### 1NC T

**Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – excludes extraction of those materials**

**Vaekstfonden 6** – Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006 [s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf](http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf)

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.

Raw material extraction

This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.

Energy production

Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.  
Transmission and distribution

**‘Restrictions’ must be direct and immediate limitations on freedom – otherwise it is simply a regulation**

CJ **Veeraswami** (Former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, India) **1966** “T.M. Kannappa Mudaliar And Ors. vs The State Of Madras” Majority opinion, <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/838831/>

The collection of a toll or a tax for the use of a road or for the use of a bridge or for the use of an aerodrome is no barrier or burden or deterrent to traders, who, in their absence, may have to take a longer or less convenient or more expensive route. Such compensatory taxes are no hindrance to anybody's freedom so long as they remain reasonable; but they could of course, be converted into a hindrance to the freedom of trade. If the authorities concerned really wanted to hamper anybody's trade they could easily raise the amount of tax or toll to an amount which would be prohibitive or deterrent or create other impediments which instead of facilitating trade and commerce would hamper them. It is here that the contrast, between 'freedom' (Article 301) and 'restrictions' (Articles 302 and 304) clearly appears; that which in reality facilitates trade and commerce is not a restriction, and that which in reality hampers or burdens trade and commerce is a restriction. It is the reality or substance of the matter that has to be determined. It is not possible apriori to draw a dividing line between that which would really be a charge for a facility provided and that which would really be a deterrent to a trade, but the distinction, if it has to be drawn is real and clear. For the tax to become a prohibited tax it has to be a direct tax the effect of which is to hinder the movement part of trade. So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory it cannot operate as a hindrance. 12. Subba Rao, J. as he then was, concurring with Das, J. took substantially the same view and observed (at page 1430);: The word ' freedom ' is not capable of precise definition, but it can be stated what would infringe or detract from the said freedom. Before a particular law can be said to infringe the said freedom, it must be ascertained whether the impugned provision operates as a restriction impeding the free movement of trade or only as a regulation facilitating the same. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Police regulations, though they may superficially appear to restrict the freedom of movement, in fact provide the necessary conditions for the free movement. Regulations such as provision for lighting, speed, good condition of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing system with compensatory fees would not be restrictions but regulatory provisions;, for without it, the necessary lines of communication such as roads, waterways and airways, cannot effectively be maintained and the freedom declared may in practice turn out to be an empty one....It is for the Court in a given case to decide whether a provision purporting to regulate trade is in fact a restriction on freedom. The further observations as to what was meant by Restrictions in Article 302 are (at page 1433): But the more difficult question is, what does the word " restrictions " mean in Article 302? The dictionary meaning of the word " restrict" is "to confine, bound, limit." Therefore any limitations placed upon the freedom is a restriction on that freedom. But the limitation must be real, direct and immediate, but not fanciful, indirect or remote....Of all the doctrines evolved in my view, the doctrine of ' direct and immediate effect' on the freedom would be a reasonable solvent to the difficult situation that might arise under our Constitution. If a law, whatever may have been its source, directly and immediately affects the free movement of trade, it would be restriction on the said freedom. But a law which may have only indirect and remote repercussions on the said freedom cannot be considered to be a restriction on it. 13. Subba Rao, J., as he then was summed up his views in the following words (at page 1436): The foregoing discussions may be summarised in the following propositions : (1) Article 301 declares a right of free movement of trade without any obstructions by way of barriers, inter-State or intra-State or other impediments operating as such barriers. (2) The said freedom is not impeded, but on the other hand, promoted by regulations creating conditions for the free movement of trade, such as, police regulations, provision for services, maintenance of roads, provision for aerodromes, wharfs, etc. with or without compensation. (3) Parliament may by law impose restrictions on such freedom in the public interest and the said law can be made by virtue of any entry with respect whereof Parliament has power to make a law. (4) The State also, in exercise of its legislative power, may impose similar restrictions, subject to the two conditions laid down in Article 304 (b) and subject to the Proviso mentioned therein. (5) Neither Parliament nor the State Legislature can make a law giving preference to one State over another or making discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry in the Lists, infringing the said freedom. (6) This ban is lifted in the case of Parliament for the purpose of dealing with situations arising out of scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India and also in the case of a State under Article 304 (h), subject to the conditions mentioned therein. And (7) the State can impose a non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from other States or the Union territory to which similar goods manufactured or produced in the State are subject. 14. It is thus well established that regulatory provisions which do not directly or immediately impede or burden the free movement of trade, commerce and intercourse but provide or intend to provide facilities for trade, commerce and intercourse are not restrictions within the meaning of Part XIII and are compatible with the freedom of trade declared by Article 301. Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. v. State of Assam , and Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan , are both cases of imposition of tax. The first was concerned with the Assam Taxation (on Goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954,, which was successfully attacked on the ground that it violated Article 301 and was not saved by Article 304 (b). The Act imposed a tax on specified goods transported by road or inland waterways in the State of Assam. The majority in that case held that the Act put a direct restriction on the freedom of trade and, since in doing so, had not complied with the provisions of Article 304 (b), it must be declared to be void. In the second case the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951, was impugned as violating Article 301. But the majority did not accept the contention on the view that the Act was merely a regulatory measure imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities. The scope of Article 301 was again in the light of the earlier decisions referred to in Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam , where the Assam Taxation (On goods carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act as amended after Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam , was attacked on various grounds but without success. 15. As already seen, the distinction between a restriction and a regulation is fine but real, though the dividing line is not capable in the nature of things of a comprehensive and satisfactory definition. The test, broadly speaking, is whether the impugned provisions lay a direct and immediate burden on the movement of trade, commerce and intercourse or are intrinsically beneficial to and provide, in the ultimate analysis, facilities for better conduct of trade, commerce and intercourse. Observed Das, J., in Automobile Transport Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan

**We have contextual evidence – Restrictions on energy production do not include border measures like tariffs and export quotas**

**Ehring and Chinale 11 –** Lothar (Assistant to Mr. Péter Balás, Deputy Director-General at the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission, responsible for multilateral affairs, as well as trade defence instruments and bilateral trade relations with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Until 2008, Lothar Ehring served in the Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade that is responsible for Legal Aspects of Trade Policy. He was the Coordinator for legal issues of multilateral trade, handled several WTO disputes and also represented the European Community in the negotiations on the reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) **and** Gian Franco **Chinale 2011** “Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: Wto, Nafta and Energy Charter” p. 134-5

The perfect example to test and discuss this interpretation is the famous case of OPEC production quotas. These quotas as implemented at the national levels of OPEC members, are horizontal restrictions on production. They limit exportation no more than domestic sales, and yet the argument is made time and again that they fall foul of Article XI:I of the GATT 1994.” The proponents of this thesis recognize that they are on thin ice. given that production limitations are as remote from being border measures as a restriction can possibly be. Equally clear is the fact that a production limitation definition does not discriminate against exports, neither de jure nor de facto. The proponents of the OPEC GATT-illegality attempt to overcome this conclusion with the argument that for some of the oil exporting countries in question. The near totality of the production goes to export. This. however, is legally irrelevant to the question of whether there is a discrimination against or higher burden on exports. The quantitative relationship between domestic consumption and exports can be very imbalanced for reasons of production and consumption capacities, in large part for reasons of a country’s size and the foreign demand for the product concerned. Also the conceptual argument that a **restriction on production** can be decomposed into a restriction on exportation as well a restriction on domestic sales **is not plausible**. The production restriction is precisely and inseparably both at the same time and this makes a qualitative difference that is **impossible to set aside.**

**Violation – the plan removes a restriction on buying solar tech, not the production itself**

**Vote neg for limits – they explode the research base and make it impossible to be neg**

### 1NC Oil

#### Oil prices will stabilize now – prices will stick above exporter break-even levels without significant changes

Irina Rogovaya August 2012; writer for Oil and Gas Eurasia, Oil Price Changes: Everyone Wants Stability <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/articles/p/164/article/1875/>

According to the current base forecast for the Eurozone prepared by Oxford Economics, within the next two years oil prices will continue to drift lower, but not beyond the bounds of the “green” corridor for the world economy – $80-100 per barrel. This forecast coincides with the expectations of the World Bank (see Fig. 4). Meanwhile, S&P analysts presented three scenarios for the energy market in June. In the base scenario, oil will remain at $100 per barrel. S&P calculates that the likelihood of a stressful scenario in which the price of oil drops below $60 per barrel (the bottom in 2009) is 1:3. Analysts believe that given today’s state of economic and geopolitical affairs, strong political will would be needed to force the price of oil below $70-80 (the current level of effective production). So far, that will is nowhere to be seen. Recent events have shown that nobody is interested in the Eurozone breaking apart. And nobody wants a war in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, nobody today intends to force the production of less valuable oil. At least that is what OPEC leaders promised during the recent summit. “Stability on the market should be at the center of our attention,” General Secretary Abdalla El-Badri said. Even Saudi Arabia, which consistently violates OPEC discipline in over-producing its quotas, announced at the beginning of July that it would review its margins to determine a higher price for Saudi supplies ordered on August contracts. Analysts noted that the average price of oil supplied to Europe and Asia had jumped (by $0.85 and $0.66 per barrel respectively), a fact which could be seen as proof that the collective members of the cartel will not let prices fall under $100 per barrel.

#### They said global model

#### High prices are key to the Russian economy and domestic stability

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but **high oil prices**. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, **Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy**, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Russian economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Steven David, January/February 1999;Professor of International Relations and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, **,** http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19990101faessay955/steven-r-david/saving-america-from-the-coming-civilwars.html

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $ 70 a month). Modern Russia can neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse than most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.  A future conflict would quickly draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office, what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders. Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a regional power and Moscow, it is not at all clear which side the military would support.  Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.  Should Russia succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe. A major power like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China**.** Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of the last Russian civil war laid the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime.

### 1NC Elections Disad

#### Obama is winning but it will be close and it’s reversible – popularity is key

**Brownstein, 9/21/12** - a two-time finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of presidential campaigns, is National Journal Group's Editorial Director, in charge of long-term editorial strategy.(Ronald, National Journal, “Heartland Monitor Poll: Obama Leads 50 Percent to 43 Percent” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-presidential-campaign/heartland-monitor-poll-obama-leads-50-percent-to-43-percent-20120921?page=1>)

President Obama has opened a solid lead over Mitt Romney by largely reassembling the “coalition of the ascendant” that powered the Democrat to his landmark 2008 victory, the latest Allstate/National Journal Heartland Monitor Poll has found.

The survey found Obama leading Romney by 50 percent to 43 percent among likely voters, with key groups in the president’s coalition such as minorities, young people, and upscale white women providing him support comparable to their levels in 2008.

The survey, conducted by Ed Reilly and Jeremy Ruch of FTI Communications, a communications and strategic consulting firm, surveyed 1,055 likely voters by landline and cell phone from Sept. 15-19. It has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. Full results from the survey, including a detailed look at Americans’ attitudes about opportunity and upward mobility, will be released in the Sept. 22 National Journal.

The Heartland Monitor’s results are in line with most other national surveys in recent days showing Obama establishing a measurable lead, including this week’s new Pew Research Center and NBC/Wall Street Journal polls. The saving grace for Republicans is that even as these surveys show Obama opening a consistent advantage, the president has not been able to push his support much past the critical 50 percent level, even after several difficult weeks for Romney that began with a poorly reviewed GOP convention. That suggests the president faces continued skepticism from many voters that could allow Romney to draw a second wind if he can stabilize his tempest-tossed campaign.

The poll found Obama benefiting from a small increase in optimism about the country’s direction. Among likely voters, 37 percent said the country was moving in the right direction. Even looking at all adults, the "right track" number now stands at 35 percent, its best showing since the April 2010 Heartland Monitor.

Obama’s approval rating in the new survey also ticked up to 50 percent, with 46 percent disapproving. That’s a slight improvement from May, when the survey of all adults found 47 percent approving and 48 percent disapproving. Among all adults, Obama’s rating improved to 49 percent approving and 45 percent disapproving, also one of his best showings since January 2010.

Those gains are critical, because as always with an incumbent president, attitudes toward Obama’s performance powerfully shape the race. Among likely voters who approve of Obama’s job performance, he leads Romney in the ballot test by 93 percent to 3 percent; those who disapprove prefer Romney by 87 percent to 5 percent.

#### Obama is promoting an “all of the above” energy strategy – this allows him to distance himself from prior renewables scandals. The plan makes Obama a target and will cost him the election

**Farnam, 12** (T.W., Washington Post, 6/27, “Energy ads flood TV in swing states,”

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/energy-ads/2012/06/27/gJQAD5MR7V_story.html>

Energy issues don’t spark much excitement among voters, ranking below health care, education and the federal budget deficit — not to mention jobs and the economy.

And yet those same voters are being flooded this year with campaign ads on energy policy. Particularly in presidential swing states, the airwaves are laden with messages boosting oil drilling and natural gas and hammering President Obama for his support of green energy. The Cleveland area alone has heard $2.7 million in energy-related ads.

The disconnect between what voters say they care about and what they’re seeing on TV lies in the money behind the ads, much of it coming from oil and gas interests. Those funders get the double benefit of attacking Obama at the same time they are promoting their industry.

Democrats also have spent millions on the subject, defending the president’s record and tying Republican candidate Mitt Romney to “Big Oil.”

Overall, more than $41 million, about one in four of the dollars spent on broadcast advertising in the presidential campaign, has gone to ads mentioning energy, more than a host of other subjects and just as much as health care, according to ad-tracking firm Kantar Media/Cmag.

In an election focused heavily on jobs and the economy, all of this attention to energy seems a bit off topic. But the stakes are high for energy producers and environmentalists, who are squared off over how much the government should regulate the industry. And attention has been heightened by a recent boom in production using new technologies such as fracking and horizontal drilling, as well as a spike in gas prices this spring just as the general election got underway.

When asked whether energy is important, more than half of voters say yes, according to recent polls. But asked to rank their top issues, fewer than 1 percent mention energy.

Still, so much spending focused on a topic low on the public agenda should not be a surprise, given the interest of the ad sponsors, said Bob Biersack, a senior fellow at the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics.

“It’s always been true that people’s financial involvement in politics tends to reinforce their self-interest,” he said.

