## DA

### Impacts

o/w, turns case – nuclear deterrence prevents global conflict escalation and WMD attacks – also solves EMP strikes which turn their space internal link to heg

Nuclear primacy controls escalation

Lieber & Press, November-December 9 - Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, November-December 2009, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, p. 50-51

A second criticism of the argument for retaining and improving certain counterforce capabilities is that the cure could be worse than the disease. Counterforce capabilities may mitigate escalation during a conflict—for example, by dissuading adversaries from nuclear saber rattling, by reassuring allies that the United States can defend them, and, if necessary, by giving the United States the ability to pursue regime change if adversaries brandish or use nuclear weapons. But they may also exacerbate the problem of controlling escalation if an adversary feels so threatened that it adopts a hair-trigger nuclear doctrine. Specifically, the United States’ ability to launch a disarming strike without killing millions of civilians might increase the escalatory pressures that already exist because of the nature of the U.S. military’s standard wartime strategy. Conventional air strikes on radar systems, communication links, and leadership bunkers may look even more like the precursors of a preemptive disarming strike if adversaries know that the United States possesses a well-honed nuclear counterforce capability. This second criticism has merit. Nevertheless, the benefits of maintaining effective counterforce capabilities trump the costs. Strong counterforce capabilities should make adversaries expect that escalating a conventional war will lead to a disarming attack, not a cease-fire. Beyond deterrence, these capabilities will provide a more humane means of protecting allies who are threatened by nuclear attack and give U.S. leaders the ability to pursue regime change if an adversary acts in a truly egregious fashion. Moreover, some danger of escalation is unavoidable because the style of U.S. conventional operations will inevitably blind, rattle, and confuse U.S. adversaries. If the United States has powerful counterforce tools, these may dissuade its enemies from escalating in desperate times, and U.S. leaders would have a much more acceptable option if deterrence fails. The nuclear forces the United States builds today must be able to act as a reliable deterrent, even in much darker times. Many of those who recommend a much smaller U.S. nuclear arsenal—and assign little importance to a nuclear counterforce option—fail to consider the great difficulties of maintaining deterrence during conventional wars. The U.S. nuclear arsenal should retain sufficient counterforce capabilities to make adversaries think very carefully before threatening to use, putting on alert, or actually using a nuclear weapon. Any nuclear arsenal should also give U.S. leaders options they can stomach employing in these high-risk crises. Without credible and effective options for responding to attacks on allies or U.S. forces, the United States will have difficulty deterring such attacks. Unless the United States maintains potent counterforce capabilities, U.S. adversaries may conclude—perhaps correctly—that the United States’ strategic position abroad rests largely on a bluff.

**Nuclear primacy prevents nuclear war – independent bioweapons impact**

**Thayer 12**, Bradley, professor of political science at Baylor University [“THAYER: Preserving our nuclear deterrence,” February 17th, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/17/preserving-our-nuclear-deterrence/>]

For deterrence purposes, nuclear weapons matter for six reasons. First, they help keep the peace and prevent crises from escalating, as the world witnessed with the Cuban missile crisis. Second, they deter an attack on the U.S. homeland. Third, nuclear weapons - both strategic and tactical - allow the United States to extend deterrence credibly, effectively and cheaply to its allies, such as Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia. This provides them with security and removes their incentive to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Fourth, we have nuclear weapons to deter attacks against the U.S. military. Fifth, nuclear weapons play a role in deterring escalation of conflict. For example, were China to attack Taiwan, U.S. nuclear weapons would deter escalation to a strategic exchange between the United States and China. Finally, nuclear weapons deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons or chemical weapons, against the U.S. homeland, allies or U.S. military. Nuclear weapons aid Uncle Sam’s ability to coerce opponents as well for three reasons. First, in a crisis situation, nuclear weapons help persuade a challenger not to escalate to a higher level of violence or move up a rung on the escalation ladder. Second, although laden with risks, they also provide the possibility of attacking first to limit the damage the United States or its allies would receive. Whether the U.S. would do so is another matter. But possessing the capability provides the nation with coercive capabilities in crisis situations or war. Third, nuclear weapons give the United States the ability to threaten nuclear first-use to stop a conventional attack or limited nuclear attack and to signal the risk of escalating violence to a higher level.

