### 1NC T

**Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – excludes extraction of those materials**

**Vaekstfonden 6** – Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 [s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf](http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf)

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.

Raw material extraction

This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.

Energy production

Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.
Transmission and distribution

#### Violation – the aff reduces restrictions on siting and extraction

#### Vote neg – they unlimit the topic to include tons of pre-power generation affs – overstretches research burdens and undermines preparedness for all debates

### 1NC CP

#### The Congress should provide independent appropriations authority to oversight committees and equalize minority party representation on such committees.

#### The counterplan creates a sustainable mechanism to strengthen Congressional oversight to solve presidential abuses of power

Kriner 09 **-** Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University (Douglas, “TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE CONGRESS?: CAN ENHANCED OVERSIGHT REPAIR "THE BROKEN BRANCH"?,” 89 B.U.L. Rev. 765, April, lexis)

While oversight is a potentially important tool of legislative influence, it is not one that Congress employs uniformly. A wealth of empirical data, both in the specific context of Iraq and of congressional oversight more generally, suggests that congressional willingness to use its investigative and oversight powers to superintend the executive branch varies considerably according to the contours of the political environment. When the President's co-partisans control the committee gavels, partisan incentives to protect their party leader in the White House largely trump the institutional incentives to defend the legislature's prerogatives from executive abuses of power. Only in divided government do partisan incentives reinforce the weak institutional incentives driving legislators to oversee the executive aggressively. [n94](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n94)

The 9/11 Commission, comprised as it was of multiple former members of Congress, presciently noted that "of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important." [n95](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n95) To strengthen the prospects for effective oversight of antiterrorism policy, the Commission focused primarily on expanding the resources and tools at the intelligence committees' disposal. [n96](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n96) For example, the Commission recommended granting the intelligence committees independent appropriations powers over relevant executive departments and agencies; [n97](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n97) this would greatly  [\*792]  strengthen the carrot and stick available to help bring a wayward agency or department to heel and ensure that congressional preferences are listened to at the policy implementation stage. No doubt, similar reforms in other substantive areas would strengthen an oversight committee's hand when seeking changes from an executive branch actor implementing policy contra legislative intent. However, such reforms do little to address the underlying problem of variable congressional motivation to oversee the executive in the first place. As long as members of the majority party in periods of unified government see themselves first and foremost as "lieutenants in the president's army," in Mann and Ornstein's phrase, [n98](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n98) instead of institutional partisans defending the legislature's prerogatives and power prospects, Congress will fail to meet its responsibilities to vigorously oversee executive exercises of power.

An important part of the solution for Mann and Ornstein is to rekindle an institutional identity - or, in Madison's words, to reconnect the interests of members of Congress with the constitutional rights of their institution [n99](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n99) - that will encourage members to take their oversight duties seriously and once again to foster legislative responsibility. [n100](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n100) Yet, it is unclear what specific reforms could be pursued to encourage members of Congress to embrace this collective institutional identity as long as their electoral interests remain so detached from that of the institution itself. As long as most members of Congress can rest secure in their re-electoral prospects even as popular confidence in Congress as an institution plummets, the impetus to put an institutional identity ahead of a partisan one will be lacking. Until voters begin to value effective oversight as much as academics, partisan electoral incentives may continue to trump institutional incentives to protect Congress's power stakes from a wayward executive branch.

An alternative avenue of reform could be to strengthen the power of the minority party within committees to conduct oversight. As mentioned previously, congressional Democrats in the 108th and 109th Congresses, shut out from the process by the negative agenda control of the committee chair's gavel, turned to the Democratic Policy Committee to hold several informal hearings critical of the Administration's conduct of the war. [n101](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n101) Expanding the resources available to these and other venues whose agenda is not controlled by the iron fist of the majority party may spark greater congressional inquiries into executive actions that in some cases could make revelations forcing the majority to relent and allow a formal committee inquiry.

In a similar vein, the 9/11 Commission urged that the staff of the revised intelligence oversight committees should be nonpartisan and at the disposal of  [\*793]  the committee as a whole. [n102](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n102) While shared staffing resources alone would not be sufficient to compel the majority party in unified government to oversee vigorously or even investigate the conduct of a co-partisan administration, steps to de-politicize the process and open up committee activities to greater influence from the minority, which possesses partisan incentives to engage in oversight, could potentially bolster congressional oversight in periods of unified government. Reforms in the 1970s attacked the concentration of power in committee chairmen and diffused power to subcommittees and their chairs and members. [n103](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1257597888722&returnToKey=20_T7813820916&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.327298.90655331896" \l "n103) However, the objective of those reforms was to bypass chairmen obstructing the will of the median member of the majority party. Whether members of Congress would ever agree to institutional reforms expanding the committee agenda power of the minority party is doubtful at best.

### 1NC DA

#### Obama is winning but it will be close and it’s reversible – popularity is key

**Brownstein, 9/21/12** - a two-time finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of presidential campaigns, is National Journal Group's Editorial Director, in charge of long-term editorial strategy.(Ronald, National Journal, “Heartland Monitor Poll: Obama Leads 50 Percent to 43 Percent” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-presidential-campaign/heartland-monitor-poll-obama-leads-50-percent-to-43-percent-20120921?page=1>)

President Obama has opened a solid lead over Mitt Romney by largely reassembling the “coalition of the ascendant” that powered the Democrat to his landmark 2008 victory, the latest Allstate/National Journal Heartland Monitor Poll has found.

The survey found Obama leading Romney by 50 percent to 43 percent among likely voters, with key groups in the president’s coalition such as minorities, young people, and upscale white women providing him support comparable to their levels in 2008.

