### 2AC T

#### Counter interp – R&D is topical and the following laundry list

US Energy Information Administration, 1 (Renewable Energy 2000: Issues and Trends, Report prepared by the US Energy Information Administration, “Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy”, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/renewables/06282000.pdf)

Over the years, incentives and mandates for renewable energy have been used to advance different energy policies, such as ensuring energy security or promoting environmentally benign energy sources. Renewable energy has beneficial attributes, such as low emissions and replenishable energy supply, that are not fully reflected in the market price. Accordingly, governments have used a variety of programs to promote renewable energy resources, technologies, and renewable-based transportation fuels.1 This paper discusses: (1) financial incentives and regulatory mandates used by Federal and State governments and Federal research and develop- ment (R&D),2, 3 and (2) their effectiveness in promoting renewables. A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: • A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; • Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, • Creating or expanding a market for producers. The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase the production or consumption of the good or service over what it otherwise would have been without the incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost, thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s) provided.4 Regulatory mandates include both actions required by legislation and regulatory agencies (Federal or State). Examples of regulatory mandates are: requiring utilities to purchase power from nonutilities and requiring the incorporation of environmental impacts and other social costs in energy planning (full cost pricing). Another example is a requirement for a minimum percentage of generation from renewable energy sources (viz., a “renewable portfolio standard,” or, RPS). Regulatory mandates and financial incentives can produce similar results, but regulatory mandates generally require no expenditures or loss of revenue by the Government.

#### Prefer it –

#### Precision – our interp cites a federal source which is the resolutional agent – predictability is a precursor to substantive engagement

#### Limits – our interp is inclusive and creates a stable vision of the topic

#### Aff innovation is better – it fosters creativity and is more educational - its hard to be aff, certainty and federal key warrants make strategic construction difficult

#### No limits offense – functional limits check and some ground is inevitable

#### Reasonability – competing interpretations are bad - cause a race to the bottom that destroys substantive debate

### 2AC K

#### consequentialism is the best ethical system

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor, AG)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those tha’t we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Perm: do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### The enactment of an alternative by the judge is not an opportunity cost to federal action—proves they destroy rational decision-making skills

#### Instrumental rationality is the only meaningful way to value the external world

Kyung-Sig 03 Prof. Hwang, Kyung-sig, Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Korea “10.1 Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism” Eubios Ethics Institute <http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm>

Galileo's astronomy forced us to convert a literal to a perspective understanding of the claim that the sun is setting. His physics gave us the distinction, elaborated by John Locke, between primary and secondary qualities. A secondary quality is observer dependent, manufactured out of the primary motions of matter. Color is an experiential conversion of photon radiation; taste and smell are molecular operations. Coached by these theories, what is then to be said of value? If the sunset is not literally a setting sun, not even red, then surely it is not literally beautiful. Samuel Alexander proposed that values were *tertiary qualities*. Humans agree about redness, owing to their having the same organs, but value appraisals require an interpretive judgment twice removed from the qualities actually there. By this account, we have no organs to taste, touch, see or smell value. So it must originate at a deeper mental level. We have no options in judging length or redness. Such experiences happen to us without any liberty to refuse them. The primary and secondary qualities are always there in the scope of consciousness. They perhaps fall into the background, but they never turn off during perception. Value judgments, by contrast, have to be decided. Beauty and utility are things we must attend to. When our minds turn aside to other thoughts, though still perceiving the object, such values entirely disappear from consciousness. Both primary and secondary qualities are in this sense empirical or natural. But finding nothing that produces consensus or proves researchable, most judges become convinced that these tertiary qualities are overlays, not really they're in the natural world. They are observer-dependent, gifts of the spectator's mind.[[6]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#6) But I don't want to say I am radical subjectivist in value theory. Rather I agreed with an admirable account of C. I. Lewis. He hedges, and grants that natural objects carry, objectively *extrinsic value*, in effect, the standing possibility of valuation. They actually have a potential for value, even if this forever remains inexperienced or is mistakenly experienced. When an experience arrives, such objects do not refer us away from themselves, but we enjoy them for what they are. Nevertheless, they cannot own any *intrinsic value*. No objective existent has strictly intrinsic value; all values in objects are extrinsic only. The Goodness of good objects consists in the possibility of their leading to some realization of directly experienced goodness.[[7]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#7) Indeed, it is so narrow to deny value to all nonhuman elements of nature. The sheer exploitation of nature based on insensitivity to the ecological interrelatedness of life systems is mistaken. But this does not rule out the view that other things in nature are valuable, as W. H. Murdy states, "as instruments to man's survival or well-being". In fact as acknowledgement of our dependent relationships with nature grows, he writes, we place instrumental value on an ever-greater variety of things.[[8]](http://www.eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm#8) We value the ozone shield more highly when we realize it protects us from excessive radiation. We value phytoplankton in the oceans when we recognize that these organisms provide much of the earth's free oxygen, and so on. Greater sensitivity to the causal chains in nature will make us acknowledge an enormous range of instrumental value that other parts of the biosphere process. But for me, that is all part and parcel of a sophisticated anthropocentrism.