**extinction**

Ochs 2 former president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project, member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group [Richard Ochs, , June 9, 2002, “Biological Weapons Must Be Abolished Immediately,” http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html]

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a “nuclear winter,” resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation’s survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope?

Nuclear primacy’s key to hegemony---makes unipolarity durable and deters great power competition

Craig 9 – Campbell Craig, Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, 2009, “American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, p. 35-36

As Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have suggested, the US may be on the verge of acquiring a first-strike nuclear capability, which, combined with an effective system of anti-ballistic missile defence, could allow the US to destroy a rival’s nuclear capabilities and intercept any remaining retaliatory missiles before they hit American cities. While this possibility clearly reduces the likelihood of other states seeking to match American power with the aim of fighting and winning a nuclear war, and, if their argument becomes widely accepted, could lead American policy-makers to reject the logic of the nuclear revolution and consider pre-emptive nuclear strikes against large nuclear rivals, it clearly is less germane to the question of small-state deterrence.33 Lieber and Press contend that the US may have the capability to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another large nuclear state lest that state use it on America first for the purposes of winning a great war. That, as they say, would mean the end of Mutual Assured Destruction as it existed during the Cold War. However, Washington would have much less reason to use its new first-strike capability against a nation that cannot threaten to destroy the US, and has no ambition to defeat America in a war, but only possesses a second-strike minimum deterrent. Such an attack would turn much of the world against a US willing to use nuclear weapons and kill hundreds of thousands or millions in order to defeat a nation that did not threaten its survival. Perhaps more to the point, an attack like this would be tremendously risky. Even after a perfect first strike some retaliation might get through, which could mean the nuclear destruction of an American city or perhaps the city of an American ally. At the very least, survivors of the attacked state and their allies would seek to unleash destruction upon the US in other ways, including an unconventional delivery of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. An imperfect first strike, or, even worse, a failure of the US anti-missile system, would constitute a total disaster for the US: not only would it incur the world’s wrath and suffer the destruction of one or more of its cities, but such a failure would also expose America as both a brutal and vulnerable state, surely encouragiwng other states to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise defy it. The US might have reason to launch a first strike against a large rival that deployed a major arsenal and appeared ready to attack America, as implausible as this scenario is. It would have little reason to do so against a small nation with a second-strike minimum deterrent arsenal. The nuclear revolution delivers a clear message to any large state considering major war with a powerful nuclear rival. The message is that such a war is likely to escalate to total nuclear exchange, and that in this event a large percentage of its citizenry will be killed or injured, its ability to govern what remains of the nation will be weakened or destroyed, and its power relative to other states that stayed out of the war will be radically diminished. It also delivers a message to any advanced small state eager to obtain security from the possible predation of large ones. The message is that if the small state possesses, or can quickly get its hands on, a few invulnerable and deliverable nuclear weapons, any large state contemplating invading it will have to weigh the benefits of invasion against a new kind of cost – not just a difficult or stalemated conventional war, such as the US faced in Vietnam and faces in Iraq, but the destruction of perhaps one, three, or five of its cities, and the death and injury of millions of its citizens. Unless it is able to obtain an absolutely fool-proof defence against any kind of nuclear retaliation, the choice that any large state is going to make when faced with this new circumstance is so likely to be peace that the small nuclear state can feel confident that it will be safe from conquest.34 The general relevance of these messages to American unipolar preponderance is clear. At the ‘great power’ level, rising states are unlikely to regard major war as a suitable means for overturning the international system and overthrowing American preponderance**.** The classic means of systemic change – hegemonic war – will not be an attractive option to any state hoping to survive, and the very existence of nuclear arsenals will make all states cautious about provoking conflict with nuclear rivals, especially the heavily armed US.35 Moreover, advanced smaller states know that they can provide for their own security, if they come to believe that it is endangered, not by embarking on large military build-ups or forming alliances with larger states, but by developing a small and invulnerable nuclear arsenal, or at least preparing the way to obtain such an arsenal quickly. This means that small states have a far greater ability to defend themselves from, and therefore be less afraid of, American predation today than comparable states facing dominant powers in previous eras.36 The main effects of the nuclear revolution, then, bolster the general claim of Power Preponderance that unipolarity is enduring. To support their claim, Brooks and Wohlforth specify three factors that dissuade would-be rivals to the US from balancing against it in traditional military terms: the effect of America’s relative geographical isolation from these potential rivals; the fact that American preponderance happened as a fait accompli about which no other nation could do anything; and the vast and growing ‘power gap’ between the US and all other rivals**.** The next section will describe each factor, and show how the nuclear revolution specifically reinforces each of them.

