### 2AC AT: IAEA/ No Solve Prolif

#### Numerous proliferation barriers make Thorium superior

IAEA 12 (IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NF-T-2.4, “Role of Thorium to Supplement Fuel Cycles of Future Nuclear Energy Systems,” May, <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1540_web.pdf>)

From the point of view of technology amenability, there are fewer conversion processes required from converting mined thorium ore into fuel forms ready for first use in a reactor than with conversion of mined uranium into the (currently most used) conventional fuel form of enriched UO2. The enrichment of uranium — a rather sophisticated technological process with a significant proliferation threat — is not needed in a pure ThFC; however, instead of enrichment, a reprocessing step is necessary.

In addition to the elimination of enrichment, a fuel cycle based on thorium/233U has other proliferation resistance related peculiarities. To create one more barrier to potential proliferation, 233U — unlike plutonium — can be mixed with the non fissile isotope 238U (in practice, with depleted uranium) to create a ‘reactor grade’ 233U/238U mixture not adherent to chemical separation. The critical configuration (i.e. mass, geometry, etc. needed for a nuclear weapon) of a mixture of 12% 233U with 238U approximately corresponds to a 20% enriched 235U/238U compound [3].

Once irradiated in a reactor, the fuel of a thorium–uranium cycle contains an admixture of 232U (half-life 68.9 years) whose radioactive decay chain includes emitters (particularly 208Tl) of high energy gamma radiation (2.6 MeV). This makes spent thorium fuel treatment more difficult, requires remote handling/control during reprocessing and during further fuel fabrication, but on the other hand, may be considered as an additional non-proliferation barrier.

### 2AC Prolif

Small = past not future

Devolution

#### Yes chain reaction – heisenboug

#### Nukes outweigh bioweapons.

**Eitzen, 1997**

[EDWARD M. EITZEN, M.D., M.P.H., FACEP, FAA, Colonel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army; Chief, Operational Medicine Division, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 1997,[www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/Ch-20electrv699.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/Ch-20electrv699.pdf)]

Biological weapons, when compared with nuclear weapons, are less likely to cause widespread physical devastation. Likely scenarios of use include large-scale attacks against fixed rear areas and forces, such as supply points, ammunition dumps, airbases, command and control assets, and fixed medical facilities; or application on a morelimited scale to cause disruption rather than annihilation. As a force is demoralized and reduced by disease and strange illnesses, attrition may become a more significant factor. It is less likely that an enemy would attempt to use biological warfare weapons against tactical maneuver units, owing to those units’ high mobility and the fact that effects on such units may not occur quickly enough to be decisive in the enemy’s favor. A proper defense against biological weapons thus requires (a) an understanding of the enemy and his likely objectives for a biological attack, and (b) the adoption of effective personal protective measures to minimize their impact. Biological defenses and future detection efforts should be emphasized in areas of the battlefield where an enemy attack is most likely. However, since an adversary may attempt to use biological weapons when and where such an attack is least expected, all efforts should be made to prepare our forces in depth for the possibility of a biological attack. This preparation should include the continued development of better vaccines and prophylactic drugs to protect U.S. military forces deployed to areas where intelligence indicates that an attack with biological agents is likely. Biological warfare agents, by themselves, are not ideal tactical weapons, owing to their unpredictability and delayed effects (long incubation times). They are also viewed as inhumane by many, and their “first use” would generate significant world criticism. Their tactical importance may in crease, however, as more is learned about the predictability of damage from specific biological agents. But the U.S. military must be prepared to defend against biological attack at all levels of conflict. Biological warfare agents in combination with other weapons systems must also be anticipated. With the development of new missile delivery systems, even intercontinental delivery of biological agents is possible, and the use of low-flying, longrange cruise missiles or remotely piloted drones may be the best way to generate a dense cloud of biological warfare agents close to the ground. It has been estimated that under suitable conditions, a cruise missile could deliver anthrax spores over an area of the same magnitude as the lethal fallout from a ground-burst nuclear warhead.3 However, much more subtle delivery vehicles (such as an agricultural sprayer mounted on a truck, boat, or other, more conventional platform) could be used to deliver biological agents anywhere in the world. Simply to maintain a defensive posture against attack is not adequate, however. The U.S. military must be able to sustain an offensive campaign in a biologically contaminated environment. To do otherwise is to invite use of such weapons by the enemy. The impact of infectious diseases on military units has been well documented in past wars, but the potential fielding of highly lethal agents by adversaries for use as biological warfare weapons makes personal protective measures and commanddriven discipline even more important for today’s army. While the more accurate conventional weapons systems that are currently fielded by some military forces produce less collateral damage, an aggressor using biological or chemical weapons may use multiple weapons or dissemination devices to cover a large area. Biological weapons could be effective if the enemy’s goal was to preserve logistical materiel; this presupposes the enemy use of captured friendly weapons and infrastructure, as opposed to mass physical destruction, thereby making biological weapons more attractive to an enemy than nuclear weapons to accomplish this purpose.12,13

### 2AC CP

**Multiple conditional worlds are a voter—skews 2AC strategy because offense in one world can be applied to other worlds—destroys aff offense, the 1AR is too late to catch up—they kill clash and real-world policy comparison, creating shallow education. Counter-interp—one advocacy solves their offense—we also get to advocate one permutation for each conditional world—key to reciprocity**

#### Only congressional action solves – overcomes external resistance

Farley, 07 [Peter, “Cleaner Nuclear Power?”, <http://www.technologyreview.com/news/409099/cleaner-nuclear-power/>]

Nuclear watchdogs say that Thorium Power's technology has real potential. Moreover, they say that the legislation is needed. It would force the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates the nuclear industry, to create new offices at the agencies to study thorium-fuel options and promote their use abroad. "It makes a lot of sense in my view," says Thomas Cochran, director of the nuclear program at the [Natural Resources Defense Council](http://www.nrdc.org/), in Washington. He says that congressional action is needed to overcome resistance within the DOE to exploring thorium.

#### The DOE has statutory authority

MIT, 10 [Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap: Report to Congress”, April 2010, http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-033-nuclear-systems-design-project-fall-2011/readings/MIT22\_033F11\_read\_core\_doe.pdf]

 In the United States, it is the responsibility of industry to design, construct, and operate commercial nuclear power plants. However, DOE has statutory authority under the Atomic Energy Act to promote and support nuclear energy technologies for commercial applications. In general, appropriate government roles include researching high-potential technologies beyond the investment horizon of industry and also reducing the technical risks of new technologies. In the case of new commercial reactor designs, potential areas of NE involvement could include: Enabling new technologies to be inserted into emerging and future designs by providing access to unique laboratory resources for new technology development and, where appropriate, demonstration. • Working through the laboratories and universities to provide unique expertise and facilities to industry for R&D in the areas of: o Innovative concepts and advanced technologies. o Fundamental phenomena and performance data. o Advanced modeling and simulation capabilities. APRIL 2010 22 34 NUCLEAR ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP o New technology testing and, if appropriate, demonstration. o Advanced manufacturing methods. Representative R&D activities that support each of the roles stated above are presented below. The level of DOE investment relative to industry investment will vary across the spectrum of these activities, with a generally increasing trend in DOE investment for longer-term activities. Finally, there is potential to leverage and amplify effective U.S. R&D through collaborations with other nations through multilateral and bilateral agreements including the Generation IV International Forum, which is investigating multiple advanced reactor concepts. DOE is also a participant in OECD/NEA and IAEA initiatives that bear directly on the development and deployment of new reactor systems.

#### Congress is key to nuclear power leeadership

Fertel, 05 - Senior Vice President And Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute (Marvin, CQ Congressional Testimony, “NUCLEAR POWER'S PLACE IN A NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY,” 4/28, lexis) //DH

