### 2ac at: binary

#### They have it backwards—the meaninglessness of suffering does not make our action meaningless but rather makes it necessary. All of their link arguments substantiate our affirmative as the only ethical action.

#### Diamantides ‘3

Dr. Marinos Diamantides Senior Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London, SYMPOSIUM: NIETZCHE AND LEGAL THEORY (PART II): THE COMPANY OF PRIESTS: MEANINGLESSNESS, SUFFERING AND COMPASSION IN THE THOUGHTS OF NIETZSCHE AND LEVINAS 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1275 March, 2003.

In relation to the classical philosophical problem posed by suffering there is, as the two quotes above indicate, an intriguing common emphasis on meaninglessness in the works of Nietzsche and Levinas, which renders fertile the reading together of their two distinct philosophies. The difference is that for Levinas, the acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of suffering without resentment is only the "least one can say." Indeed, Nietzsche exposed man's denial of absurd suffering "only" in order to support his case against the sentimentalism of Christian ethics and deontological and utilitarian moralities, which either attribute meaning to suffering or seek to rid life of it, ultimately denying life itself - for to live is also to suffer. Levinas, on the other hand, argued the inevitability of events of senseless suffering breaching from within the hermeneutically ordered world of meaning. Moreover, he viewed this as proof of the inevitability of the idea of infinity in a non-metaphysical sense, for it is "included" into the finite world of being as what cannot be matched by experience or representation, leaving a surplus of awe, astonishment, obsession. Immanence, therefore, is all there is, but to that we add that it cannot cease undergoing the idea of infinity, like an ill man who undergoes his condition. In Levinas' ethical discourse, infinity gets expressed in the "face of the other" and is transformed into obsession with providing succors for meaningless suffering. Suffering, left to its own devices, ridicules experience by always being "too much." In turn, it takes another being that comes to the rescue, thinking itself "infinitely responsible" for all the suffering it encounters, for suffering to be given an appropriate response. With this quasi-transcendental possibility in mind, this paper introduces and critically analyzes Nietzsche's notion of "affirmative compassion," as distinct from moral pity and, gradually, suggests the need for its reformulation as both an instance of will to power and **as submission to the ethical imperative to care for the other**. Given the un-saintly reputation of Nietzsche, however, the paper cannot but begin by paying tribute to his famous critique of pity, that "morbid emotion" that accompanies the denial of the senselessness of suffering and ultimately compels the nihilistic rejection of life itself. This is done in the first section in which I basically report on my law students' take on Nietzsche in the context of a course on medical law and moral reasoning. In sum, I report that Nietzsche's ideas help one critique the extensions of [\*1277] traditional legal doctrines of responsibility for man-made harm - sustained by the beliefs in the causal understanding of the world, in moral autonomy and agency - in relation to litigation that raises questions over the meaning of, and standard of care for, suffering that no one has caused. These doctrinal extensions are, arguably, instances of a hypertrophy of legal consciousness, indicating lack of understanding of the chaotic nature of the world of human affects in the face of absurd suffering and denial of the passion, obsession and delirium that correlate to the dis-equilibrium, meaninglessness and anarchy of suffering. In this connection, I offer a number of examples, often involving judgments that concern kinds of beings that blatantly manifest this senselessness, ranging from insensate beings in coma to the unborn. In the second section, I examine Nietzsche's views on how meaningless suffering affects the man of power. Because of Nietzsche's conviction that cruelty and indifference are no longer options for contemporary man, I focus on Nietzsche's formulation of a "noble compassion" that would be "affirmative" or "life-enhancing" - compassion within a meaningless universe. Such compassion is part of the becoming of beings with a "surplus of power," as opposed to morally submissive or hedonistic beings. Crucially, this is compassion that does not relinquish self-love in the process, and does not lead to the self becoming physically or emotionally "contaminated" by the suffering it witnesses. In the last two sections of the paper, said "affirmative compassion" is juxtaposed to Levinas' descriptions of the self's obsession with offering succor, without becoming sympathy or empathy, thus maintaining absolute distance. After all, Levinas' "proximity" is a "relation without relation," meaning the disposition of the self to be "in tune with" the other being's exteriority and alterity, irrespectively of whether there is or can be cognitive or emotional communication between them. Could Levinas' concept of "diachronic time," i.e., the time of proximity between human beings without traffic of information and emotional transference, be used to temporalize the relation described by Nietzsche in which the noble-man discharges compassion for another's suffering without becoming contaminated by it? Certainly, Levinas describes "responsibility" as a vocation of the self that is irreducible to consciousness and, consequently, eludes not only principle and origin, but also will to power. Nevertheless, a potential correlation between Levinas' understanding of alterity and Nietzsche's thought of the will to power has been postulated in the work of Brian Schroeder. Building on Schroeder's work, I question the status of the [\*1278] overflowing of the totality of finite existence in the exercise, respectively, of Nietzsche's "noble" compassion and Levinas' "obsessive" compassion. At least, I argue, Levinas' and Nietzsche's prophetic discourses contrast equally with the hypertrophy of consciousness from within which, the anarchy of compassion is thematized, and feared, as a situation of disorder that is alternative to order. Moreover, I demonstrate that affirmative compassion has not become "more" possible following the death of God and the dissociation of action from morality. Albeit no longer subject to theology's grip on the "meaning" of suffering and pity, contemporary secular men and women feel free to put forth innumerable new meanings only on the condition that these are contained within a totality, guaranteed as a system or organism by the new gods of science and economy. Thus, we strive to explain suffering through causation and to measure it. In this regard, I argue, we cannot rely solely on Nietzsche to overcome the problem of under-using the will to power for the purpose of allowing ourselves to exercise "noble compassion." It is possible that, had he been living today, Nietzsche might have abandoned the effort to articulate "noble compassion," retreating before ongoing nihilism, in solidarity with the "spiritual haughtiness and nausea of every man who has suffered profoundly," 1 letting prophetic discourse aside for the sake of self-love to be pursued through some disciplined practice of self, or ascesis (so popular amongst intellectuals today). Or, worse, he might have accepted the spiritual cowardice, willing things to get worse - ultimately going mad. Levinas, by contrast, boldly produced work that is neither a self-directed acquisition of merits nor pure nihilism. He was capable of doing so because, for him, the absurdity of suffering triumphs only to the extent that meaning production lacks a sense of ethical orientation - a lack that has made indifference to suffering and denial of its meaninglessness, the hallmark of hermeneutics.