### Link

#### Their Rosner evidence cited in CX says that SMRs might be competitive with other clean energy—still nowhere near as cheap as coal which is the internal link to increasing spending – it also says:

“A bankable contractual arrangement also is required, and this provides an important opportunity for federal facilities to enter into the necessary purchase power arrangements. However, to provide a “bankable” arrangement to enable the SMR project sponsor to obtain private sector financing, the federal agency purchase agreement may need to provide a guaranteed payment for aggregate output, regardless of actual generation output. 48 Another challenge is to establish a mechanism to aggregate demand among federal electricity consumers if no single federal facility customer has a large”

Which proves that the plan spends more money than what they’re buying is actually worth

Their Andres and Breetz evidence also says:

“However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now.”

Which proves that SMRs aren’t cost competitive in the squo an aren’t cheaper than coal – if they win the plan is that cheap the squo solves and vote neg on presumption

If they go for this Obama spending arg, it’s false too- their card is about commercial SMRs not DOD ones – the link evidence is specific to military budgets

## Heg ADV

### Defense

**No impact to withdrawal**

**Friedman 10**—research fellow in defense and homeland security, Cato. PhD candidate in pol sci, MIT (Ben, Military Restraint and Defense Savings, 20 July 2010, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-bf-07202010.html, AMiles)

Another argument for high military spending is that U.S. military hegemony underlies global stability. Our forces and alliance commitments dampen conflict between potential rivals like China and Japan, we are told, preventing them from fighting wars that would disrupt trade and cost us more than the military spending that would have prevented war. The theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim is weak. It overestimates both the American military's contribution to international stability and the danger that instability abroad poses to Americans. In Western Europe, U.S. forces now contribute little to peace, at best making the tiny odds of war among states there slightly more so.7 Even in Asia, where there is more tension, the history of international relations suggests that without U.S. military deployments potential rivals, especially those separated by sea like Japan and China, will generally achieve a stable balance of power rather than fight. In other cases, as with our bases in Saudi Arabia between the Iraq wars, U.S. forces probably create more unrestthan they prevent. Our force deployments can also generate instability by prompting states to develop nuclear weapons. Even when wars occur, their economic impact is likely to be limited here.8 By linking markets, globalization provides supply alternatives for the goods we consume, including oil. If political upheaval disrupts supply in one location, suppliers elsewhere will take our orders. Prices may increase, but markets adjust. That makes American consumers less dependent on any particular supply source, undermining the claim that we need to use force to prevent unrest in supplier nations or secure trade routes.9 Part of the confusion about the value of hegemony comes from misunderstanding the Cold War. People tend to assume, falsely, that our activist foreign policy, with troops forward supporting allies, not only caused the Soviet Union's collapse but is obviously a good thing even without such a rival. Forgotten is the sensible notion that alliances are a necessary evil occasionally tolerated to balance a particularly threatening enemy. The main justification for creating our Cold War alliances was the fear that Communist nations could conquer or capture by insurrection the industrial centers in Western Europe and Japan and then harness enough of that wealth to threaten us — either directly or by forcing us to become a garrison state at ruinous cost. We kept troops in South Korea after 1953 for fear that the North would otherwise overrun it. But these alliances outlasted the conditions that caused them. During the Cold War, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea grew wealthy enough to defend themselves. We should let them. These alliances heighten our force requirements and threaten to drag us into wars, while providing no obvious benefit.