Industry and government will be prepared to meet the demand for new emission-free baseload nuclear plants in the 2010 to 2020 time frame only through a sustained focus on the necessary programs and policies between now and then. As it has in the past, strong Congressional oversight will be necessary to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the federal government's nuclear energy programs, and to maintain America's leadership in nuclear technology development and its influence over important diplomatic initiatives like nonproliferation. Such efforts have provided a dramatic contribution to global security, as evidenced by the U.S.-Russian nonproliferation agreement to recycle weapons-grade material from Russia for use in American reactors. Currently, more than 50 percent of U.S. nuclear power plant fuel depends on converted Russian warhead material. Nowhere is continued congressional oversight more important than with DOE's program to manage the used nuclear fuel from our nuclear power plants. Continued progress toward a federal used nuclear fuel repository is necessary to support nuclear energy's vital role in a comprehensive national energy policy and to support the remediation of DOE defense sites. Since enactment of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE's federal repository program has repeatedly overcome challenges, and challenges remain before the Yucca Mountain facility can begin operation. But as we address these issues, it is important to keep the overall progress of the program in context. There is international scientific consensus that a deep geologic repository is the best solution for long-term disposition of used military and commercial nuclear power plant fuel and high-level radioactive byproducts. The Bush administration and Congress, with bipartisan support, affirmed the suitability of Yucca Mountain for a repository in 2002. Over the past three years, the Energy Department and its contractors have made considerable progress providing yet greater confirmation that this is the correct course of action and that Yucca Mountain is an appropriate site for a national repository. --During the past year, federal courts have rejected significant legal challenges by the state of Nevada and others to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and the 2002 Yucca Mountain site suitability determination. These challenges questioned the constitutionality of the Yucca Mountain Development Act and DOE's repository system, which incorporates both natural and engineered barriers to contain radioactive material safely. In the coming year, Congress will play an essential role in keeping this program on schedule, by taking the steps necessary to provide increased funding for the project in fiscal 2006 and in future years. Meeting DOE's schedule for initial repository operation requires certainty in funding for the program. This is particularly critical in view of projected annual expenditures that will exceed $1 billion beginning in fiscal 2007. Meeting these budget requirements calls for a change in how Congress provides funds to the project from monies collected for the Nuclear Waste Fund. The history of Yucca Mountain funding is evidence that the current funding approach must be modified. Consumer fees (including interest) committed to the Nuclear Waste Fund since its f6rmation in 1983 total more than $24 billion. Consumers are projected to pay between $750 million to $800 million to the fund each year, based on electricity generated at the nation's 103 reactors. This is more than $2 million per day. Although about $8 billion has been used for the program, the balance in the fund is nearly $17 billion. In each of the past several years, there has been a gap between the annual fees paid by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants and disbursements from the fund for use by DOE at Yucca Mountain. Since the fund was first established, billions of dollars paid by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants to the Nuclear Waste Fund-intended solely for the federal government's used fuel program-in effect have been used to decrease budget deficits or increase surpluses. The industry believes that Congress should change the funding mechanism for Yucca Mountain so that payments to the Nuclear Waste Fund can be used only for the project and be excluded from traditional congressional budget caps. Although the program should remain subject to congressional oversight, Yucca Mountain appropriations should not compete each year for funding with unrelated programs when Congress directed a dedicated funding stream for the project. The industry also believes that it is appropriate and necessary to consider an alternative perspective on the Yucca Mountain project. This alternative would include an extended period for monitoring operation of the repository for up to 300 years after spent fuel is first placed underground. The industry believes that this approach would provide ongoing assurance and greater confidence that the repository is performing as designed, that public safety is assured, and that the environment is protected. It would also permit DOE to apply evolving innovative technologies at the repository. Through this approach, a scientific monitoring program would identify additional scientific information that can be used in repository performance models. The project then could update the models, and make modifications in design and operations as appropriate. Congressional committees like this one can help ensure that DOE does not lose sight of its responsibility for used nuclear fuel management and disposal, as stated by Congress in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The industry fully supports the fundamental need for a repository so that used nuclear fuel and the byproducts of the nation's nuclear weapons program are securely managed in an underground, specially designed facility. World-class science has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain is the best site for that facility. A public works project of this magnitude will inevitably face challenges. Yet, none is insurmountable. DOE and its contractors have made significant progress on the project and will continue to do so as the project enters the licensing phase. Congressional oversight also can play a key role in maintaining and encouraging the stability of the NRC's regulatory process. Such stability is essential for our 103 operating nuclear plants and equally critical in licensing new nuclear power plants. Congress played a key role several years ago in encouraging the NRC to move toward a new oversight process for the nation's nuclear plants, based on quantitative performance indicators and safety significance. Today's reactor oversight process is designed to focus industry and NRC resources on equipment, components and operational issues that have the greatest importance to, and impact on, safety. The NRC and the industry have worked hard to identify and implement realistic security requirements at nuclear power plants. In the three-and-a-half years since 9/11, the NRC has issued a series of requirements to increase security and enhance training for security programs. The industry complied-fully and rapidly. In the days and months following Sept. 11, quick action was required. Orders that implemented needed changes quickly were necessary. Now, we should return to the orderly process of regulating through regulations. The industry has spent more than $1 billion enhancing security since September 2001. We've identified and fixed vulnerabilities. Today, the industry is at the practical limit of what private industry can do to secure our facilities against the terrorist threat. NRC Chairman Nils Diaz and other commissioners have said that the industry has achieved just about everything that can be reasonably achieved by a civilian force. The industry now needs a transition period to stabilize the new security requirements. We need time to incorporate these dramatic changes into our operations and emergency planning programs and to train our employees to the high standards of our industry-and to the appropriately high expectations of the NRC. Both industry and the NRC need congressional oversight to support and encourage this kind of stability. CONCLUSION Electricity generated by America's nuclear power plants over the past half-century has played a key part in our nation's growth and prosperity. Nuclear power produces over 20 percent of the electricity used in the United States today without producing air pollution. As our energy demands continue to grow in years to come, nuclear power should play an even greater role in meeting our energy and environmental needs. The nuclear energy industry is operating its reactors safely and efficiently. The industry is striving to produce more electricity from existing plants. The industry is also developing more efficient, next-generation reactors and exploring ways to build them more cost-effectively. The public sector, including the oversight committees of the U.S. Congress, can help maintain the conditions that ensure Americans will continue to reap the benefits of our operating plants, and create the conditions that will spur investment in America's energy infrastructure, including new nuclear power plants. One important step is passage of comprehensive energy legislation that recognizes nuclear energy's contributions to meeting our growing energy demands, ensuring our nation's energy security and protecting our environment. Equally important, however, is the need to ensure effective and efficient implementation of existing laws, like the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and to provide federal agencies with the resources and oversight necessary to discharge their statutory responsibilities in the most efficient way possible. The commercial nuclear power sector was born in the United States, and nations around the world continue to look to this nation for leadership in this technology and in the issues associated with nuclear power. Our ability to influence critical international policies in areas like nuclear nonproliferation, for example, depends on our ability to maintain a leadership role in prudent deployment, use and regulation of nuclear energy technologies here at home, in the United States, and on our ability to manage the technological and policy challenges-like waste management-that arise with all advanced technologies.

Multi-actor fiat vi – impossible opp cost for judge no authority kills rational decision making potrable impact

Education

Need solvency advocate – indep vi

### 2AC Uranium Prices

#### Price forecasts have been wrong, they’ll remain low, and current low demand disproves their impacts

**Bloomberg 12** [“Uranium Recovery Postponed as Price Drops to 2-Year Low”, Christopher Donville, Sep 19, 2012]

Uranium’s recovery from the Fukushima nuclear accident may take one or two years longer than analysts estimated as stockpiles in Japan and Germany keep prices low and cause mining companies to defer new development.¶ The price of uranium for immediate delivery declined to $47 a pound as of Sept. 17, its lowest in two years, according to Ux Consulting, a Roswell, Georgia-based uranium information provider. BHP Billiton Ltd. (BHP) and Paladin Energy Ltd. (PDN) have slowed or deferred development this year of some projects to produce the raw material in nuclear reactor fuel.¶ Japan temporarily shut all of its nuclear reactors after the disaster at Tokyo Electric Power Co.’s Fukushima Dai-Ichi plant. That nation’s return to nuclear power and demand for electricity in China, which is building 25 reactors, was supposed to help drive prices for the fuel back up in 2015, said Thomas Neff, a retired physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. That date that may be pushed back a year or two.¶ “There was a wave of optimism the Japanese would come back on fast and that China would resume rapid development,” Neff, who now works as an energy industry researcher for the university’s Center for International Studies, said yesterday by phone from Jackson, Wyoming. “Day-to-day spot prices are reflecting the belief that the short-term outlook -- at least two to three years out -- is less certain than it was.”¶ Japan will end the use of atomic power by the 2030s, the government said Sept. 14, and Germany’s government has also decided to phase out nuclear energy. China continues to review approvals for new reactors amid concerns about safety, Heenal Patel, a London-based energy analyst with Bloomberg Industries, said yesterday.¶ Net Demand¶ “Japanese and German inventories and displaced supply would result in no net new demand until after 2015,” Neff said, citing a January study his group did. The new target for a return to uranium demand is 2016 or 2017, he said.

**No Central Asian war**

**Collins 3**—pol sci, Notre Dame. PhD—AND—William Wohlforth—government, Dartmouth (Kathleen, Defying “Great Game” Expectations, <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/15-Central%20Asia-press.pdf>,. AMiles)

Note – confluence = flowing together

While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the **major powers are in a better position to serve as a** **stabilizing force** than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

**No great power escalation**

**Collins 3**—pol sci, Notre Dame. PhD—AND—William Wohlforth—government, Dartmouth (Kathleen, Defying “Great Game” Expectations, <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/15-Central%20Asia-press.pdf>,. AMiles)

Although Central Asia’s strategic salience has been on the rise, the major powers’ strategic priorities lie elsewhere. For each of the three major outside players, bilateral relationships with the others are far more important than any stake they hold in Central Asia. As the chapters on China and Russia in this volume stress, the most pressing grand strategic objectives of China and Russia remain economic development and modernization. While both are animated by a quest for great power prestige, the current consensus among officials in both capitals is that for the foreseeable future prestige concerns must take a back seat to the drive for modernization whenever the two aims come into conflict. Moreover, for China, Russia, and the United States, more immediate strategic concerns put other regions above Central Asia in their hierarchy of interests. The U.S. war on terrorism has already shifted to the Persian Gulf. Russia’s most pressing security concerns remain in Chechnya and the Caucasus, while China remains focused on Taiwan. Developments in Central Asia are, of course, related to the powers’ most pressing immediate strategic concerns to a greater (Russia) or lesser (U.S., China) degree, but in no capital can zealous officials or policy advocates make the case that any outcome in the region is pivotal to the country’s core security.

**Great powers don’t want to antagonize each other—checks outside escalation**

**Kucera 10**—regular contributor to U.S. News and World Report, Slate and EurasiaNet. (Joshua, Central Asia Security Vacuum, 16 June 2010, <http://the-diplomat.com/2010/06/16/central-asia%E2%80%99s-security-vacuum/>)

Note – CSTO = Collective Security Treaty Organization

Yet when brutal violence broke out in one of the CSTO member countries, Kyrgyzstan, just days later, the group didn’t respond rapidly at all. Kyrgyzstan’s interim president, Roza Otunbayeva, even asked Russia to intervene, but Russian President Dmitry Medvedev responded that Russians would only do so under the auspices of the CSTO. And nearly a week after the start of the violence—which some estimate has killed more than 1000 people and threatens to tear the country apart—the CSTO has still not gotten involved, but says it is ‘considering’ intervening. ‘We did not rule out the use of any means which are in the CSTO’s potential, and the use of which is possible regardless of the development of the situation in Kyrgyzstan,’ Russian National Security Chief Nikolai Patrushev said Monday. On June 10-11, another regional security group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, held its annual summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The SCO has similar collective security aims as the CSTO, and includes Russia, China and most of the Central Asian republics, including Kyrgyzstan. But despite the violence that was going on even as the SCO countries’ presidents met in Uzbekistan, that group also didn’t involve itself in the conflict, and made only a tepid statement calling for calm. Civil society groups in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (much of the violence is directed toward ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, and the centre of the violence, the city of Osh, is right on the border of Uzbekistan) called on the United Nations to intervene. And Otunbayeva said she didn’t ask the US for help. Even Uzbekistan, which many in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere feared might try to intervene on behalf of ethnic Uzbeks, has instead opted to stay out of the fray, and issued a statement blaming outsiders for ‘provoking’ the brutal violence. The violence has exposed a security vacuum in Central Asia that no one appears interested in filling. In spite of all of the armchair geopoliticians who have declared that a ‘new Great Game’ is on in Central Asia, the **major powers seem** distinctly **reluctant to expand their spheres of influence there**. Why? It’s possible that, amid a tentative US-Russia rapprochement and an apparent pro-Western turn in Russian foreign policy, **neither side wants to antagonize** the other. The United States, obviously, also is overextended in Iraq and Afghanistan and has little interest in getting in the middle of an ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan. It’s possible that the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force isn’t ready for a serious intervention as would be required in Kyrgyzstan. (It’s also possible that Russia’s reluctance is merely a demure gesture to ensure that they don’t seem too eager to get involved; only time will tell.)

**Protests prove escalation won’t happen—otherwise can’t solve**

**Stratfor, 1/18/12** [“Annual Forecast 2012”, global intelligence company, http://www.stratfor.com/forecast/annual-forecast-2012]

**Numerous factors** will undermine Central Asia's stability in 2012, but they **will not lead to a major breaking point** in the region this year. Protests over deteriorating economic conditions will occur throughout the region, particularly in Kazakhstan, though these will be contained to the region and will not result in overly disruptive violence. Serious issues in Kazakhstan's banking sector could lead to a financial crisis, though the government will be able to manage the difficulties and contain it during 2012 by using the oil revenues it has saved up.