#### The role of the ballot is to simulate policy action – this is best – our framework is rooted in the resolution, making it more predictable and key to fair division of ground – other interpretations are self-serving and infinite.

#### Perm: the judge should do the alt and the United States federal government should do the plan

#### No risk of environmental collapse – tech solves and their impact is empirically denied

Bailey 2k—award-winning science correspondent for Reason magazine, testified before Congress, author of numerous books, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities [ Ronald, “Earth Day, Then and Now The planet's future has never looked better. Here's why.”, http://reason.com/archives/2000/05/01/earth-day-then-and-now/4]

"I'm scared," confessed Paul Ehrlich in the 1970 Earth Day issue of *Look*. "I have a 14 year old daughter whom I love very much. I know a lot of young people, and their world is being destroyed. My world is being destroyed. I'm 37 and I'd kind of like to live to be 67 in a reasonably pleasant world, and not die in some kind of holocaust in the next decade." Ehrlich didn't die in a holocaust, and the world is far more pleasant than he thought it would be. It is probably too much to hope that abashed humility will strike him and he'll desist in bedeviling the world with his dire and consistently wrong predictions. He's like a reverse Cassandra --Cassandra made true prophecies but no one would listen to her. Ehrlich makes false prophecies and everyone listens to him. There's much to celebrate on the 30th anniversary of Earth Day. Indeed, one of the chief things to get happy about is that the doomsters were so wrong. Civilization didn't collapse, hundreds of millions didn't die in famines, pesticides didn't cause epidemics of cancer, and the air and water didn't get dirtier in the industrialized countries. On the occasions when they admit things have gotten better, doomsters will claim whatever environmental progress has been made over the past 30 years is only a result of the warnings that they sounded. One of the more annoying characteristics of activists such as Ehrlich and Lester Brown is the way in which these prophets of doom get out ahead of a parade that has already started. When things get better, they claim that it's only because people heeded their warnings, not because of longstanding trends and increased efficiencies. As a result, there is always the danger that governments may actually enact their policies, thereby stifling technological progress and economic growth--and making the world worse off. Then the doomsters would be able to say "I told you so." So good or bad, they get to claim that they were right all along. What will Earth look like when Earth Day 60 rolls around in 2030? Here are my predictions: As the International Food Policy Research Institute projects, we will be able to feed the world's additional numbers and to provide them with a better diet. Because they are ultimately political in nature, poverty and malnutrition will not be eliminated, but economic growth will make many people in the developing world much better off. Technological improvements in agriculture will mean less soil erosion, better management of freshwater supplies, and higher productivity crops. Life expectancy in the developing world will likely increase from 65 years to 73 years, and probably more; in the First World, it will rise to more than 80 years. Metals and mineral prices will be even lower than they are today. The rate of deforestation in the developing world will continue to slow down and forest growth in the developed economies will increase. Meanwhile, as many developing countries become wealthier, they will start to pass through the environmental-transition thresholds for various pollutants, and their air and water quality will begin to improve. Certainly air and water quality in the United States, Europe, Japan, and other developed countries will be even better than it is today. Enormous progress will be made on the medical front, and diseases like AIDS and malaria may well be finally conquered. As for climate change, concern may be abating because the world's energy production mix is shifting toward natural gas and nuclear power. There is always the possibility that a technological breakthrough--say, cheap, efficient, non-polluting fuel cells--could radically reshape the energy sector. In any case a richer world will be much better able to cope with any environmental problems that might crop up. One final prediction, of which I'm most absolutely certain: There will be a disproportionately influential group of doomsters predicting that the future--and the present--never looked so bleak.

