## 1NC

### 1NC Adv. CP

#### The United States federal government should

#### substantially increase Research and development for Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion technology

* **substantially increase its space-based climate monitoring capabilities.**
* **Pass legislation S.838 and H.R.1736**
* **Guarantee access to civilian radio-isotopes for foreign researchers.**

#### OTEC solves resource wars and displaces fossil fuels – recent advances make it feasible – R and D is key

**Huang et al. 3** – Joseph C. Huang, Senior Scientist for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hans J. Krock, Professor of Ocean &. Resources Engineering, University of Hawaii and Stephen K. Oney, PhD. and executive vice present of OCEES (July, Revisit Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion System”) Jacome

The global population is growing and most nations are becoming more industrial. Given the limited natural resources of the earth, it is unavoidable that food, energy and water, the most precious essentials for the survival and comfort of human beings, are the cardinal strategic concerns for the future of the world. Nations are already competing over the limited existing resources for energy, water, and food. Even well developed nations are now facing energy and water shortages. Global warming (largely due to the use of fossil fuels) has resulted in global climate change, especially in the pattern of precipitation, which has increased the competition over these essential natural resources even worse. Developing countries, especially small tropical island nations, spend a major portion of their gross national products on imported fuel and reliable water supplies, and are desperately seeking affordable sustainable technology for these necessities. The world is facing all these challenges, including environment deterioration, water shortage, energy security, and increasing poverty. A world-wide sustainable strategy that addresses issues of the environment, food, energy and water, requires more research and development to make available for benign alternative energy, water and food resources.

The search for natural resources on land has been very diligent and exhaustive. In the energy field, according to International Energy Agency, the rate at which we are discovering new oil will fall below the rate at which we are consuming before 2015 (Dauncey and Massa 2003). The resources for fossil energy, which took million of years through geological and morphological processes to manufacture, are very much limited and will be very precious (Resnick 1990) in the near future. According to British Petroleum World Energy, under the current rate of energy consumption, the ratio of world proved reserves to annual production will be less than 40 years for oil, 62 years for natural gas, and 216 years for coal (EIA – International Energy Outlook 2003). However, the ocean, which covers more than two-thirds of the earth and contains an unlimited bounty of these resources, has been neither well explored nor utilized. The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) technology, a superior mechanical system which takes advantages of the ubiquitous natural ocean thermal gradients between the warm surface layer and the deep cold water to generate electricity and produce other products, can be very practical for extracting the solar energy stored in the ocean to be employed for coping with current challenges. OTEC technology can be utilized to alleviate both the plight of tropical island people and the over dependence on fossil fuel of the global population. Land-based OTEC installations on tropical islands can be designed as an economically optimized system to produce multiple products. The global energy supply can be greatly supplemented by hydrogen production produced by large OTEC plants floating in the tropical ocean. In the paper, we describe the potential in the oceanic thermal energy, review the current status of OTEC technology, point out recent advancements in engineering designs, and evaluate manufacturing costs and potential market under the current worldwide economic landscaping. Finally, we recommend the need of a field demonstration for commercial OTEC developments and applications.

#### Enviro sats solve science diplomacy

**Parthemore and Rogers 11** Christine, Adjunct Professor in Johns Hopkins University's Global Security Studies Program and Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, serves on the Council of Advisors for U-Mass Boston's Collaborative Institute for Oceans, Climate and Security, Will, Research Associate and the Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Internship Coordinator at the Center for a New American Security [“ BLINDED: THE DECLINE OF U.S. EARTH MONITORING CAPABILITIES AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY,” 8-1, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Blinded_ParthemoreRogers_0.pdf>] HURWITZ

The U.S. government should take three measures to ensure that it continues to receive reliable climate and environmental data: increasing international cooperation and collaborating on space-based earth monitoring, increasing information sharing and interagency cooperation, and finding budget-conscious ways to shrink the gaps in earth monitoring capabilities. Cooperating with key allies and partners will be a vital means of ensuring adequate earth monitoring capabilities in the decades ahead. The U.S. government has increasingly emphasized the importance of leveraging its partners’ space capabilities. The 2010 National Space Strategy, for example, states that “By sharing or exchanging capabilities, data, services, personnel, operations, and technology, we can ensure access to information and services from a more diverse set of systems.”19 In practice, many agencies still view U.S. participation in the multilateral GEOSS as insufficient. As the U.S. government continues to integrate environmental and climate change issues into key strategic planning documents, policymakers are likely to discover that **the U**nited **S**tates **requires unique information** tailored to its specific national security and foreign policy priorities that GEOSS does not provide. Space cooperation on earth monitoring can serve a broader range of U.S. scientific, foreign policy and security interests by being more flexible and more robust. Thus, the United States must complement GEOSS with other bilateral initiatives to sustain a steady stream of earth monitoring data. Indeed, given likely budget constraints, leveraging the investments of U.S. allies and partners in their own earth monitoring capabilities and sharing that information will give U.S. scientists and policymakers access to the information they need in the short term, while **fostering a long-term opportunity for integrating broader science** and technology **cooperation into international partnerships**. India, for example, recently launched three remote sensing satellites to collect information on water, agriculture and climate trends; it plans to launch two more earth monitoring satellites, in 2012 and 2013, to measure carbon emissions and to monitor forest cover.20 Germany’s TerraSAR-X Satellites, designed to provide highresolution radar imagery that can monitor changes to the earth’s surface – for example, changes in land use or land cover – were used after the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. The United States has existing mechanisms to support bilateral cooperation in this area. The Japan-U.S. Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, for example, already promotes space collaboration between the United States and Japan, including on remote sensing projects.21 The United States and India have also signed agreements to foster cooperation in space, science, technology and innovation, including “enhancing the understanding of Earth and Ocean dynamics and addressing the challenges of climate change.”22 Diplomats and other foreign policy practitioners need to be aware that these mechanisms exist and that they can be used to expand environmental and climate monitoring. Doing so would be cost-effective and ensure that the United States has access to the steady stream of data that policymakers need to make informed decisions. Expanding cooperation on environmental and climate monitoring could also foster other opportunities for integrating science and technology cooperation into international partnerships, such as sharing climate and environmental data not derived from satellites and technical knowledge about emerging energy technologies. Policymakers must continue to improve information sharing and interagency coordination so that all agencies can use existing capabilities and promote efficiency. The Obama administration has instructed OSTP, NASA, DOD and other departments to better coordinate interagency earth monitoring efforts, and this coordination appears to have improved in recent years. Yet even though the administration’s own policy documents emphasize improving interagency coordination on earth observation, our interviews with officials at a range of agencies provided countless examples of areas where interagency cooperation could further be improved. Additionally, as the State Department implements some of the structural changes envisioned in its 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, NASA and NOAA should ensure that their international space partnerships are fully coordinated with the appropriate regional and functional State Department bureaus to ensure that they bolster U.S. diplomatic strategies. Consistent Congressional and executive branch support is also necessary. The MEDEA program, for example, was initiated in 1991 as a civilian intelligence venture between the CIA and scientists to declassify and allow access to historical satellite images to better inform scientific projections and climate change analysis. However, funding for this program was reduced in subsequent years and was halted altogether during the George W. Bush administration. In 2009, the CIA launched the Center on Climate Change and National Security, reviving the MEDEA program, in part due to renewed interest by the agency and other parts of the U.S. government in studying the national security implications of climate change. Since the center was launched, however, several members of Congress have again threatened to cut funding for this work, charging that assessing climate change is beyond the intelligence agency’s purpose.23 In order to reap the full benefits of past investments, policymakers should ensure that interagency coordination and information sharing are not intermittent, as this program’s work has been. Continuous support and interagency cooperation on environmental and climate change data sharing and planning provide obvious opportunities and advantages in addressing the challenges that inevitably will affect the spectrum of U.S. government resources and agencies.

**The CP Passes legislation that explicitly increases the capabilities for science diplomacy**

**Turekian, their author, 10** – [Vaugh. Director, Center for Science Diplomacy, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Keynote Address at USC Center for on Public Diplomacy Conference, 2010. <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/media/Science%20Diplomacy%20Proceedings.pdf>] Jacome

On the bright side, there are a few legislative efforts currently underway to bring science diplomacy to the forefront. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) has been pushing through S.838, which seeks to establish a science envoy program. This has already partly been realized through the recent appointment of three science envoys by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In the House, Representative Brian Baird (D-WA) has been pushing H.R.1736, which would create a committee to identify and coordinate international science and technology cooperation in order to strengthen U.S. domestic science and support foreign policy goals.

#### Their 1AC ev says that providing radio-isotopes is sufficient to solve

### 1NC Kritik

#### The modern energy system traps us into the belief of a false euphoric future while overlooking how this same system dooms us to ecological destruction, resource wars, democratic authoritarianism and extinction

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 1-3]

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss ,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings-almost one-third of the planet's population-experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact-and sometimes exacerbated-social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smi l, 2003: 370- 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who ' early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner too c heap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, ctted tn the New York Ttmes 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the "magical fire" or the prolifera~ ion of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize "inherently safe reactors" (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in "sustainable energy alternatives" that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, "green" energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy "haves" and "havenots." 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291 ), "today's nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people" as "micropower meets village power." Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a "solar global economy ... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world's cultural diversity" (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (I 934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ... an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations ... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity-here are the enemies. The living organism demands ali fe-sustaining environment. Modernity's formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity's supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era's social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the "democratic authoritarian bargain" ( 1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce "every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority" **on the condition that society demands only what the regime is** capable and **willing to offer**. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford's work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### Their call to energy systems for a ‘better future’ is a method of technocratic dominance over human life

Byrne and Toly 6—\*John Byrne, Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy at Delaware and \*\*Noah Toly, Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy [*Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 20-21] **[Gender paraphrased]**

The Technique of Modern Energy Governance While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy strategies and reflects a shared **belief in technological advance as** commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary **social progress**. The modern proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul, 1964: 133- 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality. From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar, technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy's social project. As one observer has noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the "great paradox of the technological mystique [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, **the sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical expertise."** Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics. Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford ( 1964). Governance "by the people" consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its operations. Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford suggests ( 1964: I) that the classical idea of democracy includes "a group of related ideas and practices ... [including] communal self-government ... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community." Modern conventional and sustainable energy strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being recognized as the emblems of modernist politics. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which "deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process, [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over physical nature, ultimately control over [hu]man[ity] himself, the chief purpose of existence" (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically and technologically unassailable.

#### This technocratic management makes extinction inevitable

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse **underway**—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

#### The cause of their advantages relies a faulty attribution of the problem, instead of unfettered consumption within the current energy system our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a social and critical analysis of energy production – critiquing our supply oriented outlook can cultivate an alternative to technocratic demand and consumption

Barry 12—John Barry, Reader Politics @ Queen’s University (Belfast) [*The Politics of Actually Existing Unsustainability* p. 284-290]

