per barrel between 2006 and 2008, which is a good reference point for current production costs given recent dynamics in global oil production costs.[20] Even if all government regulations on oil production and refining were removed, the cost of domestic production would be more expensive than OPEC production by multiples.