#### No impact to the environment

**Boucher 98** (Doug, "Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Science and Society, Fall, http://www.driftline.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive\_msg.cgi?file=spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international\_1998/marxism-international.9802&msgnum=379&start=32091&end=32412)

The political danger of catastrophism is matched by the weakness of its scientific foundation. Given the prevalence of the idea that the entire biosphere will soon collapse, it is remarkable how few good examples ecology can provide of this happening m even on the scale of an ecosystem, let alone a continent or the whole planet. Hundreds of ecological transformations, due to introductions of alien species, pollution, overexploitation, climate change and even collisions with asteroids, have been documented. They often change the functioning of ecosystems, and the abundance and diversity of their animals and plants, in dramatic ways. The effects on human society can be far-reaching, and often extremely negative for the majority of the population. But one feature has been a constant, nearly everywhere on earth: life goes on. Humans have been able to drive thousands of species to extinction, severely impoverish the soil, alter weather patterns, dramatically lower the biodiversity of natural communities, and incidentally cause great suffering for their posterity. They have not generally been able to prevent nature from growing back. As ecosystems are transformed, species are eliminated -- but opportunities are created for new ones. The natural world is changed, but never totally destroyed. Levins and Lewontin put it well: "The warning not to destroy the environment is empty: environment, like matter, cannot be created or destroyed. What we can do is replace environments we value by those we do not like" (Levins and Lewontin, 1994). Indeed, from a human point of view the most impressive feature of recorded history is that human societies have continued to grow and develop, despite all the terrible things they have done to the earth. Examples of the collapse of civilizations due to their over- exploitation of nature are few and far between. Most tend to be well in the past and poorly documented, and further investigation often shows that the reasons for collapse were fundamentally political.

#### Their k doesn’t deny that the whole plan is bad – vote aff for another justification

Hargraves, 12 [July, Robert, Robert Hargraves has written articles and made presentations about the liquid fluoride thorium reactor and energy cheaper than from coal – the only realistic way to dissuade nations from burning fossil fuels. His presentation “Aim High” about the technology and social benefits of the liquid fluoride thorium reactor has been presented to audiences at Dartmouth ILEAD, Thayer School of Engineering, Brown University, Columbia Earth Institute, Williams College, Royal Institution, the Thorium Energy Alliance, the International Thorium Energy Association, Google, the American Nuclear Society, and the Presidents Blue Ribbon Commission of America’s Nuclear Future. With coauthor Ralph Moir he has written articles for the American Physical Society Forum on Physics and Society: Liquid Fuel Nuclear Reactors (Jan 2011) and American Scientist: Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactors (July 2010). Robert Hargraves is a study leader for energy policy at Dartmouth ILEAD. He was chief information officer at Boston Scientific Corporation and previously a senior consultant with Arthur D. Little. He founded a computer software firm, DTSS Incorporated while at Dartmouth College where he was assistant professor of mathematics and associate director of the computation center. He graduated from Brown University (PhD Physics 1967) and Dartmouth College (AB Mathematics and Physics 1961). THORIUM: energy cheaper than coal, ISBN: 1478161299, purchased online at Amazon.com]

