# michigan ap – usc 2013

# round 1 neg v. george mason kl

## 1nc

### Kritik

#### Financialization of production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and consumptive practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The financialisation¶ of “energy”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just¶ transition to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies marginalise the role of communities and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over how society might be differently organised to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology generates crises and precludes other orientations

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As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ belies the notion that “there is no alternative.” They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our ¶ environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ planetary boundaries will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

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The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### DA

#### Obama PC key to convince GOP compromise on debt and sequestration—the impact is the economy

Michael Shear and Jonathan Weisman (writers for the International Herald Tribune) January 3, 2013 “Republicans ready for another battle; Beaten on tax increase, they're spoiling to take on U.S. borrowing limit” Lexis

President Barack Obama's eyes narrowed late Tuesday, just hours after a divided House of Representatives passed legislation to avert big income tax increases on most Americans and prevent major spending cuts, as he looked sternly into the cameras and fired a warning shot in Republicans' direction. After the bruising year-end go-around with congressional Republicans on taxes and spending, he said he had no intention of getting pulled into a new negotiation, this one over raising the nation's borrowing limit or facing a default on government debt. ''I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they've already racked up through the laws that they passed,'' the president said, pausing to repeat himself. ''We can't not pay bills that we've already incurred.'' But it is not clear exactly how Mr. Obama can avoid it. Following the president's fiscal victory - which will raise tax rates for the wealthy but do little to rein in spending - Republicans in Congress are betting that their refusal to raise the $16.4 trillion debt ceiling will force Mr. Obama to the bargaining table on spending cuts and issues like reform of Medicare and Social Security. Doing so would inevitably reprise the clash over the debt ceiling in the summer of 2011, when the government came close to defaulting before lawmakers and the president agreed to a $1.2 trillion package of spending cuts in exchange for Republican agreement to raise the debt ceiling by about the same amount. That is exactly what Republicans want. The party's caucus in the House will discuss a debt ceiling strategy at a retreat this month in Williamsburg, Virginia, a top Republican aide said. Party members are determined to insist again on spending cuts that equal the increase in the amount the country is authorized to borrow, the aide said. ''The speaker told the president to his face that everything you want in life comes with a price - that doesn't change here,'' the aide said, referring to John A. Boehner, speaker of the House, which is controlled by the Republicans. ''I don't think he has any choice.'' That strategy could risk a new round of criticism aimed at Republicans from a public fed up by Washington brinksmanship. The 2011 fight ended with a last-minute deal, but led to a downgrade in the rating of the United States' debt and a slump in the economic recovery. But Brendan Buck, a spokesman for Mr. Boehner, said Republicans had made it clear what they wanted in exchange for a willingness to allow borrowing to increase. ''If they want to get the debt limit raised, they are going to have to engage and accept that reality,'' Mr. Buck said. ''The president knows that.'' Mr. Obama also knows that the Republicans he is dealing with are not the Republicans of years past; battle lines and basic demands have shifted, complicating political calculations on both sides. Just a few years ago, the new tax deal would have been a Republican fiscal fantasy, a sweeping bill that locks in virtually all of the Bush-era tax cuts, exempts almost all estates from taxation, and enshrines the former president's credo that dividends and capital gains should be taxed equally and gently. But times have changed. Before the bill's final passage on Tuesday, House Republican leaders struggled all day to quell a revolt among caucus members who threatened to blow up a hard-fought compromise that they could easily have framed as a victory. Many House Republicans seemed almost determined to put themselves in a position to be blamed for sending the economy into a tailspin under the weight of automatic tax increases and spending cuts. The latest internal party struggle on Capitol Hill surprised even Senate Republicans, who had voted overwhelmingly for a deal largely hashed out by their leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, along with Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.; only 5 of the chamber's 47 Republicans voted no. Yet 21 hours later, the same measure was opposed by 151 of the 236 Republicans voting in the House. It was further proof that House Republicans are a new breed, less enamored of tax cuts per se than they are driven to shrink government through steep spending cuts. Protecting nearly 99 percent of the nation's households from an income tax increase, as the bill will do, was not enough if taxes rose on some and government spending was untouched. The Republicans' intense focus on cutting spending is not news to the White House; it has been on notice for months that Republicans view the debt ceiling as leverage in the next budget fight. Now, the question is what Mr. Obama and his advisers can do to avoid that fight. Mr. Obama will have to make sure that lawmakers in his own party hold firm. While the president no longer has to worry about another election, Democratic lawmakers in the House and Senate do, and they may be more willing to negotiate in order to avoid a potential government default. The White House might also turn to business executives for help. Many top executives fear that a debt ceiling crisis could wallop the U.S. economy just as it is beginning to grow again - and just as the new fiscal deal brings some of the tax certainty that the financial community has long demanded. Those executives might try to pressure Republican lawmakers not to use the country's credit as a negotiating tool. Mr. Obama might also take to the road again, using the power of his office to secure public backing for his argument that another debt-ceiling fight could bring economic crisis. Public surveys after the last debt ceiling fight suggested that people largely blamed Republicans for the threat of a default. The president and his aides have signaled that they will try to explain to the public that the increase in the borrowing limit is needed to cover debts that the government has incurred. Mr. Obama offered a dire warning in his statement on Tuesday of what would happen if the country did not meet its obligations. ''If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay these bills on time,'' he said, ''the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic - far worse than the impact of a fiscal cliff.'' The fiscal bill not only worked up the dander of many Republicans; it gave some Democrats pause, since it would make permanent virtually all of the Bush tax cuts. That is a goal that President George W. Bush spent years chasing, and the achievement of which Ari Fleischer, a Bush press secretary, called ''fantastic'' even while bemoaning the failure to bring down spending levels. It would make permanent five of the six income tax rates created in 2001 by the first Bush tax cut. It would codify Mr. Bush's successful push, in 2003, to make tax rates on dividends and capital gains equal so that one form of investment income is not favored over the other. Democrats say they had little choice. The Bush White House and Republican Congresses structured the tax cuts so that letting them expire would be politically difficult. Add the across-the-board spending cuts if Congress did nothing, and Mr. Obama felt he had to extend most of the tax cuts or watch the economy sink back into recession. ''New occasions make for new truths,'' said Representative Danny K. Davis, an Illinois Democrat and a veteran of the partisan wars over the Bush tax cuts. ''New situations make ancient remedies uncouth.'' Most galling for Republicans are provisions projected to add $330 billion in spending over 10 years, including $30 billion in unemployment compensation and $21 billion in payments to Medicare health providers. None of those provisions are objectionable on its own, but collectively they proved almost impossible for Republicans to accept. In the coming days and weeks, Mr. Obama is likely to try to focus negotiations on another looming issue: how to avoid deep, across-the-board cuts to military and domestic programs. The deal passed on Tuesday postpones those cuts for two months, but Mr. Obama and lawmakers in both parties are eager to avoid them, with Republicans focused more on military cuts and Democrats on domestic programs. Instead, the president wants a debate over spending cuts and tax changes that would remove loopholes and deductions for wealthy Americans. That fight is coming. The question is whether the president can avoid conducting it in the middle of a nasty, drawn-out debate over the debt limit.

#### Plan’s unpopular

Examiner, 7/26 (The Washington Examiner, 26 July 2012, “Virginia senators buck Obama on offshore drilling,” http://washingtonexaminer.com/virginia-senators-buck-obama-on-offshore-drilling/article/2503270#.UIKbVMXA8do)//CC

Warner spokesman Kevin Hall said any measure that fails to provide for revenue sharing with the states is a "dealbreaker" because the coastal states that "host the activity and subject ourselves to risk environmentally or otherwise" should see some financial benefit. The Webb-Warner bill would benefit mainly coastal states, and that has drawn objections from lawmakers from landlocked states who say it's fairer to have any revenues from offshore drilling flow into federal coffers. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., is among those opposed to the revenue-sharing provision, likely dooming the Webb-Warner bill for now. Bingaman, however, is retiring and the top Republican on the committee, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, of Alaska, supports revenue sharing so the legislation could advance next year.

#### Capital key to prevent GOP obstruction

Richard McGregor (writer for the Financial Times) January 2, 2013 “Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals” <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GtNWiw3I>

In the short term, fiscal fights will dominate politics for months to come and threaten to crowd out serious consideration of other issues, with a large potential downside for the economy in 2013. The fiscal cliff compromise alone will act as a drag on the economy, largely because of the end of the payroll tax holiday, which had added substantially to middle-class incomes, economists said. “The economy needs a stimulus, but under the agreement, taxes will go up in 2013 relative to 2012,” said William Gale of the Tax Policy Center in Washington in a blog post. “For most households, the payroll tax takes a far bigger bite than the income tax does, and the payroll tax cut therefore was a more effective stimulus than income tax cuts were.” The forthcoming confrontations will probably have a similar impact, as Republicans feel they enter talks over raising the debt ceiling in the coming weeks playing a far stronger hand than they had in the fiscal cliff. Under the fiscal cliff, taxes were going up no matter what Republicans did. The debt ceiling, however, cannot be lifted unless they vote for it. Barack Obama’s new cabinet will form the backbone of his administration, setting the tone for his second term in the White House Dave Camp, who chairs the congressional committee overseeing tax policy, said that House Republicans had not settled on a strategy for the debt ceiling but the central aim was to leverage it to cut spending further. “Before we raise the debt limit we have to reduce spending,” Mr Camp said. Many Republicans are less diplomatic in private and see the debt ceiling fight as a chance to get revenge both on the White House and the dealmakers within their own party for being forced into accepting a tax increase this week. Of all the issues crowding Mr Obama’s agenda, immigration has the best hope of passing in some form, as the disastrous vote recorded by Republicans among minorities in 2012 gives them a huge incentive to address the issue. But on everything else, with the Republicans remaining in control of the House, Mr Obama needs all the skills of cajoling, seducing and manipulating Congress that he has so far shown no signs of developing. “I find it remarkable that the president apparently continues to believe that he will not have to deal with people that he does not agree with,” said Mr Galston. “A president who is not disdainful of the art of legislating can get things done.” Forging a consensus on issues such as gun control and climate change, if the White House does take them on, will require Mr Obama to do more than just persuade some Republicans to support him. Many Democrats are wary of such reforms or oppose them outright, and a second-term president with declining political capital will face an uphill battle to shift their views.

#### Economic collapse causes global nuclear war

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

### DA

#### Plan crushes Russian energy security – it outweighs oil

Jack Sharples (Ph.D. Candidate specializing in EU-Russia natural gas relations at the University of Glaslow) 2012 “Russia-EU gas relations: the Russian perspective” http://glasgow.academia.edu/JackSharples/Papers/1596861/Russia-EU\_Gas\_Relations\_The\_Russian\_Perspective

 The EU as a strategic market for Gazprom and Russia Gas sales to the EU enable Gazprom to subsidise domestic gas prices Domestic gas sales accounted for 56 percent of Gazprom’s sales by volume, but just 29 percent of total sales by revenue in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011b), meaning that the domestic market was under-represented in Gazprom’s sales revenues. Conversely, gas sales to EU-27accounted for 26 percent of sales by volume, but 44.2 percent of Gazprom’s total sales by revenue in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011b), meaning that the EU is over-represented in Gazprom’s sales revenues. The reason for this imbalance is the difference in price between the destinations of Gazprom’s exports. Gazprom’s official figures divide the destinations of Gazprom’s gas sales into three groups: domestic (i.e. Russian); the Former Soviet Union (FSU); and the ‘far abroad’ (countries beyond the FSU – in this case EU-27 minus the three Baltic states, plus Turkey and Former Yugoslavia). In 2010 Gazprom earned just over 1099.2bn Roubles selling148.1bcm of gas to the ‘far abroad’ at an average price of 9166 Roubles per million cubic metres (mcm). This figure also includes 2.5bcm of LNG exports, mainly to the Far East. Using the ‘far abroad’ average price, gas sales of 130.2bcm to the EU in 2010 would have generated 966bn Roubles for Gazprom. Sales to the Former Soviet Union (including the three Baltic states) amounted to 70.2bcm and earned Gazprom approximately 450.1bn Roubles at an average price of 7039 Roubles per mcm. Finally, Gazprom earned 636.8bn Roubles selling277.3bcm of gas to the domestic Russian market at an average price of 2296.8 Roubles per mcm (Gazprom, 2011b). Thus, the price of gas sold by Gazprom on the domestic Russian market in 2010 was a quarter of that sold to the ‘far abroad’ and a third of that sold to the countries of the Former Soviet Union. The result is that gas sales to the EU are crucial for Gazprom’s ability to sell gas at low prices domestically, and for Gazprom’s ability to invest in new gas production. As Dusseault puts it, Gazprom needs export profits to recoup the losses they make on the Russian market (Dusseault, 2010). Therefore, Gazprom’s gas sales to the EU are crucial not only for Russia’s external energy security, but also for Russia’s internal energy security. The role of energy in Russia’s broader economic and political relations with the EU The EU does not only represent a key market for Russian gas exports. The EU is also Russia’s most important economic and political partner on the international stage. According to the European Commission, the EU-27 accounted for 43 percent of Russian imports and 49 percent of Russian exports in 2010 (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade,2011a, pg. 4), and it is estimated that 75 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Russia comes from EU Member States (European Commission, 2011). For comparison, China is Russia’s second-largest import and export partner, accounting for 18.1 percent of Russia’s imports and 5.3 percent of Russia’s exports (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2011a, pg.6) The extent to which energy forms the basis of this relationship is seen in the fact that, according to EU statistics, ‘mineral fuels’ accounted for around 75 percent of Russia’s exports to the EU in 2010. Of these mineral fuel exports, petroleum and petroleum products accounted for 85 percent and gas 11 percent (Ottens, 2011, pg. 3). In 2010 Russia had a positive trade balance of 68.1bn Euro, based on exports worth 138.6bn Euro, with the EU. Of these exports, oil and petroleum products accounted for 100.5bn Euro, while gas, electricity and coal combined accounted for 19.4bn Euro (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2011a, pg. 10). However, these figures seem to slightly underestimate Russia’s revenues from gas sales in 2010 – Using an exchange rate of 37 to 43 Roubles per Euro (XE,2012), the figure of 966bn Roubles used above should have given Gazprom revenues of 22.5-26.1bn Euro for EU gas sales in 2010. Whilst gas sales are significant in that they represent around a third of Russia’s positive trade balance with the EU, it would clearly be impossible for Russia to maintain a positive trade balance with the EU without oil exports. However, while oil may be more important economically, gas is arguably more important politically. In the context of a more regional market still largely based upon a fixed pipeline network, Russian state control over Gazprom, which has both a monopoly on Russian gas exports and a significant role in EU gas imports, means that gas exports to the EU bring far greater influence and political value to Russia than oil exports

#### Russian influence is stabilizing – solves organized crime, prolif and terrorism

**Rykhtik, 12** – Nizhny Novgorod State University, Nizhny Novgorod , Russia. (Mikhail, Responding to a Resurgent Russia, ed: Aggarwal and Govella, p. 28)

Russia sees the European Union as one of its key political and economic partners and will seek to promote intensive, sustained and long-term cooperation with it. So far, dialogue between the EU and Russia has been asymmetric on most issues, including the identification of priority areas for cooperation. The European Union has long been Russia’s main foreign trading partner. EU countries are the major creditors of and investors in the Russian Federation. EU countries account for 40% of all international air passenger traffic into and out of Russia. The same holds true for communications: 61% of Russia’s international telephone traffic is with the EU (Ryzhov 2002 :14–15). These and many other facts show that throughout the past decade the whole of Europe has witnessed a process of cultural, economic, and political integration and that this process has included Russia as well. And most significantly, there are signs that the EU is ready to economize its relations with Russia. There is an understanding among Russian experts and current leaders that Russia’s integration into the main European institutions will benefit everyone (Barysch et al. 2008 ) . Without an active Russian role, it would be difficult to achieve stability and security on the European landscape. Russia plays a crucial role in equipping Europe with energy, and Russia–EU scientific cooperation also has immense potential. In addition, subregional cooperation between the EU and Russia may strengthen Russia’s position, since Russia is interested in more favorable visa regimes. Russia is a key player in the Eurasian community and is eager to cooperate as long as there is no danger of interference in Russian domestic affairs.

Russia’s main strategic goal today is to preserve its national, economic, and cultural identity, while maintaining a strategic partnership with Europe. Medvedev has shown that he is interested in building relationships between Russia and the EU. The EU is obviously uncomfortable with its dependence on Russian resources and would like to switch to oil and gas supplies from other regions, including Central Asia and North Africa, or develop alternative sources of energy. But it is in the medium-term interests of both Russia and the EU to preserve the current status quo in their relationship.

The overriding question of Russian integration into the reformed security structures of Europe also needs to be resolved in a positive way. Russia is a more interesting partner for the West today, taking into account their shared security agenda of dealing with international terrorism, organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, nonproliferation, conventional arms reductions, illegal migration, and other matters. Current conditions are ripe for a new round of consultations and negotiations on a new European Security Agreement (Helsinki 2). 13 It is obvious that we are dealing with a new type of relations between Brussels and Moscow. The idea of a Helsinki 2 or Helsinki-Plus treaty has found some support in the West (Lo 2009 ) . Some experts have agreed that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act should be changed to reflect post-Cold War realities. 14 What is not welcomed by the West is Medvedev’s emphasis on hard security, which is a reflection of the realist approach which is still popular in Russia. But the new elements of Medvedev’s initiatives prompt some optimism.

#### Nuclear war

**Dobriansky, 1 -** Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the State Department (Paula, “The Explosive Growth of Globalized Crime,”http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/transnational-crime/gj01.htm

Certain types of international crime -- terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and contraband smuggling -- involve serious violence and physical harm. Other forms -- fraud, extortion, money laundering, bribery, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, and counterfeiting -- don't require guns to cause major damage. Moreover, the spread of information technology has created new categories of cybercrime.

For the United States, international crime poses threats on three broad, interrelated fronts. First, the impact is felt directly on the streets of American communities. Hundreds of thousands of individuals enter the U.S. illegally each year, and smuggling of drugs, firearms, stolen cars, child pornography, and other contraband occurs on a wide scale across our borders.

Second, the expansion of American business worldwide has opened new opportunities for foreign-based criminals. When an American enterprise abroad is victimized, the consequences may include the loss of profits, productivity, and jobs for Americans at home.

Third, international criminals engage in a variety of activities that pose a grave threat to the national security of the United States and the stability and values of the entire world community. Examples include the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, trade in banned or dangerous substances, and trafficking in women and children. Corruption and the enormous flow of unregulated, crime-generated profits are serious threats to the stability of democratic institutions and free market economies around the world.

#### EU dominance is key to Russian growth and perceived as a life or death national interest

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Europe is an unavoidable partner. The European market consumes 90% of Russia's total gas exports and 60% of its crude oil, which make up only 25 and 15% of Europe's total demand, respectively. Russia presently does not have any viable alternative markets remotely equal in size to Europe. Dependence is a two-Way phenomenon. "40% of Russian public money” comes from the sale of oil and gas to Europe, and at least 75% of Russian export revenues are linked to the EU's energy market in general. Without any extant alternative markets to exploit in the near-term, Moscow requires European gas revenues to preserve its own financial solubility.

Energy overshadows other concerns. Paillard believes that while the energy trade has, in the past, been "part of a game of blackmail, lies and fear" between Europe and Russia, its new status as a "**question of life or death for Russian revitalization**" and its importance to Europe's economic growth mean that neither side can afford to use gas supplies as leverage in other international concerns. In Paillard's estimation, Brussels and Moscow both regard issues such as human rights or the Chechen conflict as not being worth risking the energy trade over. Therefore, Russian and the European Union are inextricably bound to one another by their mutual dependence on the energy trade. Russia cannot absorb the financial consequences of interrupting the EU revenue stream, while the European Union cannot do without Russian gas supplies. Europe has few alternative suppliers, and cannot develop alternative energy sources in the near term. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to be able to diversify its economy or target new markets any better than it has in the past.

#### That makes Russia a hostile challenger

**Allison and Blackwill, 11** – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI\_final-web.pdf)

Americans often tend to focus on either Russia’s strengths or its weaknesses without seeking an integrated understanding of the real Russia. This is problematic, because it leads to dangerous assumptions about Russia’s motives and conduct. For example, those who focus on Moscow’s strengths frequently see an assertive and dangerous rival without recognizing Russia’s profound insecurity. Conversely, those who concentrate on Russia’s shortcomings see a defeated power ill-prepared to resist American pressure or preferences. While these descriptions are clearly caricatures, views like those described above can produce damaging misjudgments.

Russia is grappling with the contradictions between imperial nostalgia, on the one hand, and the dramatic decline in its power after the Soviet collapse, on the other. The Russian government’s failure to present a credible plan to reverse Russia’s decline or to develop a successful foreign policy strategy that strengthens the country’s international role makes this only more difficult and contributes to **a sense of insecurity**. Nevertheless, the United States has the opportunity to manage its relations with an evolving Russia in a manner that advances America’s vital national interests. The stakes are high. Russia is more than sufficiently powerful to create a host of costly—and even devastating—problems for the United States if Russian leaders believe that Washington has a hostile, or casual, disregard for Russian national interests and priorities. This is true even though most in Russia’s elite recognize that today’s Russia is not sufficiently strong to challenge American global leadership without the support of other major powers.

#### Causes global war

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Conversely, a Russia relatively weaker to the United States would have less capability to challenge the United States but can provide less assistance for realizing common U.S.-Russian goals. A weaker Russia may also find it harder to control its WMD assets and become vulnerable to external predators not friendly to the United States (e. g.. China and Iran). But in all probability Russia will still have sufficiently strong nuclear forces to ward off external threats. Most worrisome, a Russian leadership that perceived Russia on a slope toward protracted decline might feel compelled to take drastic measures, internally and externally, to reverse its descent. The German Empire, Imperial Japan, and other great powers in the 20th century attempted to reverse their feared decline in ways that helped precipitate disastrous global wars.

#### Russian obstructionism turns case

**Allison and Blackwill, 10/30**/11 – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67178.html

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies.

No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow.

First, Russia remains the only nation that can **erase the United States** from the map **in 30 minutes**. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.

Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose.

Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success.

Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups.

Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries.

Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps.

Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order.

Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is **vital to the U.S. economy**.

Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin.

Tenth, **Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate**. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

### Manufacturing

#### Production high now and inevitable

**Kelly-Detwiler, 11/7**/12 – writes about energy technologies and policies for Forbes (Peter, “In Obama's Second Term, Shale Gas Production Not Likely to Slow Down” Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdetwiler/2012/11/07/in-obamas-second-term-shale-gas-production-not-likely-to-slow-down/>)

Now that the election numbers are in, it’s time to take a brief look at a key element of both the Romney and Obama energy platforms: increased domestic natural gas production. It is generally expected that the Obama administration will continue to push for more oversight and regulation of shale fracking. The April 2012 EPA decision to reduce air emissions from fracking could well be followed by an effort to end exemptions from certain elements of the Safe Drinking Water Act. In the case of the EPA air emissions oversight, the rules were relaxed somewhat, and industry was given two years to bring activities into compliance. In the case of water regulation, the conversation may well continue to drag along slowly for some time to come. In the end, there is only so much regulation that is likely to occur at the national level. The 2005 Energy Policy Act essentially gave most regulatory responsibility to individual states, and it will probably remain there.

Regardless of the final regulatory outcome, gas production is likely to soar, especially as gas use grows in transportation, industry, and electric generation. And don’t forget the significant potential for LNG exports, as numerous license requests have already been tendered. The Marcellus area, and Pennsylvania in particular, should continue to see rapid growth. A new study from ASDReports announced today suggests that production could increase more than seven-fold from 2011 levels, from just over 1,000 billion cubic feet equivalent (bcfe) in 2011 to almost 5,000 bcfe in 2015, before finally leveling off at over 7,600 bcfe in 2020.

Just in the eastern US, the shale gas reserves are enormous. The US Geological Survey has pegged Marcellus at an estimated recoverable total of 84 trillion cubic feet (TCF). In October, it released its first estimates for the neighboring (in Ohio) or underlying (in Pennsylvania and New York) Utica shales of 38 TCF, plus 940 million barrels of unconventional oil resources and 208 million barrels of unconventional liquids. The current dominant players, such as Chesapeake, Range Resources, Talisman Energy, and Cabot Oil and Gas have locked up a good deal of the acreage, but they may be joined by others. The drilling will continue, and the conversation will go on as to how to produce domestic shale gas in the most efficiently, clean, and safe manner. The stuff is there, and it’s not going away.

#### Plan’s effect is delayed – takes forever to develop infrastructure and get leases

Kenneth Medlock III (Fellow in Energy Studies, at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Adjunct assistant professor in the department of economics at Rice University) July 2008 “THE OCS LEASING MORATORIUM: WHICH WAY FORWARD?” <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-WWT-OCSMoratorium-071008.pdf>

Of course, opening the OCS will not likely have an immediate impact on oil prices because of the time necessary to organize lease sales and to develop supply delivery infrastructure. However, once development progresses, the expected growth in supply would eventually influence market prices. Thus, opening the OCS should be viewed as a relevant part of a larger strategy encompassing a portfolio of options aimed at easing prices over time

#### Decrease in dependence is too small – your author

Baker Institute, ‘8 (Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Baker Institute Policy Report, January 2008, “Natural Gas in North America: Markets and Security,” <http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/30064519/study-lift-u-s-drilling-restrictions-avoid-international-lng-cartel>)//CC

The reduced U.S. requirement for LNG is not extremely large in a volumetric sense, and it certainly would not eliminate imports of natural gas under any scenario examined by the study. Moreover, the price impact of lifting access restrictions in the OCS and Rockies also is limited.

The shift in the near term from exploitation of high-cost natural gas resources to lower-cost OCS development would lower annual domestic prices by only roughly 10 percent. The effect is greater in some “end-of-pipe” markets such as the West Coast and the Middle Atlantic, particularly where restricted resources have a direct impact on regional supply. Average prices at the SoCal border (Southern California) market area and in the Tetco-M3 market area (Philadelphia and New Jersey) could be as much as $0.50 per MMBtu lower by 2017, but even this does not represent a large percentage change in average prices.

#### Lifting restrictions doesn’t sufficiently reduce demand, and status quo solves

Baker Institute, ‘8 (Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Baker Institute Policy Report, January 2008, “Natural Gas in North America: Markets and Security,” <http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/30064519/study-lift-u-s-drilling-restrictions-avoid-international-lng-cartel>)//CC

This supply picture has raised questions about growing dependence on the Middle East for both oil and gas supply. However, scenario analysis shows that opening restricted areas in the OCS and Rocky Mountains to drilling and natural gas resource development will not render the United States energy independent nor will it even lower U.S. dependence on LNG imports in 2015 by a significant volume. Price impacts also are limited, with U.S. prices only registering marginal reductions. And, in scenarios of a temporary or sporadic cutoff of Middle East supply, higher OCS and Rocky Mountain production again only produce limited benefits in pricing and supply diversification. In the intermediate term, supply diversity is available at a relatively reasonable cost from a wide variety of alternative fringe exporters in the global market.

#### Manufacturing in the US comparatively more attractive now – Chinese constraints are rising faster than ours

Urban Lehner (Vice President of the Progressive Farmer) 2011 “Reports of American Manufacturing's Death Are Exaggerated” http://www.dtnprogressivefarmer.com/dtnag/view/ag/printablePage.do?ID=BLOG\_PRINTABLE\_PAGE&bypassCache=true&pageLayout=v4&blogHandle=editorsnotebook&blogEntryId=8a82c0bc31d5e6e301336f3dd2381059&articleTitle=Reports+of+American+Manufacturing%27s+Death+Are+Exaggerated&editionName=DTNAgFreeSiteOnline

Since 1972, America's manufacturing output more than doubled. Between 1997 and 2008, its dollar value rose by a third. In 2010, the U.S. accounted for 19.4% of global manufacturing value added, just shy of China's 19.8%. The BCG study is titled "Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S." In truth, though, manufacturing never went entirely away. It seemed to in part because our factories, like our farms, are so much more productive: Factories churn out 2.5 times as much they did in 1972 with a third fewer workers. It's the jobs that went away. What also departed was America's post-World War II dominance. Because the war had destroyed European and Japanese factories while ours went unscathed, the U.S. in the early 1950s accounted for 40% of the world's manufactured goods. Our share today is half that not because our output has shrunk but because the world's has expanded faster. The most interesting aspect of the study is its argument that the U.S. is in the early phases of becoming a more attractive place to locate factories. Within five years, BCG maintains, it will no longer be cheaper to manufacture some goods in China than in the U.S. Rising Chinese wages and land costs, a weakening dollar and superior U.S. factory productivity are among the reasons the cost gap will close. BCG urges American companies to reassess their China strategy. "China should no longer be treated as the default option," BCG says. It will remain the place to make products that require a lot of labor, especially those destined for Asian markets. But products turned out in modest volumes with relatively little labor may be best manufactured in the U.S.

#### Cheap natural gas wont revitalize manufacturing

Brad Plumer (The Washington Post, Former associate editor at The New Republic) May 2012 “ Will cheap shale gas revive U.S. manufacturing? Not so fast” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/will-cheap-natural-gas-revive-us-manufacturing/2012/05/21/gIQAOORZfU\_blog.html

That last claim comes via a recent report from PricewaterhouseCoopers. But over at the Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Levi casts a more skeptical eye on arguments that the age of cheap natural gas from shale will really lead to a dramatic revival of U.S. manufacturing. There are reasons to think the overall impact will be fairly muted. Energy costs are still a small factor for many manufacturers. Levi points to a 2009 paper (pdf) by Joseph Aldy and William Pizer finding that “only one tenth of U.S. manufacturing involved energy costs exceeding five percent of the total value of shipments.” Aldy and Pizer estimated that a carbon tax, which raises energy prices, would affect manufacturing employment slightly — less than 3 percent — in the most energy-intensive industries like aluminum, cement, glass, and steel. The flipside is that lower energy costs, thanks to cheap natural gas, would have a similarly marginal impact.

**No impact**

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

**Zero studies exist to confirm that primacy is peaceful**

**Montiero, 12** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful” International Security, Winter, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received **virtually no attention**. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010. 22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. 23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war. 24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate. 25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention.

**No chance of Pakistan collapse**

**Bandow 09** – Senior Fellow @ Cato, former special assistant to Reagan (11/31/09, Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10924)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

**Alt cause to readiness**

Terry **Howell**, **9-16**-2011; Managing Editor for Benefits for Military.com, retired Coast Guard Chief Petty Officer; House Panel: Cuts Will Impact Military http://militaryadvantage.military.com/2011/09/house-panel-cuts-will-impact-military/

Our friends at the Mil­i­tary Offi­cers Asso­ci­a­tion of Amer­ica recently posted news that the House Armed Ser­vices Com­mit­tee is prepar­ing a report on the impact of pro­posed deep defense cuts to the so-called “Super Com­mit­tee” would have on our mil­i­tary readi­ness. The Super Com­mit­tee has been tasked with reduc­ing the national debt by more than a tril­lion dol­lars over the next 10 years. House Com­mit­tee Chair­man, Howard “Buck” McK­eon, is con­cerned that any pro­pos­als for more defense cuts would lead to a “hol­low­ing out” of the mil­i­tary. The DoD is cur­rently plan­ning to make $350 bil­lion in cuts over the next 10 years as part of the recent debt ceil­ing leg­is­la­tion. The Super Committee’s man­date to come up with over $1trillion in com­bined reduc­tions likely means DoD will have look for ways to make big­ger cuts. As most of our read­ers know, this will surely force dras­tic cuts in TRICARE, pay, tuition assis­tance, and retire­ment ben­e­fits. As MOAA points out, if they fail in that effort, and if Con­gress fails to pass an alter­na­tive pack­age to save an equal amount by the end of the year, the new deficit reduc­tion law imposes an auto­matic trig­ger mech­a­nism (seques­tra­tion) that will cut at least an addi­tional $500 bil­lion from the defense bud­get over the next ten years. The House Armed Services Committee report says that these cuts **would degrade readiness and require force reductions** of thou­sands of military personnel.

### Exports

#### They have the advantage backward – supply is low now BECAUSE exports are prohibited; prices are too low, and exports increase them

**Levi, ’12** David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Director of the CFR program on energy security and climate change (Michael Levi, The Hamilton Project, June 2012, “A Strategy for US Natural Gas Exports,” [http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads\_and\_links/06\_exports\_levi.pdf)//CC](http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf%29//CC)

The market has signaled its endorsement of this development by hammering natural gas prices. U.S. benchmark natural gas dipped below $2 for a thousand cubic feet in early 2012, and as of mid-April 2012, delivery of the same amount in March 2015 could be assured for $4.43. Wellhead prices, meanwhile, fell to levels unseen since 1995. 1 But the world looks different from overseas. In Europe, a thousand cubic feet of gas sold on the spot market for about $11 as of March 2012, and in East Asia, the price was north of $15 (Platts 2012). These prices are all the more striking since it costs roughly $4 to liquefy and ship a thousand cubic feet of natural gas from the United States to Europe, and only about $2 more to send it to Asia (Morse et al. 2012). Yet the United States does not export natural gas to those markets. Many have thus argued that it is leaving money on the table. The potential profits from exports have prompted several companies to apply for permits to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) without restriction. In March 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) approved the first such permit, for Cheniere Energy, and in April 2012, the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee (FERC) approved Cheniere’s Sabine Pass, Louisiana facility. As of May 2012, another eight projects had applied to the DOE for similar permits, and four more had applied for permits to export LNG to countries with which the United States has free trade agreements (DOE 2012). The DOE has signaled that it will begin making decisions on these applications after receiving the results of a contractor study on the possible impacts of LNG exports in late summer 2012. The DOE can be expected to solicit input from several agencies, including the Departments of State and Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, as well as from the National Economic Council, the National Security Council, and the Council on Environmental Quality in making its ultimate decisions. Indeed, if currently anticipated price differences hold up, and fully free trade in natural gas is allowed, several developers will likely attempt to build LNG export terminals. A wide range of analysts have claimed that as many as six billion cubic feet of daily exports by the end of the decade is plausible. That trade could expand U.S. gas production substantially and, in principle, net U.S. producers, exporters, and their suppliers north of $10 billion a year. 2 Gas exports could help narrow the U.S. current account deficit, shake up geopolitics, and give the United States new leverage in trade negotiations. This has led many people to advocate for a U.S. policy that allows—or even encourages—natural gas exports.

#### Status quo solves

**Levi, ’12** David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and Director of the CFR program on energy security and climate change (Michael Levi, The Hamilton Project, June 2012, “A Strategy for US Natural Gas Exports,” [http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads\_and\_links/06\_exports\_levi.pdf)//CC](http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/06_exports_levi.pdf%29//CC)

However, no major LNG importer other than South Korea has an applicable FTA with the United States (Ratner et al. 2011). Would-be exporters have thus sought approval to export without restriction. Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass Facility has received DOE and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approval for 2.2 billion cubic feet of daily LNG exports to non-FTA countries, and applications totaling another 10.3 billion cubic feet per day are under review. These combined applications involve total volumes similar to current U.S. LNG import capacity (Guegel 2010). Exports from the first facilities would start no earlier than 2015

#### US exports would be miniscule at best

**Victor, 12** - professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and co-director of the School's new Laboratory on International Law and Regulation at UCSD (David, “Can China Follow U.S. Shift from Coal to Gas?” – Victor is extensively quoted here by Andrew Rivkin, 7/4, http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/a-greenhouse-gift-if-china-follows-u-s-shift-from-coal-to-gas/)

Will these changes in the U.S. market affect the global picture for gas? There’s a lot of talk these days about the U.S. becoming a big gas exporter. A few companies are readying projects that would export cheap American gas by compressing and cooling it to liquefied natural gas (LNG). That’s unlikely to have much impact on the global picture any time soon for two reasons. One is that export LNG projects will be a tiny fraction of total U.S. gas consumption. Under a rosy scenario, maybe the U.S. would export perhaps 10 million tonnes of LNG per year within a decade or so. That’s equal to just 2% of current U.S. gas consumption (per BP’s bible, The Statistical Review of World Energy). The other is cost. While gas in America at $2 to $3 is historically cheap, it can’t easily compete with countries like Qatar that are so rich in gas that the fuel is practically free. Once you add the cost of cooling, shipping and regasification, the full cost of LNG from America isn’t that cheap compared with Qatari LNG (or other emerging powers, like Australia) in the most lucrative Asian and European markets. The effect of the gas revolution in America on world consumption of gas (and emissions) is less likely to be felt through American LNG exports and more likely to be seen as the rest of the world starts looking for cheap shale gas at home. Indeed, there’s lot of interest in shale gas in Europe, India and China.

#### Not enough reserves

Chris Nelder (Columnist for SmartPlanet, energy analyst and consultant who has written about energy and investing for more than a decade) December 29, 2011 “What the Frack?” http://www.slate.com/articles/health\_and\_science/future\_tense/2011/12/is\_there\_really\_100\_years\_worth\_of\_natural\_gas\_beneath\_the\_united\_states\_.html

The recent press about the potential of shale gas would have you believe that America is now sitting on a 100-year supply of natural gas. It's a "game-changer." A "golden age of gas" awaits, one in which the United States will be energy independent, even exporting gas to the rest of the world, upending our current energy-importing situation. The data, however, tell a very different story. Between the demonstrable gas reserves, and the potential resources blared in the headlines, lies an enormous gulf of uncertainty. The claim of a 100-year supply originated with a report released in April 2011 by the Potential Gas Committee, an organization of petroleum engineers and geoscientists. President and Chairman Larry Gring works with Third Day Energy LLC, a company based in Austin, Texas, that is engaged in acquiring and exploiting oil and gas properties along the Texas Gulf Coast.\* Chairman of the Board Darrell Pierce is a vice president of DCP Midstream LLC, a natural-gas production, processing, and marketing company based in Denver. The report's contributors are from the industry-supported Colorado School of Mines. In short, the Potential Gas Committee report is not an impartial assessment of resources.

#### Exports won’t be economical and the timeframe is super long

Pavel Molchanov (Political analyst for the Energy Tribune) and Alex Morris (writer for the Energy Tribune) 2012 “Will LNG Exports Rescue the North American Natural Gas Market?”, http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/10703/Will-LNG-Exports-Rescue-the-North-American-Natural-Gas-Market

Thinking of building your own LNG plant? Read this first. From what we’ve already written, it should be clear that you shouldn’t hold your breath waiting for North American LNG export plants to come to fruition. Sabine Pass is a useful case study of just how difficult and time-consuming it is to develop these projects. Cheniere’s original plan to develop liquefaction capacity at Sabine Pass dates back to June 2010. Nearly two years later, construction has not yet started – even though this specific project has the big advantage of having a well-developed site with existing LNG infrastructure. Let’s look at some of the challenges faced by North American LNG developers. Slow permitting. Let’s face it: if this was China rather than the U.S., building LNG plants (and refineries, and nuclear reactors, and just about anything else) would be a lot easier. The undeniable reality is that the permitting process for domestic LNG developers is expensive, burdensome and excruciatingly slow. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is the lead agency, though the Department of Energy (DOE) also plays a role. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Army Corps of Engineers can also be involved. In addition, state and local permits are required. For example, Cheniere’s follow-on liquefaction project, near Corpus Christi, Texas, was authorized by FERC to begin “pre-filing” in December 2011. The company aims to file the completed application in August 2012 and receive approval in September 2013. Assuming no delays, this would allow project startup in late 2017. For projects in Canada, permitting is also complex. The Kitimat project in British Columbia – a joint venture between Apache, EOG Resources and Encana – received a 20-year export license from the Canadian National Export Board in October 2011. This was nearly three years after the project received environmental approval (both federal and provincial). Industry opposition. While by no means the sole factor, one of the reasons for the slow permitting is the fact that these LNG projects face a considerable amount of public opposition. Protests from environmentalists – which helped sink the Keystone XL pipeline, and now seem particularly focused on Dominion’s Cove Point project – are not surprising. What may be more surprising is that some major industry groups are also opposed, though, of course, for different reasons. Specifically, large gas consumers do not want LNG exports for the exact same reason why large gas producers such as Chesapeake Energy applaud these projects: they would put upward pressure on gas prices. The American Public Gas Association, which represents gas utilities, testified in November 2011 before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, stating: “APGA maintains that the export of LNG is not in the best interests of our country and most notably that it will increase natural gas prices at the expense of consumers while sacrificing a unique opportunity to reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources.” The Industrial Energy Consumers of America, which represents manufacturers, has also expressed its concerns, stating: “It would be irresponsible for the DOE to approve export applications without first doing an economic analysis of the impact.” Financing constraints. LNG plants are never cheap. Even in the best of circumstances, they are immensely capital-intensive projects, with price tags that range from a few billion to tens of billions of dollars, and almost invariably they tend to come in over budget (as well as behind schedule). This needs to be seen in the context of a highly competitive commodity market where global liquefaction capacity will rapidly increase between now and 2020. Australia alone, led by projects such as Chevron’s Gorgon and Inpex’s Ichthys, is expected to surpass Qatar as the world’s #1 LNG producer by the end of the decade. Combined with other projects in West Africa, Papua New Guinea and elsewhere, the jury is out as to whether global (especially Asia-Pacific) LNG pricing will remain as strong it is currently, i.e., whether the close linkage with crude oil can be maintained. Thus, not everyone is willing to invest in North American liquefaction plants. Among companies that are willing, some (e.g., Apache) are clearly better capitalized than others (e.g., Cheniere). For project loans to be secured, offtake agreements are essential, hence Cheniere’s recent deals with KOGAS, BG Group and others.

#### Takes 10 years – industry estimate

**Fuquay, 12/11** (Jim Fuquay, 11 December 2012, “Exxon: Natural gas exports in near future,” http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/11/177061/exxon-natural-gas-exports-in-near.html)//CC

North America could be come a net exporter of natural gas by about 2020, Irving-based Exxon Mobil says in its latest outlook for world energy markets The world's largest private oil and gas producer also said North America -- Canada, the United States and Mexico -- would be a net exporter of both crude oil and natural gas by about 2030. The company's annual outlook projects supply and demand trends to 2040. Exxon also sees natural gas use gaining at the expense of coal, owing to the impact of climate change concerns and public policies. By 2040, natural gas will account for 30 percent of global electricity generation, compared with less than 25 percent today, Exxon says.

#### Relations resilient

**Green 11** – associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University and senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Michael J., "The Democratic Party of Japan and the Future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance" The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 27, Number 1, Winter 2011, Project MUSE)

Despite the travails and uncertainty now clouding the alliance, there are multiple reasons to expect that Japan will continue to be closely aligned with the United States and influential in the international system. First, there is historical precedent. As Kenneth Pyle has pointed out, Japan has always successfully reordered its domestic institutions and instruments of national power in the face of new international challenges even if institutions in Japan's conservative political culture have a sticky resistance to change, as Carol Gluck has observed.10 Postwar history also demonstrates the resilience of U.S.-Japan security relations. The fact is that the alliance has entered periods of drift and faced crises before, including the 1960 Anpo demonstrations, the protests against the Vietnam War, the "Nixon shocks," the FS-X confrontation, and the 1995 Okinawa rape incident. In each case, observers predicted the end of the alliance, yet in each case the security relationship emerged significantly strengthened. Kent Calder has described a pattern in Japanese domestic politics in which the conservative LDP elite would co-opt the opposition's policy initiatives in response to social or economic crises, thus reinforcing the social contract and legitimacy of conservative rule.11 In similar ways, the United States and Japan have repeatedly responded to bilateral political crises by offering new reciprocal "compensation" in terms of expanded Japanese security responsibilities and a reduction of the U.S. military footprint in Japan.12 This continual process of redefining and reaffirming the 1960 security treaty is not always visible in the midst of a crisis, but it is one reason why support for the alliance has steadily expanded in both the United States and Japan over its 50-year history. In addition to historical precedent, structural factors will bind if not ultimately define Japan's strategic options. The rise of Chinese power and North Korean nuclear brinkmanship render a close alliance with the United States by far the best guarantor of Japanese security, while growing economic [End Page 94] interdependence with China will ensure that Japanese governments (and U.S. governments, for that matter) will resist crude strategies of containment against China. Japan's demographic and fiscal challenges are already limiting the DPJ's original promises of largess (cutting highway fees, distributing child allowances, etc.) and forcing a consensus within the party that the policy tool kit will have to include some combination of cutting corporate taxes, raising the consumption tax, and restricting spending. If these seemed like uniquely difficult choices for Japan at one point, it is only necessary to observe the enormous changes Europe must now make in its social contract in order to remain fiscally solvent—or to consider the massive demographic challenge looming in the decade ahead in China as a result of the one child policy and a massively deficient social welfare net. Exaggerating the uniqueness and irreversibility of Japanese challenges today makes no more sense than predicting Japan's certain global domination did 20 years ago.

#### No impact to the alliance

Anthony **DiFilippo**, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, **2002**, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment, pg. 13

One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the fifty years that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold War, other serious destabilizing forces have appeared despite the continued existence of the bilateral alliance. The Korean War, which began in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into effect in 1952. The alliance did not prevent China from developing nuclear weapons-hardly a stabilizing event in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or end the Vietnam War. More recently, the U.S.-Japan security alliance did not stop the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from beginning a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, thwart Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching a projectile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the bilateral alliance in effect for decades, China went ahead with nuclear testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclear powers.

#### No Asia war—multiple safeguards and reversible tensions

**Feng 10 –** professor at the Peking University International Studies [Zhu, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact”, http://www.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia?utm\_source=feed]

As such, the surge of defense expenditures in East Asia does not add up to an arms race. No country in East Asia wants to see a new geopolitical divide and spiraling tensions in the region. The growing defense expenditures powerfully illuminate the deepening of a regional “security dilemma,” whereby the “defensive” actions taken by one country are perceived as “offensive” by another country, which in turn takes its own “defensive” actions that the first country deems “offensive.” As long as the region doesn’t split into rival blocs, however, an arms race will not ensue. What is happening in East Asia is the extension of what Robert Hartfiel and Brian Job call “competitive arms processes.” The history of the cold war is telling in this regard. Arm races occur between great-power rivals only if the rivalry is doomed to intensify. The perceived tensions in the region do not automatically translate into consistent and lasting increases in military spending. Even declared budget increases are reversible. Taiwan’s defense budget for fiscal year 2010, for instance, will fall 9 percent. This is a convincing case of how domestic constraints can reverse a government decision to increase the defense budget. Australia’s twenty-year plan to increase the defense budget could change with a domestic economic contraction or if a new party comes to power. China’s two-digit increase in its military budget might vanish one day if the type of regime changes or the high rate of economic growth slows. Without a geopolitical split or a significant great-power rivalry, military budget increases will not likely evolve into “arms races.” The security dilemma alone is not a leading variable in determining the curve of military expenditures. Nor will trends in weapon development and procurement inevitably induce “risk-taking” behavior. Given the stability of the regional security architecture—the combination of U.S.-centered alliance politics and regional, cooperation-based security networking—any power shift in East Asia will hardly upset the overall status quo. China’s military modernization, its determination to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best,” hasn’t yet led to a regional response in military budget increases. In contrast, countries in the region continue to emphasize political and economic engagement with China, though “balancing China” strategies can be found in almost every corner of the region as part of an overall balance-of-power logic. In the last few years, China has taken big strides toward building up asymmetric war capabilities against Taiwan. Beijing also holds to the formula of a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue except in the case of the island’s de jure declaration of independence. Despite its nascent capability of power projection, China shows no sign that it would coerce Taiwan or become **militarily assertive** over contentious territorial claims ranging from the Senkaku Islands to the Spratly Islands to the India-China border dispute.

#### Japan won’t abandon the alliance – shared vital interests and perceived common threats – makes sustained cooperation inevitable

**Sang-ho, 9/7**/12 Song, “US-Japan alliance grows for Asia-Pacific security balance,” Korea Herald, http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=33084&sec=1

On the surface, the alliance between the US and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years due to a long-standing controversy over the relocation of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa.

But this would not undermine the core of the alliance between the two countries that share security interests

and values of democracy, and take initiatives against global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, experts pointed out.

“People should not misconstrue a long-running local dispute over how to close one Marine air base with the durability and capability of that vital alliance,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia Programme at the Centre for a New American Security.

After the Democratic Party of Japan took power in 2009, ending a half-century of almost unbroken conservative rule, the alliance appeared to have deteriorated with the Tokyo leadership pursuing a closer yet “equal” relationship.

But it has apparently re-prioritised its relationship with Washington as it recognised growing security challenges from China and North Korea.

Amid its strategic pivot toward Asia, the US is likely to escalate its calls for the Asian ally to contribute more to maintaining stability in the region.

Japan also wanted to increase its military role in the region and beyond. But it has been fettered by the pacifist constitution.

The law prohibits Japan from going to war and having any potential war materials, and engaging in collective defence action, which makes it difficult to help support its ally US even if it is attacked. Right-wingers have sought to rewrite the law or tried to alter the interpretation of it to expand the role of the Self-Defence Forces.

The deepening of the military alliance is also crucial for Tokyo, which has been engaged in an increasingly strident territorial disputes with Beijing over a set of islands in the East China Sea, which are called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.

#### Abe’s election solidified the alliance – mutual defense interests overwhelm

**AFP, 12/19/**12 “Hawk's comeback raises hope in U.S. for closer defense ties”

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121219a8.html>)

The return of conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has raised hopes in Washington for closer security ties, although U.S. officials hope he keeps a lid on his more strident views.

Abe is a champion of revising the post-World War II pacifist Constitution and may take shorter-term steps such as boosting defense spending and allowing greater military cooperation with the United States

His Liberal Democratic Party, which ruled almost continuously from 1955 until 2009, roared back Sunday with a crushing victory over the Democratic Party of Japan, which Abe accused of harming relations with the United States.

President Barack Obama's relations with DPJ-led governments substantially improved after early friction, but Abe is seen as more supportive of U.S. force deployments and has vowed no compromise with China in the row over the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Abe's victory is a "net positive" for the United States and could end up stabilizing Japan-China ties.

## 2nc

### 2nc oview stuff

**Turns everything**

**Tilford 2008** – PhD in history from George Washington University, served for 32 years as a military officer and analyst with the Air Force and Army (Earl, “Critical mass: economic leadership or dictatorship”, Cedartown Standard, lexis)

Could it happen again? Bourgeois democracy requires a vibrant capitalist system. Without it, the role of the individual shrinks as government expands. At the very least, the dimensions of the U.S. government economic intervention will foster a growth in bureaucracy to administer the multi-faceted programs necessary for implementation. Bureaucracies, once established, inevitably become self-serving and self-perpetuating. Will this lead to “socialism” as some conservative economic prognosticators suggest? Perhaps. But so is the possibility of dictatorship. If the American economy collapses, especially in wartime, there remains that possibility. And if that happens the American democratic era may be over. If the world economies collapse, totalitarianism will almost certainly return to Russia, which already is well along that path in any event. Fragile democracies in South America and Eastern Europe could crumble. A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations—the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia—need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

**Turns Pakistan**

**Kemp 10**

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

**Turns heg**

**Brzezinski 97** (Zbigniew, Former National Security Advisor – The Grand Chessboard, http://book-case.kroupnov.ru/pages/library/Grand/part\_1.htm)

America’s economic dynamism provides the **necessary precondition** for the exercise of global primacy. Initially, immediately after World War II, America’s economy stood apart from all others, accounting alone for more than 50 percent of the world’s GNP. The economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, followed by the wider phenomenon of Asia’s economic dynamism, meant that the American share of global GNP eventually had to shrink from the disproportionately high livels of the immediate postwar era. Nonetheless, by the time the subsequent Cold War had ended, America’s share of global GNP, and more specifically its share of the world’s manufacturing output, had stabilized at about 30 percent, a level that had been the norm for most of this century, apart from those exceptional years immediately after World War II. More important, America has maintained and has even widened its lead in exploiting the latest scientific breakthroughs for military purposes, thereby creating a technologically peerless military establishment, the only one with effective global reach. All the while, is has maintained its strong competitive advantage in the economically decisive information technologies. American mastery in the cutting-edge sectors of tomorrow’s economy suggests that American technological domination is not likely to be undone soon, especially given that in the economically decisive fields, Americans are maintaining or even widening their advantage in productivity over their Western European and Japanese rivals.

#### Economic decline causes war – strong statistical support

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 2nc uniqueness

#### PC gaining for Obama now to make one big policy push – but

The Southland Times December 27, 2012 “After 2012, what lies ahead?” Lexis

The Republican candidate concentrated his campaign on Obama's slow progress in overcoming the deepest recession in 70 years (which had been caused by the previous Republican administration), but just in time the numbers started to turn upwards for Obama. The economic recovery will probably strengthen in the coming year, unless the US falls off the fiscal cliff in the next week or so, and strong growth will give Obama enough political capital to undertake at least one big reform project. The highest priority is obviously global warming, but there is a danger that he will fritter his resources away on hot- button issues like gun control.

#### Obama will get a deal on debt-ceiling package now - he is using his political capital to negotiate around the GOP to threaten their members support bases – that’s Shear and Weisman

#### Two ways. First, hes cajoling business leaders who want to avoid a repeat of the 2011 debt ceiling debate – they have significant leverage of the GOP’s rank and file in this debate. They can split the GOP’s unity

Greg Sargent (writer for the Washington Post) December 6, 2012 “Business leaders siding with Obama on debt ceiling?” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2012/12/06/business-leaders-siding-with-obama-on-debt-ceiling/

One interesting political dynamic right now is that Obama is working to enlist the support of business leaders to prevent another debt ceiling standoff next year. House Republicans are thinking about caving now on the middle class tax cuts — then coming back next year and staging another 2011 style debt ceiling battle to win the deep entitlement cuts they want. Business leaders are cool to the possibility, because such standoffs risk damaging the economy. I’ve just learned that one of the most influential business groups in Washington, the Business Roundtable, is prepared to support a provision designed to dramatically minimize the possibility of another standoff now and in the future — one also supported by the White House. This is a step forward for White House efforts to prevent a 2011-style battle, which led to a credit downgrade for the United States, and widespread fears that the country would go into default. Obama — who is refusing to negotiate over the debt ceiling again — supports a measure called the “McConnell provision,” a proposal pushed by Mitch McConnell last year to try to defuse the crisis. Under the provision, the president can request a debt limit hike, after which Congress can vote to deny the request by disapproving of it. The president can then veto that request, and unless Congress overrides that veto with a two-thirds vote in both houses, it is honored. The provision transfers most control over the debt ceiling to the President and makes it far harder for the opposing party in Congress to block hikes — meaning the constant threat of default, and the ability to engage in brinksmanship around it, are effectively removed. The McConnell provision was passed as a temporarily measure as part of last year’s debt ceiling compromise but would need to be extended now. The White House has proposed extending it; if that happens, House Republicans would not be able to stage a meaningful standoff next year. I’m told reliably that the Business Roundtable will support the McConnell provision if it’s proposed again in Congress. This underscores the rising determination among business leaders — many of whom are aligned with the GOP — to avoid a rerun of the 2011 debacle. Obama is aggressively lobbying these business leaders, publicly and privately, to make their opposition to another standoff known. And it appears that they are doing so. As Politico’s Ben White reports today, executives are privately beginning to coalesce around the McConnell provision as a means to that end. The prospect of another debt ceiling fight puts the House GOP in an interesting spot, pitting its Tea Party wing against more pragmatic GOP-aligned interests in the business community. While the former will be spoiling for another fight, the latter appears far less willing to see the country dragged through another deeply damaging round of debt ceiling brinksmanship — with the full faith and credit of the United States, and the economy, at stake — this time around.

#### Second – Obama is using the bully pulpit to manipulate congressman into caving to their constituents to put the blame on them the same way he did with the fiscal cliff.

#### This ensures Republicans can’t unify around a plan of their own – this allows Obama to back them into a corner

Bloomberg News (Tom Keene, host. Sara Eisen, hostess. Josh Barro, columnist. Hans Nichols, Bloomberg reporter) January 2, 2013 “Bloomberg`s Hans Nichols Talks Fiscal Cliff on Bloomberg TV Click for Enhanced Coverage Linking Searches

KEENE: A most interesting weekend in the United States. No one seems happy with the budget outcomes. To parse winners and losers and to frame where we're going to late February, we're speaking with Josh Barro, Bloomberg View columnist, and also Hans Nichols in Washington. Hans, let me go to you. What happens today in Washington? Do the Republicans like have breakfast together and regroup? Does everybody complain that the president's in Hawaii and they're not? What actually happens today in Washington? NICHOLS: Lawmakers will fly home, or they'll come back for - they've got a vote on the third, so they'll get ready to change offices. So a few members might go home for a few days, but basically, look, you want a good story? Go down to the capital. Figure out who's getting which plum offices. That's fun to figure out. Somewhere along the line they have to put the bill onto a military craft. They've got to hopscotch it out to Hawaii. My question is will the president be at a sushi restaurant or a golf course when he signs it, or riding the waves out there, but he'll have - they'll have to get it out to him fairly fast and he'll sign it in Hawaii. KEENE: Editorial. Everybody's taking shots at the president for being in Hawaii. He's with his kids. Enough. EISEN: Enough. You can relate to that? KEENE: Yes. EISEN: Going away with your kids. All right. Well, the question is really who won politically in this game of back and forth. Listen to what House minority whip Rep. Steny Hoyer from Maryland said on the plan. (VIDEO PLAYING) REP. STENY HOYER (D-MD): I regret that this is not a big, bold and balanced plan. We had an opportunity to reach such an agreement in a bipartisan fashion. And we will not reach a big, bold and balanced plan without bipartisanship because the decisions we will have to make will be too difficult. (END VIDEO) EISEN: Bipartisanship at its best, Josh Barro. Do the Republicans have an edge? Do they have the leverage going into the debt ceiling battle, which is the next biggie at the end of February? BARRO: No, I don't think so. And I think people are overstating the risks associated with Republicans and the debt ceiling in a couple of months. I think what we learned from this fight is that the House Republicans are completely hapless. The - nobody really won this episode, but the House Republicans certainly lost it. And the reason is they - they got to the end. They hated the deal that came to them, but they'd been unable for weeks to make an offer of their now so they had no way to reject it. If they rejected it, they were going to be left there saying, we reject this, we propose nothing else. We're going to have the same thing happen over again with the debt ceiling. The Republicans do not want to say exactly how they want to cut the government. They can't put forward a plausible plan as an alternative to what the president wants. And so what that means if they can scream and scream, but ultimately they're left with no political option.

#### That gives Obama the political freedom to broker a deal – but it can change quickly

The Irish Times January 3, 2013 “Once more unto the brink” Lexis

The federal government has already broken through that ceiling but technical extraordinary measures by the treasury will allow the government to continue paying its bills for two months. If Republicans again hold the line, the real prospect of default looms as the government runs out of money to pay wages with the likely consequent chaos on domestic and world markets . The White House says that there will be no negotiations over the debt ceiling, and that if Republicans want further spending cuts, their only chance is to hand over more tax revenue. We re back to the game of chicken. And it s not as if the small deal and Bill agreed yesterday by the House goes anywhere near solving the deficit problem it was supposed to address. On the contrary. In all, the bill which will barely stabilise borrowing overthe next decade, will cause deficits to rise by nearly $4 trillion over the period, according to the nonpartisan congressional budget office. Nor, its critics complain, does the Bill go anywhere near addressing the challenge of 12 million unemployed, while it is also stuffed with the sort of pork barrel concessions to individual politicians that are typical of the worst kind of congressional legislating. In the end, however, and this is perhaps clutching at straws, Congress did act, albeit in the most minimal way. And a significant majority of Republicans those who, as one columnist put it, still hold the old-fashioned view that they were elected to help run the country did demonstrate a degree of flexibility and bipartisanship almost unthinkable before the election. Obama s renewed mandate has given him a new small measure of freedom. But it will dissipate fast if he does not use it.

#### Political capital solves the reasons it wont pass now – the recent fight proves

Debra Saunders (writer for the San Francisco Chronicle) January 3, 2013 “Once more unto the cliff, dear friends” Lexis

So, if voters really want balance, they should root for Republicans to force spending cuts during the coming negotiations to raise the debt ceiling. As Heritage Foundation fellow J.D. Foster sardonically told me, the debt-ceiling talks offer "our last best hope for peace." Earlier in the fiscal-cliff negotiations, the president tentatively accepted a proposal to reduce spending by using a different inflation index to compute Social Security benefits. For whatever reason - maybe he wasn't in a hurry - Obama yanked that proposition. During the 2011 "grand bargain" talks, Obama reportedly privately agreed to raise the eligibility age for Social Security and Medicare. The president knows what needs to be done, but he won't push it. "As we get into future budget discussions, we've confirmed something that we at Heritage have thought for a long time," Foster observed. Those reforms - along with more means-testing for entitlements - are easy to explain, accepted on both sides of the aisle and doable. "We proved that in the recent fight," said Foster. "Since there's such strong agreement, all we need is a president to lead, and we can do it."

### 2nc links

#### Plan’s empirically unpopular in Congress

**Goode, 11** – staff writer for Politico (Darren, Politico, 5/18, "Senate slams GOP drilling bill", http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55241.html

A Senate Republican offshore drilling bill died Wednesday due to opposition from Democrats and criticism from within the GOP that the measure didn't go far enough in enabling new production.

The 42-57 vote left sponsors well short of the needed 60 for the motion to proceed to pass.

Five Republicans voted no — Sens. Jim DeMint, Mike Lee, Richard Shelby, Olympia Snowe and David Vitter. No Democrats voted yes; Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus didn't vote.

#### Congressional opposition is divisive enough to block any additional offshore drilling

**Morgan, 11** (Curtis, Tampa Bay Times, “A year after Deepwater Horizon disaster, opposition to oil drilling fades” 4/18, <http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/a-year-after-deepwater-horizon-disaster-opposition-to-oil-drilling-fades/1164429>) **Nelson=Florida Senator Bill Nelson, Fuller = Manley Fuller, president of the Florida Wildlife Federation**

In Washington, the Obama administration has adopted what Interior Secretary Salazar called a "thoughtful and deliberate approach'' to reopening the gulf, with a new oversight agency and new safety measures — notably, one mandating that the industry develop deep-water containment systems for worst-case blowouts, like the one that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon.

In October, the White House lifted the drilling ban it imposed after the BP spill but didn't start issuing new permits until last month, approving 10 new deep water wells so far, with 15 more in process. The administration also agreed to open new territory for exploration by selling new leases — but only in the already heavily drilled central and western gulf.