**There is a difference between unipolarity and primacy – material power has nothing to do with achieving the ends of hegemony**

**Maher, Ph.D. in pol sci, 11**—Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University (Richard, *Orbis*, Volume 55, Issue 1, 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Science Direct, RBatra)

Two Ways to Measure Power in World Politics

Unipolarity and primacy are two ways to describe U.S. power in contemporary world politics.2 Unipolarity and primacy are alike, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they remain conceptually distinct and describe different features or elements of power. What is distinctive about this era of international politics is that the United States is finding it **increasingly difficult to translate its enormous advantages in the first realm of power— material power—into the second kind of power—the ability to shape events and to realize its preferred outcomes.**

Unipolarity: Materialist Conception of Power. Unipolarity refers to the material distribution of power—economic, military, geographic, technological— in the international system. The international system has historically been characterized by multipolarity (three or more great powers), as in Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the first half of the twentieth century, or by bipolarity (two great powers), as in the Cold War. A unipolar system is one in which one state possesses capabilities that far exceed those of any other state. The post-Cold War world has been unipolar. As one world leader put it, in today’s unipolar world there is ‘‘One single center of power. One single center of force. One single center of decision making. This is the world of one master, one sovereign.’’3 Polarity is rarely unambiguous, however, and there have been differences among international relations scholars over how to characterize world politics in the post-Cold War era, and over how long this period of world politics will last. Samuel Huntington characterized post-Cold War world politics not as strictly unipolar but as ‘‘unimultipolar.’’ There was one state whose power far exceeded all the rest—the United States—but there were a number of secondary powers—China, Russia, Germany, India—that possessed considerable resources and influence, real or potential.4 Others have acknowledged the fact of unipolarity, but have asserted this is but a momentary aberration. World politics does not like imbalances of power, and other states will take measures—either individually or in combination with others—to balance U.S. power. Soon world politics will revert to the historically more common form of bipolarity or even multipolarity. 5 Others look at the impressive economic growth rates in China, India, and elsewhere and see a world in which power will be distributed around the world more evenly in coming decades.6 When thinking about power in this sense, as the sum total of a state’s material resources, the United States continues to be in a class by itself. This position is deteriorating, however, both in absolute and relative terms.

**Primacy: The Ability to Influence Outcomes.** The other way to think about power is the ability to realize one’s own preferences or preferred outcomes, or the ability to influence other actors—usually other states but not always—to do what you want them to do. When we think of power this way, we realize that the United States’ **vast resources alone often are not sufficient to realize its preferred ends**. There is no perfect correlation between the resources at one’s command and the ability to realize preferred outcomes. Perhaps no other period of world politics in recent memory represents this discrepancy more acutely than today. U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other state. Politically, diplomatically, and economically the United States remains in a preeminent position. While it hardly gets everything it wants, no other country can match U.S. influence in these realms. **At the same time**, from Iran, to North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not to mention Russia and China, the United States is seemingly **not getting its way on issues central to its interests**. More states are unafraid to challenge the United States (if only at the margins), ignore its blandishments, or seek to decrease their reliance or dependence on American security guarantees.

**Liberal international order inevitable with or without US leadership**

**Ikenberry ’11** – Professor of Politics and International Affairs @ Princeton

G. John Ikenberry, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. “A World of Our Making”. Democracy A Journal of Ideas. Issue #21, Summer 2011. http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=1

The main alternatives to liberal order—both domestic and international—have more or less disappeared. The great liberal international era is not ending. Still, if the liberal order is not in crisis, its governance is. Yet, given the fundamental weakness of the past international orders—brought down by world wars and great economic upheavals—the challenges of reforming and renegotiating liberal world order are, if anything, welcome ones.

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system.

Second, the character of liberal international order itself—**with or without** American **hegemonic leadership**—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance.

Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order.

Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow.