New technology makes clean energy, cheaper than coal. New energy technology solves more problems than just global warming. Some people are still skeptical that man-made CO2 emissions are responsible for global warming. They are concerned that increasing energy costs will harm the US economy. Moreover they are concerned that international treaties might disadvantage the US and other OECD nations, by exempting developing nations from emissions constraints and by paying them to avoid CO2 emissions. There are multiple reasons to develop an energy source cheaper than coal. Any one of these reasons can justify the investment in developing a solution such as the liquid fluoride thorium reactor. **Stopping** particulate **air pollution will save million of lives**. Lowering energy costs will increase economic productivity. 9 Ending energy poverty leads to a sustainable population. Reducing CO2 emissions will check global warming. Even climate skeptics should support advanced energy technology for improved economic productivity, population sustainability, and improved human health. In the US conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats bicker over impairing economic growth by imposing taxes to address global warming. Both sides should agree to an energy technology that both improves both the environment and productivity.

#### Prolif threats real

**Harvey 01** (Frank P., a member of a the Canadian International Council, “National Missile Defence Revisited, Again a Reply to David Mutimer,” International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring, 2001), pp. 347-360, Canadian International Council)

**'Before any argument** supporting NMD **can be taken seriously**, there-fore, **we must accept that a "rogue** state **threat" exists'** (p 340). I couldn't agree more. But this is perhaps the most fascinating of all of Mutimer s assertions because he himself acknowledges the 'facts' of the rogue state threat - and I thought only proponents shared the burden of proving the case for NMD. Consider the following quotes: • The rogue state needs, therefore, to be seen for what it was: the creation of the United States military to justify its claim on resources ... The rogue state, however, is a myth. [It] is not mythical in the sense that it is not real, but rather in the sense that it has been vested with a totemic importance by the United States' (p 344) (emphasis added). • 'Rogues are the enemies that make high levels of military spending legitimate. They are not a lie told by knowing capitalists in an instrumental fashion to hoodwink Congress into passing over-inflated budgets (p 345, n 24) (emphasis added). I am not arguing that the United States fabricated evidence, but rather that it produced a particular frame within which to interpret that evidence' (p 345) (emphasis added). • 'The imagined nature of threats does not mean that there is no real danger or that nothing need ever be done about risks' (p 345). • 'The issue, therefore, is not the evidence but rather how the "facts" are "evidence" of a particular form of threat labelled "proliferation" by actors labelled "rogue"' (p 344, n22). • 'There is, therefore, no need for me to engage in a discussion of the evidence of proliferation assembled, for example, in the Rumsfeld Report to bolster the case for NMD. At issue are not "the facts" but the ways in which those facts are assembled and the interpretation that is given to them' (p 344, n 22). Mutimer s honesty is refreshing but not surprising. **Ballistic missile** proliferation is difficult to deny. **It is a 'real' security threat**, driven by technological progress, the spread of scientific knowledge related to these weapons systems, diminishing costs, ongoing regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, and, most importantly, time.

Alt doens’t solve prolif
Huntley – Program Director at the Liu Institute for Global Studies – ‘7 Wade, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Time for New Thinking?, March