The three bills approved by a House committee last week don't target Florida waters specifically but lawmakers potentially could use them as tools to carve out prime areas for drilling, or shrink or lift the moratorium.

For now, with the House and Senate controlled by different parties, it's doubtful any drilling bill can make it out of Congress. Nelson and most environmentalists believe the ban on Florida's federal waters can survive political pressure and maneuvering.

"President Obama would have to lose and Bill Nelson would have to lose and they'd have to be replaced by people who want to remove that boundary,'' said Fuller of the Florida Wildlife Federation. "I don't think that is going to happen.''

A more serious threat, they say, is the possibility of a future Florida Legislature opening up state-controlled waters. That move would make it politically difficult to justify a continuing federal ban.

A coalition of environmental groups, Save Our Seas, Beaches and Shores, launched a petition drive after the 2009 House vote to put a ban on drilling in state waters into the Florida Constitution. Former Gov. Charlie Crist's effort to do the same thing during a special legislative session in July proved dead on arrival.

So far, Fuller acknowledged, only a few thousand signatures have been gathered through an online site, far short of the nearly 700,000 needed. In February, Crist's former chief financial officer, Alex Sink, who lost the governor's race to Scott, agreed to co-chair the petition drive with the goal of getting an amendment proposal on the ballot by 2012 or, more realistically, the following year.

Fuller doesn't anticipate lawmakers trying to ram through a divisive drilling bill in the near future but "that is one reason why we want it in the Constitution. We don't want to see it as a possibility at all.''

#### A vocal minority is powerful enough to block the plan over revenue sharing questions – outweighs bipartisan support

**Banerjee, 12** – Washington Bureau of the Los Angeles Times (Neela, “Congress falls short on oil spill safety, panel says” Los Angeles Times, 4/17, <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/17/nation/la-na-oil-spill-20120418>)

The report by members of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling complained that Congress had failed to pass legislation requiring the offshore oil and gas industry to bear the costs of federal oversight through fees on leasing and permitting reviews. The presidential panel had also recommended that the $75-million liability cap for offshore oil spills be increased substantially.

The Democratic-controlled Senate has passed a bill to funnel penalties from the spill to restoring the Gulf of Mexico's ecosystem, but House Republicans have yet to approve it.

Several recent developments signal the need for more serious steps to bolster offshore drilling safeguards, the report said. In the last 10 months, "at least three offshore oil and gas rigs around the world have experienced significant leaks, demonstrating again and again how risky this activity is," the report said. "Risks will only increase as drilling moves into deeper waters with harsher, less familiar environmental conditions."

Some senior administration and congressional staffers complained that the report used simple letter grades to sum up complicated efforts. But Interior Secretary Ken Salazar echoed the criticisms of Congress.

"Two years after the Deepwater Horizon, it's inexcusable that the Congress has not done more to help us make sure that the energy security of the United States is protected in a way that will ensure that we will continue to develop our oil and gas resources in a safe and responsible way," Salazar said.

The report, "Assessing Progress," credited the administration for reorganizing the federal agency that oversees offshore energy into two separate entities in order to eliminate conflicts of interest and strengthen environmental reviews.

The report highlighted industry's creation of two consortia to respond to and contain spills. But it also warned that the necessary equipment may be far from the site. It also noted that an independent government auditor concluded recently that there was "limited assurance of an operator's ability to respond to a sub-sea blowout."

Sens. Mary L. Landrieu(D-La.) and Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) said in a statement that they shared the commission's frustrations and blamed other colleagues for the gridlock on legislation.

"A bipartisan majority in the Energy Committee and the full Senate would be happy to pass common-sense legislation addressing new production, safety and a fair share of revenue for the affected states," they said. "Unfortunately, a small number of senators are opposed to engaging in a debate that includes revenue sharing."

#### Any new effort to loosen restrictions will be a fight – for every group that supports the plan, powerful groups will fight it

**Dloughy, 11/7**/12 – reporter in the Hearst Newspapers Washington Bureau (Jennifer, “Obama and the environment - a new path?” San Francisco Chronicle,

<http://www.sfgate.com/science/article/Obama-and-the-environment-a-new-path-4018611.php>

President Obama enters a second term in the White House free to toughen regulations on domestic drilling despite industry objections - and to approve natural gas exports and the controversial Keystone XL pipeline without fear of alienating environmentalists he needed at the ballot box.

But the newly unfettered president will be navigating many of the same political obstacles he faced during the first term, when his administration balanced new pollution regulations by delaying mercury rules for power plants and giving the oil industry big concessions as part of other environmental mandates.

Obama also will be facing a sharply divided Congress, with Republicans eager to use their House control to undercut new environmental requirements and Democrats in charge of the Senate pushing back against efforts to weaken them.

"The president faces checks and balances from Congress," noted Benjamin Salisbury, an analyst with FBR Capital Markets. "He also faces checks and balances from litigation, from industry and negotiations and environmental groups."

#### Natural Gas exports have been blocked by congress – congress is worried and everyone wants to do research first

Money Morning 12 (Money Morning Nerws – Investment News Service, “Natural Gas Companies: Exporters Stymied by Permit Delays”, June 1 2012, Lexis)

Just days after Forbes explained how American natural gas exports will positively change the world, the U.S. Energy Department released news that could delay natural gas companies seeking to export the fuel.¶ The DOE announced it will temporarily halt granting new licenses for companies to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) until an economic study is completed later this fall.¶ Despite finishing in January the first part of a critical study on the impact of LNG exports on U.S. energy production, prices, and consumption, the rest remains incomplete. Until this section is finished and evaluated by members of Congress and executive officials, the DOE will also suspend assessments of proposed export sites.¶ "The second part of the study, which will assess the broader economic effects of increased natural gas exports, is ongoing," Energy Department spokesman William Gibbons wrote in a release Wednesday. "We expect to be able to release the comprehensive study results late this summer."¶ The DOE has delayed permits and assessments of proposed sites mainly due to worries from Congressional members. Congress remains concerned about the long-term U.S. energy security and the potential that natural gas prices could increase dramatically as exports begin.¶ Debate Grows in Washington¶ Now, it appears that the Energy Department and members of Congress are alerting foreign importers that U.S. natural gas exportation will be a political problem over the decade.¶ As I noted recently in the Oil and Energy Investor, fracking technology has moved so quickly and volumes of natural gas have been extracted at such high volumes that regulatory agencies have been unable to keep up with such robust growth.¶ Bureaucracy in general stymies Washington, but each individual agency with skin in the game needs time to conduct studies, compare notes, and institute policy.

#### Unpopular – price effect link turns any natural gas industry arguments

**Hurdle, ’12** (Jon Hurdle, AolEnergy, 23 May 2012, “Sabine Pass Natural Gas Export Project Leads Controversial Trend,” http://energy.aol.com/2012/05/23/sabine-pass-natural-gas-export-project-leads-controversial-trend/)//CC

Would US exports of liquefied natural gas support an industry that's struggling to produce the fuel at record-low prices, or would they deprive gas users of the benefits of those super-low rates? That's the debate over plans to build 10 major export terminals that would help reduce the current surplus from America's shale-gas boom while winning customers in overseas markets where prices are higher, in part because their own shale-gas industries haven't yet supplied enough to keep prices down. Exports are a tempting prospect for US gas producers confronted with a surplus that may be as much as 10 billion cubic feet a day, thanks to the super-productive combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling that have given access to rich gas fields across the country that used to be economically off-limits. Cheniere is First at the Pass Among proponents of exports is Navigant, a consultancy that has worked on six of the proposed US terminals including Cheniere Energy's Sabine Pass project in Louisiana, which won approval in April from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and is likely to become the first LNG export facility in the continental U.S. Gordon Pickering, Navigant's director of energy, argues that, far from depriving US industry of cheap natural gas, exports would stimulate prices sufficiently to keep drillers producing, ensuring industry is supplied with gas at reasonably low prices, albeit not at the current rock-bottom levels that are already causing some production cutbacks. But with plentiful gas driving down the price of electricity and helping to moderate inflation for many products, the prospect of any rise in prices has prompted opposition to LNG exports from some quarters. The natural gas industry's main trade association, America's Natural Gas Alliance, said it's mostly focused on stimulating demand domestically. "While we support free trade, ANGA's emphasis is on what this clean, abundant resource can provide in power generation, for transportation, and for the industrial sector right here in America," said spokesman Dan Whitten.

### shield

**Every SINGLE MOVE Obama makes is hotly contested and intensely debated—there’s only risk of a link**

**TVNZ 10/8** (Jon Johansson, 10/8/09, "A presidential chess game", http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/presidential-chess-game-3060277)

While only his most serious chess matches have been mentioned here, numerous other games are continually taking shape, demanding his study and his response. **Every single move Obama makes, in whichever game he plays, is hotly contested and intensely debated**. There is no let up for him.

**Yes blame**

**Cox and Rodriguez ‘9** – \* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School AND \*\* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law (ADAM B. COX AND CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, December, “The President and Immigration Law”, 119 Yale L.J. 458, Lexis Law, dheidt)

Two routes to more formalized Presidential power over ex ante screening could be pursued: a claim of inherent executive authority on the one hand, and direct congressional delegation on the other. With respect to the first theory, one could imagine that a proactive Executive with an interest in reducing its enforcement costs, as well as in shifting the illegal population into legal status, might seek recourse in its inherent executive authority over immigration, much as Presidents Roosevelt and Truman seized the initiative in addressing farm worker shortages during and immediately after World War II. Though the question of inherent authority has never been definitely resolved, we are fairly confident that this option would not be viable in the contemporary political environment. The assertion of inherent authority would be too disruptive to the conventions that have evolved over time regarding Congress's leadership in this arena (and in administrative law generally). Indeed, even when he was riding high politically between 2002 and 2004, it did not occur to President Bush to propose publicly a large-scale guest worker program without congressional authorization. n265

### winners win

**Capital’s finite—they assume demand to leverage**

**Gerson, 12/17** (Michael, 12/17/10, Washington Post, “When it comes to politics, Obama's ego keeps getting in the way,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html)

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because **political capital is limited**. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership.

Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done.

**Not a win—randomly forcing bills through just looks misguided**

William GALSTON 11-4-10 [William, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings, “President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties” Brookings Institute -- Nov 4]

Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and- trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists.

The legislative process that produced the health care bill was especially damaging. It lasted much too long and featured side-deals with interest groups and individual senators, made in full public view. Much of the public was dismayed by what it saw. Worse, the seemingly endless health care debate strengthened the view that the president’s agenda was poorly aligned with the economic concerns of the American people. Because the administration never persuaded the public that health reform was vital to our economic future, the entire effort came to be seen as diversionary, even anti-democratic. The health reform bill was surely a moral success; it may turn out to be a policy success; but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was—and remains—a political liability.

### 2nc pc key

#### Their studies don’t take out our disad—even if capital only works at the margin it’s still key

**O’Geen and Lebo 2011** – \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at Davidson College, \*\*Associate Professor of Political Science at Stony Brook University (July, Andrew and Matthew, The Journal of Politics, 73.3, “The President’s Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena”, http://ms.cc.sunysb.edu/~mlebo/The%20Presidents%20Role%20in%20the%20Partisan%20Congressional%20Arena.pdf, WEA)

Presidential Success

The seminal work of Neustadt (1960) provides the foundation for most empirical examinations of presidential inﬂuence in Congress. Writing about power in political ofﬁce, Neustadt was interested in understanding both the sources of power for a president and the mechanisms by which that power could be maintained and used. While the conclusions are based primarily on carefully selected examples that often cannot be generalized to other situations (Bond and Fleisher 1980; Edwards 1980), they do provide a theoretical starting point for the literature on presidential success. Of what is presidential power made? For Neustadt, it is the power to inﬂuence and to persuade. On the domestic front, it is the power to effectively control both the legislative agenda and process and to turn electoral mandates into national policy. So, one way to view presidential power vis a`vis the legislature is through the president’s ability to get legislation that he favors through Congress.

One aspect of Neustadt’s (1960) argument in particular—the link between popular approval and success—attracted a lot of attention. The idea that ‘‘political capital’’ comes from presidential popularity and can be spent in the legislative arena is a persistent one. For Neustadt, the public prestige of the president was a key factor in his legislative success. He did temper this with the warning that prestige is a ‘‘factor operating mostly in the background as a conditioner’’ (1960, 87) and that it ‘‘may not decide the outcome in a given case but can affect the likelihoods in every case and therefore is strategically important to his power’’ (93).

Early work sought to empirically investigate some of Neustadt’s claims. First, it was necessary to evaluate whether the relationship between success and approval existed at all. In a series of work, Edwards (1976, 1980) looks at correlations between presidential approval and success across multiple scenarios. This research is notable in that it represents one of the ﬁrst attempts to rigorously examine the relationships identiﬁed as important by Neustadt. Edwards’ results in these studies are mixed, however. For example, the correlations between approval and support overall are very high, but much of the evidence of this relationship disappears when partisanship is introduced.

Building on the work of Edwards, scholars sought to evaluate the relationship between approval and success in more methodologically advanced ways. This research sought to both build on Edwards’ ﬁndings as well as move beyond some of the limitations of relying on correlations to make causal inferences. Much of this line of research concluded that the tenuous link identiﬁed by Edwards was much stronger than previously thought (Bond and Fleisher 1984; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rivers and Rose 1985).

Later research challenged the strength of the relationship between approval and success and found it to be marginal or nonexistent (Collier and Sullivan 1995). Separating by issue areas, Fleisher et al. (2000) ﬁnd that public support of neither domestic nor foreign policy issues have much bearing on success and that partisan factors are more determinative of roll-call results.

Still, the intuitive appeal of the hypothesis— ceteris paribus a president should have higher success if his popularity is higher—has led to multiple attempts to rescue it. Peterson states simply that a ‘‘ . . . lack of popularity with the American people diminishes a president’s policy-making stature’’ (1990, 136) and ﬁnds some support when using probit analyses for data collected at the bill level. Cohen et al. (2000) look at state-level approval and conclude that there is no relationship between it and the behavior of individual Senators towards the president’s legislative agenda. Canes-Wrone and de Marchi (2002) investigate the success of individual roll calls on which the president has taken a position and ﬁnd the impact of approval to be indirect and conditional on other bill-speciﬁc factors such as salience. Bond, Fleisher, and Wood (2003) investigate the interactive and time-varying nature of approval and ﬁnd evidence that its inﬂuence changes over time. Rudalevige (2002, 131) points out that even if popularity has a marginal effect on success, this might be key since policy is made at the margins.

In his most recent book, The Strategic President, George Edwards asserts that the power of the president is not the power to persuade. Presidents may exploit opportunities of high approval but, for the most part, ‘‘presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely beyond the president’s control’’ (2009, 150). Edwards holds out a marginal role for the president’s popularity: ‘‘Presidents must largely play the hands that the public deals them through its voting in presidential and congressional elections and its evaluations of the chief executive’s job performance’’ (152).

This is representative of the shift away from Neustadt’s focus on ‘‘what the president does and how well he does it’’ (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 12) to a perspective based more on the environment within Congress. For one, Cooper and Brady (1981) see the institutional context as more important than the personal leadership skills of the president. A thorough treatment of this viewpoint can be found in Bond and Fleisher (1990), who see success as dependent upon what they call ‘‘linkage agents’’ which provide the bridge through which the partisan and ideological makeup of Congress can inﬂuence presidential success. Similarly, Peterson (1990) sees the partisan make-up of Congress as critical to presidential success, and Rudalevige (2002) argues parties and ideology are where most studies of presidential success are centered.

Most of the recent work deals with the president’s ability to impact the legislative process not in any overt or direct way, but at the margins. For example, Wood (2009) looks at the president’s ability to shape economic policy through rhetoric and others look at the president’s use of the media and his ability to ‘‘go public’’ on important issues (for example, Barrett 2004; Canes-Wrone 2001). Also, recent work examines the president’s ability to lobby and build coalitions in Congress as a means of inﬂuencing outcomes (Beckmann 2008). However, as the quotes from Emmanuel and DeMint suggest, the impact of bargaining, coalition building, and public statements by the president can be felt long after the congressional agenda has been set. Indeed, presidential success may have an important effect on the very structure of representation in future Congresses. This leads us from an investigation of the causes of success to an interest in its consequences.

#### Yes vote switching—even due to unrelated legislation

**Simes and Saunders 2010** – \*publisher of the National Interest, \*\*Executive Director of The Nixon Center and Associate Publisher of The National Interest, served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005 (12/23, Dimitri and Paul, National Interest, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626, WEA)

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our own conversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that **Republican anger over unrelated legislation cost** five to ten **votes**. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had alienated many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty.

That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it would not have been so difficult for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to work more cooperatively with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

### 2nc agenda impact

#### The plan backlash alone allows the fiscal debate to become so all-consuming that it wrecks Obama’s second term agenda – this is a status quo cp that solves the aff and a laundry list of impacts

Ewen MacAskil and Chris McGreal (writers for the Irish Times) January 3, 2013 “Battles on cuts yet to come after fiscal cliff deal” Lexis

In the end, it is difficult to see how the White House can remain aloof, given the consequences of the US being unable to meet its debt obligations. The president expressed concern that repeated battles with Congress over the economy will eat into time that he hoped to use to push through his second-term agenda. We can settle this debate or, at the very least, not allow it to be so all-consuming all the time that it stops us from meeting a host of other challenges that we face: creating jobs, boosting incomes, fixing our infrastructure, fixing our immigration system, protecting our planet from the harmful effects of climate change, boosting domestic energy production, protecting our kids from the horrors of gun violence, Mr Obama said. (Guardian service)

#### Causes Obama to back off of immigration form

Caren Bohan (writer for the Government Executive) November 8, 2012 “Savvy strategy, not mandate, key for Obama on fiscal cliff” http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2012/11/savvy-strategy-not-mandate-key-obama-fiscal-cliff/59364/?oref=dropdown

“There are a lot of calculations going on right now at leadership levels, in both houses, in both parties, with the White House breathing a huge sigh of relief that the (pre-election) polls all were right” but also trying to figure out how to approach the fiscal cliff, Bennett said. Many Democrats expect Obama to begin a campaign-style tour to try to rally support for his positions on the fiscal cliff and long-term budget issues. Even before the election, the White House began setting the stage for the upcoming negotiations, trying to reassure liberal advocacy groups about the importance of tackling the effort at a grand bargain. The White House believes that without a budget deal, it will be much harder to move on to other items on Obama's second-term agenda, such as immigration reform

#### CIR key to heg and solves Latin American relations and prevent massive instability

Robert Gittelson (Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Policy) 2009 “The Centrists Against the Ideologues: What Are the Falsehoods That Divide Americans on the Issue of Comprehensive Immigration Reform?” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1400764

However, the above list of security enhancements is only a part of the overall security ramifications of CIR. For example, as everyone—including our enemies all over the world—knows, our military manpower is strained to the limit. Our troops are on a seemingly endless loop of deployments, with no imminent relief in sight. Our military recruiting officers are struggling to meet the vital new quotas for fresh servicemen and women, and scandals have started to come to light of instances where we have waived or lowered our induction standards.28 We are also offering record high bonus inducements to lure potential recruits to join the armed forces.29 CIR can really help us in this regard, with the potential addition of millions of military age, able-bodied men and women, should CIR allow them to legalize their status. This would not only increase the potential pool of new recruits; it would allow the military to once again raise standards, and— because of the laws of supply and demand—they could save much-needed revenue by lowering the bonuses that they are currently offering due to the short supply of potential seamen, soldiers, and airmen. The long-term benefit to our country through the addition of these potential recruits is that these young men and women would receive valuable training for advancement in life in whatever career path they should choose. They would be able to take advantage of the laws governing accelerated citizenship for immigrants who serve in the military, and, of course, our country—and by extension the entire world—would be safer because of this provision of CIR. In the alternative, should we fail to pass CIR, and instead opt to deport or force attrition on these millions of economic refugees through an enforcement-only approach to our current undocumented immigrant difficulties, what would be the net result? Forgetting for now the devastating effect on our own economy, and the worldwide reproach and loss of moral authority that we would frankly deserve should we act so callously and thoughtlessly, there is another important political imperative to our passing CIR that affects our national security, and the security and political stability of our neighbors in our hemisphere. That is the very real threat of communism and/or socialism. First of all, the primary reason why millions of undocumented economic refugees migrated to the United States is because the economies of their home countries were unable to support them. They escaped extreme poverty and oppression, and risked literally everything they had, including their lives and their freedom, to come to this country to try to work hard and support themselves and their families. Deporting our illegal immigrant population back to primarily Latin America would boost the communist and socialist movements in that part of our hemisphere, and if the anti-immigrationists only understood that fact, they might re-think their “line in the sand” position on what they insist on calling “amnesty.” Communism thrives where hope is lost. The economies of Latin American nations are struggling to barely reach a level of meager subsistence for the population that has remained at home; Mexico, for example, has already lost 14% of their able-bodied workers to U.S. migration.30 Without the billions of dollars in remissions from these nations’ expatriates working in the United States that go back to help support their remaining family members, the economies of many of these countries, most of whom are in fact our allies, would certainly collapse, or at least deteriorate to dangerously unstable levels. The addition of millions of unemployed and frustrated deported people who would go to the end of the theoretical unemployment lines of these already devastated economies would surely cause massive unrest and anti-American sentiment. The issue of comprehensive immigration reform is not simply a domestic issue. In our modern global economy, everything that we do, as the leaders of that global economy, affects the entire world, and most especially our region of the world. If we were to naively initiate actions that would lead to the destabilization of the Mexican and many Central and South American governments, while at the same time causing serious harm to our own economy (but I digress . . .), it would most assuredly lead to disastrous economic and political consequences. By the way, I’m not simply theorizing here. In point of fact, over the past few years, eight countries in Latin America have elected leftist leaders. Just last year, Guatemala swore in their first leftist president in more than fifty years, Alvaro Colom.31 He joins a growing list. Additional countries besides Guatemala, Venezuela,32 and Nicaragua33 that have sworn in extreme left wing leaders in Latin America recently include Brazil,34 Argentina,35 Bolivia,36 Ecuador,37 and Uruguay.38 This phenomenon is not simply a coincidence; it is a trend. The political infrastructure of Mexico is under extreme pressure from the left.39 Do we really want a leftist movement on our southern border? If our political enemies such as the communists Chavez in Venezuela and Ortega in Nicaragua are calling the shots in Latin America, what kind of cooperation can we expect in our battle to secure our southern border?

#### Independently causes regional war – escalates globally

James Francis Rochlin (Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia Okanagan) 1994 “Discovering the Americas” p. 130-1

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security concerns were perhaps more impotant. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of potential decline of US hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining US influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-84 due to wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some US client state in Latin America, in addition to political repression, underdevelopment, mounting external debt, anti-american sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to US strategic and economic interest and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Cental American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process thoughout the whole region. Analysts at the time worried that, in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin Ameica, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivation which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contradora, as will be seen in the next chapter

## 1nr

### 2nc a2 add on

#### Sustainability impossible – human nature

**Nelder 09** - [Nelder](http://www.businessinsider.com/author/chris-nelder), nergy analyst, journalist, consultant, and investor. I have written two books on investing and energy: Profit from the Peak and [Investing in Renewable Energy](http://www.getreallist.com/my-latest-book-investing-in-renewable-energy.html), both of which were published in 2008 (Chris, Aug. 24, 2009 “Our Energy Problems Are All Based In Human Nature” <http://www.businessinsider.com/our-energy-problems-are-all-based-in-human-nature-2009-8>) Jacome

[x](http://www.businessinsider.com/our-energy-problems-are-all-based-in-human-nature-2009-8)

Email Article

We have all the technology we need to make homes that produce their own energy. We know how to build high-efficiency rail and sailing ships. We know how to grow food organically and sustainably. We have the science to create economic systems that internalize all effects and operate in a beneficial manner. We’ve had the quantitative knowledge for decades that we would eventually go into resource and environmental overshoot.

We certainly have the technology to build an all-electric infrastructure entirely powered by renewables. We will crack the storage problem and all the other technical problems. I have no doubt that the technology also exists to build an all-nuclear solution, or even an all-hydrogen solution.

We have the technology to recycle all our water and reclaim all our waste. We could even control our population if we had the will.

We also know what real sustainability means. I don’t think I have ever seen it better put than by my friend Paul Hawken in his book, The Ecology of Commerce:

Sustainability is an economic state where the demands placed upon the environment by people and commerce can be met without reducing the capacity of the environment to provide for future generations. It can also be expressed in the simple terms of an economic golden rule for the restorative economy: Leave the world better than you found it, take no more than you need, try not to harm life or the environment, make amends if you do.

The real problem is we don’t want to act that way. Virtually no business in existence meets that standard.

Technology and knowledge simply aren’t the issue.

We don’t want to think about having to put CO2 back in the ground after we burn fuels. We don’t want to worry about the waste from our consumption. We don’t like to hear about limits to anything we want to do. We don’t want to rearrange our stuff, our lifestyles, so that they are truly sustainable. And we certainly don’t like anybody telling us we can’t have more kids.

In fact we don’t even like to think about it, so when the subject comes up, we dismiss it with a flip comment like, “So I suppose you want us all to be living in caves and working by candlelight?”

The upwelling of emotions that this topic inspires—especially fear—usually makes a neutral and scientific discussion out of the question.

And from fear, most people leap to faith: faith in the perfect wisdom of free markets, faith in technology, faith in human ingenuity. No rational discussion needed.

Nor is this aspect of human nature a news flash. ‘Twas ever so. At the suggestion of a smart hedge fund manager buddy, I recently put Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War in my reading queue for clues on how humanity actually performs when presented with serious fiscal and resource challenges.

I know some very smart people who are fully armed with the data on resource depletion and peak oil, and who still choose to believe in a cornucopian future where humanity acts wisely, humanely, justly, and in concert with a view toward long-term planning, solving all of our problems without any serious hardship.

This time, they contend, it will be different. After all, aren’t we entering the Age of Aquarius, when humanity finally embraces unity and understanding?

Well, forgive me for being skeptical. The degree of cooperation they envisage has no precedent whatsoever in human history, and there are thousands of examples to the contrary.

In fact I was a bit shocked today when I looked back on my first opus on sustainability (”[Envisioning a Sustainable Future](http://www.getreallist.com/)“), published in my online magazine Better World 13 years ago, and realized that all of the problems are the same now as they were then, only worse: population, energy, water, extinction, environmental destruction, flawed economic theory, global warming, and humanity’s problem with long-term planning.

It gave me pause. A long pause. Are all my efforts, and those of my fellow agitators for sustainability, simply battling human nature? And if so, what good is it?

#### And, their extinction impact is based on the environment – no impact to that

**Boucher 98** (Doug, "Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Science and Society, Fall, http://www.driftline.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive\_msg.cgi?file=spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international\_1998/marxism-international.9802&msgnum=379&start=32091&end=32412)

The political danger of catastrophism is matched by the weakness of its scientific foundation. Given the prevalence of the idea that the entire biosphere will soon collapse, it is remarkable how few good examples ecology can provide of this happening m even on the scale of an ecosystem, let alone a continent or the whole planet. Hundreds of ecological transformations, due to introductions of alien species, pollution, overexploitation, climate change and even collisions with asteroids, have been documented. They often change the functioning of ecosystems, and the abundance and diversity of their animals and plants, in dramatic ways. The effects on human society can be far-reaching, and often extremely negative for the majority of the population. But one feature has been a constant, nearly everywhere on earth: life goes on. Humans have been able to drive thousands of species to extinction, severely impoverish the soil, alter weather patterns, dramatically lower the biodiversity of natural communities, and incidentally cause great suffering for their posterity. They have not generally been able to prevent nature from growing back. As ecosystems are transformed, species are eliminated -- but opportunities are created for new ones. The natural world is changed, but never totally destroyed. Levins and Lewontin put it well: "The warning not to destroy the environment is empty: environment, like matter, cannot be created or destroyed. What we can do is replace environments we value by those we do not like" (Levins and Lewontin, 1994). Indeed, from a human point of view the most impressive feature of recorded history is that human societies have continued to grow and develop, despite all the terrible things they have done to the earth. Examples of the collapse of civilizations due to their over- exploitation of nature are few and far between. Most tend to be well in the past and poorly documented, and further investigation often shows that the reasons for collapse were fundamentally political.

### 2nc production high

#### Obama’s demand-side policies outweigh the effect of regulations

**Drajem, 11/8**/12 (Mark, Bloomberg, “Natural Gas That Backed Romney May Gain From Obama Win” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-08/natural-gas-that-backed-romney-may-gain-from-obama-win.html>)

While Obama will continue with a series of environmental regulations that would curb the production and use of coal, his policies promise to boost demand for natural gas in vehicles and power plants and facilitate domestic oil and gas output to levels not seen in more than two decades.

“Facts are stubborn things and they often defy people’s ideology,” John Hanger, a special counsel at Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, LLC in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the former top environmental regulator in that state, said in an interview. Obama’s “policies on the demand side are most favorable.”

The re-election of Obama and continuation of Republican control of the House of Representatives opens the possibility for legislation to boost demand for gas, including incentives for natural-gas vehicles, Hanger said. Republicans lawmakers may also try to limit actions the administration could take to regulate hydraulic fracturing or curb production on federal lands.

### 2nc no solvency

#### MMS overreach tanks the aff

Curry L. Hagerty (Specialist in Energy and Natural Resources Policy at the Congressional Research Service) June 15, 2010 “Outer Continental Shelf Moratoria on Oil and Gas Development” <http://crs.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/10Jul/R41132.pdf>

Minerals Management Service (MMS)34

Generally, federal agencies take OCS leasing moratoria direction from Congress and the President. In some cases however, lack of coordination between federal agency actions and the actions of Congress and the President in terms of OCS leasing moratoria, has created tension and controversy. For example, MMS has exercised agency authority to constrain leasing activities in areas not under moratoria policy set by Congress or the President. Deferring oil and gas development is within agency authority even when it is inconsistent with prevailing moratoria policy. MMS has deferred from offering OCS areas numerous times over the years in response to recommendations from governors, stakeholders, and others.35

#### State regulations negate the effect of the aff

Sheena Martin (Writer for ICIS – a news agency specializing in Chemicals, Energy, and Fertilizer) January 2011 “Shale gas revolution in the US presents regulatory and infrastructure challenges” http://www.icis.com/Articles/2011/01/10/9423607/shale-gas-revolution-in-the-us-presents-regulatory-and-infrastructure.html

Most state legislation - more than 30 states have varying degrees of shale production - has been based on rules laid down by Colorado after a year of stakeholder discussions. The Colorado laws include development of a comprehensive drilling plan, ways to minimize the effect on communities and the environment, drilling at a required distance from residences and reporting chemical identities in case of a related environmental or medical need to a state commission. The information would be kept confidential. New York, Wyoming and Pennsylvania have been active in creating similar regulations, and Pennsylvania passed regulations on fracking in November 2010. Regulations in Pennsylvania require disclosure of a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) with a list of additives used in drilling. Wyoming also requires MSDS reporting but companies must disclose the main ingredient of chemical additives. New York tried to place a temporary stop on fracking, so environmental impacts could be studied. In early December, the New York legislative body, the state Assembly, passed a moratorium on fracking until May 2011. However, the governor vetoed the bill.

### 2nc a2 manufacturing impact d

#### Manufacturing isn’t declining in ways that matter – increasing productivity preserves manufacturing leadership

Steve Chapman 3-8-2012; a member of the Chicago Tribune's editorial board “Manufacturing an economic myth Nostalgia is no guide to sound policy” <http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-03-18/news/ct-oped-0318-chapman-20120318_1_manufacturing-sector-rick-santorum-products>

But if nostalgia were a sound guide to economic policy, we should be building Studebakers and rotary telephones. Neither Santorum nor Obama seems to grasp the realities of manufacturing in 21st-century America. The first is that it's not declining in the ways that matter. Compared with 1990, the total value of U.S. manufacturing output, adjusted for inflation, was up by 75 percent in 2010 — despite a drop caused by the Great Recession. It has declined as a share of gross domestic product only because other industries have expanded even more rapidly. Economist Mark J. Perry of the University of Michigan at Flint points out that in 2009, the total value of America's manufacturing output was nearly 46 percent greater than China's. Over the past two decades, our share of the world's manufacturing has been pretty stable. The decline in the number of manufacturing jobs is taken as evidence that the sector is sick or uncompetitive or the victim of unfair trade practices. In reality, the change indicates sound health. Our manufacturing workers have become so much more productive that they can churn out more goods with a far smaller workforce. The same pattern, by the way, is evident in American agriculture. In 1900, 39 percent of all Americans lived on farms. Today it's 1 percent. It's a good thing, not a bad thing, that we need fewer people to produce our food. Likewise with manufactured products. Manufacturing accounts for a shrinking slice of the total economy mainly because as we grow wealthier, we spend a smaller portion of our income on physical products, like cars and appliances, and a bigger one on services, from health care to cellphone contracts to restaurant meals. That phenomenon holds across the developed world. It's the result of the free market at work, endlessly shifting resources to accommodate changes in consumer demand. Politicians don't think they should tell Americans to eat at Burger King instead of Chipotle, or buy baseball bats instead of soccer balls. They didn't insist we keep our typewriters when personal computers came along. For the most part, our leaders take it as normal and sensible to defer to consumer demand, rather than try to dictate it. Given that, why do they think they ought to rig the tax code to push consumption dollars from services, which Americans want, to goods, which they don't want quite so much? Why should they divert investment from more popular businesses to less popular ones? That's what the measures offered by Santorum and Obama would do. The point is to ease the tax burden of manufacturers at the expense of other companies, on the superstition that the former are more valuable than the latter. It's hard to see the fairness or the economic logic. When the president unveiled his proposal, Jade West of the National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors complained to The New York Times, "My guys are totally freaked out by manufacturing getting a different tax rate than we do. They're not more important in the economy than retail or distribution or anything else." In fact, manufacturing is bound to be a diminishing share of any advanced economy. Obama and Santorum can fling money into the teeth of that trend. But any time politicians want to resist powerful and beneficial economic forces, bet on the economic forces.

#### Manufacturing sector is overwhelmingly powerful now – no risk of collapse

Mark Perry (professor of economics at the University of Michigan, Flint, is also a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) February 25, 2011 “The Truth About U.S. Manufacturing “ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703652104576122353274221570.html.html

Is American manufacturing dead? You might think so reading most of the nation's editorial pages or watching the endless laments in the news that "nothing is made in America anymore," and that our manufacturing jobs have vanished to China, Mexico and South Korea. Yet the empirical evidence tells a different story—of a thriving and growing U.S. manufacturing sector, and a country that remains by far the world's largest manufacturer. This is a particularly sensitive topic in my hometown of Flint, Mich., where auto-plant closings have meant lost jobs and difficult transitions for the displaced. But while it's true that the U.S. has lost more than seven million manufacturing jobs since the late 1970s, our manufacturing output has continued to expand. International data compiled by the United Nations on global output from 1970-2009 show this success story. Excluding recession-related decreases in 2001 and 2008-09, America's manufacturing output has continued to increase since 1970. In every year since 2004, manufacturing output has exceeded $2 trillion (in constant 2005 dollars), twice the output produced in America's factories in the early 1970s. Taken on its own, U.S. manufacturing would rank today as the sixth largest economy in the world, just behind France and ahead of the United Kingdom, Italy and Brazil. In 2009, the most recent full year for which international data are available, our manufacturing output was $2.155 trillion (including mining and utilities). That's more than 45% higher than China's, the country we're supposedly losing ground to. Despite recent gains in China and elsewhere, the U.S. still produced more than 20% of global manufacturing output in 2009. The truth is that America still makes a lot of stuff, and we're making more of it than ever before. We're merely able to do it with a fraction of the workers needed in the past. Consider the incredible, increasing productivity of America's manufacturing workers: The average U.S. factory worker is responsible today for more than $180,000 of annual manufacturing output, triple the $60,000 in 1972. Increases in productivity are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, such as GM's next generation Ecotec engine. These increases are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, which last year helped boost output to record levels in industries like computers and semiconductors, medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals and medicine, and oil and natural-gas equipment.

#### Manufacturing in the US comparatively more attractive now – Chinese constraints are rising faster than ours

Urban Lehner 2011 (Vice President of the Progressive Farmer) 2011 “Reports of American Manufacturing's Death Are Exaggerated” <http://www.dtnprogressivefarmer.com/dtnag/view/ag/printablePage.do?ID=BLOG_PRINTABLE_PAGE&bypassCache=true&pageLayout=v4&blogHandle=editorsnotebook&blogEntryId=8a82c0bc31d5e6e301336f3dd2381059&articleTitle=Reports+of+American+Manufacturing%27s+Death+Are+Exaggerated&editionName=DTNAgFreeSiteOnline>

Since 1972, America's manufacturing output more than doubled. Between 1997 and 2008, its dollar value rose by a third. In 2010, the U.S. accounted for 19.4% of global manufacturing value added, just shy of China's 19.8%. The BCG study is titled "Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S." In truth, though, manufacturing never went entirely away. It seemed to in part because our factories, like our farms, are so much more productive: Factories churn out 2.5 times as much they did in 1972 with a third fewer workers. It's the jobs that went away. What also departed was America's post-World War II dominance. Because the war had destroyed European and Japanese factories while ours went unscathed, the U.S. in the early 1950s accounted for 40% of the world's manufactured goods. Our share today is half that not because our output has shrunk but because the world's has expanded faster. The most interesting aspect of the study is its argument that the U.S. is in the early phases of becoming a more attractive place to locate factories. Within five years, BCG maintains, it will no longer be cheaper to manufacture some goods in China than in the U.S. Rising Chinese wages and land costs, a weakening dollar and superior U.S. factory productivity are among the reasons the cost gap will close. BCG urges American companies to reassess their China strategy. "China should no longer be treated as the default option," BCG says. It will remain the place to make products that require a lot of labor, especially those destined for Asian markets. But products turned out in modest volumes with relatively little labor may be best manufactured in the U.S.

### 2nc a2 hegemony

#### Regional cooperation fills in

**Sachs, 11** – Director of The Earth Institute, Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University. He is also Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Jeffrey, “A World of Regions,” 5/26, http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/05/a-world-of-regions/)

In almost every part of the world, long-festering problems can be solved through closer cooperation among neighboring countries. The European Union provides the best model for how neighbors that have long fought each other can come together for mutual benefit. Ironically, today’s decline in American global power may lead to more effective regional cooperation. This may seem an odd time to praise the EU, given the economic crises in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Europe has not solved the problem of balancing the interests of strong economies in the North and those of weaker economies in the South. Still, the EU’s accomplishments vastly outweigh its current difficulties. The EU has created a zone of peace where once there was relentless war. It has provided the institutional framework for reuniting Western and Eastern Europe. It has fostered regional-scale infrastructure. The single market has been crucial to making Europe one of the most prosperous places on the planet. And the EU has been a global leader on environmental sustainability. For these reasons, the EU provides a unique model for other regions that remain stuck in a mire of conflict, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and environmental crisis. New regional organizations, such as the African Union, look to the EU as a role model for regional problem-solving and integration. Yet, to this day, most regional groupings remain too weak to solve their members’ pressing problems. In most other regions, ongoing political divisions have their roots in the Cold War or the colonial era. During the Cold War, neighbors often competed with each other by “choosing sides” – allying themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Pakistan tilted towards the Americans; India towards the Soviets. Countries had little incentive to make peace with their neighbors as long as they enjoyed the financial support of the US or the USSR. On the contrary, continued conflict often led directly to more financial aid. Indeed, the US and Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, which they believed would limit their roles as power brokers. Thus, when Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a call for Arab unity in the 1950’s, the US and Europe viewed him as a threat. The US undercut his call for strong Arab cooperation and nationalism, fearing a loss of American influence in the Middle East. As a result, Nasser increasingly aligned Egypt with the Soviet Union, and ultimately failed in the quest to unite Arab interests. Today’s reality, however, is that great powers can no longer divide and conquer other regions, even if they try. The age of colonialism is finished, and we are now moving beyond the age of US global dominance. Recent events in the Middle East and Central Asia, for example, clearly reflect the decline of US influence. America’s failure to win any lasting geopolitical advantage through the use of military force in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the limits of its power, while its budget crisis ensures that it will cut its military resources sooner rather than later. Similarly, the US played no role in the political revolutions underway in the Arab world, and still has not demonstrated any clear policy response to them. President Barack Obama’s recent speech on the Middle East is a further display of America’s declining influence in the region. The speech drew the most attention for calling on Israel to return to its 1967 borders, but the effect was undercut when Israel flatly rejected the US position. The world could see that there would be little practical follow-up. The rest of the speech was even more revealing, though it drew little public notice. When Obama discussed the Arab political upheavals, he noted the importance of economic development. Yet when it came to US action, the most that the US could offer financially was slight debt relief for Egypt ($1 billion), scant loan guarantees ($1 billion), and some insurance coverage for private investments. The real message was that the US government would contribute very little financially to the region’s economic recovery. The days when a country could depend on large-scale American financing are over. We are, in short, moving to a multi-polar world. The Cold War’s end has not led to greater US dominance, but rather to the dissemination of global power to many regions. East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have new geopolitical and economic influence. Each region, increasingly, must find its own path to economic development, energy and food security, and effective infrastructure, and must do so in a world threatened by climate change and resource scarcity. Each region, therefore, will have to secure its own future. Of course, this should occur in a context of cooperation across regions as well as within them. The Middle East is in a strong **position to help itself**. There is a high degree of economic complementarity between Egypt and the oil-rich Gulf States. Egypt can supply technology, manpower, and considerable expertise for the Arab region, while the Gulf provides energy and finance, as well as some specialists. The long-delayed vision of Arab economic unity should be returned to the table. Israel, too, should recognize that its long-term security and prosperity will be enhanced as part of an economically stronger region. For the sake of its own national interests, Israel must come to terms with its neighbors. Other regions also will find that the decline of US power increases the **urgency of stronger cooperation** between neighbors. Some of the greatest tensions in the world – say India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea – should be defused as part of region-wide strengthening. As the EU shows, ancient enmities and battle lines can be turned into mutually beneficial cooperation if a region looks forward, to resolving its long-term needs, rather than backward, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts.

#### Zero studies exist to confirm that primacy is peaceful

**Montiero, 12** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful” International Security, Winter, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received **virtually no attention**. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010. 22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. 23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war. 24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate. 25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention.

**Heg fails**

**Mastanduno 9** (Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

**Hegemonic retrenchment’s key to prevent war with Russia and China---defuses Georgia, Taiwan and the South China Seas**

MacDonald and Parent 11 \*Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami [November/December 2011, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 6]

Curbing the United States' commitments would reduce risks, but it cannot eliminate them. Adversaries may fill regional power vacuums, and allies will never behave exactly as Washington would prefer. Yet those costs would be outweighed by the concrete benefits of pulling back. A focus on the United States' core interests in western Europe would limit the risk of catastrophic clashes with Russia over ethnic enclaves in Georgia or Moldova by allowing the United States to avoid commitments it would be unwise to honor. By narrowing its commitments in Asia, the United States could lessen the likelihood of conflict over issues such as the status of Taiwan or competing maritime claims in the South China Sea. Just as the United Kingdom tempered its commitments and accommodated U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere at the turn of the last century, the United States should now temper its commitments and cultivate a lasting compromise with China over Taiwan.

### at: chemicals

#### Multiple factors ensure chemical industry resiliency

Economic Outlook 2o12; world economic review, “Economic Outlook — Economic Outlook No.2-2012” http://www.mydigitalpublication.com/display\_article.php?id=1058343

Rebound in the US Benefiting from the impact of the last two massive public budget support plans for industry, the American chemical industry was also helped in 2011 by favourable dollar/euro exchange rate and by the restored health of the Auto sector, one of its leading user industries.While construction, the chemical industry’s second major customer, has not yet genuinely recovered, its decline has at least halted, stabilising demand at levels which are manageable in the end for its chemical suppliers. The willingness of American politicians to support a forced march to US economic growth offers a reassuring outlook for activity in the sector in 2012. Additional factors include relatively stable oil prices, the good health of the inorganic chemical sector – notably fertilisers – and the improved financial structure of actors in the industry after their restructuring efforts implemented during the 2008- 2009 crisis. On top of this, there are the prospects of the juicy but more distant benefits of innovations in green chemistry.

# round 4 neg v. emory cm

## 1nc

### Topicality

#### Interpretation:

#### Increase requires specification

**OED, 89** (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)

increase, v.

3. To become greater in some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.

#### Substantial is meaningful with firm basis

**WordNet, 6** (WordNet® 3.0, © 2006 by Princeton University. Dictionary.reference.com/ browse/substantial)

Substantial, adjective

 2. having a firm basis in reality and being therefore important, meaningful, or considerable; "substantial equivalents"

#### Incentives require distinct mechanisms—not just encouragement

**Marbek Resource Consultants, 6** (Report prepared for the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment “NATIONAL EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) WORKSHOP,” 9/27, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/epr\_wkshp\_rpt\_1376\_e.pdf

The suggestion was made, and supported by others, that the word “incentives” for producers be replaced with the word “encourage”, since the term “incentive” usually implies a particular mechanism (#1).

#### Vote neg—too late to clarify:

#### 1. Ground – “incentives” is the direct object of topical action, ALL negative strategies are premised off of it and clarification makes them a conditional moving target.

#### 2. Topic education—also turns solvency

**Arvizu, 7** - Director National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Dan, CQ Congressional Testimony, “ENCOURAGING SOLAR ENERGY,” 6/19, lexis

We applaud the Committee for its continuing examination of solar and other sources of renewable electricity and fuels. If we are to ensure the nation receives the full range of benefits that renewable energy technologies can provide, we will need a carefully balanced blend of new technology, market acceptance and government policies. It is not a question of whether to rely solely on the market, or on new research, or on government action, as we work to solve our energy problems. To accelerate deployment of renewable energy technologies, we need to effectively combine all three. It's also crucial that this mix of technology, markets and policies be crafted so that each works in conjunction with the others. The reality is that distinct renewable energy technologies - be they solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, biomass power, biofuels or geothermal - are in different places in terms of their economics, technological maturity and market acceptance. While a broad range of policies are needed to spur on these varied technologies, the specifics of policies and incentives to be enacted ideally must be tailored to fit the unique requirements of each of the systems and devices we are seeking to deploy.

### DA

#### Obama PC is key to convincing the GOP to compromise on the debt ceiling and sequestration now – failure causes global economic collapse

Michael Shear and Jonathan Weisman (writers for the International Herald Tribune) January 3, 2013 “Republicans ready for another battle; Beaten on tax increase, they're spoiling to take on U.S. borrowing limit” Lexis

President Barack Obama's eyes narrowed late Tuesday, just hours after a divided House of Representatives passed legislation to avert big income tax increases on most Americans and prevent major spending cuts, as he looked sternly into the cameras and fired a warning shot in Republicans' direction. After the bruising year-end go-around with congressional Republicans on taxes and spending, he said he had no intention of getting pulled into a new negotiation, this one over raising the nation's borrowing limit or facing a default on government debt. ''I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they've already racked up through the laws that they passed,'' the president said, pausing to repeat himself. ''We can't not pay bills that we've already incurred.'' But it is not clear exactly how Mr. Obama can avoid it. Following the president's fiscal victory - which will raise tax rates for the wealthy but do little to rein in spending - Republicans in Congress are betting that their refusal to raise the $16.4 trillion debt ceiling will force Mr. Obama to the bargaining table on spending cuts and issues like reform of Medicare and Social Security. Doing so would inevitably reprise the clash over the debt ceiling in the summer of 2011, when the government came close to defaulting before lawmakers and the president agreed to a $1.2 trillion package of spending cuts in exchange for Republican agreement to raise the debt ceiling by about the same amount. That is exactly what Republicans want. The party's caucus in the House will discuss a debt ceiling strategy at a retreat this month in Williamsburg, Virginia, a top Republican aide said. Party members are determined to insist again on spending cuts that equal the increase in the amount the country is authorized to borrow, the aide said. ''The speaker told the president to his face that everything you want in life comes with a price - that doesn't change here,'' the aide said, referring to John A. Boehner, speaker of the House, which is controlled by the Republicans. ''I don't think he has any choice.'' That strategy could risk a new round of criticism aimed at Republicans from a public fed up by Washington brinksmanship. The 2011 fight ended with a last-minute deal, but led to a downgrade in the rating of the United States' debt and a slump in the economic recovery. But Brendan Buck, a spokesman for Mr. Boehner, said Republicans had made it clear what they wanted in exchange for a willingness to allow borrowing to increase. ''If they want to get the debt limit raised, they are going to have to engage and accept that reality,'' Mr. Buck said. ''The president knows that.'' Mr. Obama also knows that the Republicans he is dealing with are not the Republicans of years past; battle lines and basic demands have shifted, complicating political calculations on both sides. Just a few years ago, the new tax deal would have been a Republican fiscal fantasy, a sweeping bill that locks in virtually all of the Bush-era tax cuts, exempts almost all estates from taxation, and enshrines the former president's credo that dividends and capital gains should be taxed equally and gently. But times have changed. Before the bill's final passage on Tuesday, House Republican leaders struggled all day to quell a revolt among caucus members who threatened to blow up a hard-fought compromise that they could easily have framed as a victory. Many House Republicans seemed almost determined to put themselves in a position to be blamed for sending the economy into a tailspin under the weight of automatic tax increases and spending cuts. The latest internal party struggle on Capitol Hill surprised even Senate Republicans, who had voted overwhelmingly for a deal largely hashed out by their leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, along with Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.; only 5 of the chamber's 47 Republicans voted no. Yet 21 hours later, the same measure was opposed by 151 of the 236 Republicans voting in the House. It was further proof that House Republicans are a new breed, less enamored of tax cuts per se than they are driven to shrink government through steep spending cuts. Protecting nearly 99 percent of the nation's households from an income tax increase, as the bill will do, was not enough if taxes rose on some and government spending was untouched. The Republicans' intense focus on cutting spending is not news to the White House; it has been on notice for months that Republicans view the debt ceiling as leverage in the next budget fight. Now, the question is what Mr. Obama and his advisers can do to avoid that fight. Mr. Obama will have to make sure that lawmakers in his own party hold firm. While the president no longer has to worry about another election, Democratic lawmakers in the House and Senate do, and they may be more willing to negotiate in order to avoid a potential government default. The White House might also turn to business executives for help. Many top executives fear that a debt ceiling crisis could wallop the U.S. economy just as it is beginning to grow again - and just as the new fiscal deal brings some of the tax certainty that the financial community has long demanded. Those executives might try to pressure Republican lawmakers not to use the country's credit as a negotiating tool. Mr. Obama might also take to the road again, using the power of his office to secure public backing for his argument that another debt-ceiling fight could bring economic crisis. Public surveys after the last debt ceiling fight suggested that people largely blamed Republicans for the threat of a default. The president and his aides have signaled that they will try to explain to the public that the increase in the borrowing limit is needed to cover debts that the government has incurred. Mr. Obama offered a dire warning in his statement on Tuesday of what would happen if the country did not meet its obligations. ''If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay these bills on time,'' he said, ''the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic - far worse than the impact of a fiscal cliff.'' The fiscal bill not only worked up the dander of many Republicans; it gave some Democrats pause, since it would make permanent virtually all of the Bush tax cuts. That is a goal that President George W. Bush spent years chasing, and the achievement of which Ari Fleischer, a Bush press secretary, called ''fantastic'' even while bemoaning the failure to bring down spending levels. It would make permanent five of the six income tax rates created in 2001 by the first Bush tax cut. It would codify Mr. Bush's successful push, in 2003, to make tax rates on dividends and capital gains equal so that one form of investment income is not favored over the other. Democrats say they had little choice. The Bush White House and Republican Congresses structured the tax cuts so that letting them expire would be politically difficult. Add the across-the-board spending cuts if Congress did nothing, and Mr. Obama felt he had to extend most of the tax cuts or watch the economy sink back into recession. ''New occasions make for new truths,'' said Representative Danny K. Davis, an Illinois Democrat and a veteran of the partisan wars over the Bush tax cuts. ''New situations make ancient remedies uncouth.'' Most galling for Republicans are provisions projected to add $330 billion in spending over 10 years, including $30 billion in unemployment compensation and $21 billion in payments to Medicare health providers. None of those provisions are objectionable on its own, but collectively they proved almost impossible for Republicans to accept. In the coming days and weeks, Mr. Obama is likely to try to focus negotiations on another looming issue: how to avoid deep, across-the-board cuts to military and domestic programs. The deal passed on Tuesday postpones those cuts for two months, but Mr. Obama and lawmakers in both parties are eager to avoid them, with Republicans focused more on military cuts and Democrats on domestic programs. Instead, the president wants a debate over spending cuts and tax changes that would remove loopholes and deductions for wealthy Americans. That fight is coming. The question is whether the president can avoid conducting it in the middle of a nasty, drawn-out debate over the debt limit.

#### Wind power costs pc

AEA 8/17/12 (American Energy Alliance, “In the Pipeline: 8/17/12,” http://www.americanenergyalliance.org/2012/08/in-the-pipeline-81712/)

 Basically, Dan Simmons ran the show, even though it’s not actually named after him. The Diane Rehm Show (8/16/12) reports: “The role of subsidies for wind energy has become a **hot-button issue** in the presidential campaign. Governor Romney opposes extending tax credits for the wind industry. President Obama has re-doubled his commitment to them. In a rare show of bipartisanship last week, the Senate Finance Committee voted to extend the credits for another year. The debate over their fate will likely surface again in the fall. Supporters of the extension argue all major sources of energy have received federal help. Opponents say it’s time to let the free market take over. Diane her guests discuss the politics the future of wind energy in the U.S.”

#### Without crowding out issues like the plan – Obama wont have the negotiating position to shift their views

Richard McGregor (writer for the Financial Times) January 2, 2013 “Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals” <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GtNWiw3I>

In the short term, fiscal fights will dominate politics for months to come and threaten to crowd out serious consideration of other issues, with a large potential downside for the economy in 2013. The fiscal cliff compromise alone will act as a drag on the economy, largely because of the end of the payroll tax holiday, which had added substantially to middle-class incomes, economists said. “The economy needs a stimulus, but under the agreement, taxes will go up in 2013 relative to 2012,” said William Gale of the Tax Policy Center in Washington in a blog post. “For most households, the payroll tax takes a far bigger bite than the income tax does, and the payroll tax cut therefore was a more effective stimulus than income tax cuts were.” The forthcoming confrontations will probably have a similar impact, as Republicans feel they enter talks over raising the debt ceiling in the coming weeks playing a far stronger hand than they had in the fiscal cliff. Under the fiscal cliff, taxes were going up no matter what Republicans did. The debt ceiling, however, cannot be lifted unless they vote for it. Barack Obama’s new cabinet will form the backbone of his administration, setting the tone for his second term in the White House Dave Camp, who chairs the congressional committee overseeing tax policy, said that House Republicans had not settled on a strategy for the debt ceiling but the central aim was to leverage it to cut spending further. “Before we raise the debt limit we have to reduce spending,” Mr Camp said. Many Republicans are less diplomatic in private and see the debt ceiling fight as a chance to get revenge both on the White House and the dealmakers within their own party for being forced into accepting a tax increase this week. Of all the issues crowding Mr Obama’s agenda, immigration has the best hope of passing in some form, as the disastrous vote recorded by Republicans among minorities in 2012 gives them a huge incentive to address the issue. But on everything else, with the Republicans remaining in control of the House, Mr Obama needs all the skills of cajoling, seducing and manipulating Congress that he has so far shown no signs of developing. “I find it remarkable that the president apparently continues to believe that he will not have to deal with people that he does not agree with,” said Mr Galston. “A president who is not disdainful of the art of legislating can get things done.” Forging a consensus on issues such as gun control and climate change, if the White House does take them on, will require Mr Obama to do more than just persuade some Republicans to support him. Many Democrats are wary of such reforms or oppose them outright, and a second-term president with declining political capital will face an uphill battle to shift their views.

#### Fiscal Cliff failure destroys Middle East security – impact is war

Hutchison 9/21U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Those escalate

James A. Russell (managing editor of Strategic Insights, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS, From 1988-2001 held a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East South Asia, Department of Defense) Spring 2009 “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” <http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf>

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### DA

#### The plan undermines Chinese wind competitiveness

**Chhabara 8** (Rajesh, Climate Change Corp, “Who’ll Solve the Wind Turbine Supply Crisis?” 4/29/8, http://www.climatechangecorp.com/content.asp?contentid=5344)

In April this year, China set a massive target of expanding wind power capacity to 100,000MW by 2020, from the current 5,600MW. Previously, in 2006, China passed the Renewable Energy Law, which requires power grid companies to buy the entire output of registered renewable energy producers in their areas. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top industry planning body, sets the purchase price.

CLSA Research estimates that the US, Europe and China will be spending about $150 billion on wind projects in the next five years.

US dithers, China surges ahead

In the US, an unstable regulatory regime is one factor hindering turbine production.

Sporadic tax breaks for renewable energy projects, usually on a year-to-year basis, have discouraged US manufacturers from scaling up. Congress, for example, has stalled the extension of PTCs beyond the end of 2008.

In the past, when tax credits lapsed the demand for wind turbines came crashing down the following year. If the trend is repeated this time, it may actually result in overcapacity of turbine manufacturing in the US, at least for the domestic market.

 Yet energy analysts say that if the US market slows down due to lack of tax breaks, **China will more than compensate.**

In the short term, massive demand from China may further tighten turbine supply, but expanding local production should ease the global crunch within a couple of years. Today, the Chinese market is dominated by the top three foreign manufacturers, Vestas, GE Wind and Gamesa, who enjoy a combined market share of 47%. However, this is set to change.
Zhang Guobao, vice president of China’s NDRC, says: “We are planning several measures to support the wind power industry including localisation of equipment production.” According to the Global Wind Energy Council (www.worldenergy.org), China will become the top wind turbine manufacturer by 2009.

To encourage production, China increased tariffs on imported wind turbines in May, while slashing import taxes on components. The latter incentive, to help Chinese firms compete internationally for scarce parts, will put pressure on the industry in the rest of the world. But, again, this is a short-term problem. Government rules already require that turbines have at least 70% domestically produced components. As a result, leading manufacturers have been setting up factories in China.

As things presently stand, most Chinese manufacturers can produce only smaller turbines, up to 1MW. Chinese firms are trying to overcome this weakness by licensing agreements and joint ventures with western companies.

Goldwind, China’s largest wind turbine maker, raised $245 million through an Initial Public Offer (IPO) early this year to fund a huge expansion. LM Glassfiber of Denmark, which has a cooperation agreement with Goldwind, opened its second turbine blade factory in China in October last year.
Other major Chinese turbine makers – Sinovel, Windey, Dongfang, MingYang and HEC – are also expanding capacities and shopping for joint ventures and licensing agreements with global players.

China High, the country’s largest manufacturer of gearboxes – the most critical and complex part in a wind turbine – plans a four-fold increase in production in the next two years. The company is aiming to become one of the top three global manufacturers of gearboxes, with half of revenue coming from exports.
China High, which already supplies to GE, REpower, Nordex and Goldwind, raised $272 million through an IPO to fund massive expansion. The company is raising another $250 million through convertible bonds and plans to buy a special-steel plant to secure supplies and reduce costs. Special steel accounts for half the cost of gearboxes.
Among the foreign players, Germany’s Nordex – the fourth largest wind turbine maker in China – announced in November that it would quadruple production capacity to 800MW by 2011 to meet growing demand.
Currently, MingYang is China’s only turbine exporter. But in the next three to five years, the number of exporters is likely to grow as other firms aggressively expand and acquire technology. Foreign manufacturers may be scaling up their production in China, but in the longer term it is the emergence of Chinese turbine and component manufacturers that will probably change the global landscape of wind power.

Response from the big players

With over 8,000 parts required to make a wind turbine, requiring a large network of reliable suppliers, component supply is creating the most problematic bottleneck for turbine makers. In order to meet increasing demand, leading players are rushing to beef up their supplies by setting up new plants, signing long-term contracts with suppliers and even making acquisitions.

#### That’s key to the Chinese development model

**Wang, 05** – Michigan State University (Joy, Wind Power in China: Social Acceptability and Development of a Domestic Manufacturing Industry”, http://forestry.msu.edu/China/New%20Folder/Joy\_Wind.pdf)

China does not necessarily require the development of its own domestic wind industry and market, but from the successes of various other countries utilizing wind power, it seems such development is key to the success of wind energy within a country.

“All leading turbine manufacturers are from countries with significant domestic wind power development, and most all have been very successful in their home markets…the size of the home market is a key determinant of global success in wind turbine manufacturing. Moreover,…the top 5 countries in terms of installed capacity are also home to 9 of the top 10 wind companies globally” (Lewis & Wiser, 2005, p. 58).

The wind power market and domestic turbine manufacturers support each other. To form a strong market, a government can formulate incentives for industry to become involved. “Companies facing unstable markets are less willing to spend money on R&D and product development” (Lewis & Wiser, p. 58). With a more stable wind market, more investor interest could be gathered, and more spending on long term manufacturing R&D could be stimulated.

2. Decrease costs to further the market

A domestic wind industry can lower costs and further the market. “As the market has grown, wind power has shown a dramatic fall in cost. Production costs have fallen by up to 50% over 15 years” (BTM Consult, 2005, p. 10). Wind turbines hold about 75% of the total cost of an onshore wind project (BTM Consult, 2005,). With localized production, not only would less be spent on transportation, labor costs would also be much cheaper in China than abroad. A significant savings could be realized in turbine production, bettering the economics and feasibility of large-scale utilization of wind energy in China.

3. Better accessibility to best available wind technology

With its booming economy and strong desire to prove itself, China is demanding better products with its increasing wealth. The wind industry will be no different. If no domestic turbine manufacturers develop cutting-edge technology, any technology China receives will be second rate. Products are likely tested intensely before placement on the global market, where their performance reflects upon the manufacturing company. All commercially sold turbines will generally be reliable, with the newest technology in continued research and testing.

If China relies on non-domestic wind turbine manufacturers to supply its wind power generation facilities, it cannot expect the best technology to enter its borders first. So far, the largest installation in China to date is 1.5MW at the Nanhui and Chongming wind farms in Shanghai by General Electric (GE Wind), while the largest wind turbine installation to date has been 300 MW in the United States (BTM Consult, 2005), 200 times larger. Higher turbine capacities will transform to land savings since more electricity is generated per turbine. With limited arable land, it would make sense for China to search for better and larger turbines to reduce land requirements for the same amount of generated electricity.