'Dissident' is perhaps a better and more accurate term to apply to greens than 'revolutionary', since while both share an opposition to the prevailing social order, revolutionary is clearly more antagonistic rather than agonistic, to use the terms indicated in chapter 7. Dissidents seek to direct a self transforming present in a more radical direction, whereas revolutionaries typically seek the complete destruction of the existing order and then the construction of a new one. Greens as dissidents also begin from an acceptance of the inevitability of key aspects of this transition-primarily around climate change and the end of the oil age-and thus see an answer to 'what is to be done?' in terms of managing and shaping that inevitable transition, rather than building/re-building. Dissident also seems less extreme and dogmatic in its critique and its demands, than those who advocate full-blown revolution. And given what was said in chapter 3 and elsewhere about the link between creativity, flexibility, and adaptive fitness, it would be odd for green politics to be dogmatic revolutionaries animated by a sense of the hopelessness of working within and through contemporary institutiohs or that there was nothing worth preserving within and from the contemporary social order. Green dissent could perhaps be (wrongly) described as somewhere on a continuum between 'reformism' and 'revolution', a form of 'creative adaptive management' to create collective resilience in the face of actually existing unsustainability.1 In his essay 'The Power of the Powerless', Vaclav Havel uses the story of a greengrocer who unthinkingly displays his 'loyalty' to the regime by displaying a Communist Party slogan in his shop. This the greengrocer does 'ritualistically, since this is the only way the regime is capable of acknowledging his display of loyalty' (Havel, 1978: 45). In a similar way, being a dutiful consumer and not questioning economic growth could also perhaps be regarded as the way in which loyalty to a dominant capitalist, consumer regime is ritualistically displayed, enacted, and affirmed. It is for this reason, if not only this reason, that one completely misunderstands consumerism, consumption, and being a 'consumer', if one views it solely individualistically as some economic-cum-metabolic act. As a public display of loyalty, consuming is first and foremost a collective act, an individual joining others in a shared activity and associated identity. So while critics such as Fromm are correct in highlighting the distinction in consumer culture between 'being' and 'having' (Fromm, 1976), what these analyses often miss is that consumption is also an act of' belonging' and identity affirmation (Keat, 1994; Jackson, 2009b).It is for this reason that a refusal to consume is so damaging to the modern political and economic order and why to consciously choose not to consume is perhaps one of the most politically significant acts one can do in a consumer society. And one that, the continual performance (or rather non-performance) of which, further marks one out as a dissident, part of 'the great refusal' to use Marcuse's term (Marcuse, 1964). That is, to question economic growth under consumer capitalism is to be 'disloyal' to the prevailing order. While for Havel living in what he calls the 'post-totalitarian' communist regime is 'living a lie', I do not want to go so far and say that life in contemporary consumer capitalist democracies is in the same way to 'live a lie'. Rather what I would like to dwell upon is Havel's notion of'living within the truth' and what this can offer for green dissidents. For Havel 'living within the truth ... can be any means by which a person or group revolts against manipulation: anything from a letter by intellectuals to a workers' strike, from a rock concert to a student demonstration, from refusing to vote in the farcical elections, to making an open speech at some official congress, or even a hunger strike' (Havel, 1986: 59-60). Though clearly written with the then communist regime in mind, Havel's call to 'live in truth' is equally pertinent to consumer capitalism. As he puts it: The profound crisis of human identity brought on by living within a lie, a crisis which in turn makes such a life possible, certainly possesses a moral dimension as well; it appears, among other things, as a deep moral crisis in society. A person who has been seduced by the consumer value system, whose identity is dissolved in an amalgam of the accoutrements of mass civilization, and who has not roots in the order of being, no sense of responsibility for anything higher than his or her own personal survival, is a demoralized person. The system depends on this demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it into society. (Havel, 1978: 62; emphasis added) Silence is of course a consequence and precondition for this demoralization, and what power requires under consumer capitalism is passive and silent acquiescence as much as active participation. For Havel the re-appropriation of individual responsibility is something to be actively striven for. This reverses or balances the usual focus on rights and freedoms with which often 'progressive' critiques of consumerism are couched. In Havel's response to what Tim Jackson amongst others has called 'The Age of Irresponsibility' (Jackson, 2009b ), also connects with some of the green republican arguments outlined in chapters 6 and 7, not least the stress on both the recovery of the good of politics and the centrality of the individual citizen as a moral being and not just or only a consumer (or producer/worker or investor). As Jackson notes, 'the "age of irresponsibility" is not about casual oversight or individual greed. The economic crisis is not a consequence of isolated malpractice in selected parts of the banking sector. If there has been irresponsibility, it has been much more systemic, sanctioned from the top, and with one clear aim in mind: the continuation and protection of economic growth' (Jackson, 2009b: 26; emphasis added). The struggle Havel describes from the 1968 'Prague Spring' between 'the system' and 'the aims of life' (Havel, 1978: 66) resonate green concerns of the degradation of natural life-supporting systems and the undermining of conditions promoting human conviviality, quality of life, and well-being (Barry, 2009b; De Geus, 2009, 2003; Jackson, 2009a). What Havel goes on to say about political change and strategy in the context of a consumer culture is pertinent and important for those seeking a transition away from unsustainability, 'Society is not sharply polarized on the level of actual political power, but ... the fundamental lines of conflict run right through each person' (Havel, 1978: 91; emphasis added). This is a profound point, namely that it is difficult, if not impossible, to simply analyse actually existing unsustainability as an oppressive totalitarian regime in which there is an identifiable 'them' dominating 'us'. Under consumer capitalism, debt-based consumption, and so on, we who live in these societies are all implicated in its continuation. And while of course there are identifiable groups and institutions (such as large corporations, financial wealth management firms, the leadership of mainstream political parties, key agencies of the nation state such as departments of finance, global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMP, and what Sklair has called the 'transnational capitalist class') who do benefit more from actually existing unsustainability, we have to face up to the fact that 'ordinary people', that is, everyone also contributes (unequally of course) to the 'mundane' operation of global capitalism and the exploitation of people and planet. The recognition of this is but another way of drawing attention to the fact that capitalism, the common sense of neoclassical economics, and so on have achieved 'full spectrum' domination of hearts and minds, such that capitalism, and realistic critiques of it, need to be viewed as cultural (and indeed psychological) projects. It is for this reason that I canvassed the Transition movement in chapter 3, since it adopts an explicitly cultural and psychological approach. Of course such cultural and psychological critical analyses are not exhausted by this movement and these cannot be a substitute for oppositional political struggle. This 'cultural turn' in green politics is, to my mind, linked to the 'postscarcity economics of sustainable desire' outlined in chapter 5, and is premised firmly on a notion of human flourishing that lies beyond production, 'supplyside' solutions, 'competiveness', and increasing 'labour productivity'. This notion of flourishing is not anti-materialist. Let me make that abundantly clear, it is not an ascetic renunciation of materialism for its own sake, as if material life is intrinsically unworthy or does not express valued modes of human being. Thus I do not accept the Fromm-inspired view that materialism or indeed material consumption is simply a mode of 'having' and not 'being'. After all, the critique should be directed at consumerism and overconsumption, not materialism or consumption per se. At a basic level one can see how communism and consumerism are two 'regimes of truth' -to return to the Foucauldian language used in chapter 4 imposing their version of the truth, exacting payment, compliance, and subjectivity from their client populations, quelling, distracting, and undermining dissidents, and using different but also some shared techniques to continue. And the appropriate dissident, progressive attitude, and strategy against both is, for Havel, ultimately an ethical one, an ethical and political life-affirming 'reconstitution of society' (Havel, 1978: 115). That Havel conceives consumer-capitalist and communist societies as comparable can be seen in his view that: traditional parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the autonomism of technological civilization, and the industrial-consumer society, for they, too, are being dragged helplessly along by it. People are manipulated in ways that are infinitely more subtle and refined than the brutal methods used in the post-totalitarian societies ... the omnipresent dictatorship of consumption, production, advertising, commerce, consumer culture, and all that flood of information. (Havel, 1978: 116; emphasis added) Some of the republican elements expressed in Havel's thought centre around 'responsibility' (Havel, 1986: 104). He maintains that the abdication of responsibility in the name of consumer choice-what I have elsewhere described as the reduction of political liberty to a consumer 'freedom of choice' (Barry, 2009a)-weakens the ethical and political capacities of citizens within liberal democracies. Liberal consumer-citizens then become 'victims of the same autonomism, and are incapable of transcending concerns about their own personal survival to become proud and responsible members of the polis, making a genuine contribution to the creation of its destiny' (Havel, 1978: 116; emphasis added). In this Havel is articulating concerns very close to the type of green republicanism outlined in this book. His concluding comments in The Power of the Powerless also offer suggestive lines for interpreting the Transition movement. In a passage focusing on the contours of what Havel calls the 'existential revolution' that is needed to renew the relationship of humans to the 'human order and cosmopolitan responsibility', Havel notes that the structures needed to make this happen 'should naturally arise from below as a consequence of authentic "selforganization"; they should derive energy from a living dialogue with the genuine needs from which they arise, and when these needs are gone, the structures should also disappear ... The decisive criterion of this "selfconstitution" should be the structure's actual significance and not just a mere abstract norm' (Havel, 1978: 119). A better description of the Transition movement's aims, motivations, and objectives would be hard to find. Havel goes on to describe these new, provisional, and practical structures 'postdemocratic'. He describes the outlines of these 'authentic' political structures in this manner: Do not these groups emerge, live, and disappear under pressure from concrete and authentic needs, unburdened by the ballast of hollow traditions? Is not their attempt to create an articulate form of 'living within the truth' and to renew the feeling of higher responsibility in an apathetic society really a sign of some rudimentary moral reconstitution? In other words, are riot these informed, non-bureaucratic dynamic and open communities that comprise the 'parallel polis' a kind of rudimentary prefiguration, a symbolic model of those more meaningful 'post-democratic' political structures that might become the foundation of a better society? (Havel, 1978: 120-121). Fundamental here, I think, is Havel's call to responsibility and struggle against the prevailing political order when it undermines quality of life, perpetuates injustice, or the denial or compromising of democratic norms. In a similar vein Carla Emery puts it eloquently, 'People have to choose what they're going to struggle for. Life is always a struggle, whether or not you're struggling for anything worthwhile, so it might as well be for something worthwhile' (in Astyk, 2008: 204). Or to phrase it differently: get busy living or get busy dying. WHAT IF WE ARE THE PEOPLE WE'VE BEEN WAITING FOR? 289 As argued throughout this book in facing the many challenges of the present time-climate change, peak oil, diminishing forms of social well-being, financial and economic crises, and the ecological liquidation of the foundations of life on the planet-the most important response needed is one which explicitly focuses on imagination and creativity. As W. B. Yeats (long before Barak Obama used a version of these sentiments) suggested, what is needed is for us 'to seek a remedy ... in audacity of speculation and creation' (Yeats, 1926). While 'another world is possible' it can only be possible if it is imagined, and perhaps one of the most persistent obstacles to the transition away from actually existing unsustainability apart from ignorance of the ecological and human costs of our capitalist-consumer way of life-is the stultifying grip of 'business as usual' and its limited and limiting horizons of possible futures for ourselves and our societies. In many respects, our collective inability to respond to 'limits to growth' is in large measure due to limits of creativity and imagination. We cannot, or find it very difficult, to imagine a different social order. For Richard Norgaard the answer to our present ecological predicament is as difficult to achieve as it is simple to express, 'We need a new life story. We need an overarching story that respects a diversity of life stories. Living the story of economic development is destroying humanity and nature and a good many other species along with us. We need a master story that puts our hope, compassion, brains, sociality, and diversity to new and constructive ends' (in Deb, 2009: xxiii). And if we follow Havel, it may be that this new story we need is already here, in the same sense that the eco-feminist Mary Mellor (Mellor, 1995) has persuasively written that the sustainable world, society, or mode of being is **not some utopian 'there' but an already living**, embodied, engendered **'here'** in the reproductive and exploited labour of women, in the 'core' economic activity of caring and sharing and ... flourishing. The Polanyi-inspired attempt to 'reembed' the economy within human social relations can be viewed as a defensive move to protect community from both the formal market and the state. Such protective measures can include the expansion of the social economy, or the efforts by the Transition movement in seeking to disrupt, slow down and re-conceptualize the economy. Such reactive measures could all be thought of as seeking to defend and extend those sustainable practices in the here and now, that is, that already exist within 'actually existing unsustainability'. This is particularly the case with reproductive labour as outlined in this book. Actually it is the neoclassical economic view that is 'utopian' in promoting a fictitious and dangerous imaginary of human life lived at 365/24/7 speed and a way of life completely out of synch not just with human biological but also ecological time. And, it must be recalled, 'Mother Nature does not do bailouts'. As Havel suggests, 'For the real question is whether the "brighter future" is really always so distant. What if, on the contrary, it has been here for a long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from developing it?' (Havel, 1978: 122). Now there's an intriguing set of concluding thoughts-what if not only the resilient, sustainable way of life is 'always already here', present, and available to us if we so choose-but also if it is indeed the case that 'we are the people we've been waiting for?' And what of the hard greens, where do they and their analysis fit within this book? For it is fair to say that they have been shadowing the book. While I discussed them briefly in the Introduction and made some casual comments about them and their diverse positions and prescriptions throughout, I have not met them head on as it were. So it would be fitting for me to offer my thoughts on the place and status of the hard green position. Are they basically correct? Do I agree with them (from the green republican acceptance of the time-bound and contingent character of all human creations, including civilizations and societies) that they have identified the beginning of the end of our existing capitalist, carbon-based civilization and societies? While I certainly admire their brutal honesty, I baulk at their jump from crisis to collapse, and then from collapse to violence and 'de-civilization' (Elias, 2000; Hine and Kingsnorth, 2010). Their political analyses echo (almost always unwittingly) the eco-authoritarian position of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The hard-green view in being so pessimistic means its pessimism precludes a view of politics as the 'art of the possible', and a view of the inevitability of collapse can and does lead to de-politicized or even anti-political responses. But surely the challenge, as outlined by the green republican project of this book, is to embrace new intelligibilities, ways of being, having, and doing, new identities and subjectivities, and new arts of life, all must be part of a project to avert collapse?2 This is, as I see it, the point of green republican politics as a form of 'anticipatory politics' to challenge the rule of the 'nee-liberal vulgate'. At this present moment, on the cusp of this 'Great Transition', what greens need is to cultivate critical awareness, opposition, and dissent, to have the courage of their convictions in analysing and resisting actually existing unsustainability, and outlining their vision for the transition to a better society, in part to engage, inform, and prepare citizens for the coming changes that will characterize the decades ahead. Greens need to be realistic and cleareyed in their disavowal of naive utopianism, but convinced of its basic conviction that another world is possible, necessary, and desirable. And while on quiet mornings we may hear it coming, its arrival, like all major transitions in human history, will demand political struggle. The battle for hearts, minds, and hands has begun, and my writing this book and you reading it are constitutive of that struggle.

### 1NC Politics

#### Obama PC high now – GOP softening now on fiscal cliff – but it will be a fight

Kimberly Atkins (writer for the Boston-Herald) November 8, 2012 “Prez returns to D.C. with more clout” http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends. In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past. “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them.

#### Ensures compromise now – but re-election PC is finite

Ron Kampeas (writer for Intermountain Jewish News) November 7, 2012 “Obama’s second term: More of the same, at least until Iran flares” http://www.ijn.com/presidential-elections/2012-presidential-elections/3530-obamas-second-term-more-of-the-same-at-least-until-iran-flares

The fiscal cliff and specifically sequestration is a major concern," Daroff said. "Our concern continues to be that as the nation and our political leaders continue to assess how to make cuts in spending that those cuts don't fall disproportionately on vulnerable populations that rely upon social service agencies that depend on our funding." Cuts of about 8.5 percent would immediately affect the viability of housing for the elderly, according to officials at B'nai B'rith International, which runs a network of homes. Officials at Jewish federations say the cuts also would curb the meals and transportation for the elderly they provide with assistance from federal programs. Obama and Congress would have had to deal with heading off sequestration in any case, but as a president with a veto-wielding mandate of four more years, he has the leverage to head off deep cuts to programs that his top officials have said remain essential, including food assistance to the poor and medical entitlements for the poor and elderly. David Makovsky, a senior analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Obama's priorities would be domestic. "While a victory in the second term tends to give you some political capital, capital is still finite," he said, citing George W. Bush's failure in 2005 to reform Social Security, despite his decisive 2004 triumph. "This suggests to me the president will keep his focus on the economy and health care," and not on major initiatives in the Middle East.

#### Nuclear power costs pc

Mariotte 6/5/12 (Michael Mariotte, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is **divided on the issue**. But Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since it crosses all party and political lines. It is also clear that the American public does not see nuclear power as a “clean energy” source (nor, for that matter, “clean” coal or natural gas fracking). Congressional or state efforts to include these technologies in a “clean energy standard” or a clean energy bank concept are **bound to fail.**

#### Impact is global econ collapse

Harold Mandel (writer for the Examiner) September 27, 2012 “Fitch says fiscal cliff could set off global recession (Video)” http://www.examiner.com/article/fitch-says-fiscal-cliff-could-set-off-global-recession

The ratings agency stated, "The U.S. fiscal cliff represents the single biggest near-term threat to a global economic recovery." Fitch has gone on to warn, “A U.S. fiscal shock would be exported to the rest of the world via a sharply weaker U.S. dollar and asset prices, lower U.S. price and wage inflation and heightened risk of deflation, and the impact on commodity prices.” In the meantime leading U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years, with a primary reason being fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. And so unless the fiscal cliff is confronted and avoided this could be bad news for everyone.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### 1NC Enviro

#### Don’t solve warming – tipping point inevitable, timeframe and insufficient amount of reductions block

**Smith, 11** [Gar, environmental journalist, He is the former editor of Earth Island Journal, and currently edits Earth Island Institute's weekly "eco-zine" The-Edge. NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE CASE AGAINST A NUCLEAR RENAISSANCEhttp://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear\_Roulette\_book.pdf]

More than 200 new reactors have been proposed around the world but not enough reactors can be built fast enough to replace the world’s vanishing fossil fuel resources.2 **Even if nuclear output** **could be tripled** by 2050 (which seems unlikely in light of the industry’s record to date), this would only lower greenhouse emissions by 25 to 40 billion annual tons—**12.5** to 20 percent **of the** **reductions needed to stabilize the climate**.3 The International Energy Agency estimates that renewables and efficiency measures could produce ten times these savings by 2050. The IEA estimates that cutting CO2 emissions in half by mid-century would require building 1,400 new 1,000-MW reactors—32 new reactors every year. But since it usually takes about 10 years from groundbreaking to atom-smashing, these reactors **could not be constructed fast enough to prevent an irreversible** “**tipping” of world climate**. This hardly seems feasible since the industry has only managed to bring 30 new reactors on-line over the past ten years. Of the 35 reactors the IEA listed as “under construction” in mid-2008, a third of these had been “under construction” for 20 years or longer. Some may never be completed. By contrast, a 1.5 MW wind turbine can be installed in a single day and can be operational 4 | The Watts Bar-1 reactor, 60 miles southwest of Knoxville, Tennesee, took 24 years to build. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in two weeks.4 Still, the pace of nuclear construction has picked up lately. In 2010, the number of reactor projects underway had ballooned to 66—with most located in China (27) and Russia (11). And it’s not just a matter of designing and building new reactors.The construction of 1,400 new nuclear reactors also would require building 15 new uranium enrichment plants, 50 new reprocessing plants and 14 new waste storage sites—a deal-breaker since the sole proposed U.S. storage site at Yucca Mountain is apparently dead .The cost of this additional nuclear infrastructure has been estimated at $3 trillion.5 Moreover, since the operating lifetime of these new reactors would still be a mere 40 years, even if new construction was practical, quick and affordable, it would only “solve” the global-warming problem for another 40 years, at which point the plants would need to be decommissioned.

