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**Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – excludes extraction of those materials**

**Vaekstfonden 6** – Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 [s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf](http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf)

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.

Raw material extraction

This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.

Energy production

Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.
Transmission and distribution

**Restrictions’ must be direct and immediate limitations on production**

CJ **Veeraswami** (Former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, India) **1966** “T.M. Kannappa Mudaliar And Ors. vs The State Of Madras” Majority opinion, <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/838831/>

The collection of a toll or a tax for the use of a road or for the use of a bridge or for the use of an aerodrome is no barrier or burden or deterrent to traders, who, in their absence, may have to take a longer or less convenient or more expensive route. Such compensatory taxes are no hindrance to anybody's freedom so long as they remain reasonable; but they could of course, be converted into a hindrance to the freedom of trade. If the authorities concerned really wanted to hamper anybody's trade they could easily raise the amount of tax or toll to an amount which would be prohibitive or deterrent or create other impediments which instead of facilitating trade and commerce would hamper them. It is here that the contrast, between 'freedom' (Article 301) and 'restrictions' (Articles 302 and 304) clearly appears; that which in reality facilitates trade and commerce is not a restriction, and that which in reality hampers or burdens trade and commerce is a restriction. It is the reality or substance of the matter that has to be determined. It is not possible apriori to draw a dividing line between that which would really be a charge for a facility provided and that which would really be a deterrent to a trade, but the distinction, if it has to be drawn is real and clear. For the tax to become a prohibited tax it has to be a direct tax the effect of which is to hinder the movement part of trade. So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory it cannot operate as a hindrance. 12. Subba Rao, J. as he then was, concurring with Das, J. took substantially the same view and observed (at page 1430);: The word ' freedom ' is not capable of precise definition, but it can be stated what would infringe or detract from the said freedom. Before a particular law can be said to infringe the said freedom, it must be ascertained whether the impugned provision operates as a restriction impeding the free movement of trade or only as a regulation facilitating the same. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good condition of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions;, for without it, the necessary lines of communication such as roads, waterways and airways, cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one....It is for the Court in a given case to decide whether a provision purporting to regulate trade is in fact a restriction on freedom. The further observations as to what was meant by Restrictions in Article 302 are (at page 1433): But the more difficult question is, what does the word " restrictions " mean in Article 302? The dictionary meaning of the word " restrict" is "to confine, bound, limit." Therefore any limitations placed upon the freedom is a restriction on that freedom. But the limitation must be real, direct and immediate, but not fanciful, indirect or remote....Of all the doctrines evolved in my view, the doctrine of ' direct and immediate effect' on the freedom would be a reasonable solvent to the difficult situation that might arise under our Constitution. If a law, whatever may have been its source, directly and immediately affects the free movement of trade, it would be restriction on the said freedom. But a law which may have only indirect and remote repercussions on the said freedom cannot be considered to be a restriction on it. 13. Subba Rao, J., as he then was summed up his views in the following words (at page 1436): The foregoing discussions may be summarised in the following propositions : (1) Article 301 declares a right of free movement of trade without any obstructions by way of barriers, inter-State or intra-State or other impediments operating as such barriers. (2) The said freedom is not impeded, but on the other hand, promoted by regulations creating conditions for the free movement of trade, such as, police regulations, provision for services, maintenance of roads, provision for aerodromes, wharfs, etc. with or without compensation. (3) Parliament may by law impose restrictions on such freedom in the public interest and the said law can be made by virtue of any entry with respect whereof Parliament has power to make a law. (4) The State also, in exercise of its legislative power, may impose similar restrictions, subject to the two conditions laid down in Article 304 (b) and subject to the Proviso mentioned therein. (5) Neither Parliament nor the State Legislature can make a law giving preference to one State over another or making discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry in the Lists, infringing the said freedom. (6) This ban is lifted in the case of Parliament for the purpose of dealing with situations arising out of scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India and also in the case of a State under Article 304 (h), subject to the conditions mentioned therein. And (7) the State can impose a non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from other States or the Union territory to which similar goods manufactured or produced in the State are subject. 14. It is thus well established that regulatory provisions which do not directly or immediately impede or burden the free movement of trade, commerce and intercourse but provide or intend to provide facilities for trade, commerce and intercourse are not restrictions within the meaning of Part XIII and are compatible with the freedom of trade declared by Article 301. Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam , and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan , are both cases of imposition of tax. The first was concerned with the Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954,, which was successfully attacked on the ground that it violated Article 301 and was not saved by Article 304 (b). The Act imposed a tax on specified goods transported by road or inland waterways in the State of Assam. The majority in that case held that the Act put a direct restriction on the freedom of trade and, since in doing so, had not complied with the provisions of Article 304 (b), it must be declared to be void. In the second case the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951, was impugned as violating Article 301. But the majority did not accept the contention on the view that the Act was merely a regulatory measure imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities. The scope of Article 301 was again in the light of the earlier decisions referred to in Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam , where the Assam Taxation (On goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act as amended after Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam , was attacked on various grounds but without success. 15. As already seen, the distinction between a restriction and a regulation is fine but real, though the dividing line is not capable in the nature of things of a comprehensive and satisfactory definition. The test, broadly speaking, is whether the impugned provisions lay a direct and immediate burden on the movement of trade, commerce and intercourse or are intrinsically beneficial to and provide, in the ultimate analysis, facilities for better conduct of trade, commerce and intercourse. Observed Das, J., in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan

#### They violate Restrictions – Removing export or trade restrictions is untopical—border measures are not restrictions on production

Lothar Ehring (Assistant to Mr. Péter Balás, Deputy Director-General at the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission, responsible for multilateral affairs, as well as trade defence instruments and bilateral trade relations with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Until 2008, Lothar Ehring served in the Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade that is responsible for Legal Aspects of Trade Policy. He was the Coordinator for legal issues of multilateral trade, handled several WTO disputes and also represented the European Community in the negotiations on the reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) and Gian Franco Chinale 2011 “Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: Wto, Nafta and Energy Charter” p. 134-5

The perfect example to test and discuss this interpretation is the famous case of OPEC production quotas. These quotas. as implemented at the national levels of OPEC members, are horizontal restrictions on production. They limit exportation no more than domestic sales, and yet the argument is made time and again that they fall foul of Article XI:I of the GATT 1994.” The proponents of this thesis recognize that they are on thin ice. given that production limitations are as remote from being border measures as a restriction can possibly be. Equally clear is the fact that a production limitation definition does not discriminate against exports, neither de jure nor de facto. The proponents of the OPEC GATT-illegality attempt to overcome this conclusion with the argument that for some of the oil exporting countries in question, the near totality of the production goes to export. This. however, is legally irrelevant to the question of whether there is a discrimination against or higher burden on exports. The quantitative relationship between domestic consumption and exports can be very imbalanced for reasons of production and consumption capacities, in large part for reasons of a country’s size and the foreign demand for the product concerned. Also the conceptual argument that a restriction on production can be decomposed into a restriction on exportation as well a restriction on domestic sales is not plausible. The production restriction is precisely and inseparably both at the same time and this makes a qualitative difference that is impossible to set aside.

#### Financial incentives are committed funds directly tied to production

Webb, 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public* *funds are* either disbursed or *contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive ***effects*** which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### They violate Incentives – the plan is a nonfinancial incentive

**Shapiro**, associate – Energy, Environment & Public Utilities Practice Group @ Cozen O'Connor, publisher – Green Building Law Blog, **2011**

(Shari, “Code Green: Is 'Greening' the Building Code the Best Approach to Create a Sustainable Built Environment?” Planning & Environmental Law 63:6, p. 3-12)

The explosion of state and local green building regulations has been extraordinary and has led to interesting regulatory experimentation. Many state and local governments begin by mandating green building practices for public buildings. Some local governments have expanded that mandate to require green building practices for both public and private development, often for new construction over a certain square footage. Others have sought to encourage green building practices through financial incentives. Still others have used non-financial incentives like expedited permitting or increased density to encourage the development of green buildings.

Mandatory green building requirements work very much like traditional "command and control" environmental regulations, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act being preeminent examples. Direct regulation may mandate specific green building practices or the achievement of a green building standard such as the USGBCs Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard.3 Green building codes such as CALGreen, discussed in detail below, fall into this regulatory category.

Financial incentives have taken the form of direct grants from government entities,4 tax incentives, and rebates.5 Other forms of financial incentives for green buildings are rebates of the typical government-related costs of building, such as application fees.6

Local governments are also experimenting with nonfinancial incentives for green building practices. These incentives are often attractive to municipalities because they do not deplete public finances directly and are therefore easier to get passed in difficult financial times or with teluctant constituencies.7 Examples of nonfinancial incentives include increased floor-to-area ratios for green buildings8 and expedited permitting processes.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground – removing trade barriers lets them avoid relevant production debates and counterplans, which guts the operative topical term and grants them unpredictable external offense and disad answers.

#### 2. Limits – border policy involves a separate lit base that makes it impossible to anticipate topic evolution. Domestic topics are already complex on enough levels that adding a new foreign policy sector makes it unmanageable.

### 1NC Politics Disad

#### Obama PC high now – GOP softening now on fiscal cliff – but it will be a fight

Kimberly Atkins (writer for the Boston-Herald) November 8, 2012 “Prez returns to D.C. with more clout” http://bostonherald.com/news/columnists/view/20221108prez\_returns\_to\_dc\_with\_more\_clout

When President Obama returned yesterday to the White House, he brought with him political capital earned in a tough re-election fight as well as a mandate from voters — which means bold changes and bruising fights could lie ahead. The first agenda item is already waiting for him: reaching an agreement with lawmakers to avert the looming fiscal cliff. GOP lawmakers have previously shot down any plan involving tax increases. Obama’s win — based in part on a message of making the wealthiest Americans pay more — may already be paying dividends. In remarks at the Capitol yesterday, House Speaker John Boehner seemed to acknowledge the GOP has to take a different tack than the obstructionism that has marred progress in the past. “The president has signaled a willingness to do tax reform with lower rates. Republicans have signaled a willingness to accept new revenue if it comes from growth and reform,” Boehner said. “Let’s start the discussion there.” Obama’s fresh political clout could extend to longer term fiscal policies beyond the fiscal cliff, though don’t expect GOP pushback to vanish. House Republicans still have plenty of fight in them.