4. Opportunity to demonstrate technological prowess

With its economic rise, China has shown an increasing desire to prove itself. The 2003 launch of China’s first manned rocket demonstrates its drive to push domestic technology to further limits. The successful rocket launching caused a swell of national pride. A show of local technological prowess in wind energy could cause a similar effect (Lewis & Wiser, 2005), while also offering a relatively new global industry in which to make a presence. From this aspect, it is not surprising to see China’s desire to have its own domestic wind power industry.

5. Alleviate power shortages in areas of need

Wind power could be used to alleviate brown-outs and other electricity shortages in the more affluent east coast. Near the time of Wallace’s paper (1997), over 20 million households in the heavily populated areas were without electricity. With the largest wind resources located along the southeastern coast and an intense appetite for energy in the same region, it is likely wind power can help alleviate the lacking electricity supply there.

6. Employment opportunities

The creation of a domestic wind power market and industry could generate employment opportunities in both urban and rural areas. A strong domestic market and wind turbine manufacturing industry will create a demand and supply for wind power. By having a local manufacturing base, China could mobilize significant numbers of its currently unemployed

masses. In 2003, 8 million urban people registered unemployment. Once the numbers of unregistered urban unemployed is considered, the total could further increase. From 1998-2003, unemployment grew at an annual rate of 5.6% (“China Statistical,” 2004). With almost 60% of China’s 2003 population located in rural areas (“China Statistical,” 2004), the total unemployed number could be significantly larger. Wind Force 12 estimates that 444,000 individuals will be occupied in the Chinese wind power industry in 2020 (2005).

7. Poverty alleviation

Though the demand for electricity may be greatest along the coast, the wind turbine manufacturers may be elsewhere. Strategically placed manufacturers throughout rural China could provide higher paying work, **alleviating poverty**. The 2003 per capita net income of rural households in the 12 western provinces was 1966¥, less than 75% of the national per capital rural net income (“China Statistical,” 2004).

8. Catalyst for further infrastructure development

A domestic wind industry could provide an additional catalyst for the development of efficient transportation systems in which to transport wind related turbines. Factories in rural locations would not necessarily be distanced from the final product destination. With 23.9% of the national energy industry located in the 12 western provinces (“China Statistical,” 2004), a well-established energy transmission infrastructure must already exist. Much of China’s wind resources also are in the area. Not only will manufacturers to realize financial savings by being geographically closer to more final product destinations, the location of wind power manufacturers there could also stimulate the improvement and adaptation of existing infrastructure to suit new needs. This possibility might require large financial resources, but the reaped benefits might justify further exploration.

9. Environmental benefits

Other environmental benefits can be realized through localized production outside of the clean energy turbines produce. If turbine manufacturers locate to more rural areas, resident income and standard of living will increase. Farmland might be less stressed, as income no longer relies singly on the land’s goods. Grasslands could benefit similarly as flock size decrease when factory work is obtained. From such possibilities, wind energy could potentially benefit soil stability. As school fees become more affordable, educational levels will increase. Higher educational attainment could increase environmental consciousness and also lessen environmental degradation.

#### Solves CCP collapse

**Pethokoukis 12-1-**08 (James, US News, “Bad Economy Could Cause China Crackup” <http://www.usnews.com/blogs/capital-commerce/2008/12/1/bad-economy-could-cause-china-crackup.html?s_cid=etRR-0126>)

¶ I have written a series of blog posts warning about the geopolitical and economic fallout of a sharp slowdown in China's economy. Simply put: Slower growth **could lead to** dangerous political instability. **The sole source of the** authoritarian **government's legitimacy has been its ability to deliver an even-rising standard of living** for more than a generation. Don't believe me? Here is what President Jintao Hu said over the weekend at a party meeting:  ¶ *“In this coming period, we will starkly confront the effects of the sustained deepening of the international financial crisis and pressure as global economic growth clearly slows. ... Whether we can turn this pressure into momentum, turn challenges into opportunities, and maintain steady and relatively fast economic development is a test of our Party's capacity to govern.”*  ¶ This is why China has been hesitant to allow any dramatic appreciation by the yuan vs. the dollar. To the extent that a stronger currency slows the economy, the ruling Communist Party views a rapid yuan appreciation as an existential threat. This what journalist Will Hutton, author of *The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a Partner or Face It as an Enemy*, [told me early last year](http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/070105/5china.htm):  ¶ *"Unrest is growing even under current conditions. Such a rapid appreciation of the yuan over a short period could be a tipping point for a wave of unrest, which could threaten the regime's stability. The party leadership sees the demand for fast yuan appreciation as an act of economic warfare. In these terms, you can see why. ... The World Bank estimates that if China's growth rate fell by just 2 percent, up to 60 percent of China's bank loans would become nonperforming–so threatening both China's and, via Hong Kong, Asia's financial system. The flow of saving to finance the U.S.'s deficit would dry up, probably forcing U.S. interest rates up–so worsening the economic slowdown. ... There is the risk of a credit crunch forced by the banking system being overwhelmed by nonperforming loans. ... The risk of political instability is low, but it exists."*  ¶ Me: Let's remember that China a) has been -- along with America -- one of the primary engines of global economic growth as well as buy of U.S. bonds, and b) has nuclear weapons. While no freedom-loving member of Western Civilization has any love for the current despotic regime, neither do we want to see political and economic chaos in China. Fun China Fact: Back in the 1990s, Pentagon analysts thought a bad economy could result in the fall of the Communists from power and the political dissolution of the country into maybe a dozen smaller nations. Hey, have fun, Hillary!

#### Nuclear war

**Plate 2003** (Tom, Professor at UCLA, The Straits Times, June 28, L/N)

But, while China's prosperity may be good for Americans, is it necessarily the same for the totalitarians running China? After all, having created a runaway economic elephant, will the Communist Party leaders be able to stay in the saddle? Before long, the Chinese middle class alone may approach the size of the entire population of America. It will want more freedom, not less – bet on it. But imagine a China disintegrating – on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion – because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia – once occupied by Japan – into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth – the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

### 1nc states cp

#### COUNTERPLAN: The 50 state governments and relevant sub-federal actors should provide grants and loans for Central Appalachia wind power.

#### It’s legitimate and politics is a net benefit

**Harvard Law Review 6** – the author isn’t named but the qualifications are: John M. Olin Fellow in Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School (April, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1855, “State Collective Action”, lexis)

Consider now the reasons why states may act collectively. In the simplest terms, collective action may be **more desirable than individual state action** because it opens a panoply of otherwise unavailable policy choices and may be more desirable than **federal action** because it allocates power to a better-positioned actor. n12 These advantages may exist [\*1859] because regional organizations have better information, are better positioned to act on that information, or avoid duplicative costs or coordination problems. n13 Also, collective action may be desirable politically because it may make certain programs either more or less politically salient. n14 Similarly, political actors may want to act collectively because doing so spreads or diversifies political risk. n15 Lastly, collective action may provide opportunities for economies of scale or rent-seeking behavior that states cannot achieve independently. n16 Some brief examples of how states may act collectively illustrate the importance of the topic. n17 As in the stylized examples, states may act collectively to reduce pollution. Groups of states also could develop plans to use common reserves of natural resources, including oil fields or aquifers that cross state lines, or plans to allocate the use of rivers, lakes, forests, or other natural resources. They may also regulate wildlife that lives in multiple states, either to protect that wildlife or to use it for commercial purposes. States may take similar action to regulate or allocate **energy** or to develop interstate transit infrastructure, such as highways, rail lines, or regional airports. States may regulate the production or distribution of goods or create economic development organizations organized either geographically or by some other trait, such as agricultural or oil and gas production. They also may wish to regulate certain industries or set labor standards in common ways or may wish to regulate products commonly by adopting similar production standards or tort rules. As a final example - although one can imagine many other motivations for state collective action - states may collectivize to provide better social welfare or governmental insurance programs.

### Counterplan

#### COUNTERPLAN: The fifty state governments should

#### --substantially increase Energy Efficiency Resource Standard programs.

#### -- institute utility profit decoupling policies modeled off of California regulations.

#### Fifty state EERS policy solves efficiency across the board—demand side policy best

**Glatt and Schwentker 2010** – \* Technology Delivery Team Member, Office of Industrial Technologies Program, DOE, \*\*Research Associate at BCS Incorporated (July, Sandy and Beth, DOE, “State Energy Efficiency Resource Standards Analysis”, http://www1.eere.energy.gov/manufacturing/states/pdfs/eers\_web\_final.pdf, WEA)

The effect of state energy policies in supporting energy efficiency in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors is clear—states with strong energy efficiency policies save energy. Utilities’ citing these policies as the primary impetus for offering energy efficiency and other demand-side management programs prove the impact strong policies have. One tool in the energy efficiency policy toolbox, the state-implemented Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) program, has been instrumental in encouraging energy efficiency across the nation. EERS policies are adopted by state legislatures and implemented and managed by utilities. They require that electric and natural gas utilities offer programs and incentives to encourage their customers to reduce energy use by a specified amount each year, based on a percentage of total energy sales.

EERS policy programs typically start with modest targets that increase over time. Typical savings goals can range from the relatively modest 0.25% savings annually to the more aggressive end of the scale such as 1.25% annually, with the most successful states setting even more ambitious targets. Terms of performance standard goals can vary—some are annual while others are cumulative, but an EERS is a long-term strategy to achieve energy savings and realize the financial and environmental benefits of those savings over time. EERS programs typically offer utilities the flexibility to utilize a market-based trading system to reach their set targets, and they provide support and incentives for utilities to successfully manage their own and their customers’ energy use.

Utilities can work towards these goals by improving their own processes and distribution systems, implementing new efficiency standards in equipment and infrastructure, and encouraging their end-use customers to participate in energy-saving programs. In addition, they can purchase energy credits from over-performing utilities that have exceeded the set goals. 1

**EERS is a tested policy measure that has successfully reduced energy use in multiple states.** Texas was the first state to adopt an EERS in 1999. As of April 2010, 24 states had some form of EERS in place, with three others strongly considering it. Having a state EERS policy in place ensures uniform energy efficiency goals across the state. It also provides a mechanism to create support programs that lead to reduced energy use. As increasing attention is focused on cutting energy consumption and the accompanying benefits of lower energy costs and less environmental pollution, it behooves states to have the ability to track performance against goals.

**If all states were to adopt their own EERS, the United States could significantly lower energy costs, reduce air pollution, mitigate climate change, and improve energy reliability**. These policies also lead to job creation as utilities implement new efficiency programs and monitoring systems. Despite these benefits and successes in individual states, no federal EERS mandate or Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (EEPS), as they are also known, currently exists.

#### The combination of planks solves

**Gies 2010** – energy/environment writer for NYT and the Trust for Public Land (9/1, Erica, NYT, Special Report: Energy, “Doing More While Using Less Power”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/business/global/02iht-rensave.html?\_r=1&sq=17%20percent&st=cse&scp=3&pagewanted=all, WEA)

But some market incentives are misaligned. “Major energy providers make more money out of kilowatt-hours that they sell rather than the ones that they don’t sell,” Ms. Zoi said.

Decoupling utility profits from the amount of energy sold, as California did in 1983, is a way to fix this problem, and it is a growing trend. Twenty-nine other U.S. states have since followed that lead or are about to do so, according to the Institute for Energy Efficiency.

Ms. Zoi said the U.S. Energy Department was giving the states information and grants to help them develop effective policies. One strategy is an energy efficiency resource standard, setting targets for annual efficiency improvements, accompanied by performance-based cash rewards or penalties. The institute says 25 states have implemented target-based incentives or are about to do so — mostly in association with decoupling.

### Counterplan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should create a special category for Central Appalachia energy efficiency in the United States Department of Agriculture’s Rural Energy for America Program.

### Incentives k

#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—this fuels inequality and unsustainable consumptive practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The financialisation¶ of “energy”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just¶ transition to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies marginalise the role of communities and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over how society might be differently organised to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

**Holleman 2012** – assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1, WEA)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ belies the notion that “there is no alternative.” They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our ¶ environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ planetary boundaries will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### Advantage one

#### No backlash against the US economic model

**Katzenstein and Legro, 09** - \* Professor of International Studies at Cornell University AND \*\* Professor of World Politics, chair of the Department of Politics, and a faculty associate of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia (Peter and Jeffrey, “Think Again: America's Image,” 10/5, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/category/section/think\_again)

"The U.S. model is losing out to its competitors."

Not yet. There is no clear finding that U.S. relative standing is suffering in terms of credibility or esteem based on the rise of "competing" models of politics and policy offered by China, Europe, or Russia. Polls in 2009 suggest recent declines in the relative attractiveness of these actors. At the same time, the economic meltdown of 2008-09 has led to widespread critiques of the U.S. economic model. A liberal Chinese economist bemoaned that "the popular view is that the American model is failing." A Social Democrat in Germany's parliament concluded, "[the U.S. model] has lost its attraction entirely."

During the last four decades American standing has sometimes seen major declines, but has typically bounced back because the American model continued to have strong appeal (i.e., esteem). One indicator of this is the continuing attractiveness of the U.S. higher education system and the fact that many who come to study in the United States end up staying. U.S. universities are being used for models and actively establishing programs in places like Qatar, Singapore, and China.

That said, the potential for a resurgence in America's current standing varies by region, and how America responds to the global financial and economic crisis is especially important. If the United States provides fewer global and regional public goods, such as economic or military assistance, its standing will diminish in East Asia and erode even further in Europe. Similarly, if growing U.S. budget deficits require cuts in the recent expansion of American aid programs in Africa, this might also erode American standing in a continent where trends have been more positive in recent years.

#### No impact to hegemony

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

#### Regional cooperation fills in

**Sachs, 11** – Director of The Earth Institute, Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University. He is also Special Advisor to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (Jeffrey, “A World of Regions,” 5/26, http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/05/a-world-of-regions/)

In almost every part of the world, long-festering problems can be solved through closer cooperation among neighboring countries. The European Union provides the best model for how neighbors that have long fought each other can come together for mutual benefit. Ironically, today’s decline in American global power may lead to more effective regional cooperation. This may seem an odd time to praise the EU, given the economic crises in Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Europe has not solved the problem of balancing the interests of strong economies in the North and those of weaker economies in the South. Still, the EU’s accomplishments vastly outweigh its current difficulties. The EU has created a zone of peace where once there was relentless war. It has provided the institutional framework for reuniting Western and Eastern Europe. It has fostered regional-scale infrastructure. The single market has been crucial to making Europe one of the most prosperous places on the planet. And the EU has been a global leader on environmental sustainability. For these reasons, the EU provides a unique model for other regions that remain stuck in a mire of conflict, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and environmental crisis. New regional organizations, such as the African Union, look to the EU as a role model for regional problem-solving and integration. Yet, to this day, most regional groupings remain too weak to solve their members’ pressing problems. In most other regions, ongoing political divisions have their roots in the Cold War or the colonial era. During the Cold War, neighbors often competed with each other by “choosing sides” – allying themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Pakistan tilted towards the Americans; India towards the Soviets. Countries had little incentive to make peace with their neighbors as long as they enjoyed the financial support of the US or the USSR. On the contrary, continued conflict often led directly to more financial aid. Indeed, the US and Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, which they believed would limit their roles as power brokers. Thus, when Gamal Abdel Nasser launched a call for Arab unity in the 1950’s, the US and Europe viewed him as a threat. The US undercut his call for strong Arab cooperation and nationalism, fearing a loss of American influence in the Middle East. As a result, Nasser increasingly aligned Egypt with the Soviet Union, and ultimately failed in the quest to unite Arab interests. Today’s reality, however, is that great powers can no longer divide and conquer other regions, even if they try. The age of colonialism is finished, and we are now moving beyond the age of US global dominance. Recent events in the Middle East and Central Asia, for example, clearly reflect the decline of US influence. America’s failure to win any lasting geopolitical advantage through the use of military force in Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the limits of its power, while its budget crisis ensures that it will cut its military resources sooner rather than later. Similarly, the US played no role in the political revolutions underway in the Arab world, and still has not demonstrated any clear policy response to them. President Barack Obama’s recent speech on the Middle East is a further display of America’s declining influence in the region. The speech drew the most attention for calling on Israel to return to its 1967 borders, but the effect was undercut when Israel flatly rejected the US position. The world could see that there would be little practical follow-up. The rest of the speech was even more revealing, though it drew little public notice. When Obama discussed the Arab political upheavals, he noted the importance of economic development. Yet when it came to US action, the most that the US could offer financially was slight debt relief for Egypt ($1 billion), scant loan guarantees ($1 billion), and some insurance coverage for private investments. The real message was that the US government would contribute very little financially to the region’s economic recovery. The days when a country could depend on large-scale American financing are over. We are, in short, moving to a multi-polar world. The Cold War’s end has not led to greater US dominance, but rather to the dissemination of global power to many regions. East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have new geopolitical and economic influence. Each region, increasingly, must find its own path to economic development, energy and food security, and effective infrastructure, and must do so in a world threatened by climate change and resource scarcity. Each region, therefore, will have to secure its own future. Of course, this should occur in a context of cooperation across regions as well as within them. The Middle East is in a strong **position to help itself**. There is a high degree of economic complementarity between Egypt and the oil-rich Gulf States. Egypt can supply technology, manpower, and considerable expertise for the Arab region, while the Gulf provides energy and finance, as well as some specialists. The long-delayed vision of Arab economic unity should be returned to the table. Israel, too, should recognize that its long-term security and prosperity will be enhanced as part of an economically stronger region. For the sake of its own national interests, Israel must come to terms with its neighbors. Other regions also will find that the decline of US power increases the **urgency of stronger cooperation** between neighbors. Some of the greatest tensions in the world – say India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea – should be defused as part of region-wide strengthening. As the EU shows, ancient enmities and battle lines can be turned into mutually beneficial cooperation if a region looks forward, to resolving its long-term needs, rather than backward, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts.

### Advantage Two

#### Environmental improvements now – their evidence ignores long term trends

Hayward, 11 [Steven P, american author, political commentator, and policy scholar. He argues for libertarian and conservative viewpoints in his writings. He writes frequently on the topics of environmentalism, law, economics, and public policy.2011 Almanac of Environmental Trends¶ by Steven F. Hayward¶ April 2011¶ ISBN-13: 978-1-934276-17-4, <http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20110419_almanac2011.pdf>]

Quick: What’s the largest public-policy success story in American society over the last generation? The dramatic reduction in the crime rate, which has helped make major American cities livable again? Or welfare reform, which saw the nation’s welfare rolls fall by more than half since the early 1990s? Both of these accomplishments have received wide media attention. Yet the right answer might well be the environment. As Figure 1 displays, the reduction in air pollution is comparable in magnitude to the reduction in the welfare rolls, and greater than the reduction in the crime rate—both celebrated as major public-policy success stories of the last two decades. Aggregate emissions of the six “criteria” pollutants1 regulated under the Clean Air Act have fallen by 53 percent since 1970, while the proportion of the population receiving welfare assistance is down 48 percent from 1970, and the crime rate is only 6.4 percent below its 1970 level. (And as we shall see, this aggregate nationwide reduction in emissions greatly understates the actual improvement in ambient air quality in the areas with the worst levels of air pollution.) Measures for water quality, toxic-chemical exposure, soil erosion, forest growth, wetlands, and several other areas of environmental concern show similar positive trends, as this Almanac reports. To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the demise of the environment have been greatly exaggerated. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that these kinds of improvements will be experienced in the rest of the world over the course of this century. We’ll examine some of the early evidence that this is already starting to occur. The chief drivers of environmental improvement are economic growth, constantly increasing resource efficiency, technological innovation in pollution control, and the deepening of environmental values among the American public that have translated to changed behavior and consumer preferences. Government regulation has played a vital role, to be sure, but in the grand scheme of things regulation can be understood as a lagging indicator, often achieving results at needlessly high cost, and sometimes failing completely. Were it not for rising affluence and technological innovation, regulation would have much the same effect as King Canute commanding the tides. INTRODUCTION introduction 3 figure 1 a comparison of crime rate, Welfare, and air Pollution, 1970–2007 -60.0% -40.0% -20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 % of Population on Welfare Crime Rate (per 100,000 population) Aggregate Emissions Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, EPA 4 Almanac of Environmental Trends The American public remains largely unaware of these trends. For most of the last 40 years, public opinion about the environment has been pessimistic, with large majorities—sometimes as high as 70 percent—telling pollsters that they think environmental quality in the United States is getting worse instead of better, and will continue to get worse in the future. One reason for this state of opinion is media coverage, which emphasizes bad news and crisis; another reason is environmental advocacy groups, for whom good news is bad news. As the cliche goes, you can’t sell many newspapers with headlines about airplanes landing safely, or about an oil tanker docking without a spill. Similarly, slow, long-term trends don’t make for good headline copy. INTRODUCTIONintroduction 5Improving Trends:Causes and ConsequencesMost environmental commentary dwells on the laws and regulations we have adoptedto achieve our goals, but it is essential to understand the more important role of technologyand economic growth in bringing about favorable environmental trends. Thebest way to see this is to look at some long-term trends in environmental quality thatpredate modern environmental legislation.To be sure, the earliest phases of the Industrial Revolution led to severe environmentaldegradation. But the inexorable process of technological innovation andthe drive for efficiency began to remedy much of this damage far earlier than iscommonly perceived. In addition, new technologies that we commonly regard as environmentally destructive often replaced older modes of human activity that were far worse by comparison. A good example is the introduction of coal for heating andenergy in Britain.

No impact to the environment

**Boucher 98** (Doug, "Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Science and Society, Fall, http://www.driftline.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive\_msg.cgi?file=spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international\_1998/marxism-international.9802&msgnum=379&start=32091&end=32412)

The political danger of catastrophism is matched by the weakness of its scientific foundation. Given the prevalence of the idea that the entire biosphere will soon collapse, it is remarkable how few good examples ecology can provide of this happening m even on the scale of an ecosystem, let alone a continent or the whole planet. Hundreds of ecological transformations, due to introductions of alien species, pollution, overexploitation, climate change and even collisions with asteroids, have been documented. They often change the functioning of ecosystems, and the abundance and diversity of their animals and plants, in dramatic ways. The effects on human society can be far-reaching, and often extremely negative for the majority of the population. But one feature has been a constant, nearly everywhere on earth: life goes on. Humans have been able to drive thousands of species to extinction, severely impoverish the soil, alter weather patterns, dramatically lower the biodiversity of natural communities, and incidentally cause great suffering for their posterity. They have not generally been able to prevent nature from growing back. As ecosystems are transformed, species are eliminated -- but opportunities are created for new ones. The natural world is changed, but never totally destroyed. Levins and Lewontin put it well: "The warning not to destroy the environment is empty: environment, like matter, cannot be created or destroyed. What we can do is replace environments we value by those we do not like" (Levins and Lewontin, 1994). Indeed, from a human point of view the most impressive feature of recorded history is that human societies have continued to grow and develop, despite all the terrible things they have done to the earth. Examples of the collapse of civilizations due to their over- exploitation of nature are few and far between. Most tend to be well in the past and poorly documented, and further investigation often shows that the reasons for collapse were fundamentally political.

#### Neo-Malthusians are wrong—we control empiricism

**Linnér 2003**–Assistant Professor of Water and Environmental Studies at Linköping University–2003 (Björn-Ola Linnér, “The Return of Malthus: Environmentalism and Post-War Population-Resource Crises,” p. 222, SS)

So we may conclude that many of the population-concerned environmentalists have been wrong in many details and assumptions. Neo-Malthusianism in its simplest form, with population growth as the single root cause of the resource shortage, had not made a convincing case by the beginning of the twenty-first century, a time when it would be too late to avoid the worldwide catastrophe according to most post-war neo-Malthusian predictions. Compulsory population control never became inevitable. However, the notorious technology-optimists have not got it all right either. The complex problematic of environmental population–resource concern, with increasing consumption, environmental degradation, unequal resource distribution, short term profits, waste, pollution in combination with population growth–has not yet found an ecologically sustainable solution.

**Malthusian concern has so far been mistaken.** Even the most rapid population growth in human history has nor outstripped food supply, although it has been at a price that conservationists warned about: social costs, environmental degradation, and loss of biodiversity. But the total global catastrophe has not yet descended upon us. The lifeboat-ethic neo-Malthusians seem to have sunk mercifully into oblivion.

**Population will stabilize.**

**Population and Development Program 2006** (“10 Reasons to Rethink ‘Overpopulation’,” Fall 2006, http://popdev.hampshire.edu/projects/dt/dt40.php

World population is still growing and is expected to reach 9 billion by the year 2050. However, demographers agree that the era of rapid growth is over. Population growth rates peaked in the 1960s due to dramatic reductions in death rates and increased life expectancy. Since then, with increasing education, urbanization, and women’s work outside the home, birth rates have fallen in almost every part of the world. The average is now 2.7 births per woman. A number of countries, especially in Europe, are now concerned about declining population growth as many women have only one child. The UN projects that world population will eventually stabilize, falling to 8.3 billion in 2175.

#### The squo is structurally improving

Goklany 9**—**Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks, and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, “Have increases in population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental well-being?” 2009, <http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE_INCREASES_IN_POPULATION_AFFLUENCE_AND_TECHNOLOGY_WORSENED_HUMAN_AND_ENVIRONMENTAL_WELL-BEING.pdf>)

Although global population is no longer growing exponentially, it has quadrupled since 1900. Concurrently, affluence (or GDP per capita) has sextupled, global economic product (a measure of aggregate consumption) has increased 23-fold and carbon dioxide has increased over 15-fold (Maddison 2003; GGDC 2008; World Bank 2008a; Marland et al. 2007).4 But contrary to Neo- Malthusian fears, average **human well-being,** measured by any objective indicator, **has never been higher**. Food supplies, Malthus’ original concern, are up worldwide. Global food supplies per capita increased from 2,254 Cals/day in 1961 to 2,810 in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2008). This helped reduce hunger and malnutrition worldwide. The proportion of the population in the developing world, suffering from chronic hunger declined from 37 percent to 17 percent between 1969–71 and 2001–2003 despite an 87 percent population increase (Goklany 2007a; FAO 2006). The reduction in hunger and malnutrition, along with improvements in basic hygiene, improved access to safer water and sanitation, broad adoption of vaccinations, antibiotics, pasteurization and other public health measures, helped reduce mortality and increase life expectancies. These improvements first became evident in today’s developed countries in the mid- to late-1800s and started to spread in earnest to developing countries from the 1950s. The infant mortality rate in developing countries was 180 per 1,000 live births in the early 1950s; today it is 57. Consequently, global life expectancy, perhaps the single most important measure of human well-being, increased from 31 years in 1900 to 47 years in the early 1950s to 67 years today (Goklany 2007a). Globally, average **annual per capita incomes tripled** since 1950. The proportion of the world’s population outside of high-income OECD countries living in absolute poverty (average consumption of less than $1 per day in 1985 International dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity), fell from 84 percent in 1820 to 40 percent in 1981 to 20 percent in 2007 (Goklany 2007a; WRI 2008; World Bank 2007). Equally important, the world is more literate and better educated. Child labor in low income countries declined from 30 to 18 percent between 1960 and 2003. In most countries, people are freer politically, economically and socially to pursue their goals as they see fit. More people choose their own rulers, and have freedom of expression. They are more likely to live under rule of law, and less likely to be arbitrarily deprived of life, limb and property. Social and professional mobility has never been greater. It is easier to transcend the bonds of caste, place, gender, and other accidents of birth in the lottery of life. People work fewer hours, and have more money and better health to enjoy their leisure time (Goklany 2007a). Figure 3 summarizes the U.S. experience over the 20th century with respect to growth of population, affluence, material, fossil fuel energy and chemical consumption, and life expectancy. It indicates that population has multiplied 3.7-fold; income, 6.9-fold; carbon dioxide emissions, 8.5-fold; material use, 26.5-fold; and organic chemical use, 101-fold. Yet its life expectancy increased from 47 years to 77 years and infant mortality (not shown) declined from over 100 per 1,000 live births to 7 per 1,000. It is also important to note that not only are people living longer, they are healthier. The disability rate for seniors declined 28 percent between 1982 and 2004/2005 and, despite better diagnostic tools, major diseases (e.g., cancer, and heart and respiratory diseases) occur 8–11 years later now than a century ago (Fogel 2003; Manton et al. 2006). If similar figures could be constructed for other countries, most would indicate qualitatively similar trends, especially after 1950, except Sub-Saharan Africa and the erstwhile members of the Soviet Union. In the latter two cases, life expectancy, which had increased following World War II, declined after the late 1980s to the early 2000s, possibly due poor economic performance compounded, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, by AIDS, resurgence of malaria, and tuberculosis due mainly to poor governance (breakdown of public health services) and other manmade causes (Goklany 2007a, pp.66–69, pp.178–181, and references therein). However, there are signs of a turnaround, perhaps related to increased economic growth since the early 2000s, although this could, of course, be a temporary blip (Goklany 2007a; World Bank 2008a). Notably, in most areas of the world, the healthadjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, life expectancy adjusted downward for the severity and length of time spent by the average individual in a less-than-healthy condition, is greater now than the unadjusted life expectancy was 30 years ago. HALE for the China and India in 2002, for instance, were 64.1 and 53.5 years, which exceeded their unadjusted life expectancy of 63.2 and 50.7 years in 1970–1975 (WRI 2008). Figure 4, based on cross country data, indicates that contrary to Neo-Malthusian fears, both life expectancy and infant mortality improve with the level of affluence (economic development) and time, a surrogate for technological change (Goklany 2007a). Other indicators of human well-being that improve over time and as affluence rises are: access to safe water and sanitation (see below), literacy, level of education, food supplies per capita, and the prevalence of malnutrition (Goklany 2007a, 2007b).

## 2nc

### solves alt energy bad

#### Utilities would use a variety of strategies independent of alt energy

**ASE 2011** (February, Alliance to Save Energy, Policy Summary, “Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS)”, http://ase.org/resources/energy-efficiency-resource-standard-eers, WEA)

Under Markey’s EERS proposal, utilities could achieve energy savings though a variety of means including reducing end-use consumption, adjusting appliance standards and building codes, promoting combined heat and power at customer facilities, and reducing energy losses in energy distribution. Utilities could also purchase efficiency credits from end-users or third-party efficiency providers to meet their required reductions, although trading would be mostly limited to within the state. The program would be monitored by the Department of Energy, which would set evaluation, measurement, and verification (EM&V) rules to estimate program savings. States would be invited to administer and enforce the program and could use their own EM&V rules. Additionally, states could implement efficiency standards more aggressive than the federal EERS baseline. A similar bill, S. 548, was also been proposed by Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.).

### solves poverty

#### Efficiency programs overwhelmingly benefit the economically disadvantaged

**Mackres 9/6**/2012 – Senior Researcher and Local Policy Lead for ACEEE, Master of City Planning and Certificate of Environmental Planning from MIT (Eric, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, “Energy Efficiency and Economic Opportunity”, http://www.aceee.org/blog/2012/09/energy-efficiency-and-economic-opport, WEA)

The economic benefits of energy efficiency extend far beyond lowering energy bills for consumers. Efficiency also contributes to economic development and job creation. But who benefits most from these economic opportunities? At every step of the economic value chain produced by efficiency investments (see figure below), there are opportunities to target the economic and social benefits to those households, businesses, geographies, or sectors for whom they will make the biggest difference. The results of these choices can include lower costs for low- and moderate-income families and small businesses; opportunities for disadvantaged, local workers to get jobs with good wages; and new and retained economic activity in disinvested communities. Designing efficiency programs to achieve these goals, in addition to saving energy, can have benefits that ripple throughout the economy, helping to address inequality, build a stronger middle class, and improve economic competitiveness.

Cost Savings for Those Who Need it Most

All households and businesses can benefit from reduced utility bills from energy efficiency but for low-income households and small businesses, the cost savings can have a very significant impact on their overall budget. For example, while the average U.S. household spends 4% of income on home energy costs, low-income families spend 17% of their annual income on energy expenditures. For these families and businesses, cost savings from energy efficiency can mean the difference between going into debt (or choosing what to forgo for the month) and being able to pay for investments like education or new employees. Programs that provide efficiency services to these cash- and credit-constrained customers can have positive economic development impacts on local communities because these customers have other unmet needs and therefore are more likely than the average customer to immediately spend the money they save. For example, every dollar invested in efficiency in low-income households through the Weatherization Assistance Program results in $2.53 in energy and non-energy benefits for a community. Programs that effectively provide efficiency services to renters, moderate-income households, and small businesses can have similar strong (although somewhat smaller) economic development impacts.

#### Energy efficiency boosts quality of life of low-income households

**Bernstein 2**, USC Political Science Professor, USC Energy Institute Director [Mark, Christopher Pernin, Sam Loeb and Mark Hanson,"the public benefit of energy efficiency to the state of Massachusetts, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1588/]

The more efficient the home, the less the expenditure on energy. In this respect, low-income households benefit from having more disposable income, as do all households. But low-income households derive a broader set of benefits from a reduced energy burden. These benefits include increased comfort and health, appliance safety, reduced loss of service from termination, and increased value to property owners. Some of the cost savings from energy efficiency may be reinvested in increased usage. For example, if a residence is better insulated so as to increase the energy efficiency of air conditioning, the household may spend the same amount as previously on air conditioning but have more comfort (Brown, Berry, and Kinney, 1994).

Benefits from greater energy efficiency for low-income households may go beyond the direct benefit to the households. These benefits may include reduced arrearages, increase in quality of housing, and possibly an improved local economy (Howat and Oppenheim, 1999).

### solves warming

#### Solves warming without mandating energy types or increasing consumer cost

**Nadel and Watson 2010** (1/10, Steven and Suzanne, American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Policy Brief, “Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS)”, http://www.aceee.org/policy-brief/energy-efficiency-resource-standard-eers, WEA)

Energy efficiency saves energy and money and helps reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Studies show that large energy efficiency opportunities are available in all states, with estimates of 20–30% savings or more from installation of cost-effective efficiency measures. Furthermore, new conventional fossil fuel power plants generate electricity at a rate between 7 and 13 cents per kilowatt-hour. At a cost of 2.5 cents per kilowatt-hour saved, efficiency improvements are significantly less expensive than building new plants, new power lines, and burning more greenhouse gas-emitting fossil fuel.[i]

Summary

An Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) is a mechanism that encourages more efficient use of electricity and natural gas. A federal EERS would set a national goal for energy savings, requiring explicit reductions in energy consumption for retail electricity and natural gas distributors for a specific period, such as from 2011 through 2020. Implementation opportunities range from end-use efficiency improvements, such as high efficiency lighting and appliances, to combined heat and power (CHP) systems and distribution system improvements.

Implementing a national EERS would commit every state to utilizing this least-cost resource and establish a baseline level of cost-effective and achievable energy savings. A number of states have already achieved significant savings under an EERS. For example, Vermont has saved about 9% of annual electricity sales as a result of efficiency measures installed from 2000–2008, more than 2% of which was achieved in 2008 alone.

ACEEE estimates that by 2020, a federal EERS with 10% electricity savings would reduce peak electric demand by almost 57,000 megawatts[ii] — equivalent to over 190 power plants that each has a capacity of 300 megawatts. Carbon dioxide emissions reductions would total approximately 129 million metric tons in 2020—equivalent to taking 21.5 million automobiles off the road (for a year), and creating 150,000 net jobs. Furthermore, utility customers would save a net $78.8 billion, with the proposed EERS producing a benefit-to-cost ratio of about 2:1.

#### Efficiency straight up solves the economy—even under conservative studies

**Goldstein 2010** – PhD in physics from UC Berkeley, Fellow of the American Physical Society, MacArthur Fellow, helped developed efficiency policy standards in the United States, Russia, Kazakhstan, and China (6/11, David, Natural Resources Defense Council, Switchboard, “America's Future: Austerity or Invisible Energy?”, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dgoldstein/americas\_future\_austerity\_or\_i.html, WEA)

What is missing from this analysis is a key factor: the role energy efficiency could play in getting us away from the Hobson’s choice of spending money we don’t have or else allowing the economy to drift. I discuss this problem in my book [Invisible Energy](http://www.baytreepublish.com/invisible-energy-fr.html); which has the title that it does because efficiency is **invisible** in the economic discussions in America despite its immense potential. Invisible Energy shows how efficiency could contribute will over a trillion dollars annually to economic growth.

How can such an immense number be demonstrated? As Invisible Energy shows, the National Academy of Sciences, along with other scientific and business organizations, has estimated that efficiency could produce 30 percent of the energy America would otherwise need by 2030, even if we limit efficiency options to those where the technology is already available and where the costs are lower than business as usual. We spend about a trillion dollars annually on energy; a figure that without efficiency investment would grow to about $1.5 trillion a year, even if energy costs don’t grow. So a 30-percent savings is worth about $500 billion a year! And even better yet, the costs of efficiency investment pay themselves back on average in just three years. These facts mean that we could, as a nation, borrow the entire amount we needed to invest in efficiency from abroad and then pay back the entire amount with interest in three years. The benefits would continue to **accrue for decades**, however. **This would lead to a self-sustaining economic recovery**. But it gets better than this. If we really reduce the demand for energy by this much, energy prices will come down. The logic is simple: If OPEC can raise prices by a lot by restricting supply by a little, America can cut prices a lot by limiting demand by a little. And a 30-percent savings is not a little. There are immense environmental benefits in this course of action as well. To start with the most obvious—limiting the risk of oil spills—cutting demand, and therefore price, through efficiency will depress incentives to drill in dangerous, sensitive (and expensive) places either offshore or on-shore. Furthermore, the 30 percent estimate of savings is just the tip of the iceberg. As you might expect, the [National Academy of Sciences study](http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12621) and its companions were **extremely cautious** in estimating the size of the efficiency resource. This is not just my interpretation: the studies themselves say so explicitly.

How much difference would a realistic, as opposed to cautious, estimate make? In Invisible Energy, I show that if we change just one assumption in the Academy’s [study](http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12621)—namely that efficiency is stagnant at 2008 levels—the efficiency resource doubles or triples in size. So the economic stimulus can be several trillions of dollars per year. It is time to break free of the dismal choices that dominate the economic dialogue. By looking at our problems in a bit more detail, making efficiency visible in the discussion, we can dig our way out of the recession with a lot less pain and austerity.

### jobs

**US renewables growth will outsource its manufacturing**

**Michaels and Murphy, 09** – \* professor of economics at California State University and a senior fellow at the Institute for Energy Research. AND \*\*director of the Institute for Energy Research (Robert and Robert, “Green Jobs: Fact or Fiction?,” January, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/green-jobs-fact-or-fiction/

Even on its own terms the CAP analysis doesn’t consider that with a massive new stimulus of $100 billion from the federal government, the green sector may see some of its costs rise, and will turn more and more to foreign imports for some of its key components. There is already a growing volume of international trade in renewables hardware, and the CAP program would amplify the trend [[xxii]](http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/green-jobs-fact-or-fiction/#_edn22). There is of course nothing wrong with the renewables industries drawing on the cheapest inputs available, but the trend undercuts one of CAP’s arguments.

To repeat, the goal of energy producers is not to “create American jobs” but to provide energy to consumers at the lowest prices possible. If the energy industry uses some of its earnings to make foreign purchases, this is to contain costs and keep energy prices lower than they otherwise would be.

**Renewable incentives have no overall positive macroeconomic effect – any jobs created come from elsewhere in the economy**

**Michaels, 08** - professor of economics at California State University and a senior fellow at the Institute for Energy Research. (Robert, “A Federal Renewable Electricity Requirement: What’s Not to Like?,” 11/13, http://cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-627.pdf)

Of course, in today’s economy, renewable energy does not create jobs. Renewable energy investments waste workers who would be more productive elsewhere absent the special regulatory treatment of renewable energy.151 Calculations like these show little appreciation for the fluidity of actual labor mar-kets.152 In any case, even with an RPS, the production of renewables would be so small relative to total output that any impact on over-all employment would likely be undetectable.

**Increasing green jobs increases labor costs, increasing overall energy prices and causing structural poverty**

**Bogart et al, 09** - Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Economics, York College of Pennsylvania (William, “GREEN JOBS MYTHS,” UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. LE09-001, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1358423

 The selection of maximizing labor use as the measure of success presents several major problems. First, the ultimate goal of economic activity is not the employment of labor or of other resources, but instead is the production of goods and services that satisfy human needs and wants. Higher labor productivity makes societies wealthier and better able to satisfy their wants and needs ranging from better education to better access to health services and medicines. It also allows them to have more leisure time and provides them the resources to enjoy that leisure.250

A new method of production that uses fewer inputs to produce the same outputs as an existing method frees up inputs for use in addressing additional human needs and wants. A prime example of this is agriculture. The labor intensity of agriculture in the United States has plummeted over the last 200 years, as farmers adopted mechanization, increased agricultural knowledge, and developed higher yield seeds. Merely 1.4 percent of the U.S. workforce is engaged in agriculture today compared to over 21 percent in 1929,251 yet production today is much higher.252 The people who left agriculture are now employed in alternative occupations, creating goods and providing services that would be unavailable if those people had remained employed in agriculture. Under the definitions of green jobs used in these reports, however, this transition is a negative change in the “greenness” of American agriculture.

 Second, even assuming that some substitution of capital and other inputs for labor has negative environmental consequences, it does not follow that such substitutions generally are either net negative contributions to the environment or inappropriate. Again, agriculture provides an example. Agriculture is a dangerous occupation, with farming “among the most hazardous of industries in terms of number of fatalities, fatality rates, number of non-fatal injuries, and non- fatal injury rates.”253 Much agricultural labor was previously devoted to backbreaking, low productivity, unpleasant work that broke people down. New techniques that free people from dangerous, unpleasant work, and that increase production of food crops, have benefits that offset the claimed negatives of more capital intensive farming methods identified in these reports. As Martin Wolf notes “[s]ubsistence farming is among the riskiest of all human strategies, since starvation is one harvest away.”254 Whether particular techniques are better or worse for the environment or for the individuals engaged in the labor is thus not an issue that can be settled by assuming that all labor-intensive methods are to be preferred to all capital-intensive ones.255 Yet this is precisely what the green jobs literature does.

Third, even in the favored green industries, increasing labor efficiency has been an important component in making the technologies more commercially viable. For example, corn- based ethanol cost reductions in the United States over time have been driven in part by “upscaling farms” (i.e., introducing economies of scale) and the advanced technology necessary to convert corn into ethanol.256

Increasingly efficient use of labor was a significant factor in the remarkable economic growth of the United States’ economy during the nineteenth century. That growth was attributable to a significant degree to conditions of labor scarcity and a relentless drive to reduce the need for labor across industries. Labor scarcity led to high wages for American workers relative to workers elsewhere (an indicia of a good job, according to the UNEP report257). This then meant that, as an English investigative commission noted in 1854, “the whole energy of the people is devoted to improving and inventing labour-saving machinery.”258

Labor was scarce in 19th century America because of the abundance of cheap, fertile land in United States that made agricultural output per man high and made it harder to lure people from agriculture into industry.259 Labor scarcity meant that American manufacturers needed to organize their employees efficiently. For example, comparing English and American workers in the nineteenth century textile industry, “[t]he most conspicuous example of efficient use of labour is the training that the American manufacturers gave to their workers so that each was able to handle more looms.”260 Moreover, the increased training and skill levels of American workers then equipped those same workers to improve on the technology they used.261 Again, all these are indicia of good jobs according to the UNEP report and all are the result of high labor productivity, not low labor productivity.

The green jobs literature’s focus on inefficient labor use thus embodies three highly peculiar assumptions about human wellbeing. First, it assumes that increasing labor productivity, which increases output, should be discouraged. This reduces human welfare by reducing the goods and services available to people. While many environmentalists have promoted reductions in consumption for decades,262 adopting a policy of reducing the goods and services available to the general population should be done through open debate not by smuggling it in through a green jobs policy. Such a policy will condemn those already poor to eternal poverty. Second, low labor productivity produces low wages, as each factor of production receives its marginal productivity in a competitive economy. Since the green jobs literature insists that jobs must be high paying, creating a world of high-paying, low-productivity jobs requires an aggressively interventionist economic policy to shift rewards from high-productivity inputs (capital and resources) to low-productivity inputs (labor). Not only is such a policy inconsistent with an open market economy,263 but the payment of a wage above what productivity justifies will lead to unemployment.264 Again, an aggressive set of policy measures will be required to sustain such a shift in any economy competing with economies that have not adopted measures favoring low labor productivity.

Finally, subsidizing labor at the expense of capital is likely to delay the development of technologies that increase the efficiency with which scarce resources are used. For example, petroleum refining today is a highly capital intensive process, but these increases in capital intensity have yielded dramatic increases in the amount of fuels and specialty chemicals obtained from a barrel of crude oil.265 By increasing the yield from crude oil, these innovations have boosted the efficiency of use of natural resources. Biasing production away from capital intensity reduces the incentive to produce such innovations that raise standards of living. Moreover, because environmental protection is itself often capital intensive (to the extent that it requires additional capital equipment to reduce emissions),266 such a bias would likely increase the harm to the environment from the production that continued.

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#### Ad hoc reconfiguration of core assumptions undermines critical thinking—only the alt is conceptually coherent—this also proves they cede the political through expertism and the logic of fungibility and competition

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When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) **replaces critical thinking** about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process,¶ [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over¶ physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of¶ existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically¶ and technologically unassailable.¶ **Triumphant Energy Capitalism**¶Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to¶ market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just¶ as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical¶ preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005)¶ are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and¶ increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the¶ current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen¶ the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic¶ growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged¶ to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives¶ that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that¶ willingly invests in its own perpetuation.¶ While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the¶ conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings,¶ there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is¶ faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables-based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a¶ redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources¶ are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project,¶ according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of¶ growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional¶ energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel¶ capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference¶ with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature.¶ In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet¶ about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of¶ energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such¶ steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does¶ it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might¶ jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the¶ movement’s quest?¶ **Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse**¶After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy¶ futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of¶ governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new¶ technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector¶ and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics¶ 21¶ in which¶ the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high¶ technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities,¶ contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere.¶ Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition¶ (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy¶ and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”¶ Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is¶ important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the¶ two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of¶ more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a¶ sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy¶ visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal¶ of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological¶ marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start¶ the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and¶ social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree¶ to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.¶ 22¶ Nothing is said¶ on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be.¶ If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct,¶ then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of¶ acquiescence to things as they are. Building an **inquiry into energy as a social**¶ **project will require** the recovery of a **critical voice that can interrogate**, rather¶ than concede, **the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and**¶ capitalist **political economy**. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate¶ an energy-society order in which **energy systems evolve in response to social**¶ **values** and goals, **and not simply according** to the dictates of technique,¶ **prices**, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability¶ camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is¶ non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources¶ need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage¶ the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent¶ possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the¶ global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy¶ services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to¶ between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance¶ of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed¶ professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the¶ life-world of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to¶ design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life.¶ Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot¶ overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe¶ of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism¶ are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965:¶ 52) explained why **the democratic-authoritarian bargain** and Western capitalism **should be rejected:**¶God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the¶ West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today¶ keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, **it would strip the world bare** like locusts. Unless the capitalists of¶ India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and¶ by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of¶ the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or¶ being destroyed by them.¶ As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric¶ light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places¶ efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social¶ problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our¶ political-economic problem.¶ The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

#### Market solutions make wind a neoliberal messiah—assumes a “natural” consumerism that can’t be sustained

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**The search for harmonized market-style policies to strengthen the energy**¶ **status quo in the face of its mounting challenges reflects** the growing political power of **energy neoliberalism** in an era of economic globalization¶ (Dubash, 2002; Dubash and Williams, 2006). The two processes build a com-¶ plimentary, if circular, politics in support of conventional energy: the logic is¶ that global economic development requires energy use, which can only be¶ properly planned if international capitalist institutions can be assured that¶ the lubricant of globalization, namely, the unfettered power of markets, is¶ established by enforceable policy (Byrne et al., 2004). Correspondingly, resulting carbon emissions can only eventually be abated if economic globalization is protected so that international capitalist institutions find it profitable¶ to begin to lower carbon emissions and/or sequester them.¶ 15¶ Consumers and¶ producers, rather than citizens, are judged to be the proper signatories to the¶ social contract because these participants, without the stain of politics, can¶ find rational answers to our problems.¶ In sum, conventionalists counsel against preconceiving the social and¶ environmental requirements for an energy transition, preferring a continuation of the existing energy regime that promises to deliver a “reasonable,”¶ “practical” future consistent with its past. Scheer (2002: 137) describes the¶ erroneous assumption in such reasoning: “The need for fossil energy is a¶ practical constraint that society must respect, for better or worse; whereas¶ proposals for a swift and immediate reorientation...are denounced as irresponsible.” An orderly transition is thus forecast from the current energy¶ status quo of fossil fuel and nuclear energy dominance to a new energy status¶ quo with possibly less carbon, but surely with giant-sized fossil and nuclear¶ energy systems in wide use.¶ **The Sustainable Energy Quest**¶The problems of the conventional energy order have led some to regard¶ reinforcement of the status quo as folly and to instead champion sustainable¶ energy strategies based upon non-conventional sources and a more intelligent ideology of managed relations between energy, environment, and society consonant with environmental integrity. This regime challenger seeks to¶ evolve in the social context that produced the conventional energy regime,¶ yet proposes to fundamentally change its relationship to the environment (at¶ least, this is the hope). Technologies such as wind and photovoltaic electricity are purported to offer building blocks for a transition to a future in which¶ ills plaguing modernity and unsolved by the conventional energy regime¶ can be overcome (Lovins, 1979; Hawken et al., 2000; Scheer, 2002; Rifkin,¶ 2003; World Bank, 2004b).¶ While technical developments always include social, material, ecological, intellectual, and moral infrastructures (Winner, 1977: 54 - 58; Toly, 2005),¶ and may, therefore, be key to promoting fundamentally different development pathways, it is also possible that **technologies, even environmentally**¶ **benign ones, will be appropriated by social forces that predate them and**,¶ **thereby, can be thwarted in the fulfillment of social promises attached to the**¶ **strategy**. Indeed, if unaccompanied by reflection upon the social conditions¶ in which the current energy regime thrives, the transition to a renewable¶ energy regime may usher in very few social benefits and little, if any, political¶ and economic transformation. This is the concern that guides our analysis¶ (below) of the sustainable energy movement.¶ At least since the 1970s when Amory Lovins (1979) famously posed the¶ choice between “hard” and “soft” energy paths, sustainable energy strategies¶ have been offered to challenge the prevailing regime. Sometimes the promise¶ was of no more than “alternative” and “least cost” energy (Energy Policy¶ Project of the Ford Foundation, 1974a, 1974b; O’Toole, 1978; Sant, 1979),¶ but adjectives such as “appropriate,” “natural,” “renewable,” “equitable,”¶ and even “democratic” have also been envisioned (Institute for Local SelfReliance, 2005; Scheer, 2002: 34).¶ 16¶ The need to depart from the past, especially in light of the oil crises of the 1970s and the energy-rooted threat of¶ climate change that has beset policy debate since the late 1980s, united¶ disparate efforts to recast and reconceive our energy future.¶ Partly, early criticisms of the mainstream were reflective of a broader social¶ agenda that drew upon, among other things, the anti-war and anti-corporate¶ politics of the 1960s. It was easy, for example, to connect the modern energy¶ regime to military conflicts of the period and to superpower politics; and it¶ was even easier to ally the mainstream’s promotion of nuclear power to the¶ objectives of the Nuclear Club. With evidence of profiteering by the oil¶ majors in the wake of the 1973-1974 OPEC embargo, connecting the energy¶ regime with the expanding power of multinational capital was, likewise, not¶ difficult. Early sustainable energy strategies opposed these alliances, offering promises of significant political, as well as technological, change.¶ However, in the thirty years that the sustainable energy movement has¶ aspired to change the conventional regime, its social commitments and politics have become muddled. A telling sign of this circumstance is the shifted¶ focus from energy politics to economics. To illustrate, in the celebrated work¶ of one of the movement’s early architects, subtitles to volumes included¶ “breaking the nuclear link” (Amory Lovins’ Energy/War, 1981) and “toward¶ a durable peace” (Lovins’ Soft Energy Paths, 1979). These publications offered poignant challenges to the modern order and energy’s role in maintaining that order.¶ Today, however, the bestsellers of the movement chart a course toward¶ “natural capitalism” (Hawken et al., 2000), a strategy that anticipates synergies between soft path technologies and market governance of energy-environment-society relations. Indeed, a major sustainable energy think tank has¶ reached the conclusion that “small is profitable” (Lovins et al., 2002) in¶ energy matters and argues that the soft path is consistent with “economic¶ rationalism.” Understandably, a movement that sought basic change for a¶ third of a century has found the need to adapt its arguments and strategies to¶ the realities of political and economic power. Without adaptation, the conventional energy regime could have ignored soft path policy interventions¶ like demand-side management, integrated resource planning, public benefits¶ charges, and renewable energy portfolio standards (see Lovins and Gadgil,¶ 1991; Sawin, 2004), all of which have caused an undeniable degree of decentralization in energy-society relations. In this vein, it is clear that sustainability¶ proponents must find ways to speak the language and communicate in the¶ logic of economic rationalism if they are to avoid being dismissed. We do not¶ fault the sustainable energy camp for being strategic. Rather, the concern is¶ whether victories in the everyday of incremental politics have been balanced¶ by attention to the broader agenda of systemic change and the ideas needed¶ to define new directions.¶ A measure of the sustainable energy initiative’s strategic success is the¶ growing acceptance of its vision by past adversaries. Thus, Small is Profitable was named ‘Book of the Year’ in 2002 by The Economist, an award¶ unlikely to have been bestowed upon any of Lovins’ earlier works. As acceptance has been won, it is clear that sustainable energy advocates remain¶ suspicious of the oil majors, coal interests, and the Nuclear Club. But an¶ earlier grounding of these suspicions in anti-war and anti-corporate politics¶ appears to have been superseded by one that believes the global economy¶ can serve a sustainability interest if the ‘raison de market’ wins the energy¶ policy debate. Thus, it has been suggested that society can turn “more profit¶ with less carbon,” by “harnessing corporate power to heal the planet” (Lovins,¶ 2005; L. H. Lovins and A. B. Lovins, 2000). Similarly, Hermann Scheer (2002:¶ 323) avers: “The fundamental problem with today’s global economy is not¶ globalization per se, but that this globalization is not based on the sun—the¶ only global force that is equally available to all and whose bounty is so great¶ that it need never be fully tapped.” However, it is not obvious that market¶ economics and globalization can be counted upon to deliver the soft path¶ (see e.g. Nakajima and Vandenberg, 2005). More problematic, as discussed¶ below, the emerging soft path may fall well short of a socially or ecologically¶ transforming event if strategic victories and rhetorics that celebrate them¶ **overshadow systemic critiques** of energy-society relations and the corresponding need to align the sustainable energy initiative with social movements to¶ address a comprehensive agenda of change.¶ **Catching the Wind**¶To date, the greatest success in ‘real’ green energy development is the¶ spread of wind power. From a miniscule 1,930 MW in 1990 to more than¶ 47,317 MW in 2005, wind power has come of age. Especially noteworthy is¶ the rapid growth of wind power in Denmark (35 percent per year since 1997),¶ Spain (30 percent per year since 1997), and Germany (an astonishing 68¶ percent per year since 2000), where policies have caused this source to threaten¶ the hegemony of fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Wind now generates more¶ than 20 percent of Denmark’s electricity and the country is the world leader in¶ turbine manufacture. And as the Danes have demonstrated, offshore wind has¶ the potential to skirt some of the land-use conflicts that have sometimes beset¶ renewable energy alternatives. Indeed, some claim that offshore wind alone¶ might produce all of Europe’s residential electricity (Brown, 2004). National¶ energy strategists and environmental movements in and beyond Europe have¶ recognized the achievements of the Danes, Spaniards, and Germans with initiatives designed to imitate their success.¶ What are the characteristics of this success? One envied feature is the¶ remarkable decline in the price of wind-generated electricity, from $0.46 per¶ kWh in 1980 to $0.03 to $0.07 per kWh today (Sawin, 2004), very close to¶ conventionally-fueled utility generating costs in many countries, even before environmental impacts are included. Jubilant over wind’s winning market performance, advocates of sustainable energy foresee a new era that is¶ ecologically much greener and, yet, in which electricity remains (comparatively) cheap. Lester Brown (2003: 159) notes that wind satisfies seemingly¶ equally weighted criteria of environmental benefit, social gain, and economic efficiency:¶ Wind is...clean. Wind energy does not produce sulfur dioxide emissions or nitrous¶ oxides to cause acid rain. Nor are there any emissions of health-threatening mercury¶ that come from coal-fired power plants. No mountains are leveled, no streams are¶ polluted, and there are no deaths from black lung disease. Wind does not disrupt the¶ earth’s climate...[I]t is inexhaustible...[and] cheap.¶ This would certainly satisfy the canon of economic rationalism.¶ It is also consistent with the ideology of modern consumerism. Its politics¶ bestow sovereignty on consumers not unlike the formula of Pareto optimality,¶ a situation in which additional consumption of a good or service is warranted¶ until it cannot improve the circumstance of one person (or group) without¶ decreasing the welfare of another person (or group).¶ 17¶ How would one know¶ “better off” from “worse off” in the wind-rich sustainable energy era? Interestingly, proponents seem to apply a logic that leaves valuation of “better” and¶ “worse” devoid of explicit content. In a manner reminiscent of modern economic thinking, cheap-and-green enthusiasts appear willing to set wind to¶ the task of making “whatever”—whether that is the manufacture of low-cost¶ teeth whitening toothpaste or lower cost SUVs. In economic accounting, all¶ of these applications potentially make some in society “better off” (if one¶ accepts that economic growth and higher incomes are signs of improvement).¶ Possible detrimental side effects or externalities (an economic term for potential harm) could be rehabilitated by the possession of more purchasing power,¶ which could enable society to invent environmentally friendly toothpaste¶ and make affordable, energy-efficient SUVs. Sustainable energy in this construct cooperates in the abstraction of consumption and production. Consumption-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose, and, relatedly,¶ production-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose are not issues. The¶ construct altogether ignores the possibility that “more-is-better” consumption-production relations may actually reinforce middle class ideology and¶ capitalist political economy, as well as contribute to environmental crises¶ such as climate change. In the celebration of its coming market victory, the¶ cheap-and-green wind version of sustainable energy development may not¶ readily distinguish the economic/class underpinnings of its victory from those¶ of the conventional energy regime.¶ Wind enthusiasts also appear to be largely untroubled by trends toward¶ larger and larger turbines and farms, the necessity of more exotic materials to¶ achieve results, and the advancing complications of catching the wind. There¶ is nothing new about these sorts of trends in the modern period. The trajectory of change in a myriad of human activities follows this pattern. Nor is a¶ critique per se intended in an observation of this trend. Rather, the question¶ we wish to raise is whether another feature in this pattern will likewise be¶ replicated—namely, a “technological mystique” (Bazin, 1986) in which social life finds its inspiration and hope in technical acumen and searches for¶ fulfillment in the ideals of technique (Mumford, 1934; Ellul, 1964; Marcuse,¶ 1964; Winner, 1977, 1986; Vanderburg, 2005).¶ This prospect is not a distant one, as a popular magazine recently illustrated. In a special section devoted to thinking “After Oil,” National Geographic approvingly compared the latest wind technology to a well-known¶ monument, the Statue of Liberty, and noted that the new machines tower¶ more than 400 feet above this symbol (Parfit, 2005: 15 - 16). It was not hard to¶ extrapolate from the story the message of Big Wind’s liberatory potential.¶ Popular Science also commended new wind systems as technological marvels, repeating the theme that, with its elevation in height and complexity¶ lending the technology greater status, wind can now be taken seriously by¶ scientists and engineers (Tompkins, 2005). A recent issue of The Economist¶ (2005) included an article on the wonder of electricity generated by an artificial tornado in which wind is technologically spun to high velocities in a¶ building equipped with a giant turbine to convert the energy into electricity.¶ Indeed, wind is being contemplated as a rival able to serve society by the¶ sheer technical prowess that has often been a defining characteristic of modern energy systems.¶ Obviously, wind energy has a long way to go before it can claim to have¶ dethroned conventional energy’s “technological cathedrals” (Weinberg,¶ 1985). But its mission seems largely to supplant other spectacular methods of¶ generating electricity with its own. The politics supporting its rapid rise¶ express no qualms about endorsing the inevitability of its victories on tech-¶ nical grounds. In fact, Big Wind appears to **seek monumental status in the**¶ **psyche** of ecologically modern society. A recent alliance of the American¶ Wind Energy Association and the U.S. electric utility industry to champion¶ national (subsidized) investment in higher voltage transmission lines (to¶ deliver green-and-cheap electricity), illustrates the desire of Big Wind to¶ plug into Giant Power’s hardware and, correspondingly, its ideology (see¶ American Wind Energy Association, 2005, supporting “Transmission Infrastructure Modernization”). The transformative features of such a politics are¶ unclear. Indeed, wind power—if it can continue to be harvested by everlarger machines—may penetrate the conventional energy order so successfully that it will diffuse, without perceptible disruption, to the regime. The air¶ will be cleaner but the source of this achievement will be duly noted: science¶ will have triumphed still again in **wresting from stingy nature the resources**¶ **that a wealthy life has** grown **to expect**. Social transformation to achieve¶ sustainability may actually be unnecessary by this political view of things, as¶ middle-class existence is assured via clean, low-cost and easy-to-plug-in wind¶ power.