### Dollar heg

**Dollar heg turns the case --**

#### Dollar hegemony status is key to overall US economic and military leadership

William Clark, 2003; economic consultant and journalist, January (revised March 2003), “The Real Reasons for the Upcoming War with Iraq”, <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/RRiraqWar.html>

This unique geo-political agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1974 has worked to our favor for the past 30 years, as this arrangement has eliminated our currency risk for oil, raised the entire asset value of all dollar denominated assets/properties, and allowed the Federal Reserve to create a truly massive debt and credit expansion (or `credit bubble' in the view of some economists). These structural imbalances in the U.S. economy are sustainable as long as: 1. Nations continue to demand and purchase oil for their energy/survival needs 2. the world's monopoly currency for global oil transactions remains the US dollar 3. the three internationally traded crude oil markers remain denominated in US dollars These underlying factors, along with the `safe harbor' reputation of U.S. investments afforded by the dollar's reserve currency status propelled the U.S. to economic and military hegemony in the post-World War II period. However, the introduction of the euro is a significant new factor, and appears to be the primary threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Moreover, in December 2002 ten additional countries were approved for full membership into the E.U. Barring any surprise movements, in 2004 this will result in an aggregate E.U. GDP of $9.6 trillion and 450 million people, directly competing with the U.S. economy ($10.5 trillion GDP, 280 million people).

#### And dollar reserve status change would cause instant economic collapse

Robert Looney, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Otherwise, the effect of an OPEC switch to the euro would be that oil-consuming nations would have to flush dollars out of their (central bank) reserve funds and replace these with euros. The dollar would crash anywhere from 20-40% in value and the consequences would be those one could expect from any currency collapse and massive inflation (think Argentina currency crisis, for example). You'd have foreign funds stream out of the U.S. stock markets and dollar denominated assets, there'd surely be a run on the banks much like the 1930s, the current account deficit would become unserviceable, the budget deficit would go into default, and so on. Your basic 3rd world economic crisis scenario. "The United States economy is intimately tied to the dollar's role as reserve currency. This doesn't mean that the U.S. couldn't function otherwise, but that the transition would have to be gradual to avoid such dislocations (and the ultimate result of this would probably be the U.S. and the E.U. switching roles in the global economy)."

#### Collapse of US economic leadership would escalate every impact

Mandelbaum2005 – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – 2005 [Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224]

At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, the potential for economic calamity and wartime destruction is greater at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.

### AT: AE Now

#### Renewables will collapse in the US – financial incentives are rolling back

Justin Jacobs 5-25-2012; Petroleum Economist June 2012, Is the boom-time over for US renewables, Lexis

Justin Jacobs, LONDON: The clean energy sector has been a rare bright spot for the ailing US economy since the financial crisis took hold. Strong political support from the Obama administration and generous stimulus spending has fuelled a golden age for wind and solar technologies and led to a resurgence in the moribund nuclear industry. Non-hydro renewable electricity generation in the US, including nuclear power, doubled from 2006 to 2011, even if it still accounts for less than a tenth of electricity produced. But the good times could soon come to an end, though, as stimulus funds run dry and a host of subsidy programmes expire over coming years, potentially creating a **ruinous "funding cliff**", a report from three think tanks has warned. The report, Beyond Boom and Bust: Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence, was written by authors from the Breakthrough Institute, the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program and the World Resources Institute. It points to 2012 as a make-or-break year for the sector. Federal funding for clean energy - wind, solar and nuclear primarily - is expected to fall by nearly half this year, from $30.7 billion in 2011 to around $16 billion. That is down from a peak of $44.3 billion dollars in 2009. And spending is projected to continue its precipitous decline. By 2014 federal spending on clean energy technologies is projected to fall to $11 billion, a decline of 75% from 2009, the report's author's claim. Last year, for example, a crucial grant programme known as Section 1603, which BP took advantage of to approve an $800 million wind farm in Kansas, was allowed to expire. That led to an increase of some 50%-130% in the cost of financing new wind projects, according to the report. Dozens of similar subsidy programmes, representing 70% of all clean energy support measures, are scheduled to expire by 2014. "In the first quarter of 2012, global clean energy investment dropped to its lowest level since 2008. Good news stories are being replaced with headlines about closing factories, bankruptcies, and cancelled projects. Clean tech appears to be at a crucial inflection point," says Letha Tawney, a co-author of the report and senior associate at the World Resources Institute.