The policy debate coincides with a flurry of criticism of the Obama administration’s loan guarantee for Solyndra, a bankrupt solar-power company that defaulted on more than $500 million. Among the company’s investors was the family foundation of a major donor to Obama.

“Half a billion in taxpayer money gone, and Obama said this was a model of growth,” says an ad from the conservative group Americans for Prosperity. “Tell President Obama that workers aren’t pawns in your political games.”

Obama spokesman Ben LaBolt said the campaign welcomed the fight over the administration’s energy policies, saying the president can win on the merits.

“This debate has offered us the chance to highlight the success of the president’s all-of-the-above energy strategy – domestic oil production at a 12-year high and our dependence on foreign oil at a 16-year low, domestic natural gas production at an all-time high and doubling our renewable energy production,” LaBolt said.

Republicans are also attacking Obama for rejecting permits for the proposed Keystone XL pipeline, which would carry oil from tar sands in Canada to refineries on the Gulf Coast. Romney opened the general election with an ad prominently featuring the Keystone issue, with the candidate saying he would reverse Obama and approve the pipeline on his first day in office.

Americans for Prosperity, one of the major funders of the ads, has sponsored five television spots against Obama, two of them focused on Solyndra and another critical of government spending on clean energy.

The organization, which has promoted tea party candidates, has devoted more than 90 percent of its ad spending to energy-related commercials, according to Kantar.

The Obama campaign and other Democrats have been critical of the group, saying, among other things, that its billionaire backers, brothers Charles and David Koch, are using it to promote the interests of the chemical conglomerate they own. David Koch is a founder and chairman of the organization. A Koch spokesman declined to comment.

Obama answered Americans for Prosperity’s message in his first ad of the campaign.

“Secretive oil billionaires attacking president Obama with ads fact checkers say are not tethered to the facts,” a narrator says in the spot.

Tim Phillips, president of Americans for Prosperity, said the group focused on Solyndra because the firm’s federal loan guarantee exemplifies cronyism and big government, with bureaucrats choosing economic winners and losers in the way they dole out public money.

“To us, Solyndra encapsulates everything that’s wrong with the economic policies of President Obama,” Phillips said. “It’s not just the energy, although the energy is important.”

The group also ran millions of dollars of advertising in 2009 and 2010 opposing the president’s health-care plan, Phillips said.

All of these messages could very well do what their funders have in mind and shape public opinion, tarring renewable energy as a government boondoggle, said Kathleen Hall Jamieson, director of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania.

“Ads can create an agenda-setting effect and frame an issue,” she said. “If renewable energy comes to be seen as Solyndra, that’s a problem for that sector, not simply for future government investment in that sector.”

#### Romney causes a strike on Iran

Robert W. Merry 8-1-2012; editor of The National Interest and the author of books on American history and foreign policyRomney Edges U.S. toward War with Iran <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/romney-edges-us-toward-war-iran-7275>

The major newspapers all understood that GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s expressions in Jerusalem last weekend were important, which is why they played the story on page one. But only the New York Times captured the subtle significance of what he said. The paper’s coverage, by Jodi Rudoren and Ashley Parker, reported that Romney sought to adhere to the code that says candidates shouldn’t criticize the president on foreign soil. “But,” they added, “there were subtle differences between what he said—and how he said it—and the positions of his opponent.” Most significantly, while Obama talks about stopping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel insists Tehran should be prevented from having even the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. This means no nuclear development even for peaceful purposes. Romney embraced the Israeli language. In doing so, he nudged his nation closer to war with Iran. Based on Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s oft-repeated expressions, he clearly seems bent on attacking Iran to destroy or delay its nuclear program and, if possible, undermine the Iranian regime. And he wants America at his side when he does it. Obama has been seeking to dissuade Israel from contemplating such an assault in order to give the president’s austere sanctions regimen a chance to work. But what does he mean by “a chance to work?” If he means a complete capitulation by Iran, he’s dreaming, of course. History tells us that nations don’t respond to this kind of pressure by accepting humiliation. That’s the lesson of Pearl Harbor, as described in my commentary in these spaces. Many close observers of the Iran drama believe there may be an opportunity for a negotiated outcome that allows Iran to enrich uranium to a limited extent—say, 5 percent—for peaceful purposes. Iran insists, and most experts agree, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows such enrichment for energy production. In any event, numerous signatories to the NPT do in fact maintain limited enrichment programs for peaceful ends. Obama seems torn between pursuing such an outcome and embracing the Israeli position, which demands that Iran foreswear all enrichment and any peaceful nuclear development. In last spring’s Istanbul meeting between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group (the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany), there seemed to be a genuine interest on the part of those six nations to explore an outcome that would allow for some enrichment by Iran. Five weeks later in Baghdad, the P5+1 group seemed to backtrack and insist upon zero enrichment. Talks are ongoing but only among low-level technical people; any serious negotiations are on hold pending the election. Thus Obama has managed to maintain his flexibility during the delicate campaign period. But now we have Romney in Israel essentially telling the people there that they need fear no ambivalence on his part. If elected, he will embrace the Netanyahu position, which is designed to ensure the collapse of any negotiations attending anti-Iran sanctions, which Netanyahu already has labeled a failure. “We have to be honest,” he said over the weekend, during Romney’s visit, “and say that the sanctions and diplomacy so far have not set back the Iranian program by one iota.” That’s the view that Romney subtly embraced in Jerusalem.

#### Great power war

Trabanco 2009 – Independent researcher of geopolitical and military affairs (1/13/09, José Miguel Alonso Trabanco, “The Middle Eastern Powder Keg Can Explode at Anytime,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=11762)

In case of an Israeli and/or American attack against Iran, Ahmadinejad's government will certainly respond. A possible countermeasure would be to fire Persian ballistic missiles against Israel and maybe even against American military bases in the regions. Teheran will unquestionably resort to its proxies like Hamas or Hezbollah (or even some of its Shiite allies it has in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia) to carry out attacks against Israel, America and their allies, effectively setting in flames a large portion of the Middle East. The ultimate weapon at Iranian disposal is to block the Strait of Hormuz. If such chokepoint is indeed asphyxiated, that would dramatically increase the price of oil, this a very threatening retaliation because it will bring **intense** financial and **economic havoc upon the West**, which is already facing significant trouble in those respects. In short, the necessary conditions for a major war in the Middle East are given. Such conflict could rapidly spiral out of control and thus a relatively minor clash could quickly and **dangerously escalate by engulfing the whole region** and perhaps even beyond. There are many key players: the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Arabs, the Persians and their respective allies and some **great powers could become involved** in one way or another (America, Russia, Europe, China). Therefore, any miscalculation by any of the main protagonists can trigger something no one can stop. Taking into consideration that the stakes are too high, perhaps it is not wise to be playing with fire right in the middle of a powder keg.

### K

#### The transformation of the world into a global power station through energy production causes the evisceration and erasure of being, ultimately resulting in nuclear war and a meaningless existence – this comparatively outweighs all other impacts\*

We do not endorse the gendered language in this card

Callister 7 (Paul, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Leon E. Bloch Law Library, University of Missouri‑Kansas City School of Law. Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology: Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship Law Library Journal [Vol. 99:2)

1 Following World War II, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger offered one of the most potent criticisms of technology and modern life. His nightmare is a world whose essence has been reduced to the functional equivalent of “a giant gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man to the world [is] in principle a technical one. . . . [It is] altogether alien to former ages and histories.”2 For Heidegger, the problem is not technology itself, but the technical mode of thinking that has accompanied it. Such a viewpoint of the world is a useful paradigm to consider humanity’s relationship to law in the current information environment, which is increasingly technical in Heidegger’s sense of the term. 2 Heidegger’s warning that a technical approach to thinking about the world obscures its true essence is directly applicable to the effects of the current (as well as former) information technologies that provide access to law. The thesis of this article is that Heidegger provides an escape, not only for libraries threatened by obsolescence by emerging technologies, but for the law itself, which is under the same risk of subjugation. This article explains the nature of Heidegger’s criticisms of technology and modern life, and explores the threat specifically identified by such criticism, including an illustration based upon systematic revision of law in Nazi Germany. It applies Heidegger’s criticisms to the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo-American traditions. Finally, the article considers the implications for law librarianship in the current information environment. Heidegger’s Nightmare: Understanding the Beast Calculative Thinking and the Danger of Subjugation to a Single Will 3 The threat is not technology itself; it is rather a danger based in the essence of thinking, which Heidegger describes as “enframing”3 or “calculative thinking.”4 For Heidegger, the problem is that mankind misconstrues the nature of technology as simply “a means to an end.”5 4 Heidegger’s articulation of the common conception of technology as a “means” applies equally well to information technologies, including legal databases. True, it is hard to think of technology in any other way, but what Heidegger argues is that this failure to consider the essence of technology is a threat to humanity.6 5 He defines the threat in two ways. First, humans become incapable of seeing anything around them as but things to be brought into readiness to serve some end (a concept he refers to as “standing reserve”).7 They are thereby cut off from understanding the essence of things and, consequently, their surrounding world.8 Second, man is reduced to the role of “order-er” of things, specifically to some purpose or end, and, as a result, risks becoming something to be ordered as well.9 Heidegger illustrates these concerns as follows: The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profitmaking in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand.10 In other words, the trees, the wood, the paper, and even the forester (whose ancestors once understood the sanctity of the woods) are ultimately subordinated to the will to establish orderly public opinion. The forester, in proverbial fashion, “cannot see the forest for the trees.” Instead of appreciating the majesty and mystery of the living forest, he sees only fodder for the paper mill, which will pay for his next meal. 6 The same cynicism might be applied to legal publishing. Whole forests have given their lives to the publication of legal information in order to provide a stable basis for society—after all, the “law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still,”11 or as our comrades from Critical Legal Studies might put it, law is simply a tool “to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic status quo.”12 Cadres of West editors (commonly referred to in generic fashion as human resources, ironically making them all the less human)13 work feverishly to digest points of law and assign 55,000 cases into a taxonomy with more than 100,000 class distinctions,14 all for the sake of a predictable legal system and stable society. 7 For Heidegger, the threat is revealed in mankind’s perpetual quest to gain mastery over technology. “Everything depends on our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually in hand.’ We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control.”15 When Heidegger published these words (first in 1962, but based on lectures from 1949 and 1950),16 the implications of nuclear energy and atomic warfare occupied much academic discussion. Heidegger points out that the popular question of this period did not concern how to find sufficient energy resources, but “[i]n what way can we tame and direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that these gigantic energies suddenly—even without military actions— break out somewhere, ‘run away’ and destroy everything?”17 The modern question is about our mastery over technology, not about sufficiency of resources. 8 Similar concerns are apparent with respect to information technologies, where the primary problem is not lack of access, but too much access: for example, illegal music file swapping,18 the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),19 and trends to use licensing to control and preserve the economic value of information (and to prohibit otherwise lawfully competitive practices, such as reverse engineering).20 With respect to law and government, we see such examples as retraction of government documents,21 the Patriot Act,22 the furor over unpublished electronic precedent,23 and the recent frenzy of e-discovery.24 Some stakeholders seem to have liked things better when information resources were scarce.25 Universal access is destabilizing—hence, the considerable interest in getting a “handle” on technology through legal sanction and yet additional technological innovation (the so-called “access control” technologies). 26 9 Heidegger’s genius is in recognizing that all the fuss about mastering technologies, although close to the mark, concerns the wrong issue. The more insidious threat is not nuclear fallout or economic devaluation of intellectual property, but the worldview of “calculative” thinking that accompanies rapid technological change: “The world now appears as an object open to attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist.”27 For Heidegger, calculative thought is not limited to the manipulation of machine code or numbers. Rather, the concept is grounded in “Machiavellian scheming” and the pursuit of power. “Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next.”28 The threat Heidegger envisions to human thought is even more dangerous than nuclear warfare.29 10 Heidegger’s threat is based on the separation of man from his or her nature. By pursuing economic calculation, man is cut off from the transformative powers of his or her environment. In such a world, law does not have the capacity to educate or to provide the basis for social harmony;30 rather, like any resource, law must be employed to more economic ends. The implication is that calculative thinking mandates that everything (including law) be subjected to a single will. While Heidegger recognized the danger of subjecting everything to a single will, the issue of whether, and when, he equated the danger with Nazi totalitarianism, which he had originally supported, would require a line of historical inquiry far beyond the scope of this article.31 Regardless of Heidegger’s own political and moral journey, Nazism effectively illustrates Heidegger’s philosophical fear—that technological thinking risks the “ordering” of all the world, including humanity, as resources subject to a singular will.

#### The alternative is to do nothing. Every effort to control the world only results in new problems, which results in new solutions, which results in new problems in an escalating cycle of serial policy failure. Doing nothing allows us to reflect on the search for solutions itself

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Some might find this unnecessarily harsh. We academicians may wish to contest the accusation. Surely, in the universities of all places, thinking is going on. But Heidegger had no respect for that or any other kind of complacency. The thinking he saw as essential is no more likely, perhaps unfortunately, to be found in universities or among philosophers than anywhere else. For the thinking he saw as essential is not the simple ‘ amassing and digesting of facts or even the mastering of complex relationships or the producing of ever more powerful and inclusive theories. The thinking Heidegger saw as essential, the thinking his works call us to, is not a thinking that seeks to master anything, not a thinking that results from a drive to grasp and know and shape the world; it is a thinking that disciplines itself **to allow the world** — the earth, things — to show themselves on their own terms. Heidegger called this kind of thinking ‘reflection’. In 1936 he wrote, “Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.”2 Reflection is thinking that never rests complacently in the conclusions reached yesterday; it is thinking that continues to think, that never stops with a satisfied smile and announces: We can cease; we have the right answer now. On the contrary, it is thinking that loves its own life, its own occurring, that does not quickly put a stop to itself, as thinking intent on a quick solution always tries to do.1   
Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverishing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous “natural resource management” policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution — consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet’s climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chlorofluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; **and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity’s power to destroy all life on this globe.**

Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. **Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind.** **In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself.** But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do?   
Heidegger’s work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger’s call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking’s only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities.   
Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, **Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing**. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate.