Despite its rejection of these premises, the Bush Administration’s alternative nonproliferation paradigm can play a role in helping the material and normative dimensions of the NPT regime adapt effectively to the second nuclear era. In its current articulation, the alternative paradigm is too messianic and self-serving to function as an effective nonproliferation foundation. But its generic recognition of **the political dimension of nuclear proliferation** is overdue. In a more rigorously developed form, this perspective can function as an essential adjunct to the prevailing paradigm’s narrower focus on limiting material capabilities and upholding technical non- discrimination. Drawing on more nuanced understandings of the political and social dimensions of the causes and consequences of proliferation is particularly vital in responding to the emerging conditions of the second nuclear age, in which **abstract strategy matters less** and the broader **threat-making** and symbolic values of nuclear weapons possession **matter more**. Increasing acceptance of and reliance on nuclear threat-making deepens the insinuation of nuclear capabilities into the fabric of international relations in each of the material/security, domestic politics and normative/symbolic domains. Arms control, nonproliferation and the ideal of eventual disarmament require reversing this permeation, which in turn requires elevating conditions of global governance – at both national and international levels – above the mean dictates of anarchy. The prerequisite is both material and normative: good governance means good institutions, but the necessity of consensual acceptance means good institutions cannot be imposed by fiat. The task is necessarily a long one; there are no crusading quick fixes. The United States, as the globe’s preeminent power, can lead this task. But this must be leadership through broad and genuine consensus, not convenient and coerced “coalitions of the willing.” The Bush Administration is not wrong to orient US policy around a vision for a better world. But America’s global friends – and even its adversaries – have vital and necessary roles to play in directing that vision toward more consensual and normatively satisfying aspirations. Then they must join in its quest as well. That would not be a bad measure of “responsibility.

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant - concrete action is inevitable - they fail to create useful knowledge

**Friedrichs, 09** [Jorg, University Lecturer in Politics at the Oxford Department of International Development, “From Positivist Pretense to Pragmatic Practice Varieties of Pragmatic Methodology in IR Scholarship” Pragmatism and International Relations]

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, the way knowledge is generated according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin

#### The plan solves the terminal impact—thorium power is sustainable for millennia

Barton, ‘9

[Charles, retired counselor, writes for Energy From Thorium, “The Liquid Fluoride Thorium Paradigm,” http://www.theoildrum.com/node/4971/]

The Obama campaign, properly in my opinion, opposed the Yucca Mountain nuclear repository. Indeed, there is a far more effective way to use the $25 billion collected from utilities over the past 40 years to deal with waste disposal. This fund should be used to develop fast reactors that consume nuclear waste, and thorium reactors to prevent the creation of new long-lived nuclear waste. By law the federal government must take responsibility for existing spent nuclear fuel, so inaction is not an option. Accelerated development of fast and thorium reactors will allow the US to fulfill its obligations to dispose of the nuclear waste, and open up a source of carbon-free energy that can last centuries, even millennia. It is commonly assumed that 4th generation nuclear power will not be ready before 2030. That is a safe assumption under "business-as-usual”. However, given high priority it is likely that it could be available sooner. It is specious to argue that R&D on 4th generation nuclear power does not deserve support because energy efficiency and renewable energies may be able to satisfy all United States electrical energy needs. Who stands ready to ensure that energy needs of China and India will be entirely met by efficiency and renewables?

#### Permutation do both – solves better and the aff is a net-benefit

Bryant and Goodman 4 - \* PhD in Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, \*\*Professor of Communication Studies

Raymond and Michael, “Consuming Narratives: The Political Ecology of 'Alternative' Consumption,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, Vol. 29, No. 3