### 2AC Heidegger

#### The alternative is nihilism—this also answers any ontology first arguments

Fain 11—Lecturer in the Committee on Degrees in Social Studies at Harvard University, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Lucas, March 2011, *The Review of Metaphysics*, “Heidegger's Cartesian nihilism,” Academic OneFile, RBatra)

That Heidegger transforms happiness, classically understood as the completion of human nature, into the anxiety of being-towards-death may be deduced from the fact that it is death which signifies Dasein's "authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole," (45) **with the consequence that ethical virtue is replaced by Dasein's pure resolve in the face of nothing**. That Heidegger's conception of care may likewise be construed as an impoverished version of the Platonic doctrine of eros is plainly evident by its purely formal structure, which renders it devoid of any capacity to rank-order objects of desire. (46) By way of contrast, Platonic eros moves hierarchically between the human and the divine (that is to say, between the base and the noble), whereas Heideggerian care moves horizontally, we should even say "horizonally," in the sense that "the ontological meaning of care is temporality," and "the existential-temporal condition of the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity [of future, past, and, present], has something like a horizon." (47) That horizon is circumscribed by Dasein's thrownness into the future, and Dasein's ownmost future is, of course, its death. Hence we read, "The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future," and "The ecstatical character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one's potentiality-for-being." (48) It is therefore through Dasein's resolute anticipation of its death that the meaning of being reveals itself as the "temporalizing of temporality." (49) But temporality reduced to itself is stripped of all love, beauty, and value. **It means simply the opening up of one's future possibilities, which is to say that the authentic meaning of being is without value, and being without value is meaningless, which is finally to say that the meaning of being terminates in nihilism.** (50) Heideggerian fundamental ontology does not therefore escape from Nietzschean chaos. Rather, it returns us to it, only without the noble illusion that life requires us to make it lovable. (51) **And this remains the case no matter whether we prefer the early language of "resoluteness" or Heidegger's later "turn" into Gelassenheit or "releasement."** For insofar as Heidegger's turn (Kehre) is meant to free the meaning of being from its attachment to any notion of active or passive willing, for example, of the kind indicated by the language of resolution, it releases us ever deeper into the nullity within which the world comes to presence. (52)

So much for the meaning of being. Despite his revolutionary proclamations, Heidegger holds us in a double bind. On the one hand, the history of metaphysics (and its completion in the era of modern technology) (53) grips us in a nihilistic forgetting of the question of being. On the other hand, fundamental ontology empties the meaning of being of value, and this too is nihilism. (54) What matters in the last analysis, however, is not whether Heidegger is a nihilist, but whether his teaching is the true teaching. And if, as Leo Strauss once said, our capacity to evaluate Heidegger's teaching comes down to a question of competence, our measure of competence depends on our capacity for valuation, or more accurately, for prudential judgment or a capacity to discern what makes it right. (55) Yet, on the basis of Heidegger's existential analysis, there can be no such ground of legitimation apart from the pure instance of resolution (Entschluss). And this is because fundamental ontology cannot tell us on the basis of its questioning into being why such questioning should be desirable, or why we should want to invoke a spiritual revolution that founds itself on the abstract question of being. **Instead, there must be some more primordial notion of the good that first directs us to the question of being**--as Nietzsche would say, to the question of being as a value. In saying this, however, I do hot wish to suggest that there must be some objective or quasi-objective standard of the good that is somehow "out there" waiting to be discovered, as if it were a vein of gold embedded in the rock. Yet it is plainly evident that a more primordial access to the good must underlie any capacity for rank-ordering values or existential possibilities, and it is precisely this feature of human experience that fundamental ontology abandons or occludes by abstracting the question of being from the so-called ontic or inauthentic dimension of ordinary experience.

Stated simply, **there is no reason why the question of being should be foundational for the future of philosophy**. Yet it must be said that Heidegger never relinquished his revolutionary aspirations for bringing metaphysics to its end. For as clearly as the text of 1927 stated the need to put the future of philosophy on "new foundations" (neue Fundamente), (56) Heidegger persisted up to and through 1959 in the hope that the turn to the question of being would promise a "new ground and foundation" (neuen Grand und Boden) upon which it might be possible to confront the epoch of metaphysical nihilism. (57) Of course, it may be entirely true that our releasement into the mystery of being grants us "the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way." (58) **The question is why this should be at all desirable, especially if the thinking of being expires in nihilism.** And it is here that we find Heidegger without argument. As we read in a relevant passage from the "Letter on Humanism" of 1949:

Whether the realm of the truth of being is a blind alley or whether

it is the free space in which freedom conserves its essence is

something each one may judge after he himself has tried to go the

designated way, or even better, after he has gone a better way,

that is, a way befitting the question. (59)

I note in passing that we shall also have to judge whether the essence of freedom is itself a blind alley. But this just affirms my larger point. Heidegger returns us to the question of competence. But since fundamental ontology cannot stand the question of competence, we are left simply with a decision that leaves the future of philosophy hanging on the angst-ridden resolve that affirms itself in the face of death. (60) And this is Cartesianism all over again, in the sense that Heidegger's subordination of ethics to ontology--the decisive severing of the human relation to the good from the foundations of philosophy--amounts to the most radical late modern expression of the Cartesian legacy. **Rather than saving us from our fall into modern decadence, Heidegger's thought results finally in a deepening of the modern crisis.**

#### Perm—do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt—if the alt solves the squo, the perm solves the link

#### Turn—only the neg forgets Being by abandoning empiricism

Latour 2 – Professor, Paris Institute of Political Studies (Bruno, Environmentalism, ed Direk, p 303)

Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure 'stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. As Levi-Strauss says, 'the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believe in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987. p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and you hunker down in your forest -- then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. 'We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. **No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modern world**, or, by the same token, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter-revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: 'Einai gar kai entautha theous.'

#### The ballot should vote for a policy option—only way to avoid devolutions into arbitrary standards that kill clash. The actor of the judge isn’t an opportunity cost to the plan—proves it kills cba

#### External events—like natural catastrophes—that threaten our existence also threaten the being-ness of Dasein

Svenaeus 10—Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge, Department of Philosophy, Södertörn University (Fredrik, 24 November 2010, “Illness as unhomelike being-in-the-world: Heidegger and the phenomenology of medicine,” *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy*, Springer, RBatra) \*\*\*First paragraph is quoting Heidegger’s *Being and Time*

 If we adhere to this interpretation of the concept of ‘meaning’, that is in principle ontological-existential [that is – phenomenological], all beings whose mode of being is unlike Dasein must be understood as unmeaningful (unsinnig), as essentially bare of meaning as such. ‘Unmeaningful’ does not mean here a value judgment, but expresses an ontological determination. And only what is unmeaningful (unsinnig) can be absurd (widersinnig). Objectively present things encountered through Dasein [in its being-in-the-world] can, so to speak, run against its being, for example, events of nature which break in on us **and destroy us**. (1996, pp. 151–152, translation altered)

What I would like to focus on here is the very meaninglessness suffered by human Dasein when it encounters something that is not only unmeaningful (unsinnig), but also absurd (widersinnig). The example given by Heidegger is the encountering of “events of nature which break in on us and destroy us”. I think what he has in mind here is something like a catastrophe of nature—an earthquake or a tornado—but would it not also hold for a disease? A disease, at least a severe one, is indeed something which breaks in on us and destroys us. Such phenomena, according to Heidegger, resist meaning; they are even an offense to our attempts to find a place for them in our life as a meaningful whole. They strike against us as something totally unfamiliar, which threatens our existence.

Now, it could be said that there is a way of making sense of diseases, namely, the explanation of their causes by science, which can also lead to ways of interfering with the disease and curing the person who has been affected by it. The same could possibly be said about tornados and earthquakes to the extent that it is possible to predict and guard oneself against them with the help of meteorology, geology, and construction technology. But this way of dealing with the absurd and strange, making the phenomena in question unmeaningful rather than absurd, in the terminology of Heidegger, does not mean that the phenomena in question easily find a place in the everyday world of Dasein. They are still **a source of meaninglessness** on the everyday level, since they are hard to incorporate into the totality of relevance that constitutes the meaningfulness of human being. **They are a threat to the homelike being-in-the-world of Dasein in their radical and dreadful otherness.**

#### The alternative doesn’t solve

**Riis 11**—Carlsberg Research Fellow and Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Science Studies at Roskilde University, Ph.D. from Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Søren, 8 February 2011, “Towards the origin of modern technology: reconfiguring Martin Heidegger’s thinking,” RBatra)

Moreover, Heidegger maintains: ‘‘Readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorially.’’47 According to Heidegger’s fundamental phenomenology, which he unfolds in detail in Being and Time and reaffirms a decisive part of in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology,’’ nature is ‘‘primally’’ revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-;’’ that is to say, **‘‘**nature’’ is a resource long before the actual rise of modern and ancient technology, namely simultaneously with the very origin of human beings**.** That something is primordially revealed in its ‘‘usability’’ and ‘‘serviceability-for-’’ does not imply that it is actually used or serves accordingly, but that it is revealed as standing ready to be utilized in the corresponding context. As such, it is revealed as ‘‘standing-reserve.’’ This, for example, also corresponds to the empirical fact that prehistoric humans settled close to woods and rivers. In these areas they always had stockpiles of timber, power for transportation, and easy access to drinking water. Based on ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and completed through references to Being and Time, we now have an interpretation of the origin of the essence of modern technology, which traces back the characteristic revealing of das Gestell to the beginning of humankind.48 This does not imply that prehistoric technology is identical with contemporary technology; rather the third genealogy of the rule of das Gestell suggests that **when ‘‘we still more primally’’ try to consider the origin of the challenging revealing characterizing the rule of das Gestell, we in fact rediscover that it is connected to being human**. The rule of das Gestell has challenged humans as long as they have existed. In this sense, **humans** **first and foremost exist under the rule of das Gestell**.49 This also entails a revision and precision of Heidegger’s renowned formula characterizing the world-connectedness of human existence: being-in-the-world. Based on the comparison of ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and Being and Time, human existence is better described as being-under-the-spell-of-das-Gestell. Trying to understand the various more-or-less explicit accounts of the origin of the rule of das Gestell in ‘‘The Question Concerning Technology’’ and the resulting ambiguity is not just an exercise, nor only a way to criticize Heidegger. Rather, it is a way to better understand the nuances and layers in Heidegger’s thinking concerning technology and to warn against a short-sighted ‘‘saving’’ from an alleged danger. If the challenging revealing of nature, which characterizes the rule of das Gestell is taken seriously, then **we cannot avoid it just by revolutionizing our technology, instead, we must revise our very human existence.**

### 2AC Obama Good

#### Romney will win – Obama’s approval ratings are too low

**Talgo, 9/16/12 –** commentator for Neon Tommy, a Los Angeles-based news source sponsored by the Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism covering breaking news (Tyler, “Why Romney Will Win The Election” <http://www.neontommy.com/news/2012/09/why-romney-will-win-election>)

Given the post-convention polling bounces, some may give Obama the advantage at this stage of the race, although the bounces are subsiding. For example, new NBC/WSJ polls of three swing states have Obama leading Romney by 49 to 44 percent in Florida and Virginia, and by 50 to 43 percent in Ohio. However, when we take a closer look at the numbers, a different story is revealed. In the Florida and Virginia polls, Democrats were oversampled by 5 percent, and in Ohio they were oversampled by 10 percent. Not convinced? Here’s another fact: recent CBS/NYT/Quinnipiac polls oversampled Democrats by nine percent in Florida and by eight percent in Ohio. The Florida poll had Obama at 51 percent and Romney at 45 percent, and the Ohio poll had Obama at 50 percent and Romney at 44 percent; so, both leads were smaller than the oversampling gap. If you ask me, the advantage here clearly goes to Romney; and, believe me, these are not the only examples.