### 1NC Trade

#### No trade scenario:

#### Alt cause – EU trade war

**AFP, 7/26/12** [Chinese solar makers warn of 'trade war' with EU, Agente France Press, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ivUmnuP4DxT_q7Gn5M0iqdwRSPnw?docId=CNG.f14afb390e7dda24acd026cad5111c4b.a71>]

BEIJING — Four leading solar cell manufacturers in China on Thursday warned a possible EU anti-dumping investigation could trigger a "trade war" and urged Beijing to step in to protect their interests.¶ German cell maker SolarWorld AG has reportedly requested the European Union to probe alleged dumping by Chinese firms, said a joint statement by Yingli Green Energy, Suntech Power Holdings Co., Trina Solar and Canadian Solar, which is headquartered in Canada but manufactures in China.¶ The move came on the heels of a US decision in May to slap hefty anti-dumping duties on Chinese solar cell makers, which Beijing blasted as "protectionist".¶ The companies called on the Chinese government to block the case by opening a dialogue with the European Union to prevent a trade war.¶ "China's photovoltaic industry will suffer a deadly blow if the EU follows the United States and launches an anti-dumping probe," said the statement.¶ More than 60 percent of China's $35.8-billion-worth solar shipments were exported to the EU last year while the country imported $7.5 billion of European solar equipments and raw materials, it said.¶ "Meanwhile, (a probe) would trigger a full scale trade war between China and Europe," it said, adding the country is a big market for European products ranging from cars, aircraft, machines and luxury goods.

#### Disputes are confined internally to global trade rules – no risk of escalating conflict

**Ikenson, 12** [March 5th, Daniel, [Daniel Ikenson](http://www.cato.org/people/daniel-ikenson) is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,

<http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war>]

An emerging narrative in 2012 is that a proliferation of protectionist, treaty-violating, or otherwise illiberal Chinese policies is to blame for worsening U.S.-China relations. China trade experts from across the ideological and political spectra have lent credibility to that story. Business groups that once counseled against U.S. government actions that might be perceived by the Chinese as provocative have changed their tunes. The term "trade war" is no longer taboo.¶ The media have portrayed the United States as a victim of underhanded Chinese practices, including currency manipulation, dumping, subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer, discriminatory "indigenous innovation" policies, export restrictions, industrial espionage, and other ad hoc impediments to U.S. investment and exports. ¶ Indeed, it is beyond doubt that certain Chinese policies have been provocative, discriminatory, protectionist, and, in some cases, violative of the agreed rules of international trade. But there is more to the story than that. U.S. policies, politics, and attitudes have contributed to rising tensions, as have rabble-rousing politicians and a confrontation-thirsty media. If the public's passions are going to be inflamed with talk of a trade war, prudence demands that the war's nature be properly characterized and its causes identified and accurately depicted.¶ Those agitating for tough policy actions should put down their battle bugles and consider that trade wars are never won. Instead, such wars claim victims indiscriminately and leave significant damage in their wake. Even if one concludes that China's list of offenses is collectively more egregious than that of the United States, the most sensible course of action — for the American public (if not campaigning politicians) — is one that avoids mutually destructive actions and finds measures to reduce frictions with China.¶ Nature of the U.S.-China Trade War¶ It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship has not descended into an existential call to arms**.** Rather, both governments have taken protectionist actions that are legally defensible or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that speaks to a mutual recognition of the primacy of — if not respect for — the rules-based system of trade. And that suggests that the kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1

#### Solar tariffs aren’t key – poultry, yuan and cars – no risk of escalating trade war

**Zappone, 12** [January, Chris, Sydney Morning Herald, 'Murky protectionism' on the rise - but no trade war, <http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/murky-protectionism-on-the-rise--but-no-trade-war-20120110-1pt3t.html>]

At the outset of the global financial crisis, the world’s leaders pledged to resist calls to shield their local economies in order to prevent a trade war that could further damage global growth.¶ Four years on, with China slowing, Europe heading into recession and a political environment soured by successive financial crises, the question arises: how long will policymakers be able to resist those calls for more protectionism?¶ “Free trade is going to be under pressure,” said Lowy Institute international economy program director Mark Thirlwell. “Since 2007-08 the case for moving to greater trade liberalisation has got tougher and the demands for protection have increased.”¶ Only last week, China, which is grappling with a slowdown, raised the prospect of a trade war with the European Union in response to the EU's implementation of a carbon emissions tax on air travel to and from Europe. Earlier last month China imposed tariffs up to 21 per cent on US-made cars, affecting about $US4 billion imports a year.¶ Advertisement ¶ Across the Pacific, US politicians in the throes of an election year with 8.5 per cent unemployment have issued more strident calls for China to “play by the rules” and allow the yuan to appreciate faster against the US dollar. The US has also asked the World Trade Organisation to probe China's support for its solar panel industry and the restrictions Beijing has placed on US poultry imports.¶ In fact, the most recent WTO data shows that the number of trade restrictive measures enacted by members rose 53 per cent to 339 occurrences over the year to October.¶ Yet the WTO admits that the motives behind the spate of actions aren’t always simply to protect local jobs. “Not all measures categorised as trade restrictive may have been adopted with such an intention,” the body said.¶ In Brazil, for example, the steep rise in the value of its currency, the real, has sparked a torrent of car imports into the country - similar to the online-overseas shopping boom in Australia. Brazil has in turn put a one-year provisional 30 per cent increase on auto imports, to counterbalance the effects of their strong currency.¶ In the US, China and Australia, infrastructure spending measures contain “buy local” requirements to stoke domestic growth, not necessary punish foreign businesses. The federal government in September streamlined its anti-dumping system that eases the way for companies to ask for investigations into imported goods that come in below market value to Australia. Again, well within the rules.¶ “What we’ve seen is a gradual ratcheting up of trade intervention,” said Mr Thirlwell, amounting to what he calls “murky protectionism” or government intervention through support for industries or complaints to global trade authorities.¶ To date, observers such as Mr Thirlwell say most countries have remained remarkably resistant to throwing up significant trade barriers.¶ For example, in November, the US, Australia and seven other Asian-Pacific nations including Japan, outlined the plan for an ambitious multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership trade block worth 40 per cent of the world’s trade, in an effort to increase the flow of cross-border goods and investment. Japan, China and South Korea are also in the later stages of negotiation over a free trade deal between those three nations.¶ Australian National University international trade lecturer John Tang doesn’t believe the world is on the edge a new round of protectionism.¶ “I don’t see a general sea change towards protectionism for major trading blocks but that may be because so much of the industrialised world is relying on developing countries to sustain their exports,” he said.¶ Nevertheless, a shift in the political reality of the US, China or elsewhere could change that, he said.¶ Washington DC-based Brookings Institution fellow Joshua Meltzer said that if the euro zone broke up, elevating the crisis to a new stage, nations may switch to much more protective measures.¶ ‘‘I wouldn’t go so far to say the global economy is so integrated that we could never have anything that would approach a trade war,” said Washington DC-based Brookings Institution fellow Joshua Meltzer. “But I don’t think we’re on that track.”

**Trade wars won’t escalate to real conflict, let alone protectionism**

**Ikenson, 09** associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (Daniel, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html

A Little Perspective, Please

Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9

But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates.

If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation.

In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12

But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13

And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15

Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020.

While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

**Trade doesn’t solve war**

**Goldstone 2007** (P.R., PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a non-resident research fellow at the Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University, AlterNet, September 25, http://www.alternet.org/audits/62848/?page=entire)

Many hope trade will constrain or perhaps pacify a rising China, resurgent Russia, and proliferation-minded Iran, as it well may. Nonetheless, any prudent analysis must incorporate caveats drawn from states' particular political economy of security policy. In non-democratic states, however important global markets may be to the economy in aggregate, elites will be most sensitive to sectoral interests of their specific power base. This mismatch can cause systematic distortions in their ability to interpret other states' strategic signals correctly when genuine conflicts of interest emerge with a nation more domestically constrained. Leadership elites drawn from domestic-oriented, uncompetitive, or non-tradable constituencies will tend to discount deterrent signals sent by trading partners whose own domestic institutions favor those commerce-oriented interests, believing such interests make partners less likely to fulfill their threats. For example, one reason the BJP government of India decided to achieve an open nuclear weapons capability was that its small-business, domestic-oriented heart constituency was both less vulnerable to trade sanctions and less willing to believe that the US would either impose or long sustain such sanctions, given its own increased economic interests in India. Sometimes, deterrent signals may not be sent at all, since one nation's governing coalition may include commerce-dependent groups whose interests prevent state leaders from actually undertaking necessary balancing responses or issuing potent signals of resolve in the first place; the result can be fatally muddled strategy and even war -- as witness the series of weak attempts before the First World War by finance-dominated Britain to deter "Iron and Rye"-dominated Germany. The emergence of truly global markets makes it all the less plausible under most circumstances that a revisionist state will be unable to find some alternative source of resources or outlet for its goods. Ironically, the more the international economy resembles a true global marketplace rather than an oligopolistic economic forum, the less likely it would appear that aggressors must inevitably suffer lasting retaliatory cut-offs in trade. There will always be someone else with the capability to buy and sell.

**Mutual dependence checks trade escalation.**

**Stokes 6** (2/9/2006, Bruce, YaleGlobal, "America’s China Worries–Part II" http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=8733)

Any actions from Congress or the administration will be tempered by the mutually dependent nature of Sino-American trade and the conflicting self-interest of US multinational firms. China’s exports are only now beginning to impact American industry–so the political backlash has yet to come. And China bashing may never be as severe as Japan bashing in the 1980s, if only because the US manufacturing sector is far smaller today, so fewer people face losing their jobs. Moreover, one consequence of years of US investment in China is that Beijing now has hostages. Powerful American companies deeply involved in China have much to lose in a Sino-American trade war. They will lobby hard against meaningful trade action. Failure of the Bush administration to file a long-threatened WTO case against alleged Chinese failure to protect intellectual property rights–an action Hollywood once championed and now, at least in part, opposes–is an indication of the leverage such multinational firms exert in Washington. Finally, as concerned as Americans are about Chinese economic power, they worry more about Beijing’s military might. China is a military and creditor superpower in a way Japan never was. Thus Beijing must be accorded deference, even if it galls many Americans. Sino-American tensions will worsen because the underlying economic frictions have rubbed relations raw, as underscored by the WTO case. But a higher visibility for problems in the relationship should not be confused with a breakdown in relations. More skirmishes do not make a war. There is not yet the wherewithal or the leverage in Washington for a knockdown drag-out fight with Beijing over trade.

**No econ impact**

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

**Recent conflicts prove there is zero correlation between economic decline and war**

Barnett 9 Thomas, Senior Managing Director of Enterra Solutions LLC, Contributing Editor and Online Columnist for Esquire, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession **has had virtually no impact** whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process **wholly unrelated** to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

#### The plan is a drop in the bucket relative to overall disputes

**Stokes and Hatchigian, 12** [U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year Taking the Long View in a Season of Heated Rhetoric, Jacob, Research Assistant at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where his research focuses on U.S. national security and defense policy. His writing has appeared in CNN.com, Politico, BusinessWeek, *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Guardian* and *The American Prospect*, among other publications, Senior Fellow at American Progress.¶ <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QG6048mP53AJ:www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2012/03/pdf/us_china_relations.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us>]

This report examines the 10 most debated challenges in the U.S.-China relation-¶ ship in the 2012 presidential and congressional campaign season, exploring¶ differences between progressive and conservative approaches to China. We¶ detail these 10 issues in the pages that follow, but briefly, here is a summation of the top challenges and the different approaches advocated by conservatives and¶ taken by progressives.¶ • Ensuring fair trade. The Obama administration’s policy of vigorous enforce-¶ ment and results-oriented dialogue beats conservatives’ refusal to invest in¶ American competitiveness at home; empty, antagonistic rhetoric toward China;¶ and highly inconsistent positions on trade cases. The Obama administration has¶ announced a new trade-enforcement unit and has brought more major trade¶ cases against China than any of its predecessors.¶ • Progress on currency. The Obama administration’s efforts, on its own and with¶ other nations, to pressure China to deal with its undervalued currency have¶ resulted in progress, though more remains to be done. The administration is keeping the pressure on. The conservative answer is both needlessly antago-¶ nistic and ineffective.¶ • China owning U.S. debt. China owning just more than 8 percent of our federal¶ debt is not leverage China can use without unacceptably harming its own interests.¶ Conservative hysterics and fearmongering about this complex issue is misplaced.¶ • Chinese direct investment. Chinese investment in our country can be a major¶ source of capital and jobs going forward. We should allow proven national ¶ 4 Center for American Progress Action Fund | U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year¶ security processes to weed out threats to our nation and avoid excessive¶ paranoia around Chinese purchases, lest we miss investment-led growth¶ opportunities. Conservatives should take heed.¶ • Championing human rights. The Obama administration has consistently called¶ China out on human rights, speaking privately and publicly with Chinese¶ leaders, meeting with the Dalai Lama twice, and giving our diplomats new¶ forums to engage fully with their Chinese counterparts and the Chinese peo-¶ ple to improve human rights and religious freedoms in China. Conservatives’¶ only answer is even more forceful browbeating of Chinese leaders—emotion-¶ ally satisfying, but not an effective tactic to make real change.¶ • America the Pacific power. Under the Obama administration new trade part-¶ nerships, defense arrangements, and serious connections with regional orga-¶ nizations all support deeper U.S. engagement in Asia. Extremist conservative¶ rhetoric claiming the administration is not investing adequately in defense in¶ Asia is nonsense.¶ • Addressing China’s military. China’s military has grown rapidly in recent years,¶ albeit from a very low base. While some technologies are worrisome, the¶ United States retains a huge advantage over China. The Obama administration¶ is responding to China’s military buildup but is not exaggerating the threat, in¶ contrast to conservative efforts to use the “China threat” to justify unsustain-¶ able increases in military spending.¶ • Supporting regional allies. Asian nations continue to turn to America to ensure¶ peace and security. The United States is meeting that need by strengthening rela-¶ tions with our Pacific friends and allies. Relationships with Japan, South Korea,¶ and Australia are rock-solid, and the United States joined with regional players¶ to push back on Chinese belligerence. Conservatives ignore this track record in¶ desperate attempts to tag the Obama administration as abandoning our allies.¶ • A friend to Taiwan. The Obama administration has sold unprecedentedly large¶ packages of arms to Taiwan, including major fighter upgrades, while also upping¶ outreach to the island in ways that will not destabilize cross-Strait relations.¶ Conservatives are left complaining that the current administration, like the Bush¶ administration before it, did not sell Taiwan the most advanced jet fighters.¶ The Obama¶ administration¶ is responding to¶ China’s military¶ buildup but is¶ not exaggerating¶ the threat, in¶ contrast to¶ conservative efforts¶ to use the “China¶ threat” to justify¶ unsustainable¶ increases in military¶ spending.¶ 5 Center for American Progress Action Fund | U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year¶ • Tackling cybersecurity. From the start the Obama administration has identi-¶ fied cybersecurity as an issue of grave concern and mounted a comprehensive¶ response. Conservatives who condemn the administration’s response do not¶ understand its scope; they also offer little in the way of new ideas for combat-¶ ing the threat.¶ In the pages that follow, we will present in more detail these 10 challenges along-¶ side the response of the Obama administration and the misplaced criticisms and¶ hostile rhetoric of many conservatives.