#### Ensures compromise now – but re-election PC is finite

Ron Kampeas (writer for Intermountain Jewish News) November 7, 2012 “Obama’s second term: More of the same, at least until Iran flares” http://www.ijn.com/presidential-elections/2012-presidential-elections/3530-obamas-second-term-more-of-the-same-at-least-until-iran-flares

The fiscal cliff and specifically sequestration is a major concern," Daroff said. "Our concern continues to be that as the nation and our political leaders continue to assess how to make cuts in spending that those cuts don't fall disproportionately on vulnerable populations that rely upon social service agencies that depend on our funding." Cuts of about 8.5 percent would immediately affect the viability of housing for the elderly, according to officials at B'nai B'rith International, which runs a network of homes. Officials at Jewish federations say the cuts also would curb the meals and transportation for the elderly they provide with assistance from federal programs. Obama and Congress would have had to deal with heading off sequestration in any case, but as a president with a veto-wielding mandate of four more years, he has the leverage to head off deep cuts to programs that his top officials have said remain essential, including food assistance to the poor and medical entitlements for the poor and elderly. David Makovsky, a senior analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said Obama's priorities would be domestic. "While a victory in the second term tends to give you some political capital, capital is still finite," he said, citing George W. Bush's failure in 2005 to reform Social Security, despite his decisive 2004 triumph. "This suggests to me the president will keep his focus on the economy and health care," and not on major initiatives in the Middle East.

#### No energy production legislation or regulations will implemented before ‘fiscal cliff’ negotiations – the plan derails it

Leiter and Stockton November 10, 2012

David J. Leiter (President, ML Strategies, Washington, DC, David has more than 30 years of experience as a senior manager, political strategist and policy advisor at the federal, state and local levels of government, David served as a presidential appointee in the Clinton-Gore Administration, where he was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy at the U.S. Department of Energy, served for seven years as Chief of Staff to U.S. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, directing all operations in the Washington, DC and state offices, served as Legislative Assistant and principal advisor on budget and appropriations issues to U.S. Senator Wendell Ford of Kentucky) and Bryan M. Stockton (J.D. Georgetown Law, Member of the California Bar, Director of Government Relations at ML Strategies, where he works on a diverse set of issues for ML Strategies clients, including those concerning renewable energy, the environment, and public lands. He advises both start-up and large companies on various legislative and regulatory policies, such as the Department of Energy loan guarantee program, renewable energy tax policy, and regulatory policies impacting renewable energy production on federal lands. Former Senior Manager of Government Relations and as a Manager of Government Relations at ML Strategies) November 12, 2012 “Despite Democratic Wins, Capitol Hill Status Quo Remains” http://www.natlawreview.com/article/despite-democratic-wins-capitol-hill-status-quo-remains

Expect legislative stalemate on energy and environmental issues but increased regulatory activity Despite recent polls showing a close popular vote, President Obama won a decisive electoral vote victory, winning all of the battleground states. Election night also saw Senate Democrats increase their margin in the chamber as Democratic candidates defied expectations and eked out victories in largely Republican states like North Dakota, Montana, Indiana, and Missouri. Despite these gains for Democrats, Republicans maintained control of the House of Representatives, ensuring a divided Congress. Consequently, much of the partisan gridlock that has stalled legislation over the past year will continue. As the confetti from election night settles, the election does not present either party with a clear path to enacting its legislative agenda: indeed, the same players will be at the table as the Administration and Congress decide how to address a number of pressing fiscal and policy issues. The odds of substantive energy and environmental legislation in the next Congress is slim, but the Obama Administration—now freed from the restraints of re-election—is expected to utilize its executive powers and imprint its energy and environmental legacy through the regulatory process. Below is a more detailed look at the key energy and environmental issues to be addressed in the lame duck session of the 112th Congress and in the 113th Congress next year. With election over, federal agencies expected to move forward with regulations Federal agencies—chiefly the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—face a backlog of regulations that were put on hold in advance of the election. Just as the Administration has been slow-walking its regulatory agenda leading up to the election, we expect it will continue to do so post-election in an effort to not rock the boat too soon after the Election Day victory. For example, the Administration would be unlikely to quickly approve the Keystone XL pipeline (though an approval is expected), as that would offend environmentalists who rallied to the President’s re-election. Also, the Administration may hold back on some regulatory initiatives, as it still needs to compromise with Republicans on the fiscal cliff, and does not necessarily want to antagonize them in advance of those negotiations.

#### Impact is global econ collapse

Harold Mandel (writer for the Examiner) September 27, 2012 “Fitch says fiscal cliff could set off global recession (Video)” http://www.examiner.com/article/fitch-says-fiscal-cliff-could-set-off-global-recession

The ratings agency stated, "The U.S. fiscal cliff represents the single biggest near-term threat to a global economic recovery." Fitch has gone on to warn, “A U.S. fiscal shock would be exported to the rest of the world via a sharply weaker U.S. dollar and asset prices, lower U.S. price and wage inflation and heightened risk of deflation, and the impact on commodity prices.” In the meantime leading U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years, with a primary reason being fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. And so unless the fiscal cliff is confronted and avoided this could be bad news for everyone.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### 1NC Exports Disad

#### Russian influence over the EU is stabilizing – and key to solve organized crime, prolif and terrorism

**Rykhtik, 12** – Nizhny Novgorod State University, Nizhny Novgorod , Russia. (Mikhail, Responding to a Resurgent Russia, ed: Aggarwal and Govella, p. 28)

Russia sees the European Union as one of its key political and economic partners and will seek to promote intensive, sustained and long-term cooperation with it. So far, dialogue between the EU and Russia has been asymmetric on most issues, including the identification of priority areas for cooperation. The European Union has long been Russia’s main foreign trading partner. EU countries are the major creditors of and investors in the Russian Federation. EU countries account for 40% of all international air passenger traffic into and out of Russia. The same holds true for communications: 61% of Russia’s international telephone traffic is with the EU (Ryzhov 2002 :14–15). These and many other facts show that throughout the past decade the whole of Europe has witnessed a process of cultural, economic, and political integration and that this process has included Russia as well. And most significantly, there are signs that the EU is ready to economize its relations with Russia. There is an understanding among Russian experts and current leaders that Russia’s integration into the main European institutions will benefit everyone (Barysch et al. 2008 ) . Without an active Russian role, it would be difficult to achieve stability and security on the European landscape. Russia plays a crucial role in equipping Europe with energy, and Russia–EU scientific cooperation also has immense potential. In addition, subregional cooperation between the EU and Russia may strengthen Russia’s position, since Russia is interested in more favorable visa regimes. Russia is a key player in the Eurasian community and is eager to cooperate as long as there is no danger of interference in Russian domestic affairs.

Russia’s main strategic goal today is to preserve its national, economic, and cultural identity, while maintaining a strategic partnership with Europe. Medvedev has shown that he is interested in building relationships between Russia and the EU. The EU is obviously uncomfortable with its dependence on Russian resources and would like to switch to oil and gas supplies from other regions, including Central Asia and North Africa, or develop alternative sources of energy. But it is in the medium-term interests of both Russia and the EU to preserve the current status quo in their relationship.

The overriding question of Russian integration into the reformed security structures of Europe also needs to be resolved in a positive way. Russia is a more interesting partner for the West today, taking into account their shared security agenda of dealing with international terrorism, organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, nonproliferation, conventional arms reductions, illegal migration, and other matters. Current conditions are ripe for a new round of consultations and negotiations on a new European Security Agreement (Helsinki 2). 13 It is obvious that we are dealing with a new type of relations between Brussels and Moscow. The idea of a Helsinki 2 or Helsinki-Plus treaty has found some support in the West (Lo 2009 ) . Some experts have agreed that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act should be changed to reflect post-Cold War realities. 14 What is not welcomed by the West is Medvedev’s emphasis on hard security, which is a reflection of the realist approach which is still popular in Russia. But the new elements of Medvedev’s initiatives prompt some optimism.

#### Increasing transnational crime risks democratic and economic collapse and WMD use

**Dobriansky, 1 -** Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the State Department (Paula, “The Explosive Growth of Globalized Crime,”http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/transnational-crime/gj01.htm

Certain types of international crime -- terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and contraband smuggling -- involve serious violence and physical harm. Other forms -- fraud, extortion, money laundering, bribery, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, and counterfeiting -- don't require guns to cause major damage. Moreover, the spread of information technology has created new categories of cybercrime.

For the United States, international crime poses threats on three broad, interrelated fronts. First, the impact is felt directly on the streets of American communities. Hundreds of thousands of individuals enter the U.S. illegally each year, and smuggling of drugs, firearms, stolen cars, child pornography, and other contraband occurs on a wide scale across our borders.

Second, the expansion of American business worldwide has opened new opportunities for foreign-based criminals. When an American enterprise abroad is victimized, the consequences may include the loss of profits, productivity, and jobs for Americans at home.

Third, international criminals engage in a variety of activities that pose a grave threat to the national security of the United States and the stability and values of the entire world community. Examples include the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, trade in banned or dangerous substances, and trafficking in women and children. Corruption and the enormous flow of unregulated, crime-generated profits are serious threats to the stability of democratic institutions and free market economies around the world.