#### Nuclear power can’t solve warming -- electricity sector emissions are too small, and inevitable demand increases mean the impact is negligible at best.

Green, ‘6

[Jim, national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, has an honours degree in public health and a PhD in science and technology studies for his doctoral thesis on the Lucas Heights research reactor debates, energyscience.org.au, “Nuclear power and climate change,” November, <http://www.energyscience.org.au/FS03%20Nucl%20Power%20Clmt%20Chng.pdf>]

It is widely accepted that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions must be sharply reduced to avert climate change. However, nuclear power is at best a very partial, problematic and unnecessary response to climate change: • A doubling of nuclear power would reduce global greenhouse emissions by about 5%. A much larger nuclear expansion program would pose enormous proliferation and security risks, and it would run up against the problem of limited known conventional uranium reserves. • The serious hazards of civil nuclear programs - the repeatedly demonstrated contribution of civil nuclear programs to weapons proliferation, intractable waste management problems, and the risk of serious accidents. • The availability of a plethora of clean energy options - renewable energy sources plus energy efficiency - which, combined, can meet energy demand and sharply reduce greenhouse emissions. (See for example the reports produced by the Clean Energy Future Group).1 This information paper addresses the first of those arguments - the limitations of nuclear power as a climate change abatement strategy. A limited response Nuclear power is used almost exclusively for electricity generation. (A very small number of reactors are used for heat co-generation and desalination.) Electricity is responsible for less than one third of global greenhouse gas emissions. According to the Uranium Institute, the figure is “about 30%”.2 That fact alone puts pay to the simplistic view that nuclear power alone can ‘solve’ climate change. According to a senior energy analyst with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Alan McDonald: “Saying that nuclear power can solve global warming by itself is way over the top”.3 Ian Hore-Lacy from the Uranium Information Centre (UIC) claims that a doubling of nuclear power would reduce greenhouse emissions in the power sector by 25%.4 That figure is reduced to a 7.5% reduction if considering the impact on overall emissions rather than just the power sector. The figure needs to be further reduced because the UIC makes no allowance for the considerable time that would be required to double nuclear output. Electricity generation is projected to increase over the coming decades so the contribution of a fixed additional input of nuclear power has a relatively smaller impact. Overall, it is highly unlikely that a doubling of global nuclear power would reduce emissions by more than 5%.

#### Tripling current global capacity by 2050 is necessary for nuclear power to solve warming -- multiple constraints prevent that.

Squassoni, ‘8

[Sharon, Senior Associate, Nonproliferation Program -- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-12, “The Realities of Nuclear Expansion” Congressional Testimony: House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global Warming, Washington, DC]

In 2004, Princeton scientists Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow published a “wedge analysis” for stabilizing global climate change.3 Since fossil fuels currently emit seven billion tons of carbon/year and are projected to double that level through 2050 in the business-as-usual scenario, Pacala and Socolow considered what technologies and/or approaches might help stabilize those emissions at current levels (about 375 ppm). Seven wedges of reduced emissions (a cumulative effect of 25 billion tons through 2050, or one billion tons of carbon/year reduction at the end of that period) were postulated. One “wedge” would ultimately achieve a reduction of one billion tons per year (or 25 billion cumulative tons) by 2050. For nuclear energy to “solve” just one-seventh of the problem – lowering emissions by one billion tons per year – an additional 700 GWe of capacity would have to be built, assuming the reactors replaced 700 GWe of modern coal-electric plants.4 Because virtually all operating reactors will have to be retired in that time, this means building approximately 1070 reactors in 42 years, or about 25 reactors per year. Current global reactor capacity is 373 GWe or 439 reactors worldwide. In short, one “nuclear wedge” would require almost tripling current capacity. Mapping A “Realistic Growth” Scenario Nuclear Expansion5 The attached maps (see slide 1) depict estimates of reactor capacity growth for 2030 and 2050, according to three scenarios. The first is a “realistic growth” scenario, based on the U.S. Energy Information Administration figures for 2030.6 The second is what states have planned for 2030, or a “wildly optimistic” scenario. The third is roughly based on the high-end projections for 2050 done by MIT in their 2003 study entitled “The Future of Nuclear Power.” This 1500 GWe scenario lies between the Pacala-Socolow wedge and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change estimates that nuclear energy could reduce carbon emissions between two billion and six billion tons/year (or 1800 GWe – 4500 GWe).7 A few caveats with respect to projecting nuclear energy expansion are necessary. Nuclear energy is undoubtedly safer and more efficient now than when it began fifty years ago, but it still faces four fundamental challenges: waste, cost, proliferation, and safety. It is an inherently risky business. Most industry executives will admit that it will only take one significant accident to plunge the “renaissance” back into the nuclear Dark Ages. Because of this, estimates are highly uncertain. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not use its computer model to estimate nuclear energy growth because, among other things, key variables such as public attitudes and government policy are difficult to quantify and project. That said, estimates tend to extrapolate electricity consumption and demand from gross domestic product (GDP) growth, make assumptions about nuclear energy’s share of electricity production, and then estimate nuclear reactor capacity. The United States, France, and Japan constitute more than half of total world nuclear reactor capacity (see slide 1). Yet half of the 34 reactors now under construction are in Asia.8 Under any scenario, nuclear power is expected to grow most in Asia, because of high Chinese and Indian growth and electricity demand. Under the realistic growth scenario, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates 2030 reactor capacity at 481 GWe. The International Energy Agency (IEA) envisions greater potential for expansion, projecting a range from 414 to 679 GWe in 2030, but the higher number would require significant policy support. With electricity consumption expected to double by 2030, nuclear energy will have a difficult time just keeping its market share – currently 16 percent of global production.9 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with no change in energy policies, “the energy mix supplied to run the global economy in the 2025-2030 time-frame will essentially remain unchanged with about 80% of the energy supply based on fossil fuels.”10 Coal now provides 59% of electricity production, followed by hydroelectric power at 39% and oil and gas together provide 25%. Renewables are just 1-2% of total electricity production. Moreover, regions that have coal tend to use it, particularly for electricity generation, which increases greenhouse gas emissions. The IPCC has noted that “in recent years, intensified coal use has been observed for a variety of reasons in developing Asian countries, the USA and some European countries. In a number of countries, the changing relative prices of coal to natural gas have changed the dispatch order in power generation in favor of coal.” Many fear that states such as China and India – both of which are not subject to Kyoto Protocol targets because they are developing states – will meet their increased demand with cheap coal. Without further policy changes, according to the International Energy Agency, the share of nuclear energy could drop to 10% of global electricity production. “Wildly Optimistic” Growth Scenario Although some states, such as Germany and Sweden, plan to phase out nuclear power, the trend line is moving in the opposite direction. This growth scenario does not contain projections based on electricity demand, but instead takes at face value what states have projected for themselves. The result is a total of 700 GWe global capacity (see slide 2) – two-thirds of what one nuclear wedge to affect global climate change would require. The reason these estimates are wildly optimistic is that over 20 nations have announced intentions to install nuclear reactors. Several of these – Turkey, Egypt, and Philippines – had planned for nuclear power in the past, but abandoned such plans for various reasons. Some of these new nuclear plans are more credible than others and can be differentiated into those that have approved or funded construction, those that have clear proposals but without formal commitments, and those that are exploring nuclear energy (see slide 3). In the Middle East, these include Iran, Israel, Jordan and Yemen, with potential interest expressed by Syria, Kuwait, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states of Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain. In Europe, Belarus, Turkey and Azerbaijan have announced plans, as well as Kazakhstan. In Asia, Bangladesh, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia have announced plans, and the Philippines has also expressed interest. Venezuela has also declared it will develop nuclear power. In Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Nigeria have announced plans to develop nuclear power, and Algeria and Ghana have expressed interest.11 More than half of all those states are in the Middle East. Although this could result in reduced carbon emissions, because Middle Eastern states use more oil for electricity production (34%) than elsewhere, this is not where the real electricity demand is coming from. “Climate Change” Growth Scenario A rough approximation of where reactor capacity would expand in a climate change scenario is based on the high scenario of the 2003 MIT Study, “The Future of Nuclear Power.” For 1500 GW capacity, MIT estimated that 54 countries (an additional 23) would have commercial nuclear power programs. This essentially means a five-fold increase in the numbers of reactors worldwide and an annual build rate of 35 per year. In the event that smaller-sized reactors are deployed in developing countries – which makes eminent sense – the numbers could be much higher.12 If nuclear energy were assumed to be able to contribute a reduction of between two and six billion tons of carbon per year as outlined in the Stern Report, the resulting reactor capacity would range between 1800 GWe and 4500 GWe – increases ranging from six to ten times the current capacity.13 This would require building between 42 and 107 reactors per year through 2050. Impact on Uranium Enrichment Such increases in reactor capacity would certainly have repercussions for the front and back ends of the fuel cycle. Almost 90 percent of current operating reactors use lowenriched uranium (LEU). Presently, eleven countries have commercial uranium enrichment capacity and produce between 40 and 50 million SWU. A capacity of 1070 GWe – the one “wedge” scenario – could mean tripling enrichment capacity, requiring anywhere from 11 to 22 additional enrichment plants.14 A capacity of 1500 GWe would require quadrupling enrichment capacity (see slide 4).15 Further, if Stern Report nuclear expansion levels are achieved, enrichment capacity would have to increase ten-fold. In assessing where new uranium enrichment capacity might develop, the MIT study assumed that 18 states would have 10 GWe reactor capacity – the point at which domestic uranium enrichment becomes competitive with LEU sold on the international market – and thus might enrich uranium. (See slide 4 for a more modest approach, with nine additional countries enriching uranium).16 Impact on Spent Fuel Reprocessing A key question is whether an expansion of nuclear reactors would result in an expansion of spent fuel reprocessing. This is not necessarily the case, because decisions about whether to store fuel or reprocess it depend on several factors: existing storage capacities; fuel cycle approaches (once-through, one recycle, fast reactors) and new technologies; and cost. A shift to fast reactors that can burn or breed plutonium implies an increase in recycling, whether this is traditional reprocessing that separates out plutonium, or options under consideration now that would not separate out the plutonium. France and Japan now commercially reprocess their spent fuel and recycle the plutonium once in mixed oxide-fuelled reactors. Russia also reprocesses a small percentage of its spent fuel. A troubling development in the last two years from a nonproliferation perspective has been the U.S. embrace of recycling spent fuel under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, after a policy of 30 years of not encouraging the use of plutonium in the civil nuclear fuel cycle. Whether or not the United States ultimately reprocesses or recycles fuel, other states are now more likely to view reprocessing as necessary for an advanced fuel cycle. Constraints on Nuclear Expansion17 There are significant questions about whether nuclear expansion that could affect global climate change is even possible. In the United States, as the chief operating officer of Exelon recently told an industry conference, constraints include: the lack of any recent U.S. nuclear construction experience; the atrophy of U.S. nuclear manufacturing infrastructure; production bottlenecks created by an increase in worldwide demand; and an aging labor force.

#### Robust analysis proves nuclear power can’t mitigate climate change -- climactic effects hinder reactor effectiveness -- their authors rely on a simplistic understanding of nuclear power.

Kopytko & Perkins, ‘11

[Natalie, PhD Researcher in the Environment Department, University of York, John, former chief economist at a major international consulting firm, advised the World Bank, United Nations, IMF, U.S. Treasury Department, Fortune 500 corporations, and countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, his books on economics and geo-politics have sold more than 1 million copies, spent many months on the New York Times and other bestseller lists, and are published in over 30 languages, “Climate Change, Nuclear Power, and the Adaptation-Mitigation Dilemma,” Energy Policy, [Volume 39, Issue 1](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03014215/39/1), January 2011, Pages 318–333, Science Direct]

Numerous analysts from industry, commerce, government, academia, andnon-profits have promoted nuclear power as an appropriate mitigation for climate change. In essentially all cases the logic of the proposal is simple and appealing: • climate change results primarily from burning fossil fuels, which releases carbon dioxide to the atmosphere; • nuclear power yields no carbon emissions as electricity is generated; • therefore nuclear power is an appropriate, indeed perhaps ideal, mitigation for climate change. Appealing as this logic model appears, it unfortunately ignores a wide range of other issues, each of which impinges upon the quest for reduced carbon emissions. Thus it is too simplistic and seriously misleads. The argument leads to easy conclusions about the suitability of nuclear power to temper climate change when in fact a more robust analysis suggests the opposite conclusion. Perhaps the single most important factor undermining the simple logic model stems from the fact that nuclear reactors require enormous amounts of water to cool or condense the coolant which transfers heat from the core to the turbines and cools the reactor core. This is why nuclear power plants are located near substantial amounts of water: the ocean, large lakes, and big rivers. If climate change affects the temperature, quality, or quantity of water, then existing nuclear power plants may be adversely affected. This paper examines several ways in which climate change has already affected water in ways that create problems for existing nuclear power plants. Specifically it examines the effects of sea level rise on nine existing coastal sites in the USA and the consequences of changes in water for inland reactors in France. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) models of sea level rise and a review of existing reports and published literature suggest that numerous existing plants have been or may be adversely affected by climate change. We call the set of interactions among climate change, water, and nuclear power the “adaptation-mitigation dilemma.” This term signals that existing and projected climate change threatens the operations and safety of existing plants and poses other challenges to efforts to adapt to climate change

. Thus existing nuclear power plants may not represent a good technology for mitigation of climate change. A separate question concerns the potential of new nuclear power plants to avoid the problems with water we identify in this paper. Maybe it’s possible to build new plants that don’t suffer the syndrome of problems in the adaptation-mitigation dilemma. For reasons explained in the conclusion of this paper, however, we believe that it may be quite difficult to fully avoid the dilemmas identified here. At the very least, avoiding these challenges will add costs and possibly increase the risks of nuclear power, both of which are already severe handicaps for this technology. This paper acknowledges that sharply differing opinions abound on what, if any, role is appropriate for nuclear power in the debates about climate change. It seeks, however, to shift the analysis and debates about nuclear power away from “Is it a good, safe, cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions?” to “What can we learn about current nuclear power plants and how they have been or probably will be affected by the climate change that has already occurred?” With this shift comes the potential for analysis that is less fought with ideological baggage that hinders a clear understanding of nuclear power.