The survey, conducted by Ed Reilly and Jeremy Ruch of FTI Communications, a communications and strategic consulting firm, surveyed 1,055 likely voters by landline and cell phone from Sept. 15-19. It has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. Full results from the survey, including a detailed look at Americans’ attitudes about opportunity and upward mobility, will be released in the Sept. 22 National Journal.

The Heartland Monitor’s results are in line with most other national surveys in recent days showing Obama establishing a measurable lead, including this week’s new Pew Research Center and NBC/Wall Street Journal polls. The saving grace for Republicans is that even as these surveys show Obama opening a consistent advantage, the president has not been able to push his support much past the critical 50 percent level, even after several difficult weeks for Romney that began with a poorly reviewed GOP convention. That suggests the president faces continued skepticism from many voters that could allow Romney to draw a second wind if he can stabilize his tempest-tossed campaign.

The poll found Obama benefiting from a small increase in optimism about the country’s direction. Among likely voters, 37 percent said the country was moving in the right direction. Even looking at all adults, the "right track" number now stands at 35 percent, its best showing since the April 2010 Heartland Monitor.

Obama’s approval rating in the new survey also ticked up to 50 percent, with 46 percent disapproving. That’s a slight improvement from May, when the survey of all adults found 47 percent approving and 48 percent disapproving. Among all adults, Obama’s rating improved to 49 percent approving and 45 percent disapproving, also one of his best showings since January 2010.

Those gains are critical, because as always with an incumbent president, attitudes toward Obama’s performance powerfully shape the race. Among likely voters who approve of Obama’s job performance, he leads Romney in the ballot test by 93 percent to 3 percent; those who disapprove prefer Romney by 87 percent to 5 percent.

#### Support of fossil fuels ensures Obama loses

Metz 12 – 7/31/ (David Metz, a Partner in Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz & Associates (FM3), has provided opinion research and strategic guidance to hundreds of non-profit organizations, government agencies, businesses, and political campaigns in over 40 states since joining the firm in 1998. “Power Poll,” <http://www.climate-one.org/transcripts/power-poll>)

Dave Metz: Well, I think it’s important to think about public opinion on energy in two dimensions. The first dimension is what types of energy policies most Americans support. And there, we see actually, a lot of unanimity on some of the big picture questions. Most Americans, **regardless of geography, political party, gender, age** are most supportive of expanding use of renewable energy, solar and wind power in particular. And they’re much less supportive of continued use of fossil fuels, coal and oil, most notably with natural gas in exception to that -- that has relatively high levels of support. But once we get past those patterns, the second and more important question is, how much do those issues matter, when voters are making their decisions about how they’re going to cast their ballots. And there, the results are somewhat more mixed. In certain parts of the country and certain races, it’s likely to be a very important issue but there are other places, particularly in this economy, where there may be other issues that get more attention and are a little bit more on voter’s minds. And I think a lot of these campaigns are going to be about trying to find ways to frame the energy issue and make it drive votes in ways that will benefit either party.

#### Romney would support an Israeli strike on Iran

Robert W. Merry 8-1-2012; editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policyRomney Edges U.S. toward War with Iran <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/romney-edges-us-toward-war-iran-7275>

The major newspapers all understood that GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s expressions in Jerusalem last weekend were important, which is why they played the story on page one. But only the New York Times captured the subtle significance of what he said. The paper’s coverage, by Jodi Rudoren and Ashley Parker, reported that Romney sought to adhere to the code that says candidates shouldn’t criticize the president on foreign soil. “But,” they added, “there were subtle differences between what he said—and how he said it—and the positions of his opponent.” Most significantly, while Obama talks about stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel insists Tehran should be prevented from having even the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. This means no nuclear development even for peaceful purposes. Romney embraced the Israeli language. In doing so, he nudged his nation closer to war with Iran. Based on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s oft-repeated expressions, he clearly seems bent on attacking Iran to destroy or delay its nuclear program and, if possible, undermine the Iranian regime. And he wants America at his side when he does it. Obama has been seeking to dissuade Israel from contemplating such an assault in order to give the president’s austere sanctions regimen a chance to work. But what does he mean by “a chance to work?” If he means a complete capitulation by Iran, he’s dreaming, of course. History tells us that nations don’t respond to this kind of pressure by accepting humiliation. That’s the lesson of Pearl Harbor, as described in my commentary in these spaces. Many close observers of the Iran drama believe there may be an opportunity for a negotiated outcome that allows Iran to enrich uranium to a limited extent—say, 5 percent—for peaceful purposes. Iran insists, and most experts agree, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows such enrichment for energy production. In any event, numerous signatories to the NPT do in fact maintain limited enrichment programs for peaceful ends. Obama seems torn between pursuing such an outcome and embracing the Israeli position, which demands that Iran foreswear all enrichment and any peaceful nuclear development. In last spring’s Istanbul meeting between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group (the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany), there seemed to be a genuine interest on the part of those six nations to explore an outcome that would allow for some enrichment by Iran. Five weeks later in Baghdad, the P5+1 group seemed to backtrack and insist upon zero enrichment. Talks are ongoing but only among low-level technical people; any serious negotiations are on hold pending the election. Thus Obama has managed to maintain his flexibility during the delicate campaign period. But now we have Romney in Israel essentially telling the people there that they need fear no ambivalence on his part. If elected, he will embrace the Netanyahu position, which is designed to ensure the collapse of any negotiations attending anti-Iran sanctions, which Netanyahu already has labeled a failure. “We have to be honest,” he said over the weekend, during Romney’s visit, “and say that the sanctions and diplomacy so far have not set back the Iranian program by one iota.” That’s the view that Romney subtly embraced in Jerusalem.