#### EU dominance is vital to Russian gas exports – key to the Russian economy and perceived as a life or death national interest

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Europe is an unavoidable partner. The European market consumes 90% of Russia's total gas exports and 60% of its crude oil, which make up only 25 and 15% of Europe's total demand, respectively. Russia presently does not have any viable alternative markets remotely equal in size to Europe. Dependence is a two-Way phenomenon. "40% of Russian public money” comes from the sale of oil and gas to Europe, and at least 75% of Russian export revenues are linked to the EU's energy market in general. Without any extant alternative markets to exploit in the near-term, **Moscow requires European gas revenues to preserve its own financial solubility.**

Energy overshadows other concerns. Paillard believes that while the energy trade has, in the past, been "part of a game of blackmail, lies and fear" between Europe and Russia, its new status as a "question of life or death for Russian revitalization" and its importance to Europe's economic growth mean that neither side can afford to use gas supplies as leverage in other international concerns. In Paillard's estimation, Brussels and Moscow both regard issues such as human rights or the Chechen conflict as not being worth risking the energy trade over. Therefore, Russian and the European Union are inextricably bound to one another by their mutual dependence on the energy trade. Russia cannot absorb the financial consequences of interrupting the EU revenue stream, while the European Union cannot do without Russian gas supplies. Europe has few alternative suppliers, and cannot develop alternative energy sources in the near term. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to be able to diversify its economy or target new markets any better than it has in the past.

#### Willful disregard for core Russian interests turns Russia into a hostile challenger of the US

**Allison and Blackwill, 11** – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI\_final-web.pdf)

Americans often tend to focus on either Russia’s strengths or its weaknesses without seeking an integrated understanding of the real Russia. This is problematic, because it leads to dangerous assumptions about Russia’s motives and conduct. For example, those who focus on Moscow’s strengths frequently see an assertive and dangerous rival without recognizing Russia’s profound insecurity. Conversely, those who concentrate on Russia’s shortcomings see a defeated power ill-prepared to resist American pressure or preferences. While these descriptions are clearly caricatures, views like those described above can produce damaging misjudgments.

Russia is grappling with the contradictions between imperial nostalgia, on the one hand, and the dramatic decline in its power after the Soviet collapse, on the other. The Russian government’s failure to present a credible plan to reverse Russia’s decline or to develop a successful foreign policy strategy that strengthens the country’s international role makes this only more difficult and contributes to a sense of insecurity. Nevertheless, the United States has the opportunity to manage its relations with an evolving Russia in a manner that advances America’s vital national interests. The stakes are high. Russia is more than sufficiently powerful to create a host of costly—and even devastating—problems for the United States if Russian leaders believe that Washington has a hostile, or casual, disregard for Russian national interests and priorities. This is true even though most in Russia’s elite recognize that today’s Russia is not sufficiently strong to challenge American global leadership without the support of other major powers.

#### This causes war and will escalate globally

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Conversely, a Russia relatively weaker to the United States would have less capability to challenge the United States but can provide less assistance for realizing common U.S.-Russian goals. A weaker Russia may also find it harder to control its WMD assets and become vulnerable to external predators not friendly to the United States (e. g.. China and Iran). But in all probability Russia will still have sufficiently strong nuclear forces to ward off external threats. Most worrisome, a Russian leadership that perceived Russia on a slope toward protracted decline might feel compelled to take drastic measures, internally and externally, to reverse its descent. The German Empire, Imperial Japan, and other great powers in the 20th century attempted to reverse their feared decline in ways that helped precipitate disastrous global wars.

#### It also turns their entire advantage – Russian obstructionism prevents every other US foreign policy objective

**Allison and Blackwill, 10/30**/11 – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67178.html

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies.

No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow.

First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.

Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose.

Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success.

Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups.

Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries.

Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps.

Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order.

Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy.

Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin.

Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

#### Russian economic collapse causes nuclear war

Filger 9 – Sheldon Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, May 10, 2009, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html

The Medvedev/Putin regime has initiated a host of policy responses to mitigate the impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the nation's fragile economy. Time will determine their long-term effectiveness; however, in the short-term some measures have proven more efficacious than others. A major goal of Moscow's economic technocrats has been to stabilize the country's banking system, and for the time being a degree of success has been achieved through government provision of liquidity to financial institutions. However, this complex geopolitical space that is Russia is now facing a vast array of complex challenges that other members of the G8 are spared, despite the destructive impact of the global synchronized recession facing all major industrialized countries.

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash.

Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world.

During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### 1NC Alliance f/l

U.S.-Japanese Tensions Flare

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Printer-friendly version

Yuki Tatsumi

|

October 18, 2012

U.S. Marine Corps plans to deploy the hybrid helicopter-plane MV-22 Osprey to the air station in Futenma, Okinawa, have cast a considerable shadow over the Japan-U.S. alliance in recent months.

At the center of the controversy is safety. Two recent accidents involved Ospreys this year, one in Morocco in April and the other in Florida in June. Despite a September 19 agreement between Tokyo and Washington that gave a green light for the flight, strong protests against Osprey deployment continue in Okinawa.

While it is tempting to treat the issue of Osprey deployment as a bilateral alliance-management challenge between the United States and Japan, one should keep in mind that Japan’s neighbors in East Asia—particularly those who have contested territorial claims vis-à-vis Japan—are also watching closely to see whether the issue creates fissures in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

It is easy to frame the challenges associated with Osprey deployment in Okinawa in a purely domestic context, treating it as a base-management issue between the Japanese central government in Tokyo and the Okinawa prefectural government in Naha. After all, the primary concern about the Osprey—the one that has been articulated, anyway—is safety.

It is also important to recall that tensions over Okinawa stretch back several years. The derailment of the 2006 U.S.-Japan agreement on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan (including the relocation of the Marine Corps air station Futenma in Okinawa) by the Hatoyama government between 2009–2010 aggravated the local opposition against Osprey deployment in Okinawa. Also, this week’s news of two U.S. sailors’ arrest for the alleged rape of a local Okinawan woman is a reminder that tensions over U.S. military presence have a human dimension.

Shoring up U.S.-Japan relations in the wake of recent events will require more attention to the considerable benefits of Osprey deployment—not only to Japan’s own security but also to the efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The heart of the U.S. pivot toward the Asia-Pacific is a redistribution of its forces within the region, creating more balanced between Northeast and Southeast Asia. The ultimate fate of the regime in North Korea remains unpredictable, and the Asia-Pacific maritime domain is becoming a more contested space in the face of increasing Chinese assertiveness. Thus, a credible U.S. military presence as a demonstration of Washington’s commitments to the security of its allies and friends in the region will be critical to the future peace and stability of the region. A rotational yet formidable Marine presence is one of the most important means of assuring U.S. allies and friends of such an enduring commitment.

No china war

Zhang 11 – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (Baohui, March/April, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,")

As Kevin Narizny points out in his study of grand strategy, political turnover in the executive office often leads to dramatic shifts in state behavior. In particular, changes in control of government from one party to another can lead states to redefine their strategic goals and the means of promoting them. 40 The profound and ongoing strategic adjustment by the Obama administration has indeed borne out this argument. The much-maligned grand strategy of primacy and unilateralism has given way to a new stance that emphasizes strategic restraint and multilateral diplomacy. Smart power, rather than military preponderance, is now seen by many as the best way to pursue U.S. interests in the world. The current strategic adjustment by the U.S. has significantly lowered China’s traditional concern about the threat posed by a hegemonic America. China’s foreign policy analysts have reached a consensus that the U.S. has suffered a significant relative decline and is in the process of strategic retreat. 41 As a result, the old hegemonic system is believed to have disintegrated. This new perception of the U.S. position in the world has also led the PLA to reassess the likelihood of war between the two countries. Some Chinese military strategists now believe that the relative decline of the U.S. has critically affected the ability and will of the American military to engage in major foreign wars. Lei Sihai, a strategist with a PLA background, claims that “the military capability of the U.S. has declined significantly and it is no longer capable of launching major wars.” 42 Major General Jin Yinan, a strategist at the PLA National Defense University, has suggested that **the rise of China and the relative decline of the U.S. have made a war scenario between them very unlikely**. 43 Thus, the strategic landscape between China and the U.S., as seen by Chinese experts from both civilian and military backgrounds, has shifted because of changes in American grand strategy and military strategy. This change in perception has relaxed Chinese concerns about national security. It marks a significant turnaround from China’s view of the American threat from the mid-1990s to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the American pursuit of hegemony was seen as the greatest threat in China’s strategic environment. After U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced major changes in the Pentagon’s 2010 budget, including cancelling the procurement of F-22 fighters and key missile defense programs, one PLA strategist characterized these adjustments as “a comprehensive rethinking about U.S. geopolitical strategies.” As the analysis emphasizes, “Gates’s and Obama’s thinking no longer shows aggressiveness. Instead, they seek a new security framework through accommodation. These significant adjustments in U.S. military strategies, especially the decisions to cut missile defense and stop procurement of F-22 fighters, which are directed mainly against China and Russia, should be welcomed. They are conducive for relaxing relations among great powers and reducing their strategic misunderstanding.” 44 Moreover, Chinese experts have taken keen notice of the new space policy of the Obama administration, which opposes deployment of weapons in space and is willing to explore international agreements on the issue. As observed by a recent PLA analysis, “Obama’s willingness to reach an international treaty banning space-based weapons and to establish a global cooperative mechanism will have positive impacts on the world’s efforts for space arms control and prevention of an arms race.” 45

#### New relationship solved tension

Zhang 11 – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (Baohui, March/April, "The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,")

Until May 2008, the Taiwan Strait was a hot spot for military conflicts that could potentially drag China and the U.S. into a major war. This prospect put tremendous pressure on the PLA to search for ways to counter the massive conventional military superiority of the U.S. Now, because of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s accommodation strategy toward Beijing, a new cross-strait relationship has emerged. Military tension and pernicious mutual mistrust have given way to institutionalized dialogues, expanded economic integration, and greater people-to-people exchanges. Indeed, the **Taiwan Strait situation has been completely altered since Ma assumed the presidency** in May 2008. The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China has declared that cross-strait relations have “achieved a historical transformation.” This new and positive assessment has drastically changed the PLA’s perception of the prospects for war in the strait, and thus the possibility of U.S. military intervention. Major General Peng Guangqian of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences commented that economic integration and institutionalized political dialogues would make military conflict in the Taiwan Strait “unlikely and even unthinkable.” 48 Yan Xuetong, an influential Chinese international relations scholar with close ties to the military, has also revised his past pessimistic views. Whereas he once insisted that war in the strait was inevitable, he now believes that the probability is, currently, extremely low. 49 With minimized chances of military conflict occurring in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA should no longer be obsessed with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Indeed, the Taiwan Strait constitutes the only realistically plausible cause of war between China and the U.S. As noted earlier, Major General Jin Yinan recently concluded that the prospect of such a military conflict was extremely unlikely.