**This solves their kritik and proves the perm is the best option—the only way of affirming life is affirming our amoral connections to others along with our artificial concept of self-hood**

**Diamantides ‘3**

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 [\*1301]  In this connection, two important questions arise. First, in so far as being's active affirmation of suffering may, indeed, entail a desire for more suffering, beyond what has already passed, which the self seeks to master, n44 then "affirmation" and amor fati become questionable in general. Is not affirmation the madness of surrender to what lies outside knowledge or reason, to the chaos of becoming? Why then not just leave suffering to chance as opposed to discipline? Further, is the "undergoing" of suffering the same as "enduring" it? It would seem to me that "undergoing" signifies pure passivity whereas "enduring" presupposes, at least, the activity of sensory receptivity. A Nietzschean spirit would be glad to endure more suffering, while a Levinasian one would have no shame to sleep it off, convinced that sleep is not death but still a manner of relating to the world. A second difficulty arises from the fact that Nietzsche's "noble compassion" was not articulated as potentially a form of inviting "great suffering" for the purpose of affirmation. Arguably, however, **the "noble" practices of self-discipline, which are motivated by a desire for more life and more suffering, may include the desire for compassion and even for madly assuming "responsibility" for others' sufferings that one has not caused and, perhaps, cannot even help. For this to be the case, responsibility and compassion, of course, are not to be understood in the ordinary moral sense as bad conscience and empathic apprehension of one's own precariousness through exposure to another's misfortunes.** Indeed, I have indicated earlier that **Nietzsche did describe a non-moral sense of the noble will to care for the chance sufferings of others.** Moreover, **Nietzsche qualified this "noble compassion" as the result of an "overflow" of power and not the result of slavish compliance with duty or of emotional distress. Related to this is the dictate that the compassionate spirit only remains life-enhancing to the extent that it "guards against contamination" from another's suffering, or that the caring being is noble only to the extent that he or she cares for the other's suffering as external.** At this point, I argue, we are faced with a difficulty: how to formulate a kind of "ascesis," namely a practice  [\*1302]  that desires to incorporate more suffering as part of the love of life, that would simultaneously include noble compassion for the other sufferer, namely an act of donation that presupposes the non-reduction of the exteriority of that suffering? Does "affirmative compassion" imply the need to interpret the other's sufferings? If so, how does the affirmer not lose sight of the meaninglessness of the suffering he desires to care for? To pose these questions is no less than to think critically of Nietzsche's version of "infinity," that is ultimately collapsed in the finite world of becoming and interpreting. It is, also, to begin to doubt the value of his absolute removal of practice from the horizon of transcendence.