#### Cooperation is ineffective – internal constraints block common action

**Xinbo, 12** [Wu Xinbo is Professor at the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Forging Sino–US Partnership in the Twenty-First Century: opportunities and challenges, Journal of Contemporary China, p. UM libraries, preview available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2011.647429#preview>]

Whether China and the US can forge a genuine partnership depends on their capability to overcome bilateral differences and expand their cooperation in areas of common interests, while the latter will be even more essential given the fact that the Sino–US relationship is still growing. However, common interests do notnecessarily guarantee common actions**.** In fact, efforts to forge a Sino–US partnership are confronted with a series of challenges arising from both sides.¶ On the US side, one problem lies in the lack of experience in working with a rising power like China. Since moving to the center of the world stage following World War II, the United States has accumulated experience in dealing with rising powers like the Soviet Union, Japan and Germany. While the containment strategy proved successful in coping with Soviet expansion during the Cold War, the alliance strategy worked well to secure Japanese and German acceptance of US leadership when both countries reemerged as major economic powers in the 1960s. China, however, is different from those rising countries. Unlike the Soviet Union, it is not pursuing an antagonistic relationship with the US, nor is it, like Japan and Germany, following US leadership in international affairs as a small brother. For Washington, Beijing is neither a complete enemy nor a sheer friend. Both competitive and cooperative dimensions exist in Sino–US relations. The competitive factors may not lead to strategic confrontation if well managed, yet confrontation may happen if not well managed. Meanwhile, the cooperative factors may not automatically lead to cooperation, as it requires such serious efforts as hard bargaining, skillful trade-offs and the demonstration of a spirit of respect and equality. Given its cultural and historical background, the United States lacks such sophistication to deal with a country like China. Although the US has learned a lot since the mid-1990s about how to deal with a rising China, it still has a long way to go to enrich experiences, improve skills and adjust mentality.¶ Another outstanding challenge originating on the US side is the constraint of its domestic politics. While US democracy may arguably provide a good example for internal good governance, its foreign policy lacks continuity and credibility due to political cycles coming out of election politics and the interplay of interest group politics.[28](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2011.647429#FN0028) China policy in particular has fallen victim to internal politics from time to time. While Chinese leaders always emphasize the need to adopt strategic and long-term perspective on bilateral relations, US leaders, driven by political cycles, invariably pay more attention to tactical and short-term gains in interactions with China. It is true that China's domestic politics also increasingly works to affect its handling of relations with the US, but such impact is largely manageable and has caused much less volatility than US domestic politics does to bilateral ties. It is the volatility in US China policy that frustrates Chinese efforts and desires to secure a steady development of relations with the US. It also undermines endeavors to build mutual trust between the leaderships in both countries. ¶ On the Chinese side, a series of political, economic and security factors constrain its capability to extend the cooperation that the US expects. Politically, China appears more sympathetic with some authoritarian regimes that the US may find less tolerable, and Beijing may resist Washington's efforts to exert pressure on them through the United Nations. As a result, China is often accused of protecting those ‘rogue’ or ‘repressive’ regimes. Economically, although China now ranks as the second largest world economy, it is still a developing country in terms of per capital GDP and overall level of social–economic development, hence China refuses to shoulder international responsibilities that it views beyond its capacity, and the US may perceive China as unwilling to live up to its major power status. On the security front, given the differences in respective geopolitical interests between China and the US in the Asia–Pacific, Beijing's approach to some regional issues, such as the Korean peninsula issue, differs from that of the US. Such differences highlight bilateral competition rather than cooperation in the region.¶ Mutual trust holds the key to partnership-building. However, the lack of mutual trust is an outstanding feature of current Sino–US relations. This should be attributed not only to the real differences in respective national interests, but also to misperceptions that each possesses toward the other. A primary US misperception is that China aspires to undermine its position in the Asia–Pacific. China, on the other hand, always suspects that the US intends to contain it. Both sides are aware of the other's major concerns and try to assure each other. For instance, in both joint statements of 2009 and 2011, the United States reiterated that ‘it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs’, while China suggested that it ‘welcomes the United States as an Asia–Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region’. In spite of these assurances, however, those misperceptions remain strong, and both sides continue to try to find supporting evidence from the other's words and deeds.¶ Finally, some conceptual gaps between two countries also complicate their efforts to forge partnership in world affairs. What is China's international identity and responsibility? How to deal with the issue of sovereignty in the era of globalization and information? How strictly should the principle of non-interference in a sovereign country's internal affairs be abided by? How should foreign aid be best provided? What should a preferred international order looks like? And so on. Such differences will affect both the objectives the two countries seek to advance and the means they employ.

#### Cooperation is hindered by domestic politics and shifting blame

**Czarnezki**, **11** [Jason J. Professor of Law in the Environmental Law Center and Faculty Director of the U.S.-China¶ Partnership for Environmental Law at Vermont

Law School; A.B., J.D, “CLIMATE POLICY &¶ U.S.-CHINA RELATIONs”, Published After April 4th 2011. <http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/Jason%20Czarnezki%20Climate%20Policy%20and%20China.pdf>]

Both the United States and China are hindered by the reality of domestic politics and their ability to blame the other for lack of progress. Professor¶ Cinnamon Carlarne, increasing future political pressure, described the 2010¶ Cancun Climate Change Conference as “a determinative point for both a 2¶ degree world and the continuing validity of the UNFCCC process,”44 but¶ COP-16 in Cancun has come and gone with little fanfare. The Cancun¶ process avoided the high-stakes drama of Copenhagen, successfully set up a¶ fund for adaptation measures in poor countries, created a mechanism for¶ technology transfer, approved a deal to protect tropical forests, and ensured¶ adherence to the goals put forward in the Copenhagen Accord.45 IV. DOMESTIC POLITICS¶ The United States and Chinese governments have significant domestic¶ political pressures that limit their ability and desire to come to a progressive¶ international agreement on climate change, and these pressures create the¶ type of chaos and self-interested behavior seen at Copenhagen.¶ China does not want to limit its amazing and historic economic growth¶ and development. The domestic justifications are sound and¶ understandable. Economic prosperity defines global power, many Chinese¶ still need to be brought out of poverty, and economic success provides the¶ necessary stability for the ruling Communist party to stay in power. As a¶ result, China is happy to become far more energy efficient, but will make¶ no emissions limitations promises that have the potential to limit overall¶ economic growth.¶ To this end, China has developed “carbon intensity” targets in an effort¶ to slow its greenhouse gas emissions and become more energy efficient.¶ China proposes to reduce carbon intensity—the amount of CO2 emitted per¶ unit of economic output—by forty to forty-five percent, compared with¶ 43. Agence France-Presse, China and U.S. Blame Each Other as Climate Talks Conclude,¶ PORTFOLI (Oct. 9, 2010, 7:39PM), http://portfo.li/o/255346-china-and-u-s-blame-each-other-as-climatetalks-¶ conclude.¶ 44. Carlarne, supra note 37, at 149.¶ 45. John M. Broder, Climate Talks End with Modest Deal on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,¶ 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/science/earth/12climate.html.¶ 670 VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 12¶ 2005.46 Unfortunately, under this plan, even though the rate of emissions¶ will slow, overall emissions will continue to rise. This will eventually rub¶ up against “The China Problem”—that even if other countries reduce¶ emissions to zero, China’s growth and emissions alone, despite improving¶ energy intensity, have the potential to push global temperature above the¶ two degree Celsius threshold goal, and potentially further.47¶ Similar to China, the United States has domestic political and economic¶ considerations that have created roadblocks for international climate¶ agreements and domestic initiatives. These roadblocks include concerns¶ about limiting economic growth, a culture and infrastructure that support¶ high levels of driving and energy consumption, strong lobbying by energy¶ and automobile industries against greenhouse gas regulation, dismissal of¶ climate science, and anti-internationalism among both politicians and¶ citizens. As a result, the U.S. government has not enacted a single law¶ explicitly requiring any public or private entity to mitigate its greenhouse¶ gas impact on the global climate.¶

#### And, divergent politics interests cause misperceptions that eviscerate solvency

**Lieberthal, 09** [U.S. CHINA CLEAN ENERGY COOPERATION:¶ THE ROAD AHEAD, Kenneth G, Kenneth Lieberthal is director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at Brookings. Lieberthal was a professor at the University of Michigan for 1983-2009, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/9/us%20china%20energy%20cooperation%20lieberthal/09_us_china_energy_cooperation_lieberthal>]

In recent years both Washington and Beijing¶ have played into the politics of clean energy¶ in the other capital, but neither leadership has¶ understood this reality very well. Many Chinese¶ have viewed any U.S. effort to engage China on¶ clean energy issues as simply a ploy by Washington¶ to slow down China’s rise by burdening the¶ country with new and unfair responsibilities.¶ Many in Washington have seen China’s rapid¶ rise as a manufacturing power as morphing into¶ something even more threatening if the United¶ States were to adopt measures to put a meaningful¶ price on carbon while Chinese enterprises do¶ not bear comparable burdens.¶ In addition, the George W. Bush Administration¶ evinced considerable skepticism about the climate¶ change issue and generally sought to deal with energy¶ security issues by increasing domestic production¶ of fossil fuels. The Chinese viewed this as¶ a rich, technologically advanced country failing¶ to take seriously its responsibilities for past carbon¶ emissions and failing to take meaningful actions¶ to cope with the threat of climate change. In¶ this context, American efforts to encourage Beijing¶ to assume greater responsibilities appeared hypocritical, at best. China’s own leaders would¶ have difficulty in making the case for stringent efforts¶ on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s)¶ part on climate change grounds, given America’s¶ posture. Beyond this, most Chinese view the¶ United States as defining what a “modern” lifestyle¶ entails. As long as Americans are profligate in their energy use, Chinese will see that as the appropriate¶ model to which to aspire. Not surprisingly,¶ China therefore until 2009 justified most¶ of its energy-related measures on the grounds of¶ securing energy resources around the world, not¶ reducing carbon emissions.¶ The United States, in turn, has repeatedly pointed¶ to China’s exemption, as a developing country,¶ from any specific obligations under the Kyoto Protocol¶ to suggest that Beijing was being hypocritical¶ as it shirked its own responsibilities on this issue.¶ Opponents of the Kyoto Protocol created a television¶ commercial that showed China being cut out¶ of a map of the world with a pair of scissors, as¶ a voice said, “The Kyoto Protocol—it’s not global¶ and it won’t work.” President George W. Bush¶ mentioned China often in explaining his administration’s¶ rejection of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001.1In short, each country’s posture has made the issue¶ of climate change politically more difficult for¶ the other country’s leadership. Neither system¶ took the other country’s perspectives into serious¶ account, and the basis for substantial bilateral cooperation¶ has therefore remained very weak. It is¶ a tribute to the commitment of former Treasury¶ Secretary Henry Paulson that he was able to use¶ the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) processto forge a Ten-Tear Framework Agreement on Energy¶ and Environment with the Chinese in 2008.2¶ This document played an important role in laying¶ a foundation for the future, identifying areas¶ for cooperation, and helping forge a bureaucratic¶ consensus on the Chinese side to move ahead¶ on cooperation with the United States. Even this¶ Framework, though, avoided a focus on clean energy¶ linked to climate change.

#### Assertive US stances don’t kill relations – clarity outweighs

**Cooke, 11** [ Clean Energy: U.S.-China Cooperation and Competition ¶ By Merritt T. (Terry) Cooke ¶ Terry Cooke is owner and principal of www.terrycooke.com, a corporate seminar/scenario firm and GC3 Strategy, an international advisory/consultancy business and is a Senior Fellow at FPRI. He is the author of the forthcoming monograph Sustaining U.S.-China Cooperation in Clean Energy. He also writes the U.S.-China Clean Energy blog at www.mterrycooke.wordpress.com, <http://www.fpri.org/pubs/Obama-Hu.Summit2011.cooke.pdf>]

The U.S.’s tougher tone in the traditional politics of bilateral relations and in the new politics of economic statecraft has not tripped up U.S.-China cooperation in clean energy or triggered a combative competitive response from China. If anything, it seems to have given China’s leaders a clearer sense of a more assertive and comprehensible American president. China now seems to see Obama as playing an established and recognizable “American tune” on the global stage. During his January state visit to Washington, Hu took pains to show the “smiling face” of Chinese “peaceful rise” diplomacy, replacing the “angry face” that had been on view after the Nobel Peace Prize award to Liu Xiaobo and a series of incidents in the South and East China Seas. Hu also skillfully brandished “China, Inc.’s” checkbook, presiding over more than US $45 billion of commercial deals during his visit with one-quarter of that amount going to clean energy deals with major U.S. firms.4 In negotiations during the state visit, China also appears to have ceded ground in the highly-charged dispute over China’s “indigenous innovation” policy in government technology procurement (which U.S. critics saw as disadvantaging U.S. providers or pressuring them to transfer intellectual property rights to Chinese firms).