**Jevon’s paradox ensures demands matches supply – empirics are overwhelming**

**Zehner 12**

Green illusions,

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The Rebound Effect Phantom The nineteenth century brought us a collection of ghoulish and chilling immortals—the headless horseman of Sleepy Hollow, Bram Stoker's Dracula, and even Abraham Lincoln's phantom train, which has been heard leaving Washington DC late at night on a circuitous funeral route toward Springfield, Illinois, where it never arrives. It was during this era, in 1865, that a man named William Stanley Jevons wrote a book about a similar sort of phantom. His book, entitled The Coal Question, started out innocently enough. Jevons documented how James Watt's introduction of the steam engine greatly improved efficiency. Seems nice. But this increase in efficiency in turn made steam engines more popular and ultimately drove coal use ever higher.4 This rebound effect, also termed the "Jevons paradox," arises again and again in various incarnations **throughout the history of energy use**: Increases in energy efficiency make energy services relatively cheaper, encouraging greater **consumption.** Energy efficiency can actually lead to negative environmental impacts unless regions institute taxes, caps, or regulations to prevent growing consumption patterns from smothering efficiency gains. As long as energy-efficiency strategies come with checks to prevent the rebound effect, efficiency proponents argue that they are highly effective. For instance, new refrigerators use just a fraction of the energy of models sold decades ago, yet because there is a limit to the amount of refrigeration space one can fit in a kitchen, the benefits of efficiency are usually not usurped by the rebound effect. Similarly, there's no indication that drivers of small cars, who achieve twice the gasoline efficiency of those driving large vehicles, tend to drive twice as much as a result. And based on numerous case studies of businesses, Rocky Mountain Institute researchers claim, "We have not seen evidence that radically more efficient commercial buildings cause people to leave the lights on all night and set their office thermostats five degrees lower. In fact, energy savings in everything from office towers to schools have often been higher than projected. People do not seem to change their behaviors simply because they have a more efficient building."5 That's nice, too. But it's not the whole story. There's another problem. Even though energy consumers might not spend their efficiency savings to buy more energy, they may choose to spend these savings on other products or endeavors that still lead to energy consumption. In this case, energy-efficiency measures can unintentionally inspire other types of consumption, leaving overall energy footprints unchanged or even larger. This occurs at the macroeconomic level as well. In short, energy-efficiency savings frequently lead to larger profits, which spur more growth and thus higher energy consumption. For instance, another Rocky Mountain Institute study shows that reducing drafts, increasing natural light, and otherwise making workplaces more efficient, can increase worker productivity by as much as 16 percent.6 This higher productivity allows firms to grow, and the resulting labor cost savings can be spent on new machinery, buildings, or expansion. These rebound effects often dwarf the original energy-efficiency effects, leading to **far greater** overall **energy consumption.**7 In fact, the authors of a central report on the rebound effect conclude, "While the promotion of energy efficiency has an important role to play in achieving a sustainable economy, it is unlikely to be sufficient while rich countries continue to pursue high levels of economic growth."8 Thus, efficiency efforts will only prove effective as long as we institute contemporaneous reforms to move from a **consumption-based economy** to one grounded in sufficiency.

#### Economic leadership relies on the mythology of a “chosen people” to secure globalization—causes crusades and mass violence

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It is doubtful whether neoconservatism represents a break from neoliberalism that is significant enough to distinguish the two perspectives within the power bloc. An intrinsic incompatibility is not expressed if, for example, the ideal of the (laissez-faire) state is conceptualized differently in Chicago School economic theory (in which the state's proper role is reduced to maintaining a rudimentary system of rules that can guarantee access to "free" markets) and Straussian political philosophy (which stresses the requirement of a nationally cohesive authoritarian state-led by a beneficial tyranny-that must establish a solid moral order and ensure the defense of Western civilization). The relationship between the two positions is revealing in that the chief intellectuals identified with the neocons (e.g., Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Kagan, and William Kristol), though they frequently disagree in public on matters of philosophy and policy, are united by their enthusiasm for neoliberal economics. **Giving continuity to the U.S. ruling class is a belief in a neoliberal market standard of civilization and in the leading role of the U.S. in securing this standard of civilization**, **by force if necessary**. The more brutal and coercive form of capitalist rule that is currently being reconfigured, then, is less concerned with liberal tropes of prosperity, representation, and freedom than with asserting a universal (neoliberal) market standard of civilization. Since the birth of the U.S. state, the central legitimating myth has been the assumption that **the U.S. had adopted the mantle of the guardian of Western civilization.** The genocides of indigenous populations that enabled European colonization of the Americas, particularly in North America, were committed with reference to a "chosen people" mythology derived from the Christian Bible. Central to this mythology is the idea that the U.S. inherited from the Europeans the guardianship of Western civilization. As Amin (2004: 63) notes, "thereafter, the United States extended to the whole planet its project of realizing the work that 'God' had commanded it to carry out." The chosen-people myth formed the basis of the Manifest Destiny doctrine; it was particularly influential in the post-World War II period, especially in George Kennan's writings. Recent neocon texts express this view, by contrasting the willingness with which the U.S. defends Western civilization with the spinelessness of "old" Europe (see Kagan, 2003). The core legitimating narrative for U.S. imperialism, then, is the claim that the U.S. is uniquely placed to guarantee peace and stability, and to provide leadership for the weak, backward, wayward rest of the world; this "chosen people" myth allows the U.S. to stake claims to global economic leadership and American exceptionalism (Said, 1993: 343-349). The program first set out by the neocon pressure group-the Project for the New American Century-has now been fully realized in Afghanistan and Iraq and has taken American exceptionalism to new heights. seeking to use a full complement of diplomatic, political, and military efforts to preserve and extend "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles,"2 the program represents a profoundly nationalist stance that expresses U.S. preemptive strategy in terms derived from a "chosen people" myth. Legitimacy for U.S. global hegemony at this juncture is based upon a patriotism that reasserts the U.S. as the guardian of Western civilization. Two features of hegemonic rule, the economy and nationhood, characterize the political moment at the heart of the Imperium that is often "blamed" upon a neocon cabal. It is the neoliberal economic doctrine, wedded to a strengthening of patriotic allegiances to the United States. **This moment of political leadership in the U.S. invokes loyalty to the nation-state as a**n explicit **means of strengthening a particular form of market capitalism and uses the market to strengthen allegiance to particularly violent and authoritarian forms of state power.** It seeks a commitment to supporting the coercive responses of national states and the uninterrupted progress of the global market as twin bulwarks against terrorism.

### 2nc alt

#### Cross-apply framework—discussions at the academic level are more productive—creates better a relationship to policy which is more important than trivial simulation—if this approach is better we should win

**Bilgin 5** Assistant Prof of International Relations at Bilkent University, REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, p54-

The point is that a broader security agenda requires students of security to look at agents other than the state, such as social movements, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals, instead of restricting their analysis to the state’s agency. This is essential not only because states are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their citizens’ security, as noted above, but also because there already are agents other than states – be it social movements or intellectuals – who are striving to provide for the differing needs of peoples (themselves and others). This is not meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the contrary, they remain significant actors with crucial roles to play.25 Rather, the argument is that the state’s dominant position as an actor well endowed to provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its agency. Furthermore, broadening the security agenda without attempting a reconceptualisation of agency would result in falling back upon the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. In other words, the state being the most qualified actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. This is why students of critical approaches aim to re-conceptualise agency and practice.¶ Critical approaches view non-state actors, in particular, social movements and intellectuals, as potential agents for change (Cox 1981, 1999; Walker 1990b; Hoffman 1993; Wyn Jones 1995a, 1999). This echoes feminist approaches that have emphasised the role of women’s agency and maintained that ‘women must act in the provision of their own security’ if they are to make a change in a world where their security needs and concerns are marginalised (Tickner 1997; also see Sylvester 1994). This is not necessarily wishful thinking on the part of a few academics; on the contrary, practice indicates that peoples (as individuals and social groups) have taken certain aspects of their own and others’ security into their own hands (Marsh 1995: 130–5; Turner 1998). Three successful examples from the Cold War era – the Nestlé boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in Europe – are often viewed as having inspired the social movements of the post-Cold War era (Lopez et al. 1997: 230–1; Marsh 1995). Christine Sylvester (1994) has also pointed to the examples of the Greenham Common Peace Camp in Britain (1980–89) and women’s producer cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe (1988–90) to show how women have intervened to enhance their own and others’ security. These are excellent examples of how a broader conception of security needs to be coupled with a broader conception of agency.¶ It should be noted here that the call of critical approaches for looking at the agency of non-state actors should not be viewed as allocating tasks to preconceived agents. Rather, critical approaches aim to empower nonstate actors (who may or may not be aware of their own potential to make a change) to constitute themselves as agents of security to meet this broadened agenda. Nor should it be taken to suggest that all non-state actors’ practices are emancipatory.¶ Then, paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors will enable students of security to see how, in the absence of interest at the governmental level (as is the case with the Middle East), non-state actors could imagine, create and nurture community-building projects and could help in getting state-level actors interested in the formation of a security community. It should, however, be noted that not all non-state actors are community-minded – just as not all governments are sceptical of the virtues of community building. Indeed, looking at the agency of nonstate actors is also useful because it enables one to see how non-state actors could stall community-building projects.¶ In the Middle East, women’s movements and networks have been cooperating across borders from the beginning of the Intifada onwards. Women’s agency, however, is often left unnoticed, because, as Simona Sharoni (1996) has argued, the eyes of security analysts are often focused on the state as the primary security agent. However, the Intifada was marked by Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women’s adoption of non-zerosum, non-military practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities (Mikhail-Ashrawi 1995; Sharoni 1995). Such activities included organising a conference entitled ‘Give Peace a Chance – Women Speak Out’ in Brussels in May 1989. The first of its kind, the conference brought together about 50 Israeli and Palestinian women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip together with PLO representatives to discuss the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The follow-up event took place in Jerusalem in December 1989 where representatives of the Palestinian Women’s Working Committees and the Israeli Women and Peace Coalition organised a women’s day for peace which, Sharoni noted, ‘culminated in a march of 6,000 women from West to East Jerusalem under the banner “Women Go For Peace”’ (Sharoni 1996: 107). Aside from such events that were designed to alert public opinion of the unacceptability of the Israel/Palestine impasse as well as finding alternative ways of peacemaking, women also undertook direct action to alleviate the condition of Palestinians whose predicament had been worsening since the beginning of the Intifada (Mikhail-Ashrawi 1995). In this process, they were aided by their Western European counterparts who provided financial, institutional as well as moral support. In sum, women’s agency helped make the Intifada possible on the part of the Palestinian women, whilst their Israeli- Jewish counterparts helped enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli state.¶ The Intifada is also exemplary of how non-state actors could initiate processes of resistance that might later be taken up by policy-makers. The Intifada began in 1987 as a spontaneous grassroots reaction to the Israeli occupation and took the PLO leadership (along with others) by surprise.¶ It was only some weeks into the Intifada that the PLO leadership embraced it and put its material resources into furthering the cause, which was making occupation as difficult as possible for the Israeli government. Although not much came out of the Intifada in terms of an agree- ment with Israel on issues of concern for the people living in the occupied territories, the process generated a momentum that culminated in 1988 with the PLO’s denouncement of terrorism. The change in the PLO’s policies, in turn, enabled the 1993 Oslo Accords, which was also initiated by non-state actors, in this case intellectuals (Sharoni 1996). The point here is that it has been a combination of top-down and bottom-up politics that has been at the heart of political change, be it the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, or Intifada in Israel/Palestine.¶ Emphasising the roles some non-state actors, notably women’s networks, have played as agents of security is not to suggest that all non-state agents’ practices are non-zero-sum and/or non-violent. For instance, there are the cases of Islamist movements such as FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and Hamas in the Occupied Territories that have resorted, over the years, to violent practices as a part of their strategies that were designed to capture the state mechanism. However, although they may constitute threats to security in the Middle East in view of their violent practices, what needs to be remembered is that both FIS and Hamas function as providers for security for some peoples in the Middle East – those who are often neglected by their own states (Esposito 1995: 162–83). In other words, some Islamist movements do not only offer a sense of identity, but also propose alternative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members. However, the treatment women receive under the mastery of such Islamist movements serves to remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on non-governmental actors as agents for peace and security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas.¶ Middle Eastern history is replete with examples of non-state actors resorting to violence and/or adopting zero-sum practices in the attempt to capture state power. In fact, it is often such violent practices of nonstate actors (that is, terrorism or assassination of political leaders) that are mentioned in security analyses. Nevertheless, the fact that not all non-state actors are fit to take up the role of serving as agents of emancipatory change should not lead one to downplay the significant work some have done in the past, and could do in the future. After all, not all states serve as providers of security; yet Security Studies continues to rely on their agency.¶ Then, in order to be able to fulfil the role allocated to them by critical approaches, non-state actors should be encouraged to move away from traditional forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state power or that adopt zero-sum thinking and practices. Arguably, this is a task for intellectuals to fulfil. This is not to suggest that intellectuals should direct or instruct non-state actors. As Wyn Jones (1999: 162) has noted, the relationship between intellectuals and social movements is based on reciprocity. The 1980s’ peace movements, for instance, are good examples of intellectuals getting involved with social movements in bringing about change – in this case, the end of the Cold War (Galtung 1995; Kaldor 1997). The relationship between intellectuals and peace movements in Europe was a mutually interactive one in that the intellectuals encouraged and led whilst drawing strength from these movements.¶ Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that to make a change, intellectuals should get directly involved in political action. They could also intervene to provide a critique of the existing situation, what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in world politics. Students of security co

uld help create the political space that would enable the emergence of a Gorbachev, by presenting such critique. It should, however, be emphasised that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. In other words, intellectuals should be informed by the practices of social movements themselves (as was the case in Europe in the 1980s). The hope is that non-state actors such as social movements and intellectuals (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents when presented with an alternative reading of their situation.¶ Lastly, intellectuals could make a change even if they limit their practices to thinking, writing and self-reflection. During the Cold War very few security analysts were conscious and open about the impact their thinking and writing could make. Richard Wyn Jones cites the example of Edward N. Luttwak as one such exception who admitted that ‘strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen one’s own side in the contention of nations’ (cited in Wyn Jones 1999: 150). Still, such explicit acknowledgement of the political dimension of strategic thinking was rare during the Cold War. On the contrary, students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have been characterised by limited or no self-reflection as to the potential impact their research could make on the subject of research (Wyn Jones 1999: 148–50).¶ To go back to the argument made above about the role of the intellectual as an agent of security and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, students of critical approaches to security could function as agents of security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications of their own thinking and writing. Self-reflection becomes crucial when the relationship between theory and practice is conceptualised as one of mutual constitution. State-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a reality ‘out there’ but help reinforce statism. Although it may be true that the consequences of these scholarly activities are sometimes ‘unintended’, there nevertheless should be a sense of selfreflection on the part of scholars upon the potential consequences of their research and teaching. The point here is that critical approaches that show an awareness of the socially constructed character of ‘reality’ need not stop short of reflecting upon the constitutive relationship between theory and practice when they themselves are theorising about security. Otherwise, they run the risk of constituting ‘threats to the future’ (Kubálková 1998: 193–201).

## 1nr

### 2nc framework

#### Turns case and shuts down deliberation—implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency—our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

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States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic **policy decisions** ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) **are isolated** from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and **treated as matters of** technocratic design and **implementation**, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. **In the process, democratic participation** in ¶ decision-making **is either limited to an already** highly-**commodified**, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral **politics**, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a **highly reductionist notion** of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. **By** treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately **trying to insulate policy-making from** ¶ popular **politics** and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is ¶ itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second ¶ caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being ¶ removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being ¶ insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes **exposed to the “distortions” of** a ¶ politics of **rent-seeking and speculation**—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the ¶ Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a ¶ bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among ¶ themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries ¶ (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount ¶ of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, ¶ however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal ¶ reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), ¶ private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government ¶ control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago ¶ schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even ¶ though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as ¶ in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of ¶ the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern ¶ the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to ¶ health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable **shift from** rights-based policymaking forged through public **deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on** ¶ economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of **technocratic calculation**. In this ¶ regard, as noted above, the **treatment of subjectivity** solely in behaviorist terms of economic ¶ incentives **functions as the key conceptual choice** that makes the technocratization of public ¶ policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ¶ ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of ¶ neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

#### Use the ballot to reclaim social pedagogy—skills and knowledge are force multipliers for inequality unless we prioritize resistance in education—it’s your academic responsibility

**Giroux, cultural studies prof, 5**—Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, selected as the Barstow Visiting Scholar for 2003 at Saginaw Valley State University, named as Distinguished Scholar at multiple institutions, Ph.D. (Henry, Fast Capitalism, 1.2 2005, “Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism,” RBatra)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that **our responsibility as intellectuals** for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues.¶ **Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy** means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170).¶ Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.¶ Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that **education is already a space of politics**, power, and authority. At the same time, **they can make visible their opposition to** those **approaches** to pedagogy **that reduce it to a set of skills** to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.¶ There is also a general misunderstanding of how teacher authority can be used to create the pedagogical conditions for critical forms of education without necessarily falling into the trap of simply indoctrinating students. For instance, many conservative and liberal educators believe that any notion of critical pedagogy that is self-conscious about its politics and engages students in ways that offer them the possibility for becoming critical—what Lani Guinier (2003:6) calls the need to educate students "to participate in civic life, and to encourage graduates to give back to the community, which through taxes, made their education possible"—leaves students out of the conversation or presupposes too much or simply represents a form of pedagogical tyranny. While such educators believe in practices that open up the possibility of questioning among students, they often refuse to connect the pedagogical conditions that challenge how and what students think at the moment to the next task of prompting them to imagine changing the world around them so as to expand and deepen its democratic possibilities. Teaching students how to argue, draw on their own experiences, or engage in rigorous dialogue says nothing about why they should engage in these actions in the first place. How the culture of argumentation and questioning relates to giving students the tools they need to fight oppressive forms of power, make the world a more meaningful and just place, and develop a sense of social responsibility is missing in contemporary, progressive frameworks of education.¶ While no pedagogical intervention should fall to the level of propaganda, a pedagogy which attempts to empower critical citizens can't and shouldn't try to avoid politics. Pedagogy must address the relationships between politics and agency, knowledge and power, subject positions and values, and learning and social change while always being open to debate, resistance, and a culture of questioning. Liberal educators committed to simply raising questions have no language for linking learning to forms of public minded scholarship that would enable students to consider the important relationship between democratic public life and education, or that would encourage students pedagogically to enter the sphere of the political, enabling them to think about how they might participate in a democracy by taking what they learn into new locations and battlegrounds—a fourth grade classroom, a church, the media, a politician's office, the courts, a campus—or for that matter taking on collaborative projects that address the myriad of problems citizens face on a local, national, and global level in a diminishing democracy.¶ In spite of the professional pretense to neutrality, **academics** in the field of cultural studies **need to do more** pedagogically **than simply teach students how to argue** and question. Students need much more from their educational experience. Democratic societies need educated citizens who are steeped in more than the skills of argumentation. And it is precisely this democratic project that affirms the critical function of education and refuses to narrow its goals and aspirations to methodological considerations. As Amy Gutmann (1999) argues, education is always political because it is connected to the acquisition of agency, the ability to struggle with ongoing relations of power, and is a precondition for creating informed and critical citizens who act on the world. This is not a notion of education tied to the alleged neutrality of the academy or the new conservative call for "intellectual diversity" but to a vision of pedagogy that is directive and interventionist on the side of producing a substantive democratic society. This is what makes critical pedagogy different from training. And it is precisely the failure to connect learning to its democratic functions and goals that provides rationales for pedagogical approaches that strip critical and democratic possibilities from what it means to be educated.¶ Cultural studies theorists and educators would do well to take account of the profound transformations taking place in the public sphere and reclaim pedagogy as a central element of cultural politics. In part, this means once again recognizing, as Pierre Bourdieu (2003) has insisted, that the "power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual—lying in the realm of beliefs"(p. 66), and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. Such a task suggests that academics and other cultural workers actively resist the ways in which neoliberalism discourages teachers and students from becoming critical intellectuals by **turning them into human data banks**. Educators and other cultural workers need to build alliances across differences, academic disciplines, and national boundaries as part of broader efforts to develop social movements in defense of the public good and social justice. No small part of this task requires that such groups make visible the connection between the war at home and abroad. If the growing authoritarianism in the U.S. is to be challenged, it is necessary to oppose not only an imperial foreign policy, but also the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, and those policies that sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security.¶ Opposing the authoritarian politics of neoliberalism, militarism, and neoconservatism means developing enclaves of resistance in order to stop the incarceration of a generation of young black and brown men and women, the privatization of the commons, the attack on public schools, the increasing corporatization of higher education, the growing militarization of public life, and the use of power based on the assumption that empire abroad entails tyranny and repression at home. But resistance needs to be more than local or rooted in the specificity of particular struggles. Progressives need to develop national and international movements designed to fight the new authoritarianism emerging in the United States and elsewhere. In part, this means revitalizing social movements such as civil rights, labor, environmental, and anti-globalization on the basis of shared values and a moral vision rather than simply issue-based coalitions. This suggests organizing workers, intellectuals, students, youth, and others through a language of critique and possibility in which diverse forms of oppression are addressed through a larger discourse of radical democracy, a discourse that addresses not only what it means to think in terms of a general notion of freedom capable of challenging corporate rule, religious fundamentalism, and the new ideologies of empire, but also what it might mean to link freedom to a shared sense of hope, happiness, community, equality, and social justice. Democracy implies a level of shared beliefs, practices, and a commitment to build a more humane future. Politics in this sense points to a struggle over those social, economic, cultural, and institutional forces that make democracy purposeful for all people. But this fundamentally **requires something prior**—a reclaiming of the social and cultural basis of a critical education that makes the very struggle over democratic politics meaningful and understandable as part of a broader affective, intellectual, and theoretical investment in public life (Couldry 2004).

#### This comes before any alt or perm args—plan focus rigs debate against investigating assumptions—their model trains you not to defend the process by which you make conclusions, which distorts policy analysis

**Gunder et al**, Aukland University senior planning lecturer, **2009**

(Michael, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on¶ appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge¶ clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired¶ enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what¶ is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted¶ and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy.¶ Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a¶ lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they¶ are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack¶ and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues.¶ Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "dominant stakeholders” can¶ ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many,¶ whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and¶ Hillier 2007a, 469).

The current “post-democratic” milieu facilitates the above through avoidance¶ of critical policy debate challenging favoured orthodox positions and policy¶ approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative “solutions”, are¶ eradicated from political debate so that while “token institutions of liberal democracy”:¶ are retained, conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003,¶ 59). Consequently, “the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are¶ repeatedly used, or their work drawn upon, by different stakeholders, while more¶ critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007,¶ 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues¶ to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "˜successful' or¶ "best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further¶ maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "a cover and¶ shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the¶ political held from any research that is independent and radical in its conception¶ as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time,¶ adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses¶ for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game¶ (Blair and Kumar 1997).

### 2nc a2 case outweighs

#### Internal civil war means they don’t solve global sustainability

**Yee and Storey 02** [Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University and Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p5]

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.2 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

### 2nc a2 impact uniqueness

#### U.S. energy policy will determine whether it can prevent China from surpassing U.S. wind leadership

**Markatos, 2/3/**09 - founder of Sustainable Energy Transition (Dennis, “Record Global Wind Growth: Becomes Race Between US & China”, Huffington Post,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-markatos/record-global-wind-growth\_b\_163728.html)

Wind power did not just have [outstanding growth in the US](http://setenergy.org/2009/01/28/2008-a-record-year-for-wind/) last year. This renewable energy success story was a worldwide phenomenon. Global wind capacity grew a record [27 GW](http://www.gwec.net/index.php?id=30&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=177&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=4&cHash=04fdc8c00a), growing at the awesome speed of 28.8%.

The US became the global wind leader at 25.2 GW with Germany moving to #2 at 23.9 GW. The North American and European markets were roughly equal in 2008 growth, with Asia following closely behind.

China Rising

China doubled its wind capacity again this year, adding a big 6.3 GW to hit 12.2 GW installed (4th globally after Spain). And China is poised to grow faster than any other country in 2009, potentially doubling again to ~24 GW. At such a quick rate, China will probably pass Spain and Germany by 2010 (and accomplish its 30 GW by 2020 national goal 10 years in advance). Whether China will pass the US in 2010-12 depends on US energy policy. If the US puts significant resources behind its stated goal to foster a green economic recovery, we may grow quickly enough to outpace China for many years.

#### Increasing U.S. wind subsidies will take markets from foreign competitors

**Wiser et al, 07** - Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, (Ryan Wiser, Mark Bolinger, and Galen Barbose, "Using the Federal Production Tax Credit to Build a Durable Market for Wind Power in the United States" November <http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/reports/63583.pdf>)

As the wind power business becomes more global in scope, turbines and components will be increasingly manufactured in areas where labor and materials are relatively inexpensive. Given transportation costs, however, some degree of local manufacturing will remain. In part because of the uncertain availability of the federal PTC, however, U.S.-based manufacturing of wind turbines and components remains somewhat limited. This is true despite recent progress in increasing local manufacturing of certain components by both domestic and international firms.15 Industry members were asked to estimate the proportion of U.S. wind project costs currently sourced from or manufactured in the United States, as well as expected trends in domestic manufacturing in the coming ten years under both an uncertain (i.e., short-term) PTC environment and under a single 10-year PTC extension.

Though responses show a range of opinions on the magnitude of future domestic manufacturing, directional consistency is clear: a longer-term PTC extension is expected by industry to yield a sizable increase in domestic wind turbine and component manufacturing (Figure 3). Under the present uncertain (i.e., short-term) PTC extension path, domestic manufacturing content is expected to remain largely constant over time at its current base of roughly 30%. A single, 10- year PTC extension, on the other hand, yields a median expected domestic manufacturing share of over 70%, bringing with it jobs and local economic development benefits.

#### China is competing with the U.S. for market share in wind power – extending wind subsidies undermines Chinese wind

**Hays, 08 –** director of Emerging Energy Research (Keith, “Research Update 4Q 2007: Global Wind Energy”,

<http://www.emerging-energy.com/user/category_docs.aspx?l1=1&catid=GlobalWindEnergyAdvisory1277812780&docid=/user/GlobalWindEnergyAdvisory1277812780_reg/EERru4Q2007GlobalWind.pdf&cattype=AdvisoryServices>)

China's explosive industrial build-up around wind power underlines the country's wind power potential as it ramps up for the 2008 Beijing Games, which will accent China's green energy credentials. Led by state juggernauts such as [LongYuan](http://www.emerging-energy.com/user/category_docs.aspx?l1=1&catid=AsiaPacificWindEnergyAdvisory379240004&docid=/user/AsiaPacificWindEnergyAdvisory379240004_sub/APW915-071220IPOtoSecureLongYuansLeadinChinaWind.pdf&cattype=AdvisoryServices), the national industrial complex is prioritizing the sector alongside its massive coal generation build-out. This focus delivers opportunities for many manufacturers to the tune of over 3 GW annually, while CDM credit buyers such as [Japan](http://www.emerging-energy.com/user/category_docs.aspx?l1=1&catid=AsiaPacificWindEnergyAdvisory379240004&docid=/user/AsiaPacificWindEnergyAdvisory379240004_sub/GW925-071026JapanSearchesforNewWindGrowth.pdf&cattype=AdvisoryServices) have also flocked to China for deals. European players are now tasked with solidifying their regional portfolios while expanding aggressively into the Americas and Asia to tap major global growth opportunities. Offshore wind, seen as a key market for European expansion, continues to progress slowly, both in Europe and the US. On the positive side, German pilot project [Alpha Ventus](http://www.emerging-energy.com/user/category_docs.aspx?l1=&catid=EuropeWindEnergyAdvisory397991763&docid=/user/EuropeWindEnergyAdvisory397991763_sub/EW915-071012PilotProjectAdvancesGermanOffshoreWind.pdf&cattype=AdvisoryServices) progressed with full permitting and turbine procurement, though the [German offshore](http://www.emerging-energy.com/user/category_docs.aspx?l1=1&catid=EuropeWindEnergyAdvisory397991763&docid=/user/EuropeWindEnergyAdvisory397991763_sub/EW925-071221GermanyFacesOffshoreWindReality.pdf&cattype=AdvisoryServices) market is facing the challenging realities of large-scale build-up. A similar scenario played out in the US, where rising offshore wind costs set back [Babcock & Brown's](http://www.emerging-energy.com/user/category_docs.aspx?l1=1&catid=USCanadaWindEnergyAdvisory1259859002&docid=/user/USCanadaWindEnergyAdvisory1259859002_sub/UCW915-071112BabcockBrownFailstoFloatUSOffshore.pdf&cattype=AdvisoryServices) recent efforts for a project ofof Delaware's coast. Looking ahead, EER's forecast update indicates a shift in the global market pecking order, as China will battle it out with the US, followed by Germany, Spain, and India for global yearly MW added leadership. Key events that will determine the outcome of global competition in 2008 include:  US general elections on 4 November 2008  The renewal or expiration of the US PTC incentive in December  The EU's burden-sharing policy adoption to impose its 20% by 2020 target on member states  China's next round of NRDC project tenders combined with additional wind IPOs

#### Wind components are finite and subject to bottlenecks—every US expansion necessitates a weaker Chinese industry

**Johnson, 08** (Keith, Environmental Capital – Wall Street Journal energy blog, 3/18, “A Mighty Wind: What Will China’s Green Appetite Mean?”, <http://blogs.wsj.com/environmentalcapital/2008/03/18/a-mighty-wind-what-will-chinas-green-appetite-mean/?mod=WSJBlog>)

China’s renewable-energy push is a recognition by the NDRC that its economic development must be fueled by something other than coal—which accounts for about 75% of the country’s power generation—if big environmental impacts are to be avoided. (And bad PR, like [spooking marathon champs](http://edition.cnn.com/2008/SPORT/03/18/beijing.haile/) away from the Olympics.) It’s also a recognition that wind power is already booming in China: It had about 4 gigawatts installed last year, which meant the 2010 targets were already in sight.

But—like with almost every other energy choice China makes, from [coal to oil to gas](http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10795714)—adding more wind will likely create more headaches for the rest of the world.

Other countries, especially the U.S., have also been massively ramping up wind power in recent years; last year, wind power accounted for one-quarter of all new power in the U.S. The big problem: There still aren’t enough wind turbines to meet global demand, even though wind turbine makers have been scrambling since last year to remove production bottlenecks and boost output.

Will China’s fast-growing domestic wind turbine business come to the rescue? Not likely. While a handful of players are building top-notch turbines, domestic capacity still falls far short of China’s needs. According to a [report](http://www.gwec.net/uploads/media/wind-power-report.pdf) compiled by the Global Wind Energy Council, China’s domestic wind turbine production capacity in 2006 was 540 megawatts (about 300 good-sized machines). That’s less than half of what the country needs every year.

More worrying, even its booming domestic industry still completely relies on imports of key wind-turbine components, especially ball bearings. That means China’s appetite will just add pressure to already-stretched global supply chains, likely increasing turbine prices and thus capital costs for new wind farms everywhere.

### 2nc a2 no protests

#### Taipei times says protests are repressed that isn’t effective and causes more protests – regardless the CCP lashes out

Renxing 5—Staff Writer for The Epoch Times (San, 8 May 2005, “The CCP’s Last-ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War,” http://en.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-5/30975.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that they will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: That of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

### at: chinese transmission grid fails too

**And, the plans model ensures wind expansion, but do so zero sum with the US – kills the Chinese industry**

#### Their evidence is about Chinese transmission failures

Asia Pulse, 2/9/09 (“CHINA ROLLS OUT ECONOMICAL ULTRA-HIGH VOLTAGE TRANSMISSION LINES,” lexis)

Despite the chilly wind, the erection of electricity pylons and the building of converter stations in one of China's most remarkable technological achievements is going ahead full swing across the mountains and plains from southwest China's Sichuan Province to east China's coastal Shanghai.

Even the Spring Festival does not hold up work on the electricity power line, the world's only 800kv. direct current UHVline.

"We cannot suspend our work even in the week-long Spring Festival holidays, which began on January 26. We must complete the project by 2010," said Li Wenyi, general manager of the Direct Current Engineering Construction Co. Ltd. under the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC), in Yibin, Sichuan, on Tuesday.

Construction kicked off on Dec. 12, the pilot project will wind2,000 km eastward over eight provinces and municipalities to join up Yibin, in Sichuan with Shanghai. It will transmit hydropower generated at Xiangjiaba Hydropower Station and Xiluodu Hydropower Station on Jinshajiang River, the country's second and third largest hydropower projects, after the Three Gorges project.

UHV, defined as voltage of 1,000kv. or above in alternating current, and 800 kv. or above in direct current, is designed to deliver large quantities of power over long distances with power losses less than the most commonly used 500kv. lines.

Similar UHV power lines were previously developed in Russia andJapan, but the technology was not widely used in these countries because of relatively weak demand.

"When the transmission line is completed in 2010 as scheduled, we will deliver cheaper hydropower in an endless stream from the southwest hinterland to the energy-thirsty economic powerhouse in the east and essentially solve the electric power shortage that troubled the region for decades," said Li.

Breakthroughs have been made in core technologies and equipment production to turn into reality the dream of transmitting electric power economically with the world's most complex UHV lines.

"Yes, the Russians and Japanese might have the technology. But the most advanced core technologies cannot be bought," said Wu Yusheng, deputy chief engineer of SGCC. "Besides, we have our own conditions and technological requirements that are different from others. Therefore, we must rely on our own efforts for independent innovation."

At the end of 2004, SGCC raised a strategy to transform its power grid development mode, and accelerate constructing a nationwide power grid with 1000kv. alternating current and 800kv. direct current UHV transmission lines as the backbone.

Bearing this objective, Chinese industrial experts have tackled more than 300 key technological problems over the past four years. The result, China has had independent intellectual property rights over UHV transmission lines and could domestically produces90 per cent equipment.

Breakthroughs were made especially in the fields of voltage standard, electromagnetism environment, over-voltage and insulation co-ordination, reactive voltage control, lightning proof technology, design of transformer substations and lines in high altitude and heavily iced areas, UHV construction techniques and great power grid operation control, said Wu.

The technologies and equipment have succeeded in transmitting large quantities of electric power over long distances with low losses, with nearly one-month of stable and low-noise operation ofthe Shanxi-Hubei UHV transmission line, the first 1,000kv. AC linein the world, said Wu.

#### Chinese power demand is slowing – giving it time to make the necessary grid upgrades

**Kemp, 08** (John, International Herald Tribune, “As China slows down, power grids take less strain”, lexis)

It is an ill wind indeed that blows nobody any good. The abrupt slowdown in the global economy and widespread capacity closures in China's aluminum and steel industries have eased pressure on the Chinese power generation system, giving the government time to install capacity and complete a promised long-distance ultra-high-voltage, or UHV, transmission network.

#### China has the most advanced grid technology in the world

**Ng, 09** (Eric, South China Morning Post, 1/17, “State Grid plans 100b yuan outlay for super network” lexis)

State Grid Corp of China, the larger of the mainland's two regional power distribution monopolies, plans to spend about 100 billion yuan ($113HK.47 billion) over the next three to four years to build the world's most efficient power grids.

Shu Yinbiao, the executive vice-president of the state-owned operator of power grids in 26 provinces and regions, revealed the investment plan in Beijing yesterday after the country's first "ultra-high voltage" power line came on stream.

The 640km, 5.86 billion yuan line links coal-rich Shanxi province in the north to hydropower-rich Hubei province in central China.

The project will enable the transmission of excess power between the north and south, enhancing energy security and cutting demand for spare generation capacity.

"This will facilitate construction of mega coal-fired power generation bases and allow Shanxi to turn coal to power on site [without hauling coal over long distances]," State Grid said.

Ultra-high voltage power transmission lines carry 800 kilovolts of direct current and 1,000kv of alternating current over long distances. Less power is lost and less land used in transmission than for existing lines with a capacity of 500kv or lower.

More than 80 per cent of the country's coal reserves lie in the west and north, while more than 80 per cent of hydropower resources are in the west.

More than 60 per cent of power demand is in the central and northern regions, requiring the long-distance transport of electricity or coal.

While Beijing is building more railways to relieve the country's chronic coal transport bottleneck, building super-efficient "power transmission highways" is considered a better long-term solution by policymakers.

In addition to the Shanxi-Hubei line, State Grid is also building an 18 billion yuan, 2,000km, 800kv line connecting the Xiangjiaba hydropower dam in Sichuan province to Shanghai, a project to be completed next year.

Another line linking Jinping in Sichuan and southern Jiangsu province should begin operations in 2012.

State Grid plans to have built 15 ultra-high voltage transmission projects by 2020.

These projects and a recent decision to increase grid investment by State Grid and the other key power distributor - China Southern Power Grid - aided by Beijing's 4 trillion yuan stimulus plan, are designed to help reverse the country's under-investment in power transmission.

Last year for the first time, money spent on grid investments exceeded that of power plants as the building boom in generation facilities slowed after many years.

Grid investment is considered an effective way to bolster the sagging economy, as it lifts demand for multiple industries such as copper, steel and cement, some of the worst hit by the global economic slump.

# round 6 neg v. georgia cg

## 1nc

### Topicality

#### Energy production is the generation of power from raw materials – excludes extraction

**Vaekstfonden 6** – Vaekstfonden is a Danish government backed investment fund that facilitates the supply of venture capital in terms of start-up equity and high-risk loans "THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN DENMARK- perspectives on entrepreneurship and venture capital" No Specific Cited, Latest Data From 2006[s3.amazonaws.com/zanran\_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf](http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.siliconvalley.um.dk/ContentPages/43667201.pdf)

In all, 20 industry experts were interviewed about the composition and dynamics of the Danish energy sector. Insights from a minimum of 3 industry experts have been assigned to each of the stages in the value chain. Following is a brief description of what the different stages encompass.

Raw material extraction

This stage encompass the process before the actual production of the energy. As an example it is increasingly expensive to locate and extract oil from the North Sea. Likewise coal, gas and waste suitable for energy production can be costly to provide.

Energy production

Energy production encompasses the process, where energy sources are transformed into heat and power.

#### Voter for limits and ground—encourages affs that recover resources in obscure areas with advantages tangential to the energy itself—that robs us of core ground based on the economics of production and shifts the focus to location-based debates.

### DA

#### Obama will get a debt limit deal because he has enough polcap

**Judis 1-3** – John, senior editor for The New Republic (Obama Wasn't Rolled. He Won!, The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111573/obama-didnt-get-rolled-the-fiscal-cliff-in-fact-he-won#)

With a new House and Senate, Obama stands a good chance of winning these battles in the months to come -- if he continues to conduct these negotiations as political campaigns and not as backroom Washington affairs. The fiscal cliff deal took tax rates out of the discussion. What’s left are spending cuts. If Obama allows the Republicans and obnoxious groups like Fix the Debt to frame the issues, he’ll be in trouble. And he did seem to fall into this trap briefly when he proposed changing the cost of living index for Social Security. But if he reminds the public that what the Republicans and their allies want to do is cut their Medicare and Social Security, he and the Democrats should be in good shape.¶ As for the Republicans, the debate over the fiscal cliff, like the debate last year over the debt limit, revealed serious divisions within the party and its rank-and-file that Obama and the Democrats could exploit over the next months. There are at least three different kinds of divisions that have become visible. First is between the Senate and the House. Senate Republicans, who are in a minority, have proven more amenable to compromise on fiscal issues. Unlike most Republican House members, many senators can’t count on being re-elected by solid Republicans majorities. McConnell himself comes from a state where Democrats still hold most of the state offices. ¶ Secondly, there is a regional division in the party between the deep South, which contains many of the diehard House Republicans, and the Republicans from the Northeast, industrial Midwest, and the Far West. In the House vote on the fiscal cliff, Republican House members from the deep South opposed it by 83 to 10, while Republicans from the Northeast favored it by 24 to one, and those from the Far West by 17 to eight. After the Republican leadership refused to bring a Sandy hurricane relief bill to the floor before the end of the session – effectively killing it – New York Republican Peter King called on New York and New Jersey Republicans to withhold donations to the GOP. New Jersey Governor Chris Christe blew his top at the House Republicans.¶ Third, there is a division among Republican lobbies, political organizations and interest groups that surfaced in the wake of the election and once again this week. It’s not easy to define, but it runs between pro-business conservatives, on the one hand, and the right-wing libertarians of the Tea Party and Club for Growth and their billionaire funders. Grover Norquist and Americans for Tax Reform gave their approval the Senate bill. The Chamber of Commerce grudgingly endorsed the final bill, and the National Federation of Independent Business said the tax provisions were acceptable. The Club for Growth, the Koch Brothers’ Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks (which itself has fallen under the sway of its most ideological elements), and the Tea Party Patriots opposed any compromise. ¶ These divisions don’t necessarily augur the kind of formal split that wrecked the Whig Party in the 1850s. Nor do they suggest widespread defection of Republicans into the Democratic Party as happened during the 1930s. There is still far too much distance between, say, McConnell and Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid. But they do suggest that a process of erosion is under way that will weaken the Republicans’ ability to maintain a united front against Democratic initiatives. That could happen in the debates over the sequester and debt ceiling if Obama and the Democrats make the kind of public fuss that they did over fiscal cliff.

#### Reducing environmental restrictions on drilling triggers massive battle in congress and requires capital

**Kraft, 12** (Michael E. Kraft and Norman J. Vig, 12, Michael E. Kraft is professor emeritus of political science and public affairs and Herbert Fisk Johnson Professor of Environmental Studies emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay “Environmental Policy and Politics in Transition” http://www.cqpress.com/docs/college/Ch1-Vig-8e.pdf)

Despite these notable pledges and actions, rising criticism of environmental programs also was evident throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, both domestically and internationally. So too were a multiplicity of efforts to chart new policy directions. For example, intense opposition to environmental and natural resource policies arose in the 104th Congress (1995–1997), when the Republican Party took control of both the House and Senate for the first time in forty years. Ultimately, much like the earlier efforts in Ronald Reagan’s administration, that antiregulatory campaign on Capitol Hill failed to gain much public support at the time. 2 Nonetheless, pitched battles over environmental and energy policy continued in every Congress through the 112th (2011–2013), and they were equally evident in the executive branch, particularly in the Bush administration as it sought to rewrite environmental rules and regulations to favor industry and to increase development of U.S. oil and natural gas supplies on public lands (see Chapter 8). 3 Yet growing dissatisfaction with the effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of environmental policies was by no means confined to congressional conservatives and the Bush administration. It could be found among a broad array of interests, including the business community, environmental policy analysts, environmental justice groups, and state and local government officials. 4

Since 1992, governments at all levels have struggled to redesign environmental policy for the twenty-first century. Under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) tried to “reinvent” environmental regulation through the use of collaborative decision making involving multiple stakeholders, public-private partnerships, market-based incentives, information disclosure, and enhanced flexibility in rulemaking and enforcement (see Chapters 8, 9, and 10). 5 Particularly during the Clinton administration, new emphases within the EPA and other federal agencies and departments on ecosystem management and sustainable development sought to foster comprehensive, integrated, and long-term strategies for environmental protection and natural resource management (see Chapter 8). 6 Many state and local governments have pursued similar goals with adoption of a wide range of innovative policies that promise to address some of the most important criticisms directed at contemporary environmental policy (see Chapters 2 and 11). The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 brought additional attention to innovative policy ideas, although less attention than many of Obama’s supporters had anticipated (see Chapter 4). Taken together, however, over the past two decades we have seen a new sense of urgency emerge about climate change and other third generation environmental, energy, and resource problems and, at least in some quarters, a determination to address those problems despite weak economic conditions.

The precise way in which Congress, the states, and local governments will change environmental policies in the years to come remains unclear. The partisan gridlock of recent years may give way to greater consensus on the need to act; yet policy change rarely comes easily in the U.S. political system. Its success likely depends on several key conditions: public support for change, how the various policy actors stake out and defend their positions on the issues, the way the media cover these disputes, the relative influence of opposing interests, and the state of the economy. Political leadership, as always, will play a role, especially in reconciling deep divisions between the major political parties on environmental protection and natural resource issues. Political conflict over the environment is not going to vanish any time soon. Indeed, it may well increase as the United States and other nations struggle to define how they will respond to the latest generation of environmental problems and how they will reconcile their preferred policy actions with other priorities.

In this chapter, we examine the continuities and changes in environmental politics and policy since 1970 and discuss their implications for the early twenty-first century. We review the policymaking process in the United States, and we assess the performance of government institutions and political leadership. We give special attention to the major programs adopted in the 1970s, their achievements to date, and the need for policy redesign and priority setting for the years ahead. The chapters that follow address in greater detail many of the questions explored in this introduction.

The Role of Government and Politics

The high level of political conflict over environmental protection efforts recently underscores the important role government plays in devising solutions to the nation’s and the world’s mounting environmental ills. Global climate change, population growth, the spread of toxic and hazardous chemicals, loss of biological diversity, and air and water pollution all require various actions by individuals and institutions at all levels of society and in both the public and private sectors. These actions range from scientific research and technological innovation to improved environmental education and significant changes in corporate and consumer behavior. As political scientists, we believe government has an indispensable role to play in environmental protection and improvement. The chapters in this volume thus focus on environmental policies and the government institutions and political processes that affect them. Our goal is to illuminate that role and to suggest needed changes and strategies.

#### The impact is growth—now key

**Maass 1-2** – Harold, the Week's online executive editor (The looming debt-ceiling fight: Worse than the fiscal cliff?, The Week, http://theweek.com/article/index/238312/the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-worse-than-the-fiscal-cliff)

In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation's bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.

Obama is still smarting from the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, says Neil Munro at The Daily Caller. In that fight, "the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion." Obama has been complaining about that defeat ever since, and he's vowing not to let it happen again. But the GOP-led House is adamant about using "its authority over the nation's debt ceiling to pressure Obama to shrink future spending."

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 9 – \*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### Counterplan

#### The Supreme Court should rule that compliance orders from federal enforcement agencies regarding access restrictions on federal lands in the Outer Continental Shelf for conventional gas production are unconstitutional.

#### Solves case

Eric Waeckerlin (Attorney at Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP Past Attorney at Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Law Clerk at The Honorable Sam. E Haddon, U.S. District Court for the District of Montana Energy Policy Analyst at Western Governors' Association/Western Interstate Energy Board, J.D. University of Montana School of Law) March 21, 2012 “The Sackett Decision and Its Implications for Hydraulic Fracturing” http://www.frackinginsider.com/litigation/with-stunning-alacrity-the-united/

With stunning alacrity, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion [PDF] today in Sackett v. EPA (roughly two months since oral argument), resolutely and unanimously striking down EPA’s position that the Clean Water Act (CWA) does not provide pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance orders. This blog has covered the Sackett case and explored the potential ramifications for EPA’s pursuit of regulatory authority over hydraulic fracturing. In this respect, the opinion is surprisingly broad and is not grounded in distinctions between a non-emergency administrative order (like the CWA order at issue in Sackett) and an emergency-type administrative order under other statutes (e.g., the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or CERCLA). Accordingly, following Sackett, EPA’s ability to regulate hydraulic fracturing under the guise of emergency SDWA authority appears less clear. Justice Scalia’s opinion avoids the merits of whether EPA actually had CWA jurisdiction over the Sackett’s property, and instead focuses on whether EPA violated the Sackett’s due process rights by issuing a compliance order without a hearing or judicial review. In essence, the Sackett’s had two options: (1) comply with the order, thus acceding that EPA had jurisdictional authority; or (2) wait to be sued by the Agency meanwhile accruing $75,000/day in penalties for non-compliance. On the issue of whether the compliance order was a “final agency action” subject to judicial review the Court was clear. Justice Scalia writes “[t]here is no doubt [the compliance order] is agency action” and further, “[i]t has all the hallmarks of APA finality that our opinions establish.” Many of the core hallmarks or factors relied on by the Court would also apply in the emergency SDWA order issued by EPA in the Range Resources case. These include the imposition of future obligations (the Range Resources order imposes extensive obligations, including testing and work plans), an obligation to allow Agency access to the site, the imposition of penalties for non-compliance, and Agency conclusions regarding whether the party is in compliance (both orders contain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). The Court also held that nothing in the CWA expressly precludes judicial review. With the important caveat that the SDWA scheme differs from the CWA scheme, and that emergency power is different from general CWA jurisdictional authority, the Sackett opinion carries some potentially important implications for the Range Resources matter. First, Justice Scalia prominently noted and relied on the Administrative Procedure Act’s “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” This presumption carries across all federal statutes, including the SDWA. Second, the Court eschewed EPA’s argument that because the CWA gives the Agency a choice between a judicial proceeding and an administrative action, choosing the latter precludes judicial review. The SDWA provides a similar choice. Finally, the Court did not agree with the Government’s policy argument that providing pre-enforcement judicial review of CWA compliance orders would make EPA less likely to use such orders. Acknowledging “that might be true,” Justice Scalia essentially signaled that the Court thinks there is a substantial question about the merits of EPA’s order in Sackett, stating “[c]ompliance orders will remain an effective means of securing prompt voluntary compliance in those many cases where there is no substantial basis to question their validity.” This same policy would arguably cut against EPA in favor of full substantive judicial review in the Range Resources matter. The strongest words were penned by Justice Alito. In the opening salvo of his concurring opinion, he asserted that the position taken by EPA “would have put the property rights of ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of [EPA] and its employees.” Justice Alito went on to say “[i]n a nation that values due process, not to mention private property, such treatment is unthinkable.” In sum, the Court’s decision is a stunning rebuke of an EPA that many feel has overreached. The decision likely has much to do with the broader ongoing issues of EPA’s CWA jurisdiction and the meaning of “navigable waters.” In fact, Justice Alito’s concurrence expressly notes that the only true remedy to aggrieved property owners is Congressional clarification of the reach of EPA’s CWA jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the implications for the Range Resources case (and the broader issue of EPA’s mission to regulate hydraulic fracturing in the absence of clear statutory authority) are potentially significant.

#### Severs restrictions

Treanor & Sperling 93 William - Prof Law at Fordham. Gene - Deputy Assistant to President for Economic Policy. “PROSPECTIVE OVERRULING AND THE REVIVAL OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATUTES,” Columbia Law Review, Dec 93, lexis

Unlike the Supreme Court, several state courts have explicitly addressed the revival issue. The relevant state court cases have concerned the specific issue of whether a statute that has been held unconstitutional is revived when the invalidating decision is overturned. n42 With one exception, they have concluded that such **statutes are immediately enforceable.**

The most noted instance in which **the revival issue was resolved** by a court involved the District of Columbia minimum wage statute pronounced unconstitutional in Adkins. After the Court reversed Adkins in West Coast Hotel, President Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer [\*1913] Cummings for an opinion on the status of the District of Columbia's statute. The Attorney General responded,

 The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books; and that if a statute be declared unconstitutional and the decision so declaring it be subsequently overruled the statute will then be held valid from the date it became effective. n43

Enforcement of the statute followed without congressional action. n44

When this enforcement was challenged, the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jawish v. Morlet n45 held that the decision in West Coast Hotel had had the effect of making the statute enforceable. The court observed that previous opinions addressing the revival issue proceed on the principle that **a statute declared unconstitutional is void in the sense that it is inoperative or unenforceable,** but not void in the sense that it is repealed or abolished; that so long as the decision stands the statute is dormant but not dead; and that **if the decision is reversed the statute is valid from its first effective date**. n46

 The court declared this precedent sound since the cases were "in accord with the principle "that a decision of a court of appellate jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation, and the effect is not that the former decision is bad law but that it never was the law.' " n47 Adkins was thus, and had always been, a nullity. The court acknowledged that, after Adkins, it had been thought that the District of Columbia's minimum wage statute was unconstitutional. As the court put it, " "Just about everybody was fooled.' " n48 Nonetheless, the court's view was that since **the** minimum wage **law had always been valid,** although for a period judicially unenforceable, **there was no need to reenact it. n49**

Almost **all other courts that have addressed the issue of whether a statute that has been found unconstitutional can be revived have reached the same result** as the Jawish court, using a similar formalistic [\*1914] analysis. n50 The sole decision in which a court adopted the nonrevival position is Jefferson v. Jefferson, n51 a poorly reasoned decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Jefferson sought child support and maintenance from her husband. She prevailed at the trial level; he filed his notice of appeal one day after the end of the filing period established by the Louisiana Uniform Rules of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rejected his appeal as untimely, even though the Louisiana Supreme Court had previously found that the applicable section of the Uniform Rules violated the state constitution. One of Ms. Jefferson's arguments before the state Supreme Court was that that court's previous ruling had been erroneous and that the rules should therefore be revived. In rejecting this claim and in finding for the husband, the Court stated:

 Since we have declared the uniform court rule partially unconstitutional, it appears to be somewhat dubious that we have the right to reconsider this ruling in the instant case as counsel for the respondent judges urges us to do. For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a law is stricken as void, it no longer has existence as law; the law cannot be resurrected thereafter by a judicial decree changing the final judgment of unconstitutionality to constitutionality as this would constitute a reenactment of the law by the Court - an assumption of legislative power not delegated to it by the Constitution. n52

 The Louisiana Court thus took a mechanical approach to the revival question. According to its rationale, when a statute is found unconstitutional, it is judicially determined never to have existed. Revival therefore entails judicial legislation and thereby violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers: because the initial legislative passage [\*1915] of the bill has no legitimacy, the bill's force is considered to be purely a creature of judicial decision-making.

**Jefferson has little analytic appeal**. Its view of the separation of powers doctrine is too simplistic. Contrary to the Jefferson rationale, a "revived" law is not the pure product of judicial decision-making. It is, instead, a law that once gained the support of a legislature and that has never been legislatively repealed. Its legitimacy rests on its initial legislative authorization. Moreover, the view that a statute that has been found unconstitutional should be treated as if it never existed may have had some support in the early case law, but it has been clearly rejected by the Supreme Court. Instead of treating all statutes that it has found unconstitutional as if they had never existed, the Court has recognized a range of circumstances in which people who rely on an overturned decision are protected. Indeed, as will be developed, the doctrine of prospective overruling evolved to shield from harm those who relied on subsequently overruled judicial decisions. n53 In short, the one case in which there was a holding that a statute did not revive does not offer a convincing rationale for nonrevival.

### Kritik

#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and unsustainable practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The **financialisation**¶ **of “energy**”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ **jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just**¶ **transition** to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies **marginalise the role of communities** and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over **how society might be differently organised** to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

**Holleman 2012** – assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1, WEA)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “**social gravity**” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ **belies the notion that “there is no alternative.”** They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, **the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives**, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that **there’s no way we can just subcontract** our ¶ **environmental conscience to** the **new** breed of **green marketers**” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ **planetary boundaries** will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through **collective deliberation** ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ **rather than finding a “solution”** to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still **acting as if economic incentives are the only viable** ¶ **policy tool** in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (**because they are** **designed** to ¶ function **under such behavioral assumptions** in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, **limiting the only channels for** ¶ **communication** available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### Counterplan

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should remove restrictions on offshore oil production and provide necessary subsidies for drilling and exploration.

#### Their ONE internal link author says OIL is key to the industry in the GULF not natural gas Mason 11 (Joseph – Senior Fellow, The Wharton School, Louisiana State University Endowed Chair of Banking and nationally-renowned economist, “House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources Hearing; Fisheries, Wildlife, Oceans and Insular Affairs Legislative Hearing on H.R. 306, H.R. 588, S. 266 and H.R. 285”, 4/6, lexis)

Apart from national energy concerns, however, economic considerations also favor increased development of OCS energy resources. Specifically, the boost provided to local onshore economies by offshore production would be particularly welcome in the present economic climate. Similar to fiscal alternatives presently under consideration, OCS development would provide a long-run economic stimulus to the U.S. economy because the incremental output, employment, and wages provided by OCS development would be spread over many years. Unlike those policies, however, this stimulus would not require government expenditures to support that long-term growth. A. The Present State of Offshore U.S. Oil and Gas Production Despite its importance, U.S. oil and natural gas production in offshore areas is currently limited to only a few regions. At the present time, oil and gas is only actively produced off the coast of six U.S. states: Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, and Alaska. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) reports that Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas are the only coastal states that provide access to all or almost all of their offshore energy resources. Only two additional states--Alaska and California--are producing any offshore energy supplies. All California OCS Planning Areas and most Alaska OCS Planning Areas, however, were not open to any new facilities until the recent end of the Congressional and Presidential moratoria. The remaining 16 coastal states are not open to new production and are not presently extracting any offshore energy resources. Even without those remaining sixteen states, plus California and Alaska, the OCS is already the most important source of U.S. energy supplies. According to the MMS, "the Federal OCS is a major supplier of oil and natural gas for the domestic market, contributing more energy (oil and natural gas) for U.S. consumption than any single U.S. state or country in the world." That is, OCS production presently meets more U.S. energy demand than any other single source, including Saudi Arabia. B. Offshore Oil Production Stimulates Onshore Economies Offshore oil and gas production has a significant effect on local onshore economies as well as the national economy. There are broadly three "phases" of development that contribute to state economic growth: (1) the initial exploration and development of offshore facilities; (2) the extraction of oil and gas reserves; and (3) refining crude oil into finished petroleum products. Industries supporting those phases are most evident in the sections of the Gulf of Mexico that are currently open to offshore drilling. **For** example, the U.S. shipbuilding industry - based largely in the Gulf region - benefits significantly from initial offshore oil exploration efforts. **Exploration and development also requires specialized exploration and drilling vessels, floating drilling rigs, and miles and miles of steel pipe, as well as highly educated and specialized labor to staff the efforts.** The onshore support does not end with production. A recent report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy indicates that the Louisiana economy is "highly dependent on a wide variety of industries that depend on offshore oil and gas production" and that offshore production supports onshore production in the chemicals, platform fabrication, drilling services, transportation, and gas processing. Fleets of helicopters and U.S.-built vessels also supply offshore facilities with a wide range of industrial and consumer goods, from industrial spare parts to groceries. As explained in Section IV.G, however, the distance between offshore facilities and onshore communities can affect the relative intensity of the local economic effects. The economic effects in the refining phase are even more diffuse than the effects for the two preceding phases. Although significant capacity is located in California, Illinois, New Jersey, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, additional U.S. refining capacity is spread widely around the country. As a result, refinery jobs, wages, and tax revenues are even more likely to "spill over" into other areas of the country, including non-coastal states like Illinois, as those are home to many refining and chemical industries that ride the economic coattails of oil exploration and extraction.

