###  Exts – Can’t Solve

#### There is no impact to hegemony – the u.s. is not key to international order, Preble says that trade routes will remain open, the economy will remain resilient and that any disruption can be solved by other powers

#### They have a flawed psychological bias – prefer our evidence

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Hegemony’s Psychological Appeal

Raison d'etat cannot entirely account for the anathematic status of strategic restraint. Many people simply prefer internationalism and enjoy the prestige it appears to confer. It is human to desire greatness, to want to belong to the best team, political party or state. While all people everywhere take pride in their country or their culture, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism." The pleasure and pride that the citizens of Rome felt toward their empire is similar to that which Americans hold toward their republic. Like all people, they do not readily accept being second-best in anything, from math scores to basketball to automobile quality. "Americans love a winner," Patton told his troops on the eve of D-Day, "and will not tolerate a loser. Americans play to win, all the time .... The very thought of losing is hateful to an American." Being "number one" has a cachet that will not soon weaken as long as people are competitive by nature. We all like to bask in the reflected glory of national greatness.

Triumphalism extends beyond the masses into the halls of government and ivorytowers of academia. Some of the more strident internationalists clearly feel hostility toward the idea of sharing the stage with other powers not so much because of actual threats such a situation might pose (since they know better than anyone that such threats are minimal), but rather because they recoil from the notion that the United States should relinquish its title as de facto champion of the world without a struggle. Strategic restraint to some people would herald the end ofthe American Century and all the glory and prestige that accompanies it. Schlesinger wistfully implored his restraint-minded countrymen to "recognize, as we return to the womb, that we are surrendering a magnificent dream."" Few people make international affairs their chosen profession in order to recommend that the United States withdraw from most international affairs. Strategists are professionally predisposed to favor internationalism, if for no other reason than that it is more interesting and appealing than restraint. The national honor, after all, is at stake,

### a/t: Statistics

#### **Statistics go our way –our evidence looks at holistic history and looks at wars directly involved by the U.s.**

**Monteiro 12–** Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale (Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40,)

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace ºows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole.49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers.50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.”51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

### a/t: Transition War

**No transition wars:**

**Only one transition war in history**

**Macdonald and Parent 11 (**Paul**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)**

Based on our universe of cases, the predictions of retrenchment pessimists receive little support. In contrast to arguments that retrenchment is rare, we find that great powers facing acute relative decline adopted retrenchment in at least eleven and at most fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. By any accounting, a majority of the countries in these cases retrenched shortly after their ordinal transition. Nor does the evidence support the view that domestic interests constrain retrenchment. Every one of the great powers in our sample that chose to retrench did so within five years of the ordinal transition. This suggests timely responses to external constraints rather than domestic intransigence. Moreover, there does not appear to be a strong connection between regime type and retrenchment. Democracies account for about two-thirds of the great powers in our study, and are slightly more likely to face acute relative declines, accounting for thirteen of our eighteen cases, or 72 percent. Of the twelve democracies, seven retrenched, two did not, and three are debatable, yielding parameters from 58 to 83 percent. There are only three cases of autocracy, which makes comparison among groups difficult, but of these, two retrenched and one case is arguable, producing a range of 67–100 percent.59 In short, evidence at the coarse-grained level tentatively supports the neorealist approach outlined above: during acute relative decline, a significant majority of great powers of differing regime types elected to retrench. Wars, preventive or otherwise, do not appear to be a common fate for declining states, and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases, and in **only one** of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank.60 In addition, in six of fifteen cases, declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound, eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. Further, even if retrenchment was not successful, this does not prove that a preferable policy existed.61 In many cases of decline, there are few restorative solutions available; politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. Short of a miracle, it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain, France, or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft, even with the benefit of hindsight.

15 cases it worked

Parent and MacDonald 11 (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward” http://www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html)

Even if a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? **The historical record suggests it would**. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century.

**This transition will be uniquely peaceful**

**Macdonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conºict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.”92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo- American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been inºuenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94

### a/t: Attempt at Heg Inev

**Doesn’t matter – our impact turns are about material power**

**International incentives guarantee retrenchment**

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

This article has advanced three main arguments. First, retrenchment pessimists are incorrect when they suggest that retrenchment is an uncommon policy response to great power decline. States often curtail their commitments and mellow their ambitions as they fall in the ranks of great powers. Second and related, declining great powers react in a prompt and proportionate manner to their dwindling fortunes. They do this for the same reason that they tend to seize opportunities to expand: international incentives are strong inducements. In the high-stakes world of great power politics, states can seldom afford to fool themselves or pamper parochial interests when relative power is perilously slipping away. Third, the rate of relative decline explains not only the extent of retrenchment but also the form. The faster the rate of decline, the more likely states are to reform their militaries, increase reliance on allies, and refrain from using force in international disputes. Taken together, these findings suggest that retrenchment is an attractive strategy for dealing with great power decline. Although we make no claim that the rate of relative decline explains everything, we suggest that our study represents a solid first cut and that domestic political factors loom too large in discussions of power transitions and hegemonic change.

**MacDonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### We’ll internal link their offense – hegemony means there is no check on power, deterrence isn’t credible because there is no guarantee we don’t strike them down if they comply

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Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

###  Exts – SD Doesn’t Solve

#### Empirics prove – politics precede

**Dickson 10** – Director of Science Development online (David, June 28, “Science in diplomacy: ‘On tap but not on top’”, http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/the-place-of-science-in-diplomacy-%E2%80%9Con-tap-but-not-on-top%E2%80%9D/)

The broadest gaps in understanding the potential of scientific diplomacy lay in the third category, namely the use of science as a channel of international diplomacy, either as a way of helping to forge consensus on contentious issues, or as a catalyst for peace in situations of conflict.On the first of these, some pointed to recent climate change negotiations, and in particular the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as a good example, of the way that the scientific community can provide a strong rationale for joint international action.But others referred to the failure of the Copenhagen climate summit last December to come up with a meaningful agreement on action as a demonstration of the limitations of this way of thinking.It was argued that this failure had been partly due to a misplaced belief that scientific consensus would be sufficient to generate a commitment to collective action, without taking into account the political impact that scientific ideas would have.Another example that received considerable attention wasthe current construction of a synchrotron facility SESAMEin Jordan, a project that is already is bringing together researchers in a range of scientific disciplines from various countries in the Middle East (including Israel, Egypt and Palestine, as well as both Greece and Turkey).The promoters of SESAME hope that – as with the building of CERN 60 years ago, and its operation as a research centre involving, for example, physicists from both Russia and the United States – SESAME will become a symbol of what regional collaboration can achieve. In that sense, it would become what one participant described as a “beacon of hope” for the region.But others cautioned that, however successful SESAME may turn out to be in purely scientific terms, its potential impact on the Middle East peace process should not be exaggerated.Political conflicts have deep roots that cannot easily be papered over,however open-minded scientists may be to professional colleagues coming from other political contexts.Indeed, there was even a warning that in the developing world, high profile scientific projects, particular those with explicit political backing, could end up doing damage by inadvertently favouring one social group over another.Scientists should be wary of having their prestige used in this way; those who did so could come over as patronising, appearing unaware of political realities.Similarly, those who hold science in esteem as a practice committed to promoting the causes of peace and development were reminded of the need to take into account how advances in science – whether nuclear physics or genetic technology – have also led to new types of weaponry. Nor did science automatically lead to the reduction of global inequalities.“Science for diplomacy” therefore ended up with a highly mixed review. The consensus seemed to be that science can prepare the ground for diplomatic initiatives – and benefit from diplomatic agreements – but cannot provide the solutions to either.