#### Economic engagement means no military invasion

**Watts, 11 -** Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments (Barry, CQ Congressional Testimony, “MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACE PROGRAMS IN CHINA; COMMITTEE: SENATE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION,” 5/11, lexis)

The most common scenarios for a conflict between the United States and the PRC are built around a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan by military force. The first point to be made about the likelihood of such an attempt is that China has been fairly successful in pursuing the economic entanglement of Taiwan. In 2003 I participated in discussions of net assessment with senior Taiwanese national security officials held in Taipei. What struck me during that trip was the growing migration of Taiwan's advanced technologies and businesses to mainland China, lured by such incentives as lower labor costs. Since then, the indications are that the gradual economic entanglement of Taiwan has continued, and that it is leading in the long run to Taiwan's eventual economic "capture" by the PRC.
If this assessment is correct, then the chances of the PRC initiating a military takeover of Taiwan in 2012 or even 2020 appear to be quite low. Why use military force if economic entanglement leading to economic capture is succeeding? Note, too, that this approach embodies Sun Tzu's dictum that the acme of strategy is to subdue the enemy without fighting.

#### No escalation – China won’t use nuclear weapons

Pike 04 (John, Global Security, China’s Options in the Taiwan Confrontation, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/taiwan-prc.htm)

China would almost certainly not contemplate a nuclear strike against Taiwan, nor would Beijing embark on a course of action that posed significant risks of the use of nuclear weapons. The mainland's long term goal is to liberate Taiwan, not to obliterate it, and any use of nuclear weapons by China would run a substantial risk of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. An inability to control escalation beyond "demonstrative" detonations would cause utterly disproportionate destruction.

**No impact—the alliance empirically fails**

**DiFilippo, sociology prof, 2** – Prof Sociology, Lincoln (Anthony, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement, p 13)

One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the fifty years that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold War, other serious destabilizing forces have appeared despite the continued existence of the bilateral alliance. The Korean War, which began in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into effect in 1952. The alliance did not prevent China from developing nuclear weapons-hardly a stabilizing event in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or end the Vietnam War. More recently, the U.S.-Japan security alliance did not stop the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from beginning a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, thwart Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching a projectile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the bilateral alliance in effect for decades, China went ahead with nuclear testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclear powers.

**Alt cause—war on terror**

**Pyle, history and international studies prof and Ph.D. in Japanese history, 10** (Kenneth, let’s be honest- this guy is way more qualed than your bloggers, Ph.D. in Japanese history from John Hopkins, received the Order of the Rising Sun from the Japanese government founding prez of the National Bureau of Asian Research, received the Japan Foundation Award for Japanese Studies, History and International studies prof @ University of Washington, “Troubled Alliance” , Asia Policy, Number 10 (July 2010), 1-41, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia\_policy/AP10/AP10\_B\_JapanRT.pdf, ZBurdette)

The new DPJ administration thought not. Its leaders saw these steps as an extension of Japanese submission to the United States. The DPJ therefore adopted a different tack for an activist but more independent role. No one understood the predicament of Japan in the post—Cold War era better than Ichiro Ozawa, who is the real power in the part and who is, in his own way, no less shrewd than Yoshida and no less determined to carve out a sphere of autonomous action. “We are depending too heavily on the U.S..” he said recently, “which is why we are so obedient to wishes of American. If Japan would make up its mind about itself there would be no need for the U.S. to have itsforces on the frontline in Japan.” Ozawa wants to open up space between Japan and the United States. He sees the triangular U.S.-Japan-China relationship as becoming an equilateral triangle and does not want Japan to be held hostage to U.S. policy toward China and North Korea or to U.S. global strategy. Ozawa’s trip to China last December with a party of 639 people, including 143 mostly young new Diet members of his part, in tow on five airplanes was a deliberate stunt to demonstrate a will for autonomous foreign policy. In a book published in 2006 entitled *Ozawa shugi* (*The Principles of Ozawa*), he laid out his strategy and wrote that “the biggest foreign policy problem for Japan is its relationship with the United States, especially how to deal with America’s ‘war on terrorism.’” The essence of Ozawa’s foreign policy strategy is a UN-centered one that would allow dispatch of Japanese forces abroad only where there is a UN resolution to support it. The alliance would remain principally in the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka, and Japan would work to establish its more independent Asian policy. Ozawa’s UN-centered policy would constitute a new firewall to deter pressure from Washington to accept U.S. foreign policy priorities. It would also help to bridge differences within the DPJ and among the Japanese people with regard to a more activist role in international politics. Ozawa himself must realize that his goals can hardly be achieved in the near future, but he wants to stir sentiment for a more independent foreign policy.

**Solving trade disputes are a prerequisite to solving the alliance**

**Foster 9/15**—former State Department official, and Kanakis president and chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (Jim and Don, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/opinion/16iht-edfoster.html?\_r=1, twm)

Life rarely gives chances for a fresh start. But the launch of a new cabinet under Prime Minister Naoto Kan in Japan following the bruising leadership race in the Democratic Party of Japan offers just that opportunity. Kan’s victory came a year after the D.P.J. came to power for the first time in Japan by ousting the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party. But neither the administration of the first D.P.J. prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, nor the Obama administration in the United States, was able to seize the opportunities presented by this historic shift. Now, with the financial crisis subsiding, there is a chance for a fresh start — if the two sides have the will to seize it. For some time, both Japan and the United States have failed to deal with outstanding irritants in their economic relationship, such as the continuing restrictions on the import of U.S. beef. This has stymied efforts to extend the U.S.-Japan economic dialogue into new, more promising areas.

**Alt cause—Japanese policy paralysis**

**Hayashi 11/12** (By CHESTER DAWSON and YUKA, Wall street journalist staff writers, NOVEMBER 12, 2010, “U.S.-Japan Relations Warm”, http://online.wsj.com/article\_email/SB10001424052748704756804575607953039811866-lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.html, ZBurdette)

U.S.-Japan ties had grown strained even prior to the start of Mr. Hatoyama's tenure in September 2009. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer expressed growing frustration at the lack of strong political leadership in the waning days of the LDP-led government. Meanwhile, Japanese press reports have played up apparent slights by U.S. officials. One such episode happened shortly after Mr. Hatoyama's departure in June, when Mr. Obama referred to South Korea as "the linchpin" of security in the Pacific—a phrase often reserved for the U.S. special relationship with Japan. That came after a nearly year-long fallow period during which planned working-level talks for deepening the alliance were temporarily put on hold, reflecting both U.S. misgivings and a creeping policy paralysis in the Japanese bureaucracy.

### 1NC REE f/l

#### China’s monopoly is coming to an end

Jennings 8/31 (Ralph, 8/31/12, China's Rare Earth May Become a Bit Less Rare, <http://www.thestreet.com/story/11679118/1/chinas-rare-earth-may-become-a-bit-less-rare.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEN>, RBatra)

End users may find it easier to get those elements (Beijing will even hold prices stable, analysts believe), but the kinder export quota will make little impact over the next two to eight years as offshore competitors -- potentially solid investments -- have already started to develop better processing technology.

Today China not only produces most of the world's rare earth materials, estimated at 95% of the total, it also operates the most advanced machinery to separate those elements from the earth itself and to process them.

Automakers in Japan including Toyota Motor (TM) should gain from Beijing's export quota increase as they need the materials to produce hybrid vehicles. A handful of importers in France and Germany may welcome China's move for the same reason.

But those buyers may ultimately turn to foreign firms that are developing cleaner, more cost-effective means to separate rare earth elements, refine them or use them in the production of metals. Although China's technology leads today in these departments, players in Australia, Germany and the U.S. are catching up.

#### China won’t cut off rare earths --- economics and diplomacy check

David, 12 – System analyst at Oracle: cloud computing network (Anthony David, 4/3/12, U.S. Prepares For Major Supply Disruptions, <http://www.criticalstrategicmetals.com/u-s-prepares-for-major-supply-disruptions/>)

He said that allegations of trade monopoly against China were groundless. It is a well-known fact that while China owns about 30% of the global rare earth deposits, it produces 97% of the global production. Liu said that sustaining that kind of production without damaging the environment is impossible. He added, “Despite such huge environmental pressure China has been taking measures to maintain rare earth exports. China will continue to supply rare earths to the international market.”

A major cause of friction between China and the US is the $295 billion trade deficit recorded last year. In fact, Obama issued an executive order in February this year to create a panel that would investigate unfair trade practices by various nations, including China. During a visit to the US in February, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping requested the US to respect Chinese interests.

Co-incidentally, the rare earth complaint has come at a time of leadership transitions in both nations. While Obama will stand for re-election in November, Jinping is expected to take over the presidential reins in China in a power handover process within the communist party later this year.

Among other voices in both nations, China’s Xinhua News Agency said that the move by the US was rash and unfair and could damage trade ties. On the other hand, in the US, possible Republican presidential nominee Mike Romney said that Obama was not being tough enough on China. Vijay Vaitheeswaran, The Economist’s China business editor said, “The rhetoric over rare earths is overheated. There is no need for provoking a trade war over China’s stance on rare earths because simple economics and market forces will solve this problem.”

Analysts have pointed out that although the US has substantial rare earth deposits in Alaska and California, the nation appears to lack the political will to tap its own resources. However other countries have moved ahead and are seeking to become self sufficient in their rare earth supply. As Vaitheeswaran pointed out, “Restricted supply and higher prices have already spurred the development of big mines in Australia.”

Karel De Gucht, EU Trade Commissioner said that China’s restrictive policies gave the country a lot of advantage and its policies must be modified. The recent complaint follows the EU’s earlier challenge to China on nine other raw materials that included magnesium, silicon carbide and zinc. The WTO had ruled that export restrictions on these materials defied WTO rules. Since February, China has been increasing its supply.

#### Liberalism is inevitable – hegemony isn’t key

**Ikenberry 11** – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model."

Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way.

But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system.

In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it.