### Solvency

#### Their 1ac LORIS evidence is a million reasons the AFF doesn’t solve

Loris 12 (Nicolas, Fellow in the Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation “Senate Energy Bill: Good Start, Room for Improvement,” Heritage Foundation, 8-6-12, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement)

¶ ¶ ¶ Senator John Hoeven (R–ND) recently introduced the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (DEJA), which would greatly expand access to energy and simplify burdensome regulations that prevent projects from coming online in a timely manner. While the legislation could be improved by further increasing access and removing the top-down energy planning, DEJA would still spur economic growth and drive energy production.¶ Increasing Access to Energy ¶ DEJA would accept the State Department’s environmental review of the Keystone XL pipeline as sufficient and allow the state of Nebraska to reroute the pipeline to meet the state’s environmental concerns. The State Department studied and addressed risks to soil, wetlands, water resources, vegetation, fish, wildlife, and endangered species and concluded that construction of the pipeline would pose minimal environmental risk.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn1) The construction of Keystone XL would allow up to 830,000 barrels of oil per day to come from Canada to the Gulf Coast and create thousands of jobs. ¶ DEJA also directs the Department of the Interior (DOI) to conduct a lease sale off the coast of Virginia. The 2.9 million acres 50 miles off the coast has an estimated 130 million barrels of oil and 1.14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Opening access off Virginia’s coast is long overdue, and the legislation only opens up a small portion of America’s territorial waters that are off limits. ¶ The Offshore Petroleum Expansion Now (OPEN) Act of 2012, also co-sponsored by Senator Hoeven, would replace President Obama’s 2012–2017 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program with a much more robust plan that opens areas in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, in the Gulf of Mexico, and off Alaska.[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn2) ¶ Both DEJA and OPEN increase the royalties that states would receive from energy production, but both could go further to increase state involvement in offshore drilling decisions. Since onshore states already receive 50 percent of the royalties, Congress should also implement a 50/50 royalty-sharing program between federal and state governments involved in offshore drilling. ¶ Efficient Permitting and Leasing for All Energy Projects ¶ Another important component of DEJA is that it streamlines the permitting of all energy projects. Receiving a permit for any energy project, not just fossil fuels, takes entirely too long. Duplicative and unnecessary regulations slow the process and drive up costs. Furthermore, environmental activists delay new energy projects by filing endless administrative appeals and lawsuits. DEJA would create a manageable time frame for permitting for all energy sources to increase supply at lower costs and stimulate economic activity. ¶ DEJA also calls for an end to the lengthy permit process in the Natural Petroleum Reserve area of Alaska. It would require the DOI to approve drilling permits within 60 days and infrastructure permits within six months. ¶ Lease certainty is another critical issue. The act states that the DOI cannot cancel or withdraw a lease sale after the winning company pays for the lease. Ensuring that the federal government does not pull the rug out from under a company that wins the lease sale would provide the certainty necessary to pursue energy projects.¶ Freeze and Study Environmental Regulations ¶ DEJA would also create transparency and accountability for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations by establishing an interagency committee that would report on the full economic impact of the rules implemented by the EPA that affect fuel prices. This includes any part of the production process that would be affected by greenhouse gas regulations. ¶ DEJA delays the implementation of Tier 3 fuel standards (designed to replace the Tier 2 regulations issued in 2000) that would lower the amount of sulfur in gasoline but could add 6–9 cents per gallon to the cost of manufacturing gasoline. The EPA has declared no measurable air quality benefits from these standards.¶ DEJA delays the New Source Performance Standards for refineries, which would drive up the cost of gasoline for no measurable change in the earth’s temperature.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn3) It would also delay new national ambient air quality standards for ozone, which are unnecessary because the ozone standard set by the EPA is already more than stringent enough to protect human health. Though the delays contained in DEJA underscore the problems with these regulations, the preferred approach would be to prohibit the implementation of these three standards altogether.¶ DEJA would also prevent the DOI from issuing any rule under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 before 2014 that would adversely affect coal employment, reduce revenue from coal production, reduce coal for domestic consumption or export, designate areas as unsuitable for surface mining and reclamation, or expose the U.S. to liability by taking privately owned coal through regulation. ¶ While this temporary fix recognizes the federal overreach in coal production, a better approach would be to create a framework that restricts overregulation, empowers the states, balances economic growth and environmental well-being, and creates a timely permitting process for all aspects of coal production.[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn4)¶ Energy Central Planning Unneeded ¶ DEJA would require the federal government to create production objectives for fossil fuels and renewable energy and allow the relevant agencies to make additional lands available to meet those objectives. The bill would also require the U.S. Geological Survey to establish a critical minerals list and create comprehensive policies to increase critical mineral production. ¶ A much simpler and effective solution would be to open all federal lands for energy production of all sources and allow the private sector to determine what sources of energy and what technologies meet America’s electricity and transportation fuel demand. Too often the use of critical minerals has been used as cover for subsidies and extensive government intervention in a major industry. If there are clear military needs for certain critical materials, these should be met by government action. Absent that, streamlining the bureaucracy that has expanded around mining and opening access is the only necessary federal action surrounding critical minerals. ¶ Also alarming is that DEJA defines clean energy technology as one that reduces, avoids, or sequesters greenhouse gas emissions. While there is much debate in the scientific community as to the magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions affecting climate change, Congress should focus on promoting scientific integrity and outcomes that achieve real environmental benefits.[[5]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn5) This should include a fundamental overhaul of major environmental statutes and managing natural resources on a site- and situation-specific basis.[[6]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/domestic-energy-and-jobs-act-good-start-room-for-improvement%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn6)¶ Remove Federal Impediments and Federal Planning ¶ Government restrictions and regulations are significantly impeding the market’s effectiveness in responding to changes in energy prices and making it difficult for suppliers of all types of energy to produce energy and create jobs. DEJA would provide America with much needed energy supply and a much needed economic stimulus. However, rather than attempting to create federal energy production goals, **Congress needs to simply remove the unnecessary bureaucracies that prohibit the market from responding to price changes.**

### Exports

#### Plan crushes Russian energy security – it outweighs oil

Jack Sharples (Ph.D. Candidate specializing in EU-Russia natural gas relations at the University of Glaslow) 2012 “Russia-EU gas relations: the Russian perspective” http://glasgow.academia.edu/JackSharples/Papers/1596861/Russia-EU\_Gas\_Relations\_The\_Russian\_Perspective

 The EU as a strategic market for Gazprom and Russia Gas sales to the EU enable Gazprom to subsidise domestic gas prices Domestic gas sales accounted for 56 percent of Gazprom’s sales by volume, but just 29 percent of total sales by revenue in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011b), meaning that the domestic market was under-represented in Gazprom’s sales revenues. Conversely, gas sales to EU-27accounted for 26 percent of sales by volume, but 44.2 percent of Gazprom’s total sales by revenue in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011b), meaning that the EU is over-represented in Gazprom’s sales revenues. The reason for this imbalance is the difference in price between the destinations of Gazprom’s exports. Gazprom’s official figures divide the destinations of Gazprom’s gas sales into three groups: domestic (i.e. Russian); the Former Soviet Union (FSU); and the ‘far abroad’ (countries beyond the FSU – in this case EU-27 minus the three Baltic states, plus Turkey and Former Yugoslavia). In 2010 Gazprom earned just over 1099.2bn Roubles selling148.1bcm of gas to the ‘far abroad’ at an average price of 9166 Roubles per million cubic metres (mcm). This figure also includes 2.5bcm of LNG exports, mainly to the Far East. Using the ‘far abroad’ average price, gas sales of 130.2bcm to the EU in 2010 would have generated 966bn Roubles for Gazprom. Sales to the Former Soviet Union (including the three Baltic states) amounted to 70.2bcm and earned Gazprom approximately 450.1bn Roubles at an average price of 7039 Roubles per mcm. Finally, Gazprom earned 636.8bn Roubles selling277.3bcm of gas to the domestic Russian market at an average price of 2296.8 Roubles per mcm (Gazprom, 2011b). Thus, the price of gas sold by Gazprom on the domestic Russian market in 2010 was a quarter of that sold to the ‘far abroad’ and a third of that sold to the countries of the Former Soviet Union. The result is that gas sales to the EU are crucial for Gazprom’s ability to sell gas at low prices domestically, and for Gazprom’s ability to invest in new gas production. As Dusseault puts it, Gazprom needs export profits to recoup the losses they make on the Russian market (Dusseault, 2010). Therefore, Gazprom’s gas sales to the EU are crucial not only for Russia’s external energy security, but also for Russia’s internal energy security. The role of energy in Russia’s broader economic and political relations with the EU The EU does not only represent a key market for Russian gas exports. The EU is also Russia’s most important economic and political partner on the international stage. According to the European Commission, the EU-27 accounted for 43 percent of Russian imports and 49 percent of Russian exports in 2010 (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade,2011a, pg. 4), and it is estimated that 75 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Russia comes from EU Member States (European Commission, 2011). For comparison, China is Russia’s second-largest import and export partner, accounting for 18.1 percent of Russia’s imports and 5.3 percent of Russia’s exports (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2011a, pg.6) The extent to which energy forms the basis of this relationship is seen in the fact that, according to EU statistics, ‘mineral fuels’ accounted for around 75 percent of Russia’s exports to the EU in 2010. Of these mineral fuel exports, petroleum and petroleum products accounted for 85 percent and gas 11 percent (Ottens, 2011, pg. 3). In 2010 Russia had a positive trade balance of 68.1bn Euro, based on exports worth 138.6bn Euro, with the EU. Of these exports, oil and petroleum products accounted for 100.5bn Euro, while gas, electricity and coal combined accounted for 19.4bn Euro (European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, 2011a, pg. 10). However, these figures seem to slightly underestimate Russia’s revenues from gas sales in 2010 – Using an exchange rate of 37 to 43 Roubles per Euro (XE,2012), the figure of 966bn Roubles used above should have given Gazprom revenues of 22.5-26.1bn Euro for EU gas sales in 2010. Whilst gas sales are significant in that they represent around a third of Russia’s positive trade balance with the EU, it would clearly be impossible for Russia to maintain a positive trade balance with the EU without oil exports. However, while oil may be more important economically, gas is arguably more important politically. In the context of a more regional market still largely based upon a fixed pipeline network, Russian state control over Gazprom, which has both a monopoly on Russian gas exports and a significant role in EU gas imports, means that gas exports to the EU bring far greater influence and political value to Russia than oil exports

#### Russian influence is stabilizing – solves organized crime, prolif and terrorism

**Rykhtik, 12** – Nizhny Novgorod State University, Nizhny Novgorod , Russia. (Mikhail, Responding to a Resurgent Russia, ed: Aggarwal and Govella, p. 28)

Russia sees the European Union as one of its key political and economic partners and will seek to promote intensive, sustained and long-term cooperation with it. So far, dialogue between the EU and Russia has been asymmetric on most issues, including the identification of priority areas for cooperation. The European Union has long been Russia’s main foreign trading partner. EU countries are the major creditors of and investors in the Russian Federation. EU countries account for 40% of all international air passenger traffic into and out of Russia. The same holds true for communications: 61% of Russia’s international telephone traffic is with the EU (Ryzhov 2002 :14–15). These and many other facts show that throughout the past decade the whole of Europe has witnessed a process of cultural, economic, and political integration and that this process has included Russia as well. And most significantly, there are signs that the EU is ready to economize its relations with Russia. There is an understanding among Russian experts and current leaders that Russia’s integration into the main European institutions will benefit everyone (Barysch et al. 2008 ) . Without an active Russian role, it would be difficult to achieve stability and security on the European landscape. Russia plays a crucial role in equipping Europe with energy, and Russia–EU scientific cooperation also has immense potential. In addition, subregional cooperation between the EU and Russia may strengthen Russia’s position, since Russia is interested in more favorable visa regimes. Russia is a key player in the Eurasian community and is eager to cooperate as long as there is no danger of interference in Russian domestic affairs.

Russia’s main strategic goal today is to preserve its national, economic, and cultural identity, while maintaining a strategic partnership with Europe. Medvedev has shown that he is interested in building relationships between Russia and the EU. The EU is obviously uncomfortable with its dependence on Russian resources and would like to switch to oil and gas supplies from other regions, including Central Asia and North Africa, or develop alternative sources of energy. But it is in the medium-term interests of both Russia and the EU to preserve the current status quo in their relationship.

The overriding question of Russian integration into the reformed security structures of Europe also needs to be resolved in a positive way. Russia is a more interesting partner for the West today, taking into account their shared security agenda of dealing with international terrorism, organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, nonproliferation, conventional arms reductions, illegal migration, and other matters. Current conditions are ripe for a new round of consultations and negotiations on a new European Security Agreement (Helsinki 2). 13 It is obvious that we are dealing with a new type of relations between Brussels and Moscow. The idea of a Helsinki 2 or Helsinki-Plus treaty has found some support in the West (Lo 2009 ) . Some experts have agreed that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act should be changed to reflect post-Cold War realities. 14 What is not welcomed by the West is Medvedev’s emphasis on hard security, which is a reflection of the realist approach which is still popular in Russia. But the new elements of Medvedev’s initiatives prompt some optimism.

#### Nuclear war

**Dobriansky, 1 -** Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the State Department (Paula, “The Explosive Growth of Globalized Crime,”http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/transnational-crime/gj01.htm

Certain types of international crime -- terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and contraband smuggling -- involve serious violence and physical harm. Other forms -- fraud, extortion, money laundering, bribery, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, and counterfeiting -- don't require guns to cause major damage. Moreover, the spread of information technology has created new categories of cybercrime.

For the United States, international crime poses threats on three broad, interrelated fronts. First, the impact is felt directly on the streets of American communities. Hundreds of thousands of individuals enter the U.S. illegally each year, and smuggling of drugs, firearms, stolen cars, child pornography, and other contraband occurs on a wide scale across our borders.

Second, the expansion of American business worldwide has opened new opportunities for foreign-based criminals. When an American enterprise abroad is victimized, the consequences may include the loss of profits, productivity, and jobs for Americans at home.

Third, international criminals engage in a variety of activities that pose a grave threat to the national security of the United States and the stability and values of the entire world community. Examples include the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, trade in banned or dangerous substances, and trafficking in women and children. Corruption and the enormous flow of unregulated, crime-generated profits are serious threats to the stability of democratic institutions and free market economies around the world.

#### EU dominance is key to Russian growth and perceived as a life or death national interest

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Europe is an unavoidable partner. The European market consumes 90% of Russia's total gas exports and 60% of its crude oil, which make up only 25 and 15% of Europe's total demand, respectively. Russia presently does not have any viable alternative markets remotely equal in size to Europe. Dependence is a two-Way phenomenon. "40% of Russian public money” comes from the sale of oil and gas to Europe, and at least 75% of Russian export revenues are linked to the EU's energy market in general. Without any extant alternative markets to exploit in the near-term, Moscow requires European gas revenues to preserve its own financial solubility.

Energy overshadows other concerns. Paillard believes that while the energy trade has, in the past, been "part of a game of blackmail, lies and fear" between Europe and Russia, its new status as a "**question of life or death for Russian revitalization**" and its importance to Europe's economic growth mean that neither side can afford to use gas supplies as leverage in other international concerns. In Paillard's estimation, Brussels and Moscow both regard issues such as human rights or the Chechen conflict as not being worth risking the energy trade over. Therefore, Russian and the European Union are inextricably bound to one another by their mutual dependence on the energy trade. Russia cannot absorb the financial consequences of interrupting the EU revenue stream, while the European Union cannot do without Russian gas supplies. Europe has few alternative suppliers, and cannot develop alternative energy sources in the near term. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to be able to diversify its economy or target new markets any better than it has in the past.

#### That makes Russia a hostile challenger

**Allison and Blackwill, 11** – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI\_final-web.pdf)

Americans often tend to focus on either Russia’s strengths or its weaknesses without seeking an integrated understanding of the real Russia. This is problematic, because it leads to dangerous assumptions about Russia’s motives and conduct. For example, those who focus on Moscow’s strengths frequently see an assertive and dangerous rival without recognizing Russia’s profound insecurity. Conversely, those who concentrate on Russia’s shortcomings see a defeated power ill-prepared to resist American pressure or preferences. While these descriptions are clearly caricatures, views like those described above can produce damaging misjudgments.

Russia is grappling with the contradictions between imperial nostalgia, on the one hand, and the dramatic decline in its power after the Soviet collapse, on the other. The Russian government’s failure to present a credible plan to reverse Russia’s decline or to develop a successful foreign policy strategy that strengthens the country’s international role makes this only more difficult and contributes to **a sense of insecurity**. Nevertheless, the United States has the opportunity to manage its relations with an evolving Russia in a manner that advances America’s vital national interests. The stakes are high. Russia is more than sufficiently powerful to create a host of costly—and even devastating—problems for the United States if Russian leaders believe that Washington has a hostile, or casual, disregard for Russian national interests and priorities. This is true even though most in Russia’s elite recognize that today’s Russia is not sufficiently strong to challenge American global leadership without the support of other major powers.

#### Causes global war

**Weitz, 11** - senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor (Richard, “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?” November, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Conversely, a Russia relatively weaker to the United States would have less capability to challenge the United States but can provide less assistance for realizing common U.S.-Russian goals. A weaker Russia may also find it harder to control its WMD assets and become vulnerable to external predators not friendly to the United States (e. g.. China and Iran). But in all probability Russia will still have sufficiently strong nuclear forces to ward off external threats. Most worrisome, a Russian leadership that perceived Russia on a slope toward protracted decline might feel compelled to take drastic measures, internally and externally, to reverse its descent. The German Empire, Imperial Japan, and other great powers in the 20th century attempted to reverse their feared decline in ways that helped precipitate disastrous global wars.

#### No impact to the alliance

Anthony **DiFilippo**, Prof. Sociology at Lincoln University, **2002**, The Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security Transitions in a Changing International Environment, pg. 13

One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the fifty years that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold War, other serious destabilizing forces have appeared despite the continued existence of the bilateral alliance. The Korean War, which began in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into effect in 1952. The alliance did not prevent China from developing nuclear weapons-hardly a stabilizing event in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or end the Vietnam War. More recently, the U.S.-Japan security alliance did not stop the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from beginning a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, thwart Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching a projectile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the bilateral alliance in effect for decades, China went ahead with nuclear testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclear powers.

#### Japan won’t abandon the alliance – shared vital interests and perceived common threats – makes sustained cooperation inevitable

**Sang-ho, 9/7**/12 Song, “US-Japan alliance grows for Asia-Pacific security balance,” Korea Herald, http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=33084&sec=1

On the surface, the alliance between the US and Japan appears to have worsened in recent years due to a long-standing controversy over the relocation of the Futenma airbase in Okinawa.

But this would not undermine the core of the alliance between the two countries that share security interests and values of democracy, and take initiatives against global terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, experts pointed out.

“People should not misconstrue a long-running local dispute over how to close one Marine air base with the durability and capability of that vital alliance,” said Patrick M. Cronin, senior director of the Asia Programme at the Centre for a New American Security.

After the Democratic Party of Japan took power in 2009, ending a half-century of almost unbroken conservative rule, the alliance appeared to have deteriorated with the Tokyo leadership pursuing a closer yet “equal” relationship.

But it has apparently re-prioritised its relationship with Washington as it recognised growing security challenges from China and North Korea.

Amid its strategic pivot toward Asia, the US is likely to escalate its calls for the Asian ally to contribute more to maintaining stability in the region.

Japan also wanted to increase its military role in the region and beyond. But it has been fettered by the pacifist constitution.

The law prohibits Japan from going to war and having any potential war materials, and engaging in collective defence action, which makes it difficult to help support its ally US even if it is attacked. Right-wingers have sought to rewrite the law or tried to alter the interpretation of it to expand the role of the Self-Defence Forces.

The deepening of the military alliance is also crucial for Tokyo, which has been engaged in an increasingly strident territorial disputes with Beijing over a set of islands in the East China Sea, which are called Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.

#### Abe’s election solidified the alliance – mutual defense interests overwhelm

**AFP, 12/19/**12 “Hawk's comeback raises hope in U.S. for closer defense ties”

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121219a8.html>)

The return of conservative Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has raised hopes in Washington for closer security ties, although U.S. officials hope he keeps a lid on his more strident views.

Abe is a champion of revising the post-World War II pacifist Constitution and may take shorter-term steps such as boosting defense spending and allowing greater military cooperation with the United States

His Liberal Democratic Party, which ruled almost continuously from 1955 until 2009, roared back Sunday with a crushing victory over the Democratic Party of Japan, which Abe accused of harming relations with the United States.

President Barack Obama's relations with DPJ-led governments substantially improved after early friction, but Abe is seen as more supportive of U.S. force deployments and has vowed no compromise with China in the row over the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Michael Green, senior vice president for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Abe's victory is a "net positive" for the United States and could end up stabilizing Japan-China ties.

### more

**No CCP collapse**

**Yuan, 11** – associate professor and acting director of the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney (12/20, Jingdong, “The Arab Spring and China's Evolving Middle East Policy,” World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10992/the-arab-spring-and-chinas-evolving-middle-east-policy?page=1)

While Beijing has its concerns over the Arab Spring and its potentially infectious impacts on social and economic stability in China, there are strong reasons to believe that any imminent threat to Communist Party rule remains minimal and manageable. First, in most Middle Eastern countries, the autocratic ruler has personally reigned for decades and has instilled a political order that is typically repressive and nonrepresentative. The lack of any meaningful political participation provides ample frustration and is one of the principal reasons behind the various uprisings. By contrast, although China remains under one-party rule, managed term limits and an institutionalized leadership succession have been put in place. Second, there is a major difference between the Chinese economy and those of the Arab world. Chinese reforms over the past three decades have opened the country’s economy to the world, lifting hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty and creating a sizable middle class that is more interested in gains in personal welfare than in politics. By contrast, the stagnation in many Middle Eastern economies, despite plentiful resources and oil revenues, has infuriated ordinary citizens, especially the restless young, who find employment elusive. However, perhaps the most critical difference is that Beijing retains **total control over the military**, the paramilitary and the police forces, on whose loyalty it can count. Having learned the lessons of the 1989 Tiananmen student uprising, the Chinese authorities quickly introduced and enforced censorship of social media after the initial Arab unrest and were resolute in stopping any organized protests from growing into massive social movements. These actions contrast sharply with the militaries and security forces in countries such as Egypt and Libya, which either split or abandoned the regimes they were supposed to protect, leading to the fall of Mubarak and Gadhafi.

**No risk of U.S.-Russian war – Russia is not a threat**

**Bandow 08** (Doug, former senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former columnist with Copley News Service, 3/7. “Turning China into the Next Big Enemy.” http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=12472)

In fact, America remains a military colossus. The Bush administration has proposed spending $515 billion next year on the military; more, adjusted for inflation, than at any time since World War II. The U.S. accounts for roughly half of the world's military outlays. Washington is allied with every major industrialized state except China and Russia. America's avowed enemies are a pitiful few: Burma, Cuba, Syria, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea. The U.S. government could destroy every one of these states with a flick of the president's wrist. Russia has become rather contentious of late, but that hardly makes it an enemy. Moreover, the idea that Moscow could rearm, reconquer the nations that once were part of the Soviet Union or communist satellites, overrun Western Europe, and then attack the U.S. – without anyone in America noticing the threat along the way – is, well, a paranoid fantasy more extreme than the usual science fiction plot. The Leninist Humpty-Dumpty has fallen off the wall and even a bunch of former KGB agents aren't going to be able to put him back together.

### Shipbuilding

#### No impact to Korea war

Paul **Stares**, CFR Center for Preventive Action Director and Conflict Prevention Senior Fellow, 8/12/20**10**, “Handling Tensions on the Korean Peninsula," http://www.cfr.org/publication/22788/handling\_tensions\_on\_the\_korean\_peninsula.html, access 12/7/2010

Other than firing some coastal artillery and detaining a South Korean fishing boat that recently strayed into North Korea waters, Pyongyang has responded primarily with belligerent rhetoric and apocalyptic warnings. The recent ROK-U.S. naval exercises, for example, elicited threats of a "retaliatory sacred war." But by historical standards, such bombast is unexceptional. The recent North Korean provocations also pale in comparison to earlier attacks and skirmishes, most notably during the late 1960s when, among other things, the Blue House--South Korea's presidential residence--was attacked, or in the 1980s when the South Korean cabinet was bombed during a visit to Burma.

These far-worse periods of inter-Korean tensions never ignited another war, and the incentives to prevent this from happening are even greater today. South Korea fears losing its hard-won prosperity, while a much weaker North knows that it would never survive another major conflict.

#### No Africa war

**Barrett 5** – PhD Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary (6/1, Robert, SSRN Papers, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN\_ID726162\_code327511.pdf?abstractid=726162&mirid=1)

Westerners eager to promote democracy must be wary of African politicians who promise democratic reform without sincere commitment to the process. Offering money to corrupt leaders in exchange for their taking small steps away from autocracy may in fact be a way of pushing countries into anocracy. As such, world financial lenders and interventionists who wield leverage and influence must take responsibility in considering the ramifications of African nations who adopt democracy in order to maintain elite political privileges. The obvious reason for this, aside from the potential costs in human life should conflict arise from hastily constructed democratic reforms, is the fact that Western donors, in the face of intrastate war would then be faced with channeling funds and resources away from democratization efforts and toward conflict intervention based on issues of human security. This is a problem, as Western nations may be increasingly wary of intervening in Africa hotspots after experiencing firsthand the unpredictable and unforgiving nature of societal warfare in both Somalia and Rwanda. On a costbenefit basis, the West continues to be somewhat reluctant to get to get involved in Africa’s dirty wars, evidenced by its political hesitation when discussing ongoing sanguinary grassroots conflicts in Africa. Even as the world apologizes for bearing witness to the Rwandan genocide without having intervened, the United States, recently using the label ‘genocide’ in the context of the Sudanese conflict (in September of 2004), has only proclaimed sanctions against Sudan, while dismissing any suggestions at actual intervention (Giry, 2005). Part of the problem is that traditional military and diplomatic approaches at separating combatants and enforcing ceasefires have yielded little in Africa. No powerful nations want to get embroiled in conflicts they cannot win**–**especially those conflicts in which the intervening nation has very little interest.

#### Long timeframe – buffers outweigh

**Daily Press, 12** [Virginia Daily Press News, [http://www.dailypress.com/business/peninsula-businesses/dp-nws-shipyard-sequestration-20120625,0,7092747.story](http://www.dailypress.com/business/peninsula-businesses/dp-nws-shipyard-sequestration-20120625%2C0%2C7092747.story)]

[Newport News](http://www.dailypress.com/topic/us/virginia/newport-news-city/newport-news-%28newport-news-virginia%29-PLGEO100101184030000.topic) Shipbuilding has several years worth of work under contract, a buffer against the deep defense cuts that some defense contractors are bracing for in January, according to a company executive. But in the long run sequestration would take a toll on the yard. "I'm not in a hair-on-fire scenario today," shipyard president Matt Mulherin said in an interview with the Daily Press. [Daily Press Eyewitness: Submit photos and videos from your mobile device. Your picture could be featured on Page 2 of the Daily Press.](http://dailypress.com/eyewitness?track=online-inline)  "I have about five years of pretty steady work until the impacts of sequestration manifest themselves," he said.

#### Alt causes to the industry

**The Bulletin Panama News, 12 [**June 16th, “Shipping Industry running out of oxygen”, http://thebulletinpanama.com/shipping-industry-running-out-of-oxygen

Carriers are suffering big losses due to lower freight rates and the global crisis is showing itself among all low cost carriers. As an automatic response, companies must react to ensure their survival. The lines continue to suffer losses of millions of dollars, cargo volume decreases and conversely, fuel costs and expenses continue to rise. Those affected are taking steps to survive this crisis in the maritime industry that does not seem to have an end. Measures To fight the crisis, shipping companies are eliminating unprofitable routes and replacing them with direct calls by feeders and they have also signed agreements between two or more carriers to reduce their fleets, sharing the remaining ships. Another measure is to negotiate with shipyards to cancel shipbuilding contracts or delay delivery. A more complex plan is expected to improve cargo volumes and to reintroduce the fleet or impose “slow-steaming” (speed reduction) to consume less fuel. It is estimated that over 90% of goods and commodities passing around the planet are transported by sea, a peak international trade paradigm of globalization. Any variation in the overall economic parameters directly affects the global shipping industry. Impact With the current oversupply of vessels, carriers are competing for cargo and to make decent use of their storage capacity, trying to maintain the level of service. However, it is obvious that they are collecting less on freight rates. Today this is most pronounced because many carriers travel with much of their space empty. So if the shipping companies aim to optimize capacity of their vessels, they will have to adapt to a freight market and the low availability of all cargo to generate liquidity to fund the high daily operating cost. Major shipping lines have been affected by their business strategies in the wake of the crisis in 2008. With this continuing, there have been at least five world-class carriers which had to be rescued with state money or private injections. Something similar is happening in Asia where the three most important lines of Japan negotiated a merger. At some point there will be a reduction of existing carriers. A prestigious international consultant, who has remained anonymous, said that in the next 10 to 15 years about 12 shipping companies will disappear from the Top 20 world ranking.

#### No impact to shipbuilding

**White ‘7** (Robert, Senior Engineer in Ranges, Engineering, and Analysis Department @ Naval Sea Systems Command Division, Naval War College Review, “Globalization of Navy shipbuilding: a key to affordability for a new maritime strategy”, Autumn, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0JIW/is\_4\_60/ai\_n21107633/pg\_4/?tag=content;col1)

The commercial American shipbuilding industry is virtually nonexistent. What remains today is wholly dependent on a domestic market guaranteed by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (known as the Jones Act). (22) Though once competitive in the world market, U.S. industry no longer exports any vessels. (23) Today, commercial vessels can be built in South Korea for a third of the price of comparable ships built in the United States. (24) In fact, a Korean shipyard can deliver a new ship for what an American shipyard pays for steel alone. (25) The American military shipbuilding industry is concentrated in six shipyards run by two prime contractors. (26) Their sole customer is the U.S. Navy. As the Navy shrank from the eight-hundred-ship fleet of World War II to the roughly 280-ship fleet of today, the shipbuilding industry consolidated. Unfortunately, however, while the Navy modernized, industry fell behind. Facing no competition, U.S. shipyards became inefficient and outdated. Today's U.S. Navy combatants are highly sophisticated and more lethal than ever, yet they are constructed in essentially the same manner as they were sixty years ago. Instead of reinventing processes to remain competitive as foreign shipyards did, U.S. yards relied on "Buy American" legislation. Analysis completed in 2005 showed that Navy and industry initiatives are closing the productivity gap with foreign shipyards; (27) nonetheless, American shipyards remain fifteen years behind foreign peers. (28) Industry blames low and unstable production rates for high material costs and low productivity. But those factors have existed for sixty years. Moreover, toward the end of the Cold War the Defense Department recognized that military demand would no longer generate the economies of scale required for affordable production. The present emphasis on dual-use technology, relaxation of former requirements to use military-specification components where industry specifications are sufficient, and the preference for COTS items wherever possible have all been outgrowths of that realization. Unfortunately, their effectiveness has been limited by the segregation of U.S. shipbuilding between the commercial and military sectors. Few shipyards work in both. (29) Commercial shipbuilding, then, depends solely on protectionist legislation, and military shipbuilding hides conveniently behind national-security claims. The Department of Commerce states this claim succinctly: "It is essential that the capability and infrastructure needed to build these [military] ships is resident in the United States because it provides added assurance that they can be built, repaired, and maintained during times of conflict." (30) The problem with maintaining such a "surge" capability is twofold. First, as the Commerce Department freely admits, maintaining excess industrial capacity drives up cost and degrades competitiveness. Between 1997 and 2002 the cost of a surface combatant rose 30 percent above inflation; (31) in comparison, competition and overcapacity in shipyards on the world market drove the price of a new commercial vessel down 19 percent. (32) Second, the complexity of modern combatants renders a World War II-style mobilization entirely infeasible. (33) In fact, a three-to-five-year construction cycle means that a warship ordered at the beginning of a conflict is not likely to be available before the end. (34) Further, it is plainly unrealistic to believe that all foreign shipyards in friendly and allied countries "would simultaneously turn down revenues and deny access." (35) Finally, as early as 1988 the national security strategy recognized that defense industrial mobilization is not a unilateral matter but requires coordination between the United States and its allies. In the words of President Ronald Reagan, "Fortress America is an obsolete concept." (36)

#### The Navy is screwed

**Korb et al ‘8**

(Lawrence, (Senior Fellow @ Center for American Progress and Senior Advisor @ Center for Defense Information), Peter M. Juul, (Research Associate for National Security and International Policy @ CAP), Laura Conley, (Special Assistant for National Security and International Policy @ CAP), Myles B. Caggins, (Major in US Army and Military Fellow @ CAP), and Sean E. Duggan, (Research Associate for National Security and International Policy @ CAP), “Building a Military for the 21st Century New Realities, New Priorities”, December, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/12/pdf/military\_priorities.pdf)

The next president and defense secretary will face a mounting crisis in Navy shipbuilding; even doubling the Navy shipbuilding budget will not guarantee a future force equivalent to the current force. And making a strategic choice to focus on conventional or irregular warfare will not resolve the Navy’s shipbuilding problems. Both the incoming administration and the Navy will be forced to make hard choices about the Navy’s future fleet. They will need to make budgetary sacrifices in certain areas in order to properly fund priorities. No matter which route the next administration chooses, it is likely that the size of the Navy’s fleet will shrink rather than grow in size.

#### No reverse causal—we have excess capacity and allied production solves

**DHS 2002** – Department of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Digital Library, internal study, “2002 Industry Studies: Shipbuilding”, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=451875)

Overcapacity¶ The US shipbuilding and repair industry has significant excess capacity, both in¶ commercial and military ship production. In the case of military ships, this is the result¶ of an industrial base sized to meet the needs of a 600-ship Cold War Navy. Despite¶ significant defense industry consolidations, the current big six shipyards possess an¶ industrial capacity that far exceeds the demands of the current low rate of US military¶ ship production. While the US shipbuilding industry possesses sufficient capacity to¶ meet the requirements of military shipbuilding for the foreseeable future, the¶ overcapacity represents an overhead that is costly and that may not be necessary.¶ In the case of commercial ship production, US shipyards possess significant¶ unused capacity, despite substantial shipyard closings and consolidations. The US¶ commercial shipbuilding industry lacks competitiveness internationally in the¶ construction of large ships (crude oil tankers, bulk tankers, liquefied natural gas carriers¶ and container ships). US commercial ship production is limited to the niche markets and¶ markets protected from international competition by the Jones’ Act. The challenge for¶ US shipbuilding is to develop a competitive advantage in technologically advanced¶ commercial shipbuilding, as it has in military shipbuilding.¶ Overseas shipyards face similar challenges created by unused capacity. This state¶ of affairs will further reduce the ability of US shipyards to compete internationally. The¶ rapid ascent of Korea as a world leader in commercial ship production and increasing¶ Chinese shipbuilding market share has reduced profit margins and resulted in a worldwide¶ industrial overcapacity in the international shipbuilding industry. The Organization¶ for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates international¶ overcapacity will range from 16 to 29 percent by 2005.¶ The resulting high levels of world production in 2001 and 2002 further depressed¶ price levels. Additionally, because of the high level of construction in 2000, orders for¶ container ships, bulk carriers and cruise ships have dropped significantly. Increasingly,¶ Japanese and Korean shipbuilders are focusing on the higher technology shipbuilding,¶ such as liquid natural gas carriers, for future growth and market share.¶ Productivity¶ Productivity within the US industry lags because of its lack of investment in new¶ technologies and its inability to retain skilled production workers. US shipyards vary in¶ standards of cleanliness and condition and organization of materials. Overseas shipyards¶ generally have a higher degree of automation.¶ Information technology is used to varying degrees in different shipyards. Many¶ still rely on a wide range of hardware, software and operating systems that store data in¶ disparate databases. Different information systems are used for different aspects of¶ design and manufacturing as well as for administrative functions such as personnel and¶ financial management. Automated manufacturing processes are mostly stand-alone¶ systems with no digital connectivity to overall process. In most cases, suppliers of¶ components use different systems with no connectivity to the shipyard. Great scope¶ exists for increasing productivity through investment in information technology.¶ The industry also has inadequate workforce skills required for job productivity.¶ In some areas, there is surplus labor, in others shortfalls. More than two thirds of the US¶ shipbuilders reported labor shortfalls, primarily in their production workforce. The¶ industry has a high turnover rate, particularly amongst the newcomers, and is facing a¶ major exodus of baby boomers in the near future. As demands for new ships are¶ inconsistent, it is difficult for managers to keep employees working fulltime. The work is¶ dull, dirty and dangerous and requires intensive training. The high turnover rate¶ increases production costs as managers recruit and train new employees and¶ accommodate their learning curve on the job.

## 2nc

### saudi

**No Chinese replacement**

**Stares et al 2012** – \*General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention, Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations, \*\*PhD and Chair of the Department of Political Science, University of Vermont, \*\*\*Assistant Professor, History, Rutgers University (1/25, Paul Stares, F. Gregory Gause III, Toby Jacobs, Council on Foreign Relations, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East”, transcript, http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/saudi-arabia-new-middle-east/p27205, WEA)

**The Chinese aren't a reasonable alternative** to the U.S. The Chinese can't project kind of military power, the political will to do the sorts of things that the U.S. has historically been willing to do. But at the same time, as Judith pointed out, the U.S. doesn't have a Middle East policy. We don't have a clear approach. We don't know what our priorities are, and Andrew has said the same thing in multiple settings, right, that you know, it's kind of ad hoc; it's convoluted. Are we committed to democracy at this point, or are we a status quo power ourselves? Is Iran going to shape our policy, or it is going to be some combination of things?
I think the Saudis understand very clearly, perhaps better than most, the uncertainty that characterizes the American position. And that activism that I think you've correctly identified -- and I think Greg's right, too; it has its roots elsewhere but -- is partly a reflection of a power in the Middle East that's got a lot of resources. It's got a lot of money, even if it's convoluted, to be able to attempt to shape outcomes.

**Relations irrelevant – the Saudis are incompetent at foreign policy**

**Smith, 9/5**/11 - visiting fellow at Hudson Institute (Lee, The Weekly Standard, 9/5, “The Little Emirate that Could,” http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=8274&pubType=HI\_opeds)

The same might be said about the rest of the region, for as the Arab Spring has made evident, the Arab political system is moribund. Even before Egypt unraveled in the wake of Mubarak's downfall, the regime was static and loath to exercise the sort of positive influence that might have put it in conflict with radical actors like Iran and Syria. The Saudis are comatose, a ruling order whose chief concern is succession, and the king, crown prince, and his likely successor are all ailing. Riyadh has expressed its displeasure with the Obama administration, but as botched Saudi strategy in Iraq and Lebanon shows, the notion that the Saudi establishment is capable of crafting a coherent foreign policy is a fantasy.

**Security interests**

**Lippman, 12** [January, “Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Uncertain Future of an American Ally”, journalist and author, specializing in the [Middle East](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East) and [US](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States)-[Saudi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia) relations.[[1]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Lippman#cite_note-Mideasti-0) Lippman graduated form [Columbia University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Columbia_University). Lippman spent more than 30 years with the [Washington Post](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Post) as a writer, editor and diplomatic correspondent,[[2]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Lippman#cite_note-SUSRIS-1) also serving as the Middle East [bureau](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/News_bureau) chief for the Washington Post.[[3]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Lippman#cite_note-PBS-2) Lippman currently serves as an adjunct scholar at the [Middle East Institute](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_East_Institute), p. the Google books]

The strength and durability of the alliance can be seen in the fact that it has weathered **crises** and disputes that might have caused a long-term rupture between countries less **firmly entwined**: the disappointment of King Abdul Aziz and the fury of his most trusted son. Faisal, over President Truman`s recognition of lsrael in l948; the Arab oil embargo prompted by U.S. support for Israel in the 1973 Middle East War; American outrage over Saudi participation in the terror attacks on New York and the Pentagon on September ll, 2001; and Saudi anger at the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which in Riyadh's view strengthened **Iran and Shia Islam** at Saudi expense. (King Abdullah shocked Washington with a 2007 speech at an Arab summit conference that denounced the "illegitimate foreign occupation" oflraq.) When Barack Obama became president in january 2009, he inherited a bilateral relationship deeply strained by Saudi resentment over the policies of his predecessor, George VV. Bush, especially Buslfs ill-atlvisctl and ill-fated effort to move Saudi Arabia toward political liberalization as the price of continued U.S. friendship. Saudi A|';\l1ia`s association with the events of 9/'ll brought to the surface a deep reservoir of popular antipathy in the United States. An outpouring, of books. articles, political speeches, and movies excoriated thc kingdom for its support of religious extremism and its dismal human rights record. During the extremist insurgency that began in 2003, thousands of Americans \vho had been living in Saudi Arabia left because of the rising security threat, n threat that was exaggerated hy hair-raising warnings from the State Department. The Saudi insurgency also coincided with a rising Arab wave of anti-American sentiment over the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Those years represented one of the **darkest periods** in the history of the alliance. Yet even then, there was **no prospect** of an outright **rupture** between Washington and Riyadh because neither side wanted or could afford such a development. The United States needed the Saudis' cooperation in the war on terrorism and in cutting off the flow of money to extremist groups. And Saudi Arabia continued to rely on the United States to confront the threat from the kingdom's most powerful rival, Iran. Differences over Iraq and the Israeli-Palestiiiiam question could not be allowed to interfere with those strategic realities. The Final Re/fort of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, popularly known as T/ae 9/ll Commission Report and issued in 2004, gave Bush the political cover he needed to rebuild the relationship whcn ir "found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually" funded the al-Qaeda networl<."˜ The commission did not absolvc the Saudi government from responsibility for creating an zitmospliere in which al-Qaetla could flourish and noted that individual Saudi citizens had been financial backers of the organization. The Bush administration and thc Saudi govcrnmcnt, llowcvcr. chose to emphasize the report's positive findings as they strove to repair the damage done by the 9/ll attacks. By the end of his second term, Bush had retreated from his efforts to dcmoeratize the Middle East, and on a last trip to Riyadh in May 2008 he signed a new package of bilateral agreements, including a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia develop civilian nuclear energy. The White Housc's fact sheet describing the results ofthe presid::nt's visit said the agreements "further cement the longstanding U.S.-Saudi friendship and close cooperation to help bring peace and stability to the region and its people." liven in the darkest days, the extensive bilateral business relationships remained in place. American companies lowered their profile in the kingdom, but Saudi Arabia retained its standing as the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East. Although Bush worked hard in his last few years as president to pull the bilateral relationship back from the brink of disintegration, there was a palpable sense of relief in Riyadh \vhen his presidency ended. ()l"l"IM ISM A BOUT (IBA MA Saudi Arabia regarded President Obama optimistically, if only because he was IIOI Bush, and Obama set out almost immetliately upon becoming president to restore harmony to the relationship. On his first trip to the Middle East, he first stopped in Riyadh and mer with King Abdullah before heading to Cairo to deliver his landmark speech about U.S. relations with the Muslim world. The Saudis appreciated the gesture, but Obama's relations with Aladullah got off to a rocky start when the president, who was poorly briefed, asked the king for unilateral gestures of goodwill toward Israel, such as extending to Israeli aircraft the right to fly over Saudi airspace. As was predictable, the king rebuffed the president. The Saudis' position is that they crafted, and persuaded all members of the League of Arab States to endorse. a comprehensive peace offer based on Israe1`s return to its pre-1967 borders. They feel they have no obligation to do more. Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal said as much a year later, after meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Washington the eve of f\bdullah's return visit. "The question is not what the Arab world will offer-that has been established: an end to the conflict, recognition, and full normal relations as exist between countries at pence," he said. "The question really is: what \vill Israel give in exchange for this comprehensive offer?" But the prince also declared, "Our two nations have been friends and allies for over seven decades. We have seen the coming and breaking of many storms. Over time, the relationship has grown stronger, broader, and deeper. And our discussion today reflected the |I`li\[ll|'l[}' of this relationship. lt was frank, honest and open-just as it should be among friends." The open differences over policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are hardly new; indeed, they have been part of the bilateral discussion since Roost-velt's meeting with Abdul Aziz. The deep **economic and strategic ties** between the two countries remain in place despite those differences, as they always have. But the U.S.-Saudi relationship will never be what it was at its height in the 19805 because the kingdom and \vorld around it have changed. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the (lold War eliminated a cornerstone of the alliance. The threat that had united Washington and Riyadh against Egypt's Nasser and other pro-Soviet Arab nationalists. against (fuhan influence in Africa, against the Santlinistas in Nicaragua, and finally against the Soviet Union itself in Afghanistan vaporizetl with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Now the only common enemy facing the United States and the Saudi regime. other than Iran, is Islamic radicalism, which is dangerous to both but an existential threat to neither. The end of the communist threat and the discrediting ofsecular Arab nationalism have liberated Saudi Arabia to stake out positions different from those ofthe United States on several international issues. including the Israeli-Palestinian question and Iraq, and to find new arms suppliers, including Russia. In domestic terms, Saudi Arabia is a grown-up country now and is no longer tlepcntlent on Americans for its industrial development. After half a century of American tutelage, Saudi Arabia no longer needs Americans to operate its oil industry, construct its buildings, fly its airplanes, or staff its hospitals. The years when Saudi government agencies were staffed by American civil servants, through contracts inanaged by the U.S. Treasury Department, ended in 2000, because the Saudis decided that the arrangement had outlived its usefulness. Saudi Arabia is xx member of the World Trade Organization and the only Arab state in the G-20 group of economically developed countries. It has options in economic affairs that it did I`l()l' have when the Americans were making most of the decisions, as evidenced by the rapid rise ol' its trade with (fhina, South Korea, and other Asian countries. ln 2009 for the first time Saudi Arabia exported more oil to China than it did to the United States. It has financed the construction of refineries in China that can process the heavy crude that American refiners do not want. Saudi r\rahia`s quest for assured markets and reliable long-term customers fits neatly' with China's need for ever-greater supplies. Chinese construction contractors can bc found all across Saudi Arabia, even in Mecca, where they have constructed a monorail to facilitate pilgrimage tra ffic. In trade volume, the United States remains Saudi Arabia's biggest partner. but its share of the market is declining while (Ihina's has more than doubled, rising from 4.| percent in 2000 to 9.6 percent at the cntl of 2007.5 Saudi officials have become frequent visitors to China and vice versa. King Abr.|ullal1`s first foreign trip after he assumed the throne was to China. ln short, n country \vith which Saudi Arabia refused to have any contact whatsoever before thc late 1980s because it was communist has become a major. growing trade partncr and at cornerstone of Saudi Arabiafs industrialization plans. TIIE CHINA SYNDR()ME So wide and deep have the economic links between Saudi Arabia and China become over the past tleeade that some American and European analysts predict that China will supplant the United States as the kingdoms principal security guarantor. To cite just one example, two analysts at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in Dubai wrote in April 2010 that "the pendulum is clearly shifting toward the Chinese camp. In time, as the Kingdnm's economic tics grow firmer with China, their military relationship will expand. As China's milira ry power comes to match its political and economic power globally, it will become Saudi Arabizfs strongest military ally." 'l`here is a certain superficial logic to such arguments. An alliance with China could be appealing to Saudi Arabia because China, like the United States, is a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security (founeil. Because of (Il1ina`s need for oil, it also has an abiding interest in maintaining stability in the Gulf. lt has been expanding its armed forces, especially its navy, while the United States has been bogged down in Iraq and Afglianistan. lr does not harangue its trading partners about their human rights policies or religious preferences. lt has no history of colonial interference in the Middle East and no territorial ambitions in the region. lt carries none of the Israeli baggage that makes dependence on Washington a political liability for the Saudi rulers. Nevertheless, Chinn is not about to assume the principal role in securing the (Â§ulf's stability, or the unique responsibility for the security of Saudi Arabia, that the United States has held for decades, China has neither the capability not the desire to do so, Its economic ties to Saudi Arabia match its economic ties to Iran, and it is reluctant to jeopardize either relationship. China has massive security concerns right in its own neighborhood, with Taiwan, North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, and Tibet. As japan did in an carlier era, it can reap economic benefits from all around the (iulf, including Iran, without having to assume responsibility for maintaining order. China is not going to match the 230,000 members of the U.S. armed forces, equipped with the most sophisticated aircraft, ships, and weapons, that the United States maintains in the area of CENTCOME responsibility, which includes the Gulf and South Asia." There is no prospect that China will develop zi carrier-based tlect and station it in Bahrain to patrol the (iulf, as the United States does. Nor can it easily supplant seven decades of American influence with the Saudi armed forces, painstakingly constructed through training, operational cooperation, and shared experiences such as the |991 (iulfWar. As Library of Congress researchers reported to Congress in late 2009. "The United Sutes has long been Saudi Arabia`s leading arms supplier. From |950 through 2006, Saudi Arabia purchased and received from the United States weapons. military equipment, and related services through Foreign Military Sales worth over $62.7 billion and foreign military construction services worth over $17.1 billion (figures in historical doll;lrs.)"Â° President Bush in his second term added millions more, and the Obama administration, in office less than a year at the time of that report, had already notified Congress of pending sales worth an additional $2 billion. More, much more, was soon to come. The only foreigners directly involved in securing internal stability within the kingdorn are Americans. Under bilateral agreements, the United States provides contractors to train and equip the National Guard and the Interior Ministry's new Facilities Security Force. It would take decades for China to achieve a similar position in Saudi Ar;\lvi;1`s security apparatus, even if it were so inclined. Alarmist essays hy academics notwithstanding, there is scant evidence that the people in the U.S. government who are responsible for the eountry's national security feel urgent concern about a possible Chinese threat to U.S. strategic dominance in the Gulf region. ln the National Security Strategy document issued hy the White House in May 2010, for instance, the word "China" does not even appear in the section covering the Middle East." The l'cntagon's "Quadrennial Defense Review," issued in February 2010, notes that "as part of its long-term, comprehensive military modernization, China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization programs, raising a number of legitirnatc questions regarding its long-term intentions." It also says, however; that "the United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances." It adds that China`s newfound economic interests in the Middle East might turn out to be a positive development if Beijing pursues stability and long-term security there." A few months after publication of the "Quadrennial Defense Review," the Pentagon sent to Congress its annual report on Chinese military capabilities and national security policy, tl1e most comprehensive unclassified document available on the subject. lt noted the rapid escalation of China's military capability, including an expansion of its deep-sea navy and its missile arsenal. lt also said, l1o\.vever, that the (iliincsc buildup-and (fhincsc policy-are focused on regional concerns in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Strait of Malacca. The report also cited an expanding range and depth of (fhinese military cooperation with the United States and depicted China not as a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf but as an asset in promoting regional stability. "China's military engagement with other countries," such as its participation in the multinational antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. "seeks to enhance China`s national power by improving foreign relationships, bolstering its international image, and assuagin other countries' concerns about Cbina's rise," the report said." China is the beneficiary of a changing global energy picture and of the ambitions ofa rising class of Saudi entrepreneurs looking for new opportunities. China's development of su hstantial economic ties to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region need not be detrimental to the United States or to the U.S.-Saudi relationship. On the contrary, it gives China incentive ro help the United States stave off instability all around the Gulf. PRESERVING THE REGIME This entire discussion assumes, of course, that the House of Saud will continue to rule the kingdom. All the sons who have followed King Abdul Aziz on the throne have upheld, \vitb varying degrees of enthusiasm, the alliance that he forged. None ofthe potential successors to King Abdullah, in his generation or the next, would be likely to break away. If some other person or group were to come ro power in Riyadh, thc alliance could well come to an end. After ovcrthrowing their monarcllies. Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, Libya in 1969, and Iran in 1979 all jcrrisoncd their alignments with Western Countries. Given the widespread unpopularity ofthe United States in the Arab world, any new regime in Saudi Arabia might follow that pattern, especially if that new rulcr came from an Islamist movement. A rupture would not necessarily be total unless the new ruler or rulers came from the most radical fringe of Islamic extremism, but a new regime might well believe that its legitimacy would he enhanced if it developed new security arrangements that were less dependent on Washington. The often-expressed fear in the West of an oil cutoff is unfounded, Anyone running Saudi Arabia. regardless of ideology, will have to sell oil in the global market because the country has no other way to pay for food or to support the state. In any case, for reasons explained in chapter l, there is no reason to think that any such upheaval is on the horizon in Saudi Arabia. Critics ofthe Saudi regime have been predicting its downfall ever since Abdul Aziz`s death in 1953, and it has not yet come close to happening. There is no domestic or external threat visible today that could bring an end to Al-Saud rule. lt is a truism of intelligence work that "you don't know what you <lon't kno\v"-nobody had hczlrd ofGam:1l Abdel Nasser before the Egyptian revolution-but the House of Saud seems to be in full control. Therefore, the U.S.-Saudi alliance, which is crucial to both countries. is likely to continue, and to continue evolving, as it has for several decades. That evolution is likely to be based on ad hoc and informal arrangements rather than on any forn1al,tre;1ty-based mutual defense commitment. When the possihility that Iran might acquire nuclear weapons became part of (iulf regional security calculations several years ago, one concern that naturally arose in Washington was that it might ignite il regional nuclear arms race, in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others might take part. ln addition to thinking about how to deter or dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, analysts began to consider how to avert a rush by other countries to match it if Iran broke through to nuclear warhead dcliverability. Think tank-sponsored conferences and papers offered one answer: The United States should formally bring friendly countries in the region under its protection and create a Persian Gulf version ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The idea was that sheltering Saudi Arabia and other friendly states under what is kno\vn as the U.S. nuclear umbrella would convincc rhcm rhcy did nor need to acquire such weapons on their own and scare off any potential attackers. NATO members that might have developed nuclear weapons-in particular, Germany and Turkey-refrained from doing so and adhered to thc Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because they wcrc under the U.S. umbrella. japan followed the same course in Asia. Obamafs secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, took this concept from the theoretical into the possible in 2009. When asked about Iran during a news conference in Thailand, she said, We will hold the door open [to lrnnl, but we also have made it clear that we`ll take actions, as l'vc said time and again, crippling actions working to upgrade the defense of our partners in the region. \Ve want Iran to calculate what I think is a fair assessment, that ifthc United States extends a dcfcnsc unilwrella over the region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in the Gulf, it's unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer, because they \\fon't be able to intimidate and dominate, as they apparently believe they can, once they have a nuclear weapon." l-ler remarks were widely interpreted as a signal that thc Obama administration was contemplating the sort of defense treaty initiative that had been the subject of academic speculation in the past about opening the "nuclear umbrella" over friendly Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. But Clinton did not use the word "nuclear" and with good reason. A commitment to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Saudi Arabia would require a treaty and its ratification by the Senate. Having been a senator, Clinton surely knew that such a development is highly unlikely if not out ofthe question. Given the low esteem in which many Americans hold Saudi Arabia, it would be extremely difficult politically for any president to sign such a treaty or for any senator to vote for it. The Saudis know that. They stopped asking for a formal mutual defense treaty long ago. Instead, they have settled for American support that has included arms sales, military training, public statements, consultations, and troop deployments when necessary, in Operation Desert Shield after Iraq`s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Saudis know that. They stopped asking for a formal mutual defense treaty long ago. Instead, they have settled for American support that has included arms sales, military training, public statements, consultations, and rroop deployments when necessary, in Operation Desert Shield after Iraq`s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. When Congress authorized military assistance to Middle East countries in 1950, President Truman formally declared that military aid to Saudi Arabia was "essential" to American national security. "ln making this determination," his statement said, "I find that (I) the strategic location of Saudi Arabia makes it of direct importance to the defense ofthe Near East area, (2) the assistance to be furnished is of critical importance to the defense of free nations, and (3) the immediately increased ability of Saudi Arabia to defend itself is important to the preservation ofthe peace and security ofthe Near East area, and to the security of the United States."""˜ Every subsequent president has taken more or less the same position, without the formality of a mutual defense treaty. President Obama has followed the template. On October 20, 2010, the Obama administration notified Congress of plans for a major new arms sale to Saudi Arabia, probably the biggest ever once all transactions are completed over the next decade or so, with a potential value of S60 billion. Congress can disapprove such transactions, and there bad been strong objections to previous proposed sales to Saudi Arabia because of its hostility to Israel. To ga uge sentiment in advance of the formal notification, the Obama administration briefed members of key committees and their staffs and leaked information about thc planned sale to the news media. Only token opposition surfaced, and by the time of formal notification, officials at the Pentagon and the State Department were convinced that the deal would be atlproved. as indeed it was. That Obama would send this arms sale notification to Congress less than t\vo weeks before his party faced mid-term elections, \vhich polls indicated would not go well, was a sure sign that 9/ll was off the table as a political issue. Saudi Arabia`s campaign over the previous nine years to sanitize its reputation had succeeded to the point where Obama and his advisers did not fear preeleetion accusations of being soft on terrorism. On Capitol Hill, it was clear to IHOSI legislators and to staff members of the relevant committees that the arms sale was a matter of Gulf security and the presumed threat from Iran and that it did not pose any danger to Israel. Absent compelling reasons to do otherwise, members of Congress tend to favor arms sales because they mean jobs for American workers and reduce the overall per-unit cost of developing weapons systems for the U.S. armed forces. In its official notification to Congress about the planned Saudi sale, the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency listed the contractors that would manufacture the weapons and aircraft to be delivered. It included such defense industry giants as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, General Electric, and Sikorsky Aircraft. The hardware package included: I 84 F-15A combat icts and upgrades of the kingd0m's existing flcct of 70 F-155 fighters to the F-15A configuration, with additional capabilities I 190 helicopters, including 66 Apaches and Black Hawks I 6,568 surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, and air-to-air missiles, such as Harpoons, Siclcwindcrs, high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMS), and Hellfire lls I assorted boinbs, machine guns, and cannons I radar and air detection equipment and night vision gear ln addition, hundreds of Americans, both active-duty military personnel and contractors, would be deployed to Saudi Arabia for years to supervise the delivery and installation ofthe aircraft and weapons. From \Vasl1ington's perspective, these transactions could ha vc several benefits beyond the assembly-line jobs they would generate. They could reinforce the ability of an important ally to defend itself and strengthen that ally`s need to stay on good terms with the United States. They could discourage Iranian adventurism in the region and help Saudi Arabia secure itself against troublesome infiltration from Yemen. And they could give \V/ashington more leverage than it already has in discouraging any ambitions Saudi Arabia might develop to follow Iran down the road to nuclear weapons. Technically the sale will he made in four separate packages to the air force; the army; the National Guard, which is the principal domestic security force; and the Royal Guard, an army regiment assigned to protect the filling family, Each piece, the Pentagon said in its notification documents, "will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States hy helping to improve the security ofa friendly country \vhicl1 has been and continues to he an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle l3ast."" "We welcome S;1uÂ¢.liArabi;1`s decision to continue to strategically align itself with the United States," Assistant Defense Secretary Alexander Vershhow said at ar briefing for reporters. "If approved, this program will bc implemented over 15 to Z0 years, which means that our defense bond with the Saudis \vill only continue to grow deeper and stronger." "We are undertaking this sale because it supports our wider regional security goals in the Gulf by deepening our security relationship \vith a key partner \vith \Vl]0|Tl wc'vc enjoyed a solid security relationship for nearly 7() years," Assistant Secretary of State Andrew J. Shapiro said at the same briefing. He said the planned sale "will send a strong message to countries in the region that we are committed to support thc security of our key partners and allies in the Arabian (iulfand the broader Middle East. And it \vil| enhance Saudi Arabia`s ability to dctcr and defend against threats to its borders and to its oil infrastructure, which is critical to our economic interests." The sale is "not solely about lran," Vcrshlvow said. The Saudis "live in a dangerous neighborhood, and we`re helping them preserve and protect their security in a dangerous neighborhood against legitimate security threats." ""˜ Neither Shapiro nor Vershbow addressed the question of whether the Saudis are capable of using such weapons effectively or even keeping them operational. Defense contractors who have lived in the kingdom and worked with its armed forces have told me that the Saudis are chronically deficient in maintenance and operational readiness, but those issues have not been a deterrent to equipment sales. William Hartung, director ofthe Arms and Security Initiative of the New America Foundation, was one of the few voices raised in opposition to the latest proposed sale. "ls the Middle East really suffering from a dearth of advanced weaponry?" he asked. "ln addition, how stable is Saudi Arabia? In the shon run, there may be no maior cause for concern, but the combat planes, helicopters, missiles, and bombs that are part of the deal will last for decades. Would anyone have predicted in the mid-19705 that the heavily armed regime of the Shah of Iran would be toppled by a group of Islamic fundamentalists?" " No, few predicted thc Iranian regime change, but the position ofthe House of Sand is not comparable to that of the shah, as explained in chaptcr 1. And in any case, the gamble to which Hartung obiected is the same one that the United States has been making since the Truman administration. A self-confident Saudi Arabia, equipped \vith weapons powerfull enough to help keep peace in the Gulf but not powerful enough to threaten Israel or, in the unlikely event of a change in regime, to thrcatcn the United States, is much more of an asset than it is a potential liability. Thus this combination of longterm U.S, commitment and ad hoc implemelltution can be expected to continue indefinitely. security issues that had soured the relationship in the 1990s had been resolved. As the threat of terrorist violence has receded, U.S. diplomats and other officials assigned to the kingdom arc again permitted to take their families with them, and the length of their tours has been restored to two years instead of one. Embassy personnel are leaving their secure but isolated building in increasing numbers to interact with the local population. Student and business visas-which after 9/l l had been virtually shut off, to the anger of Saudis \vho considered themselves longtime friends ofthe United Statesarc once again available. "And we have not compromised security at all," Smith said." He omitted any mention of the long-running struggle to have Saudi Arabia toughen its policy on those who export funds to extremist groups, a lingering irritant in the bilateral relationship. (See chapter S.) The dramatic events that transformed the Arab world in the \VlI`lI("˜|' of 2011, howeven brought new tensions over new issues. The Saudis felt that the United States contributed to the humiliation of their longtime ally, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. They also resented American criticism of their decision to intervene **in Bahrain**. And they were angry after Secretary Clinton gave a speech at :J conference in Qatar in which she criticized corrupt Arab leaders. ln this spat, the Saudis actually declined to receive Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates. They soon relented on Gates, \Vl1() visited Riyadh, and welcomed a week later Obama's national security adviser, Tom Donilon. I was in Riyadh at the time of l)onilon's visit. While my conversations with Saudis and Americans alike clearly indicated that the countries` **disagreements were serious**, they would not threaten the fundamental strategic and economic relationship because **each country continued to need the other.** A few weeks earlier, the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council had reported that the volume of bilateral trade reached $43 billion in 2010, or a 3| percent increase from the year before, as the global economy began rccovcring from recession. Cooperation in combating terrorism continued without interruption. Obviously at radical t|';1nsfn|'mation ofthe government of Saudi Arabia would shatter this harmony, but there is no reason to expect any such devclopmcnt and nobody in \Vashi|1gton can plan for it. For hcttcr or for worse, the United States and Saudi Arabia are closely intertwined on matters of defsnse and security. 1\S(|lt'}' have been for nearly seven decades. Whatever the outcome of Saudi Arabiafs long-term economic restructuring, its educational reform, and its social evolution, the kingdom can pursue those emleavors sc\*cure in the knowledge that it can do so largely undisturbed by external threats to its pcacc and sccurity. As long as oil is the fuel of the global economy, the United States will see to Saudi Arabia's security.

### 2nc overview

#### Turns any short-term investment

Malone 11 Scott is a Reuters writer. “Analysis: Corporate America sweats as U.S. nears fiscal cliff,” 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-usa-economy-fiscalcliff-idUSBRE88P1PX20120927

Top U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years - and a key reason is fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. The uncertainty, coupled with slowing demand in Asia and Europe, is forcing corporate leaders to postpone decisions on major investments and hiring, and hurting sales of everything from textbooks to telephone lines. "If we don't deal with the fiscal cliff and don't deal with predictability on taxes for both citizens and business, with the rest of the world in a struggling state, this is really bad for us," John Chambers, CEO of network equipment maker Cisco Systems Inc (CSCO.O), told Reuters on Tuesday. Some 34 percent of U.S. CEOs plan to cut jobs in the United States over the next six months, up from 20 percent a quarter ago, according to a Business Roundtable survey released on Wednesday. Only 30 percent plan to raise capital spending, compared with 43 percent previously. The group's index of CEO confidence fell to its lowest point since the third quarter of 2009, when the United States had just emerged from its worst recession in 80 years. The main culprit is the fiscal cliff -- Washington's self-imposed year-end deadline to agree on a plan to shrink the federal budget or trigger $600 billion in spending cuts and higher taxes that were put in place last summer. The sharpest pain would be felt by the defense and healthcare sectors, which face direct funding cuts. But any resulting slowdown could send shockwaves across the economy.

#### Turns energy access and global governance

**Tilford 2008** – PhD in history from George Washington University, served for 32 years as a military officer and analyst with the Air Force and Army (Earl, “Critical mass: economic leadership or dictatorship”, Cedartown Standard, lexis)

Could it happen again? Bourgeois democracy requires a vibrant capitalist system. Without it, the role of the individual shrinks as government expands. At the very least, the dimensions of the U.S. government economic intervention will foster a growth in bureaucracy to administer the multi-faceted programs necessary for implementation. Bureaucracies, once established, inevitably become self-serving and self-perpetuating. Will this lead to “socialism” as some conservative economic prognosticators suggest? Perhaps. But so is the possibility of dictatorship. If the American economy collapses, especially in wartime, there remains that possibility. And if that happens the American democratic era may be over. If the world economies collapse, totalitarianism will almost certainly return to Russia, which already is well along that path in any event. Fragile democracies in South America and Eastern Europe could crumble. A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations—the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia—need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

#### Turns shipbuilding

**Washington Examiner, 6/21/12** (“Obama, Congress budget rift to cost another 1 million jobs,” Washingtonexaminer.com, June 21, 2012, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-congress-budget-rift-to-cost-another-1-million-jobs/article/2500307>)//AS

With defense contractors already drawing up preliminary walking papers for employees if President Obama and Congress can't cut a deal on the budget, a new report Thursday warned that failure to act will put over another 1 million out of work and raise the unemployment rate to 8.9 percent. The National Association of Manufacturers looked at the potential of slashing $500 billion from the Pentagon's budget over 10 years and found that the aerospace, shipbuilding and electronics industry will be crushed if the so-called budget sequester takes effect. What's more, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fl., today said that the impact will be felt long before the January sequester because most defense companies prepare their budget and staffing many months in advance. As a result, he said, it is likely that job cuts will start to hit in September. Despite the warnings of a pending jobs disaster, lawmakers and the administration seem disinterested in dealing with budget and taxes until after the election. Under the Budget Control Act, automatic cuts of $1.2 trillion will go into effect in January, with about half from the Pentagon's budget, if a deal isn't cut. "In a fragile economic recovery, policymakers need to take whatever steps necessary to prevent defense cuts that will cost more than one million jobs," said NAM President Jay Timmons. His group's report said that in addition to job cuts, the sequestration would whack the economy, cutting GDP by 1 percent. The basics from his report are: -- 1,010,000 private sector jobs, including 130,000 manufacturing jobs will be lost in 2014. -- GDP will be almost 1 percent lower by 2014. -- Total job losses will increase the unemployment rate by 0.7 percent. -- California will experience the largest job losses in 2014 at 148,000 followed by Virginia at 115,000 and Texas with 109,000. -- Certain industries will be hit, with aerospace losing 3.4 percent of its jobs, shipbuilding 3.3 percent, and the search and navigation industry losing 9.3 percent of their jobs.