#### Alt excludes oppressed bodies – white coal workers in Kentucky stuck in an endless cycle, villagers in India

#### This radical negativity that essentializes the Black as an ontological category excludes the ontological position of the people identified in the 1ac & prevents contestation of the meaning of whiteness as well as building coalitions for white allies in the struggle against white supremacy. Whether Black or White, the politics of purity is a failure

Michael J. **Monahan,** Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Marquette University, Racial Justice and the Politics of Purity, '**8**, http://www.temple.edu/isrst/Events/documents/MichaelMonahanUpdated.doc

The abolitionist/elimitavist position demands that any legitimately anti-racist endeavor stand simultaneously as a rejection of race, or at least racialized identity. As Alcoff and Outlaw have argued (though in different ways), this demands that one have an ahistorical sense of identity – that one reject the way in which one’s “interpretive horizon” has been positioned by one’s racial membership. Again, this is because the abolitionist ontology both reduces whiteness to white supremacy – whiteness just is – purely - an affirmation of white supremacy, and offers an effectively disembodied account of agency, such that the only way to be anti-racist is to reject whiteness. But what I have been trying to show is the way in which the history of white people has always been one of ambiguity and contestation over the meaning of whiteness (and that the same is true, though in different ways, for members of all racial categories). The history is one of different people who were white in certain important ways, but were not white in other ways, or at least were white in ways different from other white people, engaging in a process of arbitrating the meaning and significance of that whiteness. Part of the project of white supremacy, therefore, was not merely the domination of non whites, but the determination of the meaning of whiteness as fixed, given, and above all, pure. It is a history of brutal conquest, genocide, chattel slavery, torture, and Jim Crow, and by no means do I wish to suggest that we ignore or “white wash” that history. But it is also the history of John Brown, Sophie Scholl, the San Patricio Brigade, and, among others, those Irish servants in Barbados who risked their lives alongside enslaved Africans. The insistence that antiracism must reject whiteness – that John Brown, in struggling against white supremacy, was therefore not white –capitulates to the politics of purity. We must understand racial membership, therefore, not as a static and pure category of identity, but as an ongoing context for negotiating who “we” are (both as individuals and as groups) and how we relate to each other. Because races, like all social categories, are historical, and this history gives them meaning and significance, their reality is manifest both politically (in how our social structures and organizations take shape and interact) and individually (in how we understand ourselves and our place in the world). But, and this is the crucial point for my approach, the histories themselves are histories of contestation of meaning, and fraught with ambiguity, such that we participate in the process of shaping the meaning of race not only in the here and now, but also its meaning and significance historically. The elimitavist ontology insists, therefore, not only on purity for racial categories themselves (one either is or is not white), but also employs a politics of purity in its approach to history. That is, it treats the history of whiteness purely as a history of white supremacy, and any individuals or groups who break politically with white supremacy thereby demonstrate their non-whiteness. What I am calling for is a rejection of purity in both of these senses. Racial memberships and the identities that go along with them never really function as all or nothing categories (though they may pretend to do exactly that), and to ignore white struggles against white supremacy is as much of an inadequate interpretation of history as it would be to ignore white affirmation of white supremacy. And this is true for all racial categories and identities. They are all fraught with ambiguity, indeterminacy, and even outright contradiction, and part of my claim is that the damage is done in large part by trying to conceive of them as purified of that ambiguity and contradiction, for it is that insistence on purity that links racial categories to oppressive norms.

#### No link – we don’t aim to end all hierarchies – but the plan is an instance of positive change

#### Anti-pessimistic black progressivism may have problems but it is vital to check against the violence of white privilege -- their nihilism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy

Miah quoting West in 94

(Malik Miah, Cornel West's Race Matters, May-June, http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/3079)

In the chapter, “Nihilism in Black America,” West observes “The liberal/conservative discussion conceals the most basic issue now facing Black America: the nihilistic threat to its very existence. This threat is not simply a matter of relative economic deprivation and political powerlessness -- **though economic well-being and political clout are requisites for meaningful Black progress**. It is primarily a question of speaking to the profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness, and social despair so widespread in Black America.” (12-13) “Nihilism,” he continues, “is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine ... it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness.” (14) “Nihilism is not new in Black America. . . . In fact,” West explains,”the major enemy of Black survival in America has been and is neither oppression nor exploitation but rather the nihilistic Threat -- that is, loss of hope and absence of meaning. For as long **as hope remains and meaning is preserved, the possibility of overcoming oppression stays alive.** The self-fulfilling prophecy of the nihilistic threat is that without hope there can be no future, that without meaning there can be no struggle.” (14-15)

### Impact

#### Securing life preconditions value to life—it’s also subjective

White 90 (Alan, Within Nietzsche's Labyrinth, http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty\_and\_goodness.htm, AG)