#### Warming’s irreversible

**Solomon et al ‘10** Susan Solomon et. Al, Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ph.D. in Climotology University of California, Berkeley, Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Chairman of the IPCC, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Deputy Head, Director of Science, Technical Support Unit Working Group I, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Affiliated Scientist, Climate and Environmental Physics, Physics Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland, John S. Daniel, research scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Ph.D. in physics from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Todd J. Sanford, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Science, University of Colorado Daniel M. Murphy, Chemical Sciences Division, Earth System Research Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Boulder Gian-Kasper Plattner, Deputy Head, Director of Science, Technical Support Unit Working Group I, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Affiliated Scientist, Climate and Environmental Physics, Physics Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland Reto Knutti, Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science, Eidgenössiche Technische Hochschule Zurich and Pierre Friedlingstein, Chair, Mathematical Modelling of Climate Systems, member of the Science Steering Committee of the Analysis Integration and Modeling of the Earth System (AIMES) programme of IGBP and of the Global Carbon Project (GCP) of the Earth System Science Partnership (ESSP) (Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences of the United States of America, "Persistence of climate changes due to a range of greenhouse gases", October 26, 2010 Vol 107.43: 18354-18359)

Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other greenhouse gases increased over the course of the 20th century due to human activities. The human-caused increases in these gases are the primary forcing that accounts for much of the global warming of the past fifty years, with carbon dioxide being the most important single radiative forcing agent (1). Recent studies have shown that the human-caused warming linked to carbon dioxide is nearly irreversible for more than 1,000 y, even if emissions of the gas were to cease entirely (2–5). The importance of the ocean in taking up heat and slowing the response of the climate system to radiative forcing changes has been noted in many studies (e.g., refs. 6 and 7). The key role of the ocean’s thermal lag has also been highlighted by recent approaches to proposed metrics for comparing the warming of different greenhouse gases (8, 9). Among the observations attesting to the importance of these effects are those showing that climate changes caused by transient volcanic aerosol loading persist for more than 5 y (7, 10), and a portion can be expected to last more than a century in the ocean (11–13); clearly these signals persist far longer than the radiative forcing decay timescale of about 12–18 mo for the volcanic aerosol (14, 15). Thus the observed climate response to volcanic events suggests that some persistence of climate change should be expected even for quite short-lived radiative forcing perturbations. It follows that the climate changes induced by short-lived anthropogenic greenhouse gases such as methane or hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) may not decrease in concert with decreases in concentration if the anthropogenic emissions of those gases were to be eliminated. In this paper, our primary goal is to show how different processes and timescales contribute to determining how long the climate changes due to various greenhouse gases could be expected to remain if anthropogenic emissions were to cease. Advances in modeling have led to improved AtmosphereOcean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) as well as to Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs). Although a detailed representation of the climate system changes on regional scales can only be provided by AOGCMs, the simpler EMICs have been shown to be useful, particularly to examine phenomena on a global average basis. In this work, we use the Bern 2.5CC EMIC (see Materials and Methods and SI Text), which has been extensively intercompared to other EMICs and to complex AOGCMs (3, 4). It should be noted that, although the Bern 2.5CC EMIC includes a representation of the surface and deep ocean, it does not include processes such as ice sheet losses or changes in the Earth’s albedo linked to evolution of vegetation. However, it is noteworthy that this EMIC, although parameterized and simplified, includes 14 levels in the ocean; further, its global ocean heat uptake and climate sensitivity are near the mean of available complex models, and its computed timescales for uptake of tracers into the ocean have been shown to compare well to observations (16). A recent study (17) explored the response of one AOGCM to a sudden stop of all forcing, and the Bern 2.5CC EMIC shows broad similarities in computed warming to that study (see Fig. S1), although there are also differences in detail. The climate sensitivity (which characterizes the long-term absolute warming response to a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations) is 3 °C for the model used here. Our results should be considered illustrative and exploratory rather than fully quantitative given the limitations of the EMIC and the uncertainties in climate sensitivity. Results One Illustrative Scenario to 2050. In the absence of mitigation policy, concentrations of the three major greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide can be expected to increase in this century. If emissions were to cease, anthropogenic CO2 would be removed from the atmosphere by a series of processes operating at different timescales (18). Over timescales of decades, both the land and upper ocean are important sinks. Over centuries to millennia, deep oceanic processes become dominant and are controlled by relatively well-understood physics and chemistry that provide broad consistency across models (see, for example, Fig. S2 showing how the removal of a pulse of carbon compares across a range of models). About 20% of the emitted anthropogenic carbon **remains in the atmosphere for** many **thousands of years** (with a range across models including the Bern 2.5CC model being about 19 4% at year 1000 after a pulse emission; see ref. 19), until much slower weathering processes affect the carbonate balance in the ocean (e.g., ref. 18). Models with stronger carbon/climate feedbacks than the one considered here could display larger and more persistent warmings due to both CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gases, through reduced land and ocean uptake of carbon in a warmer world. Here our focus is not on the strength of carbon/climate feedbacks that can lead to differences in the carbon concentration decay, but rather on the factors that control the climate response to a given decay. The removal processes of other anthropogenic gases including methane and nitrous oxide are much more simply described by exponential decay constants of about 10 and 114 y, respectively (1), due mainly to known chemical reactions in the atmosphere. In this illustrative study, we do not include the feedback of changes in methane upon its own lifetime (20). We also do not account for potential interactions between CO2 and other gases, such as the production of carbon dioxide from methane oxidation (21), or changes to the carbon cycle through, e.g., methane/ozone chemistry (22). Fig. 1 shows the computed future global warming contributions for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide for a midrange scenario (23) of projected future anthropogenic emissions of these gases to 2050. Radiative forcings for all three of these gases, and their spectral overlaps, are represented in this work using the expressions assessed in ref. 24. In 2050, the anthropogenic emissions are stopped entirely for illustration purposes. The figure shows nearly irreversible warming for at least 1,000 y due to the imposed carbon dioxide increases, as in previous work. **All published studies to date**, which use multiple EMICs and one AOGCM, show largely irreversible warming due to future carbon dioxide increases (to within about 0.5 °C) on a timescale of at least 1,000 y (3–5, 25, 26). Fig. 1 shows that the calculated future warmings due to anthropogenic CH4 and N2O also persist notably longer than the lifetimes of these gases. The figure illustrates that emissions of key non-CO2 greenhouse gases such as CH4 or N2O could lead to warming that both temporarily exceeds a given stabilization target (e.g., 2 °C as proposed by the G8 group of nations and in the Copenhagen goals) and remains present longer than the gas lifetimes even if emissions were to cease. A number of recent studies have underscored the important point that reductions of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions are an approach that can indeed reverse some past climate changes (e.g., ref. 27). Understanding how quickly such reversal could happen and why is an important policy and science question. Fig. 1 implies that the use of policy measures to reduce emissions of short-lived gases will be less effective as a rapid climate mitigation strategy than would be thought if based only upon the gas lifetime. Fig. 2 illustrates the factors influencing the warming contributions of each gas for the test case in Fig. 1 in more detail, by showing normalized values (relative to one at their peaks) of the warming along with the radiative forcings and concentrations of CO2 , N2O, and CH4 . For example, about two-thirds of the calculated warming due to N2O is still present 114 y (one atmospheric lifetime) after emissions are halted, despite the fact that its excess concentration and associated radiative forcing at that time has dropped to about one-third of the peak value.

#### No extinction – empirically denied

**Carter 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CMarc%5CDesktop%5CSurviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

### 1NC Science Diplomacy

#### Science Diplomacy fails

**Dickson 9** – Director of Science Development online (David, “The limits of science diplomacy”, http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html)

**Using science for diplomatic purposes has obvious attractions and several benefits. But there are limits to what it can achieve.** The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international perspective — scientists often ignore national boundaries and interests when it comes to exchanging ideas or collaborating on global problems. So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on scientific and technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working relationships. More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt dialogue has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations provided a conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control. **Only so much science can do** Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems.Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. **Conflicting ethos** Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. **Worlds apart yet co-dependent** The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.

**Visas and security concerns tank solvency**

**Royal Society 10** – a Fellowship of more than 1400 outstanding individuals from all areas of science, mathematics, engineering and medicine, who form a global scientific network of the highest calibre. The Fellowship is supported by over 130 permanent staff with responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Society and its activities. [January, 2010, “New frontiers in science diplomacy”] Jacome

Practical barriers to scientific exchange

The constraints to science diplomacy include regulatory barriers, such as visa restrictions and security controls. Immediately after September 11 2001, more stringent travel and visa regimes in countries like the US and the UK severely limited the opportunities for visiting scientists and scholars, particularly from Islamic countries. Although efforts have been made to unpick some of these strict controls, there are still signifi cant problems with the free mobility of scientists from certain countries. Such policies shut out talented scientists and hinder opportunities to build scientifi c relations between countries. Security controls can also prevent collaboration on certain scientifi c subjects, such as nuclear physics and microbiology. Although these policies are based on legitimate concerns over the dual use potential of some scientifi c knowledge, they should also take into consideration the diplomatic value of scientific partnerships in sensitive areas to help rebuild trust between nations.

#### No risk of water wars

**Lawfield 10** – Thomas Lawfield is an MA candidate at the University for Peace. Water Security: War or Peace? Thomas Lawfield May 03, 2010, <http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=715>, ZBurdette) \*note: changed to BC[E]

In reality, water does not cause war. The arguments presented above, although correct in principle, have little purchase in empirical evidence. Indeed, as one author notes, there is only one case of a war where the formal declaration of war was over water.[20] This was an incident between two Mesopotamian city states, Lagash and Umma, over 2,500 years BC[E], in modern day southern Iraq.

Both the initial premises and arguments of water war theorists have been brought into question. Given this, a number of areas of contestation have emerged: "Questioning both the supply and demand side of the water war argument [...] Questioning assumptions about the costs of water resources [...and] Demonstrating the cooperative potential of the water resource."[21]

Why then is water not a cause of war? The answer lies in two factors: first, the capacity for adaptation to water stresses and, second, the political drawbacks to coupling water and conflict.

First, there is no water crisis, or more correctly, there are a number of adaptation strategies that reduce stress on water resources and so make conflict less likely. Unlike the water war discourse, which perceives water as finite in the Malthusian sense, **the capacity for adaptation to water stress has been greatly underestimated**. For instance, I will discuss in particular a trading adaptation known as ‘virtual water’, which refers to the water used to grow imported food. This water can be subtracted from the total projected agricultural water needs of a state, and hence allows water scarce states to operate on a lower in-country water requirement than would otherwise be expected.[22] This means that regions of the world that are particularly rich in water produce water intense agricultural products more easily in the global trade system, while other water scarce areas produce low intensity products.[23] The scale of this water is significant - Allan famously pointed out that more embedded water flows into the Middle East in the form of grain than flows in the Nile.[24]

In addition, there are significant problems around the hegemonic doctrine of the water crisis. Many authors point to relatively low water provision per capita by states, and suggest that this will increase the likelihood of a state engaging in war with a neighbouring state, to obtain the water necessary for its population. This is normally a conceptual leap that produces the incorrect corollary of conflict, but is also frequently **a problem of data weaknesses** around the per capita requirements. For instance, Stucki cites the case of the Palestinians being under the worst water stress, with a per capita provision being in the region of 165m³/year.[25] Unfortunately, such an analysis is based on false actual provision data in this region. Based on the authors work on water provision in Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps, the actual provision is over 90m³/month. Such a figure is highly likely to be representative of other camps in the region.[26] If this example is representative of trends to exaggerate water pressures in the region, then **we should be sceptical about claims of increasing water stress.**

Furthermore, given that many water systems have a pipe leakage rate of fifty per cent, combined with a seventy per cent loss of agricultural water, significant efficiency enhancements could be made to existing infrastructure. Combined with desalination options in many water shortage prone states, there is an overall capacity for technological and market driven solutions to water scarcity.[27]

### 1NC Prolif

#### Prolif decreases the risk of full-scale war

**Asal 7**—pol sci, SUNY—AND—Kyle Beardsley—pol sci, Emory (Victor, Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior, http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139, AMiles)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that **nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior**, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors – Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992) – and five nuclear actors – Gulf War (1990) – only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors – by extension, many general actors as well – experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving super- powers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, **the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial**. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of full-scale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, **the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply**, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of **nuclear powers** does not prevent war, it **significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war**, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the out-comes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman-type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction.

#### Empirically proven

**Tepperman 9—**Deputy Editor at Newsweek. Frmr Deputy Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs. LLM, i-law, NYU. MA, jurisprudence, Oxford. (Jonathan, Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb, http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome\_files/nukes\_Final.pdf, AMiles)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that’s a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama’s idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it’s not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn’t be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nukefree planet) that’s both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there’s never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it’s hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading “nuclear optimist” and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, “We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. **It’s striking and against all historical precedent** that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they’re pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it’s almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn’t think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button— and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, “Why fight if you can’t win and might lose everything?” Why indeed? The **iron logic of deterrence** and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it’s led to what’s known as the nuclear peace: the virtually **unprecedented stretch** since the end of World War II in which all the world’s major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there’s very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, “It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.” The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nucleararmed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn’t do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other’s vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials’ thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it’s crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today’s nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you’d be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who’s never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes —and there’s no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but **history says otherwise**. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to “bury” the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn’t be so bad because even “if half of mankind died . . . the whole world would become socialist.” Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame points out that Stalin and Mao are the real recordholders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today’s international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad’s antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn’t win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish.

#### Prolif solves conventional wars

**Preston 9**—assoc prof, IR, Wash State U (Thomas, From Lambs to Lions, 31-2, AMiles)

Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993,162). for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters—whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions—none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through non-nuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses"' of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989. 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 **there has not been one** **single historical instance of** nuclear **deterrence failure** {especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II. over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001.28).3 Further, as Gray (1999. 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

#### Curbing nuclear prolif causes a shift to bioweapons.

**Zilinskas 2k**—Former Clinical Microbiologist, Dir. – Chem/Bio Weapons Nonproliferation Program – Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (Raymond, Biological warfare: modern offense and defense, 1-2, AMiles)

It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of biological weapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, **as tougher** international **controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking** to acquire chemical and **nuclear weapons, leaders may be** even more **drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction.** Before beginning a consideration of the implications of molecular biology for biological warfare (BW) and defense, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of microbiology. It has passed through two eras, and we presently are in its third era. The first was the “pre-Pasteur” era; when the underlying science of fermentation was unknown, so microbiology was applied strictly on an empirical basis. Although undoubtedly any fine beers and wines, as well as breads and other fermented foods, were produced through the use of empirically developed fermentation techniques, no finely controlled production of chemicals was possible. During this era, BW was also empirically based. Common tactics included contaminating water sources with bloated animal carcasses and catapulting infected cadavers into citadels (Poupard and Miller, 1992).