#### Great power war

Trabanco 2009 – Independent researcher of geopolitical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at Anytime,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring **intense** financial and **economic havoc upon the West**, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and **dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region** and perhaps even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some **great powers could become involved** in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### 1NC CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should

#### require the Secretary of the Interior to offer for sale at least 25 percent of onshore federal lands nominated by firms for oil and gas leasing

#### prohibit the Secretary from deferring lease sales in areas where the Bureau of Land Management is revising existing land use plans, and

#### require the Secretary to establish certain fees for activities related to the development of oil and gas on federal lands.

## 1NC Congressional Power

### 1NC Other D

#### Util good

**Cummiskey 90** – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### No internal link to global democracy—also, American democracy isn’t going to collapse

#### No impact to democracy

Robert Kaplan, influential journalist and author, 1998, At the End of the American Century, p. 95

What does democracy do? It does not create middle classes. The record of history suggests that middle classes, which are in fact the pre­requisite for stability in modern and postmodern societies, tend to emerge more easily under various kinds of authoritarian regimes— whether in East Asia or elsewhere. The values brought to America were often middle-class values or petty bourgeois values that were generated in Europe under some form of authoritarian regime. **Democracy emerges best when it emerges last—**after **all the other prerequisites of order are in place**. In other words, it is difficult for ethnically or region­ally based parties to debate issues like budgets and gun control until they have settled more explosive topics. The situation in Central and Eastern Europe bodes well for democ­racy because of a sufficient prewar tradition of bourgeois values and other strong indicators of social stability—including literacy rates of 99 percent and low birthrates. Yet in places such as Pakistan and sub­Saharan Africa, democracy will not be enough to guarantee a stable gov­ernment: literacy is relatively low; parties, when they are formed, are often just masks for various regions or ethnic groups; and there is often no significant middle class and very little industrialization. One there­fore should not place too much hope in the mere fact that elections are being held in many parts of the Third World.

### 1NC Heg D

#### Heg inevitable

**Friedman** **10 –** American political scientist and author. He is the founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor. He has authored several books (George, “The Next 100 Years” p 13-31)

We are now in an America- centric age. To understand this age, we must understand the United States, not only because it is so powerful but because its culture will permeate the world and deﬁne it. Just as French culture and British culture were deﬁnitive during their times of power, so American culture, as young and barbaric as it is, will deﬁne the way the world thinks and lives. So studying the twenty- ﬁrst century means studying the United States. If there were only one argument I could make about the twenty- ﬁrst century, it would be that the European Age has ended and that the North American Age has begun, and that North America will be dominated by the United States for the next hundred years. The events of the twentyﬁrst century will pivot around the United States. That doesn’t guarantee that the United States is necessarily a just or moral regime. It certainly does not mean that America has yet developed a mature civilization. It does mean that in many ways the history of the United States will be the history of the twenty- ﬁrst century. There is a deep- seated belief in America that the United States is approaching the eve of its destruction. Read letters to the editor, peruse the Web, and listen to public discourse. Disastrous wars, uncontrolled deﬁcits, high gasoline prices, shootings at universities, corruption in business and government, and an endless litany of other shortcomings—all of them quite real—create a sense that the American dream has been shattered and that America is past its prime. If that doesn’t convince you, listen to Europeans. They will assure you that America’s best day is behind it. The odd thing is that all of this foreboding was present during the presidency of Richard Nixon, together with many of the same issues. There is a continual fear that American power and prosperity are illusory, and that disaster is just around the corner. The sense transcends ideology. Environmentalists and Christian conservatives are both delivering the same message. Unless we repent of our ways, we will pay the price—and it may be too late already. It’s interesting to note that the nation that believes in its manifest destiny has not only a sense of impending disaster but a nagging feeling that the country simply isn’t what it used to be. We have a deep sense of nostalgia for the 1950s as a “simpler” time. This is quite a strange belief. With the Korean War and McCarthy at one end, Little Rock in the middle, and Sputnik and Berlin at the other end, and the very real threat of nuclear war throughout, the 1950s was actually a time of intense anxiety and foreboding. A widely read book published in the 1950s was entitled The Age of Anxiety. In the 1950s, they looked back nostalgically at an earlier America, just as we look back nostalgically at the 1950s. American culture is the manic combination of exultant hubris and profound gloom. The net result is a sense of conﬁdence constantly undermined by the fear that we may be drowned by melting ice caps caused by global warming or smitten dead by a wrathful God for gay marriage, both outcomes being our personal responsibility. American mood swings make it hard to develop a real sense of the United States at the beginning of the twentyﬁrst century. But the fact is that the United States is stunningly powerful. It may be that it is heading for a catastrophe, but it is hard to see one when you look at the basic facts. Let’s consider some illuminating ﬁgures. Americans constitute about 4 percent of the world’s population but produce about 26 percent of all goods and services. In 2007 U.S. gross domestic product was about $14 trillion, compared to the world’s GDP of $54 trillion—about 26 percent of the world’s economic activity takes place in the United States. The next largest economy in the world is Japan’s, with a GDP of about $4.4 trillion—about a third the size of ours. The American economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined: Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom. Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States. Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion (in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than Japan’s and China’s industries combined. There is talk of oil shortages, which certainly seem to exist and will undoubtedly increase. However, it is important to realize that the United States produced 8.3 million barrels of oil every day in 2006. Compare that with 9.7 million for Russia and 10.7 million for Saudi Arabia. U.S. oil production is 85 percent that of Saudi Arabia. The United States produces more oil than Iran, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates. Imports of oil into the country are vast, but given its industrial production, that’s understandable. Comparing natural gas production in 2006, Russia was in ﬁrst place with 22.4 trillion cubic feet and the United States was second with 18.7 trillion cubic feet. U.S. natural gas production is greater than that of the next ﬁve producers combined. In other words, although there is great concern that the United States is wholly dependent on foreign energy, it is actually one of the world’s largest energy producers. Given the vast size of the American economy, it is interesting to note that the United States is still underpopulated by global standards. Measured in inhabitants per square kilometer, the world’s average population density is 49. Japan’s is 338, Germany’s is 230, and America’s is only 31. If we exclude Alaska, which is largely uninhabitable, U.S. population density rises to 34. Compared to Japan or Germany, or the rest of Europe, the United States is hugely underpopulated. Even when we simply compare population in proportion to arable land—land that is suitable for agriculture—America has ﬁve times as much land per person as Asia, almost twice as much as Europe, and three times as much as the global average. An economy consists of land, labor, and capital. In the case of the United States, these numbers show that the nation can still grow—it has plenty of room to increase all three. There are many answers to the question of why the U.S. economy is so powerful, but the simplest answer is military power. The United States completely dominates a continent that is invulnerable to invasion and occupation and in which its military overwhelms those of its neighbors. Virtually every other industrial power in the world has experienced devastating warfare in the twentieth century. The United States waged war, but America itself never experienced it. Military power and geographical reality created an economic reality. Other countries have lost time recovering from wars. The United States has not. It has actually grown because of them. Consider this simple fact that I’ll be returning to many times. The United States Navy controls all of the oceans of the world. Whether it’s a junk in the South China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed—or denied—at will by the U.S. Navy. The combined naval force of the rest of the world doesn’t come close to equaling that of the U.S. Navy. This has never happened before in human history, even with Britain. There have been regionally dominant navies, but never one that was globally and overwhelmingly dominant. This has meant that the United States could invade other countries—but never be invaded. It has meant that in the ﬁnal analysis the United States controls international trade. It has become the foundation of American security and American wealth. Control of the seas emerged after World War II, solidiﬁed during the ﬁnal phase of the European Age, and is now the ﬂip side of American economic power, the basis of its military power. Whatever passing problems exist for the United States, the most important factor in world affairs is the tremendous imbalance of economic, military, and political power. Any attempt to forecast the twenty- ﬁrst century that does not begin with the recognition of the extraordinary nature of American power is out of touch with reality. But I am making a broader, more unexpected claim, too: the United States is only at the beginning of its power. The twenty ﬁrst century will be the American century.