Nietzsche exhorts us to live beautifully; on this point, Nehamas and I agree. A second point of our agreement is in at­tributing to Nietzsche an insistence that the assessment of a specific life's beauty is a matter, primarily, for the individual living that life. [Continued] A post-moral world , one wherein the minotaur was silenced, would be one in which each of us could determine his or her own good; that would have to be a world within which diversity would be encouraged rather than inhibited. But that, it might seem, would entail a new form of moral dog­matism, one with the paradoxical form, "the good for all is that there be no 'good for all'"? How could Nietzsche defend such a perspective, or such affirmation, as one appropriate for everyone? How could Nietzsche defend any general position at all? With this question, I turn to what I take to be the dan­gerous part of Nehamas's response to the problem of immoralism. The problem emerges, for Nehamas, through the question, what is a bad life, if life is literature? Must we not respond, the only bad life is a boring life, a life that doesn't make a good story? Are we then to denounce or condemn the couch potato, but not the mass murderer or the child molester? At times, Nehamas seems to point us in this direction. Insisting that Nietzsche's perspec­tivism "forbids any general evaluation [of life], positive or negative," Nehamas argues: What Nietzsche eventually comes to attack directly is not any par­ticular judgment but the very tendency to make general judgments about the value of life in itself, as if there were such a single thing with a character of its own, capable of being praised or blamed by some uniform standard. [...] Life itself has no value, but the life of an individual or a group has as great a value as that individual or group can give it . Some lives are mean or hor­rible, others magnificent. Life's value depends on what one makes of it, and this is a further sense in which Nietzsche believes that value is created and not discovered. (135) This conclusion, which follows from the forbidding of any general evaluation of life, is, it seems to me, as dangerous in its implications as any of Nietzsche's "words of war," any of his "thunder and fireworks." If "life itself has no value," and if "some lives are mean and horrible," then those who strive to live beautifully need take no account of those whose lives they deem, on whatever basis, to be ugly. "Some lives," Nehamas tells us, "are mean or horrible." I agree, but only if we read Nehamas as asserting that some lives have been mean or horrible. This correction is vital, for no life can be simply "mean or horrible" until it is over. The life that appears, as it develops, to be simply "mean or horrible" may be a life whose beauty has not yet emerged. As Nietzsche notes in what he calls "a parable," "Not every end is a goal. A melody's end is not its goal; nevertheless, so long as the melody has not reached its end, it also has not reached its goal" (HHII:WS:204). Perhaps Nehamas is right in asserting that Nietzsche's perspectivism "forbids any general evaluation [of life], positive or negative"; yet, I have argued, Nietzsche attempts to develop a "general" perspective of life, he attempts to see life as it really is. The lenses of art are not the only lenses we need; Nietzsche exhorts us to view art through the lenses of life. One of the things we see through the lenses of life is that no final evaluation of a life can be made until, at least, the life is over. To say that a life still underway is simply "mean and horrible" is not to express a justifiable opinion, it is to judge prematurely. Nietzsche's parable, which presents life as melody rather than as literature, provides a basis for rejecting the inhumanity seemingly licensed by the simple classification of some lives as "mean or horrible"; yet it may intensify the problem that led to that classification, for it may also seem to provide further sup­port for the claim that the life of the child molester or serial murderer can be a life that is beautiful. Even if we agree that child molestation is simply ugly, does it follow that a life that has included child molestation must be ugly? That there can be no objection to the execution of the child molester? A different way to put the question is this: can suicide be noble? Would the life of the pale criminal attain its highest beauty if the pale criminal were to kill himself? Granting that nothing the pale criminal may do following his crime will suffice to make his life, as a whole, one to be emulated -- one cannot , I think, will to commit a crime for the sole purpose of then being able to overcome that crime -- we must also recognize that the question that faces the pale criminal himself is not, "would I want others to act as I have acted?" Nor is his question the one posed by Nehamas, i.e., "would I want to do the same things all over again?" His question, rather, is, what now ? What is to be the significance of this murder, which I myself deem repellent, within my life as it continues to develop? Is this calamity to destroy me, or rather, perhaps, to be the basis for my transforma­tion? We approximate the situation the pale criminal is in if we ask ourselves whether we might think better of him, perhaps even be inspired by him, if, instead of committing suicide, he were to seek to help others to learn from his example. Phrasing the question in terms of suicide indicates that the earlier formulation is too simple. Just as accounts are neither simply true nor simply false, lives are neither simply beautiful or noble nor simply ugly or base. Lives are more or less beauti­ful, and as long as any life continues, it can, in principle, con­tinue to transform the initial ugliness, if there be such, of its past.