#### Extinction

**Ochs 2** [Richard, Naturalist – Grand Teton National park with Masters in Natural Resource Management – Rutgers, “Biological Weapons must be abolished immediately” 6-9, http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

#### Prolif inevitable and slow – nothing can stop determined leaders

**Hymans 6**—assist prof, IR, USC. PhD, pol sci, Harvard (Jacques, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 3-8, AMiles) Figure omitted

For this is not the first time we have faced widespread projections of a coming "second nuclear age." The 1960s era US government and other estimates foresaw between fifteen and twenty-five nuclear weapons states by the end of the 1970s; 1970s era estimates foresaw as many as thirty-five nuclear weapons states by the end of the 1980s; the early 1990s betting line was that at least Germany and Japan and possibly many more states would soon join the nuclear weapons "club.\*\*1 **Such forecasts even supposedly optimistic ones have proved too pessimistic.** In spite of the breathless reporting about new uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing capacities, it must be emphasized that the basic pattern in the history of nuclear proliferation to this point is the small number of nuclear weapons states, as compared to the large number of states capable of building those weapons. The expansion of nuclear technological capacities that previous generations feared has indeed occurred, but the expected realization of their military potential has not followed. Today, although nuclear technology is decidedly old technology and ex-Soviet scientists and fissile material have been on the market for over a decade,'1 to the best of our knowledge fewer than ten states actually have the bomb. These are the United States (first nuclear weapons test 1945); Russia (1949); Great Britain (1952); France (1960); China (1964); India ("peaceful nuclear explosion'1 1974; first official nuclear weapons test 1998); Pakistan (1998); plus almost certainly Israel (likely test 1979), and possibly North Korea (no test yet).5 Figure 1.1 offers a rough picture of the evolution in the numbers of actual and potential nuclear weapons states over time, adapted from work by Stephen Meyer and Richard Stoll on states\* latent nuclear capabilities.u The figure reports their data at five-year intervals.' This yawning gap between technical potential and military reality should have led to widespread rethinking of the phenomenon of nuclear weapons proliferation. To a surprising extent it has not. Much of the proliferation literature continues to focus its attention primarily on the "supply-side" issue of the growth of technical capacities. Volumes with titles like How Nuclear Weapons Spread are devoted entirely to analyses of the technological similarities between civilian and military nuclear programs.8 Such a focus on technical capacity leads many proliferation specialists to persist in foretelling "life in a nuclear-armed crowd" a quarter-century after Albert Wohlstetter coined the phrase." Indeed, William Arkin has aptly labeled the study of proliferation "the sky-is-still-falling profession."10 This is not to claim that all of the current literature is in denial about the gap between technical potential and military reality. Indeed, awareness of that gap has produced soaring evaluations of the past effectiveness of the "non-proliferation regime" and its centerpiece, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The rising reputation of the regime over the past two decades has been especially noticeable in academic writing on international relations. Scholars working within all three major international relations paradigms - realists, institutionalists, and constructivists - have pointed to the regime as an essential dam holding back the tide of nuclear proliferation: • Realists stress that the regime provides a framework for joint great power application of export controls, technical safeguards agreements, and other supply-side means of blocking states from acquiring and applying nuclear know-how.11 • Neo-liberal institutionalists stress that the regime offers states a functional means to escape the presumed proliferation "prisoner's dilemma" by giving them the assurance that their rivals are also keeping their nuclear powder dry.12 • Finally, constructivists stress that the regime has contributed to a "nuclear taboo," an international normative prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, which has reduced their utility, tarnished their image, and thus diminished their attractiveness.13 The non-proliferation regime has made a difference. Careful case study research on various countries’ nuclear histories has detailed the regime’s role in easing many of them further down the nuclear weaponsfree path.14 Therefore, the mounting evidence that the regime today is encountering increasing political and technical difficulties is a matter of no little concern. But **this begs the real question**: has the regime caused states that otherwise would have decided to acquire nuclear weapons not to do so, or has it simply reinforced the non-proliferation commitments of already abstaining states? The chorus of praise for the regime implicitly suggests that without it the world would today be home to a “nuclear-armed crowd.” But in fact there is much reason to doubt this counterfactual about the regime’s impact. First of all, if the regime were indeed the key to containing proliferation, then proliferation should have been rampant before the regime became a real factor in states’ calculations, in the mid-1970s. Yet as Figure 1.1 shows, already then there was a wide gap between the numbers of nuclearcapable and nuclear weapons states. So, according to the very logic of those who take a “strong” view of the regime’s success, by the time the regime was finally built, it should have been too late to prevent widespread proliferation. Second, if the regime were so crucial, then recent proliferation should have been limited to “rogue states” that do not worry about their position in international society. Such states, not surprisingly, have been the focus of most policymakers’ proliferation worries.15 But, in fact, the list of nuclear weapons states is no rogues’ gallery, and two of the youngest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, are widely internationally recognized states whose ultimate choices for the bomb were even made by democratically elected leaders. Third, for the regime to play the key role that has been ascribed to it, it would have to have created stable expectations among states that it would last. But, in fact, the regime’s survivability is regularly called into question, with the regime’s proponents often the loudest doubters of all. Not only have they viewed all sorts of actions around the world, such as India’s and Pakistan’s 1998 tests, as potential mortal blows to the cause of non-proliferation; they also see various types of inaction, such as the continuing maintenance of large arsenals by the nuclear powers, as equally dangerous to the regime.16 Given this generalized perception of the regime’s weakness in the policy world (which stands in stark contrast to its glimmering academic reputation), it is hard to buy into the notion that it provides states with the stable expectations they crave. Finally, if the regime is widely perceived as brittle, those who know it best equally perceive it as hollow. Close analysis of the regime’s actual operation finds a set of ambiguous and erratically enforced rules, myriad technical loopholes, and underfunded international agencies. For one thing, until recently international inspections were only carried out at declared nuclear facilities.17 The case of pre-1991 Iraq shows how easily a determined state could hide the true extent of its nuclear program.18 Since the possibilities for cheating have been so wide open, the existence of the regime could hardly have reassured any states that were prone to doubt the good faith of their peers. Thus, if this really were a prisoner’s dilemma type situation, they should have cheated and gone nuclear themselves. But instead, the vast majority of states have not “defected” from the regime. In short, for all its utility, the non-proliferation regime simply cannot support the explanatory weight that it has been asked to bear. What, then, accounts for the slow pace of proliferation? This book suggests that the answer lies less in external efforts to stop states from going nuclear, and more in the hearts of state leaders themselves. It argues that, in fact, contrary to the conventional wisdom, most state leaders are not sorely tempted by the prospect of “going nuclear.” Rather, state leaders tend to lack sufficient levels of motivation and/or certitude to catapult their states into a new and dangerous world of nuclear deterrence. In short, the non-proliferation regime has appeared to be a dramatic success because few state leaders have desired the things it prohibits.19

#### New proliferators will build small arsenals which are uniquely stable.

**Seng 98** (Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “Strategy for Pandora's Children: Stable Nuclear Proliferation Among Minor States”, p. 203-206)

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage those arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' **greatly diminishes the statistical probability** that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may not have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

#### Uncertainty solves war

**Karl 96**—president of the Asia Strategy Initiative and a lecturer in IR, USC (David, Winter, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539274?seq=9, Aly M)

Optimists have relaxed views of the preventive-war dangers entailed in situations in which a nuclear power confronts a nuclearizing rival. The practical difficulties of ensuring a disarming strike to preclude any possibility of nuclear retaliation make preventive actions a military gamble that states are very unlikely to take. As Waltz explains, "prevention and pre-emption are difficult games because the costs are so high if the games are not perfectly played.... Ultimately, the inhibitions [against such attacks] lie in the impossibility of knowing for sure that a disarming strike will totally

destroy an opposing force and in the immense destruction even a few warheads can wreak."25 To optimists, states will have to learn to live with a rival's emerging nuclear armory. Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect, optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of nuclear-armed states as an additional element of stability Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator, for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear powers will make all hesitant to strike individually26 As an example, they point to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when first the United States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action against China's nascent nuclear weapon sites. The net effect of the uncertain reaction of others is that "**the probability of** deliberate **nuclear attack falls to** near **zero** with three, four, or more nuclear nations."27 Similarly, Waltz reasons that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear weapons will prove "poor instruments for blackmail" because a "country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to **incalculable heights** because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers."28

## 2NC

### Exts – Solvency

#### We only need to harness 1 percent of ocean thermal energy to provide enough energy for the human race 100 times over

**Huang et al. 3** – Joseph C. Huang, Senior Scientist for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hans J. Krock, Professor of Ocean &. Resources Engineering, University of Hawaii and Stephen K. Oney, PhD. and executive vice present of OCEES (July, Revisit Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion System”) Jacome

The ocean covers more than 70.8% of the surface of the earth. A nearly equal fraction of the solar energy intercepted by the earth falls onto the ocean surface. The sun irradiates and releases an output of 380 million billion billion Watts (3.8 × 1026 Watts) and about 175 million billion (1.75 × 1017Watts) reaches the earth. Figure 1 shows the annual earth solar energy fluxes in percentile normalized by the annual total radiated solar energy that reaches the earth. However, not all these energy fluxes can be transformed into useful form of energy under present available technologies. The current world total energy consumption, as indicated in the lower right of Figure 1, is about only five thousandth of one percent (0.005%) of the solar energy flux reaching the earth. It is estimated that the amount of thermal energy absorbed in the oceans, on an annual basis, is equivalent to at least 1000 times the total amount of energy presently consumed by human beings over the world (Vega 1995). If only one percent of the solar energy flux in the equatorial zone is extracted from the thermal potential capacity in the ocean alone, it can provide hundreds of times more energy than the total current consumption of electricity. Due to the huge volume and high heat capacity of oceanic water, some rough calculations reveal that all the energies together in the atmosphere, including kinetic energy in hurricanes and other storms, are less than the thermal energy in the surface layer at a two and half meter depth in the ocean.

### Solves Water Scarcity

#### Solves water scarcity, gives us clean fuel, and solves warming

**Huang et al. 3** – Joseph C. Huang, Senior Scientist for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hans J. Krock, Professor of Ocean &. Resources Engineering, University of Hawaii and Stephen K. Oney, PhD. and executive vice present of OCEES (July, Revisit Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion System”) Jacome

The OTEC system has many co-products (or by-products). In addition to electricity, other products are briefly described below: The open cycle of OTEC generates electricity and also produces drinking water after condensing the vaporized steam. The closed cycle and hybrid OTEC also produce both with some minor modifications. OTEC can be used effectively to produce hydrogen through electrolysis. Hydrogen is considered to be the clean energy carrier of the future. Liquid hydrogen can be transported as fuel with some cryogenic storage. Hydrogen can also be combined with Nitrogen to form ammonia which is much easier to transport. Methanol, which burns cleanly as a substitute for petroleum-based fuel, can be made by combining two volumes of hydrogen with one volume of carbon monoxide in the presence of a suitable catalyst (Amery and Wu 1994). The deep ocean water can also be used for air conditioning, for aquacul ture fishery farming and for temperature controlled agricultural food growth. All these valuable by-products have been demonstrated in Hawaii (Daniels 2000).

### water

#### **Even if water conflicts do occur – they are over allocation – scarcity only fosters cooperation**

Allouche 11 – Institute of Development Studies, UK (Jeremy, January 2011, "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global tradestar, open," Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272>) Jacome

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [[Allouche, 2005]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272%22%20%5Cl%20%22b0015), [[Allouche, 2007]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272%22%20%5Cl%20%22b0020) and [[Rouyer, 2000]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272%22%20%5Cl%20%22b0290)). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment ([Ohlsson, 1999](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272%22%20%5Cl%20%22b0250)). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([[Dinar and Dinar, 2005]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272%22%20%5Cl%20%22b0090) and [[Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919210001272%22%20%5Cl%20%22b0055)).

#### X – No impact—water scarcity leads to cooperation

Brooks and Linton 2K – Senior Advisor in the Program and Partnership Branch of the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, and \* freelance writer who specializes in water issues (David B. and Jamie, July 2000, Globe and Mail “Drinking (Water) With Your Enemy”, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/18677/1/116118.pdf)

As Israelis and Palestinians approach final status talks, water is high on the agenda. As Israelis and Syrians jockey for negotiating room the waters of the Golan and of the Sea of Galilee are points of contention. Yet, tough as these issues are, there is little danger that inter-state conflict will erupt over water. Even in the Middle East, where water is scarcer than anywhere else in the world, water has served as a greater cause for cooperation than for conflict. Cooperation not conflict The notion of cooperation over international water resources will strike most readers as anomalous. Have we not all heard that "the wars of the 21 st century will be about water," as World Bank vice president Ismail Serageldin stated a few years ago. Or that water was the only conceivable reason for Jordan to go to war with Israel, as the late King Hussein is alleged to have said. There is, however, very little evidence that disputes over water have led or are about to lead to international conflict. (Nor has anyone been able to document King Hussein's remarks about going to war with Israel over water.) Though some have asserted that Arab-Israeli warfare has been motivated in part by the desire to assert control over water resources, historical evidence shows that water was not a factor in strategic planning by either side during the hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. Water problems If water wars are unlikely, does this mean that we need not be concerned about conflict over water? Not at all. Worldwide water use went up more than six fold in the 20th century and it continues to grow twice as fast as the increase in population. Problems associated with water scarcity and control over water resources are all too common. However, they are much more likely to occur within countries — such as the competition for water between urban dwellers seeking drinking water and farmers seeking water for irrigation — than between countries. The violence that erupted earlier this year in Cochabamba, Bolivia, following tariff increases for municipal water illustrates the kind of water conflict that we can expect to see. (see Globe and Mail, May 9 and 18, 2000) Experience shows that the presence of water on an international border is more likely to provide a catalyst for cooperation than conflict between the countries that depend on it. Researchers at the University of Oregon have compiled a Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database. In examining the cases generally considered to be examples of international water conflict, they have arrived at a surprising conclusion: Instead of fighting, countries that share water resources tend to maintain dialogue and negotiation leading to treaties for joint management of water. Jordan River The Jordan River forms much of the boundary between Israel and Jordan and is one of the world's most hotly contested waterways. Even while these two countries were legally at war, they maintained informal contacts on managing the river. As a result, when the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed in 1994, it was possible to include a well-developed annex devoted "to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between [Israel and Jordan]." What has been true for surface water on an international border also seems to be true for aquifers underlying a border. Prior to the signing of their historic agreement in 1993, Israeli and Palestinian academics and officials began holding discussions on joint management of the Mountain Aquifer, an extremely important source of groundwater underlying both Israel and the West Bank. The success of these discussions has helped forge a climate within which the broader peace process can take place. India-Pakistan collaboration Examples of collaboration over water are not restricted to the Middle East. Despite three wars and numerous skirmishes since 1948, India and Pakistan have managed to negotiate and implement a complex treaty on sharing the waters of the Indus River system. During periods of hostility, neither side has targeted the water facilities of the other nor attempted to disrupt the negotiated arrangements for water management. In Africa too, where eleven countries share the basin of the Nile, cooperation over water is more evident than conflict. "Perhaps the weight of history lies too heavy in the silt of the Nile valley," writes historian Robert Collins, "but man will always need water; and in the end this may drive him to drink with his enemies." Closer to home, the International Joint Commission, which manages waters shared by Canada and the United States, is considered such a model of success that it is being emulated by other nations. Minor skirmishes Approximately 40% of the world's population lives in the 264 river basins shared by more than one country. Put another way, almost half the world's land area is found in international water basins. And yet there have been only seven minor skirmishes over international waters in modern history, and even these involved factors in addition to water. Meanwhile, hundreds of international treaties have been negotiated to deal with water management, about 150 in the past century alone. There is no doubt that humanity faces a worldwide water crisis. Growing demand for drinking water and the much higher demand for irrigation water are placing enormous pressures on available fresh water supplies. At the same time, increasing pollution is reducing the usefulness of available water. The threats that these conditions pose for the poor and for the environment can not be overstated. Nevertheless, it is far more useful to consider the role of water in promoting cooperation rather than conflict, particularly in international relations. As the opening quote suggests, those who are inclined to belligerence may look to water as a reason for fighting. But for most of us, water's greatest value may be the way it brings people together.