All of this is revealed in the context of a time in which Republicans are much more enthusiastic than Democrats. Last month the number of Americans who consider themselves Republicans was the highest ever recorded since 2002 at 37.6 percent, compared to only 33.3 percent who consider themselves Democrats.

So, assuming that all else is equal, what does it mean when a national poll says something like 47 percent for Obama and 44 percent for Romney, or vise versa? The nature of the missing 10 percent is one of the most important factors that come to play in all presidential reelection campaigns. Historically, the final results in an election are almost always worse than polling suggests for an incumbent president. If you took the undecided vote, according to Gallup, from every general election since 1964 that featured an incumbent president seeking reelection, 89 percent of it went to the president’s challenger. You can bet that the Obama camp understands that a 47-44 poll in its favor is not good news at all. This is why it’s virtually unheard-of for an incumbent president to win reelection when he's polling below 50 percent.

#### The plan creates jobs in key swing states -- boosts reelection probability.

Korte, 4-27-12

[Gregory, USA Today, “Politics stands in the way of nuclear plant's future,” http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-04-13/usec-centrifuges-loan-guarantees/54560118/1]

. USEC estimates the project at its peak will generate 3,158 jobs in Ohio, and 4,284 elsewhere. Pike County, home to the centrifuges, has a 13% unemployment rate — the highest in Ohio. The median household income is about $40,000. The average job at USEC pays $77,316. Centrifuge parts are stacked up in Piketon. "It's as shovel-ready as they come," says spokeswoman Angela Duduit. Indeed, the project has enjoyed bipartisan support. A USA TODAY review of DOE records shows that no fewer than 46 members of Congress — 32 Republicans and 14 Democrats — have pressured the Obama administration to approve the loan guarantee for USEC. "Quick action is paramount," said one bipartisan letter. "It is imperative that this application move forward now," said another. The congressional support comes from states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Missouri, Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina— an almost exact overlay of the states that would benefit from the 7,442 jobs the company says would be created.

#### Plan wouldn’t affect the important states

Joel Kotkin 3-30-2012; executive editor of NewGeography.com and is a distinguished presidential fellow in urban futures at Chapman University, and contributing editor to the City Journal in New York. He is author of The City: A Global History. His newest book is The Next Hundred Million: America in 2050, released in February, 2010. Is Energy the Last Good Issue for Republicans? <http://www.newgeography.com/content/002698-is-energy-last-good-issue-republicans>

In the short run, Obama’s political exposure in the energy wars is somewhat limited. Most of the big-producing states—Oklahoma, Wyoming, Utah, Texas, Louisiana, Alaska, and North Dakota—are unlikely to vote for him anyway. Nor does he have to worry about too much pressure from inside his party; Democratic ranks in Congress from energy-producing states have thinned considerably in recent years, removing contrary voices inside the party.

#### Public supports nuclear power expansion -- no safety concerns.

Bowman, 4-18-12 [Karlyn, American Enterprise Institute, “Polls on the environment, energy, global warming and nuclear power,” http://www.aei.org/papers/politics-and-public-opinion/polls/polls-on-the-environment-energy-global-warming-and-nuclear-power-april-2012/]

\* President Obama is getting low marks on his handling of gas prices. In a February 2012 AP/GfK-Roper poll, 39 percent approved of the job he is doing in this area. Significant majorities say rising gas prices have caused difficulties in their households. \* The majority of Americans still think nuclear power is safe. In a March 2012 Gallup poll, 57 percent favored using nuclear energy as one way to provide electricity for the United States. But people still wouldn’t want to build a nuclear plant in their backyard. Only 35 percent told CBS pollsters in March 2011 that they would approve of a nuclear power plant in their community, and 62 percent disapproved. \* Americans like an “all-of-the-above” energy strategy that includes more energy production, developing alternative energy sources, more conservation and nuclear power.

#### The plan saves obama’s election

David Rothkopf 6-12-2012; CEO and editor at large of Foreign Policy; Foreign Policy: 5 Ideas To Save Obama's Presidency http://www.npr.org/2012/06/12/154836962/foreign-policy-5-ideas-to-save-obamas-presidency

5. Energy. The idea of real energy independence once seemed like a dream. It should now be a national goal. The United States is already an energy exporter. According to a recent Citibank report, by 2020 "the U.S. should see combined domestic supply and Canadian imports of oil reach over 20 million barrels per day, while U.S. oil demand falls 2 million to below 17 million barrels per day, leaving a 3 million barrel per day surplus available for export." And with new gas discoveries, alternative energy technologies, offshore resources, and the promise of huge Canadian reserves, we ought to be able to say that North America can be energy independent by 2030. Certainly, we can set the goal of no longer depending on a drop of oil from the volatile, dangerous Middle East. Tom Friedman has been right about this "moon shot" for many years now, and with each month new discoveries suggest it is more rather than less achievable. Start with a commitment to framing in the next 12 months a whole-of-the-economy, whole-of-government energy policy — just the kind of strategy the United States has never had until now. Will this cure what ails the Obama campaign? Not instantly. But here's the most important point: The Obama team needs to accept that its legitimate distaste for the Republican theme of economic Darwinism (campaign slogan: Let's make Americans work harder to make the 1 percent even richer) is not enough around which to build a campaign. The White House has to offer a real alternative, not just to Romney but to many of the sometimes disappointing, business-as-usual, Obama results of the past three and a half years.

#### Not tied to Obama

Caruso, ‘10

[Doug, The Colombus Dispatch, 3-7, “The mighty thorium: The nearly perfect energy source nobody has heard of,” http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/science/2010/03/07/thorium-art-gc67nvgb-1.html]

The Department of Energy approved $200,000 in funding at Oak Ridge for analytical studies this year of molten salt reactors using thorium and uranium, a department spokeswoman said. In 2008, Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, and Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nevada., introduced a bill that would direct thorium research begin at the Idaho National Laboratory. They introduced a new bill last week.

#### Also did loan guarantees earlier

#### Already spent

**Laing 7/16 –** <http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/highways-bridges-and-roads/238161-obama-touts-highway-bill-as-modest-sign-of-cooperation-from-congress>

President Obama said Monday that lawmakers' recent approval of a $105 billion transportation spending bill was a sign of possible cooperation in the future between him and Republicans in Congress.
The transportation bill, which was the first new road and transit spending deal approved [since 2005](http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/highways-bridges-and-roads/235683-lawmakers-exhale-after-heavy-lift-on-transportation-bill), was signed by Obama earlier this month after months of contentious debate between Democrats and Republicans in Congress.

#### Romney wouldn’t start a trade war with China if elected

**Politico, 9-15-12**, p. http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81254.html

Mitt Romney is hoping his tough talk on China policy will win him votes — but few of his big business donors or fellow Republicans support what he’s saying or believe he’d follow through if elected.¶ And if he did, many analysts say, he’d likely spark a disastrous and counter-productive trade war that would hurt both American consumers and the workers he says he’s trying to protect. But Romney advisers say voters shouldn’t expect him to back off the tough talk if he gets elected, and other experts say fears of a “trade war” are overblown since the Chinese need the American market just as much consumers like cheap Chinese imports.

#### Romney is all talk- won’t actually crack down on China

NYT 12 (New York Times, John Hardwood, writer, “The Electoral Math of Romney’s Stance on Trade With China”, 3/22, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/politics/mitt-romneys-stance-on-china-trade.html?\_r=1&pagewanted=all)