### Peak oil

#### Economics solves peak oil – new waves of innovation and price mechanisms check every shortage

Tim Worstall 7-6-2012; ¶ Tim Worstall is a Senior Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London, and one of the global experts on the metal scandium, one of the rare earths. His book, Chasing Rainbows, on the economics of climate change, is available at Amazon.¶ We are nowhere near hitting 'peak oil', because we keep inventing new ways of extracting the stuff http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/timworstall/100018350/so-thats-the-end-of-peak-oil-then/

Any economist could have told him that. Resource constraints are always an economic problem: solved by the price mechanism.¶ It was never true that we would run out of oil – it just gets more expensive. At a higher price, people use less and go and hunt for more. Both have happened: the amount of oil (or energy of any kind) used to produce one dollar of GDP has been falling for decades now. Techniques to extract more have been developed as those prices rise. And I'm afraid that people don't seem to understand the implications of those new techniques.¶ Take the Macondo field drilled by BP. Yes, a disaster in the Gulf: but also the deepest well ever drilled. Having developed the technology to drill so deeply we have not only discovered one new oil field – we've also discovered a whole new Earth that we can explore for oil. That part of the entire globe that between 4,000 and 5,000 feet below the surface.¶ Inventing fracking does not mean just extracting gas from Pennsylvania or oil from the Bakken. It means prospecting the whole planet again for such deposits. New technologies mean we have invented whole new planets to explore for resources.¶ This does not apply only to peak oil or peak gas. There are those out there who worry about peak copper, peak indium and even peak tellurium (an odd one when we use 125 tonnes a year and there's 120 million tonnes in the crust). None of these are geological problems, they are all plain and simple economic ones.

**Peak oil is nonsense**

**Deming, Ph.D. in geophysics, 4/7**—American geologist and geophysicist, associate professor of Arts and Sciences at the University of Oklahoma in Norman, BS degree in geology, Ph.D in geophysics from the University of Utah (David, 4/7/12, “The petroleum age is just beginning,” <http://newsok.com/the-petroleum-age-is-just-beginning/article/3664151>, RBatra)

Peak Oil is the theory that the production history of petroleum follows a symmetrical bell-shaped curve. Once the curve peaks, decline is inevitable. The theory is commonly invoked to justify the development of alternative energy sources that are allegedly renewable and sustainable.

**It's time to consign Peak Oil theory to the dust bin of history**. The flaw of the theory is that it assumes the amount of a resource is a static number determined solely by geological factors. But the size of an exploitable resource also depends upon price and technology. These factors are difficult to predict.

The U.S. oil industry began in 1859 when Edwin Drake hired blacksmith Billy Smith to drill a 69-foot-deep well. Subsequent technological advances have opened up resources beyond the limits of our ancestors' imaginations. We can drill offshore in water up to 8,000 feet deep. We have enhanced recovery techniques, horizontal drilling and four-dimensional seismic imaging. Oklahoma oilman Harold Hamm is turning North Dakota into Saudi Arabia by using hydraulic fracturing technology. U.S. oil production has reversed its 40-year decline. By the year 2020, it is anticipated that the U.S. will be the world's top oil producer.

For at least 100 years, people have repeatedly warned that the world is running out of oil. In 1920, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the world contained only 60 billion barrels of recoverable oil. But to date we have produced more than 1,000 billion barrels and currently have more than 1,500 billion barrels in reserve. World petroleum reserves are at an all-time high. The world is awash in a glut of oil. Conventional oil resources are estimated to be in the neighborhood of 10 trillion barrels. The resource base is growing faster than production can deplete it!