### 2nc yes deal

#### It’s comparatively likely Obama wins now—but if negotiating position changes default is entirely possible

**Klein 1-2** – Ezra, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/ (Calm down, liberals. The White House won., Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/)

Fourth, I don’t think the White House has a shred of credibility when they say they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling. They may not call what they’re about to do negotiating over the debt ceiling, but that’ll be what they’re doing. That said, I’m quite convinced that they don’t intend to be held hostage over the debt ceiling. As a former constitutional law professor, the president sees himself as a steward of the executive branch and is deeply hostile to setting the precedent that congressional minorities can hold presidents hostage through the debt ceiling. At some point in the coming talks, Boehner or McConnell or both are going to realize that the White House really, seriously will not accept a bargain in which what they “got” was an increase in the debt limit, and so they’re going to have to decide at that point whether to crash the global economy.¶ Fifth, the constellation of economic interest groups that converge on Washington understands the debt ceiling better than they did in 2011, are becoming more and more tired of congress’s tendency to negotiate by threatening to trigger economic catastrophes, and is getting better at knowing who to blame. It’s not a meaningless sign that John Engler, the former Republican Governor of Michigan who now leads the Business Roundtable, called for a five-year solution to the debt ceiling. ¶ It’s worth keeping this in perspective: All it means is that the White House can potentially demand a perfectly reasonable compromise of one dollar in revenue-generating tax reform for every dollar in spending cuts. When you add in the fiscal cliff deal, and the 2011 Budget Control Act, that’ll still mean that the total deficit reduction enacted over the last few years tilts heavily towards spending, particularly once you account for reduced war costs. ¶ But that is, arguably, another reason that the White House isn’t in such a bad position here: They’ve set up a definition of success that will sound reasonable to most people — a dollar in tax reform for a dollar in spending cuts — while the Republicans have a very unreasonable sounding definition, in which they get huge cuts to Medicare or they force the United States into default. So while it’s possible that the White House will crumble, rendering itself impotent in negotiations going forward, and while it’s possible that the we’ll breach the debt ceiling, both possibilities seem less likely than Republicans agreeing to a deal that pairs revenue-generating tax reform with spending cuts.

#### Obama has a small window to get it through but he’ll succeed now

The Irish Times 1/3/2013 “Once more unto the brink” Lexis

The federal government has already broken through that ceiling but technical extraordinary measures by the treasury will allow the government to continue paying its bills for two months. If Republicans again hold the line, the real prospect of default looms as the government runs out of money to pay wages with the likely consequent chaos on domestic and world markets . The White House says that there will be no negotiations over the debt ceiling, and that if Republicans want further spending cuts, their only chance is to hand over more tax revenue. We’re back to the game of chicken. And it s not as if the small deal and Bill agreed yesterday by the House goes anywhere near solving the deficit problem it was supposed to address. On the contrary. In all, the bill which will barely stabilise borrowing overthe next decade, will cause deficits to rise by nearly $4 trillion over the period, according to the nonpartisan congressional budget office. Nor, its critics complain, does the Bill go anywhere near addressing the challenge of 12 million unemployed, while it is also stuffed with the sort of pork barrel concessions to individual politicians that are typical of the worst kind of congressional legislating. In the end, however, and this is perhaps clutching at straws, Congress did act, albeit in the most minimal way. And a significant majority of Republicans those who, as one columnist put it, still hold the old-fashioned view that they were elected to help run the country did demonstrate a degree of flexibility and bipartisanship almost unthinkable before the election. Obama’s renewed mandate has given him a new small measure of freedom. But it will dissipate fast if he does not use it.

#### If that status quo continues he’ll prevent sequestration and default

**Politico 1-3** – Gleen Thrush and Reid Epstein (President Obama's debt problem, Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/obamas-debt-problem-85708\_Page3.html)

Obama was able to splinter his deeply divided Republican opponents over the issue of tax cuts for the wealthy. But a similar fate might await the president and his Democratic allies if he brokers a deal with the GOP that requires massive spending and entitlement cuts.

During the cliff talks, Obama was purposely opaque about what cuts he’d ultimately accept, saying only that Republican resistance to a one-shot grand bargain meant he needed to make a deal in pieces — taxes first, spending second.

That tactic delayed but didn’t eliminate a looming day of reckoning on spending and entitlements that will come within 60 days thanks to the convergence of the debt ceiling deadline and the new deadline for keeping automatic cuts from kicking in.

“Republicans — and some Democrats — want to curtail Social Security, veterans benefits, Medicare and Medicaid — that’s not a secret — and some of us are going to be fighting to say no,” said Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), author of a letter sent by 29 Senate Democrats in September demanding Obama back off chained CPI, which would reduce Social Security increases indexed to inflation.

“It is absolutely imperative the president and Democratic leadership stay strong on this issue. If they do, we will win,” added Sanders, who wants the president to aggressively push for tax hikes and loophole elimination on corporations.

Former Clinton administration official Alice Rivlin, a member of Obama’s defunct deficit commission, says Obama “understands the [deficit-reduction] issue” but “he’s got to deal with his own left wing, which is not enthusiastic about doing it. The real problem … is that Social Security has become kind of [a] no-no” to liberals.

In a video message to his 2012 campaign supporters released Wednesday, Obama offered few specifics on how he’d approach the coming fight. He reiterated his call for a “balanced” approach to deficit reduction despite a cliff deal that contains only a few billion in cuts and may add hundreds of billions to the debt in coming decades, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

His one reference to budget and entitlement cuts was retrospective — referring to the $1 trillion in discretionary spending reductions, phased in over 10 years, he agreed to last year as part of the debt ceiling pact.

Conservatives, for their part, are hoping to regroup after their cliff dive, and quickly. The Club for Growth is hoping to retrench for the next battle, even though the club’s former president, Sen. Pat Toomey (R-Pa.), voted for the fiscal cliff deal.

Now that Obama has his tax hike on the wealthy, “all the stories are going to say there’s no deficit reduction and you got what you wanted and it didn’t work. At some point, the questions are going to be asked and the charade will be revealed,” Chocola said.

By squeezing $600 billion in tax hikes on the rich out of the GOP, Obama, in effect, ate his dessert first.

Now comes the eat-your-peas part: A united GOP is in no mood to offer a dollar more in tax hikes, as Obama hopes to extract in the upcoming talks. If he wants to avoid draconian domestic and defense cuts, he’ll likely have to compromise. That might mean accepting tens of billions more in spending and entitlement cuts beyond those he’s already laid out.

Obama and his team has said they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling again after last year’s fiasco, which led to a national credit downgrade. But by extending the sequester for a scant two months, they have guaranteed that fight will happen, several White House allies said.

“I think that a lot of his leverage is gone,” said a top aide to a senior Hill Democrat involved in the negotiations over the fiscal cliff. “By agreeing to a short-term deal, he’s set up a flashpoint with Democrats.”

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Obama’s surprise ally on the fiscal cliff fight, laid down the marker on Wednesday: No more taxes.

“Democrats now have the opportunity — and the responsibility — to join Republicans in a serious effort to reduce Washington’s out-of-control spending,” McConnell said in a statement intended as a shot across the Obama bow.

“That’s a debate the American people want. It’s the debate we’ll have next. And it’s a debate Republicans are ready for. … And now that he has the tax rates he wants, his calls for ‘balance’ mean he must join us in our efforts to achieve meaningful spending and government reform. We have an immediate opportunity to act: the debt ceiling.”

Anti-tax hawk Grover Norquist, who reluctantly backed Tuesday’s deal, predicted that GOP senators and House members were so embittered by the cliff fight, they won’t allow Obama to beat them twice.

“Now you think they’re going to raise taxes for you, that’s never happening,” he told POLITICO. “You knocked them down and mugged them once, they’re not going out on a date with you a second time.”

Whether that’s bluster or a fair reading of the mood on the Hill, the next deal will likely come down to brinkmanship again, the rolling game of Russian roulette played out every half-year or so, with trillions of debt in the kitty.

### 2nc links

#### Can’t get a win, even if it’s popular

**Harder, 12** (Amy Harder, energy and environment reporter, National Journal, 8/13/12, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php>

Which energy and environment policies garner bipartisan support? And what's holding Washington back from acting on them?

Numerous bills pending before Congress have widespread support from Democrats and Republicans in both chambers, including bills on energy efficiency, natural gas-powered vehicles, and toxic-chemicals reform. Yet even popular measures like these remain stalled.

What other measures have attracted broad, bipartisan support? What's holding back all these measures? Is there any common thread? What can Washington do to make progress on these issues while it remains gridlocked over more divisive issues, such as climate change and offshore oil and gas drilling?

#### They don’t want to give him a win—even if it’s bipart, politics will mire the plan in gridlock

**Whatley, 12** (Michael Whatley is the executive vice president of Consumer Energy Alliance in Washington D.C, 10/30, <http://rigzone.com/iphone/article.asp?a_id=121729>)

Should Republicans hold the House, and Democrats hold the Senate, it will make it exceedingly difficult for any meaningful energy legislation to pass in the next two years, regardless of who wins the Presidency, Smaller legislative measures, including requisite funding for federal agencies, are likely, but a bipartisan movement to pass a comprehensive energy package is unlikely.

For the Obama administration, partisan gridlock in Congress would require the President to push his energy agenda through regulation. Potential items of his docket include efforts to expand federal regulation over hydraulic fracturing and to create new incentives or mandates for altemative fuel consumption, such as a low carbon fuel standard.

For a Romney administration, any substantive changes to our current regulatory structure, especially as it relates to public lands, would require Congressional approval, something that a bitterly divided Congress will be loath to provide. Similarly, incentives for renewable energy programs and tax credits would be up to the discretion of the Congress and its budgeting process, However, a Romney administration would likely expand leasing opportunities in the federal offshore and public lands for oil and natural gas development.

#### They don’t assume a divided administration

**Morgan, 11** (Curtis, Tampa Bay Times, “A year after Deepwater Horizon disaster, opposition to oil drilling fades” 4/18, <http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/a-year-after-deepwater-horizon-disaster-opposition-to-oil-drilling-fades/1164429>) **Nelson=Florida Senator Bill Nelson, Fuller = Manley Fuller, president of the Florida Wildlife Federation**

In Washington, the Obama administration has adopted what Interior Secretary Salazar called a "thoughtful and deliberate approach'' to reopening the gulf, with a new oversight agency and new safety measures — notably, one mandating that the industry develop deep-water containment systems for worst-case blowouts, like the one that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon.

In October, the White House lifted the drilling ban it imposed after the BP spill but didn't start issuing new permits until last month, approving 10 new deep water wells so far, with 15 more in process. The administration also agreed to open new territory for exploration by selling new leases — but only in the already heavily drilled central and western gulf.

The three bills approved by a House committee last week don't target Florida waters specifically but lawmakers potentially could use them as tools to carve out prime areas for drilling, or shrink or lift the moratorium.

For now, with the House and Senate controlled by different parties, it's doubtful any drilling bill can make it out of Congress. Nelson and most environmentalists believe the ban on Florida's federal waters can survive political pressure and maneuvering.

"President Obama would have to lose and Bill Nelson would have to lose and they'd have to be replaced by people who want to remove that boundary,'' said Fuller of the Florida Wildlife Federation. "I don't think that is going to happen.''

A more serious threat, they say, is the possibility of a future Florida Legislature opening up state-controlled waters. That move would make it politically difficult to justify a continuing federal ban.

A coalition of environmental groups, Save Our Seas, Beaches and Shores, launched a petition drive after the 2009 House vote to put a ban on drilling in state waters into the Florida Constitution. Former Gov. Charlie Crist's effort to do the same thing during a special legislative session in July proved dead on arrival.

So far, Fuller acknowledged, only a few thousand signatures have been gathered through an online site, far short of the nearly 700,000 needed. In February, Crist's former chief financial officer, Alex Sink, who lost the governor's race to Scott, agreed to co-chair the petition drive with the goal of getting an amendment proposal on the ballot by 2012 or, more realistically, the following year.

Fuller doesn't anticipate lawmakers trying to ram through a divisive drilling bill in the near future but "that is one reason why we want it in the Constitution. We don't want to see it as a possibility at all.''

#### Expanding offshore drilling spurs partisan battle and committee gridlock

**E&E Daily, 12** (Environment and Energy Daily, “Committees prep their agendas — but will anything really get done?” 1/17, <http://www.governorswindenergycoalition.org/?p=896>)

Despite an impressive track record at clearing energy and public lands measures, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee didn’t see a single measure debated on the Senate floor in 2011.

Retiring committee Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) is likely to keep the pressure on Senate leaders to take those measures up in the full chamber as his time in the Senate comes to a close at the end of this year. And he’ll also likely encourage discussions of his upcoming clean energy standard legislation.

The measure isn’t likely to gain much traction among Republicans in either chamber — a fact Bingaman acknowledges — but he says it will still be important to start debate on the issue.

OTHER HIGHLIGHTS

Lessons learned from 2011

The committee last year kept up its famously bipartisan appearances, churning out an impressive 61 bills. But the panel still suffered from bouts of partisanship that brought action on certain issues — like a response to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill — to a standstill. The addition of several new tea party-backed GOP freshmen to the roster also caused some strife at committee meetings and in negotiations on seemingly noncontroversial bills. Head-butting isn’t likely to go away on key issues as election-year politics dominate discussions throughout the Capitol.

CES: Bingaman has vowed to float legislation early this session that would create a federal clean energy standard requiring utilities to generate a certain percentage of their electricity from low-carbon sources in the coming decades. Once introduced, the measure is sure to get ample face time in the committee, but partisan roadblocks in the full Senate and a sure death in the House will likely prevent it from moving beyond the panel.

Smaller bipartisan bills: The committee last year cleared dozens of smaller energy bills on a bipartisan basis — many of them breakouts from a broad 2009 energy bill that stalled in the full Senate — but none have seen floor time. Bingaman will likely push Senate leaders to move on some of those measures as he sees the clock ticking on his time in the Senate.

Offshore drilling: Efforts last year to advance offshore drilling safety language stalled after ranking member Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) and Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-La.) urged the inclusion of coastal revenue-sharing language in a bill responding to the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Bingaman isn’t likely to advance the legislation this session, but the committee could take a look at other offshore drilling issues, such as Interior’s five-year leasing plan. Republicans and the oil industry want to see the areas included in that plan beefed up, while environmentalists and many Democrats say it already infringes on too many sensitive areas.

#### Opposition from even single powerful committee member drains capital because of unique ability to block legislation

**Seidenfeld 94.** , Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, 94 (Mark, Iowa Law Review, October, Lexis)

The cumbersome process of enacting legislation interferes with the President's ability to get his legislative agenda through Congress much as it hinders direct congressional control of agency policy-setting. n196 A President has a limited amount of political capital he can use to press for a legislative agenda, and precious little time to get his agenda enacted. n197 These constraints prevent the President from marshalling through Congress all but a handful of statutory provisions reflecting his policy [\*39] vision. Although such provisions, if carefully crafted, can significantly alter the perspectives with which agencies and courts view regulation, such judicial and administrative reaction is not likely to occur quickly. Even after such reaction occurs, a substantial legacy of existing regulatory policy will still be intact.

In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201 At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

### 2nc at: winners win

**Capital’s finite—they assume demand to leverage**

**Gerson, 12/17** (Michael, 12/17/10, Washington Post, “When it comes to politics, Obama's ego keeps getting in the way,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html)

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because **political capital is limited**. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership.

Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done.

**Not a win—randomly forcing bills through just looks misguided**

William GALSTON 11-4-10 [William, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Brookings, “President Barack Obama’s First Two Years: Policy Accomplishments, Political Difficulties” Brookings Institute -- Nov 4]

Second, the administration believed that success would breed success—that the momentum from one legislative victory would spill over into the next. The reverse was closer to the truth: with each difficult vote, it became harder to persuade Democrats from swing districts and states to cast the next one. In the event, House members who feared that they would pay a heavy price if they supported cap-and- trade legislation turned out to have a better grasp of political fundamentals than did administration strategists.

The legislative process that produced the health care bill was especially damaging. It lasted much too long and featured side-deals with interest groups and individual senators, made in full public view. Much of the public was dismayed by what it saw. Worse, the seemingly endless health care debate strengthened the view that the president’s agenda was poorly aligned with the economic concerns of the American people. Because the administration never persuaded the public that health reform was vital to our economic future, the entire effort came to be seen as diversionary, even anti-democratic. The health reform bill was surely a moral success; it may turn out to be a policy success; but it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it was—and remains—a political liability.

### 2nc polcap key

#### Negotiation is inevitable—polcap ensures it leads to a deal—this is also in our uniqueness ev

**Kornacki 1-3** – Steve, writes about politics for Salon. (The real test for Obama, Salon, http://www.salon.com/2013/01/03/the\_real\_test\_for\_obama/)

The issue is the debt ceiling, which must be addressed by the end of February or early March. As Greg Sargent has been pointing out, the government’s ability to borrow money to pay the bills that Congress runs up shouldn’t be a point of negotiation, but Republicans since 2011 have been adamant about making it one. And the opportunity to do so again in the first months of 2013 is a key reason why the fiscal cliff deal – which ended the 22-year streak of no Republicans voting for a tax hike – was enacted without a full-scale revolt from the right. Fairly or not, conservatives see a chance with the debt ceiling to force Obama and Democrats to make the kind of deep cuts to the social safety net that they’d been hoping for during the cliff talks.

Lindsey Graham, who isn’t a member of the House but who is scared of a potential 2014 Senate primary challenge (and therefore has an incentive to channel the ideology that drives House conservatives), summed up the opportunity that the right now senses the other day:

I’m not going to raise the debt ceiling unless we get serious about keeping the country from becoming Greece, saving Social Security and Medicare. So here’s what I would like: meaningful entitlement reform – not to turn Social Security into private accounts, not to take a voucher approach to Medicare –but, adjust the age for Social Security, CPI changes and means testing and look beyond the ten-year window. I cannot in good conscience raise the debt ceiling without addressing the long term debt problems of this country and I will not.

This is what conservatives in the House will be demanding before voting to raise the debt ceiling – or, for that matter, in exchange for undoing the $1.2 trillion sequester that was put on hold for two months as part of the cliff deal. The catastrophic consequences of a debt ceiling default are well-documented, but an alarming number of Tea Party-types in the House – the type that Boehner is often intimidated by – genuinely don’t seem to mind.

This sets up a major test for Obama. His public position has been clear since the election: He will not negotiate with Republicans over the debt ceiling – it’s simply something they have to raise, unless they want to take responsibility for ruining the economy.

But in a way, Obama already has negotiated over the debt ceiling. He began the fiscal cliff talks by saying he wanted a permanent end to debt ceiling brinksmanship to be part of any deal. Then he indicated he’d settle for a two-year extension. Then he signed off on a deal that didn’t address the debt ceiling at all. This has the right feeling somewhat emboldened; they didn’t get their way on the fiscal cliff, but now they have (in their view) real leverage to compel Obama to sign off on their safety net-cutting agenda.

This doesn’t necessarily mean Obama cut a bad deal on the fiscal cliff. In fact, the deal itself is more favorable to Democratic priorities than Republican concerns. But by not addressing the debt ceiling and signing off on a sequester delay, he in effect put off the real battle over entitlement programs by two months. Now conservatives will use the threat of a catastrophic default to try to make the president and other Democrats blink. The worry is that Obama will ultimately give serious ground; the hope is that he’ll stand his ground, and ultimately find support from the (generally pro-GOP) business community, which grasps the threat that a default represents. Only when these battles are over will we really know whether the debt ceiling deal was a good one.

**Their ev is a blog post, not peer reviewed and only about court nominations –Dickinson concludes neg**

**Dickinson, 2009** (Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keit

h Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto and finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Bradyand Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents do influence the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, Matthew Beckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level, Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call (Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition, Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote "buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).

### at: miller

#### Goes global—strong studies

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### 2nc key to growth

#### Going over the debt ceiling collapses the economy

Millhiser 12/30

(Ian Millhiser - Senior Constitutional Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund and the Editor of ThinkProgress Justice, “Lindsay Graham: I Will Destroy America’s Solvency Unless The Social Security Retirement Age Is Raised,” Dec 30, 2012, <http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/12/30/1379681/lindsay-graham-i-will-destroy-americas-solvency-unless-the-social-security-retirement-age-is-raised/?mobile=nc> KB)

Although official Washington is currently fixated on the so-called “Fiscal Cliff,” the biggest threat to American prosperity is the debt ceiling, which must be raised in February to prevent economic catastrophe. If Republicans refuse to reach a deal on the so-called cliff, the Congressional Budget Office predicts that they will spark a new recession in 2013. But if Republicans block action on the debt ceiling, they will make that potential recession look quaint. Without raising the debt ceiling, the United States will be forced to embrace austerity so severe it will lead to “a bigger GDP drop than that experienced during the Great Recession of 2008.”

#### Consensus of analysts

**NBC News 12-30** (Forget the 'fiscal cliff': Debt ceiling is much scarier, From Reuters, http://www.nbcnews.com/business/forget-fiscal-cliff-debt-ceiling-much-scarier-1C7753061)

Investors fearing a stock market plunge if the U.S. tumbles off the "fiscal cliff" next week may want to relax.

But they should be scared if a few weeks later Washington fails to reach a deal to raise the nation's debt ceiling as that threatens a default, another credit downgrade and a financial markets panic.

Market strategists say that falling off the cliff for any lengthy period -- which would lead to automatic tax hikes and stiff cuts in government spending -- would badly dent both consumer and business confidence, but it would take some time for the U.S. economy to slide into recession. In the meantime, there would be plenty of chances for lawmakers to make amends by reversing some of the effects.

That has been reflected in a U.S. stock market that has still not shown signs of melting down. Instead, it has drifted lower and gotten more volatile.

In some ways, that has let Washington off the hook. In the past, a plunge in stock prices forced the hand of Congress, such as in the middle of the financial crisis in 2008.

"If this thing continues for a bit longer and the result is you get a U.S. debt downgrade ... the risk is not that you lose two and half percent, the risk is that you lose ten and a half," said Jonathan Golub, chief U.S. equity strategist at UBS Equity Research in New York.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner said earlier this week that the United States will technically reach its debt limit at the end of the year.

'Tremendous fight'

The White House has said it will not negotiate the debt ceiling as in 2011, when the fight over what was once a procedural matter preceded the first-ever downgrade of the U.S. credit rating, but it may be forced into such a battle again. A repeat of that war is most worrisome for markets.

Markets posted several days of sharp losses in the period surrounding the debt ceiling fight in 2011. Even after a bill to increase the ceiling passed, stocks plunged in what was seen as a vote of no confidence in Washington's ability to function, given how close lawmakers came to a default.

Credit ratings agency Standard & Poor's lowered the U.S. sovereign rating to double-A-plus, citing Washington's legislative problems as one reason for the downgrade. The benchmark S&P 500 dropped 16 percent in a four-week period ending Aug. 21, 2011.

"I think there will be a tremendous fight between Democrats and Republicans about the debt ceiling," said Jon Najarian, a co-founder of online brokerage TradeMonster.com in Chicago.

"I think that is the biggest risk to the downside in January for the market and the U.S. economy."

There are some signs in the options market that investors are starting to eye the January period with more wariness. The CBOE Volatility Index, or the VIX, the market's favored anxiety indicator, has remained at relatively low levels throughout this process, though on Thursday it edged above 20 for the first time since July.

## 1nr

### A2 Eurozone

#### Eurozone fine now – only a risk of our link

#### Reutuers, One hour ago http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-eurozone-pmi-idUSBRE90308Y20130104

(Reuters) - Activity in the dominant U.S. services sector perked up in the final month of 2012, while hopes grew that Europe may be through the worst of its economic slump, surveys showed on Friday.¶ Britain's vast services sector, however, contracted for the first time in two years, suggesting the broader economy probably shrank as well in the final three months of 2012.¶ Worldwide, private sector business growth hit a nine-month high, boosted largely by service-oriented firms.¶ But none of the data suggest growth is robust enough to pressure central banks on either side of the Atlantic to tinker with highly stimulative monetary policies.¶ The Institute for Supply Management said its index of U.S. service firms grew at its fastest clip in 10 months in December, boosted by a rise in new orders. The pace of hiring in the sector hit a five-month high.¶ Throughout the U.S. economy, employers added 155,000 new workers last month, a separate report on Friday showed. Gains were distributed broadly, from manufacturing and construction to health care, which economists say suggests the economy would probably grow by about 2.0 percent in 2013.¶ "The overall tone was one consistent with modest economic growth," said Joshua Shapiro, chief U.S. economist at MFR, a global consulting firm based in New York.¶ The 17-country [euro zone](http://www.reuters.com/subjects/euro-zone), on the other hand, probably closed out the year in recession, though evidence that the pace of contraction in the service sector had slowed suggested things may be turning around.¶ "I think (the euro zone PMIs) are showing a decisive bottoming-out of activity," said James Nixon, chief European economist at Societe Generale. "Now, the actual levels of the surveys are still consistent with GDP declining, but at least things aren't getting worse any faster."¶ According to financial information firm Markit, the euro zone's composite PMI, which measures the activity of thousands of companies, rose to 47.2 last month, its highest since March.¶ The decline eased among firms such as banks and restaurants, which comprise the bulk of the euro zone economy, though things looked worse for manufacturers. <EU/PMIM>¶ "The surveys at least bring some substance to the belief that the worst is over and that a return to growth is in sight for the region in 2013," said Chris Williamson, chief economist at Markit.

#### Doesn’t causes US collapse

**New York Times, 11-11-11,** p. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/business/global/european-turmoil-could-slow-us-recovery.html?pagewanted=1

Economists say Europe’s troubles would need to worsen significantly before putting the United States economy, which has been strengthening lately, at risk of a new recession.

#### Debt doesn’t spillover

**New York Times, 11-11-11,** p. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/business/global/european-turmoil-could-slow-us-recovery.html?pagewanted=1

United States financial institutions have tried to inoculate themselves by drastically cutting risk to the euro zone debt markets, partly in response to urging from policy makers. For instance, prime money-market funds — a common and higher-yielding alternative to bank deposits, and the site of a freeze in the financial markets in October 2008 — have reduced their exposure to euro zone banks by more than half since May, according to a JPMorgan analysis released this week. “Most prime fund managers are allowing existing euro zone exposures to run off,” the analysts wrote.

#### Doesn’t trigger a global crisis - adaptation

**New York Times, 11-11-11,** p. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/business/global/european-turmoil-could-slow-us-recovery.html?pagewanted=1

Because Europe’s troubles have been developing for more than two years, financial firms have had more time to prepare than they did for the 2008 crisis, when the collapse of Lehman Brothers almost caused credit markets to freeze. This preparation could prevent a repeat of the 2008 global crisis, even if the European troubles deepen.

### 2nc overview

#### Russia impact outweighs – causes extinction – 1nc Weitz evidence says only they have enough nukes to annihilate the planet – the impact is more probable because of nuclear launch postures

**Bostrom 2002** (Nick Bostrom, 2002. Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale. "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards," 38, www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization. Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently.

#### Turns case – Russian obstructionism turns everything

**Allison and Blackwill, 10/30**/11 – \* director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND \*\* Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67178.html

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies.

No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow.

First, Russia remains the only nation that can **erase the United States** from the map **in 30 minutes**. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.

Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose.

Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success.

Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups.

Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries.

Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps.

Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order.

Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is **vital to the U.S. economy**.

Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin.

Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

### 2nc a2 russia econ uniqueness

#### Economy fine now – and its competitive

Margarita Bogatova 6-26-2012; writer for Voice of Russia quoting prominent investment executives, O'Neil: Russia should be less dependent on oil prices http://english.ruvr.ru/2012\_06\_26/79409411/

Russia, the world’s ninth economy, has improved its initial growth forecast and may post a 4%-5% year-on-year GDP increase in 2012. Contrary to expectations, the opposition protests of the past few months have not scared investors. Rather, they are perceived as evidence that the Russian democracy is on the right track, says Ivan Rodionov, a professor of the Higher School of Economics. "The protests have not affected the investment climate because no one understands what the opposition wants. But the fact that the opposition does exist is a positive factor perceived as progress in the right direction. Earlier, it was strange that everything was well in Russia, but there was no opposition. Now everything is still well and we also have the opposition. They cannot say what they want and they have no political platform, but that’s actually good."

### A2 Case leads to coop

#### ONLY the EU and Russia can supply each other in the short run – US challenges would be existential

Richard **Weitz** (senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor) November 2011 “Can We Manage a Declining Russia?”, http://www.aei.org/files/2011/12/08/-can-we-manage-a-declining-russia\_152701899417.pdf)

Europe is an unavoidable partner. The European market consumes 90% of Russia's total gas exports and 60% of its crude oil, which make up only 25 and 15% of Europe's total demand, respectively. Russia presently does not have any viable alternative markets remotely equal in size to Europe. Dependence is a two-Way phenomenon. "40% of Russian public money” comes from the sale of oil and gas to Europe, and at least 75% of Russian export revenues are linked to the EU's energy market in general. Without any extant alternative markets to exploit in the near-term, Moscow requires European gas revenues to preserve its own financial solubility. Energy overshadows other concerns. Paillard believes that while the energy trade has, in the past, been "part of a game of blackmail, lies and fear" between Europe and Russia, its new status as a "question of life or death for Russian revitalization" and its importance to Europe's economic growth mean that neither side can afford to use gas supplies as leverage in other international concerns. In Paillard's estimation, Brussels and Moscow both regard issues such as human rights or the Chechen conflict as not being worth risking the energy trade over. Therefore, Russian and the European Union are inextricably bound to one another by their mutual dependence on the energy trade. Russia cannot absorb the financial consequences of interrupting the EU revenue stream, while the European Union cannot do without Russian gas supplies. Europe has few alternative suppliers, and cannot develop alternative energy sources in the near term. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to be able to diversify its economy or target new markets any better than it has in the past.

#### Europe accounts for 97 percent of Russian natural gas exports

Jack Sharples (Ph.D. Candidate specializing in EU-Russia natural gas relations at the University of Glaslow) 2012 “Russia-EU gas relations: the Russian perspective” http://glasgow.academia.edu/JackSharples/Papers/1596861/Russia-EU\_Gas\_Relations\_The\_Russian\_Perspective

Earlier it was mentioned that the EU accounts for approximately 60 percent of Russia’s gas exports by volume. However, the regional nature of Russia’s gas exports is much more apparently when it is considered that the Energy Community (EU-27 plus Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Moldova) (Energy Community, 2011) accounted for 80 percent of Russia’s gas exports (175bcm) in 2010, while exports to geographical Europe (EU-27 plus Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Switzerland, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Moldova) totalled accounted for 97 percent (213bcm) of Russia’s exports in 2010 (Gazprom, 2011a, pg. 53-58).

### 2nc no japan

**Japan relations structurally ineffective.**

Alan D. Romberg, Distinguished Fellow and the director of the East Asia program at Stimson, and Yoshihide Soeya, rofessor of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies of Keio University, March **20**11, “North Korea: Challenges for the US-Japan Alliance,” <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Full_-_North_Korea_Challenge_for_the_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

Introduction The difficulties encountered during the Six-Party Talks are manifestations of a larger dynamic deeply embedded within the broader challenges emanating from the Korean Peninsula. While the United States and Japan have successfully collaborated on joint strategic objectives, including maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia–Pacific region for the last half-century, the alliance has also been at odds with the more specific national objectives of the two allies vis-à-vis North Korea: Tokyo’s ability to forge an independent and proactive policy towards North Korea has been hampered, while frustration in Washington over the inability to forge a unified consensus with Tokyo on North Korea policies has strained the alliance relationship. Thus, rather than serving as a useful mechanism to bridge differences and produce a unified policy, the alliance itself, rather than common objectives on the Korean Peninsula, became the focal point of US– Japan relations. As such, conventional wisdom tends to blame key leaders and bureaucrats working in the Six-Party process for the growth in mistrust and suspicion in Tokyo and Washington during this period. However, recent tensions are the symptoms and not the cause of misaligned strategic objectives in the region and a security structure too rigid to adjust to shifting regional and global dynamics. The Six-Party Talks are thus an interesting case study in the complex set of dynamics at play, rather than the process itself; as such, this chapter focuses on the former rather than the latter.

**No US-Japan relations and no impact—South Korea.**

John S. Park, Senior Research Associate at the United States Institute of Peace, March 2011, “North Korea: Challenges for the US-Japan Alliance,” <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Full_-_North_Korea_Challenge_for_the_US-Japan_Alliance.pdf>

The sinking of the Cheonan in March 2010 also strengthened the relationship between South Korea and the United States. Even before the North Korean attack, US–ROK ties were expanding as rising difficulties with China and growing Futenma-related friction with Japan cast South Korea as a dependable ally for the United States. After the Cheonan incident, the US–ROK security relationship strengthened through the “Invincible Spirit” naval exercises held in late July. Intended to deter North Korea from carrying out future attacks, the joint naval exercise sparked strong condemnation from China, despite its relocation from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan/East Sea. While it was a positive development to have four officers from Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force aboard the supercarrier USS George Washington as observers in order to demonstrate the solidarity among the United States, Japan, and the ROK on this matter, “Invincible Spirit” demonstrated that the US– ROK alliance was more dynamic and useful than the US-Japan alliance in bolstering the United States’ position in East Asia. Due in large part to these developments, the United States has gradually shifted its focal point for bilateral cooperation in Asia from Tokyo to Seoul. This shift was formally acknowledged by President Barack Obama in a bilateral meeting with President Lee Myung Bak on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Toronto, when he stated that “...this alliance is the lynchpin of not only security for the Republic of Korea and the United States but also for the Pacific as a whole.”5 Soon after President Obama’s remarks, senior officials in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly asked if “lynchpin” could be used in a plural context.

**Japan alliance not key to anything**

Bruce **Klingner**, Research Fellow for Northeast Asian Studies Center at Heritage. 8/26/**09**. The Heritage Foundation, “How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg2308.cfm

What the U.S. Should Do Stop referring to Japan as the only linchpin of U.S. security in Asia, instead emphasizing the parallel importance of South Korea, which has fewer constraints on the use of its military overseas. Seoul is more able and willing to commit sufficient capabilities to achieve shared political and security objectives.

### 2nc no ccp

**No CCP impact**

**Feng 2010** [5/10, Zhu, PhD, Professor of School of International Studies and Director of the Center for International & Strategic Studies @ Peking University, has served as research fellow @ Washington based CSIS & Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies @ Harvard University, visiting scholar @ Durham University in UK, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact”, May 10, 2010, http://w ww.fpif.org/articles/an\_emerging\_trend\_in\_east\_asia]

Many China watchers in the West contend that the weak legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spurred its military buildup. But this is mostly an attribution error. Despite a great number of challenges from home and abroad, the CCP’s ruling legitimacy has not suffered from any shock. **The Chinese people do not believe that a change of ruling party** or the party’s relinquishing of power **will resolve their complaints**. Even if domestic unrest flares up, China would likely turn inward rather than outward, even at the cost of effectively muting an assertive foreign policy.

**Collapse inevitable—governance failure and runaway growth**

**Bleicher, 8** – Chief Strategist for New Initiatives in the Overseas Buildings Operations Bureau of the U.S. State Department (Samuel Bleicher “China: Superpower or Basket Case?” May 8. Foreign Policy in Focus. <http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5210>)

It may not make such interesting reading to say that China is slowly emerging out of feudalism and desperately hopes to use the fruits of Western technology to pull its people away from the edge of starvation, at least for a few decades. And it is extraordinarily difficult to quantify the real economic limitations imposed by China’s environmental and natural resource deficiencies. But these concerns are rarely given serious consideration as real constraints on China’s future development. Equally important, the international policy consequences of a faltering China are not being seriously discussed or explored. The reality is that the Chinese “Communist” central government and Chinese economic, social, political, and legal institutions are quite weak. China is ineffectually governed. It will be struggling for decades to get and stay beyond subsistence. It has built an export-dependent economy ill-suited to meeting its domestic needs, and it will shortly face insurmountable environmental and natural resource obstacles to its rapid growth. The central government has succeeded in unleashing the entrepreneurial, profit-driven economic engine, but it is unable to apply any brakes–that is, to address effectively any of the adverse effects of the single-minded focus on profit. The leadership claims that it recognizes the corrosive economic and social consequences of the current situation and is taking remedial actions. Even if it were seriously committed to these policies as a high priority, the government lacks the mechanisms to rein in the runaway horse.

# doubles neg v. msu bc

## 1nc

### T

#### Interpretation:

#### Increase requires specification

**OED, 89** (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Online through Emory)

increase, v.

3. To become greater in some specified quality or respect; to grow or advance in.

#### Substantial is meaningful with firm basis

**WordNet, 6** (WordNet® 3.0, © 2006 by Princeton University. Dictionary.reference.com/ browse/substantial)

Substantial, adjective

 2. having a firm basis in reality and being therefore important, meaningful, or considerable; "substantial equivalents"

#### Incentives require distinct mechanisms—not just encouragement

**Marbek Resource Consultants, 6** (Report prepared for the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment “NATIONAL EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) WORKSHOP,” 9/27, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/epr\_wkshp\_rpt\_1376\_e.pdf

The suggestion was made, and supported by others, that the word “incentives” for producers be replaced with the word “encourage”, since the term “incentive” usually implies a particular mechanism (#1).

#### Vote neg—now is too late to specify financial incentives type:

#### 1. Ground – “incentives” is the direct object of topical action, ALL negative strategies are premised off of it and clarification makes them a conditional moving target.

#### 2. Topic education—also turns solvency

**Arvizu, 7** - Director National Renewable Energy Laboratory (Dan, CQ Congressional Testimony, “ENCOURAGING SOLAR ENERGY,” 6/19, lexis

We applaud the Committee for its continuing examination of solar and other sources of renewable electricity and fuels. If we are to ensure the nation receives the full range of benefits that renewable energy technologies can provide, we will need a carefully balanced blend of new technology, market acceptance and government policies. It is not a question of whether to rely solely on the market, or on new research, or on government action, as we work to solve our energy problems. To accelerate deployment of renewable energy technologies, we need to effectively combine all three. It's also crucial that this mix of technology, markets and policies be crafted so that each works in conjunction with the others. The reality is that distinct renewable energy technologies - be they solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, wind, biomass power, biofuels or geothermal - are in different places in terms of their economics, technological maturity and market acceptance. While a broad range of policies are needed to spur on these varied technologies, the specifics of policies and incentives to be enacted ideally must be tailored to fit the unique requirements of each of the systems and devices we are seeking to deploy.

### DA

#### Obama will get a debt limit deal because he has enough polcap to roll Republicans

**Judis 1-3** – John, senior editor for The New Republic (Obama Wasn't Rolled. He Won!, The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111573/obama-didnt-get-rolled-the-fiscal-cliff-in-fact-he-won#)

With a new House and Senate, Obama stands a good chance of winning these battles in the months to come -- *if he continues to conduct these negotiations as political campaigns* and not as backroom Washington affairs. The fiscal cliff deal took tax rates out of the discussion. What’s left are spending cuts. If Obama allows the Republicans and obnoxious groups like Fix the Debt to frame the issues, he’ll be in trouble. And he did seem to fall into this trap briefly when he proposed changing the cost of living index for Social Security. But if he reminds the public that what the Republicans and their allies want to do is cut their Medicare and Social Security, he and the Democrats should be in good shape.¶ As for the Republicans, the debate over the fiscal cliff, like the debate last year over the debt limit, revealed serious divisions within the party and its rank-and-file that Obama and the Democrats could exploit over the next months. There are at least three different kinds of divisions that have become visible. First is between the Senate and the House. Senate Republicans, who are in a minority, have proven more amenable to compromise on fiscal issues. Unlike most Republican House members, many senators can’t count on being re-elected by solid Republicans majorities. McConnell himself comes from a state where Democrats still hold most of the state offices. ¶ Secondly, there is a regional division in the party between the deep South, which contains many of the diehard House Republicans, and the Republicans from the Northeast, industrial Midwest, and the Far West. In the House vote on the fiscal cliff, Republican House members from the deep South opposed it by 83 to 10, while Republicans from the Northeast favored it by 24 to one, and those from the Far West by 17 to eight. After the Republican leadership refused to bring a Sandy hurricane relief bill to the floor before the end of the session – effectively killing it – New York Republican Peter King called on New York and New Jersey Republicans to withhold donations to the GOP. New Jersey Governor Chris Christe blew his top at the House Republicans.¶ Third, there is a division among Republican lobbies, political organizations and interest groups that surfaced in the wake of the election and once again this week. It’s not easy to define, but it runs between pro-business conservatives, on the one hand, and the right-wing libertarians of the Tea Party and Club for Growth and their billionaire funders. Grover Norquist and Americans for Tax Reform gave their approval the Senate bill. The Chamber of Commerce grudgingly endorsed the final bill, and the National Federation of Independent Business said the tax provisions were acceptable. The Club for Growth, the Koch Brothers’ Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks (which itself has fallen under the sway of its most ideological elements), and the Tea Party Patriots opposed any compromise. ¶ These divisions don’t necessarily augur the kind of formal split that wrecked the Whig Party in the 1850s. Nor do they suggest widespread defection of Republicans into the Democratic Party as happened during the 1930s. There is still far too much distance between, say, McConnell and Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid. But they do suggest that a process of erosion is under way that will weaken the Republicans’ ability to maintain a united front against Democratic initiatives. That could happen in the debates over the sequester and debt ceiling if Obama and the Democrats make the kind of public fuss that they did over fiscal cliff.

#### Additional funding is unpopular

Forbes, 11-1-12

[“The Global Race For Fusion Power”]

And to turn a scientific experiment into a power plant would require creating a laser fusion system that works flawlessly hour after hour. The NIF can fire its lasers at a hydrogen target once every 10,000 seconds or so. A power plant would need to compress hydrogen targets ten times a second to produce around a gigawatt. Another problem: money and political willpower. Although fusion has received support from both sides of the political aisle, funding for R&D remains far more challenging in the U.S. now than it decades, or even a few years, ago. The New York Times recently suggested Congress take a hard look at continuing it, considering the annual operating budget comes to $290 million. (The cumulative budget for NIF exceeds $3.5 billion, money could have been used to for farm subsidies or weapons systems that will never go into battle.)

#### The impact is growth—near term debates key

**Maass 1-2** – Harold, the Week's online executive editor (The looming debt-ceiling fight: Worse than the fiscal cliff?, The Week, http://theweek.com/article/index/238312/the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-worse-than-the-fiscal-cliff)

In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation's bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.

Obama is still smarting from the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, says Neil Munro at The Daily Caller. In that fight, "the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion." Obama has been complaining about that defeat ever since, and he's vowing not to let it happen again. But the GOP-led House is adamant about using "its authority over the nation's debt ceiling to pressure Obama to shrink future spending."

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 9 – \*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### Counterplan (1)

#### The United States Federal Government should:

#### --not substantially increase grants for non-inertial fusion energy generation in the United States

#### --shift its domestic magnetic fusion programs away from short-pulse tokamak research except for that performed by Alcator C-MOD and towards computation, simulation, and stellarator research for magnetic fusion, as well as any tokamak research performed by Alcator C-MOD.

#### This solves the entire case. The CP rebalances US fusion research priorities to capitalize on US strengths while letting ITER assume responsibility for tokamak construction and research. This harmonizes the US fusion program internationally, retains the STEM pipeline, and functions within current diminishing fusion budgets.

**Wurden, 12** - LANL Fusion Energy Sciences Program Manager(Glen, “Leading Fusion Research via Alternative Pathways” 8/8, <http://fire.pppl.gov/Wurden%20White%20Paper-3.pdf>)

The USA has clearly ceded the lead in tokamak research to other countries in the last 15 years. Our present (30 year old) copper machines, while workhorses with excellent diagnostic sets and research teams, epitomize the peak of research capabilities possible in the line of short-pulse tokamaks. They have a limited research life ahead of them. Furthermore, even though the NSTX-Upgrade is welcomed (by most people), it is still is only an intermediate facility in the tokamak line. Given our present state of knowledge about long-pulse issues, disruptions and ELMS, blanket issues, and the cost of DT tokamaks, we might as well recognize that FNSF is not only premature but carries substantial financial and technical risks if undertaken before successfully operating burning plasmas in ITER. It doesn’t make sense for the USA to embark on this path before ITER is shown to be successful.

Where can (and does) the USA lead in magnetic fusion research? In theory, computation, and simulation, without a doubt. Another answer is in (call it what you will) “alternates” at the concept exploration and proof of principle stage of development. Both of these areas have the advantage of big returns for small investments. But both of these areas have faced heavy reductions in recent years. The Fusion Simulation Project is presently idling at best. The advantage of pursuing approaches that don’t face the known limitations of tokamaks, are that outstanding science can still be done at the $5M/year level of effort, while making high-risk, high-long-term payoffs possible. We could easily envision a diverse spectrum of such efforts, spread throughout the country, even with our present financial limitations. A US program built on a portfolio of several small “advanced concept” plasma physics devices tied together with an intermediate sized state-of-the-art 3D magnetic confinement device would provide a unique strategic platform for the base program regardless of the outcome of the ITER project.

But to do this, in flat or declining budgets requires the planned and orderly closure of Alcator C-Mod and DIII-D experiments, while simultaneously transitioning the research teams to other, new efforts, whether within the USA or international. It also requires looking very carefully at the wisdom of NSTX-U versus (for example) a renewed stellarator effort at PPPL. This transition should be well planned and carefully executed to: 1) maintain strong support for a lead US role in one or more key ITER physics areas, 2) maintain continuity in providing critical hightemperature plasma data with which to validate advanced numerical codes and theories and 3) provide vibrant, cutting-edge, experiments that will facilitate quid-pro-quo international scientific exchanges.

(I) The world fusion community (rightly or wrongly) believes that ITER is the only device capable of accessing a stable, steadily burning plasma state: the cutting edge frontier of high-temperature plasma physics; a supreme technical challenge.

(II) It is unacceptable to put forth a scientific fallacy that our existing large rho-star number, non-burning, copper tokamaks in the U.S. can somehow "look beyond" ITER, or "circumvent" ITER to produce meaningful scientific information about a Demo fusion plasma state twenty years off. The secondary argument that we need to continue operating these machines to sustain “the workforce" and attract/train young scientists for ITER is also out of step with reality. Scientific research drives the graduate workforce, not the other way around. Other training platforms are possible. When ITER is ready "they will be attracted and they will come": It only takes 5 years to get a PhD.

(III) The US should use the knowledge gained in ITER to establish a path forward beyond ITER. Begin to do this now by strengthening its predictive understanding, using theory, simulation and integrated modeling programs, as the most cost effective way to participate in ITER. Here the U.S. can sustain its world-class status in the fusion arena for decades to come, despite a lackluster investment in fusion energy science.

(IV) The US fusion program must invest in, and investigate within the peer review process, high-gain, non-toroidal fusion approaches that use magnetic fields such as the MTF and MagLIF pulsed power options, as well as foreign tokamak and upgraded devices coming on line. The most attractive fusion pathways have always had elements of high density, high beta, and high magnetic fields. Jim Tuck recognized this in the 1960’s, and it is still true today.

### Counterplan (2)

#### The 50 state governments and relevant sub-federal actors should substantially increase grants for no inertial fusion energy generation in the United States

#### It’s legitimate and politics is a net benefit

**Harvard Law Review 6** – the author isn’t named but the qualifications are: John M. Olin Fellow in Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School (April, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1855, “State Collective Action”, lexis)

Consider now the reasons why states may act collectively. In the simplest terms, collective action may be **more desirable than individual state action** because it opens a panoply of otherwise unavailable policy choices and may be more desirable than federal action because it allocates power to a better-positioned actor. n12 These advantages may exist [\*1859] because regional organizations have better information, are better positioned to act on that information, or avoid duplicative costs or coordination problems. n13 Also, collective action may be desirable politically because it may make certain programs either more or less politically salient. n14 Similarly, political actors may want to act collectively because doing so spreads or diversifies political risk. n15 Lastly, collective action may provide opportunities for economies of scale or rent-seeking behavior that states cannot achieve independently. n16 Some brief examples of how states may act collectively illustrate the importance of the topic. n17 As in the stylized examples, states may act collectively to reduce pollution. Groups of states also could develop plans to use common reserves of natural resources, including oil fields or aquifers that cross state lines, or plans to allocate the use of rivers, lakes, forests, or other natural resources. They may also regulate wildlife that lives in multiple states, either to protect that wildlife or to use it for commercial purposes. States may take similar action to regulate or allocate energy or to develop interstate transit infrastructure, such as highways, rail lines, or regional airports. States may regulate the production or distribution of goods or create economic development organizations organized either geographically or by some other trait, such as agricultural or oil and gas production. They also may wish to regulate certain industries or set labor standards in common ways or may wish to regulate products commonly by adopting similar production standards or tort rules. As a final example - although one can imagine many other motivations for state collective action - states may collectivize to provide better social welfare or governmental insurance programs.

### Counterplan (3)

#### The United States federal government should:

#### - provide diminishing [grants], but the recipients of the plan must become cost competitive within the plans solvency timeframe and must improve in price and performance in order to continually receive this incentive.

#### - reduce grants as non-inertial fusion energy generation improves in price and performance.

#### Temporary, diminishing incentives are vital to inducing competition, technological innovation and ending subsidy dependence

**Jenkins, 12** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, Congressional Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 5/22, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=31b79a1a-83a0-4ae6-8c80-30fe754ad0ea>)

Recognizing that investment horizons, technology development cycles, and market conditions vary across advanced energy technology segments, precise policy mechanisms will likely differ from sector to sector. Yet whether through production or investment subsidies, consumer rebates, market-­‐creating regulations or standards, or other market incentives, we recommend that any advanced energy deployment subsidies meet the following policy design criteria. Reformed policies should:

1. ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE MARKET. Deployment policies should create market opportunities for advanced clean energy technologies while fostering competition between technology firms.

2. DRIVE COST REDUCTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS. Deployment policies should create market incentives and structures that demand and reward continual improvement in technology performance and cost.

3. PROVIDE TARGETED AND TEMPORARY SUPPORT FOR MATURING TECHNOLOGIES. Deployment policies must not operate in perpetuity, but rather should be terminated if technology segments either fail to improve in price and performance or become competitive without subsidy.

4. REDUCE SUBSIDY LEVELS IN RESPONSE TO CHANGING TECHNOLOGY COSTS. Deployment incentives should decline as technologies improve in price and performance to both conserve limited taxpayer and consumer resources and provide clear incentives for continued technology improvement.

5. AVOID TECHNOLOGY LOCK-OUT AND PROMOTE A DIVERSE ENERGY PORTFOLIO. Deployment incentives should be structured to create market opportunities for energy technologies at different levels of maturity, including new market entrants, to ensure that each has a chance to mature while allowing technologies of similar maturity levels to compete amongst themselves.

6. PROVIDE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS CERTAINTY. While deployment incentives should be temporary, they must still provide sufficient certainty to support key business decisions by private firms and investors.

7. MAXIMIZE THE IMPACT OF TAXPAYER RESOURCES AND PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE PRIVATE CAPITAL. Deployment incentives should be designed to avoid creating unnecessarily high transaction costs while opening up clean tech investment to broader private capital markets.

#### Conditioning on price competition solves better and avoids our disads

**Hayward, 10** – resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Steven, “Post-Partisan Power: How a Limited and Direct Approach to Energy Innovation Can Deliver Clean, Cheap Energy, Economic Productivity and National Prosperity”, October, <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan%20Power.pdf>)

Yet today’s mess of open-ended energy subsidies reward production of more of the same product, not innovation. The federal government showers subsidies across many energy options, from oil and coal to ethanol and wind power. None of these efforts, however, are designed or optimized to drive and reward innovation and ensure the prices of these technologies fall over time, making the subsidies effectively permanent. This must change.

Competitive Deployment Incentives

The current energy subsidy and deployment framework should be turned on its head. Government investments succeed not when they are blanket subsidies but rather when they are narrowly targeted to specific outcomes, such as developing computers to allow for rocket systems, building a communications network to survive a nuclear attack, or creating increasingly efficient and powerful jet engines. These public investments paid off handsomely in personal computers, the Internet, and gas turbines used in both commercial air travel as well as modern natural gas power plants. 68

In an era of expanding federal debt, across-the-board energy subsidy reform should be pursued. Incentives for energy technology deployment should be targeted and disciplined. Technologies should receive competitive deployment incentives only to the extent that they are becoming cheaper in unsubsidized terms over time.

The strategy that we propose would be aimed at low-carbon technologies that, at a minimum, satisfy the following criteria:

 The technology has been demonstrated and has proven technical feasibility at commercial scale;

 Is currently priced above normal market rates and is locked out of markets by more mature,

entrenched technology competitors;

 Has potential for significant and sustained cost and performance improvements during deployment

and scale-up;

#Has strong prospects for significant market penetration once the technology reaches competitive

prices.

Targeted and competitive deployment incentives could be created for various classes of energy technologies to ensure that each has a chance to mature. Incentive levels should fall at regular intervals, terminating if the technology class either fails to improve in price or reaches cost parity in the absence of any further incentives.

Structured in this manner, reformed national energy deployment incentives will not select winners and losers, nor will it create permanently subsidized industries. These public investments will instead provide opportunity for all emerging low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs while increasing the rate at which early-stage clean and affordable energy technologies are commercialized.

#### The CP prevents the collapse of the energy bubble – avoids economic collapse

**Swezey, 11** – project director for The Breakthrough Institute (Devon, “Clean Tech Sector Heading for a Major Crash” 7/11, <http://blacklistednews.com/?news_id=14600&print=1>)

The global clean energy industry is set for a major crash. The reason is simple. Clean energy is still much more expensive and less reliable than coal or gas, and in an era of heightened budget austerity the subsidies required to make clean energy artificially cheaper are becoming unsustainable.¶ Clean tech crashes are nothing new. The U.S. wind energy industry has collapsed three times before, first in the mid 1990s and most recently in 2002 and 2004 when Congress failed to extend the tax credit that made it profitable. But the impact and magnitude of the coming clean tech crash will far outstrip those of past years.¶ As part of its effort to combat the economic recession, the federal government pumped nearly $80 billion in direct investment and tax credits into the clean energy sector, catalyzing an unprecedented industry expansion. Solar energy, for example, grew 67% in the United States in 2010. The U.S. wind energy industry also experienced unprecedented growth as a result of the generous Section 1603 clean energy stimulus program. The industry grew by 40% and added 10 GW of new turbines in 2009. Yet many of the federal subsidies that have driven such rapid growth are set to expire in the next few years, and clean energy remains unable to compete without them.¶ The crash won't be limited to the United States. In many European countries, clean energy subsidies have become budget casualties as governments attempt to curb mounting deficits. Spain, Germany, France, Italy and the Czech Republic have all announced cuts to clean energy subsidies.¶ Such cuts are not universal, however. China, flush with cash, is bucking the trend, committing $760 billion over 10 years for clean energy projects. China is continuing to invest in low-carbon energy as a way of meeting its voracious energy demand, diversifying its electricity supply, and alleviating some of the negative health consequences of its reliance on fossil energy.¶ If U.S. and European clean energy markets collapse while investment continues to ramp up in China, the short-term consequences will likely be a migration of much of the industry to Asia. As we wrote in our 2009 report, "Rising Tigers, Sleeping Giant," this would have significant economic consequences for the United States, as the jobs, revenues and other benefits of clean tech growth accrue overseas.¶ In the long-term, however, clean energy must become much cheaper and more reliable if it is to widely displace fossil fuels on the scale of national economies and become a commercially viable industry.¶ Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle¶ Why is the United States still locked in this self-perpetuating boom-bust cycle in clean energy? The problem, according to a new essay by energy experts David Victor and Kassia Yanosek in this week's Foreign Affairs, is that our system of clean energy subsidization is jury-rigged to support the deployment of only the least-risky and most mature clean energy technologies, while lacking clear incentives for continual innovation that could make clean energy competitive on cost with conventional energy sources. Rather, we should "invest in more innovative technologies that stand a better chance of competing with conventional energy sources over the long haul." According to Victor and Yanosek, nearly seven-eighths of global clean energy investment goes toward deploying existing technologies that aren't competitive without subsidy, while only a small share goes to encouraging innovation in existing technologies or developing new ones.¶ This must change. Rather than simply subsidize production of current technologies, we need a comprehensive energy innovation strategy to develop, manufacture, and deploy riskier but more promising clean energy technologies that may eventually compete with fossil energy at scale. Instead of rewarding companies for building the same product, we should reward companies who continuously improve designs and cut costs over time.¶ Such a federal strategy will require major federal investments, but of a different kind than the subsidies that have driven the clean tech industry in years past. For starters, we must dramatically ramp up funding for early-stage clean energy research and development. A growing bipartisan group of think tanks and business leaders have pushed an investment of at least $15 billion annually in energy R&D, up from its current $4 billion level.¶ Targeted funding is needed to solve technology challenges and ensure that innovative technologies can develop and improve. One key program that helps fulfill this need is ARPA-E, which funds a portfolio of innovative technology companies and helps connect them with private investors. But ARPA-E's budget has continually been under assault in budget negotiations, hampering its ability to catalyze innovation in the energy sector and limiting its impact.¶ We also need to invest in cutting-edge advanced manufacturing capabilities and shared technology infrastructure that would help U.S. companies cut costs and improve manufacturing processes. As the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology wrote in a report released last week, manufacturing is vital to innovation, "because of the synergies created by locating production processes and design processes near to each other." Furthermore, bringing down manufacturing costs, such as by supporting shared infrastructure for small firms, or offering financing for the adoption of innovative technologies in manufacturing, will be a key component of reducing the costs of new clean energy innovations.¶ Lastly, the nation's hodgepodge of energy deployment subsidies is in dire need of reform. As Breakthrough and colleagues wrote in "Post-Partisan Power," we need an energy deployment regime that demands and rewards innovation, rather than just supporting more of the same. Brookings' Mark Muro (a co-author or PPP) expands, "targeted and competitive deployment incentives could be created for various classes of energy technologies that would ensure that each has a chance to mature even as each is challenged to innovate and locate price declines." Rather than create permanently subsidized industries, such investments would "provide the opportunity for opportunity for all emerging low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs," while speeding commercialization.¶ It is clear that the current budgetary environment in the United States presents challenges to the viability of the fast-growing clean energy industry. But it also presents an opportunity. By repurposing existing clean energy policies and investing in clean energy innovation, the United States can be the first country to make clean energy cheap and reliable, a distinction that is sure to bring major economic benefits in a multi-trillion dollar energy market.

### Solvency

#### No fusion

Geoff Brumfiel, Scientific American, June 2012, Fusion's Missing Pieces, EBSCO

Scientists such as Lee have been seduced by fusion for half a century. Many before him have promised its impending arrival. Although some of those researchers were charlatans, the vast majority of them turned out to be plain wrong. Fusion is tough, and nature breaks promises.

Here is the core challenge: because hydrogen ions repel one another, scientists must slam them together to make them fuse. ITER's strategy is to heat the hydrogen inside a magnetic cage. The particular type of magnetic cage it employs is called a tokamak -- a metal doughnut circled by loops of coil that generate magnetic fields. These magnetic cuffs squeeze a charged plasma of hydrogen ions as it warms to hundreds of millions of degrees -- temperatures no solid material can withstand.

In the 1970s tokamaks looked so promising that some researchers predicted they could build fusion electricity plants by the mid-1990s. The only challenge was scaling research reactors up to sufficient size -- in general, the bigger the tokamak, the hotter the plasma can get, and the more efficient fusion becomes.

Then problems arose. Plasma conducts electricity and so can suffer from self-generated currents that make it buck and writhe. Violent turbulence snaps the plasma out of its cage, firing it toward the machine's wall. As the temperature rises, the tokamak grows to give the plasma space, and the magnetic fields need to be stronger to hold it. Extra room and stronger magnetic fields require higher electric current in the doughnut's copper coils. And higher current requires more power. Put simply: the larger and more powerful a machine becomes, the more energy it consumes trying to hold everything together.

This feedback meant that conventional tokamaks would never produce more energy than they consumed. Lee and others knew of only one solution: superconductors -- special materials that, at very low temperatures, can carry extremely high current with no resistance. If a tokamak's magnets were superconducting, they could be pumped up with current and left to run indefinitely. It would solve the energy problem but would not be cheap. Superconductors are exotic, expensive materials. And to work, they need to be constantly cooled with liquid helium to just four kelvins above absolute zero.

#### Plan crushes ITER

Cunningham, 8-15-12

[Nicholas, American Security Project, “Fusion Budget on Hold’,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/fusion-budget-on-hold/]

The European Union is financing 45% of the total cost of ITER, with six other nations (one of which is the United States) chipping in 9% each. That means that the ITER bill for the U.S. totals a relatively modest $2.8 billion spread over 10 years. However, U.S. funding for both ITER and the American domestic fusion program comes out of the same pie, pitting the two against each other. Congressional efforts to cut government spending have put appropriators in a bind. In order to meet its international commitments, President Obama has proposed to take $45 million out of the domestic program (a 16% cut), and reallocate that money to ITER. The cut to the domestic program would essentially shut down MIT’s Alcator C-MOD fusion project, a facility that is researching smaller and cheaper ways of doing fusion. Scrapping the MIT program would be a huge setback. The Senate is going along with the President’s budget, appropriating $398 million for the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences, the office through which fusion labs get their funding. The House on the other hand, balked at the President’s request. Instead, it increased funding to $475 million. The two appropriations bills have not been reconciled. Fusion Power Associates has a good explanation of the details here. Realistically, fusion funding is a sideshow compared to other budget fights in Congress, so the fusion program is hostage to the political season. House Speaker John Boehner reached an agreement with Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid to pass a six-month continuing resolution when Congress returns in September. The six-month continuing resolution will mean that fusion funding remains unchanged from FY12 levels (no cuts), at least through early next year. So, while the fusion program has been spared for a few months, the budget fight will resume in early 2013.