WASHINGTON — Among all the elements of Mitt Romney’s 59-point economic plan, his vow to crack down on China’s trade policy would seem the most out of place. That is not because his promise to label China a “currency manipulator” and impose tariff penalties is unique. Plenty of politicians in both parties talk tough about Beijing. What is unusual is that Mr. Romney, a former financial executive identified with Republicans’ free-trade, pro-business wing, has promised to go further than Presidents Obama or George W. Bush in confronting China. Some other business-friendly Republicans warn that his approach could set off a counterproductive trade war that would damage the United States economy. The political question is whether Mr. Romney’s stance can attract enough votes to give him the chance to put it into effect. That question echoes through Republican primaries, in which he has struggled to connect with working-class conservatives, and a possible general election against Mr. Obama. Republican and Democratic strategists alike say that confronting China can play effectively to an anxious public’s sense of economic grievance. The Obama administration has recently lodged a complaint with the World Trade Organization against China’s handling of crucial rare earth mineral exports, and imposed tariffs on Chinese solar panels to counter what it considers unfair subsidies by Beijing. “With blue-collar voters specifically, there’s a perception that we have an economic adversary in China that doesn’t play by the rules,” said Geoff Garin, a Democratic pollster. And the concern “cuts across socioeconomic lines,” said Tony Fabrizio, a Republican pollster, who said higher-income voters fear that China’s ownership of United States government debt threatens American security. Yet prominent figures who generally share Mr. Romney’s economic outlook have criticized his stance, which the Wall Street Journal editorial page called “Romney’s China Blunder.” Business leaders, while pressing for China to open its markets and protect intellectual property, caution that labeling China a currency manipulator could backfire, harming those efforts. Jon M. Huntsman Jr., who was ambassador to China before embarking on his failed bid for the Republican presidential nomination, accused Mr. Romney of “total pandering” on the issue before exiting the race and endorsing him. Rick Santorum, now competing with Mr. Romney for blue-collar votes, has taken a similar view. “We all know Mitt Romney will do and say anything to get votes,” said Hogan Gidley, Mr. Santorum’s communications director. Mr. Obama’s advisers called Mr. Romney’s stance hypocritical. A Romney family blind trust owns a stake in an investment fund established by his former company, Bain Capital, that has bought a Chinese video surveillance company. And in his 2010 book, “No Apology,” Mr. Romney criticized Mr. Obama for levying a trade complaint against Chinese tire exports. Accusing Mr. Obama of acting to reward union supporters, he wrote, “Protectionism stifles productivity.” Mr. Romney’s China currency stance “is about as authentic as his brief flirtation with cheesy grits,” said David Axelrod, Mr. Obama’s top political strategist. “When you build a career around outsourcing, slashing jobs and wages, and profiting handsomely off of bankrupting companies, I don’t think people are going to be moved by what is an **obvious election-year conversion**.” One Romney adviser, Vin Weber, initially wondered whether the position reflected political calculation. When he joined internal discussions about Mr. Romney’s forthcoming economic plan last year, Mr. Weber said he sought to persuade other economic advisers to abandon the promised currency crackdown, which he still considers a policy mistake. Soon Mr. Weber was making that case directly to the candidate — who rejected the appeal and insisted his policy is the right one. “This is directly from him,” said Mr. Weber, a Washington lobbyist and former Republican congressman from Minnesota. “He believes it will strengthen his hand substantially. Mitt Romney is a person who sees himself as a successful negotiator.” Underpinning Mr. Romney’s argument is his assertion that recent presidents of both parties have been “played like a fiddle” by Chinese leaders. By keeping the yuan’s value lower against the dollar than market forces would dictate, Beijing makes exports to the United States cheaper and imports from the United States more expensive. In a Republican debate last year, Mr. Romney said China’s interest in smooth relations with a mammoth customer like the United States would preclude his actions from backfiring. “You think they want to have a trade war?” Mr. Romney said. “If you are not willing to stand up to China, you will get run over by China, and that’s what’s happened for 20 years.” That assertion grates on veterans of the Bush administration, which in 2006 began a “strategic economic dialogue” with China led by Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., a former chairman of Goldman Sachs. The Obama administration has extended that dialogue, pressing Beijing to raise the value of the yuan while stopping short of declaring China a currency manipulator. “Both the Bush and Obama administrations have been as aggressive as possible while protecting the American people,” said Neel T. Kashkari, a Bush administration Treasury official now at Pimco, the giant bond-trading firm. “Launching a trade war with China would hurt us as much as it would hurt them.” Mr. Romney’s economic plan makes it sounds as if he is willing to take that risk. It lists the currency crackdown among five executive orders he pledges to issue on “Day 1” of his presidency. But a close reading of the language suggests **he has left himself an out**. It pledges to label China a currency manipulator “if China does not quickly move to float its currency.” China has already been raising the value of its currency against the dollar somewhat in recent years, including by 4.7 percent in 2011. Some experts on China policy predict a President Romney would find a way to sidestep his pledge once electioneering gave way to governance. “It is a campaign, after all,” said Nicholas R. Lardy, a fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “My forecast is that if Romney becomes president there will be **little or no change in our China policy**.”

#### China won’t retaliate—no impact

Bosco 9/6—national security consultant, master of laws from Georgetown (Joseph A., 9/6/12, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/china-and-a-mitt-romney-presidency/2012/09/06/32917432-f76f-11e1-a93b-7185e3f88849_story.html>, RBatra)

First, **it takes two to wage a “trade war.”** When China realizes that Mr. Romney is serious about declaring it a currency manipulator (which it is), **wiser counsel may well prevail in Beijing**. Playing by international rules is far more in China’s interest than is retaliating against free and fair trade. China could avoid the choice between dangerous escalation and embarrassing submission by preemptively starting to free its currency before a Romney inauguration.

#### The debates and labor statistics will determine the election

**Lombardo, 9/12**/12 - Global CEO, StrategyOne (Steve, “Why This Election Comes Down to Two Days in October,” Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-lombardo/election-monitor-why-this\_b\_1877815.html)

Several national polls released this week show that President Obama received a small but meaningful bounce after the conventions. The bounce -- in the 3-5 point range -- is within the median for convention bounces since 1964. The problem for Republicans is that Romney got no bounce from his convention. In fact, his vote share likely shrunk a point or two in the last two weeks. While the Republican convention may have strengthened Romney's position with the base, it did little to expand his coalition. The momentum from "You didn't build that" has been halted. ¶ However, we see nothing in the data yet to suggest this is anything but a dead heat. For all the hand wringing over the GOP convention and the Romney campaign they are in a dead heat with an incumbent President with 55 days to go. When you look at likely voters in key swing states, this thing is truly 50/50. ¶ Here is our take as of 12 a.m. EST: ¶ The murder of Ambassador Stevens and the unrest in Libya will thrust both candidates into the foreign policy fray. It will be very interesting to see how each handles the coming hours and days and how much the media -- and ultimately voters -- focuses on the issue.¶ Look for a higher level of advertising spend from the Romney campaign in key battleground states over the next two weeks. History has shown that the candidate who is clearly in the lead by mid to late September will likely be the winner in November. That doesn't mean things can't change in October -- they can. But sentiment will start to firm up in the next two weeks. The Romney campaign has a $60 million cash-on-hand advantage, and they should use it now. Team Obama defined Romney in the spring using their cash advantage; the Romney campaign should not wait until October. They need to change the dynamic before October 1.¶ The two biggest dates of the campaign are October 3rd and October 5th. The first debate will be held on Wednesday, October 3rd at the University of Denver at 9 p.m. EST. For three reasons this will be far and away the most important debate:¶ It is the first and therefore, unless there is a major blunder, is likely to be the one that sets the image of Romney in stone.¶ We really do not believe that the other two will matter if Romney has a poor debate performance here. Romney has to win this debate pure and simple.¶ This one is purely on domestic policy, i.e. the economy. If Romney can't win this one, he is unlikely to win the other two, barring a miscue by the President.¶ On October 5th at 8:30 a.m. EST the Bureau of Labor Statistics will release the September unemployment numbers. This will be the most impactful announcement of the campaign. If the unemployment rate goes up it could be devastating for the president's reelection chances. Similarly, if it goes down -- especially if it goes below 8 percent -- it may pretty much secure an Obama victory in November.¶

### 2AC 123

#### Prolif collapses alliances

Kroenig, 12 [May 26th, Matthew Kroenig: Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future? Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30>]

Undermines alliances: The spread of nuclear weapons also complicates U.S. alliance relationships. Washington uses the promise of military protection as a way to cement its alliance structures. U.S. allies depend on America’s protection, giving Washington influence over allied states’ foreign policies. Historically, the United States has offered, and threatened to retract, the security guarantee carrot to prevent allied states from acting contrary to its interests. As nuclear weapons spread, however, alliances held together by promises of military protection are undermined in two ways. First, U.S. allies may doubt the credibility of Washington’s commitments to provide a military defense against nuclear-armed states, leading them to weaken ties with their patron. As Charles de Gaulle famously asked about the U.S. commitment to defend France from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, would Washington be willing to trade New York for Paris? Similarly, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, U.S. partners in the Middle East, such as Israel and Gulf States, will question Washington’s resolve to defend them from Iran. After all, if the United States proves unwilling to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, would it really be willing to fight a war against a nuclear-armed Iran? Qatar, for example, already appears to be hedging its bets, loosening ties to Washington and warming to Tehran. Second, nuclear proliferation could encourage client states to acquire nuclear weapons themselves, giving them greater security independence and making them less dependable allies. According to many scholars, the acquisition of the force de frappe was instrumental in permitting the French Fifth Republic under President Charles de Gualle to pursue a foreign policy path independent from Washington at NATO.[[1]](#footnote-1)[68] Similarly, it is possible that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other regional states will acquire independent nuclear capabilities to counter Iran’s nuclear arsenal, greatly destabilizing an already unstable region and threatening Washington’s ability to influence regional dynamics.

#### South Korea doesn’t care about the U.S. security alliance – ties with China check

**Ross 10**—Professor of Political Science at Boston College, Associate, John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University (Robert S., Fall 2010, Orbis, The Rise of Chinese Power and the Implications for the Regional Security Order, 10.1016/j.orbis.2010.07.003, RBatra)

These trends in South Korean defense policy also explain Seoul’s **sanguine response to U.S. troop reduction** in South Korea. When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, **at the height of the U.S. preparations for war against North Korea** in 2003, proposed removal of U.S. troops from the demilitarized zone and a reduction of U.S. military presence on the peninsula, Seoul merely questioned the timing of the proposal and then entered into negotiations regarding the schedule for U.S. redeployments. In 2004, when the U.S. announced that it would transfer 4,000 troops from South Korea to Iraq and that in 2005 it would reduce its forces in South Korea by one-third, **Seoul was not alarmed**.15 By the end of the Bush administration, there had been a 40 percent reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea. In the context of South Korean accommodation of the rise of China, **U.S. military presence had become less relevant** to South Korean security. In 2005, former South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung explained that South Korea planned to be less dependent on its alliance with the United States and that it would **increasingly cooperate with Russia and China** as it developed a balancer role in Northeast Asia.16

The rise of China has thus compelled South Korea to accommodate China’s foremost security interest in the Korean Peninsula – minimal great power capabilities on the Korean Peninsula that could challenge Chinese security. The United States and South Korea will remain ‘‘security partners,’’ their militaries will continue to train together, and South Korea will continue to buy advanced U.S. weapons. Nonetheless, South Korea increasingly seeks security **primarily through cooperation with China**, rather than primarily through cooperation with the United States.

#### The ROK alliance is dead

**Denmark & Hosford 10** – Fellow and Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security (December 2010, Abraham M. Denmark and Zachary M. Hosford, Center for a New American Security, “ Securing South Korea: A Strategic Alliance for the 21st Century,” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_South%20Korea\_DenmarkHosford.pdf, JMP)

America’s Constraints

For the foreseeable future, the United States will face **several constraints on the exercise of American military power that will directly affect the U.S.-ROK alliance**.3 Strategists in Washington and Seoul should recognize these constraints, and adjust the alliance to reflect this new reality.