### Prolif

#### Proliferation is not going to happen

Alison 10 – Director at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Graham, Foreign Affairs, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats", <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19819/nuclear_disorder.html>,)

After listening to a compelling briefing for a proposal or even in summarizing an argument presented by himself, Secretary of State George Marshall was known to pause and ask, "But how could we be wrong?" In that spirit, it is important to examine the reasons why the nonproliferation regime might actually be more robust than it appears. Start with the bottom line. There are no more nuclear weapons states now than there were at the end of the Cold War. Since then, one undeclared and largely unrecognized nuclear weapons state, South Africa, eliminated its arsenal, and one new state, North Korea, emerged as the sole self-declared but unrecognized nuclear weapons state.  One hundred and eighty-four nations have forsworn the acquisition of nuclear weapons and signed the NPT. At least 13 countries began down the path to developing nuclear weapons with serious intent, and were technologically capable of completing the journey, but stopped short of the finish line: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Italy, Libya, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia. Four countries had nuclear weapons but eliminated them: South Africa completed six nuclear weapons in the 1980s and then, prior to the transfer of power to the postapartheid government, dismantled them. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine together inherited more than 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991. As a result of negotiated agreements among Russia, the United States, and each of these states, all of these weapons were returned to Russia for dismantlement. Ukraine's 1,640 strategic nuclear warheads were dismantled, and the highly enriched uranium was blended down to produce low-enriched uranium, which was sold to the United States to fuel its nuclear power plants. Few Americans are aware that, thanks to the Megatons to Megawatts Program, half of all the electricity produced by nuclear power plants in the United States over the past decade has been fueled by enriched uranium blended down from the cores of nuclear warheads originally designed to destroy American cities. Although they do not minimize the consequences of North Korea's or Iran's becoming a nuclear weapons state, those confident in the stability of the nuclear order are dubious about the prospects of a cascade of proliferation occurring in Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. In Japan, nuclear neuralgia has deep roots. The Japanese people suffered the consequences of the only two nuclear weapons ever exploded in war. Despite their differences, successive Japanese governments have remained confident in the U.S. nuclear umbrella and in the cornerstone of the United States' national security strategy in Asia, the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. The South Koreans fear a nuclear-armed North Korea, but they are even more fearful of life without the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops on the peninsula. Taiwan is so penetrated and seduced by China that the terror of getting caught cheating makes it a poor candidate to go nuclear. And although rumors of the purchase by Myanmar (also called Burma) of a Yongbyon-style nuclear reactor from North Korea cannot be ignored, questions have arisen about whether the country would be able to successfully operate it.  In the Middle East, it is important to separate abstract aspirations from realistic plans. Few countries in the region have the scientific and technical infrastructure to support a nuclear weapons program. Saudi Arabia is a plausible buyer, although the United States would certainly make a vigorous effort to persuade it that it would be more secure under a U.S. nuclear umbrella than with its own arsenal. Egypt's determination to acquire nuclear weapons, meanwhile, is limited by its weak scientific and technical infrastructure, unless it were able to rent foreign expertise. And a Turkish nuclear bomb would not only jeopardize Turkey's role in NATO but also undercut whatever chances the country has for acceding to the EU.  Looking elsewhere, Brazil is now operating an enrichment facility but has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which outlaws nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and has accepted robust legal constraints, including those of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Other than South Africa, which retains the stockpile of 30 bombs' worth of highly enriched uranium that was once part of its nuclear program, it is difficult to identify other countries that might realistically become nuclear weapons states in the foreseeable future.

#### No Prolif and at worst its slow – management issues

**Hymans 12** – is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California (Jacques, May/June, “Botching the Bomb” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb>) Jacome

[NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=8&sid=7585163c-914e-4787-9fd6-b2e36f800b43%40sessionmgr12&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)

"TODAY, ALMOST any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, **only three have achieved a bomb**. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

International security experts have been unable to convincingly explain this remarkable trend. The first and most credible conventional explanation is that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has prevented a cascade of new nuclear weapons states by creating a system of export controls, technology safeguards, and on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. The NPT regime has certainly closed off the most straightforward pathways to the bomb. However, the NPT became a formidable obstacle to would-be nuclear states only in the 1990s, when its export-control lists were expanded and Western states finally became serious about enforcing them and when international inspectors started acting less like tourists and more like detectives. Yet the proliferation slowdown started at least 20 years before the system was solidified. So the NPT, useful though it may be, cannot alone account for this phenomenon.

A second conventional explanation is that although the NPT regime may not have been very effective, American and Israeli bombs have been. Syria's nascent nuclear effort, for instance, was apparently dealt a major setback by an Israeli air raid on its secret reactor construction site in 2007. But the record of military strikes is mixed. Contrary to the popular myth of the success of Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq, the strike actually spurred Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to move beyond vague intentions and commit strongly to a dedicated nuclear weapons project, which lasted until the 1990-91 Gulf War. Moreover, the bombs that the United States dropped on Iraq during that conflict mostly missed Saddam's nuclear sites.

Finally, some analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons projects become inefficient due to political leaders' flagging levels of commitment. But these analysts are reversing cause and effect: leaders lose interest when their nuclear programs are not running well. And some nuclear weapons projects, such as France's, have performed well despite very tepid support from above. The imperfect correlation between the commitment of leaders and the quality of nuclear programs should not be surprising, for although commentators may speak casually of "Mao's bomb" or "Kim Jong Il's bomb," the real work has to be carried out by other people.

[ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=8&sid=7585163c-914e-4787-9fd6-b2e36f800b43%40sessionmgr12&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)

A MORE CONVINCING explanation of the proliferation slowdown begins with the observation that during the early days of the nuclear age, most states with nuclear ambitions were in the developed world, whereas since the mid-1960s, most would-be nuclear states have been in the developing world. As proliferation has become a mainly developing-world phenomenon, timelines to the bomb have slowed down dramatically. But the relevant difference here is not primarily economic. Some nuclear programs in very poor states have fared rather well, such the one undertaken by famine-stricken China in the 1950s and 1960s. Conversely, wealthy oil states, such as Iraq and Libya, spent vast amounts on decades-long nuclear quests but still failed.

National income is only one dimension of development, however, and in this case it is not the most important one. As the political scientist Francis Fukuyama has stressed, despite strong rates of economic growth, most developing countries struggle to establish high-quality state bureaucracies. And a dysfunctional bureaucracy is likely to produce a dysfunctional nuclear weapons project.

Nuclear research and development organizations depend heavily on intense commitment, creative thinking, and a shared spirit of cooperation among large numbers of highly educated scientific and technical workers. To elicit this positive behavior, management needs to respect their professional autonomy and facilitate their efforts, and not simply order them around. Respect for professional autonomy was instrumental to the brilliant successes of the earliest nuclear weapons projects. Even in Stalin's Soviet Union, as the historian David Holloway has written, "it is striking how the apparatus of the police state fused with the physics community to build the bomb.… [The physics community's] autonomy was not destroyed by the creation of the nuclear project. It continued to exist within the administrative system that was set up to manage the project."

By contrast, most rulers of recent would-be nuclear states have tended to rely on a coercive, authoritarian management approach to advance their quest for the bomb, using appeals to scientists' greed and fear as the primary motivators. That coercive approach is a major mistake, because it produces a sense of alienation in the workers by removing their sense of professionalism. As a result, **nuclear programs lose their way**. Moreover, underneath these bad management choices lie bad management cultures. In developing states with inadequate civil service protections, every decision tends to become politicized, and state bureaucrats quickly learn to keep their heads down. Not even the highly technical matters faced by nuclear scientific and technical workers are safe from meddling politicians. The result is precisely the reverse of what the politicians intend: not heightened efficiency but rather a mixture of bureaucratic sloth, corruption, and endless blame shifting.

Although it is difficult to measure the quality of state institutions precisely, the historical record strongly indicates that the more a state has conformed to the professional management culture generally found in developed states, the less time it has needed to get its first bomb and the lower its chances of failure. Conversely, the more a state has conformed to the authoritarian management culture typically found in developing states, the more time it has needed to get its first bomb and the **higher its chances of failure.**

#### Prefer our claims – empirics and exaggeration.

Potter 8 and Mukhatzhanov– Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and \*\* Research Associate at the James Martin Center (William C. and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanov, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: a review essay.” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 139–169, )

Today it is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to and one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and tipping points.42 The lead author of this essay also has been guilty of the same tendency, and initially named an ongoing research project on forecasting proliferation he directs “21st Century Nuclear Proliferation Chains and Trigger Events.” As both a thors proceeded with research on the project, however, and particularly after reading the books by Hymans and Solingen, we became convinced that the metaphor is inappropriate and misleading, as it implies a process of nuclear decisionmaking and a pace of nuclear weapons spread that are unlikely to transpire. The current alarm about life in a nuclear-armed crowd has many historical antecedents and can be found in classified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as well as in scholarly analyses. The 1957 NIE, for example, identified a list of ten leading nuclear weapons candidates, including Canada, Japan, and Sweden.43 Sweden, it predicted, was “likely to produce its first weapons in about 1961,” while it was estimated that Japan would “probably seek to de- velop weapons production programs within the next decade.”44 In one of the most famous forecasts, President John Kennedy in 1963 expressed a nightmarish vision of a future world with afteen, twenty, or twenty-ave nuclear weap- ons powers.45 A number of the earliest scholarly projections of proliferation also tended to exaggerate the pace of nuclear weapons spread. A ourry of studies between 1958 and 1962, for example, focused on the “Nth Country Problem” and identified as many as twelve candidates capable of going nuclear in the near future.46 Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland were among the states most frequently picked as near-term proliferators. The “peaceful nuclear explosion” by India in 1974 was seen by many ana- lysts of the time as a body blow to the young NPT that would set in motion a new wave of proliferation. Although the anticipated domino effect did not transpire, the Indian test did precipitate a marked increase in scholarship on proliferation, including an innovative study developed around the concept— now in vogue—of proliferation chains. Rarely cited by today’s experts, the 1976 monograph on Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975–1995, by Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, set forth fifteen scenarios for nuclear weapons spread, each based on the assumption that one state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt several other states to follow suit, which in turn would trigger a succession of additional nuclearization decisions.47 Although lacking any single theoretical underpinning and accepting of the notion that proliferation de- cisions are likely to be attributed to security needs, the Dunn-Kahn model rejected the exclusive focus by realists on security drivers and sought to probe beneath the rhetoric to identify the possible presence of other pressures and constraints. To their credit, Dunn and Kahn got many things right and advanced the study of proliferation. Their forecasts, however, were almost without excep- tion wildly off the mark. Why, one may inquire, were their pessimistic projec- tions about nuclear weapons spread—and those of their past and subsequent counterparts in the intelligence community—so often divorced from reality? Although Hymans and Solingen appear not to have been familiar with the re- search by Dunn and Kahn on proliferation trends at the time of their books’ publications, their national leadership and domestic political survival models offer considerable insight into that dimension of the proliferation puzzle.48

## 1NR

### Environment

**Stagnant growth causes global warming/water pollution/environmental damage.**

Jerry **Sanders**, Senior Fellow of the World Policy Institute, ‘**90** (Bulletin of Peace Proposals, May)

Among the poorest countries, particularly those burdened by debt, we can expect that a shrinking world market and declining terms of trade will serve to accelerate deforestation and soil exhaustion as nations seek to maximize agricultural, mining, and other commodity exports in a losing effort to stay even. Paradoxically, therefore, stagnant growth very likely will produce increases in carbon dioxide and other trace gases that trigger global warming, acid rain and toxic waste that poison ground water, and desertification that makes the spread of fallow land a growing danger in many regimes of the Third World.

### Prolif

**Economic desperation fuels prolif**

William **Burrows and** Robert **Windram ‘94** (Critical Mass, p. 491-2)

Economics is in many respects proliferation’s catalyst. As we have noted, economic desperation drives Russia and some of the former Warsaw Pact nations to peddle weapons and technology. The possibility of considerable profits or at least balanced international payments also prompts Third World countries like China, Brazil, and Israel to do the same. Economics, as well as such related issues as overpopulation, drive proliferation just as surely as do purely political motives. Unfortunately, that subject is beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that, all things being equal, well-off, relatively secure societies like today’s Japan are less likely to buy or sell superweapon technology than those that are insecure, needy, or desperate. Ultimately, solving economic problems, especially as they are driven by population pressure, is the surest way to defuse proliferation and enhance true national security.

### Link

#### 1nc link ev says it’s politically controversial – threshold of link is just to distract Obama’s focus

#### Fo real – nobody like it

Mariotte 6/5/12 (Michael Mariotte, Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the polls say,” http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say)

Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this: About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’” and this: About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.” Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that **support plummeted**. This is **consistent with findings over the past decade**, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source. A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.

#### IFR unpopular

**Dardenon 9** Steve is a writer for The Seeker Blog. “How The Integral Fast Reactor Was killed,” Oct 21, http://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear\_power\_industry\_news/b/nuclear\_power\_news/archive/2009/10/21/how-the-integral-fast-reactor-was-killed-10214.aspx

Here’s a [concise history of the Integral Fast Reactor](http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0509till.html), including how Sen. John Kerry orchestrated the killing:

The anti-IFR forces were led by John Kerry. He was the principal speaker and the floor manager of the anti forces in the Senate debate. He spoke at length, with visual aids; he had been well prepared. His arguments against the merits of the IFR were not well informedand many were clearly wrong. But what his presentation lacked in accuracy it made up in emotion. He attacked from many angles, but principally he argued proliferation dangers from civilian nuclear power.

While all serious weapons development programs everywhere in the world have always taken place in huge laboratories, in specialized facilities, behind walls of secrecy, and there has been negligible involvement with civilian nuclear power, it is impossible to argue that there CAN be none. For this reason the IFR processes were specifically designed to further minimize such possibilities, and, if developed, they would have represented a significant advance over the present situation. This did not slow Senator Kerry, as he went through the litany of anti-nuclear assertions, articulately and confidently.

After both sides had their say the vote came, and the pro-IFR forces prevailed. But now the funding bill had to go to conferencea compromise committee of both houses whose job was to consolidate the different versions passed by the two houses into one bill to be sent to the President for signature into law. There was brief hope that IFR development could continue even **in the face of the powerful opposition**.

But the conference committee, behind the closed doors normal to such meetings, upheld the House position. There was to be no IFR funding. The IFR was dead.

A few weeks later, the mid-term elections swept Republicans into power in Congress. The IFR votes had always been politicized. With some significant exceptions, in fact just enough each year to fund the IFR, the vote had always been along party lines. Had the IFR been able to hang on for a few more weeks its development almost certainly would have gone on to completion.

#### Nuclear causes huge partisan fights

**US News 9** (3/27, Gauging the Prospects for Nuclear Power in the Obama Era, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/energy/2009/03/27/gauging-the-prospects-for-nuclear-power-in-the-obama-era.html, AG)

When asked about their views on nuclear power, President Obama and his advisers say they support it. "I believe in nuclear power as a central part of our energy mix," Energy Secretary Steven Chu recently told Congress. The phrase, both inclusive and relatively vague, has its advantages. But now on Capitol Hill and elsewhere, there are growing doubts over just how much the Obama administration really means it. The first telling sign came in the stimulus debate, when a push to include tens of billions of dollars in insurance for new nuclear reactors failed. Then, the Obama administration came out this month against storing nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Now, a third front, with far-reaching consequences, is about to open up. The Senate Energy Committee will begin debating an ambitious bill next week that could, among other things, decide whether nuclear power will be treated as a renewable energy source. Democrats are pushing for it to include a national "Renewable Electricity Standard" that would require utilities to generate a significant percentage of their electricity from renewable sources, including wind, solar, and geothermal. Under the current proposal, nuclear energy would not qualify. These moves are provoking testy criticism from pro-nuke Republicans, who are fully aware of the powerful market boost such a rule would have for nuclear were it included. Meanwhile, in utility boardrooms, people are asking, "Where is the administration on this?" says Marvin Fertel, the Nuclear Energy Institute's president. This debate is not just a partisan one. In fact, it's setting off something of a regional clash, with a particularly loud cry coming from the Southeast, where state officials say that the rules could punish their region, which is not well situated to take advantage of most kinds of alternative energy. "It's going to be hot as blazes here come July and August, but we're still not going to be a great solar resource," says Stan Wise, a Georgia public service commissioner. "Give us credit for the new nukes we are going to build." Even Democrats are arguing among themselves over how much to support nuclear energy. Few are flat-out opposed to nuclear, the country's leading source of low carbon-emitting electricity, but many prefer to support true renewables. And as Wise, who recently testified before the House, says, "I got a hint of support from some of the moderate Democrats. My concern is, can they stand up to their committee chairs and this powerful agenda?"