To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

#### Empirics prove hegemony does not solve war

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability.

First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present.

Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### Kagan is flawed – retreat of hegemony will encourage stability

**Preble 6/28/12** (\*hristopher, director of foreign policy studies at CATO, former professor of history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, Ph.D. in history from Temple University [“The Critique of Pure Kagan” July/August <http://nationalinterest.org/print/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>]

KAGAN’S FLAWED analysis begins with a fundamental misconception about the international system and the relations of states within it. His worldview perceives two types of countries: those that are congenitally incapable of dealing with urgent security challenges on their borders or in their respective regions; and a crafty, rapacious few who are forever scheming to intimidate, disrupt or simply devour the hapless and the helpless. Within this dichotomy, however, is a third sort of country, the only one of its kind. The United States enjoys a privileged place in the world order, explains Kagan. Its power is unthreatening because it is relatively distant from others. And, according to Kagan, the costs of this power are easily borne by the wealthiest country in the world.¶ Kagan’s world order “is as fragile as it is unique,” and “preserving [it] requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.” The message today is consistent with that from sixteen years ago when he and William Kristol first made the case for what they called “benevolent global hegemony.”¶

In other respects, however, the story that emerges from The World America Made is subtly different. Anticipating a rising tide of pessimism and gloominess within the American electorate, Kagan at times resorts to the tone of a pep talk. Whereas he once highlighted the “present dangers” confronting the United States (in a volume coedited with Kristol, published in 2000), he now says the world today isn’t as dangerous as it once was—during the Cold War, for example, or at other periods in American history. Looking ahead, he says, China has its own set of problems, is unlikely to make a bid for regional hegemony and is unlikely to succeed if it tries. Likewise, we shouldn’t be overly frightened by China’s growing economic power, Kagan explains, which will lag well behind that of the United States for years. Other global challenges are more modest still.¶

The object of these relatively optimistic assessments is to convince Americans that they can manage to hold on to their position of global dominance for many years without bankrupting themselves financially or exhausting themselves emotionally. This line of argument cuts against Kagan’s other claims, however, both in this volume and elsewhere, that the United States should spend even more on its military and that Washington should use this military more often, and in more places, than it has in the recent past.¶ In other critical ways, Kagan’s assessment of global politics has remained remarkably consistent, even if the tone of this current volume is slightly less alarmist. In the past, he has argued that the world would collapse into a brutal, Hobbesian hell if the U.S. military were smaller and fought in fewer wars or if the U.S. government were less inclined to extend security guarantees to other countries. Today, he merely suggests such a scenario is possible and warns it would be foolish to gamble on the outcome.¶

Kagan’s too-casual rejection of any reasonable alternative to American hegemony reveals the crucial flaw in his reasoning, however, given that he predicts we might not be afforded a choice in the future. If the United States can’t sustain its current posture indefinitely, a wiser long-term grand strategy would set about—preferably now—easing the difficult and sometimes dangerous transitions that often characterize major power shifts. Rather than continuing to discourage other countries from tending to their security affairs, the United States should welcome such behavior. Kagan’s reassuring tone—about China’s unique vulnerabilities, for example—actually buttresses that competing point of view. After all, if a distant, distracted hegemon like the United States can manage the challenge posed by China, and if it can do so while preventing wars and unrest in several other regions simultaneously, then Asian nations would be at least equally capable of accomplishing the same task given that they will be focused solely on their own security primarily in just that one region.¶

KAGAN REFUSES to consider this possibility. He writes that the “most important features of today’s world—the great spread of democracy, the prosperity, the prolonged great-power peace—have depended directly and indirectly on power and influence exercised by the United States.” It follows, therefore, that the world would become considerably less democratic, less prosperous and less peaceful if the United States were to withdraw militarily from Europe, Asia and the Middle East.¶ Of course, he can’t actually prove either claim to be true, and he concedes as much**. Instead, he bases his case on a particular set of beliefs about how the world works** and about the United States’ unique characteristics within that system. Kagan asserts that the world requires a single, order-inducing hegemon to enforce the rules of the game and that America must perform this role because its global economic interests demand it. He also believes that the United States has a special obligation, deriving from its heritage as a “dangerous nation,” to spread democracy and human rights. What’s more, America’s military might is the essential ingredient that leads to its international influence. The spread of democracy and market capitalism, Kagan claims, is made possible by U.S. power but would retreat before autocracy and mercantilism if that power were seen to be waning. The attractiveness of America’s culture, economics and political system—the vaunted “soft power” in Joseph Nye’s telling—is fleeting and would dissipate if Americans were to commit what Kagan calls “preemptive superpower suicide.”¶ How other nations respond to U.S. power also follows a familiar pattern. In Kagan’s telling, allies will bandwagon with us if we are committed to defending them but bolt like frightened racehorses at the first sign of trouble. Would-be challengers will back down in the face of U.S. power but rush to exploit opportunities for conquest if Uncle Sam exhibits any hesitation or self-doubt. And Kagan simply dismisses any suggestion that other countries might chafe at American dominance or fear American power.¶

#### Decline facilitates US multilateralism—paves the way for a soft landing that prevents their transition impacts.

**He 10**—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

#### Multilateralism leads to global cooperation and solves the escalation of conflicts

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Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons.

First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage.

The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement.

In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks.

#### That cooperation is key to planetary survival—weak regulations risk extinction.

**Masciulli 11**—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

#### Hegemony causes prolif

**Monteiro 12**\*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, **raising** the **risk of arms races**. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt.

#### Our turn is historically proven

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At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the first war, its ability to manage confrontations between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

#### Extinction

Asal and Beardsley 9 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

**Limits kill the activity**

**Rowland 84 -** (Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

### AT: CI

#### – their definition lists what those mechanisms are and they do not meet the example financial incentive for production

EIA, their author, 01 <http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/128_PURPA/Agency_Activities/EIA/Incentive_Mandates_and_Government.htm>, “Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy”

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels. (1) This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and development (R&D), (2), (3) and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables.

**A financial incentive is defined** in this report **as providing** one or more of the following benefits:

A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively;

Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or,

Creating or expanding a market for producers.

The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided. (4)

### `a/t: Deterrence

#### We’ll internal link their offense –

**Monteiro 10** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. His research and teach­ing focuses on international relations theory and security studies. He is currently writing a book on the causes of conflict in a unipolar world. Professor Monteiro received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009 [http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/105216monteiro.pdf, Spring Summer 2010, “Why U.S. Does Not Deter Challenges”]

Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

### a/t: Link Turn

#### No risk of their link turn

**Macdonald and Parent 11** \* Paul-**Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/ December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment”** <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment>]

Despite the erosion of U.S. military and economic dominance, many observers warn that a rapid departure from the current approach to foreign policy would be disastrous. The historian Robert Kagan cautions that "a reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation." The journalist Robert Kaplan even more apocalyptically warns that "lessening [the United States'] engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity." But these defenders of the status quo confuse retrenchment with appeasement or isolationism. A prudent reduction of the United States' overseas commitments would not prevent the country from countering dangerous threats and engaging with friends and allies. Indeed, such reductions would grant the country greater strategic flexibility and free resources to promote long-term growth. A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses -- the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall. Nor is there good evidence that reducing Washington's overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the forces' repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship between Washington and Seoul. Calls for Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese forces. Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and falling dominoes. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent and ideological disputes remarkably mild.

### /t: Liberalism

#### Here is more –

#### There are obstacles to overturn it

**Ikenberry, 11** – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

The liberal international order is not just a collection of liberal democratic states but an international mutual-aid society -- a sort of global political club that provides members with tools for economic and political advancement. Participants in the order gain trading opportunities, dispute-resolution mechanisms, frameworks for collective action, regulatory agreements, allied security guarantees, and resources in times of crisis. And just as there are a variety of reasons why rising states will embrace the liberal international order, **there are powerful obstacles to opponents who would seek to overturn it.**

To begin with, rising states have deep interests in an open and rule-based system. Openness gives them access to other societies -- for trade, investment, and knowledge sharing. Without the unrestricted investment from the United States and Europe of the past several decades, for instance, China and the other rising states would be on a much slower developmental path. As these countries grow, they will encounter protectionist and discriminatory reactions from slower-growing countries threatened with the loss of jobs and markets. As a result, the rising states will find the rules and institutions that uphold nondiscrimination and equal access to be critical. The World Trade Organization -- the most formal and developed institution of the liberal international order -- enshrines these rules and norms, and rising states have been eager to join the WTO and gain the rights and protections it affords. China is already deeply enmeshed in the global trading system, with a remarkable 40 percent of its GNP composed of exports -- 25 percent of which go to the United States.

China could be drawn further into the liberal order through its desire to have the yuan become an international currency rivaling the U.S. dollar. Aside from conferring prestige, this feat could also stabilize China's exchange rate and grant Chinese leaders autonomy in setting macroeconomic policy. But if China wants to make the yuan a global currency, it will need to loosen its currency controls and strengthen its domestic financial rules and institutions. As Barry Eichengreen and other economic historians have noted, the U.S. dollar assumed its international role after World War II not only because the U.S. economy was large but also because the United States had highly developed financial markets and domestic institutions -- economic and political -- that were stable, open, and grounded in the rule of law. China will feel pressures to establish these same institutional preconditions if it wants the benefits of a global currency.

Internationalist-oriented elites in Brazil, China, India, and elsewhere are growing in influence within their societies, creating an expanding global constituency for an open and rule-based international order. These elites were not party to the grand bargains that lay behind the founding of the liberal order in the early postwar decades, and they are seeking to renegotiate their countries' positions within the system. But they are nonetheless embracing the rules and institutions of the old order. They want the protections and rights that come from the international order's Westphalian defense of sovereignty. They care about great-power authority. They want the protections and rights relating to trade and investment. And they want to use the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism as platforms to project their influence and acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. The UN Security Council, the G-20, the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions -- these are all stages on which rising non-Western states can acquire great-power authority and exercise global leadership.