This approach by China—a purring voice in response to twin U.S. growls— is understandable. The Chinese leadership, over many decades, has come to expect, and tends to respect, clear and principled postures of strength and clear assertions of legitimate interests from the United States. Chinese state-owned companies know that they cannot hope to become world-class if they do not acquire global market experience and global management skills. Access to U.S. markets provides an indispensable proving-ground. Chinese state-owned and private manufacturers depend on sales to U.S. markets in key areas, including, in the clean energy sector, photovoltaic solar products. They need U.S. markets to grow while they wait for a domestic market to be developed. Public attitudes in China are deeply confused by all the talk they hear of from U.S. sources about “Sputnik moments” and about the United States losing the innovation race to the Chinese. To their minds, innovation is in the U.S. market’s DNA and is the most notable feature missing from the Chinese market. The notion that Chinese innovation is an existential “Sputnik”-like threat to the United States, thus, does not describe for Chinese observers a recognizable reality. That may make it all the more alarming and effective as a rallying cry for U.S. action taking a tougher line against, and seeking to out compete, China in clean energy and other innovation-intensive sectors.

#### US China relations are deeply institutionalized – no risk of collapse

**Shambaugh, 11** [David, Professor and Director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C, “Stabilizing and Strengthening Sino-American Relations”, http://chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/stabilizing-and-strengthening-sino-american-relations/]

The Third Round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was held in Washington, D.C. on May 9-10, 2011. The main result of the meetings is that the world’s most important bilateral relationship is now more stable and stronger, although still fragile and in need of further strengthening in several areas. The S&ED continues the trend begun by President Hu Jintao’s January 2011 state visit to Washington, which served to arrest the year-long downward slide in relations. As a result of these two sets of high-level U.S.-China interactions, the deterioration has been halted, a new atmosphere of partnership started, and mutual understanding improved. While 2010 was the worst year for U.S.-China relations in many years, 2011 is shaping up to be much better.¶ The outcome of the S&ED can be measured on three principal levels.¶ The first implication is the depth of institutionalization of the U.S.-China relationship. This is seen in the unprecedentedly high-level and deep nature of the two government’s delegations. More than a dozen cabinet level officials and agency heads on each side participated—representing well more than half of each government’s institutions. Neither nation has anywhere near such an extensive bureaucratic set of exchanges with another nation. For the first time, this time both delegations included senior military officers—who inaugurated the Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) under the strategic track of the S&ED. In this context, the two sides discussed the sensitive issues of cyber security and maritime security. At the very top, the two delegations were again led by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Treasury and State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Executive Vice Premier Wang Qishan. In addition, a large number of other minister/cabinet level officials participated. The character of the two delegations represents the deep institutionalization that the Sino-American relationship has now achieved, and this is a strong stabilizing force.¶ The second implication of the S&ED is breadth of the exchanges. The S&ED produced a remarkable 48 point list of “outcomes.” Unlike last year’s document or those produced at the past two presidential summits, this one was not so much aspirational as substantive. The document is a remarkable testimony to the extremely diverse nature of the U.S-China relationship today, and it reveals the fact that there is hardly any issue in international affairs and the world today that is not on the U.S.-China agenda. The two sides had separate discussions on virtually every major region of the world; on several key “hot spot” issues like Iran and North Korea. They addressed pressing global challenges like climate change, terrorism, disaster relief, ocean and atmospheric issues, nuclear nonproliferation, weapons transfers and demining, and energy security. They addressed a range of bilateral issues human rights: clean energy, agriculture, science and technology exchanges, people-to-people exchanges, law enforcement, anti-corruption work, customs and coast guard cooperation, marine and fishery science cooperation, and announced a new governor-level forum. Several new inter-governmental protocols were prepared for future signing in the area of health sciences, supply chain security and trade facilitation, law enforcement, and ecology.¶ These were the outcomes on the so-called “strategic track.” The “economic track” did not put out a similar document—but judging from the press briefings given by both sides, the economic discussions were equally wide-ranging and thorough-going. Both Vice Premier Wang Qishan and Secretary of Treasury Geithner noted how the subject of broad macro economic management and rebalancing of each nation’s economy was discussed in depth. Additionally issues, such as Chinese currency appreciation, U.S. export controls, and foreign direct investment were high on the agenda.¶ The third implication of the S&ED is the potential to sustain cooperation in the months ahead. As noted above, the relationship has sailed through very rough waters over the past year—and, before the S&ED, could be described as being in a state of “fragile stability.” The S&ED definitely served to strengthen the stability, and thereby overcome some of the fragility in the relationship. While this is encouraging, analysts all note that there still exists substantial mistrust on both sides and a number of nettlesome issues over which the two governments find themselves far apart. Yet, to bridge these differences requires intensive and candid dialogue—which is what this year’s S&ED did achieve.

**No China war**

**Brendon 10**—fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge University (Piers, 20 October 2010, “China Also Rises”, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/china-rises-4236, RBatra)

HERE, THEN, is an account calculated to show that the reinvigorated Chinese dragon will endeavor to retaliate against the American eagle, itself seeking a new foe in lieu of the Soviet bear. China is bound to regain face, so the argument goes, by using its newfound resources to arm itself and to confront the United States in military terms. The idea that progress heads westward and that power follows the sun was heard, it has rightly been said, “from Horace to Horace Greeley.” Now Chinese authorities such as Wang Jisi (dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University) quote the adage that “the torch of history seems to be relayed from the West to the East.” A clash between the two titans, divided for so long by so much bad blood, is widely supposed to be inevitable.

This is not the case. Not only does history not repeat itself, it contains no rhythms or patterns which enable its students to make sure predictions. It is a “flickering lamp,” wrote Winston Churchill, in a world governed by time and chance. Human beings and all their works are subject, as Edward Gibbon said, to “the vicissitudes of fortune.” Or, in the somewhat less coherent words of Margaret Thatcher, “the unexpected happens” and “fail-safe plans are designed to go wrong.” But while certainty is unattainable, history does offer more optimistic possibilities than the saga of Chinese humiliation at foreign hands may suggest. One conceivable outcome that deserves serious consideration is that **we are at the dawn of an era of fruitful cooperation between China and America.**

It must be said that commercially successful states do not automatically or immediately beat their pruning hooks into swords. For all its overwhelming industrial and mercantile dominance, the United States remained a tenth-rate military power (except for its navy) until galvanized by Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Deng’s China itself put the modernization of its armed forces behind that of agriculture, manufacturing and science, and in the two decades after 1981 its troop numbers fell by half, to 2.3 million. Admittedly, its defense spending rose thereafter, but it remains a much-lower percentage of GDP than does America’s. And this year the rise has been checked, apparently in order to assuage foreign worries about its military modernization.

In other words, **there is no necessary correlation between economic growth and military strength**. Witness Stalin’s Russia, which made guns at the expense of butter during the 1930s, starving itself great. As Hitler and Mussolini also showed, this is a policy to which totalitarian states are particularly prone. Yet China’s leaders seem dedicated to augmenting prosperity in order to secure stability. Having been racked by internal convulsions for generations, the country evidently prefers tyranny to anarchy, even to democracy. Anything is better than a return to the bloody turmoil of the Taiping or the warlord era or to the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. As Deng Xiaoping insisted, “Stability supersedes all.”

The ideal of harmony is quintessentially Confucian. The philosopher stressed that good order is the basis of prosperity and security. **Violence is a last resort** and will probably be ineffective. Historically, China has assimilated aggression, rolling with punches, overcoming hardness with softness. Where possible it has avoided taking the offensive. This is not to say, of course, that the Beijing government avoids coercion close to home, as became tragically clear in the suppressing of the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and the crushing of resistance in Tibet. But it is to suggest that China prefers, particularly in a nuclear age, to use “soft power” and “smile diplomacy” abroad.

**THERE IS little evidence** that China wishes to jeopardize its burgeoning affluence by adventurist attempts to contest American hegemony. On the contrary, the Chinese leadership is all too conscious that the Soviet Union’s endeavor to compete militarily with the United States was a major factor in its collapse. Prosperity breeds contentment. As Jonathan Swift noted in The Battle of the Books, quarrels usually stem from want rather than plenty, and “we may observe in the republic of dogs . . . that the whole state is ever in the profoundest peace after a full meal.”

Needless to say, accidents do happen, and when American bombers destroyed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, a wave of spontaneous fury engulfed the People’s Republic. The bombing was said to be a “barbarian” act of aggression comparable to the imperialist invasion of China after the Boxer Rebellion. It was even compared to a Nazi war crime. Fearing domestic and international damage, however, the authorities did their best to calm the storm. The kept press assuaged popular passions. Television reports were emollient. Censorship of the Internet was tightened via a list of some thousand taboo words, the building blocks of the Great Firewall of China.

There was a similar response to George W. Bush’s disastrous invasion of Iraq, which replaced Chinese sympathy for the United States in the wake of 9/11 with feelings of anxiety and mistrust—feelings exacerbated by President Obama’s failure to pull America out of the Afghan quagmire. Just as England’s difficulty was once Ireland’s opportunity, so America’s difficulty might have been China’s. But, no. The Chinese media tamped down outbursts of chauvinism which might have led to public protests. One result, according to Susan Shirk’s excellent book China: Fragile Superpower, was that the American abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib was condemned much more vehemently in the Great Republic than in the People’s Republic.

Perhaps nationalism has succeeded Communism as the creed of Red China, but its rulers show signs of wanting to make their country a good citizen of the world. They have signally reduced the number of land-border disputes with their fourteen neighbors. They have participated eagerly in international forums such as the World Trade Organization. They have eased relations with Japan and, horrified by the nuclear brinkmanship of Kim Jong Il, mediated with Korea. They have muted criticisms of the United States, even when Jiang Zemin’s Boeing 767 was found to contain twenty-seven sophisticated bugging devices after being refitted in Texas in 2001—a covert operation which might have been designed to demonstrate that the term “intelligence agency” is an oxymoron.

Wang Jisi articulates the official Chinese position: since Mao’s victory in 1949 the Communist elite has generally believed that America and other hostile outside forces have been intent on conquering and destabilizing China. But **globalization has increased the cost of conflict and reduced the danger of war.** It has also magnified many of the problems from which China suffers, such as pollution, urban overcrowding and huge disparities of wealth—100 million people live on less than a dollar a day and a quarter of the population lacks access to clean drinking water. So China’s priority is to tackle these problems. It aims to build a rich and great society, dedicated to peace, progress, harmony, sustainable development and international cooperation.

**No impact**

**Lieber and Press 9** (Keir A.,  Associate Professor @ Georgetown University,  Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec)

MODELING THE UNTHINKABLE To illustrate the growth in U.S. counterforce capabilities, we applied a set of simple formulas that analysts have used for decades to estimate the effectiveness of counterforce attacks. We modeled a U.S. strike on a small target set: 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in hardened silos, the approximate size of China's current long-range, silo-based missile force. The analysis compared the capabilities of a 1985 Minuteman ICBM to those of a modern Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. [The technical details of the analysis presented in this essay are available online [2].] In 1985, a single U.S. ICBM warhead had less than a 60 percent chance of destroying a typical silo. Even if four or five additional warheads were used, the cumulative odds of destroying the silo would never exceed 90 percent because of the problem of "fratricide," whereby incoming warheads destroy each other. Beyond five warheads, adding more does no good. A probability of 90 percent might sound high, but it falls far short if the goal is to completely disarm an enemy: with a 90 percent chance of destroying each target, the odds of destroying all 20 are roughly 12 percent. In 1985, then, a U.S. ICBM attack had little chance of destroying even a small enemy nuclear arsenal. Today, a multiple-warhead attack on a single silo using a Trident II missile would have a roughly 99 percent chance of destroying it, and the probability that a barrage would destroy all 20 targets is well above 95 percent. Given the accuracy of the U.S. military's current delivery systems, the only question is target identification: silos that can be found can be destroyed. During the Cold War, the United States worked hard to pinpoint Soviet nuclear forces, with great success. Locating potential adversaries' small nuclear arsenals is undoubtedly a top priority for U.S. intelligence today. The revolution in accuracy is producing an even more momentous change: it is becoming possible for the United States to conduct low-yield nuclear counterforce strikes that inflict relatively few casualties. A U.S. Department of Defense computer model, called the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC), estimates the dispersion of deadly radioactive fallout in a given region after a nuclear detonation. The software uses the warhead's explosive power, the height of the burst, and data about local weather and demographics to estimate how much fallout would be generated, where it would blow, and how many people it would injure or kill. HPAC results can be chilling. In 2006, a team of nuclear weapons analysts from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) used HPAC to estimate the consequences of a U.S. nuclear attack using high-yield warheads against China's ICBM field. Even though China's silos are located in the countryside, the model predicted that the fallout would blow over a large area, killing 3-4 million people. U.S. counterforce capabilities were useless, the study implied, because even a limited strike would kill an unconscionable number of civilians. But the United States can already conduct nuclear counterforce strikes at a tiny fraction of the human devastation that the FAS/NRDC study predicted, and small additional improvements to the U.S. force could dramatically reduce the potential collateral damage even further. The United States' nuclear weapons are now so accurate that it can conduct successful counterforce attacks using the smallest-yield warheads in the arsenal, rather than the huge warheads that the FAS/NRDC simulation modeled. And to further reduce the fallout, the weapons can be set to detonate as airbursts, which would allow most of the radiation to dissipate in the upper atmosphere. We ran multiple HPAC scenarios against the identical target set used in the FAS/NRDC study but modeled low-yield airbursts rather than high-yield groundbursts. The fatality estimates plunged from 3-4 million **to less than 700** -- a figure comparable to the number of civilians reportedly killed since 2006 in Pakistan by U.S. drone strikes. One should be skeptical about the results of any model that depends on unpredictable factors, such as wind speed and direction. But in the scenarios we modeled, the area of lethal fallout was so small that very few civilians would have become ill or died, regardless of which way the wind blew. Critics may cringe at this analysis. Many of them, understandably, say that nuclear weapons are -- and should remain -- unusable. But if the United States is to retain these weapons for the purpose of deterring nuclear attacks, it needs a force that gives U.S. leaders retaliatory options they might actually employ. If the only retaliatory option entails killing millions of civilians, then the U.S. deterrent will lack credibility. Giving U.S. leaders alternatives that do not target civilians is both wise and just. A counterforce attack -- whether using conventional munitions or low- or high-yield nuclear weapons -- would be fraught with peril. Even a small possibility of a single enemy warhead's surviving such a strike would undoubtedly give any U.S. leader great pause. But in the midst of a conventional war, if an enemy were using nuclear threats or limited nuclear attacks to try to coerce the United States or its allies, these would be the capabilities **that would give a U.S. president real options.**