#### Empirics prove hegemony doesn’t cause stability

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability.

First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present.

Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve anything

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Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldn’t have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.

#### There are no threats – regional actors can prevent war

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More than two decades after the Cold War dramatically ended, the U.S. maintains a Cold War military. America has a couple score allies, dozens of security commitments, hundreds of overseas bases, and hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. Yet international hegemonic communism has disappeared, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Maoist China has been transformed, and pro-communist Third World dictatorships have been discarded in history's dustbin.

The European Union has a larger economy and population than America does. Japan spent decades with the world's second largest economy. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. As Colin Powell exclaimed in 1991, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung."

Yet America accounts for roughly half of the globe's military outlays. In real terms the U.S. government spends more on the military today than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War. It is difficult for even a paranoid to concoct a traditional threat to the American homeland.

Terrorism is no replacement for the threat of nuclear holocaust. Commentator Philip Klein worries about "gutting" the military and argued that military cuts at the end of the Cold War "came back to haunt us when Sept. 11 happened." Yet the reductions, which still left America by far the world's most dominant power, neither allowed the attacks nor prevented Washington from responding with two wars.

And responding with two wars turned out to be a catastrophic mistake. Evil terrorism is a threat, but existential threat it is not. Moreover, the best response is not invasions and occupations — as the U.S. has learned at high cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the most effective tools are improved intelligence, Special Forces, international cooperation, and restrained intervention.

Attempts at nation-building are perhaps even more misguided than subsidizing wealthy industrialized states. America's record isn't pretty. The U.S. wasn't able to anoint its preferred Somali warlord as leader of that fractured nation. Washington's allies in the still unofficial and unstable nation of Kosovo committed grievous crimes against Serb, Roma, and other minorities. Haiti remains a failed state after constant U.S. intervention. The invasion of Iraq unleashed mass violence, destroyed the indigenous Christian community, and empowered Iran; despite elections, a liberal society remains unlikely. After nine years most Afghans dislike and distrust the corrupt government created by the U.S. and sustained only by allied arms.

The last resort of those who want America to do everything everywhere is to claim that the world will collapse into various circles of fiery hell without a ubiquitous and vast U.S. military presence. Yet there is no reason to believe that scores of wars are waiting to break out. And America's prosperous and populous allies are capable of promoting peace and stability in their own regions.

#### Hegemony is bad – Unipolar system creates recalcitrant power backlash which leads to proliferation and war

**Monteiro 12**\*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, **raising** the **risk of arms races**. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including **major power wars**. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

#### Extinction

Asal and Beardsley 09 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

#### Unipolarity destroys coordination necessary to stop the next epidemic-abandoning heg solves

**Weber et al. 7 \***Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, [“How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy]

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. **Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand**. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. **These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American powe**r. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. **As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, we’re not likely to get any help.** Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can’t change that alone.