#### America is not key to liberal order – decline still means the u.s. can facilitate an order

**Ikenberry, 11** – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected. In an open and rule-based international order, this is what happens. If the architects of the postwar liberal order were alive to see today's system, they would think that their vision had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Markets and democracy have spread. Societies outside the West are trading and growing. The United States has more alliance partners

 today than it did during the Cold War. Rival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the global stage. It is difficult to read these world-historical developments as a story of American decline and liberal unraveling.

In a way, however, the liberal international order has sown the seeds of its own discontent, since, paradoxically, the challenges facing it now -- the rise of non-Western states and new transnational threats -- are artifacts of its success. But the solutions to these problems -- integrating rising powers and tackling problems cooperatively -- will lead the order's old guardians and new stakeholders to an agenda of renewal. The coming divide in world politics will not be between the United States (and the West) and the non-Western rising states. Rather, the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today's system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order built on spheres of influence. These fault lines do not map onto geography, nor do they split the West and the non-West. There are passionate champions of the UN, the WTO, and a rule-based international order in Asia, and there are isolationist, protectionist, and anti-internationalist factions in the West.

The liberal international order has succeeded over the decades because its rules and institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence. The agenda for the renewal of the liberal international order should be driven by this same imperative: to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and achieve their economic and security goals.

As the hegemonic organization of the liberal international order slowly gives way, more states will have authority and status. But this will still be a world that the United States wants to inhabit. A wider array of states will share the burdens of global economic and political governance, and with its worldwide system of alliances, the United States will remain at the center of the global system. Rising states do not just grow more powerful on the global stage; they grow more powerful within their regions, and this creates its own set of worries and insecurities -- which is why states will continue to look to Washington for security and partnership. In this new age of international order, the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.

## 1NR

### Addon

#### Zero chance of protectionism

**Anderson 9**—head of Asia-Pacific Economics for UBS (Jonathan, Reality Check for Prophets of Protectionism, 17 August 2009, http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-17/110225722.html, AMiles)

Now, here we are again, at the beginning of what some commentators call the "Great Depression II." And according to the World Trade Organization, we are seeing a sharp uptick in protectionist measures around the world. Are we risking another wave of trade destruction that closes the world's doors? And could a new wave crush China and the rest of the emerging world? The short answer is no. We do not worry much about the protectionism issue. We think these fears are vastly overstated for four reasons. First, conditions in the global economy are not that bad. If we look back at the Great Depression in the 1930s, we find the United States economy contracted nearly 30 percent in real terms, and more than a quarter of the entire workforce was unemployed. Up to one-third of the economy simply disappeared. In many European economies, the impact was greater still. How do things look today? At last count, the United States, euro zone countries, and Japan had seen a cumulative GDP contraction of 6 percent or so, with average unemployment nearing 9 percent. And this is probably as bad as it will get; the world economy is now expected to stabilize and recover in the second half of 2009. Of course, the recovery may be extremely weak. But even if developed countries don't grow at all over the next 18 months, the situation still compares favorably with the events of 75 years ago. In other words, there's just no reason to look for the same kind of protectionist reaction today. We should add that we're not seeing it. The WTO has reported a sharp increase in various protectionist actions, claims and cases, but the overall economic impact of these measures is still small by any standard. This is likely to be the worst it will get. Second, the effects of "plain vanilla" protectionism are highly exaggerated. Although Smoot-Hawley passed in 1930, raising tariffs on thousands of products, most economists agree the real attack on global trade didn't come until the breakup of the international monetary and exchange rate arrangements in 1931, and a corresponding collapse of global finance. Of course, many pundits now worry about the fall of the U.S. dollar as a global invoicing and reserve currency, and that this could have a similarly negative impact on trade and financing. However, we should stress that as bad as the U.S. economy looks at present, it's still the best thing we have. The European Union is beset by crushing regional disparities and political pressures, with significant basket cases hiding inside its borders. Japan simply doesn't have the necessary dynamism or commitment to globalization. And as far as fiscal balance sheets are concerned, all three major regions have equally significant problems. The United States stands alone in terms of how fast the Federal Reserve has expanded its monetary balance sheet, raising specific concerns about U.S. inflation and its impact on the dollar. But as one can see by looking at U.S. economic data, we are still falling into a deflation cycle for the time being, with nary a hint of inflationary pressure yet. We fully expect the Fed to be able to rein in the monetary expansion quickly if these pressures arise. We should add that, although it's fashionable to look at China and the yuan as a rising competitor to the dollar, this is simply not a realistic theme for the next 10 years – and perhaps for much longer. China doesn't have an open capital account, which means there is little opportunity or interest in holding the yuan as a serious asset. If anything, the impact of the current global crisis is likely to convince mainland authorities to be slow in opening their borders. China also doesn't have the kind of deep, domestic financial markets required of a global reserve currency; the bond market in particular is still in its infancy. As a result, it will be a long time indeed before the yuan starts playing a real role on the global stage. Third, even if we do see an unexpected wave of protectionism, emerging countries have less to lose than the developed world. Let's start by asking this question: When we talk about "protectionism," what exactly are we trying to protect? The answer is, of course, domestic workers and domestic jobs. In what areas do the labor forces of the United States, Europe and Japan work? The vast majority are in services and construction, sectors that don't compete much directly on the international arena. Only 10 to 15 percent are manufacturing jobs, and these are mostly in capital intensive, high-tech industries such as autos, precision machinery and high-end electronics. By contrast, manufactured goods that China and other emerging markets sell – toys, textiles, running shoes, sporting goods, light electronics, etc. – are barely made at all in the G3 countries. Rich countries outsourced most of these low-end, labor-intensive jobs a long time ago. A related point holds for commodities and raw materials, which make up much of the rest of the exports from the low-income world. All three major, developed regions are heavily dependent on imported resources, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The bottom line here is that even if we do get a big wave of protectionism in developed countries, it unlikely to be aimed specifically at low-end goods from the developed world. Rather, it makes more sense to protect the auto industry along with high-end equipment and chemical manufacturers. Moreover, any tariffs and barriers placed on toys and textiles are much more likely to raise consumer prices than crush volumes, given the absence of competitive domestic industries that could take advantage of protection to grab local market shares. The final point concerns financial leverage. There has never been a time in recent global economic history when the developed world was so dependent on low-income countries for financial resources. For the first time, the emerging world is a net financial creditor. Given the rapid expansion of public debts, the major developed countries are extremely interested in seeing China and other low-income countries continue to buy U.S. Treasuries, Japanese Government Bonds and various European debt instruments. The impact of a big, potential pullout from global bond markets actually could be much more negative than positive in terms of protecting domestic industries. So emerging markets now are in a much better bargaining position than at any time in the past. Protectionist fears are likely to continue to bother investors over the next year or two, and perhaps longer. But we don't think the real situation supports these fears.

#### No trade wars

**Barnett 9—**senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx, AMiles)

Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### Interdependence doesn’t solve war

**May 5—**Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Principal Investigator for the DHS. (Michael, “The U.S.-China Strategic Relationship,” September 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Sep/maySep05.asp, AMiles)

However important and beneficial this interdependence may be from an economic point of view, it is not likely to be a significant factor for strategic stability. Famously, economists before World War I sounded clear warnings that Europe had become economically interdependent to an extent that war there would ruin Europe. The war was fought nevertheless, Europe was duly ruined, and the ensuing political consequences haunted Europe to the end of World War II. Other cases exist. Modern war has been an economic disaster. Economic realities, including economic interdependence, play little role in whether a country goes to war or not. Economic myths certainly do and they usually affect strategic stability quite negatively. This is another reason why domestic perceptions matter: they determine which myths are believed.

#### They have it backwards

**Mueller 9**—pol sci prof and IR, Ohio State. Widely-recognized expert on terrorism threats in foreign policy. AB from U Chicago, MA in pol sci from UCLA and PhD in pol sci from UCLA (John, Faulty Correlation, Foolish Consistency, Fatal Consequence: Democracy, Peace, and Theory in the Middle East, 15 June 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/KENT2.PDF, AMiles)

This already seems to hold for the relationship between peace and trade. Although expanding trade and interactions may enhance or reinforce the process, attitude toward war is likely to be the key explanatory variable in the relationship. Thus, it has frequently been observed that militarized disputes between countries reduce trade between them (Pollins 1989a; Pollins 1989b; Li and Sacko 2002). By contrast, if a couple of countries that have previously enjoyed a conflictual relationship lapse into a comfortable peace and become extremely unlikely to get into war, businesses in both places may well become inclined to explore the possibilities for mutually beneficial exchange. Similarly, although international institutions and norms often stress peace, they, like expanded trade flows, are not so much the cause of peace as its result. Many of the institutions that have been fabricated in Europe--particularly ones like the coal and steel community that were so carefully forged between France and Germany in the years following World War II--have been specifically designed to reduce the danger of war between erstwhile enemies. However, since it appears that no German or Frenchman in any walk of life at any time since 1945 has ever advocated a war between the two countries, it is difficult to see why the institutions should get the credit for the peace that has flourished between those two countries for the last half century and more.17 They are among the consequences of the peace that has enveloped Western Europe since 1945, not its cause. As Richard Betts puts it for institutions of collective security, "peace is the premise of the system, not the product.18

#### Trade doesn’t solve war—empirically proven

**Copeland 96** – Professor of Government, Virginia (Dale, Economic Interdependence and War, International Security 20.4, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/copeland.htm, AG)

The unsatisfactory nature of both liberal and realist theories is shown by their difficulties in explaining the run-ups to the two World Wars. The period up to World War I exposes a glaring anomaly for liberal theory: the European powers had reached unprecedented levels of trade, yet that did not prevent them from going to war. Realists certainly have the correlation right-the war was preceded by high interdependence-but trade levels had been high for the previous thirty years; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient. At first glance, the period from 1920 to 1940 seems to support liberalism over realism. In the 1920s, interdependence was high, and the world was essentially peaceful; in the 1930s, as entrenched protectionism caused interdependence to fall, international tension rose to the point of world war. Yet the two most aggressive states in the system during the 1930s, Germany and Japan, were also the most highly dependent despite their efforts towards autarchy, relying on other states, including other great powers, for critical raw materials. Realism thus seems correct in arguing that high dependence may lead to conflict, as states use war to ensure access to vital goods. Realism's problem with the interwar era, however, is that Germany and Japan had been even more dependent in the 1920s, yet they sought war only in the late 1930s when their dependence, although still significant, had fallen.