**Won’t go nuclear or draw in outside powers**

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This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

### 1NC China Econ

#### The Solar industry is strong now despite tariffs – adaption solves and no competitiveness internal

**Alic, 12** [July 16th, Jen, Oil Prices.Com, US Solar Companies can compete Despite Chinese Subsidies, <http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/>]

The US solar industry is undergoing some serious growing pains, with bankruptcies and mergers a necessary part of that process; meanwhile, competition from Chinese solar panels has many believing that American solar simply cannot compete. Not so.¶ Solar’s track record is certainly not inspiring: The past couple of years have seen a number of high-profile bankruptcies, including Solyndra, Q-Cells, Evergreen Solar and Abound Solar. At the same [time](http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/), while Chinese solar companies have managed to avoid bankruptcy, they are in trouble and are posting sharp losses, and debts are not government-owned as most might think. Perhaps the Chinese government will bail these heavily subsidized solar companies out, but not necessarily as such a move would further imbalance the solar market.¶ While solar installers have benefitted from the market, US solar manufacturers have taken a hit, with solar panel prices falling by some 47% over last year due to global oversupply.¶ Quite simply, competition means that solar companies will have be a bit more innovative in reducing costs and improving efficiency.¶ Not all solar companies are going under: [First Solar](http://investor.firstsolar.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1274494-12-22&CIK=1274494), Inc. (NASDAQ:FSLR)is doing fine. First Solar has net debt, indeed, but it stands to have a positive cash flow for the next two years. Two other companies, SunPower and Trina Solar, are also projecting a return to profitability for 2013. By 2014, First Solar will be restructured into a utility-focused [company](http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/), giving up the rooftop solar market. This is how it is adapting and changing with the market.¶ Solar companies will not be successful until they give up on markets in which their only recourse for competing is through government subsidies. This mindset is what is weeding out the future solar winners from the losers.¶ [General Electric](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=newssearch&cd=1&ved=0CDYQqQIwAA&url=http://www.technologyreview.com/news/428449/ges-solar-setback-reflects-a-new-technology/&ei=T7f9T7DpJ8fBrQGdz92LCQ&usg=AFQjCNHN9MznNo7ittGO35DBJUxjuW1Oq) Company ([NYSE](http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/):GE) was hoping to produce thin-film solar panels which are less bulky and more efficient than conventional solar panels. GE was hoping to be able to produce these panels at a low enough price as to be attractive to the average homeowner. However, those plans have been delayed (not scrapped) because of the falling price of thin-film panels to the point that GE cannot cover the cost of producing them. Still, GE is not ready to throw in the towel. Instead, it’s planning to improve its technology in order to increase production efficiency to rival its Chinese competitors. It’s called innovation and it is essential for competition-subsidies or no.¶ Things are not as bad as they seem. According to a recent [report](http://www.greentechmedia.com/research/ussmi/) from GTM Research and the solar Energy Industries Association, the first quarter of 2012 was one of its best in terms of installation (506 mw to [power](http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/) over 350,000 homes). Furthermore, installed solar power is forecast to increase 75% in 2012, adding another 3.3 gigawatts of solar power to the current 4.4 gigawatts already installed across the country. But the rooftop installation market will not be forging solar’s future in the US. The future will be in solar power installation by big utility companies. While this category saw installation decline sharply in late 2011, the scale and scope of these projects is vast and construction time-consuming, so quarterly figures are not as relevant.¶ There are also alternatives to subsidies that solar power could latch on to. The Solar Renewable Energy Certificates ([SREC](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=newssearch&cd=1&ved=0CDIQqQIwAA&url=http://www.dailyrecord.com/article/20120626/NJOPINION03/306240002/Solar-energy-investment-boosts-New-Jersey-s-economy&ei=w7X9T6-KMoG26wG0rsT7Bg&usg=AF)) program grants anyone who installs solar access to the state market to sell credits for every 1,000 kilowatt-hour of electricity generated. This is currently on offer in New Jersey, and other states are considering similar programs.¶ Slapping harsh tariffs on Chinese solar panels was the result of some heavy-handed lobbying led most relentlessly by German-owned SolarWorld AG (ETR:SWV), which is now planning to file an anti-dumping case against Chinese firms in the European market.¶ According to SolarWorld, the company will [pursue](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/solarworld-plans-china-anti-dumping-case-with-eu-peers.html) ”anti-subsidy” and “anti-dumping” cases against Chinese solar panel manufacturers in Europe in cooperation with a coalition of European manufacturers.¶ This is a rather rich move coming from a company that has itself been built on government subsidies.¶ It also comes on the heels of a decision by the US Commerce Department in May to impose a 31% tariff on the main Chinese manufacturers of solar panels in the US-a move led by petitioning efforts from SolarWorld’s US branches.¶ China is not entirely to blame for the global oversupply, of course. All manufacturers continued to produce massive quantities of solar panels despite overstocked inventories.¶ What most fail to understand, however, is that the US wants (and needs) Chinese clean-energy cash in order to make its clean-energy ambitions a reality-especially at a time when federal subsidies are dwindling.¶ More important than the solar panel dumping debate is what China can do for the US clean energy industry through cash investments-and China is aggressively pursuing this avenue with the American blessing. China invested $264 million last year in renewable-energy deals in the US. Beijing-based [GSR Ventures](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=newssearch&cd=1&ved=0CCsQqQIwAA&url=http://www.sacbee.com/2012/07/09/4619742/protean-electric-announces-84.html&ei=hLX9T6WyBumz6wHZjszSBg&usg=AFQjCNFhVGW9aF-XYNOLpJskI4bhWQd70g&sig2=8wE9), from its offices in Silicon Valley, helped [fund](http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/) electric battery manufacturer Boston-Power Inc’s move into China. Meanwhile, San Francisco has come up with the [ChinaSF](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=newssearch&cd=1&ved=0CC4QqQIwAA&url=http://www.sfgate.com/business/bottomline/article/Chinese-bank-looks-to-finance-to-major-SF-projects-3665212.php&ei=ULX9T7HdO-jr6wHsnr3qCg&usg=AFQjCNFoK) program, whose ultimate goal is to lure Chinese [investment](http://www.valuewalk.com/2012/07/us-solar-companies-can-compete-despite-chinese-subsidies/) in clean energy.¶ In the end, it will be Chinese cash and American access to (massive) Chinese consumers for clean-energy products that saves the industry and allows it to gain a competitive edge over fossil fuels.¶ As such, slapping tariffs on Chinese solar panels for “dumping” is tantamount to biting the hand that will feed the US clean-energy industry. And as for US solar panel manufacturers, well, competition means finding ways to survive in the real market, beyond subsidies that were never intended to last forever. Solar companies must adapt or shut down.

#### Production shifts now and inevitable – takes out the advantage

**Castelazo, et al, 12** [China’s Solar Industry and the U.S. Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidy Trade Case, Molly Castelazo, Director¶ ChinaGlobalTrade.com, The Kearney Alliance, The Kearny Alliance, a nonprofit 501 (c) (3) foundation based in¶ Scottsdale, Arizona, partners with other international organizations to¶ further its mission of “Aid through Trade,” to advance international¶ development and poverty alleviation through trade-related business¶ education, training and applied research, <http://ww1.prweb.com/prfiles/2012/05/16/9517260/China%20Global%20Trade%20Solar%20Manufacturing_May%202012b.pdf>]

While manufacturing cells and modules in the U.S. is certainly one potential outcome of significant¶ subsidies against Chinese producers, they could also shift manufacturing to other countries. According to¶ Shyam Mehta, Senior Analyst at GTM Research, Chinese firms could manufacture the components in¶ Taiwan, or buy Taiwanese components, assemble the panels in Mexico, then sell them into the U.S. That¶ keeps module assembly close to the end market, avoids tariffs on modules made of Chinese cells, and¶ allows Chinese producers to maintain significant cost advantage over manufacturing in the U.S.¶ Moving production elsewhere is a step Chinese manufacturers are already gearing up to take, according to¶ one executive at a Chinese solar module manufacturer. “A lot of companies are already doing that.¶ They’re going to Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico to see if they can outsource to companies there to ship into¶ the U.S.” She said that for her company, “the U.S. remains a very important market, it just opened.”¶ In fact, if manufacturing cells in Taiwan would allow Chinese manufacturers to keep their upstream¶ supply chains intact, that could be their best solution. They could then assemble the modules anywhere in¶ the world – in Taiwan, in China, in Mexico, in the end-use country. And if manufacturing and assembling¶ outside the U.S. allows Chinese manufacturers to keep costs down and avoid U.S. tariffs, we might see¶ that happen. There is far greater indication that this will be the route Chinese producers take – if they¶ move production anywhere – rather than move cell manufacturing into the U.S.¶ According to Jigar Shah, President of the Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy, “If the U.S. makes the¶ mistake of levying high tariffs against Chinese products, the U.S. is going to import solar modules from¶ India, Malaysia, and Taiwan. They’re not going to manufacture in the U.S. If the Chinese lose this case,¶ we’re not going to get the panels from the U.S.; we’re going to get them from other countries that have an¶ industrial policy. So we’re going to sacrifice our downstream jobs in the U.S.; we’re going to shift jobs in¶ manufacturing from China to Taiwan. Why exactly are we doing this? I get that people hate China right¶ now, but it seems like a foolish thing to do.”

#### No extinction – empirically denied

**Carter 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C:\Users\Marc\Desktop\Surviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

#### Their impact evidence uses bad studies and massively exaggerates the impact

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Hundreds of studies have been published on the effects of future climate change on various ecosystems or species, but the conclusions are often easily disputed. Why are these results so shaky? This study shows that there are systematic gaps in the methods used, and that these gaps all tend to falsely increase the potential negative impacts of climate change and inflate the certainty of the studies.

In this study, criteria for conducting reliable and useful assessments of impacts of future climate were suggested. The major steps involve: clearly defining an emissions scenario; selecting a climate model; evaluating climate model skill and bias; quantifying General Circulation Model (GCM) between-model variability; selecting an ecosystem model and assessing uncertainty; properly considering transient vs. equilibrium responses; including effects of CO2 on plant response; evaluating implications of simplifying assumptions; and considering animal linkage with vegetation. A sample of the literature was surveyed in light of these criteria. Many of the studies reviewed used climate simulations that were >10 years old and not representative of best current models. Future effects of elevated CO2 on plant drought resistance and productivity were generally included in growth model studies but not in niche (habitat suitability) studies, causing the latter to forecast greater future adverse impacts or even negative impacts when positive effects are likely. Overly simplified spatial representation was frequent and caused the existence of refugia to be underestimated. Few studies compared multiple climate simulations and ecosystem models (including parametric uncertainty), leading to a false impression of precision and potentially arbitrary results due to high between-model variance. No study assessed climate model retrodictive skill or bias. For niche models, the equilibrium assumption (that species must, following warming, instantly move to a new geographic region corresponding to their niche model, or else die) is unsupported by any experimental data. That is, no evidence exists in most cases that projected climate change will cause a species to die out in their current range. Instead, geographic displacement should take hundreds to thousands of years for plants and result from gradual competitive processes. Thus the risk of extinction is grossly exaggerated in most studies. Overall, no current studies in the survey met all of the proposed criteria and typically have very little quantification of uncertainty. The net effect is a strong bias in this literature toward predicting negative consequences of climate change.

#### Turn – CO2 helps ag – key to biodiversity and water preservation

**Carter 11**, Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) [“Climate Change Reconsidered 2011 Interim Report,” September, Science and Environmental Policy Project, Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Published by The Heartland Institute]

Several years ago, Waggoner (1995) rhetorically asked: How much land can ten billion people spare for nature? That was the title of an essay he wrote to illuminate the dynamic tension between the need for land to support the agricultural enterprises that sustain mankind and the need for land to support the natural ecosystems that sustain all other creatures. As noted by Huang et al. (2002), human populations ―have encroached on almost all of the world‘s frontiers, leaving little new land that is cultivatable.‖ And in consequence of humanity‘s ongoing usurpation of this most basic of natural resources, Raven (2002) has noted ―species-area relationships, taken worldwide in relation to habitat destruction, lead to projections of the loss of fully two-thirds of all species on earth by the end of this century.‖ In addition, Wallace (2000) has calculated we will need to divert essentially all usable non-saline water on the face of the Earth to the agricultural enterprises that will be required to meet the food and fiber needs of humanity‘s growing numbers well before that. So what parts of the world are likely to be hit hardest by the great land-grabbing and water-consuming machine of humanity? Tilman et al. (2001) report developed countries are expected to withdraw large areas of land from farming between now and the middle of the century (2050), leaving developing countries to shoulder essentially all of the growing burden of feeding our expanding population. In addition, they calculate the loss of these countries‘ natural ecosystems to crops and pasture represent about half of all potentially suitable remaining land, which ―could lead to the loss of about a third of remaining tropical and temperate forests, savannas, and grasslands,‖ along with the many unique species they support. If one were to pick the most significant problem currently facing the biosphere, this would probably be it: a single species of life, Homo sapiens, is on course to annihilate two-thirds of the ten million or so other species with which we share the planet within the next several decades, simply by taking their land and water. Global warming, by comparison, pales in significance, as its impact is nowhere near as severe and in fact may be neutral or even positive. In addition, its chief cause is highly debated, and actions to thwart it are much more difficult, if not impossible, to define and implement. Furthermore, what many people believe to be the main cause of global warming—anthropogenic CO2 emissions—may actually be a powerful force for preserving land and water for nature. In an analysis of the problem of human land-use expansion, Tilman et al. (2002) introduced a few more facts before suggesting some solutions. They noted, for example, that by 2050 the human population of the globe is projected to be 50 percent larger than it was in 2000, and that global grain demand could double because of expected increases in per-capita real income and dietary shifts toward a higher proportion of meat. Hence, they stated the obvious when they concluded, ―raising yields on existing farmland is essential for ‗saving land for nature‘.‖ So how is it to be done? Tilman et al. (2002) suggested a strategy built around three essential tasks: (1) increasing crop yield per unit land area, (2) increasing crop yield per unit of nutrients applied, and (3) increasing crop yield per unit of water used. Regarding the first of these requirements, Tilman et al. note that in many parts of the world the historical rate of increase in crop yields is declining, as the genetic ceiling for maximal yield potential is being approached. This observation, in their words, ―highlights the need for efforts to steadily increase the yield potential ceiling.‖ With respect to the second requirement, they indicate, ―without the use of synthetic fertilizers, world food production could not have increased at the rate it did [in the past] and more natural ecosystems would have been converted to agriculture.‖ Hence, they state the solution ―will require significant increases in nutrient use efficiency, that is, in cereal production per unit of added nitrogen, phosphorus,‖ and so forth. Finally, as to the third requirement, Tilman et al. remind us ―water is regionally scarce,‖ and ―many countries in a band from China through India and Pakistan, and the Middle East to North Africa either currently or will soon fail to have adequate water to maintain per capita food production from irrigated land.‖ Increasing crop water use efficiency, therefore, is also a must. Although the impending biological crisis and several important elements of its potential solution are thus well defined, Tilman et al. (2001) noted ―even the best available technologies, fully deployed, cannot prevent many of the forecasted problems.‖ This was also the conclusion of Idso and Idso (2000), who stated that although ―expected advances in agricultural technology and expertise will significantly increase the food production potential of many countries and regions,‖ these advances ―will not increase production fast enough to meet the demands of the even faster-growing human population of the planet.‖ Fortunately, we have a powerful ally in the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content that can provide what we can‘t. Since atmospheric CO2 is the basic ―food‖ of essentially all plants, the more of it there is in the air, the bigger and better they grow. For a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 concentration, for example, the productivity of Earth‘s herbaceous plants rises by 30 to 50 percent (Kimball, 1983; Idso and Idso, 1994), and the productivity of its woody plants rises by 50 to 80 percent or more (Saxe et al. 1998; Idso and Kimball, 2001). Hence, as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, the land use efficiency of the planet will rise right along with it. In addition, atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically increases plant nutrient use efficiency and plant water use efficiency. Thus, with respect to all three of the major needs identified by Tilman et al. (2002), increases in the air‘s CO2 content pay huge dividends, helping to increase agricultural output without the taking of new land and water from nature.