#### Disease – It leads to extinction

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Senate Majority Leader Frist describes the recent slew of emerging diseases in almost biblical terms: “All of these [new diseases] were advance patrols of a great army that is preparing way out of sight.”3146 Scientists like Joshua Lederberg don’t think this is mere rhetoric. He should know. Lederberg won the Nobel Prize in medicine at age 33 for his discoveries in bacterial evolution. Lederberg went on to become president of Rockefeller University. “Some people think I am being hysterical,” he said, referring to pandemic influenza, “but there are catastrophes ahead. We live in evolutionary competition with microbes—bacteria and viruses. There is no guarantee that we will be the survivors.”3147 There is a concept in host-parasite evolutionary dynamics called the Red Queen hypothesis, which attempts to describe the unremitting struggle between immune systems and the pathogens against which they fight, each constantly evolving to try to outsmart the other.3148 The name is taken from Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass in which the Red Queen instructs Alice, “Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place.”3149 Because the pathogens keep evolving, our immune systems have to keep adapting as well just to keep up. According to the theory, animals who “stop running” go extinct. So far our immune systems have largely retained the upper hand, but the fear is that given the current rate of disease emergence, the **human race is losing the race**.3150 In a Scientific American article titled, “Will We Survive?,” one of the world’s leading immunologists writes: Has the immune system, then, reached its apogee after the few hundred million years it had taken to develop? Can it respond in time to the new evolutionary challenges? These perfectly proper questions lack sure answers because we are in an utterly unprecedented situation [given the number of newly emerging infections].3151 The research team who wrote Beasts of the Earth conclude, “Considering that bacteria, viruses, and protozoa had a more than two-billion-year head start in this war, a victory by recently arrived Homo sapiens would be remarkable.”3152 Lederberg ardently believes that emerging viruses may imperil human society itself. Says NIH medical epidemiologist David Morens, When you look at the relationship between bugs and humans, the more important thing to look at is the bug. When an enterovirus like polio goes through the human gastrointestinal tract in three days, its genome mutates about two percent. That level of mutation—two percent of the genome—has taken the human species eight million years to accomplish. So who’s going to adapt to whom? Pitted against that kind of competition, Lederberg concludes that the human evolutionary capacity to keep up “may be dismissed as almost totally inconsequential.”3153 To help prevent the evolution of viruses as threatening as H5N1, the least we can do is take away a few billion feathered test tubes in which viruses can experiment, a few billion fewer spins at pandemic roulette. The human species has existed in something like our present form for approximately 200,000 years. “Such a long run should itself give us confidence that our species will continue to survive, at least insofar as the microbial world is concerned. Yet such optimism,” wrote the Ehrlich prize-winning former chair of zoology at the University College of London, “might easily transmute into a tune whistled whilst passing a graveyard.”3154

## 1NC Industry Certainty

### 1NC Business Confidence

#### Biz con high

Reuters 9/11 (9/11/12, US small business confidence rises in August, [www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/idUSW1E8I201H20120911](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/idUSW1E8I201H20120911), RBatra)

U.S. small business sentiment rose in August for the first time in four months as more owners anticipated better business conditions after the Nov. 6 elections and increased sales.

The National Federation of Independent Business said on Tuesday its optimism index rose 1.7 points to 92.9 last month.

While owners expected an improvement in business conditions over the next six months, they still did not believe that this was a good time to expand operations.

"But looking past the election and year end, owners became a bit more optimistic about improvements in real sales volumes and business conditions," the NFIB said in a statement.

There were gains in spending and hiring measures last month, with job creation plans doubling. The number of owners reporting job openings were hard to fill increased modestly.

#### No double dip – employment and consumer confidence are increasing

Gautam Godhwani 8-15-2012; CEO, SimplyHired.com “Signs Of Resilience In Our Economy” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gautam-godhwani/us-economy-jobs\_b\_1778664.html

These days, it's rare to see a day pass without hearing some sort of negative commentary or sentiment towards today's economy. But, there's one characteristic about our nation's economy that folks tend to overlook -- resiliency. By definition, resiliency is "an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change." Today's economy is proving to be rather resilient - the growth is slow, but we continue to head in the right direction, even at a time when economies across the globe continue to struggle. With the prospect of a modest, steady recovery in our future, employer confidence continues to rise. In Simply Hired's monthly U.S. Employment Outlook, we've seen job openings increase in each of the last three months. Nationwide job openings increased 4.5 percent in July, while June saw a 9.2 percent jump and May had a 3.3 percent increase. In addition, every one of the top 50 metropolitan areas experienced growth in job openings for the second month in a row. Nationwide, we're looking at a total of 4.3 million job openings right now. That's nearly a 10 percent increase from last year. Sounds promising, right?

#### No impact to economic decline – even if it produces conflict, there’s no chance of all our war

**Jervis 2011** – professor, Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University (December, Robert, Survival, 25.4, “Force in Our Times”)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be **great enough to lead** the members of the community **to** contemplate **fighting** each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Lessons learned from the 30s are durable—this card crushes

**Drezner 2011** – professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (8/12, Daniel, Foreign Policy, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers”, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/please\_come\_down\_off\_the\_ledge\_dear\_readers, WEA) \*note: charts and graphics omitted

So, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. Why won't these other bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931?

Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes.

The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide **much stronger cement** for the current system. In terms of publuc attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below:

The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany and China. On the whole, **despite the worst** global economic **crisis** since the Great Depression, public attitudes have not changed all that much. While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky or anything so drastc.

Another big difference is that multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are still working quite well. Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo.

As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance. **Even if there are disagreements**, communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse.

Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social unrest. The working papercited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19:

[I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant.

This is good news!! The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the **exception more than the rule**.