#### Cutting ITER funding crushes US science collaboration efforts -- countries won’t cooperate with us.

FPA, ‘8

[Fusion Power Associates, 1-4, “ITER Budget Cuts Protested,” http://aries.ucsd.edu/fpa/fpn08-01.shtml]

On January 4, 21 members of the U.S. fusion community sent a letter to members of Congress and the Executive Branch protesting the removal of funds for U.S. participation in the ITER project in the Fiscal Year 2008 appropriations bill recently signed by the President. The letter was addressed to the President's Science Advisor, John Marburger, the Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, and the chairs of the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Energy and Water Development, Byron Dorgan and Peter Visclosky, respectively. Copies of the letter were sent of Department of Energy Under Secretary for Science Raymond Orbach and to all members of the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, Energy and Natural Resources, and Science and Technology. The letter reads as follows: Despite being fully funded in the President's and in the House and Senate Appropriations measures, the Fiscal Year 2008 omnibus funding measure contains $0 for the U.S. contribution to the ITER Project. ITER is the key breakthrough project for magnetic fusion energy. The purpose of the ITER Project is to "demonstrate the scientific and technological feasibility of fusion energy for peaceful purposes." If the United States cannot participate in ITER, the U.S. will lose a centerpiece of its own fusion program, a key scientific tool for understanding a fundamental process in the universe (burning plasmas like those in the sun and stars) and the pathway to the future of fusion energy. ITER is a joint project of the China, the European Union, India, Japan, Korea, Russia and the United States. Congress authorized U.S. participation in this project in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the President committed the United States to its approximately 10% share of the ITER construction just a few months ago. Failure by the United States to sustain its international commitments to ITER seems certain to establish the United States as an unreliable partner not only in the ITER project, but in many other areas of science. This comes at a time when the expense and scope of many critically important scientific activities suggest international partnership and cooperation. Therefore, for the sake of the international and domestic fusion effort and for the sake of the U.S. reputation in the international scientific community, we most respectfully urge that funding be provided for continued U.S. participation in ITER.

#### International scientific collaboration solves extinction -- war, terrorism, disease, poverty, resource distribution, climate change, environmental collapse.

**Hassan, ‘8**

[Mohammed, executive director of TWAS, the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World, 1-1, Issues in Science and Technology]

Expanding the reach of ST&I to countries that have been largely left behind is one of the most critical problems of our time. But it isby no means the only one. The problems of sustainable well-being areincreasingly complex and global in their dimensions. Yet the people who are most vulnerable to the risks posed by global assaults on the environment are often the most impoverished and marginalized people in the developing world. In our interconnected world, which has become a truly global community thanks largely to the Internet and airline travel, no country can fully escape the acute problems that plague other nations. That is the message encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approved by member states of the United Nations in 2000. These goals set targets to address the world's most pressing problems--problems that stand in the way of sustainable well-being in the developing worldand that threaten peace and harmony everywhere: poverty, hunger, thespread of infectious diseases, poor education, gender inequality, and the lack of access to safe drinking water, sanitation, and energy. To help make progress on all these fronts, the MDGs' eighth measure calls for the creation of global partnerships that tap the collective talents of individuals and institutions in the developed and developing worlds. Experts agree that the MDGs have no chance of being metunless special attention is paid to problems of well-being (or should we say ill-being) that exist in Africa. More than 40% of all Africans do not have access to safe drinking water. Seventy percent do not have access to electricity. Twenty-five million Africans are infectedwith HIV, more than 60% of the world's total. Ninety percent of the world's malaria victims, numbering more than one million people each year, reside in Africa. Agriculture is the main source of sustenance and income for 70% of all Africans. Yet in Africa, 30 million children go to bed hungry every night. Africa may be poor, but it is not small. It includes more than 20%of Earth's landmass, comprising an area larger than Australia, Brazil, Europe, and the United States combined. And although Africa may beweak, it is home to nearly one billion people. Africa, in short, maybe poor and weak, but it cannot be ignored. In many respects, the future of our planet lies with the future of Africa. Africa, simply put, is where global attention must be focused if we are to make progress in meeting the MDGs. But that still leaves open the question of what tools must be summoned in our efforts to succeed. The fact is that the MDGs cannot be achieved without strong capacity to generate and use ST&I and without vigorous and sustained international partnerships to help build this capacity. Other

global issues, which affect the developed and developing world in equal measure, also carry growing significance. Global warming is at the top of this list. But in addition, there are issues relatedto energy security, access to adequate supplies of drinking water, and the overexploitation of natural resources such as fisheries and forests. Consequently, the second major challenge is this: How can international collaboration in ST&I assist in solving urgent global problems facing the world today? Reducing the gap between rich and poor countries and ensuring that the most critical global issues are tackled with tools that only global ST&I can provide are daunting challenges that cannot be met unless a critical mass of well-trained scientists is present in all countries. Today, experts estimate that more scientists who have been educated and trained in universities in sub-Saharan Africa have migrated to the United States than have remained in Africa. Experience has shown that brain drain cannot be stopped unless the most talented scientists find favorable working conditions in their homelands. Once a scientist has left and established roots in another country, it is difficult to lure him or her back home, although China, South Korea, and Taiwan have been exceptions to this rule. Yet, as Rajiv Gandhi, the eldest son of Indira Gandhi and former prime minister of India, has noted:"Better brain drain than brain in the drain." Experience has also shown that a nation's scientific diaspora can be tapped through international scientific exchange in ways that could prove beneficial to both the scientists' host and adopted countries. So the third challenge for international cooperation in ST&I is this: How can global cooperation assist in converting the brain drain into brain circulation, providing benefits for both scientists and thescientific community regardless of where a scientist was born and where he or she chooses to live and work? Science is a global enterprise, and excellence in science has always depended on the ability of scientists to associate freely with their colleagues around the world. Such movement not only benefits international science but also serves to deepen international understanding and appreciation of cultural diversity--a welcome byproduct in today's troubled world. Yet as we all know, the free circulation of scientists, especially to the United States, has been severely restricted since the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001. The scientific community fully recognizes that security interests take precedence over scientific exchange. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that scientific exchange is an important instrument in the fight against ignorance, suspicion, hopelessness, and terrorism. The U.S.State Department, urged by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences andothers, has taken steps to ease the burden of entry into the United States for scientists traveling from abroad. But many of our colleagues, particularly those from Africa and the Islamic region, hope that more can be done. Governments in the developing world are also discussing, and in some cases implementing, strategies to facilitate foreign travel by their scientists. For example, earlier this year the foreign ministers of the African Union (AU) endorsed a proposal to grant displomatic passports to African scientists to ease their travel across Africa.

### Fusion Leadership

#### NIFs close to successful fusion -- solves energy supplies within the decade.

Cossins, 12-6-12

[Daniel, Wired, “The world's biggest laser could give the electrical grid a boost,” <http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2012/12/start/power-surge>]

The day after this year's US Independence Day fireworks lit up American skies, scientists at the National Ignition Facility (NIF) in Livermore, California, released the most powerful laser shot in history. For a brief moment, 192 laser beams fired simultaneously at a 2mm-diameter target, producing 500 trillion Watts of power and 1.85 megajoules of UV laser light -- 100 times more than any other laser has produced. The laser has taken the $3.5-billion (£2bn) factory a step nearer its goal: fusion ignition, the point at which nuclear-fusion reactions become self-sustaining and churn out more energy than was originally supplied. It's the same process that gives stars their energy and it could provide us with abundant, sustainable power. The conditions required for ignition are within reach. "We are close," says Mike Dunne, programme director for laser-fusion energy at NIF. "Ignition will prove the physics works. With funding, we could put hundreds of megaWatts of power into the grid within ten years."

#### The affs not key to reap global fusion benefits -- other countries will fill the void.

Olynyk, ‘12

[Geoff, The Tech -- MIT, 3-6, “Opinion: GUEST COLUMN: Fusion research is a wise investment,” http://tech.mit.edu/V132/N9/olynyk.html]

The proposed budget ramps down the U.S. fusion program at a time when other countries are scaling up their efforts. In China, a new long-pulse tokamak called EAST is now producing scientific results, and the government has announced plans to train 2,000 fusion PhDs this decade. In Korea, fusion funding is guaranteed by law until 2040. Germany has a new stellarator (another type of magnetic fusion device) coming online next year. A consortium of six nations plus the EU is constructing the world’s first burning-plasma device, the ITER tokamak in France, which will produce 10 times more fusion power than external power put in to heat the plasma. The rest of the world sees the tremendous potential of magnetic fusion energy.

#### Even with unlimited funding and a perfect investment climate the plan will have no effect for decades.

CN, ‘12

[The Challenge Network, “Nuclear Fusion: Penurious Promise,” <http://www.chforum.org/scenario2012/paper-1-4.shtml>]

Suppose that we had access to unlimited funds and that it was clear today how to spend them? The figure shows work done by Shell on the pace at which energy technologies penetrate the global market. Plainly, the economic potential and the regulatory environment will effect these, but the general trend is clear enough. Fusion, if available today, would take a considerable time to replace and extend existing electricity infrastructure. What consequences would even the knowledge of its certain existence have on the world? It would, self-evidently, render investment in all but a few renewables obsolete. It would change our perception of primary energy from a limited to an unlimited resource, or one properly limited only by economic realities. It would considerably reduce the long run potential of the oil producing countries, and increase those of, in particular, poor importing nations. However, given the slow penetration that the figure shows, these would be impacts anticipated rather than felt in 2025. The forced retirement of conventional power stations by states as a climate management measure could well bring this forward, but still to the 2030s and beyond. The nature of the plant - turnkey modules or complex, delicate equipment that needed constant expert management - would greatly impact poor-world uptake, and hydrocarbons could become "poor man's energy" in such an environment.

### C-Mod

#### The US won’t fund quantum computing research – their author

**Aaronson 8**

(Scott, Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT, "Quantum Computing and the Ultimate Limits of Computation: The Case for a National Investment," 12-12-08, [http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum\_Computing.pdf-http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum\_Computing.pdf](http://www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum_Computing.pdf-http%3A//www.cra.org/ccc/docs/init/Quantum_Computing.pdf))

The US has long dominated computing technology. The transistor and integrated circuit

were invented in the US, and Silicon Valley has been the preeminent creator of computing

technologies over the last few decades. It is critical that the US continue to lead with the

computing technologies of the 21st century. Recently Singapore invested over $100 million

in quantum computing research. The Canadian government has contributed over $50

million to the University of Waterloo's Institute for Quantum Computing and the Perimeter

Institute for Theoretical Physics, both of which have become world leaders in quantum

computing and information. European spending on quantum computing is comparable to

that of the US. In short, while the US has funded quantum computing research, it has done

so only at a level sufficient enough to barely keep up with the rest of the world. In some

areas of quantum computing, for instance in the theory of these computers, the US is being

eclipsed by the rest of the world.

#### Their China fusion leadership argument says its inevitable and happening now – it’s not reverse causal, the aff has ZERO evidence that says it will stop this

#### Chinese fusion research inevitable – and has ramped up despite prior US support

Shieber, 11 (Jonathan, “China Cranks Up Heat on Nuclear Fusion” WSJ, 5/26, <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/05/26/china-cranks-up-heat-on-nuclear-fusion/>)

According to a report in the state-run China Daily, the central government is planning to train 2,000 experts to pursue research and development into magnetic confinement fusion, which seeks to use magnetic fields to create the high-pressure conditions necessary for fusion.

A number of research institutes and private companies around the world are racing to perfect magnetic confinement.

China is already a signatory and participant in the France-based International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, that is perhaps the largest project pursuing magnetic approach. Arguably one of the most world’s ambitious multinational scientific undertakings, the project has a price tag of at least $21 billion and involves hundreds of scientists from China, the European Union, Japan, India Korea, Russia and the United States.

One concern among Chinese scientists is that the nation is not getting enough value out of its investment the ITER project. “China is trying to dispatch more qualified scientists to work on” the project, Cao Jianlin, vice-minister of science and technology, told China Daily.

Right now China provides 10% of the funding for the project, but supplies only 5% of the scientists, which means the country is missing out on valuable training for its would-be fusion experts.

Chinese engineers and scientists are currently responsible for building components such as heating, diagnostic and remote maintenance equipment for the project, as well as transporting it to Cadarache in the south of France, where the ITER reactor will be built.

Another researcher quoted by the China Daily thinks it’s not nearly enough and complained about the lack of exposure Chinese scientists are getting to the new technologies that could reshape the energy market.

“The ITER is related to 34 core scientific engineering technologies and management subjects,” Wan Yuanxi, dean of the school of nuclear science and technology under the University of Science and Technology of China, said. “Chinese researchers only work on 11 of them, which means we have no involvement in more than 60 percent of its core scientific engineering technologies and management subjects.”

In addition to its international efforts, China is also pursuing its own research into fusion technologies in research around the country, including at a laboratory in Chengdu.

An April guideline issued jointly by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Education, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the China National Nuclear Corp. recommends the government subsidize at least 200 researchers who intend to pursue doctorates in magnetic controlled fusion.

Currently there are 1,254 researchers have been involved with magnetic controlled fusion-related projects in China, according to the China Daily report.

Not to be outdone, the U.S. has spent billions of dollars on fusion research, in addition to the work it is doing to promote ITER projects domestically and on the main project in France, although funding for the European project has been a political football in the past. Like China, the US is responsible for around 9% of the ITER project’s total costs, with the EU has taking on the bulk of financing.

#### No impact to fusion prolif -- the international community will be able to respond quickly and disable the facility.

Goldston et al., ‘9

[RJ., A. Glaser, AF Ross, Princeton University, “Proliferation Risks of Fusion Energy: Clandestine Production, Covert Production, and Breakout,” <http://web.mit.edu/fusion-fission/HybridsPubli/Fusion_Proliferation_Risks.pdf>]

In sum, it appears that a time scale of at least 1–2 months would be required to produce one significant quantity of weapon-usable material in a fusion power plant after breakout. This period is dominated by the time required to reconfigure and restart the facility. More analysis is required to refine this estimate, but it gives a sense of the time scale over which the international community would be able to react without concern that significant quantities of fissile material had already been produced. As with the fission breakout scenario, there are political and diplomatic options at this point, but unlike the fission case there is also the option to disable the plant and prevent the production of weapon-usable material. Fusion power plants require many supporting facilities that are non-nuclear in nature, but if deactivated would immediately prevent the power plant from operating. These include the massive power input and power conditioning equipment that provides electricity to the magnets, a very large cryoplant that provides liquid nitrogen and liquid helium to these magnets, and the secondary cooling system that removes heat from the system. Such facilities can be seen in the layout of the ITER site, shown in Figure 4. These are distant from the fusion confinement system itself, and could be disabled without significant risk of nuclear contamination. The fact that this can accomplished before a significant quantity of weapon-usable material is produced represents a qualitative difference from the fission breakout scenario.

#### FYI -- fusion weapons (ICF) have zilch to do with fusion reactors -- the former are Fourth Generation thermonuclear reaction weapons, use nanotech and lasers and have distinct R & D trajectories

**Parker ‘3**, Randall, FuturePundit “Nanotech To Enable New Types Of WMD” January 21 http://www.futurepundit.com/archives/cat\_dangers\_nanotech.html

Nanotechnology will make it possible to develop new kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Nanotechnology has the potential to create entirely new weapons.Fourth-generation nuclear weapons are new types of nuclear explosives that would use inertial confinement fusion (ICF) facilities. The defining technical characteristic of fourth-generation nuclear weapons is the triggering - by some advanced technology such as a superlaser - of a relatively small thermonuclear explosion in which a deuterium-tritium mixture is burnt in a device whose weight and size are not much larger than a few kilograms. Since the yield of these warheads could go from a fraction of a ton to many tens of tons of high-explosive equivalent, their delivery by precision-guided munitions or other means will dramatically increase the fire-power of those who possess them - without crossing the threshold of using kiloton-to-megaton nuclear weapons, and therefore without breaking the taboo against the first-use of WMD. Moreover, since these new weapons will use no (or very little) fissionable materials, they are expected to produce virtually no radioactive fallout. The problem this poses is that as nanotech manufacturing equipment becomes available for purchase many more groups and countries will be able to make weapons that are currently beyond their technical ability to build. The ability to build nuclear weapons with little or no fissionable materials will remove another obstacle. Countries that are now struggling to buy and build uranium and plutonium enrichment facilities (e.g. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and perhaps Libya) will suddenly find that the size of that problem will shrink by orders of magnitude.

### Development

#### Huge timeframe before spinoffs will be beneficial -- takes longer than fusion to get right.

Rothwell, ‘97

[Jed, cold fusion researcher, “Cold Fusion and the Future: Part 2 - A Look at Economics and Society,” March-June, Infinite Energy Magazine, Issue #13-#14, http://www.infinite-energy.com/iemagazine/issue1314/future.html]

Cold fusion spin-off like indoor farming, desalination, and aerospace engines will take decades to develop. They will require massive investment, new factories, and years of research. Cold fusion itself will take time to perfect, but the spin-offs will take longer because they are more complex, and because large scale research on them will not begin until cold fusion is commercialized. Indoor farming with robots might take 30 to 60 years to develop. It is cost effective for some crops already: flowers in the Netherlands, tomatoes in Tokyo, aquaculture in Boston. But it will be a long time, if ever, before we grow wheat more cheaply indoors than on the Great Plains. The change to automated indoor farming will occur gradually, giving displaced farm workers time to find new jobs. The energy production industries ­ oil, gas, coal, and the electric power companies ­ are another matter. The potential for chaotic disruption here is very great, because the transition will be swift and it will be in one direction only. All jobs will be lost, none will be created.

#### Your predictions are bad – other areas disprove

**HGFRC, ‘1** (Institutes of the HGF Research Collaboration on Nuclear Fusion, Hearing on Nuclear Fusion before the Bundestag Committee for Education, Research, and Technology Assessment, 28 March 2001, http://fire.pppl.gov/eu\_bundestag\_english.pdf)//CC

Moreover, it is to be doubted that the presentation of long spin-off lists can be regarded as a justification for high future expenditures. Such lists have been drawn up in many areas of research, among others, in elementary particle physics (CERN), in space research (ESA, NASA) and also in the field of fusion research (JET, DOE Office for Fusion Research). A justification on the basis of expected spin-offs, however, is not possible since it is difficult to quantify the coming economic benefit. It would also have to be analysed what benefit would have been achieved if this money had been spent otherwise. On the other hand, it may be assumed, however, that the expenditure of similar sums in different high-technology areas produces similar levels of spin-offs. The fact that fusion research requires very complex, specifically developed instruments in various technological areas makes it so to speak destined for the generation of spin-off products.

#### Status quo solves – ITER not key

**Morrison, ’10** (Chris Morrison, CBS Money Watch, 1 February 2010, “Ten Serious Nuclear Fusion Projects Making Progress Around the World,” [http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123\_162-34242897/ten-serious-nuclear-fusion-projects-making-progress-around-the-world/)//CC](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-34242897/ten-serious-nuclear-fusion-projects-making-progress-around-the-world/%29//CC)

Besides the NIF, there are fusion projects going on around the world. All have two things in common: they're still at an experimental stage, and they've all been derided by critics at one point or another. But by looking at the pedigree, breakthroughs and financial support of projects, I've come up with a set of TKTK projects that, like the NIF, could someday give the world a cheap new energy source. I've tried to roughly rank them by their apparent prospects. By necessity the descriptions are pretty short, but you can Google any for more; also, look up the Lawson criterion, which sets the requirements for the sort of self-powered fusion reactions that would be required for any of the below projects to be successful. Here they are: The National Ignition Facility (USA) -- With its initial proof of the viability of using lasers to create fusion, the NIF has become the world's most watched fusion project. The ful name of the technology is laser-based inertial confinement fusion; the basic concept is firing 192 separate lasers to rapidly compress a tiny fuel pellet, which will (hopefully)undergo fusion at its core. Experiments around the idea began in the late 1970s, and following a series of cost overruns, the $3.5 billion NIF opened last year. ITER and DEMO (France) -- The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor is planned for France, but ultimately funded by seven countries, if you count the European Union as a single member. Building on the work of numerous other projects, like the Joint European Torus, China's EAST and South Korea's KSTAR, it would be proper to call ITER the grandfather of fusion research -- though the facility won't actually be complete until 2018. ITER is based on a tokamak, a circular (toroidal) magnetic chamber that compresses atoms to achieve fusion. If ITER works out perfectly, construction could begin on DEMO, a Demonstration Power Plant intended to produce usable amounts of electricity. LDX (USA) -- The Levitating Dipole Experiment, also mentioned above, is MIT's attempt to create a new design for fusion reactors. While shaped like a tokamak, which uses external magnets, the LDX brings the magnetic field inside its chamber, allowing different interactions with the plasma inside, including an unexpected density from turbulence. And, as the name suggests, the chamber levitates. HiPER (Europe) -- The High Power Laser Energy Research facility is supposed to be something of an improvement on the NIF's design, using a "fast ignition" approach that shrinks the size and output of the lasers to save on energy costs. Needless to say, HiPER got a boost from the NIF's early success, but the initial design and construction work isn't planned to begin for another year or two. Z-IFE (USA) -- A device at Sandia National Laboratory called the Z machine has proven capable of reaching extremely high temperatures (in the billions of Kelvins) and causing fusion with X-rays. Sandia has already upgraded the Z machine once, and through a series of further upgrades plans to reach the Z-inertial fusion energy (ZIFE) power plant and work up to creating a fairly continuous stream of fusion energy. The trick, as with all of these projects, will be achieving a positive energy output. General Fusion (Canada) -- This is a Canadian startup working on something they call "acoustically driven magnetized target fusion". Much like the NIF's laser fusion, General Fusion plans to use many pressure points to cause fusion in a central pellet; but unlike NIF, the company's design uses phsyical rams that transmit shock waves to compress the material. It's funded with a few million dollars, versus the billions governments have put into projects like NIF and ITER, but General Fusion can at least claim a unique design, which it says is superior because of modern computer controls. Lawrenceville Plasma Physics (USA) -- Another private company, LPP is working with even less funding than General Fusion, for the moment. LPP, run by a researcher who started off with NASA grants, plans to use a "dense plasma focus" device that creates magnetic fields with electricity and uses them to focus matter into a plasmoid. While similar to ITER, one of its advantages would be a lack of external magnets (like the LDX); another, its much lower cost to prototype and smaller scale overall. FRX-L (USA) -- Under study at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Air Force Research Laboratory, the FRX-L uses magnetized target fusion, which is much like General Fusion's approach, above. Unlike General Fusion, the researchers using FRX-L aren't driven by the imperative of finding success within a few short years or being shut down. Wendelstein 7-X (Germany) -- Another pilot project intended only to evaluate the potential of fusion energy, the Wendelstein 7-X is, like ITER, based on a toroidal design. The 7-X will be a replacement for the previous 7-AS unit at Germany's Max Planck Institute when it's completed in 2015; the aim is for the unit to be able to operate for 30 minutes continuously, proving that fusion could be used in power plants. Sonofusion (USA) -- Also called bubble fusion, this technique can supposedly use sound waves to compress matter for fusion. It's also in the scientific doghouse, following a scandal in which the students of a researcher who initially claimed to have achieved sonofusion wrote a paper supporting his results. You can find a long technical paper on it here, and there's also a startup called Impulse Devices working on sonofusion.

#### Mad Cow is laughable – no reverse causal internal link

#### Status quo solves the case -- ITER research.

Busquin, ‘3

[Philippe, European Research Commissioner, “Fusion Energy: Moving Forward,” http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/pdf/spin\_off\_en.pdf]

Achieving the aim of making fusion a viable energy source requires a sustained long-term research effort. Due to the scale of the undertaking and the need for expertise in a wide range of disciplines, it is being conducted as a joint effort by the EU Member States. The successes achieved to date show that we are ready to demonstrate the scientific and technical feasibility of fusion by a further major experiment that is essentially the ‘core’ of a fusion power station. Collaboration is now taking place on a global scale on the possible construction and operation of such an experiment. Together with its international partners, Europe is engaged in the planning of the large next-step fusion device ITER. The underlying basic science, plasma physics, and a whole range of supporting technologies have advanced in leaps and bounds in the coordinated work on fusion R&D. A major benefit has been the degree of co-operation on both a European and on a world level. This has evolved to a higher degree than in any other field of scientific or technological research, providing a valuable model and a precedent for the internationalisation of R&D in other areas. Attainment of the goal of fusion power is an exciting and stimulating challenge. Along the way many of the leading-edge technologies involved have been pushed to new limits and in many cases the innovative solutions to the challenging problems have found applications far beyond the bounds of fusion. There are already numerous examples of spin-offs with other applications in industry, providing real solutions to real and current problems. The exploitation of spin-offs from the technologies developed within the fusion programme is of significant benefit to European society. Examples of spinoff successes resulting from development work in the fusion programme, past and present are highlighted in this brochure. A feature of the European Fusion Programme is the constant knowledge transfer between the Programme and industry. ITER, however, is an exciting new challenge promising a wealth of additional spin-off opportunities for those involved. The purpose of this brochure is to stimulate interest in the exciting challenges in fusion R&D and to provide guidance on where to obtain help and information on the exploitation of potential spin-offs. Large companies, many of which may already have experience of operating on an international stage, would be involved in ITER. Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME’s), many of which may previously only have had experience in a more limited area of operation, would also be involved either directly or indirectly as subcontractors of larger companies.

## 2nc

### 2nc CP solvency

#### The CP addresses all current risks in the current fusion program – diversifying the research program away from an exclusive focus on short-pulse tokamaks and ITER to turn tokamaks into a stellerator program solves

**Wurden, 12** - LANL Fusion Energy Sciences Program Manager(Glen, “Risk Reduction” <http://fire.pppl.gov/Wurden%20White%20Paper-2.pdf>)

Germany has a major investment in alternates. Japan has a major investment in alternates. China has many parallel approaches under development. We should not be left with a program that is effectively ITER and nothing else. We should not plan a program without significant risk reduction efforts. And I mean, risk reduction approaches that are as orthogonal to the tokamak as possible, in key areas that are known to be tokamak weaknesses. Our program can be a world leader in alternates, once again.

What does this mean for the US Fusion Energy Sciences program in the next 5‐10 years?

1). We should expand the stellarator program in the USA. One of the three tokamak facilities should be given the opportunity to make a systematic transition towards a mid‐sized stellarator (instead of their present tokamak), as a result of a directed competition. This would be the next new US machine.

2). We should restart reactor design modeling efforts, that really look at simultaneous issues of RAMI,

blanket replacement, complexity/simplicity, and tritium breeding (not just hypothetical, but can you

really get the ratios you need in the presence of other demands on actual in‐ vessel real estate).

3). I suggest a reasonable split of resources is 30% on ITER, 30% on tokamak (which includes ST and AT

R&D), and 30% on alternates. The other 10% can go to basic plasma science and HEDLP, which

unfortunately aren’t being discussed here today.

#### A stellarator program solves and they can’t win offense because US ITER funding will sustain tokamak research. Stellarators create a credible alternative form of magnetic confinement and maximize US leadership – and they are more likely to be commercialized – which means it solves their fusion advantage better

**Weitzner, 12** - Professor of Mathematics Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences New York University (Harold, “The Need for a National Stellarator Program” <http://fire.pppl.gov/FESAC_WP_Stellarator_Weitzner.pdf>)

A national stellarator program should be an integral part of the U.S. magnetic fusion program. The stellarator program should be at least as large as it is at present, and preferably larger. The arguments in favor of stellarator research are easily stated, clear, and generally accepted. As a candidate fusion device stellarators are a credible alternative to tokamaks, with significant advantages, as well as difficult issues, in comparison with the leader. Outside the U.S., stellarators are on a slow, but steady, development path, complementing the main line efforts. It can be, and has been, argued that stellarator development could be deferred until any serious limitations of the tokamak line are identified. Even without consideration of the important contributions made by stellarator work in support of the tokamak line, the policy of deferring stellarator development is unwise. Even if ITER achieves all its goals, the need to maintain currents in a tokamak for extremely long pulses could render the tokamak concept difficult to translate into an economically sensible power source. Additionally, one must recognize that in any research project there is a possibility of not reaching one’s goals. In either case, one should have available a credible alternative to the main line activity. One should not wait additional decades to offer an alternative. These ideas are well recognized outside the U.S., and our program should also be an active participant in furthering this part of world fusion development.

#### This can be achieved by reprioritizing the domestic research program – it can occur without an increase in fusion research

**Neilson, 12** - Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (Hutch, “A Leadership-Class U.S. Domestic Stellarator Program” <http://fire.pppl.gov/FESAC_WP_Stellarator_PPPL.pdf>)

Q: Can we afford it under flat budget constraints? A: Indeed the proposed program would require

significant budgets on several FES budget lines, growing over the next few years by, for

example, ~$50M in major facilities, ~$5M in theory and computation, and ~$5M in international

collaboration. Within a flat domestic MFE budget, it would obviously require significant shifts in

priorities and redirection of work affecting multiple institutions and individuals. Whether we are

capable of such a shift is not in doubt. We are much better positioned than China and Korea

were 15 years ago, before they grew world-class fusion programs starting from practically

nothing. Most U.S. stellarator researchers today came from backgrounds in tokamak research,

and the W7-X research team will necessarily be staffed mostly by people with little or no prior

stellarator experience. U.S. researchers and institutions are versatile enough to adapt their talents

and technical capabilities to new challenges.

Q: Why not wait for W7-X or for growth in the overall U.S. fusion budget? A: One can make

that choice, but it amounts to a decision to forego a clear opportunity that exists now to assert

international leadership and follow a path with potential for breakthroughs and quantum

improvements in the vision for magnetic fusion energy systems.

#### The CP is much more cost-effective than the aff -- enables effective fusion research.

Tang, ‘12

[W.M., Princeton University, Plasma Physics Laboratory, 7-26, “White Paper: Fusion Simulation Program (FSP),” http://fire.pppl.gov/FESAC\_WP\_FSP\_Tang.pdf]

In view of the current ITER fiscal issues, it is particularly important to highlight validated simulation and modeling capabilities, enabled by modern high-performance computing, as key to mitigating costs by: (i) designing optimized scenarios and providing possible in situ guidance for the long pulse ITER experiments; (ii) efficient harvesting and dissemination of results from ITER; and (iii) risk mitigation by rapid proto-typing and exploring alternative designs and approaches. In particular, projections for plasma performance in the international burning plasma ITER experiment have been based on simplified computational models. However, reliable operation and efficient experimentation will demand careful planning based on more accurate modeling of the integrated physics in ITER as our knowledge continues to significantly improve.

#### Those simulation programs are all we need to meet the ITER commitment

Tang, ‘12

[W.M., Princeton University, Plasma Physics Laboratory, 7-26, “White Paper: Fusion Simulation Program (FSP),” http://fire.pppl.gov/FESAC\_WP\_FSP\_Tang.pdf]

Over the past decade, the development and initiation of the FSP has been strongly supported by numerous major community workshops and strongly endorsed by FESAC and ASCAC panels. The problems now targeted by the FSP are entirely consistent with key priorities articulated by the ITER organization (IO), the FES community Research Needs Workshop (ReNeW) document, and the recent FESAC reports on international collaboration opportunities (e.g., in Asia with long pulse experimental capabilities not available in US facilities). A two-year DoEfunded FSP planning effort has produced a program plan in 2011 posted on the national FSP web-site and was achieved with strong community engagement via numerous national workshops and individual site visits to laboratories, universities, and industries. This major effort involved 6 national laboratories, 9 universities, and 2 companies that followed a set of prioritization criteria which included: (i) a clear need for multi-scale, multi-physics integration; (ii) importance and urgency; (iii) readiness and tractability; and (iv) opportunity to open up new lines of research and producing new insights/potential breakthroughs inaccessible by other means. Overall, the FSP will embody our state of knowledge in a suite of advanced codes under a unified framework and made widely available to the FES community. The funding needed to successfully launch the FSP is currently estimated to be ~ $12M/year – ramping up as the work-scope expands over the course of 5 years to a $22M/year effort. Details together with specific deliverables and timelines are specified in an Execution Plan posted on the national FSP web-site.

### we meet

#### Still violates substantially and increase – increase requires specification of a particular quality, that’s OED. And, substantially requires a meaningful increase, not specifying means their incentives aren’t meaningful

**Driesen, 98 -** Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law(David, 55 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 289, “Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy,” Spring, lexis)

Any meaningful theory of economic incentives must address several key questions. What precisely does a proposed program provide incentives to do? Who will create the incentives? A theory that focuses on these questions helps analyze claims that emissions trading offers free market-like dynamic advantages inducement of innovation and continuous environmental improvement central to its attractiveness. n22 It clarifies the advantages and [\*294] disadvantages of traditional regulation. It shows that much more useful things can be done with the concept of economic incentives than trade emission reduction obligations. A theory of economic incentives may help create more dynamic and effective environmental law.

#### Comparative ev—incentives are more important than energy types

**Prinn et al, 7** – PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF EARTH, ATMOSPHERIC AND PLANETARY SCIENCES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (Ronald Federal News Service, 2/28, HEARING OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, lexis)

And I personally think that, one way or another, significant effort has to be put in to see is this economically feasible. I think it's technologically feasible. But is it geologically feasible that the capacity of these reservoirs that are down about 7, 8 miles deep in some places, can they take all of this carbon dioxide, keep it there.

A small leakage is all right. But if the answer to that is yes, and if the economics works out, and the technology, as I say, I think is largely there, then coal can continue to be an important source of electrical energy for the nation. But the utilities right now are faced with a dilemma. They need to perhaps build a few more power plants.

What are they going to do? Are they going to continue to build conventional coal-fired power plants that may be very, with great difficult and cost, converted to carbon capture, or not at all? Or do they look at nuclear power? Do they begin to think that renewables, biofuels will power utilities into the future?

They, I think, have got great difficulties in front of them, and the more that there's some leadership on this, this issue for the nation to say this is where we're going, we're going to reduce emissions, it'll help utilities make those very, very expensive decisions.

REP. CAMP: Well, and there has been a lot done, particularly in the auto industry. The automakers, a majority of them, have already committed to achieving at least a 10 percent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2012, and that's from a baseline of 2002.

And we had some testimony about the '70s. And I will just say that vehicles today are 99 percent cleaner than they were in the '70s, and that's just one particular industry. Looking at another industry, in the refrigeration industry, for example, home appliance, they're much more efficient than they were just a few short years ago.

But I do think the economic cost of Kyoto is something we should look at. The estimates show it could cost 2.4 million U.S. jobs, double the cost of electricity, raise the cost of gasoline by an additional 65 cents a gallon, reduce the U.S. output by $300 billion, which is greater than the total expenditure on primary and secondary education.

So I do think we have to look at the costs and tradeoffs, and my question would be is the cap and trade program a viable program to reduce emissions? And I guess I would just ask each of you quickly to answer. I know I don't have much time left.

DR. PRINN: Potentially, yes. I realize the debate, I think, is going to be between taxes versus cap and trade.

DR. SCHNEIDER: The short answer is yes, but like anything that complicated, the devil is in the details and how it's structured from the point of view of incentives and fairness will matter both politically and from the efficiency point of view.

#### Generic incentives don’t exist—it’s impossible to evaluate any of the aff without prior specification

**Ilex Associates, 96** – Consultants to the British Department of Trade and Industry (“A REVIEW OF OVERSEAS FINANCING MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES FOR COMMERCIAL RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS”, <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file15101.pdf>)

Ilex Associates has conducted a comprehensive world study of incentive and financing mechanisms for supporting renewable technologies. A number of countries have been identified as having particularly interesting current or past policies for the development and commercialisation of renewable energy technologies and which can, therefore, be used to inform policy decisions in the UK. These countries are: Austria, Denmark, Greece, India, The Netherlands, Spain and two States of America together with its federal programme. Detailed case studies for each of these countries are presented in Volume 2, and the summaries for each of these countries are included in Appendix I of this volume. Shorter reports for those countries which were studied in less detail as part of the initial world study are presented in Volume 3 of this study, and brief 'thumb-nail' sketches of the countries are included in Appendix II of this report. The findings of the different country studies have been reviewed to identify the main forms of "incentive mechanisms" and "financing mechanisms" that are used to support renewable technologies world-wide, and the successes and failures of the different approaches. The overall objectives of different governments vary and, combined with the context of the industry structure, these variations are reflected in the range of mechanisms used. Schemes can probably be placed along a spectrum whose two extremes are government­ driven consensus mechanisms at one end, and market mechanisms at the other. One of the key results to come out of the work is the fact that **whilst some incentive mechanisms may be appropriate** to some technologies, they may not be appropriate to others. This is either because of the different characteristics of the technologies (i.e. whether they are grid-connected electricity generating technologies, or heat producing, or stand-alone/domestic scale electricity generating technologies), or because of the different stages of maturity of the technology. **No single incentive mechanism is appropriate to all types** of technology.

#### Precision is vital—turns solvency and research quality

**Resnick 1** [Evan Resnick, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring 2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, “Defining Engagement”]

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### Vagueness means the aff is manipulated to fail

**Thompson 2k** (Anne, FAO, Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches at the Policy Level

Paper prepared for FAO e-conference, March, <http://www.livelihoods.org/pip/pip/tho2-fao.doc>) (emphasis in original)

Policy itself can be analysed conceptually at a number of different levels. In its broadest sense, the term policy can be used to include projects, programmes, strategies, plans and their implementation, in fact every element of public or collective decision-making. Although it is a rather artificial simplification, policy can be divided into content and the process of policy formulation, in other words the way in which that content is arrived at. The way in which policy is implemented can change the effective content of policy, either because policy interactions have not been fully understood, or because the policy is subverted by those responsible for implementing it.

### AT: Perm – do the CP

#### 1. Severs the plan – the plan provides incentives even if recipients don’t take external measures. There's no explicit termination clause in the plan, and it isn’t conditioned on cost competitiveness. An explicit termination clause must be offered at the outset – that’s Jenkins and Hayward, and there is no construction of the plan as written that does that.

#### 2. Incentives are unconditional – they’re flat and must increase each year to adjust for inflation

**Jenkins et al, 12** - Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, “Beyond Boom & Bust: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO SUBSIDY INDEPENDENCE” April,

[http://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust\_Embargoed\_4\_17.pdfhttp://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust\_Embargoed\_4\_17.pdf](http://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust_Embargoed_4_17.pdfhttp%3A//assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust_Embargoed_4_17.pdf))

Reducing the cost of clean energy technologies will require continuous innovation and improvement even after technologies are commercialized and launched into the marketplace. Yet, by and large, today’s energy subsidies do not do enough to support America’s innovators, and they have not yet succeeded in driving down the costs of clean energy far enough to compete with fossil fuels. The government, however, has a long history of successfully driving innovation and price declines in emerging technologies by acting as a demanding customer to spur the early commercialization, largescale deployment, and steady improvement of cutting-edge technology. 91¶ Unfortunately, clean tech deployment policies today often closely resemble crop supports, offering a flat production subsidy for any clean energy produced, rather than the demanding military procurement policies that delivered steady improvements and the eventual mass-adoption of everything from radios, microchips, and jet engines, to gas turbines, lasers, and computers. 92¶ Many of today’s clean energy subsidies are focused primarily on supporting the deployment of existing energy technologies at current prices, and most provide no clear pathway to subsidy independence. The federal renewable electricity PTC, for example, has provided the same level of subsidy to wind power and closed-loop biomass-fueled power plants since initial enactment in 1992 and to geothermal and other qualifying renewable electricity sources since 2004, when it was first extended to them. Subsidy levels increase each year at the rate of inflation, keeping per MWh subsidy levels constant in real dollar terms and providing no clear incentive for continual cost declines or pathway to eventual subsidy independence.¶ If not designed with care, deployment policies can also lock out more promising but higher risk technologies from markets, slowing their development. Renewable portfolio standards, for example, which require utilities to purchase a certain percentage of electricity generation from renewable sources, encourage deployment of the lowest-cost renewable energy technology available—generally wind power or biomass. But they do little to drive down the price of other, clean energy technologies, such as solar or advanced nuclear power designs, that may have higher costs now but hold the potential to become much cheaper in the long-run. 93¶ The intermittent and haphazard nature of US energy policy also wreaks havoc with the business confidence necessary for the long-term investments required to develop new and improved products. 94 The PTC for wind power, for example, was first enacted in 1992, but has since expired three times, and has been renewed a total of seven times, often with less than a month to spare before pending expiration. Other clean tech subsidies, including key tax credits for solar, biofuels, energy efficient products, and other segments have experienced similarly erratic expirations. The market effects are chilling, and many private firms are forced to focus principally on ramping-up production for subsidized markets while they last, rather than pioneering next-generation designs and manufacturing processes for the long-term.¶ In the worst cases, maintaining lucrative, blunt subsidies over prolonged periods can even create a disincentive for firms to innovate 95 or can support “dead end” technologies that have no viable path to long-term competitiveness. 96

#### Severs should

**Summers 94** (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16

[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]

13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### Severs substantially

**Words and Phrases** 19**64** (40 W&P 759) (this edition of W&P is out of print; the page number no longer matches up to the current edition and I was unable to find the card in the new edition. However, this card is also available on google books, Judicial and statutory definitions of words and phrases, Volume 8, p. 7329)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.

### 2nc certainty run

#### Plan links more – the CP establishes a more predictable framework

**Trabish, 12** – edits NewEnergy News (Herman, “TODAY’S STUDY: THE BACKING NEW ENERGY IS GETTING AND THE BACKING IT NEEDS” 5/7, <http://newenergynews.blogspot.com/2012/05/todays-study-backing-new-energy-is.html>)

g Cost competitiveness is achievable, but until technological innovation and cost declines can secure independence from ongoing subsidy, clean tech segments will remain continually imperiled by the threat of policy expiration and political uncertainty. Continual improvement in price and performance is thus the only real pathway beyond the cycle of clean tech boom and bust.

#### Jenkins explicitly applies to nuclear

**Jenkins, 12** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, Congressional Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 5/22, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=31b79a1a-83a0-4ae6-8c80-30fe754ad0ea>)

1 Advanced energy technology or “clean tech” industry segments are defined variously. Unless otherwise noted, this testimony refers to the following industry segments when discussing advanced energy technology or clean tech sectors: solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, and nuclear power technologies; fuel cells; combined heat and power (CHP); energy efficient technologies, appliances, and building practices; smart grid; carbon capture and sequestration (CCS); alternative fuels (alcohol fuels, biofuels, biodiesel); advanced batteries; hybrid and electric vehicles; and high speed rail.

#### The CP’s cost reduction conditions pressure companies to innovate – this is the only way to ensure continued innovation and making new energy competitive. Otherwise, natural gas will out-compete the plan despite the incentives, causing a market bust

**Jenkins et al, 12** - Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, “Beyond Boom & Bust: PUTTING CLEAN TECH ON A PATH TO SUBSIDY INDEPENDENCE” April,

[http://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust\_Embargoed\_4\_17.pdfhttp://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust\_Embargoed\_4\_17.pdf](http://assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust_Embargoed_4_17.pdfhttp%3A//assets.nationaljournal.com/Beyond%20Boom%20and%20Bust_Embargoed_4_17.pdf))

These and other clean energy technologies, however, must continue to improve substantially. Costs overall remain higher than fossil competitors, and as the emergence of low-cost shale gas demonstrates, the energy sources that clean technologies are competing against are not standing still. After three decades of private and public-sector collaboration to develop cost-effective technologies to extract natural gas from shale deposits, the “shale revolution” has unlocked large new supplies of domestic natural gas and slashed spot market prices to one-fifth of the peak levels reached in 2008. 85 Solar, wind, nuclear and other zero-carbon energy must now redouble efforts to reduce costs to stay competitive in North American electricity markets (see Part 2 above).

Fortunately, energy technology experts at the International Energy Agency 86 point to numerous remaining technical opportunities to achieve significant cost reductions and performance improvements across a range of clean tech segments, from wind and solar power to enhanced geothermal energy systems, advanced nuclear designs, and improved vehicle technologies and fuels. Successful competition with fossil fuels is possible in the near- to medium-term—the steady process of innovation is the key.

Still, the reality is that until technological innovation and cost declines can secure independence from ongoing subsidy, clean tech segments will remain continually imperiled by the threat of subsidy expiration and political uncertainty. Meanwhile, public tolerance for significant energy subsidies or the internalization of higher prices for energy is limited. 87 If clean energy technologies scale up without corresponding declines in price, this limited tolerance will eventually be expended, leading to another market bust. This means that the simple, perpetual extension of today’s clean energy subsidies and policies, with its somewhat passive approach to innovation, offers no sustainable path beyond a cycle of clean tech boom and bust.

It is true that the federal government has historically devoted greater total subsidies to fossil energy sources than to clean energy sources 88—a fact that changed only recently with the large temporary increase in federal clean tech spending documented in this report 89—and that fossil sectors continue to enjoy subsidies to this day. It is long-past time to end subsidies for mature fossil energy technologies as well. If subsidies for clean tech sectors must phase out as these sectors mature, there is little rationale for perpetual subsidization of well-established fossil energy production methods and technologies.

At the same time, subsidies for clean tech markets in the United States are many times greater than US fossil fuel subsidies when considered per unit of energy generated, meaning that the wholesale termination of all energy subsidies would not automatically make clean energy technologies cost competitive.

Policy makers who may disagree about the appropriate role of government in the energy sector should therefore seek neither across the board cuts to energy subsidies nor their simple maintenance. Rather, they must engage in serious-minded, innovation-centered reform.

For their part, clean tech companies and investors would do well to lead this energy policy reform effort. While many clean tech entrepreneurs deserve credit for achieving innovation and technology improvements under existing subsidy regimes that should better reward their efforts, others have obtained subsidies without facing pressure to reduce costs or improve performance. Embracing innovation-focused policy reform will ensure US firms are well positioned to outcompete international challengers, as well. Simple deployment subsidies or policies to create demand, for example, still allow foreign competitors to undercut domestic manufacturers and seize larger and larger market shares, as Chinese solar PV companies have proven in the last three years. 90 Only steady innovation can keep US firms at the leading edge of clean tech sectors, and a supportive policy regime will be essential.

Businesses and policy makers alike must therefore understand that the true economic rewards in clean energy industries will come not from producing technology for subsidy-created markets that vacillate wildly with the public mood and the political cycle but rather by producing cheap and reliable clean energy technologies that can compete on cost with both international competitors and conventional fossil fuels.

The coming collapse of US clean tech policies thus presents a critical opportunity for intelligent energy policy reform. With the US clean energy policy system set to be effectively wiped clean in the coming years, American business and policy makers must now unite to craft a coordinated new set of limited but direct federal strategies optimized to drive innovation and make clean energy subsidy independent over time. With such a strategy in place, the United States also has the potential to successfully make clean energy technologies cheap enough for widespread export to energy-hungry markets throughout the world.

#### Government R&D backfires

Green, 12 – resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (Kenneth, “Government Is a Lousy Venture Capitalist”, 2/24, <http://www.american.com/archive/2012/february/government-is-a-lousy-venture-capitalist>)

2) Displacement is not addition. Studies show that government “investment” in applied research and development does not add new money to the pot, it displaces private capital, and does so disproportionally. When government steps in, it displaces more money than it throws in the pot.¶ Again, Kealey sums it up well using a study by the OECD:¶ Furthermore, regressions including separate variables for business-performed R&D and that performed by other institutions (mainly public research institutes) suggest that it is the former that drives the positive association between total R&D intensity and output growth... The negative results for public R&D are surprising and deserve some qualification. Taken at face value, they suggest publicly performed R&D crowds out resources that could be alternatively used by the private sector, including private R&D. There is some evidence of this effect in studies that have looked in detail at the role of different forms of R&D and the interaction between them. (p.19)¶ Kealey’s own research agrees:¶ Moreover, the OECD does not stand alone: at least two other researchers, Walter Park of the Department of Economics at the American University at Washington, D.C., and myself, have found—by similar surveys of OECD data—similarly damaging effects of the government funding of research and development.

### innovation

#### More subsidies won’t induce innovation, collapses public support – causing an energy bust

**Jenkins, 12** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, Congressional Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 5/22, <http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=31b79a1a-83a0-4ae6-8c80-30fe754ad0ea>)

Fortunately, energy technology experts at the International Energy Agency point to numerous remaining technical opportunities to achieve significant cost reductions and performance improvements across a range of advanced energy technologies, from wind and solar power to enhanced geothermal energy systems, advanced nuclear designs, and improved vehicle technologies and fuels.16 If costs continue to fall over the next several years, for example, rooftop solar PV installations will become fully cost competitive without subsidy in a growing number of retail electricity markets. Line‐of-site innovations and improvements in both PV module and non-module costs could also bring utility-scale solar costs down to $40-­‐102 per MWh by the end of the decade, making solar power subsidy independent in wholesale markets across much of the United States.17 Analysts similarly project incremental turbine technology improvements have the potential to decrease wind energy costs by 10-30 percent in the 2015-2020 period, bringing the unsubsidized levelized cost into the $42-67 per MWh range and making wind power broadly competitive in that time frame.18¶ Full cost competitiveness with fossil fuels should be achievable in the near-to medium-term for a variety of advanced energy technologies. The steady process of innovation is the key.¶ As with prior energy innovations from gas turbines and nuclear reactors to shale gas extraction techniques,19 sustained government policies will be critical to support private entrepreneurs and firms in driving further cost reductions and moving today’s advanced energy technologies towards full maturity.¶ At the same time, the reality is that until technological innovation and cost declines can secure independence from ongoing subsidy, advanced energy technologies will remain continually imperiled by the threat of subsidy expiration and political uncertainty. Meanwhile, public tolerance for significant energy subsidies or the internalization of higher prices for energy is limited. If nascent energy technologies scale up without corresponding declines in price, this limited tolerance will eventually be expended, leading to another market bust. This means that the simple, perpetual extension of today’s advanced energy subsidies and policies, with its passive approach to innovation, does not offer a sustainable path beyond a cycle of clean tech boom and bust.

## 1nr

### 2nc overview

#### Turns any short-term investment

Malone 9/26 Scott is a Reuters writer. “Analysis: Corporate America sweats as U.S. nears fiscal cliff,” 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/27/us-usa-economy-fiscalcliff-idUSBRE88P1PX20120927

Top U.S. executives have less confidence in the business outlook now than at any time in the past three years - and a key reason is fear of gridlock in Washington over the fiscal deficit and tax policy. The uncertainty, coupled with slowing demand in Asia and Europe, is forcing corporate leaders to postpone decisions on major investments and hiring, and hurting sales of everything from textbooks to telephone lines. "If we don't deal with the fiscal cliff and don't deal with predictability on taxes for both citizens and business, with the rest of the world in a struggling state, this is really bad for us," John Chambers, CEO of network equipment maker Cisco Systems Inc (CSCO.O), told Reuters on Tuesday. Some 34 percent of U.S. CEOs plan to cut jobs in the United States over the next six months, up from 20 percent a quarter ago, according to a Business Roundtable survey released on Wednesday. Only 30 percent plan to raise capital spending, compared with 43 percent previously. The group's index of CEO confidence fell to its lowest point since the third quarter of 2009, when the United States had just emerged from its worst recession in 80 years. The main culprit is the fiscal cliff -- Washington's self-imposed year-end deadline to agree on a plan to shrink the federal budget or trigger $600 billion in spending cuts and higher taxes that were put in place last summer. The sharpest pain would be felt by the defense and healthcare sectors, which face direct funding cuts. But any resulting slowdown could send shockwaves across the economy.

#### Turns energy access and global governance

**Tilford 2008** – PhD in history from George Washington University, served for 32 years as a military officer and analyst with the Air Force and Army (Earl, “Critical mass: economic leadership or dictatorship”, Cedartown Standard, lexis)

Could it happen again? Bourgeois democracy requires a vibrant capitalist system. Without it, the role of the individual shrinks as government expands. At the very least, the dimensions of the U.S. government economic intervention will foster a growth in bureaucracy to administer the multi-faceted programs necessary for implementation. Bureaucracies, once established, inevitably become self-serving and self-perpetuating. Will this lead to “socialism” as some conservative economic prognosticators suggest? Perhaps. But so is the possibility of dictatorship. If the American economy collapses, especially in wartime, there remains that possibility. And if that happens the American democratic era may be over. If the world economies collapse, totalitarianism will almost certainly return to Russia, which already is well along that path in any event. Fragile democracies in South America and Eastern Europe could crumble. A global economic collapse will also increase the chance of global conflict. As economic systems shut down, so will the distribution systems for resources like petroleum and food. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that nations perceiving themselves in peril will, if they have the military capability, use force, just as Japan and Nazi Germany did in the mid-to-late 1930s. Every nation in the world needs access to food and water. Industrial nations—the world powers of North America, Europe, and Asia—need access to energy. When the world economy runs smoothly, reciprocal trade meets these needs. If the world economy collapses, the use of military force becomes a more likely alternative. And given the increasingly rapid rate at which world affairs move; the world could devolve to that point very quickly.

### 2nc key to growth

#### The US is key to the global economy

Caploe 9 David is the Chief Political Economist at Economy Watch and holds a PhD in International Political Economy from Princeton. April 7, 2009, The Straits Times, “Focus still on America to lead global recovery,” http://acalaha.com/STarticle07Apr09.pdf

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.' ¶ While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US. To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and hasn't been for the last six decades. **If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen**. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. ¶ This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity. ¶ At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression.

#### Credit downgrade takes down the whole global economy

**Goldwein 11** (Marc, senior policy analyst for the fiscal policy program at the New America Foundation and former Associate Director of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Atlantic, 8/11, Drawing a AAA-Road Map for Post-Downgrade America, <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/drawing-a-aaa-road-map-for-post-downgrade-america/243463/>)

Rather than going up, interest rates have actually fallen a bit since the rating downgrade. This is not inconsistent with what has happened to other AAA-downgraded countries, where interest rate effects have generally been quite small. ... Okay, Panic a Little If rating downgrades don't augur immediate crises, they tend to indicate trouble on the horizon. Of the 10 other countries that have been downgraded from AAA, eight experienced further downgrades and five have still never recovered their AAA rating. Deeper downgrades have been associated with interest rate spikes, and the fact that both S&P and Moody's have us on a negative outlook suggests that more downgrades could be in our future. What are the consequences of **further downgrades?** The most direct one could be higher interest rates, as investors insist on a risk premium. Even a 0.1 percent increase in interest rates would mean an additional $130 billion in government spending on interest over the next 10 years that we would have to offset in hiring taxes or fewer investments to meet the same debt goal. A 0.7% increase in interest rates would be enough to erase all of the gains from the recent debt deal. In addition, higher interest rates could reverberate throughout the market, impacting everything from mortgages to small business loans - and ultimately leading to something economists call "crowd out," where fewer dollars go into growth-driving investments. The biggest concern, though, should be that these **rating downgrades could advance the day of a fiscal crisis.** Atsome point, if we don't make some changes, **investors will lose confidence** in our nation's ability to make good on its debt. When that occurs, it is possible we could experience a global economic crisis akin to the financial crisis of 2009, **except with no one available to bail out the U.S.** government. It's Not About the Money The United States has a higher burden of gross debt than any other AAA-rated country in the world. We're also the only country besides Finland to expect our debt share to grow through 2016. Our entitlement programs are growing uncontrollably as a result of an aging population and rapid health care cost growth - structural problems that make it difficult to deal with our debt.

### 2ac yes agreement

#### It’s comparatively likely Obama wins—but if negotiating position changes default is still possible

**Klein 1-2** – Ezra, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/ (Calm down, liberals. The White House won., Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/02/calm-down-liberals-the-white-house-got-a-good-deal-on-the-fiscal-cliff/)

Fourth, I don’t think the White House has a shred of credibility when they say they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling. They may not call what they’re about to do negotiating over the debt ceiling, but that’ll be what they’re doing. That said, I’m quite convinced that they don’t intend to be held hostage over the debt ceiling. As a former constitutional law professor, the president sees himself as a steward of the executive branch and is deeply hostile to setting the precedent that congressional minorities can hold presidents hostage through the debt ceiling. At some point in the coming talks, Boehner or McConnell or both are going to realize that the White House really, seriously will not accept a bargain in which what they “got” was an increase in the debt limit, and so they’re going to have to decide at that point whether to crash the global economy.¶ Fifth, the constellation of economic interest groups that converge on Washington understands the debt ceiling better than they did in 2011, are becoming more and more tired of congress’s tendency to negotiate by threatening to trigger economic catastrophes, and is getting better at knowing who to blame. It’s not a meaningless sign that John Engler, the former Republican Governor of Michigan who now leads the Business Roundtable, called for a five-year solution to the debt ceiling. ¶ It’s worth keeping this in perspective: All it means is that the White House can potentially demand a perfectly reasonable compromise of one dollar in revenue-generating tax reform for every dollar in spending cuts. When you add in the fiscal cliff deal, and the 2011 Budget Control Act, that’ll still mean that the total deficit reduction enacted over the last few years tilts heavily towards spending, particularly once you account for reduced war costs. ¶ But that is, arguably, another reason that the White House isn’t in such a bad position here: They’ve set up a definition of success that will sound reasonable to most people — a dollar in tax reform for a dollar in spending cuts — while the Republicans have a very unreasonable sounding definition, in which they get huge cuts to Medicare or they force the United States into default. So while it’s possible that the White House will crumble, rendering itself impotent in negotiations going forward, and while it’s possible that the we’ll breach the debt ceiling, both possibilities seem less likely than Republicans agreeing to a deal that pairs revenue-generating tax reform with spending cuts.

#### Obama has a small window but he’ll succeed now

The Irish Times 1/3/2013 “Once more unto the brink” Lexis

The federal government has already broken through that ceiling but technical extraordinary measures by the treasury will allow the government to continue paying its bills for two months. If Republicans again hold the line, the real prospect of default looms as the government runs out of money to pay wages with the likely consequent chaos on domestic and world markets . The White House says that there will be no negotiations over the debt ceiling, and that if Republicans want further spending cuts, their only chance is to hand over more tax revenue. We’re back to the game of chicken. And it’s not as if the small deal and Bill agreed yesterday by the House goes anywhere near solving the deficit problem it was supposed to address. On the contrary. In all, the bill which will barely stabilise borrowing overthe next decade, will cause deficits to rise by nearly $4 trillion over the period, according to the nonpartisan congressional budget office. Nor, its critics complain, does the Bill go anywhere near addressing the challenge of 12 million unemployed, while it is also stuffed with the sort of pork barrel concessions to individual politicians that are typical of the worst kind of congressional legislating. In the end, however, and this is perhaps clutching at straws, Congress did act, albeit in the most minimal way. And a significant majority of Republicans those who, as one columnist put it, still hold the old-fashioned view that they were elected to help run the country did demonstrate a degree of flexibility and bipartisanship almost unthinkable before the election. Obama’s renewed mandate has given him a new small measure of freedom. But it will dissipate fast if he does not use it.

#### If that status quo continues he’ll prevent sequestration and default

**Politico 1-3-12** – Gleen Thrush and Reid Epstein (President Obama's debt problem, Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/obamas-debt-problem-85708\_Page3.html)

Obama was able to splinter his deeply divided Republican opponents over the issue of tax cuts for the wealthy. But a similar fate might await the president and his Democratic allies if he brokers a deal with the GOP that requires massive spending and entitlement cuts.

During the cliff talks, Obama was purposely opaque about what cuts he’d ultimately accept, saying only that Republican resistance to a one-shot grand bargain meant he needed to make a deal in pieces — taxes first, spending second.

That tactic delayed but didn’t eliminate a looming day of reckoning on spending and entitlements that will come within 60 days thanks to the convergence of the debt ceiling deadline and the new deadline for keeping automatic cuts from kicking in.

“Republicans — and some Democrats — want to curtail Social Security, veterans benefits, Medicare and Medicaid — that’s not a secret — and some of us are going to be fighting to say no,” said Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), author of a letter sent by 29 Senate Democrats in September demanding Obama back off chained CPI, which would reduce Social Security increases indexed to inflation.

“It is absolutely imperative the president and Democratic leadership stay strong on this issue. If they do, we will win,” added Sanders, who wants the president to aggressively push for tax hikes and loophole elimination on corporations.

Former Clinton administration official Alice Rivlin, a member of Obama’s defunct deficit commission, says Obama “understands the [deficit-reduction] issue” but “he’s got to deal with his own left wing, which is not enthusiastic about doing it. The real problem … is that Social Security has become kind of [a] no-no” to liberals.

In a video message to his 2012 campaign supporters released Wednesday, Obama offered few specifics on how he’d approach the coming fight. He reiterated his call for a “balanced” approach to deficit reduction despite a cliff deal that contains only a few billion in cuts and may add hundreds of billions to the debt in coming decades, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

His one reference to budget and entitlement cuts was retrospective — referring to the $1 trillion in discretionary spending reductions, phased in over 10 years, he agreed to last year as part of the debt ceiling pact.

Conservatives, for their part, are hoping to regroup after their cliff dive, and quickly. The Club for Growth is hoping to retrench for the next battle, even though the club’s former president, Sen. Pat Toomey (R-Pa.), voted for the fiscal cliff deal.

Now that Obama has his tax hike on the wealthy, “all the stories are going to say there’s no deficit reduction and you got what you wanted and it didn’t work. At some point, the questions are going to be asked and the charade will be revealed,” Chocola said.

By squeezing $600 billion in tax hikes on the rich out of the GOP, Obama, in effect, ate his dessert first.

Now comes the eat-your-peas part: A united GOP is in no mood to offer a dollar more in tax hikes, as Obama hopes to extract in the upcoming talks. If he wants to avoid draconian domestic and defense cuts, he’ll likely have to compromise. That might mean accepting tens of billions more in spending and entitlement cuts beyond those he’s already laid out.

Obama and his team has said they won’t negotiate over the debt ceiling again after last year’s fiasco, which led to a national credit downgrade. But by extending the sequester for a scant two months, they have guaranteed that fight will happen, several White House allies said.

“I think that a lot of his leverage is gone,” said a top aide to a senior Hill Democrat involved in the negotiations over the fiscal cliff. “By agreeing to a short-term deal, he’s set up a flashpoint with Democrats.”

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Obama’s surprise ally on the fiscal cliff fight, laid down the marker on Wednesday: No more taxes.

“Democrats now have the opportunity — and the responsibility — to join Republicans in a serious effort to reduce Washington’s out-of-control spending,” McConnell said in a statement intended as a shot across the Obama bow.

“That’s a debate the American people want. It’s the debate we’ll have next. And it’s a debate Republicans are ready for. … And now that he has the tax rates he wants, his calls for ‘balance’ mean he must join us in our efforts to achieve meaningful spending and government reform. We have an immediate opportunity to act: the debt ceiling.”