#### Biodiversity loss leads to extinction

**Young 10 –** PhD coastal marine ecology[Ruth, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, February 9th, <http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/>]

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, **they all have a niche**. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are **vital for our survival**. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the [production of ⅓ of our food crops](http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/01/biodiversity/bees-pollination/). Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a *“keystone”* role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See [Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay)](http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0202-hance_toppredators.html). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the**keystone roles**. However, there are a *couple of problems with this idea*. First of all, for most ecosystems **we don’t know which species are the keystones!** *Ecosystems are so complex* that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its *groups of species* not just one species that are *vital for the ecosystem*. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, **what back-up plan would we have** if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? **Would there be another species to save the day** and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! *Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles!* In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The **more biodiverse** an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the **more resilient** an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime*, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity*. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes **our survival on this planet** possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

**Economic crisis cause democratization**

**The Guardian 8** [(UK), 6/1/2008. “Why China doesn't break,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jun/01/whychinadoesntbreak]

The CCP has conducted a tireless and largely successful campaign to co-opt, and in many respects create, the rising educated and economic classes. By remaining the key economic player as well as overseeing an extensive system of awards, promotions, and regulation, the government continues to control and dispense a dominant share of the most valued economic, professional, and intellectual opportunities.

This means that entrepreneurs are better off doing business as a "partner" of the state. Intellectuals and academics favoured by officials are granted generous research grants, are fast tracked into senior positions, and given personal perks. Journalists have [little choice](http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=27034) but to work for media outlets that are still subsidiaries of party organs. These are the contented middle classes emerging in China today. Far from being an independent class, **why would these middle classes want to change toward a more democratic system when it could lead to their own dispossession?**

The CCP's hold on power remains vulnerable to a profound economic shock, such as a significant downturn in economic growth. This would impede the regime's continued capacity to co-opt and appease. Regardless, a Chinese middle class that looks and acts the same as we do in the west might nevertheless think very differently when it comes to democracy and the future of the country.

**Chinese democracy is key to global democracy**

**Friedman 9**—political science professor (Edward, Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Wisconsin, Dissent, “China: A Threat to or Threatened by Democracy?” Winter, <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=1318>, ZBurdette)

THESE CCP antidemocratic policies are significant. Democratization tends to occur regionally—for example, after 1974–1975 in Southern Europe, subsequently in Latin America, in the late 1980s in East Asia (the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan), and after November 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe. The CCP regime, in contrast, aims to create an Asian region where its authoritarian ruling groups are unchallenged, in which regional institutions are inoculated against democratization**. China’s successes in that direction make it hard to imagine Asia**, in any foreseeable future, **becoming defined by a democratic ethos** that makes authoritarian China seem the odd nation out. An exception is democratic Taiwan. Starting in the 1990s, Beijing has portrayed Taiwan as a trouble-making polity and a chaotic society. But the basic interests of China’s economic modernizers are to move as quickly as possible into advanced technology and Information Technology (IT). This requires improving economic relations with Taiwan, a world leader in IT. Good relations between Beijing and Taipei would increase exchanges of students, tourists, families, and entrepreneurs across the Taiwan Strait. Democratic Taiwan, over time, could come to seem to Chinese victims of a repressive, greedy, corrupt, and arbitrary political system to be China’s better future. If Singapore, in a post–Lee Kuan Yew era, would then democratize, that, too, could help make democracy seem a natural regional alternative to politically conscious Chinese. For the CCP is trying to solve its governance problems, in part, by evolving into a Singapore-type authoritarianism, a technocratic, professional, minimally corrupt, minimally cruel, one-party, administrative state. In sum, although the CCP’s foreign policy works against the spread of democracy, there are some ways in which regional forces could yet initiate a regional democratization. The future is contingent on unknowable factors. One key is Indonesia. There are political forces in Jakarta that oppose Beijing’s efforts in Southeast Asia to roll back the advance of democracy. If Indonesia were to succeed, and if nations in South Asia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, were also to democratize, it is possible to imagine politically conscious Chinese seeking to ride a wave of regional democratization, especially if Taiwan and Singapore were both admirable democratic alternatives. Although regional factors make all this unlikely, enough wild cards are in play that China’s democratization is not impossible. HAVING EXAMINED regional forces, we must then ask about the political possibilities inherent in the way economic forces create new social groups that interact with the different interests of state institutions. First, China’s growth patterns have polarized the division of wealth such that China may soon surpass Brazil as the most unequal (but stable) major country in the world. All students of democratic transitions agree that great economic inequality makes ruling groups resistant to a democratization that they believe would put their ill-gotten gains at risk. This consensus hypothesis, that democratic transitions are more likely where economic polarization is limited, is formalized in a rational-choice model in Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Too much economic inequality is a huge obstacle blocking a democratic transition. The rising urban middle classes prefer to be defended by the authoritarian state rather than risk their status and fortunes in a democratic vote, where the majority is imagined as poor, rural, and vengeful against economic winners, imagined as an undeserving and traitorous upper stratum. To be sure, there are democratic tendencies that result from the move from collective farming to household agriculture and from the rise of property rights, a new middle class, literacy, wealth, and so on—as Seymour Martin Lipset long ago argued. But an adaptable and resilient CCP regime that continues to deliver rapid economic growth is not going to be abandoned by rising classes worried about vengeance by the losers in a polarized society. Still, China is combining rapid industrialization with a climb into postmodern service and high-technology-based growth in which industrial workers can seem a dying breed, an albatross to further growth. Core areas of industrialization are beginning to hollow out. It is possible to imagine the losers from China’s continuing rapid growth—for example, sixty million laid-off former State Owned Enterprise (SOE) workers—turning against the regime. Should a global financial shock cause China to lose its export markets, instability might threaten the regime. As Haleb’s Black Swan suggests, a full exploration of democratic possibilities should look into all the wild-card factors. The regime’s economic reformers, however, could be portrayed as having sold the nation’s better future to Western imperialism if Chinese lost their jobs because of an economic virus spreading from New York and London to Shanghai. And then, opponents of the government would not back a move to democracy. The West would be seen as a fount of evil, and then both the people and the ruling groups might choose a transition to a more chauvinistic and militarist order that would renounce China’s global openness as a betrayal of the nation’s essence. History suggests that left nationalists within the regime, who largely control the security and propaganda apparatuses, would be militantly against any opening to democracy. Such a neofascist ruling coalition might turn to military adventures or close China’s doors in order to appeal to nativists—in ways, however, that would lose China the sources of continuing high growth. That is, neofascist hardliners might implement policies that would alienate many people in China and in Asia, and thereby create a counterforce that might find democracy attractive. But such imaginings rest too much on long-term speculations about concatenating factors leading to distant futures. Such meanderings of the mind should not be confused with confident predictions about a democratic outcome. Still, it is clear that much depends on how the post-Mao right-authoritarian populist system relates to social contradictions. The CCP is moving toward presidential succession rules similar to what Mexico institutionalized in its earlier era of a one-party dominant presidential populism. Mexico had a one-term president for six years who chose his successor; China has a president who serves two five-year terms and chooses his successor at the close of the first. Chinese analysts fear that as economic stagnation, corruption, and debt delegitimated Mexico’s presidential populism, so the same could happen with China. The danger is dubbed Latin Americanization. Anxious analysts worry about the entrenchment of greedy local interests that resist the many adaptations required for the continuing rapid growth that wins legitimacy and stability for the regime. Ever less charismatic and weaker presidents in China will lack the clout to defeat the vested interests who will act much as landed elites acted in the days of the ancien régime to block the changes required for economic growth. Resultant stagnation would create a regime crisis, as occurred in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, leading there to a wave of military coups, but also, in the 1980s, to a democratic opening in Mexico—because, among other things, Mexico uniquely abutted the United States and wished to benefit from greater access to the U.S. market. China has no similarly large and attractive democratic neighbor, unless globalization so reduces distance that the two sides of the Pacific seem no further apart than the English Channel did in the eighteenth century. This is a real possibility in our age of transportation and communication revolutions. The internal Chinese analysis of a future crisis brought on by Latin Americanization should be treated seriously. But East Asian economic growth seems to me to be of a different order than Latin America’s. Region is decisive. In addition, household agriculture and physical mobility in China make it likely that Kuznets curve factors, in which the economic gap narrows after an initial widening as a country develops, will operate in China in the future. That is, the forces of polarization will be reversed. Chinese household agriculture is very different from the world of the landed elites that emerged out of slave-plantation Latin America. Perhaps there will turn out to be truth to the analogy of a feudal-like CCP-type system rooted in Russian czarist feudal institutions with the repressed labor relations of plantation slavery and its aftermath. My own hunch, however, is that anxiety about Latin Americanization in China is an indicator that the regime remains preemptive, flexible, and responsive to threats and will, therefore, head off dangers to the regime, nipping them in the bud. It is a resilient regime, not a fragile one. ALTHOUGH WE may be seeing through a glass darkly to try to locate forces of regime instability or democratization in China, what is clear is how to analyze the forces at work that will decide whether it is more or less likely that China will democratize. An analyst should try to understand how the forces of region, of groups and interests fostered by the economic moment globally and at home, and of the state, comprehended in terms of the strength and weakness of its diverse and conflicting elements, interact. My own reading of this interaction is that democracy is not impossible, but that a far more likely outcome is either continuity, that is, evolutionary change toward a dominant-party populist presidentialism imagining itself as becoming more like authoritarian Singapore, or a transition in a more chauvinistic and militaristic direction. China is not likely to democratize in any immediate future, but it is not inconceivable. China is a superpower probing, pushing, and pulling the world in its authoritarian direction. Japan is out of touch in imagining a superior Japan leading China into an East Asian Community, with Japan showing China the way in everything from environmentalism to shared high standards of living. For Confucian China, China is the core, apex, and leader of an Asian community. **The CCP intends for authoritarian China to establish itself as a global pole.** China will similarly experience it as a threatening American arrogance for the U.S. government to assume that an incredibly successful China, imagining itself as a moral global pole leading humanity in a better direction, needs to be saved by American missionaries of democracy. The democracies might be able to promote an end to systemic abuses of human rights in China, but Americans will not be heard in Chinese ruling circles unless they abandon a democratization agenda in which change for the better in China presupposes ending the leadership role of the CCP. Appeasement is the price of long-term good relations. The alternatives seem too costly. There is no other long-lasting basis for trustful cooperation with the government in Beijing than to accept the regime’s legitimacy. CCP ruling groups imagine foreign democracy-promotion as a threat to China’s—and the world’s—better future, identified, of course, as at one with the interests of CCP ruling groups. Can the world afford not to treat China as the superpower it is? The CCP imagines a chaotic and war-prone world disorder of American-led democracy-promotion being replaced by a beneficent Chinese world order of authoritarian growth with stability. There may be far less of a challenge to China from democracy than there is **a challenge to democracy from China.** Democracy-promoter Larry Diamond concludes in his recent book The Spirit of Democracy that **democracy is in trouble across the world because of the rise of China, an authoritarian superpower that has the economic clout to back and bail out authoritarian regimes around the globe. “Singapore . . . could foreshadow a resilient form of capitalist-authoritarianism by China, Vietnam, and elsewhere in Asia**,” which delivers “booming development, political stability, low levels of corruption, affordable housing, and a secure pension system.” Joined by ever richer and more influential petro powers leveraging the enormous wealth of Sovereign Investment Funds, “**Asia will determine the fate of democracy,” at least in the foreseeable future. Authoritarian China**, joined by its authoritarian friends, **is well on the way to defeating the global forces of democracy**.