Nine years ago, **I predicted that the age of petroleum has only just begun. I was right. The Peak Oil theorists, the malthusians and the environmentalists were all wrong. They've been proven wrong, over and over again, for decades. A tabulation of every failed prediction of resource exhaustion would fill a library.**

**Oil is abiotic and renewable\*\*\***

**Lewis, quoting Gold, 12**—Thomas Gold, deceased professor of astronomy at Cornell University, a member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and a Fellow of the Royal Society (Greg, 3/18/12, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/03/what_if_oil_and_natural_gas_are_renewable_resources.html>, RBatra)

The evidence is mounting that not only do we have more than a century's worth of recoverable oil in the United States alone (even if there is a limit to the earth's oil supply), but that we also actually have a limitless supply of Texas tea because oil is in fact a renewable resource that is being constantly created deep under the earth's surface and which rises upward, where microscopic organisms that thrive in the intense pressure and heat miles below us interact with and alter it.

In other words, we have an unending supply of oil, some of which is constantly migrating upward from the depths at which it is created to refill existing oil deposits, and much more of which remains far below the surface. This oil can be recovered using existing technology.

Scientist Thomas Gold presents the decades-old theory of "abiotic" oil-creation, which supports these facts, in his book, The Deep Hot Biosphere. In it he explains that the idea of the "biotic" creation of "fossil fuels" -- that decaying organic matter is compressed into oil -- is incorrect. In fact, the earth is constantly producing new oil very deep below its surface, and in some cases the oil flows up to replenish existing oil fields thought to be exhausted. In simple terms, the microscopic organisms mentioned above interact with the hydrocarbons, altering them and leaving their footprint, thus disproving the notion that oil is a "fossil fuel."

Here's an example of how the process plays out:

Eugene Island is an underwater mountain located about 80 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. In 1973 oil was struck and off-shore platform Eugene 330 erected. The field began production at 15,000 barrels a day, then gradually fell off, as is normal, to 4,000 barrels a day in 1989. Then came the surprise; it reversed itself and increased production to 13,000 barrels a day. Probable reserves have been increased to 400 million barrels from 60 million. **The field appears to be filling from below and the crude coming up today is from a geological age different from the original crude**, which leads to the speculation that **the world has limitless supplies of petroleum.**

The theory of what Gold calls the deep hot biosphere was explored more fully in Stalinist Russia in the 1940s when the Russian dictator demanded that his scientists find a way to increase Soviet oil production. As they explored the idea that oil and other hydrocarbons are constantly being generated deep beneath the earth's surface, Russian technology was developed in the 1970s to test the theory by drilling as deep as 40,000 feet into the earth. As a result, Russia was the first nation to begin to understand and exploit these renewable oil reserves, and today their oil industry is thriving.

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### Turns oil shocks

Bronson 6 - Chicago Council on Global Affairs programs and studies VP, [Rachel, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, 2-3, http://www.oup.com/us/pdf/TTO/Excerpts.pdf

Few relationships are as vital, under as much pressure, and as poorly understood as that between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The 865,000-square-mile kingdom, equivalent in area to more than one-fifth of the United States, sits astride one- quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves and neighbors two of America’s foreign policy hot spots, Iraq and Iran, and one of its closest friends, Israel. Every devout Muslim turns toward its holy city, Mecca, five times a day to pray. Traditionally the United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia has been characterized as a basic bargain of “oil for security.” For its part, since the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia has ensured the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. The kingdom’s ability to put oil on the market quickly during times of crisis is the most obvious benefit the United States gains from good relations. Immediately after September 11, for example, Saudi Arabia increased oil shipments to the United States in order to keep prices stable. It also augmented oil production just before Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced, a time when political strife in Venezuela and Nigeria threatened to elevate oil prices dramatically. In return for this, the United States extends to Saudi Arabia’s leadership a security umbrella, including a commitment to its territorial integrity. Since 1950 the United States has explicitly vowed to help defend the kingdom against external threats—including, over the years, the Soviet Union, Yemen, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq. Since the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, this commitment has evolved into implicit support for the Saudi regime against internal challenges, including today’s al-Qaeda.