#### The consumption practices of the conservation- and solidarity-seeking commodity cultures described here offer one alternative to the call for a politics of redistribution. In the end, these cultures offer a privileged notion of transnational 'commun- ity' given the relatively high cost of purchasing commodities such as organic cereal and fair trade coffee. True, commodities that 'speak' to 'altern- ative' consumers can possibly make them more aware of what is happening to tropical environ- ments and small-scale producers. And yet, only those that can afford to pay the economic premium can take part in this form of 'resistance'. Thus, 'moral' commodities may become 'alternative' in the larger sense by eschewing more progressive re- constructions of 'moral economy'. The creation of niche markets gives the North, albeit in geographi- cally variable ways, the ability to 'tune in but drop out' of both conventional global economies and more demanding forms of resistance to social injus- tice and environmental degradation. A field of political ecology oriented towards the conceptual- ization of production **and** consumption dynamics is **uniquely** situated to explore the ambiguities of North/South connections evinced by alternative consumption-related politics. Third, this paper builds on work that challenges dualistic thinking that has bedevilled human geo- graphy for some time. Examples of these schisms (and authors that challenge them) include those of nature/society (e.g. Murdoch 1997; Whatmore 2002), discursive/material (e.g. Cook and Crang 1996) and cultural/economic (e.g. Jackson 2002b; Sayer 2001). Considering together consumption and the commoditization of political ecology narrat- ives further complicates the 'hybrid' or 'mutant' notions of landscape change and development (Escobar 1999; Arce and Long 2000; Bebbington 2000). **Breaking down the dualisms** of production and consumption thus should provide critical space from which to examine the political ecologies of (alternative) development.9 In some ways, starting from processes of commoditization and associated narratives of development allows the researcher to **go 'forward'** into the processes and meanings of consumption as well as **'backwards'** along the powerful socio-economic and ecological networks of production and development.

#### Changing consumption isn’t enough. Simulating public positions in debate is vital to refashioning environmental citizenship.

**MacGregor and Szerszynski, Institute for Environment, Philosophy & Public Policy at Lancaster University, ‘3 (Sherilyn and Bronislaw, “Environmental Citizenship and the Administration of Life”, July,** <http://www.ncl.ac.uk/geps/research/politics/MacGregorandSzerszynskipap.doc>)

Firstly, in relation to ‘changing one’s mind’, we want to argue that environmental citizenship should focus not on listing ways of changing values and priorities but on participatory expertise (Torgerson, 1999:81, Fischer, 2000), on basic skills of citizenship such as informed scepticism towards expert knowledge, on bringing a reflexive questioning angle to public debates, and so on. Environmental citizenship should not be about changing one’s mind from wrong to right, but continuously cultivating a citizenly attitude towards environmental and other issues. This does not mean simply changing *private* thoughts, but learning the habits of engaging in *public* thought. It is from this, rather than from the following of rules, that changes in practices should flow. In individual decisions such as those involved in consumption practices, what should be encouraged is not rule-following but enlarged (Arendt, 1978) or dilemmatic (Billig et al., 1988) thinking. Rather than such decisions being conceived as resulting from the monological operation of an isolated mind, based on fixed knowledge and values, they should be seen as the result of an internal dialogue, a simulacrum of public debate between different positions in the ideological dilemmas involved in ecological and other contemporary issues. Rather than encouraging people to seek a pure, green self or subjectivity, securing an untroubled, private green ‘goodness’ through the application of green knowledge and values – for example by following the Earth Charter – environmental citizenship should involve a continual openness to the dilemmas and uncertainties of green action.

Secondly, concerning ‘doing one’s bit’, it is problematic that environmental citizenship tends to be reduced to lifestyle changes that can be confined to the private sphere. Not only does this risk obscuring questions of fairness and equality (especially as regards the gendered division of unpaid domestic work), but it also obscures the structural (i.e., social, economic, political) causes of environmental unsustainability. It seems naïve, even dangerous, to assume that the cumulative effect of each small individual ‘bit’ will be enough to make up for the tangled mess of much bigger bits of ecological destruction that occur (rather are *allowed* to occur) simultaneously. (How much industrial pollution is emitted whilst aluminium cans are being washed and squashed in 25 million households?) Green ‘lifestyle’ is here being conflated with citizenship, closing off the larger debate about the common good. Private acts such as green consumer choices and recycling are about maintaining purity within oneself and following rules rather than putting oneself at risk, getting ones hands dirty thorough appearing to others in the political realm. It is not that we are arguing against recycling and green consumerism; rather we are arguing that it is possible to do it and think about it differently; lifestyle change has be informed by public thought, reflective judgement and enlarged thinking.