#### Nietzsche posits that universal judgment about value of life cannot be made because we are always in the process of becoming

White 90 (Alan, online book, Within Nietzsche’s Labyrinth http://www.williams.edu/philosophy/faculty/awhite/WNL%20web/beauty\_and\_goodness.htm).

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#### Case is a gateway to the alt

Connolly 91 – PolSci Professor, John Hopkins (William, Identity/Difference, p 187, AG)

The Nietzschean conception of a few who overcome resentment above politics while the rest remain stuck in the muck of resentment in politics is not today viable on its own terms. Today circumstances require that many give the sign of the overman a presence in themselves and in the ethicopolitical orientations they project onto the life of the whole. But this break with the spirit of Nietzsche requires further elucidation. The shift results partly from the late-modern possibility of human self-extinction. In this new world the failure to "preserve man' could also extinguish the human basis for the struggle Nietzsche named "overman." Preservation and overcoming are now drawn closer together, so that each becomes a term in the other: the latter cannot succeed unless it touches the former. But the entanglement of each with the other in sociopolitical relations means, when the logic of this entanglement is worked out, that the "overman" as a type cannot eliminate from its life some of the modalities definitive of the "human." If the overman was ever projected as a distinct type—and this is not certain—it now becomes refigured into a struggle within the self between the inclination to existential resentment and an affirmation of life that rises above this tendency.

**Younkins 4** – Professor of Business Administration, Wheeling Jesuit (Edward, The Flawed Doctrine of Nature's Intrinsic Value, *Quebecois Libre* 147, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/04/041015-17.htm, gender modified, AG)

Environmentalists erroneously assign human values and concern to an amoral material sphere. When environmentalists talk about the nonhuman natural world, they commonly attribute human values to it, which, of course, are completely irrelevant to the nonhuman realm. For example, “nature” is incapable of being concerned with the possible extinction of any particular ephemeral species. Over 99 percent of all species of life that have ever existed on earth have been estimated to be extinct with the great majority of these perishing because of nonhuman factors. Nature cannot care about “biodiversity.” Humans happen to value biodiversity because it reflects the state of the natural world in which they currently live. Without humans, the beauty and spectacle of nature would not exist – such ideas can only exist in the mind of a rational valuer. These environmentalists fail to realize that value means having value to some valuer. To be a value some aspect of nature must be a value to some human being. People have the capacity to assign and to create value with respect to nonhuman existents. Nature, in the form of natural resources, does not exist independently of man. Men, choosing to act on their ideas, transform nature for human purposes. All resources are [hu]man-made. It is the application of human valuation to natural substances that makes them resources. Resources thus can be viewed as a function of human knowledge and action. By using their rationality and ingenuity, [humans] men affect nature, thereby enabling them to achieve progress. Mankind’s survival and flourishing depend upon the study of nature that includes all things, even man himself. Human beings are the highest level of nature in the known universe. Men are a distinct natural phenomenon as are fish, birds, rocks, etc. Their proper place in the hierarchical order of nature needs to be recognized. Unlike plants and animals, human beings have a conceptual faculty, free will, and a moral nature. Because morality involves the ability to choose, it follows that moral worth is related to human choice and action and that the agents of moral worth can also be said to have moral value. By rationally using his conceptual faculty, man can create values as judged by the standard of enhancing human life. The highest priority must be assigned to actions that enhance the lives of individual human beings. It is therefore morally fitting to make use of nature. Man’s environment includes all of his surroundings. When he creatively arranges his external material conditions, he is improving his environment to make it more useful to himself. Neither fixed nor finite, resources are, in essence, a product of the human mind through the application of science and technology. Our resources have been expanding over time as a result of our ever-increasing knowledge. Unlike plants and animals, human beings do much more than simply respond to environmental stimuli. Humans are free from nature’s determinism and thus are capable of choosing. Whereas plants and animals survive by adapting to nature, [humans] men sustain their lives by employing reason to adapt nature to them. People make valuations and judgments. Of all the created order, only the human person is capable of developing other resources, thereby enriching creation. The earth is a dynamic and developing system that we are not obliged to preserve forever as we have found it. Human inventiveness, a natural dimension of the world, has enabled us to do more with less. Those who proclaim the intrinsic value of nature view man as a destroyer of the intrinsically good. Because it is man’s rationality in the form of science and technology that permits him to transform nature, he is despised for his ability to reason that is portrayed as a corrupting influence. The power of reason offends radical environmentalists because it leads to abstract knowledge, science, technology, wealth, and capitalism. This antipathy for human achievements and aspirations involves the negation of human values and betrays an underlying nihilism of the environmental movement.