### Japan Alliance

#### Relations resilient – empirically proven and China guarantees continued cooperation

**Green 11** – associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University and senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Michael J., "The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance" The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 27, Number 1, Winter 2011, Project MUSE)

Despite the travails and uncertainty now clouding the alliance, there are multiple reasons to expect that Japan will continue to be closely aligned with the United States and influential in the international system. First, there is historical precedent. As Kenneth Pyle has pointed out, Japan has always successfully reordered its domestic institutions and instruments of national power in the face of new international challenges even if institutions in Japan's conservative political culture have a sticky resistance to change, as Carol Gluck has observed.10 Postwar history also demonstrates the resilience of U.S.-Japan security relations. The fact is that the alliance has entered periods of drift and faced crises before, including the 1960 Anpo demonstrations, the protests against the Vietnam War, the "Nixon shocks," the FS-X confrontation, and the 1995 Okinawa rape incident. In each case, observers predicted the end of the alliance, yet in each case the security relationship emerged significantly strengthened. Kent Calder has described a pattern in Japanese domestic politics in which the conservative LDP elite would co-opt the opposition's policy initiatives in response to social or economic crises, thus reinforcing the social contract and legitimacy of conservative rule.11 In similar ways, the United States and Japan have repeatedly responded to bilateral political crises by offering new reciprocal "compensation" in terms of expanded Japanese security responsibilities and a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Japan.12 This continual process of redefining and reaffirming the 1960 security treaty is not always visible in the midst of a crisis, but it is one reason why support for the alliance has steadily expanded in both the United States and Japan over its 50-year history. In addition to historical precedent, structural factors will bind if not ultimately define Japan's strategic options. The rise of Chinese power and North Korean nuclear brinkmanship render a close alliance with the United States by far the best guarantor of Japanese security, while growing economic [End Page 94] interdependence with China will ensure that Japanese governments (and U.S. governments, for that matter) will resist crude strategies of containment against China. Japan's demographic and fiscal challenges are already limiting the DPJ's original promises of largess (cutting highway fees, distributing child allowances, etc.) and forcing a consensus within the party that the policy tool kit will have to include some combination of cutting corporate taxes, raising the consumption tax, and restricting spending. If these seemed like uniquely difficult choices for Japan at one point, it is only necessary to observe the enormous changes Europe must now make in its social contract in order to remain fiscally solvent—or to consider the massive demographic challenge looming in the decade ahead in China as a result of the one child policy and a massively deficient social welfare net. Exaggerating the uniqueness and irreversibility of Japanese challenges today makes no more sense than predicting Japan's certain global domination did 20 years ago.

#### Their impacts prove

**Okamoto 2** (Yukio, President – Okamoto Associates, Washington Quarterly, Spring, Lexis)

Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought "threats to the alliance," the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable -- because there are no acceptable alternatives.

#### Cooperation inevitable—disputes won’t manifest

**Bader 10** Jeffrey 6/7, Senior fellow at Brookings- Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, 6/7/10 [Keynote Speech: US-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Partnership” http://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript\_Jeff\_Bader.pdf]

The sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, by North Korea served as a dramatic reminder that Northeast Asia is still “a dangerous neighborhood.” The Japanese Cabinet noticed. The Japanese government also experienced some difficulties in its relationship with China, in which it had invested a considerable amount. The DPJ has come to understand with increasing clarity that others in the region have been watching closely the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan could not afford the impression of a rift to “gain traction.” It turns out that all politics is not 100 percent local, as it had been seen in Japan for some months before then. The decision came against a series of other policy decisions by the Japanese government that demonstrate that the alliance is about more than basing issues. Japan has allocated $900 million in its current budget towards a multi-year, $5 billion, pledge to the Afghan Army and police, including for rehabilitation and training of demobilized Taliban and important development projects. Japan, like the United States, believes that peace and security in Afghanistan depend significantly on stability in Pakistan, and Tokyo has pledged $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan and hosted a major pledging conference. Japan has strongly backed the Republic of Korea, in the face of aggression from the North, in the wake of the Cheonan incident. Its solidarity with South Korea has been firm and public. Japan has sought trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea, and taken a leading role in fashioning a UN Security Council response. As a member of the UN Security Council, this year, Japan is supporting the U.S.–led draft of a resolution on Iran. Prime Minister Kan – Prime Minister to be Kan – indeed reiterated that support in his first conversation with President Obama, this past week. Japan’s leadership has made clear recently that it favors U.S. participation in an eventual East Asian Community, a change taken from the DPJ position last fall. Japan strongly supported President Obama’s initiatives in the April Nuclear Security Summit and worked closely with the U.S. delegation at the NPT Review Conference in May. So, nine months after the DPJ’s electoral victory, the scorecard, from the U.S. perspective, at last, is positive and improving. There has been lots of attention to what a rough ride it has been, to the precipitous decline in Hatoyama’s polling numbers and, ultimately, his demise, his political demise, to the difficulties of the DPJ government in “getting its feet under it.” And now the – as I said – the resignation. I’ll leave to experts on Japan the analysis of these, but from the viewpoint of the U.S., the larger issue, in conclusion, is this: That Japan has gone through the single most dramatic political change in 50 years – after 50 years of stasis in party rule, and the U.S.-Japan alliance has emerged in sound condition, having been scrutinized and ultimately validated by the new political leadership. This is, in one sense, not surprising, since 80 percent of all Japanese, in polling, support the alliance.\*\* That is the indispensible foundation for the alliance.

### Taiwan

#### No Asia War

**Vannarith 10**—Executive Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. PhD in Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific U (Chheang, Asia Pacific Security Issues: Challenges and Adaptive Mechanism, <http://www.cicp.org.kh/download/CICP%20Policy%20brief/CICP%20Policy%20brief%20No%203.pdf>, AMiles)

Some people look to China for economic and strategic interests while others still stick to the US. Since, as a human nature, change is not widely acceptable due to the high level of uncertainty. It is therefore logical to say that most of the regional leaders prefer to see the status quo of security architecture in the Asia Pacific Region in which US is the hub of security provision. But it is impossible to preserve the status quo since China needs to strategically outreach to the wider region in order to get necessary resources especially energy and raw materials to maintain her economic growth in the home country. It is understandable that China needs to have stable high economic growth of about 8 percent GDP growth per year for her own economic and political survival. Widening development gap and employment are the two main issues facing China. Without China, the world will not enjoy peace, stability, and development. China is the locomotive of global and regional economic development and contributes to global and regional peace and stability. It is understandable that China is struggling to break the so-called containment strategy imposed by the US since the post Cold War. Whether this tendency can lead to the greater strategic division is still unknown. Nevertheless, many observers agree that whatever changes may take place, a multi-polar world and multilateralism prevail. The reasons or logics supporting multilateralism are mainly based on the fact that no one country can really address the security issues embedded with international dimension, no one country has the capacity to adapt and adopt to new changes alone, and it needs cooperation and coordination among the nation states and relevant stakeholders including the private sector and civil societies. Large scale interstate war or armed conflict is **unthinkable** in the region due to the high level of interdependency and democratization. It is believed that economic interdependency can reduce conflicts and prevent war. Democracy can lead to more transparency, accountability, and participation that can reduce collective fears and create more confidence and trust among the people in the region. In addition, globalism and regionalism are taking the center stage of national and foreign policy of many governments in the region except North Korea. The combination of those elements of peace is necessary for peace and stability in the region and those elements are **present and being improved in this region.**

#### No Taiwan war

**Saunders and Kastner 2009** – \*Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, \*Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland and former China Security Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Phillip and Scott, International Security, 33.4, “Bridge over troubled water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan peace agreement”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.87, WEA)

Most observers agree that the issue of Taiwan’s status is not ripe for resolution. China remains committed to the ultimate goal of unification and refuses to renounce the use of force to prevent Taiwan independence. Former President Jiang Zemin emphasized the goal of unification, and China’s policies sometimes implied a timetable for achievement of that objective.2 China’s policy toward the Taiwan issue, however, has undergone a significant shift under President Hu Jintao, who has emphasized the short-to-medium-term goal of deterring Taiwan independence, postponing unification into the indefinite future.3

On Taiwan, public opinion polls consistently show strong (more than 75 percent) public support for maintaining the status quo. Only a small percentage favors either immediate independence or immediate unification with China.4 Although this polling reflects conditional preferences that factor in the likelihood of China using force if Taiwan were to declare independence,5 it accurately reflects the widespread view on Taiwan that permanent resolution of the issue of Taiwan’s status is not presently possible. While the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has sought to mobilize voters by highlighting Taiwan’s separate identity and sought ways to emphasize Taiwan’s sovereignty during President Chen Shui-bian’s term in office, the KMT has adjusted the emphasis in its cross-strait policy to more closely match the views of mainstream Taiwan voters. In the 2008 presidential campaign, KMT candidate (and eventual victor) Ma Ying-jeou articulated “three nos” that would govern policy toward China in his administration. These were a pledge that there would be no pursuit of de jure independence, no negotiations with the mainland about unification, and no use of force.6 President Ma reiterated these points in his May 20, 2008, inaugural address.