Persistent economic hardships stemming from the 2008 financial crisis, and a debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio that is projected to exceed the post-World War II record of 109 percent as early as 2020, may **constrain America’s ability to project and sustain military power**.4 For this reason, the Obama administration’s 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy linked America’s economic strength to its geopolitical power; it is also why the United States Joint Forces Command’s 2010 Joint Operating Environment report identified the nation’s growing debt problem as **the major threat to U.S. national security**.5

American public sentiment regarding overseas commitments – in part driven by domestic economic constraints – will also influence how the United States deploys its military resources. After nine years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American people are growing tired of foreign entanglements. According to public opinion polls, support for the ongoing wars is declining and Americans increasingly believe that other issues are significantly more important than foreign policy.6 According to a 2010 survey of American opinion by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 91 percent of Americans think it is more important for the United States to fix problems at home rather than address challenges abroad, and 71 percent think the United States should do its share to solve international problems together with other countries.7 This generally comports with Korea-specific elements of the survey, in which 56 percent of Americans said they opposed the use of U.S. troops if North Korea invaded the South, but 61 percent favored the use of U.S. troops if they were part of a U.N.-sponsored effort to reverse North Korean aggression.⁸

Furthermore, the U.S. military’s current focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to the many other security problems the U.S. military may face in the coming years, may weaken its ability to focus on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) identified a wide variety of challenges for the future of the U.S. military, including counterterrorism, stabilizing fragile states, preventing human suffering due to natural disaster, defeating aggression by adversaries armed with advanced anti-access capabilities, protecting the global commons and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁹

Moreover, population-centric counterinsurgency operations such as those being employed by the United States in Afghanistan require large numbers of troops, and the all-volunteer U.S. military force has been, at times, hard pressed to meet deployment requirements.1⁰ The scale and scope of these challenges will strain the U.S. military’s capacity, leading to American calls for allies and partners to play a greater role in ensuring stability.¹¹

#### China makes collapse of the alliance inevitable

**Kang 7**—Professor of Government, Dartmouth College (David C., no date given but latest cited is 2007, Forging an Enduring Foundation for U.S.-Rok Relations, <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/programs/program_pdfs/rok_us_kang.pdf>, RBatra)

In an optimistic scenario where China and the U.S. manage their relations well, Seoul will have more freedom to retain warm relations with both Washington and Beijing, and to strengthen the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance. Current U.S. policy is to engage China and urge it to become a “responsible stakeholder,” in the region. 9 Note that although the concept of responsible stakeholder contains both value and interest connotations, if the Chinese can credibly signal that their goals are benign, many observers will probably be willing to put off the question of Chinese identity and values far into the future. Chinese behavior during the Six Party Talks, for example, has been seen as one indicator that it may be becoming a prudent force in the region. Should this continue, and should the U.S. manage to keep its relations with China at least cordial, the prospects for managing the U.S.-R.O.K. alliance are fairly bright.

Under a pessimistic scenario, however, the U.S. and China may begin to slide into more confrontation. In that instance, Seoul will find itself in an exceptionally difficult situation, one which could very well **rupture the alliance**. Especially if the U.S. binds its East Asian foreign policy to Japan while the rest of East Asia leans more toward China, South Korea would be in the most difficult position of any East Asian country. For now, Seoul has managed to avoid confronting this difficult issue by “choosing not to decide.” Indeed, policymakers in Seoul would probably like to avoid ever having to make a stark choice between the U.S. and China. Unfortunately, **Seoul** **may not have that luxury**.

#### Alliance doesn’t prevent any credible scenario for Asian war

Bandow 3 (Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, “Ending the Anachronistic Korean Commitment”, Parameters, 33, Summer, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03summer/bandow%20.pdf)

Advocates of a permanent US occupation talk grandly of regional stability. However, it would be a miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged in the Cold War and created to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighbor turned out to be the perfect arrangement to meet completely different contingencies in a completely different security environment. In fact, there are no secondary “dual-use” functions for America’s soldiers to perform. For instance, US and Chinese interests might eventually collide, but America’s deployments in Korea would provide little value in that scenario. No US administration would initiate a ground invasion against the PRC. And South Korea, like Japan for that matter, is unlikely to allow itself to become the staging ground for such a conflict. To do so would turn itself into China’s permanent enemy. Containing a resurgent Tokyo is an even more fanciful role. The greatest threats to regional stability are internal—insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democratic protests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic, nationalistic, and religious division in Indonesia. But they impinge no vital American interests and are not susceptible to solution by the US military.18 Even more distant are “such transnational threats as terrorism, piracy, drug- trafficking, and infectious diseases,” cited in a recent article by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Carl Haselden.19 What, one wonders, would troops in Korea do to combat AIDS? In sum, without any connection to the larger Cold War and global hegemonic struggle, Korea is relatively unimportant to the United States. So some American policymakers make an entirely different argument: outposts in the ROK allow the United States to base soldiers overseas at someone else’s cost. But such security guarantees require Washington to create additional units, a cost that America’s allies do not cover.20 Moreover, friendly states are not likely to long accept a foreign occupation carried out solely to save money for Americans.

#### Stronger South Korea would fill-in – solves the impact

Carpenter and Bandow 4 (Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, and Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute, The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea, p. 130-131)

William Cohen worries that a conventional pull-out from South Korea would spark Japan to develop nuclear weapons.53 This suggests a long, dubious daisy chain of events. Moreover, the end result, as discussed earlier, is still likely to be better than the alternative of American involvement in a regional con‑ frontation involving North Korea, or even worse, the People's Republic of China. If Washington backs away from defending Japan and the ROK, worries Haselden, "a power vacuum" might ensue, and "the instability between nations with combined strong economies and militaries could lead to an arms race having detrimental effects on regional stability and the global economy."54 In fact, this was a constant refrain before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke went so far as to contend that the loss of Korea "would be the end of our position in the entire Pacific."55 Ambassador William Gleysteen Jr. said the alliance contributes "importantly to the regional balance of power."56 Similarly, Heritage Foundation president Edwin Feulner once called the Mutual Defense Treaty "a linchpin for stability in the entire Northeast Asian region."57 In 1990 Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney warned that a U.S. with­drawal would be followed by a vacuum. As a result, "There almost surely would be a series of destabilizing regional arms races, an increase in regional tensions, and possibly confiict."58 In early 1995 the Department of Defense made much the same pitch, promising to maintain the alliance "even after the North Korean threat passes . .. in the interest of regional security."59 Yet in 1997, when no one was questioning the U.S. commitment, mili­tary analyst Michael Klare reported: "Throughout East Asia, countries are spending more on their military forces, making this the only region in the world where military expenditures have been rising since the end of the Cold War."6° The regional economic crisis, not the American military commitment, temporarily reversed this process. In any case, it is difficult to develop a scenario involving real war between real countries, with or without an arms race: no general East Asian conflict seems to be threatening to break out. The region is no longer the focus of global hegemonic competition. All of the major regional powers benefit from peace; none has significant and growing differences with other major powers. Potential sources of discord are mostly within small states—Burma, Cambo­dia, and the Philippines, in particular. (The only major state with serious in­ternal instability is Indonesia.) The United States might have been the key to regional stability 40, 30, and even 20 years ago. That it was the key 10 years ago is doubtful and that it is the key today is very unlikely. In the end, the issue again seems to come down to the ROK's preference to free-ride on the United States. For instance, Kim Sung-han of IFANS com­plains about a "vacuum" in the absence of American troops, which might force the ROK and then Japan to develop nuclear weapons.6' Perhaps. But even if regional political frictions increased, a stronger ROK and Japan would help contain, not exacerbate, those problems. Both countries would be forces for regional stability, not disruption. Nor is it clear how unexplained regional "instability," as opposed to wide­spread conflict, would harm the global economy. Only if the nations through­out East Asia essentially collapsed would there be substantial harm to America and other countries, and, again, it is hard to build a plausible scenario leading to such a result. Moreover, subsidizing the defense of populous and prosperous allies involves a substantial redistribution of wealth from Americans to, in this case, Koreans. Their economy may gain from that process; not so ours, which bears the added military burden. The end of America's defense commitment to the ROK would not termi­nate U.S. influence in the region. With the world's largest and most produc­tive economy and dominant culture, a stable constitutional system and attractive entrepreneurial environment, and the globe's most powerful mili­tary, America would remain influential. A willingness to station an infantry di­vision that has little practical to do in Northeast Asia is unlikely to augment Washington's authority.

#### The alliance causes prolif and the nuclear umbrella is already shot

**CSIS 10** (Pacific Forum CSIS, August 2010, Issues & Insights, “The Cheonan’s Long Shadow: The Second US-ROK Strategic Dialogue,” <http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol10n22.pdf>, JMP)

Extended deterrence has been a pillar of the US-ROK alliance strategy and is a key symbol of the US commitment to the defense of South Korea. Our South Korean presenter argued that the nuclear component of that strategy has been gradually reduced as a result of South Korea’s decision to not pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and the unilateral withdrawal of US nuclear weapons in early 1990s. At the same time, however, **North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons capability to neutralize the US-ROK alliance**. Our South Korean presenter warned that this creates vulnerability in the ROK and should make both it and the US wary of any peace settlement with the North that does not resolve the nuclear imbalance on the Korean Peninsula.

From this perspective, the negative security assurance contained in the US Nuclear Posture Review, which says that the US will not use nuclear weapons against a state that signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not use nuclear weapons, weakens the US commitment to the defense of South Korea. Our ROK presenter argued that this negative security assurance means that if North Korea says it will give up its nuclear weapons, the nuclear umbrella for the ROK will disappear even though North Korea retains other asymmetric capabilities including chemical and biological weapons.

#### China’s top priority is to preserve North Korea as a buffer against the U.S.—causes them to water down sanctions

**Carpenter 10**—vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute (Ted Galen, Winter 2010, Plan B for Dealing with North Korea, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/Policy-TedGalenCarpenter.pdf>, RBatra)

The strategy of imposing tighter economic sanctions also faces major hurdles. Both Beijing and Moscow have consistently opposed vigorous sanctions in the UN Security Council, arguing that they will make Pyongyang less rather than more cooperative. The Russians and Chinese (particularly the latter) were successful in dramatically diluting the 2009 sanctions that the United States and Japan wanted.

It is especially important to understand the reasons for China's reluctance to endorse truly robust sanctions. Although a few Sinophobes in the United States charge that China is in league with the North Koreans and would not mind a nuclear-armed North Korea, most evidence suggests that Beijing is not eager to see nuclear weapons introduced on the Korean Peninsula. Among other drawbacks, such a development may lead the Japanese to build nuclear deterrents of their own, which is the last thing China wants.

Maintaining the non-nuclear status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be a significant Chinese objective, but it is not their most important one.5 **Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a buffer between China and the US sphere of influence** in Northeast Asia. Chinese leaders probably fear that rigorous sanctions would increase the danger of the North Korean state imploding, much as East Germany did in 1989. Such a development could lead to a unified Korea allied to the United States right on China's doorsteps-probably with the **continued presence** of American military bases on the Korean Peninsula. It might lead to a massive flow of North Korean refugees into China. Uneasiness over these scenarios limits the amount of pressure that Beijing is willing to exert on Pyongyang.

In theory, China might be able to use its economic leverage as North Korea's principal source of energy, food, and other vital commodities to **compel Kim** Jong Il**'s regime to halt its nuclear weapons program. Without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang**. And given Washington's dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US Treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions.