So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's. And, based on the **data we've got**, that's not going to happen.

### 1NC Energy Production

#### Increasing domestic oil production doesn’t solve the reasons dependence is bad

Aaron Menenburg 9-6-2012; graduate student in international relations at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University. “Let’s Get Real: Energy Independence is an Unrealistic and Misleading Myth” http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/06/lets-get-real-energy-independence-is-a-unrealistic-and-misleading-myth/

Thus far, when energy has been discussed, the foci are “energy independence” and “alternative energy.” Although far from dominating energy markets, the latter is quickly becoming a significant source of US energy consumption and will likely to continue to gain market share. The concept of energy independence, however, is unrealistic, largely undesirable, and misleading. I am going to tackle the façade of the energy independence argument in this piece and in doing so will try to explain the issues actually affecting national energy policy. This piece will focus on oil because (1) it is our most used source of energy and (2) it is our major energy import. At the heart of the energy independence idea is the rationale that achieving energy independence will unhook us from world energy prices and disengage us from the geopolitical consequences Americans find unpalatable, namely massive engagement in the Middle East. Neither is true, and in fact they’re not even remotely plausible outcomes. If there is one take-away I want the reader to remember, it is this: the goal of self-sufficiency in energy supplies – especially in oil – misdiagnoses the problem as one characterized largely by importation of oil. Rather, energy security, the implications of energy on the economy, and America’s reliance on imported oil is a function of the importance of oil consumption in the domestic economy regardless of its source. The only way to reduce the cost of gasoline is by consuming significantly less of it, while the only way to ensure minimal political and security insulation from oil is to stop using it.

#### Energy production doesn’t solve jobs

Levi 12 – Senior Fellow (at CFR) for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Michael, July/August, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=full>) Jacome

"The U.S. Energy Boom Will Create Millions of New Jobs."

**Overstated**. The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA.

It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more normal economy. Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. The oil and gas boom won't change these much.

That's why we should be skeptical about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, these will mostly come **at the expense of jobs elsewhere.**

#### Terrorism isn’t linked to oil – numerous alt causes

Bryce 8 a senior fellow with the Center for Energy Policy and the Environment at the Manhattan Institute (Robert, Jan 18, “5 Myths About Breaking Our Foreign Oil Habit” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011002452.html>) Jacome

In a speech last year, former CIA director R. James Woolsey Jr. had some advice for American motorists: "The next time you pull into a gas station to fill your car with gas, bend down a little and take a glance in the side-door mirror. . . . What you will see is a contributor to terrorism against the United States." Woolsey is known as a conservative, but plenty of liberals have also eagerly adopted the mantra that America's foreign oil purchases are funding terrorism.

But **the hype doesn't match reality.** Remember, the two largest suppliers of crude to the U.S. market are Canada and Mexico -- neither exactly known as a belligerent terrorist haven.

Moreover, terrorism is an ancient tactic that predates the oil era. It does not depend on petrodollars. And even small amounts of money can underwrite spectacular plots; as the 9/11 Commission Report noted, "The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack." G.I. Wilson, a retired Marine Corps colonel who has fought in Iraq and written extensively on terrorism and asymmetric warfare, calls the conflation of oil and terrorism a "contrivance." Support for terrorism "doesn't come from oil," he says. "It comes from drugs, crime, human trafficking and the weapons trade."

#### Oil revenue solves terrorism

Gregory D. Miller, April 2010; assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence”, the Washington Quarterly April 2010 http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf

Although internal violence, including terrorism, is often believed to be born out of¶ economic hardship, the number of terrorists coming from Kuwait is greater than¶ the number from Niger. 6 This suggests that some level of wealth is necessary for¶ violence to occur; bomb-making requires some education, and ammunition costs¶ money. The most dangerous situations appear to be when individuals have wealth,¶ but then lose what they have or fear they are about to, therefore engaging in¶ violence out of dissatisfaction. For example, Professor Scott Atran shows that¶ suicide terrorists are not poor or lacking in opportunities, but that relative loss of¶ economic or social advantage by educated persons might encourage support for¶ terrorism.7 If true, **current oil-exporting states are particularly susceptible** to¶ internal violence as a result of this relative deprivation. Several of these states¶ already suffer from internal problems because of social divisions, but these issues¶ will grow as national wealth declines, making governments less capable of dealing¶ with unrest either by providing social programs or through intimidation. Even in¶ states where the majority of the population does not directly profit from the sale of¶ oil, many people still benefit from oil wealth, such as better roads, more¶ educational opportunities, and more advanced technology. Even **relatively small**¶ cuts in revenue will negatively affect those populations.¶ Similarly, just as resource scarcity is a catalyst for interstate conflict, economic¶ problems stemming from a lack of necessary resources also lead to internal¶ violence, as illustrated in Sierra Leone in the early 1990s and Indonesia in 1997.8¶ These same types of conflicts would increase in frequency within states that are¶ somewhat stable now, only because oil provides them with a relatively satisfied¶ population and because it gives governments the means to crack down on those¶ who would engage in violence.