#### Turns heg – outweighs the aff internal link

Lazazzero 8 — Wake Forest JD, Law Clerk at Liberty Mutual Group (Joseph, “The U.S.-Saudi Alliance: A Necessary Shift toward Peace”, www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Lazazzero.pdf)

Perhaps no other time in contemporary history has the United States’ presence in the Middle Eastbeen such a key element in international stability or instability. September 11, the War on Terror and subsequent invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq made Middle East relations the primary focus of the current White House administration, and certainly many in the future. While conventional wisdom from both US politicians and Middle East scholars has criticized Saudi Arabia on issues ranging from human rights violations to serving as a breeding ground for violent jihadists, Saudi Arabia is an essential ingredient to the victory in the War on Terror, as well as for other key economic and geopolitical interests. The fact that most of the hijackers on 9/11 were of Saudi origin has led many to label the country as a state that promotes and protects terrorists. Members of the United States Congress have publicly accused Saudi Arabia of serving as a financial hub for many terrorist organizations, and have painted members of the Saudi Government as preaching hatred and violence against the United States (US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, 2004). Saudi Arabia’s foreign religious schools, known as madrasas, have been accused of teaching violent jihadism. The essential fact missed in today’s debate over the role of Saudi Arabia is America’s goals in the region. The United States’ primary goals in the region area steady supply of oil and international security, not exporting human rights and democracy. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States have a mutual investment in a continued economic partnership. Saudi Arabia, America’s largest oil provider, is essential to a stable US economy. The importance of this partnership will only increase as oil supplies dwindle and prices rise. Secondly, Saudi Arabia has taken significant steps to join the United States in its War on Terrorism. King Abdullah has already initiated massive education overhauls that focus on religious tolerance, amended the banking laws and financial oversight within his country, and arrested prominent members of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. The reason for these, and many other initiatives that will be discussed in depth later, is not because of international pressure or a mere public image campaign, but instead rests on a point that many of those critical to a US-Saudi relationship miss, that the United States and Saudi Arabia have a common enemy in violent Islam and terrorism. Just as the United States grieved over those killed by Al-Qaeda on September 11, Saudi Arabia has done the same after Al-Qaeda bombings like that in Riyadh in 2003. Thus, the pragmatic and strategic decision for the United States is to engage with the Saudis in order to ensure these interests are fulfilled. Disengaging from Saudi Arabia would impair vital US interests in the region and only exacerbate the very problems for which those within the United States currently criticize the Saudis.

### 2NC China Impact

#### Split with the Saudis pushes them to China – causes great power conflict

Luft 2004 (Gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS) a Washington based think tank focused on energy security, specializes in strategy, geopolitics, terrorism, Middle East and energy security, Los Angeles Times, “US, China Are on Collision Course Over Oil” http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0202collision.htm)

Optimists claim that the world oil market will be able to accommodate China and that, instead of conflict, China's thirst could create mutual desire for stability in the Middle East and thus actually bring Beijing closer to the U.S. History shows the opposite: Superpowers find it difficult to coexist while competing over scarce resources. The main bone of contention probably will revolve around China's relations with Saudi Arabia, home to a quarter of the world's oil. The Chinese have already supplied the Saudis with intermediate range ballistic missiles, and they played a major role 20 years ago in a Saudi financed Pakistani nuclear effort that may one day leave a nuclear weapon in the hands of a Taliban-type regime in Riyadh or Islamabad. Since 9/11, a deep tension in U.S.-Saudi relations has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to win the heart of the House of Saud. The Saudis hear the voices in the U.S. denouncing Saudi Arabia as a "kernel of evil" and proposing that the U.S. seize and occupy the kingdom's oil fields. The Saudis especially fear that if their citizens again perpetrate a terror attack in the U.S., there would be no alternative for the U.S. but to terminate its long-standing commitment to the monarchy - and perhaps even use military force against it. The Saudis realize that to forestall such a scenario they can no longer rely solely on the U.S. to defend the regime and must diversify their security portfolio. In their search for a new patron, they might find China the most fitting and willing candidate. The risk of Beijing's emerging as a competitor for influence in the Middle East and a Saudi shift of allegiance are things Washington should consider as it defines its objectives and priorities in the 21st century. Without a comprehensive strategy designed to prevent China from becoming an oil consumer on a par with the U.S., a superpower collision is in the cards. The good news is that we are still in a position to halt China's slide into total dependency.