#### That’s key to solve Korean war

**Kelly 10**—Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University (Robert E., 16 December 2010, Yeonpyeong Shelling Summation (2): More Causes in Hindsight, <http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2010/12/16/yeonpyeong-shelling-summation-2-more-causes-in-hindsight/>, RBatra)

China continues to calculate that an erratic, nuclearized NK is preferable to unification on Southern terms. A peninsula-wide version of SK is the only realistic unity scenario given NK’s extreme backwardness – decrepit, corrupt NK probably could not even manage the whole peninsula – and SK’s demonstrated unwillingness to sacrifice democracy for unity. **China’s continued subsidization for NK’s economy is well-known and has only become more crucial** as events like the famines, failed currency reform, UN sanctions, expensive nuclear program, and continued resistance to Chinese-style reforms have effectively devastated the NK economy, all the more ironic for its autarkic claims of juche. (The CIA estimates NK’s GDP at just $42 billion for 24 million people.) China’s refusal to endorse the Security Council reprimand of NK over the Cheonan signaled that when pushed, it will choose North over South.

**This opens the door for continued NK intransigence and provocation. Given NK’s extreme asymmetric dependence on China**, it is highly unlikely that NK would openly cross its benefactor. One can only speculate what if any Chinese red-line warnings on provocations were given to Kim Jong-Il on his recent trips to Beijing. Yeonpyeong probably did not cross that line, as the Chinese response has been widely regarded as tepid and insufficient.

#### Korea war goes global and nuclear

**STRATFOR 10** (5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100526_north_korea_south_korea_military_balance_peninsula>, JMP)

So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, **the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real.**

Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall.

For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too **easily escalate into** and **a thermonuclear World War III**, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward.

Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions are **quickly escalating to a level unprecedented** in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.

#### Chinese cooperation on sanctioning North Korea is the only way to solve de-nuclearization

**Oh 10**—PhD from Korea University in North Korean studies, researcher at the Sejong Institute (Gyeong-seob, Sejong Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010, “International Cooperation for the Denuclearization of North Korea: Limitations and Alternatives,” RBatra)

To force North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs, the international community has to consider the fact that the North has developed **nuclear weapons as a means of survival**. It should therefore either make it too costly for the North to continue its nuclear programs – to the extent that possessing nuclear arms threatens the existence of the regime – or collectively guarantee its survival. The international community, however, has failed to increase the cost for the North’s nuclear armament due to the limitations of applied sanctions. On the other hand, under the anarchistic system of the international community, it also is difficult for nations to provide comprehensive security measures to protect North Korea, let alone carry them out, because nations are afraid of being deceived by others.

Those are the two key obstacles to international cooperation in the denuclearization of North Korea.

2) Limitations of the Sanctions

**For successful international cooperation in denuclearizing North Korea, the cost of possessing nuclear weapons and subsequent disadvantage should be so immense as to make the North’s regime feel a serious threat of its demise**. To arouse such a sense of vulnerability, concerned nations should take military options or enforce strong punitive sanctions. But a military strike has been excluded from feasible options since the first North Korean nuclear crisis of the early 1990s. At the height of the first nuclear crisis, Washington had prepared phased military action as well as economic sanctions, but the military option was shelved after former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang. Both South Korean and Chinese authorities also strongly objected to taking military actions against the North: Seoul feared the possibility of an all-out war with the North while China was worried about the destabilization of the regional situation.

Therefore, from the first nuclear crisis, North Korea perceived that the United States was unable to take military steps and consequently, the international community faced serious limitations in reining in North Korea. In the following years, the North test-fired long-range missiles, conducted nuclear tests twice and disclosed a uranium enrichment program to boldly escalate the crisis, and finally declared its being a nuclear-possessing power.

During the second North Korean nuclear crisis, South Korea and China opposed the U.S.-led economic sanctions against the North, which they argued would only aggravate the security situation on the Korean peninsula. Beginning in the late 1990s, South Korea promoted an engagement policy with the North, asserting that the South could induce the North to abandon its nuclear programs through dialogue if the international community eased pressure on the Pyongyang regime. The Roh Moo-hyun administration in Seoul did not take strong punitive actions even after the North conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 but instead increased economic aid and expanded economic cooperation.

China took a lukewarm attitude at the time of the North’s first nuclear test, and then agreed to the U.N. Security Council resolution after the second test, but without joining sanctions against Pyongyang. In other words, **the international community failed to deliver a clear message to North Korea that its possession of nuclear weapons could lead to the collapse of its present regime. And there also was no dramatic rise in the North’s cost of possessing nuclear arms**.

The UNSC adopted Resolution 1718 after North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and Resolution 1874 after the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Under these U.N. resolutions, North Korea is being subjected to international sanctions that include bans on financial transactions related to weapons of mass destruction and arms trade, search of suspected ships and seizure of banned items, and prohibition on exporting luxury goods to the North. But these measures have exposed fundamental limitations in threatening the survival of the North Korean regime.

3) Concerns about Deception among Nations

Some experts have claimed that North Korea would give up its nuclear programs when a peace treaty is concluded between the North and the United States and other nations concerned. This argument ignores the reality of international politics, however. When we review the events related to the North Korean nuclear issue over the past two decades, both the United States and North Korea were unable to reach an agreement because of their mutual distrust and they exhibited very little possibility of implementing any agreement because of their mutual worries of being deceived by the other side.

During the past 20 years, North Korea has deceived the international community by vowing nonproliferation but at the same time taking strenuous steps to obtain nuclear materials. At the time of the first nuclear crisis, North Korea broke its promise to accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and unilaterally declared withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The 1994 Agreed Framework, an accord between the United States and North Korea signed after months of negotiations in Geneva, was scrapped under mutual distrust prompted by the North’s acts of deception.

Pyongyang secretly carried out a uranium enrichment program after the signing of the Geneva accord, which provided a freeze of the North’s nuclear programs in exchange for energy aid by the United States, South Korea and other nations. The six-party talks to settle the second North Korean nuclear crisis have produced agreements and promises, none of which have been faithfully implemented. The two nuclear tests by North Korea have proved that the North has been cheating the international community.

A review of the first and second nuclear crises suggests an extremely low possibility that the international community and North Korea can reach an agreement through dialogue. Even if an agreement is reached, the chances are very low that the agreement will be honored, and there is no way of verifying its implementation if Pyongyang promises to do so.

The international community suspects that North Korea could break any promise and resume nuclear programs; on the other hand, the North would not completely trust the international community’s guarantee of the security of the regime. National security is a matter of survival and any mistake is irreversible. It is unrealistic to expect North Korea to forsake its nuclear programs on the back of international assurances.

Even if the United States and South Korea make good their assurance of North Korea’s security following complete denuclearization of the country, there still can be serious problems. Suppose the North Korean system is so durable that it can withstand external influences; the Pyongyang regime could quicken its economic openness and adopt reforms – and be unthreatened.

But, Pyongyang leaders know how vulnerable their system is. Since the collapse of the socialist system, North Korea has remained a pariah, pursuing “socialism of our own” and defying reform and openness. It is therefore unimaginable that North Korea would trust non-interference by the world in its domestic affairs. Summing up, North Korea’s demand for an international guarantee of its security is nothing but a ploy to justify its nuclear arsenal and to delay multilateral denuclearization talks.

2. China’s Non-participation in International Sanctions

**International efforts to disarm North Korea have failed because of China’s reluctance to participate in sanctions on the North**. Following North Korea’s second nuclear test in May 2009, there were heated debates between China’s “strategists” and “traditionalists.” The former argued that the Chinese government should strongly push for the North’s denuclearization by fully utilizing its political and economic leverage on Pyongyang, pointing to changes in the two countries’ bilateral relations. The traditionalists emphasized the importance of the Beijing-Pyongyang alliance. They called for substantial economic aid to the North, which they said was necessary to stabilize the North Korean situation and prevent provocative activities against South Korea and the United States.

The traditionalists won the debate. The Chinese government decided that the stabilization of the North Korean regime was more important than the denuclearization of the North. In order to prevent the fall of the North Korean regime, China started economic aid to the North.

When special relations between nations cause a crack in international sanctions against a targeted country, **the measures are destined to lose their effect.** China resisted sanctions on North Korea because of its unstable relations with the United States. In the post-Cold War era, the ideological and systemic differences between the United States and China and their economic and psychological conflicts have produced a roller-coaster relationship that alternates between competition and cooperation.

#### The alliance causes a cycle of mistrust between the u.s. and china – solves all scenarios for Asian war

**Zhu 12/13**—John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur chair in East Asian politics and an associate professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University (Zhiqun, 13 December 2010, “North Korea tests US-China relations,” <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2010/12/137_77935.html>, RBatra)

Beijing is deeply concerned about a quick South Korean and U.S. takeover of North Korea **with U.S. troops at China's doorsteps**. Beijing and Washington seem to be sliding into **a vicious cycle of mutual strategic mistrust.** The deeper the mistrust, the more valuable North Korea is to China.

Clearly, the key to solving the North Korea problem lies in cooperative U.S.-China relations. **Beijing and Washington must make sure that their long-term interests in Asia do not clash**. A strong relationship between Beijing and Washington is crucial for untying the North Korea knot and achieving long-lasting peace in Asia.

#### A withdrawal of forces from South Korea forces it to modernize its defense—this is key to a peaceful China rise

**Bandow 9** – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan (6/16/09, Doug, “A Tattered Umbrella,” <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21606>, JMP)

South Korea’s foreign minister reports that Washington plans to guarantee his nation’s defense against a nuclear-armed North Korea in writing. The promise reportedly will be formalized when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits the United States this week. It’s a bad idea. Washington should be shedding defense responsibilities, not increasing them.

More than a half century after the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) remains surprisingly dependent on America. It’s as if the United States was cowering before the Mexican military, begging its friends in Europe for help. In fact, the ROK requires no assistance to defend itself from conventional attack.

The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has a strong numerical military advantage over the South: about 1.1 million personnel under arms, compared to fewer than seven hundred thousand for Seoul. Pyongyang also has impressive numbers of other weapons, including more than four thousand tanks and roughly eighteen thousand artillery pieces.

However, most of the North’s equipment is decades old, a generation or two behind even that of the long-gone Soviet Union. Training is minimal and many of the DPRK’s military personnel perform construction and similar tasks. The Korean peninsula’s rugged geography favors defense. Putting thousands of antiquated tanks backed by hundreds of thousands of malnourished soldiers on the move south would create a human “turkey shoot” of epic proportions.