#### The alternative isn’t feasible – production-focus is net-better

Winter 3 – PhD in Psychology, Professor @ Whitman

Deborah, “The Psychology of Environmental Problems,” Google Book

Giving up comforts and conveniences may be more than we can fathom, and reverting to preindustrial culture is probably impossible anyway. Even if we could scale down consumption to preindustrial levels, most people would not want to. However, many preindustrial cultures have sustained themselves for centuries, demonstrating that sustainable culture is possible. While copying preindustrial cultures may not be feasible, selecting certain features might be useful. In addition, sustainable cultures may offer some benefits to human psychological needs that are not well provided for by industrialized cultures. The modern Western tradition of emphasizing the individual has given us both unsustainable technology and increasing social alienation. Embedded in the modern Western worldview, we try to use the former to mitigate the latter. It may not even be necessary to "give anything up" in order to ac-complish a reduction or reversal of environmental degradation. Improving efficiency or productivity is typically much more effective than significantly reducing overall use, and much relevant technology is already available. For example, it would be far easier to find an automobile with twice the fuel efficiency of our present cars than to cut our driving in half, and buying an efficient water heater is a lot easier than reducing our use of hot water (Stern, 2000).

#### Focus on individual consumption leads to socially regressive solutions – re-inscribe inequality

Martens and Spaargaren 5 - \* Researcher at the Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University, \*\*Professor of Environmental Policy @ Wageningen

Martens, S. & Spaargaren, G. 2005. The politics of sustainable consumption: the case of the Netherlands. Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy 1(1):29-42. Proquest

We begin with a discussion of the possible weaknesses inherent in more consumption-oriented environmental policies, and consider the “individualization” of politics and political responsibilities as developed by Bauman (1993) and Princen et al. (2002). Many environmental problems are ultimately rooted in the conduct of institutional actors, such as companies and governments. Under these circumstances, there is little merit imposing obligations on citizen-consumers, who not only lack the power to influence the organization of production and consumption, but also cannot—and arguably should not—be held responsible for issues that arise out of the “treadmill of production and consumption” (Schnaiberg, 1980). It is likely to be unproductive, and above all illegitimate, to burden citizen-consumers with remedying such problems. If policy initiatives only advance individual solutions—and ignore institutional actors—socially regressive and environmentally ineffectual outcomes will be the result.

#### Consumption-only focus fails – ignores production-oriented environmental degradation

Holmes 7 (Dave, “A socialist view of global warming: change the system, not the climate!”, Google Books, accessed: 6/26/12)//AMV

Such views among genuine environmental activists reflect a well-meaning but ultimately utopian belief that if only enough of us decide to drastically reduce our demand on the world’s resources — via greatly reduced personal consumption, purchasing from firms with sustainable production techniques and non-polluting technologies — big business and governments will respond to “market signals” and accept and adapt to a slow-growth or no-growth economy. Of course, we should not dismiss the importance of environmental consciousness and radicalisation, which is often expressed in attempts to live in ways consistent with sustainability. It is a good thing if people try to organise their lives so that they live more ecologically. But we have to be clear that that alone will not be enough to halt the crisis. It certainly cannot be the main strategy of the mass environment movement, as it will let the real culprits off the hook and divert precious activist energy away from the underlying systemic dynamic that is driving ecological degradation. As Marxist ecologist John Bellamy Foster explained in a very useful and accessible article published in the Monthly Review magazine in February 1995,6 behind most appeals for individual “ecological morality”, “there lies the presumption that we live in a society where the morality of the individual is the key to the morality of society. If people as individuals could simply change their moral stance with respect to nature and alter their behaviour in areas such as propagation, consumption, and the conduct of business, all would be well.” However, Foster continues: “What is all too often overlooked in such calls for moral transformation is the central institutional fact of our [capitalist] society: what might be called the global ‘treadmill of production’.”