#### Empirically proven

**Slocum 08** – director of Public Citizen’s Energy Program

(Tyson, Multinational Monitor “Nuclear’s Power Play: Give Us Subsidies or Give Us Death,” Sept/Oct 2008, vol.. 29, no. 2, http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2008/092008/slocum.html) // JMP

The lobbying effort paid off with passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The Act authorized the Department of Energy (DOE) to institute a loan guarantee program for “innovative technologies,” of which nuclear power was to receive the lion’s share.

The 2005 Act instructed the DOE to develop rules for handing out loan guarantees. That process proved complicated and controversial, with disputes raging about whether Congress would have to okay the guarantee program as developed by the DOE, and what amount of guarantees could be provided.

Wall Street investment banks joined the nuclear industry in pushing for a large-scale loan guarantee program. Investment banks would like to broker financing deals for nuclear plants, but they know no deals will be forthcoming without government guarantees. “We believe many new nuclear construction projects will have difficulty accessing the capital markets during construction and initial operation without the support of a federal government loan guarantee,” six banks — Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Bros., Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley — wrote in a July 2007 letter to the DOE. “Lenders and investors in the fixed income markets will be acutely concerned about a number of political, regulatory and litigation-related risks that are unique to nuclear power, including the possibility of delays in commercial operation of a completed plant or ‘another Shoreham’ [a completed nuclear facility in New York State that was unable to open due to protests over safety concerns]. We believe these risks, combined with the higher capital costs and longer construction schedules of nuclear plants as compared to other generation facilities, will make lenders unwilling at present to extend long-term credit to such projects in a form that would be commercially viable.”

As the Department of Energy program neared implementation, the nuclear industry lobbied Congress to authorize $50 billion in loan guarantees for nuclear power alone. Campaigning by public interest and anti-nuclear groups got that amount knocked down to $20.5 billion ($2 billion for waste recycling and $18.5 billion for new reactors) in the appropriations bill that Congress passed at the end of 2007. That bill provided for $38.5 billion in loan guarantees, with more than half reserved for nuclear, one fifth for coal, and the rest for renewables and efficiency.

### Fiat

**Politics DA’s are good—**

**1) The inherent barrier to the affirmative is political concerns – arguing that this barrier is good is key to best policy and real world advocacy – political considerations are intrinsically tied to real-world evaluation of the plan**

**2) Ground – politics is a key neg generic especially on a topic with few disads – key to clash and offsetting small affs**

**3) Education – debates get stale – the politics DA is key to keep the educational value of debate fresh throughout the year and encourages research over current political issues**

**Key to civic engagement**

**States Education Commission 4** – summary of a report on American schools by over fifty distinguished scholars (The Progress of Education Reform 2004, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/51/34/5134.pdf, AG)

Written by a distinguished group of more than 50 scholars and practitioners, this report summarizes the evidence in favor of civic education in K-12 schools. With regard to educating students, the report finds research supports several recommendations: • Study a wide range of topics – Students perform better on tests of civic skills and knowledge if they have studied a range of relevant subjects, such as the Constitution, U.S. history, the structure of government and elections, and the legal system. • Use interactive lessons – Students who participate in active debates that make connections to current issues have a greater interest in politics, improved critical thinking and communication skills, and are more likely to say they will vote and volunteer as adults. • Service-learning is an effective tool – Students should be provided with the opportunity to apply what they learn through the performance of community service that is linked to the formal curriculum and classroom instruction. Known as “servicelearning,” this approach can be more effective at instilling civic skills and values among students than volunteering that is unconnected to the school’s curriculum. The report finds that a majority of schools do not currently link community service programs to the curriculum. • Encourage student participation in school governance – Research suggests that giving students more opportunities to help manage their own classrooms and schools builds civic skills and attitudes. • Extracurricular activities are valuable – Long-term studies of Americans show that, even over several decades, those who participated in high school extracurricular activities remain more civically engaged than those who do not participate. More research is needed to determine which specific activities have the most impact on civic values. • Simulations show promise – Empirical evidence indicates simulations of voting, trials, legislative deliberations and diplomacy can lead to students becoming more informed and interested in politics and government.

**Solves extinction**

**Boggs 97** – professor of social sciences, Los Angeles (Carl, The Great Retreat, Theory and Society 26.6, jstor, AG)

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, **be reduced to impotence**. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, **the fate of the world** hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, **well-informed and ready to participate at many levels**, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an already familiar dynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75

### PC key

#### PC key

Janie Lorber and Kate Ackley (writers for Roll Call) November 8, 2012 “Lobbyists Eager for Short-Term Fiscal Deal” http://www.rollcall.com/issues/58\_35/Lobbyists-Eager-for-Short-Term-Fiscal-Deal-218891-1.html?pos=olobh

“The stakes over the fiscal cliff discussion just got significantly higher,” said David French, chief lobbyist at the National Retail Federation. “If Washington was looking to guidance from the voters on the path ahead, voters weren’t exactly clear.” As the nation approaches its debt ceiling yet again, lawmakers have less than 20 legislative days to decide what to do about the simultaneous expiration of the Bush-era tax cuts and the Social Security payroll tax holiday, as well as the first round of sequestration cuts. Every interest group has a stake. Business advocates argue that the tax provisions set to expire on Dec. 31 will stifle the still sputtering economy. Defense lobbyists fear that the longer the Pentagon budget remains up in the air, the harder it will be for contractors to recover. And unions and other liberal groups worry that emboldened Senate Democrats may agree to cuts in Medicare as part of a last-minute compromise. Add to that pleas from lobbyists representing municipalities ravaged by Hurricane Sandy that are desperate for federal funds to speed disaster relief efforts. “Folks in the business community believe it’s time to unite our country because America’s competitiveness is at stake,” Jay Timmons, the president of the National Association of Manufacturers, said on a conference call Wednesday. “I don’t think there’s anything more urgent than dealing with our fiscal crisis.” For the past year, defense giants and, to a lesser degree, technology firms, have begged lawmakers to avoid billions of dollars in cuts associated with sequestration. Michael Herson, a Republican lobbyist with American Defense International, said he is optimistic that lawmakers will delay sequestration until the next Congress and said most defense lobbyists will adopt a wait-and-see approach for the lame-duck session. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which fielded its largest voter mobilization effort ever and spent millions in support of Republicans this cycle, also urged the parties to come together on comprehensive tax and entitlement reforms. But with many of the same faces returning to Washington, D.C., next year, lobbyists wondered whether the illusive “grand bargain” is little more than a pipe dream. “[It] hinges on how Obama plays it. If he and his team really bear down and work with GOPers — an element sadly lacking the last four years — they can make a lot of progress,” said Jack Howard, a Republican lobbyist at Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates. “If, however, he takes a hands-off approach, then I don’t really see much of a path forward. He has to be the arm-twister, the head-knocker to move things forward.”

#### Obama’s political capital will give him leverage in the ‘fiscal cliff’ negotiations now – brokers a deal

Andrew Sprung (he is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor) September 21, 2012 “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html)

In my view, Klein is viewing this question too narrowly. Obama is well aware of the limitations of the bully pulpit, and he's got to know better than any person on the planet that presidential advocacy polarizes, entrenching the opposing party in implacable opposition to whatever the president proposes. Yet, in presenting a revamped theory of how the presidency works, he's not just feeding us a line of BS. And if Obama wins reelection, I believe that we will look back five or ten or twenty years from now and recognize that yes, Obama did change the way Washington works. Or at the very least, he kept the US on a sane policy course in a time of extreme polarization and thus gave (will have given...) the system space to self-correct, as it has in the past. Let's start with Klein's objection to Obama's characterization of how healthcare reform got done: The health-care process, which I reported on extensively, was a firmly “inside game” strategy. There were backroom deals with most every major interest group and every swing legislator.... By the time the law passed, many more Americans viewed it unfavorably than viewed it favorably — exactly the opposite of what you’d expect if health care had passed through an “outside game” strategy in which, as Obama put it, “the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” And yet, health care passed. The inside game worked. All true, laddie. And yet, in claiming that the impetus for healthcare reform came from the outside, I don't think Obama is attempting to whitewash this long and messy process -- or is even referring to it. He is alluding to the marshaling or channeling of popular will that got him elected. The essence of Obama's primary election argument against Hillary Clinton was that he was better equipped to marshal the popular will for fundamental change -- with healthcare reform as the centerpiece -- than she was. I well remember the moment when that argument first impressed itself on me. It was in a debate in the immediate aftermath of the Iowa caucuses, on Jan. 5, 2008: Look, I think it's easier to be cynical and just say, "You know what, it can't be done because Washington's designed to resist change." But in fact there have been periods of time in our history where a president inspired the American people to do better, and I think we're in one of those moments right now. I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobilized around big changes -- not incremental changes, not small changes. I actually give Bill Clinton enormous credit for having balanced those budgets during those years. It did take political courage for him to do that. But we never built the majority and coalesced the American people around being able to get the other stuff done. And, you know, so the truth is actually words do inspire. Words do help people get involved. Words do help members of Congress get into power so that they can be part of a coalition to deliver health care reform, to deliver a bold energy policy. Don't discount that power, because when the American people are determined that something is going to happen, then it happens. And if they are disaffected and cynical and fearful and told that it can't be done, then it doesn't. I'm running for president because I want to tell them, yes, we can. And that's why I think they're responding in such large numbers.

Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance. But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support. Obama also used the bully pulpit at crucial points, if not to rally public opinion, at least to re-commit wavering Democrats -- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a good faith negotiator, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals. In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. Savvy politicians channel public opinion; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he amassed the political capital, and he spent it, and we got what he paid for. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey: But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered. Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said: I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message. So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes. Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts. First, he understates Obama's (and the Democrats') successes in the year of confrontation that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition. Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced" approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. But that battle ain't over yet, and popular support for Obama's position is political capital that's still in the bank. In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama, if he wins reelection, will have the whip hand, given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes banked him further capital in this upcoming fight. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side. Third, it's rational for Obama to recast his bid for change in election season, because of course he's seeking further "change" from the outside, i.e., more Democrats elected to Congress. He's not going to win a mandate as in 2008, or, most likely, majorities in both houses of Congress. But he has to make the pitch for being granted renewed tools to advance his agenda. Finally, a key part of Obama's "you are the change" pitch in his convention speech was a frank call to play defense -- to protect the changes wrought in his first term and fend off the further capture of the electoral process and the nation's resources by the oligarchy the GOP represents: If you turn away now – if you buy into the cynicism that the change we fought for isn’t possible … well, change will not happen. If you give up on the idea that your voice can make a difference, then other voices will fill the void: lobbyists and special interests; the people with the $10 million checks who are trying to buy this election and those who are making it harder for you to vote; Washington politicians who want to decide who you can marry, or control health-care choices that women should make for themselves.

**Dickinson concludes neg**

Dickinson, 9 (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009, MSU Institute File)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level, Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call (Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition, Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote "buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).

**Capital is key to the agenda**

**Light 99** – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 34)

In chapter 2, I will consider just how capital affects the basic parameters of the domestic agenda. Though the internal resources are important contributors to timing and size, capital remains the cirtical factor. That conclusion will become essential in understanding the domestic agenda. Whatever the President’s personal expertise, character, or skills, capital is the most important resource. In the past, presidential scholars have focused on individual factors in discussing White House decisions, personality being the dominant factor. Yet, given low levels in presidential capital, even the most positive and most active executive could make little impact. A president can be skilled, charming, charismatic, a veritable legislative wizard, but if he does not have the basic congressional strength, his domestic agenda will be severely restricted – capital affects both the number and the content of the President’s priorities. Thus, it is capital that determines whether the President will have the opportunity to offer a detailed domestic program, whether he will be restricted to a series of limited initiatives and vetoes. Capital sets the basic parameters of the agenda, determining the size of the agenda and guiding the criteria for choice. Regardless of the President’s personality, capital is the central force behind the domestic agenda.

**Capital is key – it outweigh ideology, party support, or concessions**

**Light 99** – Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Service (Paul, the President’s Agenda, p. 24-25)

Call it push, pull, punch, juice, power, or clout – they all mean the same thing. The most basic and most important of all presidential resources is capital. Though the internal resources time, information, expertise, and energy all have an impact on the domestic agenda, the President is severely limited without capital. And capital is directly linked to the congressional parties. While there is little question that bargaining skills can affect both the composition and the success of the domestic agenda, without the necessary party support, no amount of expertise or charm can make a difference. Though bargaining is an important tool of presidential power, it does not take place in a neutral environment. Presidents bring certain advantages and disadvantages to the table.

#### Presidential push for a fiscal bargain solves status quo divisions

Vicki Needham (writer for The Hill) November 7, 2012 “Business groups urge quick extension of tax policies in lame duck” http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/economy/266701-business-groups-urge-quick-extension-of-tax-policies-in-lame-duck

A grand bargain will require complex negotiations that will take more time than the six or so weeks left before year's end. "What we need is action," Engler said. Engler, Casey and Jay Timmons, president of the National Association of Manufacturers, told reporters that Obama must lay out a blueprint for Congress that will tackle the long list of these issues hampering a more robust economic recovery. "This is going to take executive leadership," Engler said. Timmons said it is time for unity to help the country improve its global competitiveness. "Our goal is to grow the economy," he said. The president talked to congressional leaders on Wednesday about the legislative agenda less than a day after winning reelection. But congressional leaders immediately staked out the same positions that have created so much division on Capitol Hill. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) said he would not yield to raising any taxes this year, while Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) argued for letting tax rates expire for wealthier earners. Still, both men hinted that they need to find a way to work togther toward a bipartisan compromise.

#### Crowded lame duck means trade off.

Inside U.S. Trade, "Vietnam PNTR could be delayed by Peru, Oman despite broad support" June 16, 2006 lexis

Business lobbyists reacted with alarm to Boehner's comments, because considering trade bills in a lame duck session creates additional uncertainties. Following the elections, members may not vote the way they would have previously, one source noted, and there also is a danger that the agenda in a lame duck session would become too crowded for consideration of trade bills.

#### Crowded lame duck items get pushed off the agenda.

The Times of India, Chidanand Rajghatta, "Senate takes up bill on Indo-US nuke deal" November 16, 2006 lexis

The timeline is so short and tight and the legislative agenda for the lame-duck session is so crowded that some Indian activists were fearful that the Nuke deal might again get pushed out of the calendar. But Frist's announcement set the fears to rest.