#### dependence solves mideast resource war

**Miller 10**—assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma (Gregory D., April 2010, © Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 33:2, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr\_Miller.pdf, RBatra)

At the regional level, conflicts between neighboring states would become more likely. Neighbors already make up the bulk of militarized disputes, which are even more common when states must compete for scarce resources. Japan’s expansion for oil prior to World War II is one example, and several conflicts were at least partly about scarce water: Israel and Jordan (1967), Egypt and Ethiopia (1980), and South Africa and Lesotho (1986). **A dramatic decrease in demand would lower the price of oil on the world market, which could lead to severe economic consequences for many oil exporters.** Initially, many consumer states will benefit as they will be able to afford more oil. Oil-exporting states, however, will see profits decline; and **scarcities will become more pronounced, especially in the Middle East.**

Oil has often been a cause of regional conflicts, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or the July 2001 clash between Iran and Azerbaijan over oilbearing zones in the Caspian Sea. So, it is possible that less global demand for oil would decrease the frequency of such situations. As states lose their oil revenue, however, and thus the ability to provide their people the standard of living to which they have grown accustomed, **basic necessities could become catalysts for conflict**. Resources such as food and water are already scarce in many parts of the world, a problem that would be exacerbated for states that lose substantial oil revenues.

#### decreased revenue cause Russian adventurism and nuclear war

**Miller 10**—assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma (Gregory D., April 2010, © Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 33:2, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence,” http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr\_Miller.pdf, RBatra)

Russia is another potential danger spot because it is the only nuclear state, at least for now, that has significant revenue from the sale of oil, roughly **8—20 percent of its GDP**. Losing that income will have less dramatic effects on Russia than on many OPEC states more heavily reliant on oil sales, at least partly because of recent attempts to diversify the Russian economy. Its economy, however, is still **too fragile to handle a major drop in demand for oil**. Given the existing **tension between Russia and states such as Georgia and Ukraine**, neither the United States nor Russia’s neighbors can afford the risk of **a nuclear Russia** suffering economic instability.19

#### Dependence prevents Iran prolif – leverage over future extraction is the biggest bargaining chip

Roger Howard, 11-29-2008; Roger Howard is a writer and broadcaster on international relations. His books include Iran in Crisis? (Zed, 2004), What’s Wrong with Liberal Interventionism (Social Affairs Unit, 2006) and Iran Oil: The New Middle East Challenge to America (IB Tauris, 2006). He has written widely for newspapers and journals ranging from the Daily Mail and Daily Express to the National Interest and the RUSI Journal. “An Ode to Oil” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html

The United States has powerful political leverage over producers because it holds the key to future oil supply as well as market demand. The age of "easy oil" is over, and as fears grow that oil is becoming harder to get, so too will the dependency of producers on increasingly sophisticated Western technology and expertise. Such skills will be particularly important in two key areas of oil production. One is finding and extracting offshore deposits, like the massive reserves reckoned to be under the Caspian and Arctic seas, or in Brazil's recently discovered Tupi field. The other is prolonging the lifespan of declining wells through enhanced "tertiary" recovery. Because Western companies have a clear technological edge over their global competitors in these hugely demanding areas, Washington exerts some powerful political leverage over exporters, many of whom openly anticipate the moment when their production peaks before gradually starting to decline. Syria illustrates how this leverage can work. Although oil has been the primary source of national income for more than 40 years, production has recently waned dramatically: Output is now nearly half of the peak it reached in the mid-1990s, when a daily output of 600,000 barrels made up 60% of gross domestic product, and can barely sustain rapidly growing domestic demand fueled by a very high rate of population growth. With enough foreign investment Syrian oil could be much more productive and enduring, but Washington has sent foreign companies, as well as American firms, a tough message to steer well clear. It is not surprising, then, that the Damascus regime regards a rapprochement with the U.S. as a political lifeline and in recent months has shown signs of a new willingness to compromise. The same predicament confronted Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi, who first offered to surrender weapons of mass destruction during secret negotiations with U.S. officials in May 1999. Facing a deepening economic crisis that he could not resolve without increasing the production of his main export, oil, Col. Gadhafi was prepared to bow to Washington's demands and eventually struck a path-breaking accord in December 2003. Col. Gadhafi had been the "Mad Dog" of the Reagan years, but oil's influence had initiated what President Bush hailed as "the process of rejoining the community of nations." Oil could also help the outside world frustrate the nuclear ambitions of Iran, whose output is likely to steadily decline over the coming years unless it has access to the latest Western technology. Many wells are aging rapidly and the Iranians cannot improve recovery rates, or exploit their new discoveries, **unless Washington lifts sanctions**, which have been highly successful in **deterring international investment.**

#### Nuclear war

Uchino Yoshinari 3-26-2011; Faculty of Science, Kyoto University, Iran’s Nuclear Program and U.S. Security Policy http://www.viz.media.kyoto-u.ac.jp/sympo2010/data/Paper\_Collection.pdf#page=47

What if Iran gets nuclear weapons? This section of the paper explores the consequences of Iran going nuclear. First, some of Iran‟s neighbors might follow suit and go nuclear. Several Arab states have nuclear energy programs as hedges against nuclear-armed Iran, as mentioned above. If Iran acquires a nuclear bomb, these states might decide to produce nuclear weapons, although it might be too late. Moreover, Pakistan might provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, and a delivery system. Emerging nuclear-armed states might use nuclear weapons, as noted above.[42] Second, some of the Gulf States might appease Tehran. In such a country, Iran might engage in illicit activities, including transferring weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, and money laundering. Third, a nuclear war between Israel and Iran might occur. Indeed, Iran might refrain from preemptive strike on Israel because of Israel‟s second-strike capabilities, such as Dolphin-class submarines and SLCMs.[43] Israel might refrain from a first strike for fear of Iran‟s attack by ballistic missiles and proxy warfare with Hezbollah. However, Israel might want to carry out preventive strike before Iran increases its nuclear arsenal. Iran might also launch the first strike before it loses its nuclear weapons, as discussed by Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery.[44] Fourth, Iran would conduct frequent provocative actions, including support for terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, subversive activities in Sunni Arab states, and deliberate near-misses toward the U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. Fifth, allies of the United States, as well as Iran, China, and North Korea, would question the extended deterrence policy. Would Washington risk the homeland to protect Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE? The best way to solve these conundrums is to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.