Anyway, the ROK’s numerical inferiority is a **matter of choice**, not an immutable artifact of geography. In its early years the South’s resources were sharply limited. But today, South Korea is thought to have upwards of forty times the North’s GDP. Seoul also possesses a substantial industrial base, sports high-tech expertise and enjoys a sterling international credit rating. The ROK’s population is twice that of the North. South Korea could spend more than the equivalent of North Korea’s entire economy on defense if the former wished. But it hasn’t wished to do so, **preferring to rely on Washington instead.**

The time for subsidizing wealthy allies has long passed. The financial crisis makes it imperative that the United States return to such nations responsibility for their own defense. Undoubtedly an American withdrawal would **result in a far-reaching debate among South Koreans** over how much they felt threatened by the North and how much they believed necessary to spend in response. But that is precisely the debate they should have had years ago. The prospect of a nuclear North Korea obviously is more frightening than even one with ample numbers of artillery pieces targeting the city of Seoul. But there is little reason to believe that the North has any deliverable weapons at this point.

Given present course, that time is likely, but not certain, to come. However, South Korea has time to prepare. Rather than relying on America for its protection, Seoul should invest in missile defense and enhance its air-defense capabilities. The South also should consider **creating a conventional deterrent**: the ability to respond to a nuclear strike by eliminating the Kim regime. That means **developing potent offensive missile and air attack capabilities.** (Japan, despite its quasi-pacifist constitution, should do the same.)

Such forces would help fulfill a second function: **deter an aggressive China**, if Beijing ever changed its policy from the oft-repeated “peaceful rise” to a more belligerent stance. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has much to gain from stability in East Asia and has worked to assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions. However, the future is unknowable. The best way for Beijing’s neighbors to ensure China’s rise is peaceful is to maintain armed forces sufficient to deter the PRC from considering military action.

Such a “dual use” capability would benefit the United States as well. The objective would not be a high-profile attempt at containment, but a low-profile capacity for deterrence, **relieving Washington of any need to intervene.** Most important, America should not reflexively extend its “nuclear umbrella” in response to the future possibility of a nuclear North Korea. Doing so would inevitably deepen American involvement in regional controversies, potentially turning every local dispute into an international crisis.

#### Chinese aggression against Taiwan will escalate and go nuclear

**Adams, 09** – reporter for global post and newsweek on China and Taiwan (3/31/09, Jonathon, Global Post, “The dragon sharpens its claws,” <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/china-and-its-neighbors/090331/the-dragon-sharpens-its-claws>)

TAIPEI — It's the stuff of dark sci-fi scenarios; the war that nobody wants.

But the most recent Pentagon report on China's military power — released last week — shows how high the stakes have become, in the unlikely event the United States and China ever do come to blows.

China has the world's fastest-growing military. It is building state-of-the art fighter jets, destroyers, and anti-ship missiles worth billions of dollars. It's just confirmed it will build an aircraft carrier.

And according to the Pentagon, it's now fielding a new nuclear force able to "inflict significant damage on most large American cities."

Most disturbing, Chinese military officials have publicly threatened to use that capability against the United States — in a conflict over Taiwan.

"China doesn't just threaten war, it **threatens nuclear war**," said John Tkacik, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat, at a forum in Taipei last weekend. "This is the kind of thing that rattles cages in the U.S."

For now, **Taiwan is the only plausible cause of military conflict between the world's superpower and the rising Asian giant.**

#### South Korea is perceived as dependent – makes foreign policy leadership impossible

Bandow 98 (Doug, Senior Fellow – Cato Institute and Robert A. Taft Fellow – American Conservative Defense Alliance, “America’s Obsolete Korean Commitment”, Orbis, 42(4), Fall, Ebsco)

Are there risks from American disengagement from Korea and ultimately East Asia? Of course -anything is possible, however unlikely. As historian William Stueck observes, the original Korean war was “laden with miscalculation on all sides.“31 But that record is all the more reason to disengage. Mistakes were made between 1945 and 1950 that gave Americans little choice but to fight another war less than five years after the end of World War II. With the end of the Cold War, however, Washington need no longer bear the burden of other nations’ mistakes. In turn, South Korea and its neighbors would no longer have to help pay for America’s mistakes. The ROK and Japan, in particular, should ponder carefully the costs of their continuing security dependence on Big Brother. The first is the negative social impact, exemplified by the 1995 subway brawl in South Korea and rape in Okinawa involving American servicemen. Washington is used to having other nations treat its troops as occupying heroes, but tens of thousands of young American soldiers are not always going to act like gentlemen sensitive to a foreign culture. The second is the question of respect accorded other nations, particularly the ROK. “Most people in South Korea are beginning to feel more prestigious and self-confident,” says newspaper columnist Kil Jeong Woo. “These kinds of things should be respected by our American friends, not ignored.“32 But they will be ignored so long as the South relies on what amounts to U.S. military charity. This issue may have consequences beyond simply wounding the national ego of its allies. While Washington is generally benevolent, there is no reason to expect it to put anyone else’s interest before its own. Nor is this ever likely to change: the United States has yet to establish a security partnership among equals. As Ted Galen Carpenter puts it, “It is not in the best interest of the South Korean people for the ROK to have its national survival in the hands of decision makers in Washington.“33 Conclusion Americans will stay as long as South Koreans want us, according to the manna chanted by successive American presidents and defense secretaries. But such a policy makes no sense, even for Seoul. Indeed, the ROK’s Ministry of National Defense has acknowledged the importance of developing “a future oriented defense policy in preparation for the twenty-first century and the post-unification era.” As South Korea emerges as a significant international player in economic and political terms, it needs to begin playing an equally influential and independent military role as well.

#### Perception of independence is key to effective South Korean diplomacy – solves extinction

Robertson 8 (Jeffrey, Trade Research Specialist with the Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Group – Australian Parliamentary Information and Research Service, “Middle Power: A New Strategy for Korea?”, Korea Herald, 3-28, Lexis)

However, increasingly common definitions of what constitutes a middle-power focus not solely upon measurements of capacity, but also on foreign policy behavior. Once states attain a middle-power status in capacity terms, their foreign policy behavior is thought to evolve toward a distinct form of "middle-power diplomacy" or "middlepower~~man~~ship." Middle-power diplomacy is marked by the tendency to seek compromise in international disputes, to seek multilateral solutions to global issues and to demonstrate "good international citizenship." Reflecting its status as a middle-power in terms of capacity measurements, it could be expected that South Korea would begin to demonstrate middle-power foreign policy behavior. Accordingly, a new national strategy for Korea could well be the pursuit of middlepowermanship. What is a middle-power foreign policy? The tendency to seek compromise in international disputes, to seek multilateral solutions to global issues and to demonstrate good international citizenship revolve around the status quo. The central aim of any middle-power is to ensure the maintenance of the status quo, and in doing so, maintain its comfortable position in the upper echelons of the international hierarchy of states. Essentially, they seek to maintain the existing international order so that they may continue to derive benefit from entrenched inequalities in power and wealth. South Korea has already demonstrated a tendency toward this. During the late 1990s, with the collapse of the North Korean economy and uncertainty regarding its leadership transition, South Korea had the greatest potential to topple North Korea in the history of the peninsula's division. Despite this, South Korea sought to maintain the status quo. The Sunshine Policy with its key principles of coexistence and rejection of attempts to absorb or forcefully unify the peninsula was welcomed by a South Korean population accustomed to an advanced level of economic development and aware of the risk that change represented. The Sunshine Policy demonstrated a vested interest in both compromise and in the maintenance of the status quo. Middlepowermanship, however, goes further than just a preference for the status quo. Middle-powers must ensure that there are tools to maintain the status quo. They have a strong stake in a rules-based international order. Multilateralism is the middle-power's best friend. In multilateral forums middle-powers can engage with lesser powers to constrain the actions of major powers, and equally, they can engage with major powers to ensure lesser powers do not upset the existing hierarchy. Whether it is in trade at the World Trade Organization, arms control at the United Nations or economics at the OECD, the ability of middle-powers to achieve a favorable diplomatic outcome is greatly enhanced by multilateralism. Middle-powers can achieve more in a multilateral setting than could possibly be achieved in a bilateral setting. South Korea is yet to fully explore the potential that multilateralism holds for a middle-power. Reflecting its history, the young South Korea did not have a chance to mold multilateralism as more established middle-powers did, but rather was molded by multilateralism. During the Cold War, its position at the frontline and its contested legitimacy as the representative of the Korean peninsula, severely constrained South Korean participation in multilateralism. While the Cold War is long past, to this day, there remains a certain level of cynicism regarding multilateralism in South Korea. Other more established middle-powers are marked by their active use of multilateralism to further diplomatic aims. The classic example is Australia at the WTO. After years of seeking adjustments to European Union and United States agricultural support in a bilateral context, Australia launched a campaign at the multilateral level, in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the forerunner of the WTO. Through active coalition building, Australia was instrumental in the creation of the Cairns Group - a coalition of 17 agricultural exporting states. As leader of the Cairns Group, Australia pushed its diplomatic agenda at a level that would have been impossible in a bilateral context. The Cairns Group allowed Australia access to high level meetings and greatly enhanced its negotiating position vis-a-vis its old negotiating foes in agricultural liberalization, the European Union and the United States. Today, South Korea has the potential to play a much larger role in multilateral forums than ever before. As a middle-power with a substantial diplomatic capacity (and a former foreign minister at the helm of the United Nations) South Korea could play a much larger role. Indeed, as a middle-power, it should. To strengthen multilateralism, middle-powers must also make commitments that sometimes seem less self-interested. Middle-powers must adhere to what former Australian Foreign Minister and current President of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans, coined good international citizenship. This includes strengthening rules-based regimes, such as nonproliferation controls, environmental protection and human rights, and also increasing cooperation to tackle pandemics, transnational crime and terrorism. Essentially, good international citizenship is a recognition of the interdependence between states and the need to address global problems in collaboration. Middle-powers also serve their own self-interest in promoting good international citizenship. By making commitments to peace-keeping, humanitarian operations, leading forums on tackling AIDS or combating environmental degradation, middle-powers gain credibility. Middle-powers need to be viewed as credible and independent actors in international affairs in order to strengthen their capacity to build coalitions and wage successful diplomatic campaigns. Middle-power challenges in Korea There are notable challenges to the pursuit of a middle-power foreign policy in South Korea. Firstly, reflecting its historical background, South Korea often falls victim to an internal policy debate between "independence" and "reliance" that can constrain its foreign policy choices. Since its emergence as a modern state, Korean foreign policy debate has centered on the question of independence versus reliance. A long time before the terms "sadaejuui" (reliance on a greater power) and "juche" (self-reliance) were corrupted by communist propaganda, these and other analogous terms framed the nationalist debate on how Korea should develop and modernize, and what role it should play in the region. Indeed, the debate between independence and reliance continues in contemporary South Korean politics, as can be seen in the clash of foreign policy aims between former President Roh Moo-hyun and current President Lee-Myung-bak. However, the question of independence versus reliance constrains South Korean foreign policy. In South Korea, as a result of the security situation on the peninsula, independence versus reliance is often framed as a debate between extremes and is further muddied by ideological overtones. This constrains South Korea's capacity to use reliance and independence as a means to achieve diplomatic aims.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)