Collectively, these positions suggest that China and Taiwan may be prepared to defer the issue of Taiwan’s status for resolution at some point in the future. **Both sides have expressed the desire to improve relations, expand cross-strait contacts, and negotiate a peace agreement** between Taipei and Beijing. These goals were articulated in the joint press communiqué issued following KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s April 2005 meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.7 Hu Jintao reiterated China’s willingness to negotiate a peace agreement with Taiwan in his statements at the October 2007 17th Party Congress: “On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework for peaceful development of cross-straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase of peaceful development.”8 Both candidates in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election called for negotiation of a peace agreement with Beijing, and President Ma repeated the call in his inaugural address.9 Upon assuming office, Ma moved quickly to restart dialogue between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the semiofficial bodies that previously served as vehicles for cross-strait dialogue.10

#### Deterrence checks

**Ross 2001** – professor of political science at Boston College, associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University (Robert, The National Interest, Fall 01, “The stability of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait”, ProQuest, WEA)

There can never be total confidence that deterrence will work. Yet U.S. deterrence of any actual Chinese use of force against Taiwan-outside of a Taiwan declaration of independence-is highly stable. Overwhelming U.S. superiority means that the strategic, economic and political costs to China of U.S. military intervention would be astronomical. U.S. conventional superiority and its strong political commitment to Taiwan mean that the credibility of the U.S. threat to intervene is very high. In an insecure world, the U.S. deterrent posture in the Taiwan Strait is an unusually secure one.

#### No China/ Taiwan War

**Sun 11**—vice president of the Prospect Foundation (Yang-ming, 5 December 2011, “The Potential Crisis of Asian-Pacific Stability,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/05/potential-crisis-of-asian-pacific-stability/820d, RBatra)

The **structural factors that contribute to the stability of the China-Taiwan relationship** stem from three different policy lines coming out of Taiwan, China, and the United States. For Taipei, when Mr. Ma won his 2008 campaign, he didn’t hesitate to construct a policy of “maintaining cross-Strait stability” according to his party platform. That platform was based on the 1992 Consensus, in which Beijing and Taipei agreed that there is one China, but that each side has its own interpretation of what that means. That policy line helped eliminate the instability caused by the “one country on each side” principle that was raised by Ma’s predecessors from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). It implied that China and Taiwan were separate countries, not just two political spheres within one country. In Beijing, almost immediately after Ma won the presidency, there was a great debate over China’s Taiwan policy. Policymakers wondered whether Beijing should push Taiwan toward unification or maintain the current stage of cross-Strait peaceful development. Chinese President Hu Jintao prudently concluded that the character of current cross-Strait relations should be fixed on anti-independence rather than a push for unification, suggesting that the policy of “cross-Strait peaceful development” should remain intact. Last but not least was Washington’s policy. The United States, as the most important player in the region, has been trying to maintain the status quo. So, a stable framework was constructed through a vague saddle point to keep the current cross-Strait situation from descending into chaos: Taipei acted to maintain cross-Strait stability; Beijing promoted cross-Strait peaceful development; and Washington sought to maintain the status quo. The stability is no longer abstract but has a distinct structure, though that framework is still fragile and each side still has to learn how to trust the others. Almost all the subsequent policies that can help bring about greater stabilization are based on this fragile structure. There is the potential for a diplomatic truce, Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization, and, most importantly, Taipei’s involvement in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a trade agreement between China and Taiwan that came into effect in September 2010. The effects of ECFA have been greatly distorted. Those who criticize the agreement believe that it will only make Taiwan more dependent on the Chinese Mainland. They argue that Beijing also sees the agreement as a way to increase Taiwan’s dependence on China, but that the Chinese use a different phrase: “deepening the interaction of the two sides.” But for Taipei, the ECFA represents something different. First, it tells Beijing that Taiwan did not shut down all the possibilities of a common future, and this will definitely make Beijing consider similar future policies more reasonably and rationally. Second, the ECFA is a gateway for Taiwan’s economy. For the first decade of the twenty-first century, there were approximately 60 meaningful free trade agreements around the pan-Pacific region. Two countries were excluded from those agreements: North Korea and Taiwan. The result is that Taiwan has been gradually marginalized. The previous Taiwanese administration tried to push Beijing on this matter. But under the leadership of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan failed to sign any trade or investment agreements with its neighbors. Through the ECFA, Taipei has gotten closer to Southeast Asia, America, Europe, and Japan. **This helps create a favorable environment for the cross-Strait peaceful development and peaceful competition**, with benefits for both sides of Taiwan Strait. This group constitutes a collective force resisting the economic magnet that is the Chinese Mainland. And **this creates a strategic balance across the Straits**. Simultaneously, more relaxed cross-Strait relations allow Taiwan to move closer to the West in the areas of ideology and security.

#### Taiwan won’t push for independence—relations with China will inevitably improve—no risk of forcing unification

**Ross 10**—Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate, John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University (Robert S., Fall 2010, Orbis, The Rise of Chinese Power and the Implications for the Regional Security Order, 10.1016/j.orbis.2010.07.003, RBatra)

The demise of the Taiwan independence movement reflects the mainland’s development of a decisive deterrent capability. Beijing can retaliate against a Taiwan declaration of independence with **devastating economic and military capabilities** that would more than offset any Taiwan emotional or ideological gain from such a declaration. But unlike trends on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, the mainland has yet to develop the coercive ability to compel Taiwan to accommodate Beijing’s interest in the ‘‘one-China principle.’’ The DPP has abandoned its promotion of independence, but it strongly opposes any suggestion that Taiwan is part of the mainland and it enjoys popular support for this position. Thus, although the Ma Ying-jeou government has moved rapidly to expand mainland-Taiwan economic and societal ties, it has firmly resisted mainland interest in opening a dialogue on political issues and on a mainland-Taiwan peace accord, which would require discussion of the one-China principle. Moreover, although Taiwan may be less interested in purchasing expensive and sophisticated U.S. weaponry, it remains committed to buying American arms despite Beijing’s opposition. Thus, the rise of China has enabled Beijing to deter Taiwan from adopting policy that would challenge the status quo by declaring indepen- dence, but it remains unable to compel Taiwan to change its current policy by accommodating Beijing’s one-China policy and ending U.S.-Taiwan arms sales. This is in contrast to Beijing’s ability to transform South Korea’s strategic relationship with the United States. In part, this distinction reflects ongoing **limitations of the mainland’s military rise** in the Taiwan Strait despite the trends in mainland-Taiwan economic relations. Crossing the Taiwan Strait and defeating Taiwan would be a less certain operation, requiring more advanced capabilities and imposing far greater costs on China’s military forces than a ground force operation across a land border, even should the United States not intervene in cross-strait hostilities. And should the United States intervene with its maritime forces, however uncertain that might be, the costs to the PLA would be even greater. These constraints on PLA capabilities undermine the threat of coercive use of force to change the status quo by compelling Taiwan unification with the mainland – Beijing can deter a Taiwan declaration of independence, but it cannot compel Taiwan to accept its one-China position. China’s overwhelming economic dominance of Taiwan cannot offset its limited military capabilities. This reality enables Taiwan to resist PRC pressures and compels China to accept **long-term gradual change in cross-strait relations**. In recognition of the political realities on Taiwan, despite the rise of China, growing Chinese international confidence, and heightened popular Chinese expectations that the Ma Ying-jeou government would enable rapid progress toward unification, the Chinese leadership remains **committed to cooperation and incremental peaceful change** across the Taiwan Strait.

#### Wouldn’t risk Taiwan

**Bremmer 10** – president of Eurasia Group and author (Ian, March 22, “China vs. America: Fight of the Century,” Prospect, , <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/>)

China will not mount a military challenge to the US any time soon. Its economy and living standards have grown so quickly over the past two decades that it’s hard to imagine the kind of catastrophic event that could push its leadership to risk it all. Beijing knows that no US government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already by offering Taiwan’s business elite privileged investment opportunities.

#### No US intervention

**Sollenberger 10**, student at the Johns Hopkins University, graduate Swarthmore and analyst, [Matthew, spring, “Challenging US Command of the Commons:Evolving Chinese defense technologies as a threat to American hegemony?”, http://bcjournal.org/2010/challenging-us-command-of-the-commons/]

The advancement of Chinese military capabilities in the areas of information warfare, anti-access measures, and strategic nuclear forces has substantially altered the strategic environment surrounding a US-China conflict, particularly in the Chinese littoral theaters. By hampering US intelligence gathering and communication assets and using anti-access measures, China could delay a US military response to a possible confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. Given the Chinese-Taiwanese balance of forces, which has tilted significantly against Taiwan in the last years, any delay in the US response to such a crisis could allow China to achieve its unification goals militarily and present the US with a fait accompli. Meanwhile, China’s enhanced capability to inflict substantial damage on US military and civilian assets at different levels of escalation has increased the costs of a potential military conflict between the US and China and thus, may reduce the readiness of US decision-makers to intervene in favor of Taiwan – particularly given China’s evolving ability to withstand US nuclear coercion and deny the US potential benefits from escalation. China has thus effectively challenged US command of the commons, contesting US military power in several key areas. By definition, this erodes one of the pillars of hegemony, namely unrivaled military prowess.

#### Chinese leaders fear excess nationalism—won’t bolster the public to invade

**Marti 2—**Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, National Defense University (Michael, China’s Taiwan Policy, http://www.dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/papers/2002-09/CSP0209001e.pdf)

In addition to the Bush Administration’s tougher stand, there is another important consideration that has prompted Beijing to take a more conciliatory stand: to mobilize for war, China would have to mobilize the populace, and recent history suggests that once aroused, they can be difficult to control.11 In 1989 the student protests that ended in the Tiananmen Massacre, began as a memorial march for Hu Yaobang, whom they regarded as a force for political liberalization. It turned into a protest against government corruption and mishandling of the economy. The leadership, split by indecision, failed to respond quickly to suppress it. As a consequence, the movement spread across the country, becoming a threat to the regime. It took 180,000 troops in central Beijing to reassert control. In May 1999, when the U.S. accidentally bombed the PRC embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese leadership sought to orchestrate anti-American demonstrations. However, once again the situation got out of hand. The U.S. consulate in Chengdu was torched, and the embassy in Beijing was seriously damaged. It was apparent that even a call to national pride was fraught with dangers for the regime. As a result, when a PRC fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane near Hainan Island, the leadership did not permit any public demonstrations, limited press commentary, and regulated internet discussion of the incident. It is clear that the regime has reason to fear any mobilization of the people. Like the Cultural Revolution, mass movements can quickly spin out of control. Therefore, it is inconceivable that the regime would risk mobilizing a populace, which has already voiced a desire for political liberalization, to crush a functioning Chinese democracy (Taiwan), with which it has growing economic and cultural ties.