### AT: Winners Win

**Obviously not a win – their evidence assumes the passage of a piece of Obama’s agenda --- not the plan which is a 100% reversal of policy that he throws on Congress – only a risk it sucks him into a political fight that distracts from the rest of the agenda.**

**Turn isn’t unique—short-term extension of payroll already gave him a win**

**Fighting for passage of the plan FORCES a trade-off with other agenda priorities**

**Bernstein 8/20** (Jonathan, 8/20/2011, “The power that a president does -- and doesn't -- have A president has less power than Obama's liberal critics think -- but they also have more power than they realize,” http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war\_room/2011/08/20/bernstein\_presidential\_power/index.html, JMP)

Moreover, the positions of the president and most everyone else are, to look at it one way, sort of opposites. The president has potential influence over an astonishing number of things -- not only every single policy of the U.S. government, but policy by state and local governments, foreign governments, and actions of private citizens and groups. Most other political actors have influence over a very narrow range of stuff.

What that means is that while the president's overall influence is certainly far greater than that of a House subcommittee chair or a midlevel civil servant in some agency, his influence over any specific policy may well not be greater than that of such a no-name nobody. A lot of good presidential skills have to do with figuring out how to leverage that overall influence into victories in specific battles, and if we look at presidential history, there are lots of records of successes and failures. In other words, it's hard. It involves difficult choices -- not (primarily) policy choices, but **choices in which policies to fight for and which not to, and when and where and how to use the various bargaining chips that are available.**

**Spending political capital makes Obama reluctant to push on other issues**

Grumet, 11 --- president of the Bipartisan Policy Center (9/22/2011, Jason, “"Pass this bill" - rebalancing the Administration's relationship with Congress,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/183315-qpass-this-billq-rebalancing-the-administrations-relationship-with-congress)

To date, the Obama Administration has largely presented Congress with legislative principles and worked behind the scenes as legislation is developed. There are surely many reasons for the Obama Administration’s approach to Congress. At the outset of his Administration, Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress. On health care, the memories of President Clinton’s assertive approach surely played a role. Moreover, the political capital expended to pass the Affordable Care Act clearly created some reluctance to push Congressional Democrats too hard on other issues. But it is hard to argue that the Administration received, much if any, political protection through its greater deference to Congress.

**Fights bleed Obama’s momentum**

Harris and Lee, 10(John Harris and Carol Lee, 1/20/2012, “Obama's first year: What went wrong,” http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4DF829C9-18FE-70B2-A8381A971FA3FFC9)

• Obama believed that early success would be self-reinforcing, building a powerful momentum for bold government action. This belief was the essence of the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a big stimulus package would lead to success in passing health care, which in turn would clear the way for major cap-and-trade environmental legislation and “re-regulation” of the financial services sector — all in the first year.

**This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power**. The massive cost of the stimulus package and industry bailouts — combined with the inconvenient fact that unemployment went up after their passage — meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum rather than steadily increasing public confidence in his larger governing vision. That vision was further obscured for many Americans by the smoke from the bitter and seemingly endless legislative battle on Capitol Hill over health care.

**Obama’s new political persona as a middle class warrior is the root of his political success**

Nicholas 12 (Peter, 1/1/2012, LA Times, “Obama's resolution? To limit dealings with Congress,” http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-obama-plans-20120101,0,2595075.story)

Now that the payroll tax cut has been extended, the White House is resorting to some of the same language that Obama had rejected. White House aides have made it clear that Obama fought — and won — a battle with congressional Republicans.

The president did so in part by trying to adopt a **new political persona**. Earnest described him as having "worked to claim the mantle as a **warrior for the middle class**."

He'll try to emphasize that identity in the new year, perhaps as soon as Wednesday, when he travels to Cleveland to give a speech on the economy. That trip comes one day after the Republican caucuses in Iowa, the first major contest in the race to establish a GOP nominee.

Obama won't congratulate the winner, the White House said, but he will try to distinguish himself from Republican candidates who are bashing each other in a fierce campaign.

**Legislative success depletes capital – doesn’t increase it**

**Purdum 10**—Todd S. Purdum 10 is a correspondent in the Washington bureau of The New York Times "Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them" 12/20 www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html

With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington).

**Illogical—if winners win were true, Obama wouldn’t have lost after his first win**

**Our link assumes this—previous, calculated wins will allow Obama to pass his agenda** **now, but missteps like the plan drain capital**

**Youngman 9** (Sam, 7/27/09, The Hill, "July has been disaster for Obama, Hill Dems",” http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/52107-analysis-july-has-been-disaster-for-obama-hill-dems, WEA)

Despite a number of former Democratic members and aides working in the Obama administration, Democrats on Capitol Hill have grown bolder in defying their party leader. Many centrist Democrats are worried that Republicans will have the upper hand in the 2010 elections. Paul Light, an expert on the presidency and a professor at New York University, said the president's problems with Capitol Hill reflect "a miscalculation by the Obama administration on how political capital gets spent in Washington." Light said that capital, even for a president who enjoys immense personal popular support like Obama, is spent a bit at a time on each initiative or piece of legislation. "I think the Obama administration has been spending political capital at roughly the same rate the federal government spends money," Light said. "**Eventually, it runs out."** Light quoted President Lyndon Johnson, who said that "if you don't get it done in six months, you're not going to get it done." One of the reasons Obama has spent so much capital, aside from his ambitious agenda, has been his willingness to cede so much control to Congress, Light said. While lawmakers like Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) are allies of the president, his political capital is not necessarily a priority of theirs. To that end, Light says, Obama has made a mistake in making Pelosi his "broker," spending his political capital but not always to his benefit.

**Obama’s Velcro – only blame will stick**

**Nicholas and Hook, 10** (Peter Nicholas and Janet Hook, 7/30/10, LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president,” http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730)

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro.

Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame.

Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.

But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.

The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape.

**What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting.**

Instead, **voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick**: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.

"I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."

**Political capital is finite – focus is key**

**Francis 10** – a Washington, DC-based public affairs and political consultant. He once served as chief of staff to then Representative Norman Y. Mineta (D-CA) and as Deputy Assistant and Deputy White House Chief of Staff to President Jimmy Carter (12/16/10, Les, “Top Dem: White House Needs Fresh Blood,” http://www.frumforum.com/top-dem-white-house-needs-fresh-blood, JMP)

Next, the President and his advisers should wake up to an underappreciated reality: The American presidency, although a powerful position, does have its limits. The capacity of any White House to do things—to pass legislation, issue executive orders, run the executive branch, lead its political party, attend to its many ceremonial responsibilities, shape and mobilize public opinion and (not to be forgotten) wage war—is not inexhaustible. There is only so much time, so much intellectual fire power, so much energy and **so much political capital to spend** on a presidential agenda. So narrow it. And focus, focus, focus!

### Intrinsicness—

**Counterinterp –the judge is a citizen deciding whether to support the plan**

**1) Key to civic engagement—most debaters won’t be policy-makers—it is more important to understand the implications of supporting policies—key to successful democracy**

**2) Policymakers take political considerations into account—the USFG isn’t a monolithic entity—Clinton proves political choices have ramifications**

**3) Neg ground—USFG could circumvent the link to any disad—forces debates about impact-turns that disincentivize specific research**

**4) Extra T—intrinsicness lets the aff solve all DAs—overstretches our research burden and undermines preparedness—reject the team for the time-skew and to deter crappy theory args that tradeoff with substance**

### 2NC – A2 Uniqueness O/W Link

#### Even if it doesn’t prevent passage – an ugly fight on the way to passing it still triggers our impact

The Australian October 1, 2012 “Investors eye the 'fiscal cliff' as Barack Obama's poll numbers improve “ http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/us-election/investors-eye-the-fiscal-cliff-as-barack-obamas-poll-numbers-improve/story-fn95xh4y-1226485913043

The widespread belief on Wall Street is that Congress and Mr Obama will start negotiations over raising the debt limit and pushing back the fiscal cliff when they return in late November - the so-called lame-duck session, because newly elected members of Congress will not have taken their seats. Twists in the talks will likely rattle markets as the new year approaches. But if stocks do fall sharply, investors expect that would push Republicans and Democrats to reach a deal. "Ugly negotiations in the lame-duck session could really throw the market for a loop," says Mr Kleintop. "It could be a painful process for investors." In a report out this week, analysts at Goldman Sachs tried to estimate just how painful could be. Goldman expects the stock market will start sinking after the elections as people realize the fiscal cliff "will not be solved in a smooth fashion."

#### Time pressure – scheduling ensures small window

Chad Pergram (writer for Fox News) October 27, 2012 “The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Lame Duck Session of Congress” http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2012/10/27/hitchhikers-guide-lame-duck-session-congres

The Congressional schedule for this lame duck session is remarkably abbreviated. The House and Senate are both slated to next meet on Tuesday, November 13. That's a little later simply because that Monday is Veterans' Day. The Senate hasn't set any schedule other than a procedural vote at 5:30 pm on "The Sportsmen Act." But the House plans to be in session through the 16th and then take off the next week for Thanksgiving. The House then comes back November 27-30, December 3-6 and December 11-14. That's an incredible time-crunch. For starters, no one on Capitol Hill is anticipating the House freshman to start arriving until the week of November 13th. Then there are leadership elections in both bodies. House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) says Democratic leadership elections won't hit until November 29. So in addition to figuring out which party is in charge of what (if electoral disputes linger), it doesn't look like Congress can truly get down to business on the pressing legislative issues until December.

#### Short-term aversion to fiscal cliff will get negotiated now – but it will be a political slugfest

The Hotline October 24, 2012 “Panic Cliff” Lexis

Lawmakers "are downplaying hopes that they will avert the so-called fiscal cliff," but "they suggest a partial fix is likely. Leading lawmakers have no intention of letting the sequester happen or all of the tax cuts expire. Nor will Congress vote to punt those events entirely, even for a few months," cong. aides said. Instead, cong. "leaders are discussing a plan to make a down payment of targeted cuts worth about half of the" $110B, "while establishing a framework for additional cuts." Rep. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD): "It will be very difficult to put together a comprehensive plan in just six weeks. Everyone's going to have to scramble" (Friedman/House, National Journal Daily, 10/23). Sens. Mark Warner (D-VA) and Saxby Chambliss (R-GA) "told the financial community on" Oct. 23 "that the industry's engagement is critical if the country is to avoid the 'fiscal cliff." Chambliss "said he expects a 'tough political slugfest' between Thanksgiving and Christmas as Congress and the administration race to beat the end-of-year deadline in an environment that will be politically charged no matter who wins the" WH.

### Resilience

#### Fiscal cliff collapses the economy

Maximillian Walsh (writer for the Australian Financial Review) October 25, 2012 “Good ship QE3 must reverse sometime” Lexis

Even though fiscal gridlock has meant Ben Bernanke has, in effect, been operating with one arm tied behind his back, his monetary strategy has been courageous and reasonably effective. The US still has a way to go but its recovery to date has been in line with the experience of previous systemic financial crises as outlined by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their timely study, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Full recovery from such episodes averages out at about 10 years. Output in the US rose above its pre-crisis peak in the second half of 2011 - a result that put it ahead of most developed economies. Since then, however, the US, along with rest of the developed world, has lost some momentum. The IMF's World Economic Outlook, published this month, reports there is now a one in six chance of global growth falling below 2 per cent. For the US the biggest immediate risk is the so-called fiscal cliff - drastic and automatic tax increases and spending cutbacks - scheduled to come into effect on January 1. The conventional wisdom is that these measures will be postponed by Congress in the lame-duck session after the coming presidential election. Winston Churchill's observation that the US always does the right thing after all other options have been tried, is widely quoted to support the conventional wisdom. That wasn't the case in 1930, when Congress gave open slather to vested interests and brought down what was the most protectionist bill in US history - the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. This became the excuse for other countries to introduce "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies that exacerbated the contraction in global trade and deepened the Great Depression. This was the outcome predicted by economists who petitioned Congress against Smoot-Hawley. Not surprisingly, the approaching threat of the fiscal cliff and the absence of any engagement in the political area on its consequences is already having a significant impact on the capital investment and employment plans of American industry. It needs to be said that, considering the magnitude of the ongoing financial crisis, the two presidential candidates remain insouciance personified. It's not just the candidates. As John Hussman, an American economic analyst, wrote in his weekly commentary: "We've become desensitised to extraordinary large numbers - if hundreds of billions don't solve the problem, then a few trillion will - ignoring the magnitude of those figures relative to our actual capacity to produce economic output." If the fiscal cliff is not dealt with - and this would involve postponing most of the measures - then the US is headed for recession in 2013 and it will drag the rest of the developed world and quite a swag of the emerging economies down with it.

## 2NR

### PC Key

**Also, Obama can push marginal voters – obviously he won’t convince every republican but he can sway enough**

Beckmann & Kumar, 11 --- Department of Poli Sci and UC Irvine (Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar, Journal of Theoretical Politics, “How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking,” SAGE Journals Database)

Agreeing that presidents’ strategic options in Congress do indeed depend heavily on factors beyond their control, our model’s first insight is explicating the two systematic strategies presidents have available for exerting influence in Congress: they can target marginal voters to shift the preference distribution on roll-call votes and they can target congressional leaders to censor the policy alternatives making it that far. While the first of these is widely recognized and studied, the second is not. By detailing the actual mechanisms of president-led coalition building on Capitol Hill, **ours is a theory that puts positive presidential power on a firmer conceptual footing; legislative opportunities are predictable (if not controllable) and capitalizing on them depends on nothing more heroic than the normal grist of legislative politics: arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading.** In this way, we subscribe to President Eisenhower’s observation: ‘I’ll tell you what leadership is: it’s persuasion, and conciliation, and education, and patience. It’s long, slow, tough work’ (Hughes, 1963: 124).

However, if spending political capital in the service of vote-centered and agenda-centered strategies is a necessary condition for presidents to have positive influence in Congress, it certainly is not a sufficient condition. Instead, we find the exact policy return on a particular presidential lobbying campaign is conditioned by the location of the status quo, and the nature of leading opponents’ and pivotal voters’ preferences. Beyond enjoying ample political capital, then, those presidents who seek to change far-off status quos and confront pliable leading opponents and/or pivotal voters are expected to wield the greatest policymaking impact. By comparison, presidents with little to no political capital, seeking to change centrist status quos, or confronting opposing leaders and pivotal voters who staunchly oppose their proposals can find themselves with ‘nothing to do but stand there and take it’, as Lyndon Johnson once put it.

**History proves that capital is effective --- backroom negotiations can produce agreements**

Mandel, 12 --- Assistant Editor of Commentary magazine (Seth, 3/23/2012, “Contentions Lessons of Presidential Persuasion: Be the Commander-In-Chief,” http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/03/23/presidential-persuasion-commander-in-chief-obama-reagan-clinton/)

I want to offer Klein one more note of optimism. He writes:

Back-room bargains and quiet negotiations do not, however, present an inspiring vision of the Presidency. And they fail, too. Boehner and Obama spent much of last summer sitting in a room together, but, ultimately, the Speaker didn’t make a private deal with the President for the same reason that Republican legislators don’t swoon over a public speech by him: he is the leader of the Democratic Party, and if he wins they lose. This suggests that, as the two parties become more sharply divided, it may become increasingly difficult for a President to govern—and there’s little that he can do about it.

I disagree. The details of the deal matter, not just the party lines about the dispute. There is no way the backroom negotiations Clinton conducted with Gingrich over social security reform could have been possible if we had prime ministers, instead of presidents. **The president possesses political capital Congress doesn’t**. History tells us there are effective ways to use that capital. One lesson: quiet action on domestic policy, visible and audible leadership on national security.