**Extinction**

**Diamond 95—**prof of political science and sociology, Stanford. Senior research fellow at Hoover.(Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.html)

Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that ­govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

**Chinese democracy solves U.S.-China relations, regional arms races, and U.S.-China war**

**Waldron 4** [Arthur Waldron, Spring 2004. Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Lauder Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania. “Democratization and Greater China: How Would Democracy Change China?” Orbis, www.fpri.org/orbis/4802/waldron.democracychangechina.pdf]

How would a democratic Chinese parliament assess Chinese national interests? First, it would be interested in improving the living standards of the country’s hundreds of millions of impoverished people. The only way to free resources for this would be to change the foreign policy that demands, for example, such vast military expenditures. This would entail shifting friend- ships away from the few countries that seek to counter U.S. dominance in the world and reorienting toward the countries that provide the most to China economically. In other words, Beijing would have to become friendly with the United States, its biggest market; Japan, another major trading partner and, to a lesser extent, investor; South Korea and Taiwan, both important trading partners and major investors (China’s info-tech industry is owned roughly 70 percent by Taiwan and 15 percent by South Korea); Europe (a major market and investor); and Australia (a major trading partner, particularly in raw materials). And being rid of its empire, it could enter into genuine friendship, or at least correct relations, with peoples who had previously despised it for its colonial rule.

Hitherto, Beijing has placed disproportionate stress on supporting other dictatorships. It is deeply involved in Myanmar (whose human rights record, it must be admitted, is somewhat better than China’s). It continues to subsidize North Korea, providing Pyongyang with items of trade that can be used for military programs. It has supported Pakistan’s nuclear program. Its support for Serbia as NATO attempted to dislodge Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 was massive. Beijing continues to undermine its relationship with Washington through its rigid14 approach to Taiwan, which should be its partner, and its interest in Cuba, in particular in the former Soviet signals intelligence facilities there. China has been reported, at least in the past, to be involved in supporting a range of unsavory regimes in the Middle East and to maintain a close clandestine military relationship with Israel. This political and military club is not one to which China should want to belong.

Under conditions of freedom and democracy, China would move to non-belligerence toward the West, cooperation, and increasing openness. This would of course greatly beneﬁt China’s neighbors and the United States, ending the accelerating arms race that wastes so much money and creates so much danger in Asia today. But for now China remains a dictatorship, and as such it cannot welcome the prospect of other dictatorships’ becoming free. China is an odd ﬁt: its culture, from the time of Confucius, has contained plenty of liberal elements, and in the past century, democracy was the shared demand of most of the intelligentsia, some of whom imagined that communism would be democratic.15 Not only that, until 1949 China was, politically, far freer than it is today. True, it was ruled autocratically, but ideas could be published and discussed, universities harbored genuinely free thought, and entrepreneurship was relatively untrammeled. So China’s current global policies, far from being a natural consequence of Chinese tradition and national interest, are anomalous.

**Chinese growth causes nationalism**

**Kurlantzick 2**—Fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy. Frmr visiting scholar in the China program at Carnegie. (Joshua, China: Economic Power, Political Enigma, http://www.twq.com/02summer/kurlantzick.pdf, AMiles)

The popularity of videos glorifying the World Trade Center bombing, as well as the anti-Uighur crackdown, which enjoys support among Han Chinese, testifies to a development within Chinese society that many policymakers would rather ignore: as China opens and grows, it is experiencing a period of heightened nationalism. Although continued economic integration with the world and greater political freedom within China will help temper this nationalism eventually, for now Chinese nationalism is a fact that Washington must address. Renewed U.S. alliances with neighboring Asian countries, a series of unfortunate Sino-U.S. incidents including the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the decline of communism as a unifying identity, and the nationalist curricula taught in many schools have all combined to make many young Chinese more nationalistic. Though Jiang’s limited antiterror cooperation may be insignificant, many Chinese—especially students and young professionals, the same groups who damaged the U.S. embassy in Beijing after the bombing in Belgrade—believe that their president has been too conciliatory toward the United States. Studying the Chinese media after September 11, virtually every commentator mentioned that the war in Afghanistan was as much a U.S. power grab in Central Asia as a battle against nihilistic terror. Consequently, the popularity of anti-U.S. videos and the lead role that Chinese students at universities in Xinjiang often take in criticizing and even assaulting their Uighur peers is hardly surprising. A unilateralist foreign policy that challenges U.S. “hegemonism” wherever possible, abrogates international norms of freedoms for religious and ethnic minorities, and includes mouthing platitudes to U.S. officials while subtly forestalling antiterror cooperation suits this ascendant nationalism. The coexistence of this rising nationalism and its attendant policy misadventures with “wrenching” economic opening is not unfathomable. Today, global prestige is often attained through economic power rather than military might. Beijing realizes that China can only take its place as an economic leader by playing by international trading rules—rules that, given the development of the WTO, are better defined than any diplomatic norms and that force rising powers to conform to a trading system that benefits many nations. The past 20 years have branded this lesson on Beijing’s mandarins. The heir to Jiang’s throne, Hu, although he has welcomed Western economics experts to the party’s premier training school, is unlikely to forget the lesson either. Indeed, Beijing’s leaders have seen the rewards that Chinese society has reaped from economic reform and integration with the global trading system, as well as the negative impact whenever foreigners pull capital out of certain sectors of the economy. **Economic** **growth** through global integration **and nationalism can go hand in hand.**

**Nuclear war**

**Copley News Service 5** (“Daily Editorials Bombs and butter” 7-25-05, avail. lexis)

Earlier this month, Gen. Zhu Chenghu of China threatened to rain nuclear bombs on the United States. Defend Taiwan in a war with China, he warned, and "the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds ... of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese." Chinese diplomats disavowed the remarks, which Zhu described as his personal view, but a general does not speak such blood-curdling words to foreign journalists without approval from above. A message was sent.  Then, on Thursday, the Chinese took a small step toward raising the value of the yuan. China has been under mounting pressure from America and Europe over a cheap-yuan policy that keeps Chinese factories humming at the expense of those in the West. The two incidents illustrate the twin problems of dealing with China. The Chinese economy is growing at an astounding 9 percent per year, a growth rate built largely on foreign trade. Its $162 billion trade surplus with the United States is unsustainable. Over the long run, it's not good for either nation.  The world must find a way to manage the economic growth of China without sparking trade wars or financial upheavals. Last week's move on the yuan could be a mere feint intended to deflect western pressure for trade sanctions. Or, it could be a first measured step toward a rational solution.  **As China gains economic clout, its** government's brand of touchy, **saber-rattling nationalism becomes more worrisome**. That touchiness is rooted in the memory of humiliation inflicted by foreigners, from the Western colonial concessions of the 19th century, and it is rooted in the more recent memory of Japanese atrocities during the World War II occupation.  That wounded pride explains the orchestrated national spleen-venting over Japanese textbooks, the 2001 U.S. spy plane collision and the mistaken U.S. bombing of China's embassy during the Kosovo campaign. It has much to do with China's oft-repeated threats to attack Taiwan, which seem extreme to everyone except the Chinese.  As China gains power, that nationalism becomes more worrisome. China's authoritarian government lacks the natural restraint of voters or of dissenters free to challenge government assumptions that can lead to war.  The Pentagon recently reported that China is rapidly building its military with a goal of extending its influence across Asia. In the future, its leaders "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests or resolve disputes," the report concluded. If more muscle combined with nationalist passions tempt Chinese leaders to attack Taiwan, the United States and the world would be faced with a crisis more serious than any since at least the 1962 Cuban missile crisis with the Soviet Union. The United States would feel compelled to come to Taiwan's aid, resulting in a war between heavily armed countries that possess nuclear arsenals.

**Social unrest and CCP collapse are inevitable**

**STRATFOR 11** (Matthew Gertken and Jennifer Richmond, 19 April 2011, “China and the End of the Deng Dynasty,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110418-china-and-end-deng-dynasty?utm\_source=GWeekly&utm\_medium=email&utm\_campaign=110419&utm\_content=readmore&elq=611b10f872f7401bbfb2d3d9953377a5, RBatra)

Meanwhile, the Chinese economy has maintained a furious pace of credit-fueled growth despite authorities’ repeated claims of working to slow growth down to prevent excessive inflation and systemic financial risks. The government’s cautious approach to fighting inflation **has emboldened local governments** and state companies, which benefit from rapid growth. Yet the risk to socio-political stability posed by inflation, expected to peak in springtime, has provoked a gradually tougher stance. The government thus **faces twin perils of economic overheating on one side and overcorrection on the other, either of which could trigger an outburst of social unrest** — and both of which have led to increasingly erratic policymaking. These security and economic challenges are taking place at a time when the transition from the so-called fourth generation of leaders to the fifth generation in 2012 is under way. The transition has heightened disagreements over economic policy and insecurities over social stability, further complicating attempts to coordinate effective policy. Yet something deeper is driving the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) anxiety and heavy-handed security measures: the need to transform the country’s entire economic model, which carries hazards that the Party fears will **jeopardize its very legitimacy**. Deng’s Model Former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping is well known for launching China’s emergence from Mao’s Cultural Revolution and inaugurating the rise of a modern, internationally oriented economic giant. Deng’s model rested on three pillars. The first was economic pragmatism, allowing for capitalist-style incentives domestically and channels for international trade. Deng paved the way for a growth boom that would provide employment and put an end to the preceding decade of civil strife. The CPC’s legitimacy thus famously became linked to the country’s economic success rather than to ideological zeal and class warfare. The second pillar was a foreign policy of cooperation. The lack of emphasis on political ideology opened space for international maneuver, with economic cooperation the basis for new relationships. This gave enormous impetus to the Sino-American detente Nixon and Mao initiated. In Deng’s words, China would maintain a low profile and avoid taking the lead. China would remain unobtrusive to befriend and do business with almost any country — as long as it recognized Beijing as the one and only China. The third pillar was the primacy of the CPC’s system. Reform of the political system along the lines of Western countries could be envisioned, but in practice would be deferred. That the reform process in no way would be allowed to undermine Party supremacy was sealed after the mass protests at Tiananmen, which the military crushed after a dangerous intra-Party struggle. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police would serve as Deng’s “Great Wall of steel” protecting the Party from insurrection. For three decades, Deng’s model remained mostly intact. Though important modifications and shifts occurred, the general framework stands because Chinese-style capitalism and partnership with the United States have served the country well. Deng also secured his policy by establishing a succession plan: He was instrumental in setting up his immediate successor, Jiang Zemin, and Jiang’s successor, current President Hu Jintao. Hu’s policies have not differed widely in practice from Deng’s. China’s response to the global economic crisis in 2008 revealed that Hu sought recourse to the same export- and investment-driven growth as his predecessors. Hu’s plans of boosting household consumption have failed, the economy is more off-balance than ever, and the interior remains badly in need of development. But along the general lines of Deng’s policy, the country has continued to grow and stay out of major conflict with the United States and others, and the Party has maintained indisputable control. Emergent Challenges **Unprecedented challenges to Deng’s model have emerged in recent years**. These are not challenges involving individuals; rather, they come from changes in the Chinese and international systems. First, more clearly than ever, China’s economic model is in need of restructuring. Economic crisis and its aftermath in the developed world have caused a shortfall in foreign demand, and rising costs of labor and raw materials are eroding China’s comparative advantage even as its export sector and industries have built up extraordinary overcapacity. Theoretically, the answer has been to boost household consumption and rebalance growth — the Hu administration’s policy — but this plan carries extreme hazards if aggressively pursued. If consumption cannot be generated quickly enough to pick up the slack — and it cannot within the decade period that China’s leaders envision — then growth will slow sharply and unemployment will rise. **These would be serious threats to the CPC, the legitimacy of which rests on providing growth.** Hence, the attempt at economic transition has hardly begun. Not coincidentally, movements have arisen that seek to restore the Party’s legitimacy to a basis not of economics but of political power. Hu’s faction, rooted in the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), has a doctrine of wealth redistribution and Party orientation. It is set to expand its control when the sixth generation of leaders arrives. This trend also exists on the other side of the factional divide. Bo Xilai, the popular Party chief in Chongqing, is a “princeling.” Princelings are the children of Communist revolutionaries, who often receive prized positions in state leadership, large state-owned enterprises and the military. This group is expected to gain the advantage in the core leadership after the 2012 transition. Bo made himself popular by striking down organized-crime leaders who had grown rich and powerful from new money and by bribing officials. Bo’s campaign of nostalgia for the Mao era, including singing revolutionary songs and launching a “Red microblog” on the Internet, has proved hugely popular. It also has added an unusual degree of public support to his bid for a spot on the Politburo Standing Committee in 2012. Both sides appeal to the inherent value of the Party, rather than its role as economic steward, for justification. The second challenge to Deng’s legacy has arisen from the military’s growing self-confidence and confrontational attitude toward foreign rivals, a stance popular with an increasingly nationalist domestic audience. The foreign policy of inoffensiveness for the sake of commerce thus has been challenged from within. Vastly more dependent on foreign natural resources, and yet insecure over prices and vulnerability of supply lines, China has turned to the PLA to take a greater role in protecting its global interests, especially in the maritime realm. As a result, the PLA has become more forceful in driving its policies. In recent years, China has pushed harder on territorial claims and more staunchly defended partners like North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. This trend, especially observable throughout 2010, has alarmed China’s neighbors and the United States. The PLA is not the only institution that seems increasingly bold. Chinese government officials and state companies have also caused worry among foreigners. But the military acting this way sends a particularly strong signal abroad. And third, Deng’s avoidance of political reform may be becoming harder to maintain. The stark disparities in wealth and public services between social classes and regions have fueled dissatisfaction. Arbitrary power, selective enforcement of the law, official and corporate corruption, and other ills have gnawed at public content, giving rise to more and more frequent incidents and outbursts. **The social fabric has been torn, and leaders fear that it could ignite with widespread unrest**. Simultaneously, rising education, incomes and new forms of social organization like non-governmental organizations and the Internet have given rise to greater demands and new means of coordination among dissidents or opposition movements. In this atmosphere, Premier Wen Jiabao has become outspoken, calling for the Party to pursue political reforms in keeping with economic reforms. Wen’s comments contain just enough ambiguity to suggest that he is promoting substantial change and diverging from the Party, though in fact he may intend them only to pacify people by preserving hope for changes in the unspecified future. Regardless, it is becoming harder for the Party to maintain economic development without addressing political grievances. Political changes seem necessary not only for the sake of pursuing oft-declared plans to unleash household consumption and domestic innovation and services, but also to ease social discontent. The Party realizes that reform is inevitable, but questions how to do it while retaining control. The possibility that the Party could split on the question of political reform, as happened in the 1980s, thus has re-emerged.