#### Oil dependence is key to US-Saudi relations

JadMouawad9-25-2009 New York Times, “Saudi Blasts American Energy Policy”, <http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/saudi-blasts-american-energy-policy/>

The question of American “energy independence” clearly rankles officials in Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest exporter of crude oil, who seem increasingly puzzled by the energy policy of the United States, the world’s biggest oil consumer. In a short and strongly-worded essay in Foreign Policy magazine, Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former ambassador to the United States and a nephew to King Abdullah, said that for American politicians, invoking energy independence “is now as essential as baby-kissing,” and accuses them of “demagoguery.” All the talk about energy independence, Mr. al-Faisal said, is “political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and consuming countries alike.” There is no technology on the horizon that can completely replace oil as the fuel for the United States’ massive manufacturing, transportation, and military needs; any future, no matter how wishful, will include a mix of renewable and nonrenewable fuels. Considering this, efforts spent proselytizing about energy independence should instead focus on acknowledging energy interdependence. Like it or not, the fates of the United States and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia date back to the 1930s when American geologists first struck oil in the kingdom. While American companies built the Saudi oil industry, Americans have never shaken off their suspicions and mistrust of the kingdom since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. It’s not the first time a Saudi official has criticized American energy policy, or its growing reliance on renewable fuels. Many of Prince Turki’s arguments recycle Saudi Arabia’s position that for the past 30 years, the oil-rich kingdom has acted in a responsible manner to keep oil markets well supplied. Prince Turki correctly points at the steps taken by Saudi Arabia in recent years to increase its production to make up for lost production in Iraq or elsewhere in times of crisis, and invest close to $100 billion in new capacity over the past five years. On the other hand, he points out that four countries — Iran, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela — failed to live up to expectations that they would raise their production over the past decade for a variety of reasons, including “a U.S. invasion” in the case of Iraq. The Saudis have genuine reasons to fear the effects of the Obama administration’s energy policy and its commitment to reducing oil consumption, as well as efforts to reduce carbon emissions. As Prince Turki points out himself, Saudi Arabia holds 25 percent of the world’s known oil reserves and would like to keep selling oil for several more decades. As such, the Saudis know that any attempt to reduce gasoline consumption is a threat to the future of the Saudi economy. It’s an old refrain: in his most famous remark, the former Saudi oil minister, Sheik Yamani, once said that the stone age didn’t end because the world ran out of stones, and the oil age will not end because the world runs out of oil. It will end when something replaces it. The trend has already started. Oil demand in the United States has peaked — instead of rising as it has since the dawn of the age of oil more than a century ago, the nation’s oil consumption has begun its long decline. The question is: how fast will the transition take?

Relations key to stable Pakistan

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Besides, Saudi Arabia isn't just a giant gas station with a flag. Saudi help is now essential for numerous top-shelf U.S. priorities, from containing Iran to countering terrorism to extricating U.S. troops from Afghanistan and keeping Pakistan stable. **Only Saudi Arabia**, with its carefully cultivated, behind-the-scenes links to countries and leaders who do not trust Washington, can play this role.

Nuke war

Morgan, 10 **–**Labour Party Executive Committee, political writer, author of "The Mind of a Terrorist Fundamentalist - the Cult of Al Qaeda" (Stephen, “Better Another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR,” 6/4, http://society.ezinemark.com/better-another-taliban-afghanistan-than-a-taliban-nuclear-pakistan-4d0ce18ba75.html)

The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly **nuclear war**, between Pakistan and India **could not be ruled out.** Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

#### Oil independence efforts cause spiraling protectionism

Dennis Phillips, 6-9-2008; taught foreign policy at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and American history and politics at Macquarie University, for over 30 years.; America's energy 'independence' <http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/31686.html>

Bryce reminds us that, in this election year, the rhetoric of 'energy independence' has saturated the campaign of every presidential candidate. Everyone, it seems, is in favour of the United States freeing itself from the yoke of dependence on energy imports.¶ It is argued that a type of strategic Nirvana awaits. Once achieved, the great goal of energy independence will allow the country to cut its dependence on imported oil, restore stability to its blighted economy, turn its back on authoritarian oil-producing regimes, extricate its troops from the Middle East and live happily ever after.¶ The only problem is that it isn't going to happen - and the results would be disastrous if it did. The global energy business - worth about $US5 trillion a year - is one of the most integrated and interdependent commercial networks in the world. The US imports crude oil from more than 40 different countries, jet fuel from 26 countries and gasoline from 46. Dozens more countries, including Australia, supply the US with strategic mineral commodities (in Australia's case, uranium, manganese, bauxite, tantalum, titanium, nickel, magnesium, etc.)¶ For the US to try to achieve 'energy independence' in a globalised, interdependent world would be the short road to ruin, both for it and for countries like Australia supplying the raw materials. In reality, the rhetoric of 'energy independence' in American politics is a euphemism for foreign policy isolationism. Those sweet sounding words appeal to patriotic impulses and serve as a popular cover for protectionist trade policies.¶ Essentially what Bryce and other realist experts on the energy crisis are telling us is that, if we are to deal effectively with the complex challenges of the energy crisis, we must begin by replacing 'dangerous delusions' and mindless political rhetoric with smart power.

#### Great power wars and terrorism

MichaelPanzner2008**,** faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138, googlebooks)

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. ¶ In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. ¶ Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point. ¶ More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.