Anti-tax hawk Grover Norquist, who reluctantly backed Tuesday’s deal, predicted that GOP senators and House members were so embittered by the cliff fight, they won’t allow Obama to beat them twice.

“Now you think they’re going to raise taxes for you, that’s never happening,” he told POLITICO. “You knocked them down and mugged them once, they’re not going out on a date with you a second time.”

Whether that’s bluster or a fair reading of the mood on the Hill, the next deal will likely come down to brinkmanship again, the rolling game of Russian roulette played out every half-year or so, with trillions of debt in the kitty.

### at: obama not involved

#### Doesn’t matter—he’ll get involved – their evidence cites statements by Obama, but our evidence speaks to the likehlihood he actually gets involved

Ashley Killough (writer for CNN) January 3, 2013 “McConnell: Debt debate 'starts today'” Lexis

Hours after Congress sent a bill for the president's signature to avoid the fiscal cliff, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell is already gearing up for the next showdown. The Kentucky Republican wrote in an op-ed that President Barack Obama should be prepared to "have a fight" over government spending and the debt limit in the coming weeks, adding that the tax debate is now a thing of the past with the new legislation. "I have news for him: The moment that he and virtually every elected Democrat in Washington signed off on the terms of the current arrangement, it was the last word on taxes. That debate is over," McConnell wrote in the Yahoo News op-ed. "Now the conversation turns to cutting spending on the government programs that are the real source of the nation's fiscal imbalance. And the upcoming debate on the debt limit is the perfect time to have that discussion." By late February or early March, Congress will have to vote on raising the debt ceiling, the amount the government can legally borrow. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner has already said federal borrowing has reached the current $16.394 trillion debt ceiling. Also in March, Congress will have to deal with the delayed sequester--automatic spending cuts--and vote on a continuing budget resolution. The upcoming "mini-cliffs," as some have called it, are almost sure to have partisanship similar to that seen in the fiscal cliff debacle. Republicans say they oppose raising the debt limit, preferring instead to cut spending. In the 2011 debt limit fiasco, Democrats argued it was necessary to raise the ceiling and prevent the government from defaulting on its loans. Many are repeating the same argument. Obama said in his statement late Tuesday night at the White House that he wants "less drama" and "brinksmanship" in future negotiations over fiscal matters. "I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they've already racked up through the laws that they passed," he said. House Republicans expressed frustration late Tuesday night over the fiscal cliff deal's lack of spending cuts, with many vowing to pursue aggressive cuts in the debt ceiling debate. McConnell wrote that the president should get ready for the battle. "The President may not want to have a fight about government spending over the next few months, but it's the fight he is going to have, because it's a debate the country needs," he said, adding that Obama "must show up" and deliver a serious plan for slashing federal spending. "That's the debate the American people really want. It's a debate Republicans are ready to have. And it's the debate that starts today, whether the President wants it or not," McConnell wrote.

#### Opacity is part of his strategy—he’s taking a hardline stance—we’ll win it works now

Leon Hadar (Washington Correspondent for the Business Times, Singapore) January 3, 2013 “Kicking the fiscal can down the road;

Yet again, that is - the new normal seems to be not a 'fiscal cliff' but a long 'fiscal slope' in Washington” Lexis

Debt ceiling The US Treasury Department has already informed Congress that the nation has reached the US$16.4 trillion debt ceiling and that unless the lawmakers extend it by the end of February, the federal government will default on its debt. And just like in the summer of 2011, the Republicans are threatening not to support raising the debt limit without a new agreement on spending cuts. It is going to be deja vu all over again, they insist, unless the White House and the Democrats agree to trade every dollar of debt-ceiling increase for every dollar of spending cuts. But President Obama has pledged that he will not be forced into another nasty fight over the debt ceiling like he was in 2011. If the Republicans refuse to raise the debt ceiling, he will not cave in, he says, and will go directly to the American people and ask for their support instead. Yet the Republicans believe he's bluffing, and that they will win the fight. And if that does not work out, there will be two more opportunities for the Republicans to extract concessions from President Obama: in early March, when the delayed automatic spending cuts go into effect; and the end of the month, when Congress will be required to approve a short-term measure to fund the government and avoid its shutdown.

### at: sandy thumper

#### Budget fights consume all the political oxygen

**Nelson 1-1** – Colleen, writer for WFJ (Lack of Grand Bargain Complicates Obama's Priorities, WSJ, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323635504578216253683816078.html)

Historically, second-term presidents have had a limited window to roll out major policy proposals before lame-duck status sets in and passing significant legislation becomes a steeper challenge. With that in mind, Mr. Obama has said he would roll out proposals aimed at reducing gun violence and overhauling immigration laws early this year.

The White House view is that Mr. Obama would have been ill-positioned to pass policy priorities if the country was still preoccupied with the effects of having gone over the fiscal cliff.

But now, because lawmakers postponed for two months the spending cuts that were set to take effect Wednesday, fiscal issues will continue to consume much of the political oxygen in the near future. So will talks about whether to raise the nation's statutory borrowing limit.

#### This card slays sandy

Joe Coscarelli (Writer for New York Magazine) January 3, 2013 “Public Shaming of John Boehner Helping Sandy Aid Vote Happen” http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/shaming-john-boehner-leads-to-sandy-aid-vote.html

The torrent of blame unleashed on John Boehner and his House Republicans yesterday — much of it from within their own party — over the failure to pass a relief bill for victims of Hurricane Sandy seems to have accomplished something. Although he stayed mostly silent through a day of verbal lashings, Boehner told local leaders privately that he would hold a vote tomorrow on $9 billion for a flood insurance program, with the rest of the $60 million package to be put before the House on January 15. In a joint statement with Eric Cantor yesterday, Boehner reiterated that "getting critical aid to the victims of Hurricane Sandy should be the first priority in the new Congress." But all is not forgiven just yet. New York Representative Peter King, who led the charge against Boehner from within the Republican Party, has calmed down some from yesterday, when he said, "Anyone from New York or New Jersey who contributes one penny to congressional Republicans is out of their minds," with smoke practically erupting from his ears. "Whether we agree or disagree, obviously we made our position clear," said a mollified King after speaking with Boehner. "That's in the past."

### at: immigration thumper

#### This will dominate the agenda

Richard McGregor (writer for the Financial Times) January 2, 2013 “Fiscal fights threaten US policy goals” <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f8ef804-5501-11e2-a628-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz2GtNWiw3I>

In the short term, fiscal fights will dominate politics for months to come and threaten to crowd out serious consideration of other issues, with a large potential downside for the economy in 2013. The fiscal cliff compromise alone will act as a drag on the economy, largely because of the end of the payroll tax holiday, which had added substantially to middle-class incomes, economists said. “The economy needs a stimulus, but under the agreement, taxes will go up in 2013 relative to 2012,” said William Gale of the Tax Policy Center in Washington in a blog post. “For most households, the payroll tax takes a far bigger bite than the income tax does, and the payroll tax cut therefore was a more effective stimulus than income tax cuts were.” The forthcoming confrontations will probably have a similar impact, as Republicans feel they enter talks over raising the debt ceiling in the coming weeks playing a far stronger hand than they had in the fiscal cliff. Under the fiscal cliff, taxes were going up no matter what Republicans did. The debt ceiling, however, cannot be lifted unless they vote for it. Barack Obama’s new cabinet will form the backbone of his administration, setting the tone for his second term in the White House Dave Camp, who chairs the congressional committee overseeing tax policy, said that House Republicans had not settled on a strategy for the debt ceiling but the central aim was to leverage it to cut spending further. “Before we raise the debt limit we have to reduce spending,” Mr Camp said. Many Republicans are less diplomatic in private and see the debt ceiling fight as a chance to get revenge both on the White House and the dealmakers within their own party for being forced into accepting a tax increase this week. Of all the issues crowding Mr Obama’s agenda, immigration has the best hope of passing in some form, as the disastrous vote recorded by Republicans among minorities in 2012 gives them a huge incentive to address the issue. But on everything else, with the Republicans remaining in control of the House, Mr Obama needs all the skills of cajoling, seducing and manipulating Congress that he has so far shown no signs of developing. “I find it remarkable that the president apparently continues to believe that he will not have to deal with people that he does not agree with,” said Mr Galston. “A president who is not disdainful of the art of legislating can get things done.” Forging a consensus on issues such as gun control and climate change, if the White House does take them on, will require Mr Obama to do more than just persuade some Republicans to support him. Many Democrats are wary of such reforms or oppose them outright, and a second-term president with declining political capital will face an uphill battle to shift their views.

#### If Obama bothers with it he’ll segment the debate to avoid trouble

Munro, 12/31/12 (2012, Neil, “Obama promises new immigration plan but keeps endgame close to his vest,” <http://dailycaller.com/2012/12/31/obama-promises-new-immigration-plan-but-keeps-endgame-close-to-his-vest/>

12/31/2012)

“A bunch of Democrats are not going to be supportive,” de Posada predicted. That rejection would damage Obama’s standing among Latinos in the 2014 race, he said, and help GOP outreach. De Posada said the GOP can win some sympathy among Latinos by pushing an ambitious bill that would welcome temporary migrant workers from across the United States’ southern border. In turn, that sympathy will ensure that Latinos actually listen to the GOP’s economic and social messages, he said. However, various right-of-center immigration reformers are already trying to win passage of small-scale measures that don’t include a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants, or invitations to new migrant workers. The small-scale bills can help American workers and high-tech employers, and also split the various ethnic, ideological and business groups now pushing for easier immigration, say the reform advocates. A comprehensive bill “will not pass, just as it didn’t last time around [and if Obama] were actually serious, he would agree to a piecemeal approach where each piece could garner sufficient support to pass,” said Rosemary Jenks, director of government relations at NumbersUSA, an immigration-reform group.

### Link

Securing funding for the aff costs capital.

ASP, ‘11

[American Security Project, “Fusion Energy: An Opportunity for American Leadership and Security,” December, http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fusion-2020-White-Paper-FINAL2.pdf]

With the political will and the right investment, the potential strategic gains for the U.S. in the aggressive development and deployment of fusion power plants are extraordinary. These would include: • Clean, safe, sustainable, and affordable electricity generation in the U.S. and the world; • Energy independence and associated freedom from foreign countries for our energy supplies; • Transition to an electricity-generating economy to power our cars and trucks; • Elimination of the actinides in spent nuclear-fuel by building fusion/fission hybrid plants (using the high neutron fields from fusion to transmute the actinides in spent fuel and thereby render the spent fuel non-toxic within 200 years – not tens of thousands of years); • The two-fold boost to the U.S. economy of reducing our huge trade imbalance by eliminating the cost of importing oil and making the U.S. a world-leader in the energy market by providing fusion generating plants for the whole world; • Creation of a large number of jobs in building and maintaining commercialized fusion power plants; • Demonstration of how U.S. leadership in technology can be leveraged to drive leadership in energy; and • Increase interest and high-paying jobs for young people going into scientific and engineering fields. What is Fusion Energy? At the heart of fusion energy is the world’s most famous equation, E = mc 2 . The basic fuel for fusion is deuterium, a form of hydrogen easily separated from ordinary water. Fusion energy is obtained by forcing together atomic nuclei from deuterium and tritium (another form of hydrogen). This releases energy due to the slightly smaller mass of the helium nucleus produced. The amount of energy available through fusion is extraordinary. A single gram of fuel can yield 90,000-kilowatt hours of energy. Put another way, it would take 10 million pounds of coal to yield as much energy as one pound of fusion fuel. This energy will be available as heat to make steam to run a conventional electric generator. How is Fusion Energy Practically Obtained? Fusion has been repeatedly achieved in experiments ranging from a table-top apparatus to devices yielding short pulses of up to 15 million watts of power. However, for practical electric generation purposes, two “mainstream” approaches have evolved. Each of these is designed to get the fuel nuclei close enough together and moving fast enough to fuse into one new nucleus—helium, the same gas that fills a child’s balloon. In a Magnetic Fusion Energy (MFE) machine, strong magnetic fields suspend the reacting particles in a doughnut-shaped (toroidal) chamber. Such machines, called “tokamaks,” have been built over many years in several countries and great advances have recently been made in this technology. The second mainstream approach uses multiple high-energy laser beams to heat and compress a tiny pellet of fuel. This Inertial Fusion Energy (IFE) technique is now coming to fruition as a nearly all-American project in California. “Ignition” experiments planned for this year and next are expected to yield pulses The U.S. has led the fusion field for decades, and is now in a position to capitalize on the culmination of over 50 years of effort. For both these approaches, clear pathways exist for the development of commercial utility-scale power plants. According to the U.S. fusion program scientific leaders, the first such plants could be operational within 15 years if there was the will to drive forward. Such next-generation power sources, built in conjunction with other nearer-term energy sources, could change the world. Are We Ready to Proceed? In 1980, Congress passed an authorization bill that envisioned a demonstration fusion power plant by the year 2000. This visionary program was never funded and subsequently died.

#### Obama not tied to it now – plan draws him in because of the incentive

ASP, ‘11

[American Security Project, “Fusion Energy: An Opportunity for American Leadership and Security,” December, http://americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Fusion-2020-White-Paper-FINAL2.pdf]

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is the major funder of fusion energy research through both the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences (OFES), largely directed to Magnetic Fusion Energy (MFE), and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), largely directed to Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF). The lack of DOE political will, strategic push, and planning has had a major impact on slowing of U.S. commercialization.

#### No turns no constituency

Baker, ‘12

[Matthew, American Security Project, 6-25, “It’s Time for Magnetic Fusion to Have a Seat at the Energy Table,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/its-time-for-magnetic-fusion-to-have-a-seat-at-the-energy-table/]

What if there was a source of energy that had the potential to supply almost infinite amounts of clean energy, making our reliance on foreign oil and concerns surrounding fossil fuel emissions obsolete? Public enthusiasm behind this technology would be immense, right? Unfortunately for magnetic fusion energy, this is not the case. We can see this lack of support through funding cuts proposed by the Obama Administration, which could force some of the leading fusion programs in the country to close. A systematic effort using public and private partnerships over the next few decades could make fusion the solution to some of the greatest challenges of the 21st century such as climate change and energy security. Therefore, it is vital that we make fusion part of the public discourse surrounding our inevitable transition away from harmful fossil fuels.

### 2nc at: shielding

**Obama is made of Velcro- everything from his administration sticks to him**

**Los Angeles Times, 7-30-10**, p. <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730>

Reporting from Washington — If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack Obama is made of Velcro.

Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become ensnared in blame.

Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.

But Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.

The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape.

**Leaks**

**Aftergood, 6**[Steven Aftergood - Director of Project on Government Secrecy - Federation of American Scientists, 5/26, “Statement of Steven Aftergood” www.fas.org/press/\_docs/052606aftergood.pdf]

By acts of omission and commission, Congress has inadvertently created an environment where unauthorized disclosures are more likely to occur. Specifically, there is a perception that Congress does not welcome classified disclosures from whistleblowers. Meanwhile, Congress has encouraged overclassification by blocking classification reform. 2a. Classified Communications to Congress Seem to be Unwelcome Unfortunately, Congress has discouraged those who in good faith seek to inform Congress about government misconduct on a classified basis. This was the recent experience of Mr. Russell Tice, a former National Security Agency employee who alleges illegal activity by the NSA.4 For months, he sought to brief the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding his allegations, in accordance with the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act. According to Mr. Tice, the Senate Committee never responded to his approach. A meeting with House Committee staff, he says, was concluded when staff determined that they lacked the security clearances to receive his allegations!5 Although Mr. Tice eventually gained a hearing from the Senate Armed Services Committee, the difficulty he encountered in presenting his concerns to Congress in a classified setting might well have dissuaded a less determined person, and convinced him that the press offered the only venue to air his concerns. If Congress wishes to discourages leaks, it should therefore ensure that the alternative to leaking is simple, straightforward, and productive. Today, it is not. 2b. Congress Has Unwisely Resisted Classification Reform. By all accounts, overclassification is a systemic problem in the intelligence community and government-wide. “We overclassify very badly,” said then-HPSCI chairman Rep. Porter J. Goss in testimony before the 9-11 Commission on May 23, 2003.6 “I do think we overclassify, and I think it's because we got bad habits," said Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the nominee to be the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, at his May 18 confirmation hearing.7 But despite a near-universal consensus that overclassification is rampant, Congress has done little to address the problem.8 To the contrary, Congress has blocked the most significant efforts at classification reform. The single most important step that could be taken towards classification reform in intelligence is the disclosure of the intelligence budget. Every independent expert assessment has concluded that this step is feasible, necessary and desirable.9 But Congress has repeatedly blocked the move. Most recently, intelligence budget disclosure was identified by the 9-11 Commission as one of its 41 specific recommendations, based on a finding that excessive secrecy was degrading the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies.10Likewise, a decade ago the Aspin-Brown Commission on intelligence reform urged annual disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget appropriation and the next year’s budget request.11 By repeatedly defying this bipartisan consensus, Congress has effectively stopped classification reform in its tracks. Worse, Congress has reinforced widespread contempt for the classification system by perpetuating discredited secrecy policies like intelligence budget secrecy. As long as overclassification is prevalent and classification policies lack credibility, unauthorized disclosures – however dishonorable or dangerous some of them may potentially be – can also contribute to overcoming classification abuse. From my own perspective, it seems likely that their benefits in preserving constitutional values greatly outweigh their risks to national security.

#### Makes them not topical – voting issue for jurisdiction

#### “The” means all parts

Encarta 9 (World English Dictionary, “The”, http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861719495)

2. indicating generic class: used to refer to a person or thing considered generically or universally
Exercise is good for the heart.
She played the violin.
The dog is a loyal pet.

#### “Government” is all three branches

Black’s Law 90 (Dictionary, p. 695)

“[*Government*] In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.”

**Requires appropriations**

**Lovell 2k** – Assistant Professor of Government, College of William and Mary (George, 17 Const. Commentary 79, AG)

An initial problem with this complaint is that it is not entirely accurate. Even in a world with delegation, voters can usually trace regulatory decisions to "yes" or "no" votes cast by their representatives in Congress. It is true that members of Congress do not cast "yes" or "no" votes on particular rules created by agencies, but they do quite often need to go on record with "yes" or "no" votes that make agency activities possible. Legislators must cast votes to establish executive branch agencies and to give those agencies the authority to make regulatory decisions. The democratic controls created by such votes weaken over time. (Most of the voters who voted for the legislators who passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act are now dead). But members of Congress need to take at least one vote per year (on the relevant appropriations bill) in order for any regulatory program to continue, and circumstances sometimes force members to cast additional votes on particular programs. Since no regulatory program can operate without being created and continually authorized by Congress, there is nothing about delegation that prevents an unhappy electorate from holding members of Congress accountable for regulatory power exercised by the agencies. Opponents of incumbents are certainly free to make such votes an issue in the next campaign, and they sometimes do. Representative George Nethercutt (R-Washington) recently found this out the hard way from an ad sponsored by some of his political opponents. Nethercutt probably did not know that he had voted for the Endangered [\*91] Species Act twelve times until he saw an ad that recounted his votes on various appropriations and authorizations items. 21

### 2nc a2 winners win

**Political capital is limited – controversies burn capital**

**Gerson, 12/17**/10 (Michael, 12/17/10, Washington Post, “When it comes to politics, Obama's ego keeps getting in the way,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121604039.html)

In some areas - such as education reform or the tax deal - Obama's governing practice is better than his political skills. But these skills matter precisely because political capital is limited. The early pursuit of ambitious health-care reform was a political mistake, as former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel internally argued. But every president has the right to spend his popularity on what he regards as matters of principle. Political risks, taken out of conviction with open eyes, are an admirable element of leadership.

Yet political errors made out of pique or poor planning undermine the possibility of achievement. Rather than being spent, popularity is squandered - something the Obama administration has often done.

**Empirically proven** (Health Care and Climate Legislation)

**Lashof**, 7/28/**10** – director of the National Resource Defense Council's climate center, Ph.D. from the Energy and Resources Group at UC-Berkeley (Dan,, NRDC Switchboard Blog, "Coulda, Shoulda, Woulda: Lessons from Senate Climate Fail," <http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dlashof/coulda_shoulda_woulda_lessons.html>

Lesson 2: Political capital is not necessarily a renewable resource. Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I’m sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success. A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama’s political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital and created the Tea Party movement. Public support for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. But this is occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama’s political capital in time to help push climate legislation across the finish line.

# octos neg v. wake bm

## 1nc

### DA

#### Obama will get a debt limit deal because he has enough polcap to roll Republicans

**Judis 1-3** – John, senior editor for The New Republic (Obama Wasn't Rolled. He Won!, The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111573/obama-didnt-get-rolled-the-fiscal-cliff-in-fact-he-won#)

With a new House and Senate, Obama stands a good chance of winning these battles in the months to come -- *if he continues to conduct these negotiations as political campaigns* and not as backroom Washington affairs. The fiscal cliff deal took tax rates out of the discussion. What’s left are spending cuts. If Obama allows the Republicans and obnoxious groups like Fix the Debt to frame the issues, he’ll be in trouble. And he did seem to fall into this trap briefly when he proposed changing the cost of living index for Social Security. But if he reminds the public that what the Republicans and their allies want to do is cut their Medicare and Social Security, he and the Democrats should be in good shape.¶ As for the Republicans, the debate over the fiscal cliff, like the debate last year over the debt limit, revealed serious divisions within the party and its rank-and-file that Obama and the Democrats could exploit over the next months. There are at least three different kinds of divisions that have become visible. First is between the Senate and the House. Senate Republicans, who are in a minority, have proven more amenable to compromise on fiscal issues. Unlike most Republican House members, many senators can’t count on being re-elected by solid Republicans majorities. McConnell himself comes from a state where Democrats still hold most of the state offices. ¶ Secondly, there is a regional division in the party between the deep South, which contains many of the diehard House Republicans, and the Republicans from the Northeast, industrial Midwest, and the Far West. In the House vote on the fiscal cliff, Republican House members from the deep South opposed it by 83 to 10, while Republicans from the Northeast favored it by 24 to one, and those from the Far West by 17 to eight. After the Republican leadership refused to bring a Sandy hurricane relief bill to the floor before the end of the session – effectively killing it – New York Republican Peter King called on New York and New Jersey Republicans to withhold donations to the GOP. New Jersey Governor Chris Christe blew his top at the House Republicans.¶ Third, there is a division among Republican lobbies, political organizations and interest groups that surfaced in the wake of the election and once again this week. It’s not easy to define, but it runs between pro-business conservatives, on the one hand, and the right-wing libertarians of the Tea Party and Club for Growth and their billionaire funders. Grover Norquist and Americans for Tax Reform gave their approval the Senate bill. The Chamber of Commerce grudgingly endorsed the final bill, and the National Federation of Independent Business said the tax provisions were acceptable. The Club for Growth, the Koch Brothers’ Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks (which itself has fallen under the sway of its most ideological elements), and the Tea Party Patriots opposed any compromise. ¶ These divisions don’t necessarily augur the kind of formal split that wrecked the Whig Party in the 1850s. Nor do they suggest widespread defection of Republicans into the Democratic Party as happened during the 1930s. There is still far too much distance between, say, McConnell and Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid. But they do suggest that a process of erosion is under way that will weaken the Republicans’ ability to maintain a united front against Democratic initiatives. That could happen in the debates over the sequester and debt ceiling if Obama and the Democrats make the kind of public fuss that they did over fiscal cliff.

#### Congressional opposition is divisive enough to block the aff

**Morgan, 11** (Curtis, Tampa Bay Times, “A year after Deepwater Horizon disaster, opposition to oil drilling fades” 4/18, <http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/a-year-after-deepwater-horizon-disaster-opposition-to-oil-drilling-fades/1164429>) **Nelson=Florida Senator Bill Nelson, Fuller = Manley Fuller, president of the Florida Wildlife Federation**

In Washington, the Obama administration has adopted what Interior Secretary Salazar called a "thoughtful and deliberate approach'' to reopening the gulf, with a new oversight agency and new safety measures — notably, one mandating that the industry develop deep-water containment systems for worst-case blowouts, like the one that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon.

In October, the White House lifted the drilling ban it imposed after the BP spill but didn't start issuing new permits until last month, approving 10 new deep water wells so far, with 15 more in process. The administration also agreed to open new territory for exploration by selling new leases — but only in the already heavily drilled central and western gulf.

The three bills approved by a House committee last week don't target Florida waters specifically but lawmakers potentially could use them as tools to carve out prime areas for drilling, or shrink or lift the moratorium.

For now, with the House and Senate controlled by different parties, it's doubtful any drilling bill can make it out of Congress. Nelson and most environmentalists believe the ban on Florida's federal waters can survive political pressure and maneuvering.

"President Obama would have to lose and Bill Nelson would have to lose and they'd have to be replaced by people who want to remove that boundary,'' said Fuller of the Florida Wildlife Federation. "I don't think that is going to happen.''

A more serious threat, they say, is the possibility of a future Florida Legislature opening up state-controlled waters. That move would make it politically difficult to justify a continuing federal ban.

A coalition of environmental groups, Save Our Seas, Beaches and Shores, launched a petition drive after the 2009 House vote to put a ban on drilling in state waters into the Florida Constitution. Former Gov. Charlie Crist's effort to do the same thing during a special legislative session in July proved dead on arrival.

So far, Fuller acknowledged, only a few thousand signatures have been gathered through an online site, far short of the nearly 700,000 needed. In February, Crist's former chief financial officer, Alex Sink, who lost the governor's race to Scott, agreed to co-chair the petition drive with the goal of getting an amendment proposal on the ballot by 2012 or, more realistically, the following year.

Fuller doesn't anticipate lawmakers trying to ram through a divisive drilling bill in the near future but "that is one reason why we want it in the Constitution. We don't want to see it as a possibility at all.''

#### The impact is growth—near term debates key

**Maass 1-2** – Harold, the Week's online executive editor (The looming debt-ceiling fight: Worse than the fiscal cliff?, The Week, http://theweek.com/article/index/238312/the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-worse-than-the-fiscal-cliff)

In many ways, the threat of default in two months is a more serious risk than the Jan. 1 fiscal cliff deadline. If Congress does not increase the debt ceiling, the government will quickly run out of ways to pay the nation's bills and make interest payments on the nation’s outstanding debt. Any failure by the government to meet its financial obligations could be seen as a default, shaking world financial markets, given the special role that U.S. government bonds play in the global economy.

Obama is still smarting from the 2011 debt-ceiling dispute, says Neil Munro at The Daily Caller. In that fight, "the GOP eventually pressured him to accept spending curbs in exchange for an increase to the debt limit up to $16.4 trillion." Obama has been complaining about that defeat ever since, and he's vowing not to let it happen again. But the GOP-led House is adamant about using "its authority over the nation's debt ceiling to pressure Obama to shrink future spending."

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 9 – \*counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, \*\*member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.

In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.

The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.

Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### K

#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and unsustainable practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The financialisation¶ of “energy”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just¶ transition to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies marginalise the role of communities and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over how society might be differently organised to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

**Holleman 2012** – assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1, WEA)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ belies the notion that “there is no alternative.” They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our ¶ environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ planetary boundaries will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable ¶ policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to ¶ function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for ¶ communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### topicality

#### Restrictions must legally mandate less production, not just regulate it

Anell 89

Chairman, WTO panel

"To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the

CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68)

<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/88icecrm.pdf>

The United States argued that Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial controls on fluid milk did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production. The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

#### The decreases regulations, not restrictions. Voter for limits because they manipulate terminology to expand the hardest part of the rez to debate

Sinha 6

<http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/>

Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

#### Precision—restrictions must be a distinct term for debate to occur

Eric Heinze (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, Queen Mary. He has held fellowships from the Fulbright Foundation and the French and German governments. He teaches Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, Human Rights and Public International Law. JD Harvard) 2003 “The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse” http://mey.homelinux.org/companions/Eric%20Heinze/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20%28839%29/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20-%20Eric%20Heinze.pdf

Variety of ‘restrictions’

The term ‘restriction’, defined so broadly, embraces any number of familiar concepts: ‘deprivation’, ‘denial’, ‘encroachment’, ‘incursion’, ‘infringement’, ‘interference’, ‘limitation’, ‘regulation’. Those terms commonly comport differences in meaning or nuance, and are not all interchangeable in standard legal usage. For example, a ‘deprivation’ may be distinguished from a ‘limitation’ or ‘regulation’ in order to denote a full denial of a right (e.g. where private property is wholly appropriated by the state 16 Agents without compensation) as opposed to a partial constraint (e.g. where discrete restrictions are imposed on the use of property which nonetheless remains profitably usable). Similarly, distinctions between acts and omissions can leave the blanket term ‘restriction’ sounding inapposite when applied to an omission: if a state is accused of not doing enough to give effect to a right, we would not colloquially refer to such inaction as a ‘restriction’. Moreover, in a case of extreme abuse, such as extrajudicial killing or torture, it might sound banal to speak merely of a ‘restriction’ on the corresponding right. However, the term ‘restriction’ will be used to include all of those circumstances, in so far as they all comport a purpose or effect of extinguishing or diminishing the right-seeker’s enjoyment of an asserted right. (The only significant distinction which will be drawn will be between that concept of ‘restriction’ and the concept of ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The terms ‘breach’ or ‘violation’ will be used to denote a judicial determination about the legality of the restriction.6) Such an axiom may seem unwelcome, in so far as it obliterates subtleties which one would have thought to be useful in law. It must be stressed that we are seeking to eliminate that variety of terms not for all purposes, but only for the very narrow purposes of a formal model, for which any distinctions among them are irrelevant.

### OIL DA

#### Oil prices are on the brink for Canada’s energy industry – lower prices crush their economy

Ora Morison 7-15-2012; The Globe and Mail “Falling oil puts pinch on economy” <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/falling-oil-puts-pinch-on-economy/article4418057/>

Few countries feel the rise and fall of oil prices more than Canada, and a healthy oil industry is crucial to ensure the country’s modest growth outlook doesn’t turn into something worse. Consider that oil and gas exports and investment in machinery and infrastructure in the oil sands accounted for fully one-third of Canada’s economic growth in 2010 and 2011. In May, oil exports fell 5.5 per cent to $5.7-billion (Canadian), according to Statistics Canada – the fourth-consecutive monthly decline. “If oil prices get to a point where they are going to deter investment in the [energy] sector, the negatives outweigh the benefits,” said Diana Petramala, an economist at the Toronto-Dominion Bank. At Calgary-based Mullen Group, the negatives are starting to be felt. The trucking and oil-field services company is paying less for fuel, its second-largest operating cost. But its most important customers, oil sands producers, are slowing production and putting off expansion. Murray Mullen, CEO of the company whose roots go back to 1949, says he’s happier when energy prices are higher, even if it costs more to run his machines. “There’s a fine balance,” he said. “Oil is a lifeblood to our customers.” Worries are mounting about the energy sector’s pace of spending. Energy stocks, which comprise one-quarter of the value of the S&P/TSX composite index, have been poor performers. The sector has declined by 9 per cent this year as declining oil prices, particularly for Canadian benchmark crude, have dampened earnings expectations. If oil prices were to reach as low as $70 per barrel, large Canadian producers such as Imperial Oil, controlled by Exxon Mobil Corp., would be “significantly outspending cash flow,” said Andrew Potter, an analyst at CIBC World Markets.

#### Canadian economic decline causes Quebec secession

Nuechterlein1999; Rockefeller Research Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley,[Donald E. Nuechterlein, September 1999. “CANADA DEBATES A VARIETY OF DOMESTIC ISSUES,” <http://donaldnuechterlein.com/1999/canada.html>.

Current opinion polls in Quebec show that pro-independence forces are somewhat below the 50 percent margin that would trigger formal negotiations with the rest of Canada on the terms of separation. The current premier, Lucien Bouchard, is a crafty nationalist who will not put the question to another referendum unless he is convinced it will obtain a majority vote. My guess is that if Bouchard has doubts about reaching at least 50 percent in favor of independence, he will first call a provincial election and hope to increase the majority of his Parti Quebecois. That would give him more confidence about winning a referendum. An important factor influencing many Quebeckers will be their degree of satisfaction with the Canadian economy. At present, prosperity reigns in most parts of the country and many Quebec voters may worry that their province will suffer economically if it separates.

#### Quebec secession crushes Canada’s great power aspirations – those are key t0 prevent Arctic conflict, Russia-EU war, NATO collapse, and check multipolar transition wars

Zach Paikin 7-27-2012; a frequent media commentator on public policy issues and Canadian political affairs. He also contributes research on international affairs to several Washington-based think tanks and institutes. He was a candidate for National Policy Chair of the Liberal Party of Canada at the party’s 2012 biennial convention. He holds a BA in Middle East Studies from McGill University and is currently pursuing graduate studies in Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. ‘How Canada can become a major global power ‘ http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/07/27/zach-paikin-how-canada-can-become-a-major-global-power/

The theme of my most recent column may suggest that Quebec could not survive outside of Canada under the current economic circumstances. What also needs to be understood, however, is that Canada cannot survive without Quebec. This is not only the case with regards to the economic assets that the Canadian economy would lose from Quebec’s secession (forestry, shale gas, mining, hydroelectricity and a bilingual workforce all come to mind quite quickly). Canada, as we know it, would cease to exist. In a Canada without Quebec, Ontario would possess almost half of the seats in the national legislature. Some might suggest that the province of Ontario would need to be broken up in order to prevent its dominance when it comes to political issues within the federation. The result may well be a total redraw of the federal-provincial power balance and therefore a fundamental change in how Canada operates and thinks of itself – and that’s only if negotiations between Ottawa and the other provinces succeed. The question of whether Canada and Quebec need one another has proven to be a never-ending debate. Some outside Quebec acknowledge the latter’s above-cited contribution to Confederation whereas others pounce on the idea that Quebec is holding back the more successful provinces in the West. Within Quebec, some note that the French-speaking province could not survive economically without Canada while others disagree in one way or another, arguing that the economic downturn following secession would be negligible in the long run or alternatively that secession is a goal to be achieved over the long term. The key for those who cherish national unity is to advance an irrefutable argument that focuses on what all regions of Canada can accomplish together. Here is one very important element of that thesis: A strong and united Canada can be one of the 21st century’s major powers. This is a position seldom put forward by our country’s political leaders and one that may come as a shock to most readers. Canadians have for a very long time seen themselves in the shadow of the United States – as members of a nation content to make a large moral impact but a limited physical one. Becoming a global power is not only within the realm of possibility thanks to Canada’s large territory, good borders (an ally to the south and oceans to the north, east and west), potential for population growth, relatively solid finances and abundant natural resources. It is also a national necessity. The United States, already in strategic decline, will likely voluntarily continue its slow retreat from the world in order to get its fiscal house in order and to placate an electorate that is largely fed up with allocating so much spending to overseas wars. That means that Washington will be less inclined to defend its NATO allies in future conflicts. And Canada is most certainly vulnerable. As climate change advances and the Northwest Passage continues to thaw, global interest in the Arctic region (believed to possess as much as 25 per cent of the world’s oil reserves) increases. Canada has a vital interest in ensuring that the Passage – which has considerable strategic and economic value – is viewed internationally as being under Canadian sovereignty. This presents Canada with the opportunity not only to rebuild and refocus its military, but also to make significant strategic advances across the globe. A deal – be it legal or economic – struck between Canada and Russia over the Northwest Passage would be of major importance to both countries and would allow for an important rapprochement between Ottawa and Moscow. This would allow Canada to increase its diplomatic clout in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states, which in turn would give Canada the opportunity to act more significantly as an interlocutor between NATO and Russia when it comes to issues such as ballistic missile defense. (Missile defense installations are planned over the coming years in Eastern European states such as Poland and Romania.) In the same vein, Canada would have more of a say in mediating economic relations between the European Union (which now contains numerous Eastern European states) and Russia, which consequently would increase Canada’s influence within the EU itself. A Canada with major inroads in Europe and Russia. A Canada with the potential to increase exports to Asian markets drastically. A Canada that can use its special relationship with the United States to project its influence to regions originally thought to be out of its reach. This is the Canada of the 21st century. And this Canada can only be achieved if national unity is preserved and strengthened. If Quebec were to separate Canada would lose more than just military bases vital to ensuring Arctic sovereignty. (A similar argument could be advanced if the West, for argument’s sake, were to separate.) Canada would also have to deal with Quebec’s competing Arctic claims and may lose the ability to achieve much of the global influence described above as a consequence. A strong and united Canada is one that can think strategically and advance its interests significantly across the globe. Advancing those interests is what will give Canada the ability to advance and secure its values at home and abroad on a magnified scale. This is the next argument in support of national unity, and the one that will be explored in my next column.

### Mexico

#### One google search ends this advantage

**Martin 2012**

World Politics Review

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12455/mexicos-calderon-leaves-behind-a-healthier-pemex-oil-industry

Mexico's Calderon Leaves Behind a Healthier Pemex, Oil Industry

By Jeremy Martin, on 29 Oct 2012, Briefing

Critical assessments of Mexico’s oil industry in general and of its state-owned oil company, Pemex, in particular are commonplace, often with good reason: Both face many challenges in overcoming the historical legacies that have long undermined their performance. Nevertheless, when President Felipe Calderon’s term in office ends on Dec. 1, he will be leaving both in better shape than when his presidency began six years ago.

True, there have been strategic misfires under his administration. Pemex’s opaque expenditure of almost $2 billion for an increased stake in Spanish oil company Repsol stands out, both for the lack of strategic oversight it highlighted but also the naivety it exposed in terms of the purported desire to use the deal to gain access to deep-water drilling technology. Worse, since Argentina’s expropriation of Repsol’s YPF shares in April, the company’s stock price has dropped and may cause Pemex to write down a loss.

In addition, Mexico’s current severe challenges in meeting domestic natural gas demand underscore its failure to focus sooner on enhancing natural gas infrastructure and developing its world-class shale gas potential. [Natural gas sales](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12455/mexicos-calderon-leaves-behind-a-healthier-pemex-oil-industry) in Mexico have risen 70 percent in the past decade, while production has only increased approximately 46 percent. As a result, imports from the United States hit record highs in 2012. Meanwhile, natural gas pipeline infrastructure has become increasingly jammed, and cuts put in place by Pemex have angered industrial customers.

But despite these stumbles, a number of positive developments during Calderon’s presidency warrant attention, [beginning with the energy reform of 2008](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6759/mexicos-energy-reform-and-the-future-of-pemex). Putting aside the arduous and polemic nature of the process, the reform measures signed into law late that year were important, if incremental.

The reform package gave Pemex increased flexibility, particularly in terms of corporate governance and planning, as well as contractually, allowing the company to pursue integrated exploration and production contracts based largely on an incentive and fee-for-barrel formula. Having successfully weathered a constitutional challenge, the [new](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12455/mexicos-calderon-leaves-behind-a-healthier-pemex-oil-industry)contractual model has provided Pemex not only with key lessons for modernizing its business practices and incorporating technology, but also with the potential to moderately recover its oil production. Two bid rounds over the past 18 months brought initial investment commitments of more than $363 million from eight winning bidders for what are largely mature field projects, with a third bid round just getting underway.

#### Renewables transition solves

**Melgar 2012** – Americas Quarterly

The Future of PEMEX

BY LOURDES MELGAR

http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3781

http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3781

Mexico became a champion of climate concerns during the administration of President Felipe Calderón (2006–present). In April 2012, Congress approved the Ley General de Cambio Climático (Climate Change Law), the second of its kind worldwide, establishing the framework to achieve voluntary nationwide greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation targets: 30 percent by 2020 and 50 percent by 2050. Congress also set a goal of generating 35 percent of electricity with clean technologies by 2024. Reaching these objectives will require a major transformation of an energy mix that relies heavily —93 percent—on hydrocarbons, including 60 percent in the power industry. Wind, solar and geothermal energy, all of which Mexico has in abundance, have yet to be tapped to their fullest potential.

PEMEX not key to econ - “cash cow”

Kaplan evidence says a host of internal factors internal to Pemex are causinginstability – aff doesn’t solve things like military offensives, drug violence or weak governmentrule

NO drugs internal link – sayst here is a battle

NO drugs internal link – sayst here is a battle

#### Macroeconomic factors and political stability are improving – and current growth is sustainable

Joseph Hogue 5-30-2012; provides investment research and analysis through his firm, Efficient Alpha. He has appeared as a guest on BloombergTV for his analysis of Latin American securities and holds the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation.Mexican economy in contrast to its negative stereotypes http://emergingmoney.com/mexico/mexican-economy-eww/

The diverse Mexican economy has been growing at a sustainable pace of 3.5-5.5% over the past three years. The political mood seems to be shifting incrementally in the direction of further liberalization. Ties to relatively strong neighbors – the U.S. and the rest of Latin America – position the Mexican economy well relative to other emerging markets more dependent on floundering Europe or slowing China. The drug killings may even simmer down with the expected return to power this July of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). U.S. investors willing to look past stereotypes will find a range of modern industries in Mexico issuing easily tradable American Depository Receipts (ADRs). The composition of the iShares MSCI Mexico Investable Market ETF (EWW, quote) offers a snapshot of the Mexican economy excluding oil, which remains largely nationalized. Consumer staples account for 32% of the ETF’s holdings, telecommunications 24% and materials 15%.A number of large transportation firms are also publicly traded. The macroeconomic and political outlooks for Mexico are both positive**.** This means the Mexican economy should outperform other emerging markets over the next 12 months, though probably underperforming the Andean region of Latin America. Inflation was running at 3.5% annually as of April 2012, near the bottom of Mexico’s historical range. That means the usually conservative central bank is considering stimulus measures if global growth weakens further. The expected victory of the PRI in the July presidential poll (and return to power after a lame-duck period in December) also looks positive for investors. The PRI’s 70-year rule was interrupted under charges of widespread corruption in 2000. The party’s roots are socialist, but it has in recent decades embraced market reforms and moved to the center. Its presidential candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, has run on a platform of reforms including partial privatization of state oil monopoly PEMEX, along the lines of Brazil’s Petrobras. Nieto also supports liberalizing employment laws. While the full extent of promised reforms is doubtful, Nieto’s pro-market rhetoric is welcome. Opening the oil sector to more private contractors could increase capital spending on infrastructure and accelerate GDP growth for the Mexican economy. The caveat is that these effects will be longer-term, while equity performance over the next year remains more dependent on growth in the United States and global headline risks.

#### Drilling is in both of their interests

#### Corruption and labor costs makes PEMEX collapse inevitable and crushes profitability even if prices are high

Camarena 10-19-2010 World Politics Review/ http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6759/mexicos-energy-reform-and-the-future-of-pemex

Separate from the question of allowing private investment in Pemex, analysts believe that the company would greatly benefit from passage of the Law on Union Transparency (Ley de Transparencia Sindical), promoted by Calderón's center-right National Action Party (PAN) and supported by some legislators from the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). **Inflated labor costs and onerous worker entitlements are the largest and fastest-growing short-term liabilities on Pemex's ledger and are largely responsible for the company's recurring loss of profits during a period of record oil prices.** The urgent need for union transparency was highlighted by the Pemexgate scandal -- uncovered in January 2001 during former President Vicente Fox's administration -- when an audit of Pemex's books found that funds from the Pemex workers union were being funneled to Francisco Labastida's presidential campaign in 2000. Labastida, then the candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), is currently the president of the Congressional Committee on Energy. Although the Pemexgate scandal debunked any remaining arguments against the legislation on union transparency, the political will needed to pass the law has been lacking, in part because it would not only affect all public-sector unions, but could also be extended to force greater scrutiny and transparency upon other recipients of public funds -- including political parties, public institutions and all branches of government. While the benefits of such a reform to public accountability and governance would be considerable, passing the measure would surely doom any hopes Calderón might have of gaining political support from opposition parties or the country's influential public-sector unions in the future. Given Calderón's waning time in office and the [PAN's congressional minority](http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6223/mexicos-pan-and-prd-band-together-before-coming-apart), public-sector reforms are unlikely to occur before congressional and presidential elections in 2012. But unless radical changes to Mexico's energy sector are enacted soon, **the country's fate as a future net oil importer may very well be sealed.**

#### Hedging solves price collapse – Mexico is insured if prices fall

SWF Insitute 2-1-2012; “Mexico Hedges Oil Revenues in 2012, Uses Put Options” http://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-article/mexico-hedges-oil-uses-put-options/

Mexico is a country that is economically dependent on its petroleum industry. Revenue volatility from one budget to the next, as business cycles tend to coincide with oil cycles, and the proficient use of oil revenues increases remain significant challenges for Mexico. Also, Mexico must deal with the scenario of decreased oil revenues as production is in steady decline and proven reserves are shrinking. The Government of Mexico has purchased put options at the US$ 85 a barrel level. This is to protect Mexico’s finances in case of a potential drop in the average price. The put options may be exercised in the event Mexico’s basket of export crude treads below an average of US$ 85 a barrel. This is nothing new as comparable hedging strategies have been used in the past to protect against oil price volatility. The oil coverage program is applied through Mexico’s Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund.

#### Not dependent on oil

Gregory D. Miller, April 2010; assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence” Center for Strategic and International Studies The Washington Quarterly • 33:2 pp. 107119 http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf

Mexico has a different story. For one thing, oil accounts for less than 10 percent¶ of its total export revenues. In addition, Mexico actually benefits when global oil¶ prices drop because its main trade partner, the United States which accounts for¶ nearly 90 percent of Mexico’s total exports, is able to purchase more Mexican¶ goods. Because its economy is becoming more diversified and less dependent on¶ the sale of oil, Mexico is likely to withstand a drop in demand for oil, whereas many¶ OPEC states will not be so lucky unless they diversify their economies. Herein lies¶ an important lesson: the more that states develop trade in non-oil sectors, the more¶ the profits from those sectors will offset any loss of oil revenue and eventually¶ promote stability.

**No instability – reject media hype**

**Seelee and Shirt, 10** – **\***director of theMexicoInstitute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars AND \*\* fellow at the center and an associate professor at the University of San Diego (Andrew Selee, David Shirk, 3/27/10, " Five myths about Mexico's drug war ", Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032602226.html)

The country has certainly seen a big rise in drug violence, with cartels fighting for control of major narcotics shipment routes -- especially at the U.S. border and near major seaports and highways -- and branching into kidnapping, extortion and other illicit activities. Ciudad Juarez, in particular, has been the scene of major battles between two crime organizations and accounted for nearly a third of drug-linked deaths last year.

But the violence is not as widespread or as random as it may appear. Though civilians with no evident ties to the drug trade have been killed in the crossfire and occasionally targeted, drug-related deaths are concentrated among the traffickers. (Deaths among military and police personnel are an estimated 7 percent of the total.) A major reshuffling of leaders and alliances is occurring among the top organized crime groups, and, partly because of government efforts to disrupt their activities, violence has jumped as former allies battle each other. The bloodshed is also geographically concentrated in key trafficking corridors, notably in the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas.

While the violence underscores weaknesses in the government's ability to maintain security in parts of the country, organized crime is not threatening to take over the federal government. Mexico is not turning into a failed state.

**Alt cause—migration barriers**

**Littlefield 2009** (Edward, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "As Mexico’s Problems Mount: The Impact of the Economic Recession on Migration Patterns from Mexico")

As migration from, and remittances to, Mexico have decreased as a result of the current recession, the Mexican economy ominously worsens - Migration, remittances, and the national economy should be considered as integral components in the debate over whether Mexico deserves to be classified as a “failed state,” and what should be United States policy The Mexican economy and many of its national institutional structures may be on the brink of collapse. While drug war violence has dominated the recent news about the possible irreversible status as a society beyond remediation, the topic of immigration has been either marginalized or used to further promote fears that the conflict may spread to the United States. Drugs, national security, and economic recession have replaced immigration reform on the United States’ policy agenda. However, the current financial crisis, and its impact south of the border, is intricately linked to matters of immigration, security, and Mexico’s very cohesion.

**Their impact is empirically denied—no escalation**

**Hartzell 2000** (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, “Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change.” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\_0286-28765765\_ITM)

Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

**Instability’s inevitable—drug trafficking**

**Grudgings 2009** (Stuart, Rueters, Latin America ex-leaders urge reform of US drug war, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN11358345)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The war against drugs is failing and the U.S. government should break with "prohibition" policies that have achieved little more than cram its prisons and stoke violence, three former Latin American presidents said on Wednesday. The respected former presidents urged the United States and Latin American governments to move away from jailing drug users to debate the legalization of marijuana and place more emphasis on the treatment of addicts. Former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria said there was no meaningful debate over drugs policy in the United States, despite a broad consensus that current policies had failed. "The problem today in the U.S. is that narco-trafficking is a crime and so any politician is fearful of talking about narco-trafficking or talking about policies because they will be called soft," he said. Gaviria has joined with former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo to try to change the debate on drugs in Latin America, where trafficking gangs have killed tens of thousands of people and weakened democracies through corruption. From Mexico's gang wars to the drug-funded FARC guerrilla group in Colombia and daily shoot-outs between gangs and police in Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns, much of the region is scarred by drug violence and many believe U.S. policies have failed. A United Nations meeting in Vienna next month will frame international drugs policy for the next 10 years, and the three former presidents, whose group is called the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, said it is time for change. They pointed to falling street prices for cocaine and still high levels of consumption in the United States despite decades of policies focused on punishing users and cutting supplies from Latin American countries such as Colombia. 'PREJUDICES, FEARS' The presidents' commission released a report calling on governments to refocus policies toward treating users, move toward decriminalizing marijuana, and invest more in education campaigns. It said current policies were rooted in "prejudices, fears and ideological visions" that inhibited debate. Even as the group met in Rio on Wednesday, police arrested 51 people in a major operation in the city and other states against a suspected drug smuggling ring that sent cocaine to Europe and brought back synthetic drugs like Ecstasy. Organized crime has flourished around drugs and is now threatening the stability of Mexico, where a spiraling war between rival gangs killed more than 5,700 people last year. Cardoso, one of Latin America's most respected figures, said U.S. leadership was essential to break the cycle of drug-related crime and violence. "It will be almost impossible to solve Mexico's problems and other countries' problems without a more ample, comprehensive set of policies from the U.S. government," he said. Despite winning power on broad promises of change, drugs policy featured little in U.S. President Barack Obama's election campaign and there are few indications that he will embark on a major overhaul. Gaviria said Washington appeared increasingly isolated in its repressive approach as Latin America and Europe move toward treating drug abuse as a health problem rather than a crime. (Editing by Raymond Colitt and Kieran Murray)

**No impact to heg**

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

Zero studies exist to confirm that primacy is peaceful

Montiero, 12 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful” International Security, Winter, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received virtually no attention. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010. 22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. 23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war. 24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate. 25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention.

**Heg fails**

**Mastanduno 9** (Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

**Empirically–food crises are effected by local factors, not global prices**

**Paarlberg, 08 -** professor of political science at Wellesley College and a visiting professor of government at Harvard University (Robert, “The Real Food Crisis,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 6/27, lexis)

Ironically, it was only when the so-called food crisis of the 1970s came to an end, during the slow-growth decade of the 1980s, that food circumstances in poor countries significantly worsened. In Latin America, even though world **food prices** were falling sharply, the number of hungry people increased from 46 million to more than 60 million. The reason was a regional "debt crisis" triggered by higher U.S. interest rates after 1979. The number of hungry people also increased sharply in Africa during the 1980s. The reason was faltering farm production, exacerbated in some regions by severe drought and civil conflict. The price for imported food was down, but hunger was up. Most real food crises are local rather than global.

**High prices increase production, solves immediate crises and dampens the price climb.**

**Abbot et al, 09** — agricultural economist at Purdue (Philip, “What’s Driving Food Prices? March 2009 Update,”

http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/1702-Farm%20-%203-10-09%20-%20Food%20Prices%20Update%20-%20Book%20for%20Posting.pdf

The July 2008 What’s Driving Food Prices? report suggested that market mechanisms would result in adjustments over time. High prices ultimately result in reductions in consumption and increases in production. Both have occurred, with a considerable exchange rate adjustment and the added shock of a world financial crisis. World stocks-to-use ratios still remain relatively tight by historic standards for corn, soybeans, wheat and rice. As a result, prices also remain relatively high by historic standards. The period from 1998 to 2005 was one of surplus stocks, with consumption outpacing production and drawing down stocks. From 2006 to mid-2008, the on-going growth of world food demand was extended by the surge in biofuels usage. These large demand expansions came during two weak production years (2006/07 and 2007/08) and shortages became the norm. Today, world stocks have increased somewhat from dangerously low levels. World crop area has increased, and the surge in biofuels demand will be less than had been anticipated just a few months ago. This means a better balance of production and utilization in the near-term. The depths of the current world economic downturn and eventual recovery will be important drivers of grain and oilseed prices in the next few years, as will be energy prices and biofuels policy around the world.

### GULF

Empirically denied by past OIL Spills – no reason the plan is critical – to continue that

**No impact to the environment**

**Boucher 98** (Doug, "Not with a Bang but a Whimper," Science and Society, Fall, http://www.driftline.org/cgi-bin/archive/archive\_msg.cgi?file=spoon-archives/marxism-international.archive/marxism-international\_1998/marxism-international.9802&msgnum=379&start=32091&end=32412)

The political danger of catastrophism is matched by the weakness of its scientific foundation. Given the prevalence of the idea that the entire biosphere will soon collapse, it is remarkable how few good examples ecology can provide of this happening m even on the scale of an ecosystem, let alone a continent or the whole planet. Hundreds of ecological transformations, due to introductions of alien species, pollution, overexploitation, climate change and even collisions with asteroids, have been documented. They often change the functioning of ecosystems, and the abundance and diversity of their animals and plants, in dramatic ways. The effects on human society can be far-reaching, and often extremely negative for the majority of the population. But one feature has been a constant, nearly everywhere on earth: life goes on. Humans have been able to drive thousands of species to extinction, severely impoverish the soil, alter weather patterns, dramatically lower the biodiversity of natural communities, and incidentally cause great suffering for their posterity. They have not generally been able to prevent nature from growing back. As ecosystems are transformed, species are eliminated -- but opportunities are created for new ones. The natural world is changed, but never totally destroyed. Levins and Lewontin put it well: "The warning not to destroy the environment is empty: environment, like matter, cannot be created or destroyed. What we can do is replace environments we value by those we do not like" (Levins and Lewontin, 1994). Indeed, from a human point of view the most impressive feature of recorded history is that human societies have continued to grow and develop, despite all the terrible things they have done to the earth. Examples of the collapse of civilizations due to their over- exploitation of nature are few and far between. Most tend to be well in the past and poorly documented, and further investigation often shows that the reasons for collapse were fundamentally political.

#### Oceans resilient

**Kennedy 2** (Victor, Coastal and Marine Ecosystems and Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/marine.cfm)

There is evidence that marine organisms and ecosystems are resilient to environmental change. Steele (1991) hypothesized that the biological components of marine systems are tightly coupled to physical factors, allowing them to respond quickly to rapid environmental change and thus rendering them ecologically adaptable. Some species also have wide genetic variability throughout their range, which may allow for adaptation to climate change.

#### Alt causes doom solvency

**Kunich 6** – Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law (John, Killing Our Oceans, p 122-3, AG)

It is crucial, albeit perhaps counterintuitive, that we pay close attention to land-based activities even as we focus on marine hotspots. There are enormous threats to marine biodiversity that originate, not in the oceans, but on dry land in the coastal zones of the world. Part of the reason these threats are prevalent is that an estimated 67 percent of the entire global human population lives either on the coast or within 37 miles of the coast, and that percentage is increasing.14 These huge and growing populations often cause overutilization of fishing and other resources in coastal areas, habitat destruction and degradation, pollution (both organic and inorganic), eutrophication and related issues such as pathogenic bacteria and algal toxins, introduction of invasive species, watershed alteration, marine littering, and other harms to the nearby marine regions.15 Given that so many key marine centers of biodiversity reside in the near-coast coral reefs and continental shelf areas, it is of tremendous importance that our legal approach embrace appropriate controls over these land-based threats. Any plan that shortsightedly and narrowly focuses too much on ocean-based activities will, paradoxically, miss the boat.

**No offense --- defenses of terrestrial biodiversity are inapplicable**

**Valdivia and Molis, 9** (Nelson, Biologische Anstalt Helgoland, Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Section Seaweed Biology, Germany, Markus, “Observational evidence of a negative biodiversity–stability relationship in intertidal epibenthic communities,” *Aquatic Biology*, Vol. 4: 263–271, January)

The effects of biodiversity on ecosystem processes have received considerable attention because of the concern that loss of biodiversity can impair the functioning of ecosystems (reviewed by Hooper et al. 2005, Stachowicz et al. 2007). Greater species diversity represents more adaptive responses to environmental fluctuations (MacArthur 1955, Elton 1958). By this, the probability that some species maintain functioning when other species fail ensures the persistence of ecosystem properties under variable environmental conditions (Walker 1992, Yachi & Loreau 1999). Indeed, influential research in terrestrial habitats has shown that diversity is beneficial for the functioning and stability of ecosystems (e.g. Tilman 1996, Hector et al. 1999, Loreau & Hector 2001, Tilman et al. 2006). These ideas, however, remain poorly examined in aquatic ecosystems, for which there is also a need to understand the ecological consequences of species loss (Gessner et al. 2004, Hooper et al. 2005). Considering the differences between terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems (Giller et al. 2004), generalisations obtained from terrestrial habitats may not apply to marine habitats.

**Marine biodiversity destabilizes ecosystems**

**Valdivia and Molis, 9** (Nelson, Biologische Anstalt Helgoland, Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Section Seaweed Biology, Germany, Markus, “Observational evidence of a negative biodiversity–stability relationship in intertidal epibenthic communities,” *Aquatic Biology*, Vol. 4: 263–271, January)

Our observations suggest that community stability decreased as the number of species increased, in contrast to what most theoretical and empirical work predicts (reviewed by Hooper et al. 2005, Stachowicz et al. 2007). In addition, the patterns of community and population stability were highly complex. In the present study, the average total community coverage significantly increased with species richness (i.e. overyielding) and the variance scaled with the mean coverage with 1 < z < 2. Overyielding and z-values between 1 and 2 should have led to a positive diversity–stability relationship (Tilman et al. 2006, van Ruijven & Berendse 2007). Yet, increasing stability with increasing diversity also requires increasingly negative species covariances and an even distribution of species abundances. On average, summed covariances were significantly less than zero. At both sites dominated by the canopy forming Fucus serratus, however, covariances were equal to or larger than zero. Positive covariances for these sites may have resulted from the positive effect of F. serratus on obligate understorey species (N. Valdivia unpubl. data). Moreover, persistent removals of the F. serratus canopy caused compensatory dynamics of species with different environmental tolerances; the resulting negative covariances buffered the community stability but reduced the population stability (N. Valdivia unpubl. data). Therefore, the covariance in the species responses to environmental disturbances can strongly influence the stability of the shores studied here. In the present study, the insignificant relationship between species covariances and species richness probably prevented a positive effect of diversity on stability.

#### Storms cause spills that collapse ecosystems – comparatively more dangerous

Blue Channel 9-27-2012; news channel, “In unlikely turn, conservationists lobby to save Gulf of Mexico oil rigs” http://www.bluechannel24.com/?p=14763

U.S. Department of Interior officials say the federal “idle iron” policy, updated in 2010, makes good sense after storms during the 2005 hurricane season toppled 150 defunct oil rigs, causing considerable damage. If defunct rigs are toppled by storms, they can break loose and hit other rigs – potentially causing an oil spill – be swept to land and destroy a dock or a bridge, knock into and damage natural reefs and cause problems with ship navigation. “Cleaning up afterwards is a lot more expensive and inefficient,” said David Smith, spokesman for the department’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. Federal law has long required the removal of drilling infrastructure no longer in use, but a 2010 agency notice asked operators to detail plans for 650 dormant oil and gas production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico and 3,500 inactive wells. Companies have to demonstrate the infrastructure will be put to use eventually or offer a plan to move ahead with decommissioning, the agency said.

## 2nc

### 2nc framework

#### Turns case and shuts down deliberation—implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency—our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic **policy decisions** ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) **are isolated** from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and **treated as matters of** technocratic design and **implementation**, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. **In the process, democratic participation** in ¶ decision-making **is either limited to an already** highly-**commodified**, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral **politics**, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a **highly reductionist notion** of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. **By** treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately **trying to insulate policy-making from** ¶ popular **politics** and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is ¶ itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second ¶ caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being ¶ removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being ¶ insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes **exposed to the “distortions” of** a ¶ politics of **rent-seeking and speculation**—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the ¶ Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a ¶ bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among ¶ themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries ¶ (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount ¶ of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, ¶ however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal ¶ reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), ¶ private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government ¶ control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago ¶ schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even ¶ though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as ¶ in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of ¶ the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern ¶ the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to ¶ health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable **shift from** rights-based policymaking forged through public **deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on** ¶ economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of **technocratic calculation**. In this ¶ regard, as noted above, the **treatment of subjectivity** solely in behaviorist terms of economic ¶ incentives **functions as the key conceptual choice** that makes the technocratization of public ¶ policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ¶ ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of ¶ neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

#### Use the ballot to reclaim social pedagogy—skills and knowledge are force multipliers for inequality unless we prioritize resistance in education—it’s your academic responsibility

**Giroux, cultural studies prof, 5**—Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, selected as the Barstow Visiting Scholar for 2003 at Saginaw Valley State University, named as Distinguished Scholar at multiple institutions, Ph.D. (Henry, Fast Capitalism, 1.2 2005, “Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism,” RBatra)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that **our responsibility as intellectuals** for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues.¶ **Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy** means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170).¶ Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives. Within the ongoing process of democratization lies the promise of a society that is open to exchange, questioning, and self-criticism, a democracy that is never finished, and one that opposes neoliberal and neoconservative attempts to supplant the concept of an open society with a fundamentalist market-driven or authoritarian one.¶ Cultural studies theorists who work in higher education need to make clear that the issue is not whether higher education has become contaminated by politics, as much as recognizing that **education is already a space of politics**, power, and authority. At the same time, **they can make visible their opposition to** those **approaches** to pedagogy **that reduce it to a set of skills** to enhance one's visibility in the corporate sector or an ideological litmus test that measures one's patriotism or ratings on the rapture index. There is a disquieting refusal in the contemporary academy to raise broader questions about the social, economic, and political forces shaping the very terrain of higher education—particularly unbridled market forces, fundamentalist groups, and racist and sexist forces that unequally value diverse groups within relations of academic power.¶ There is also a general misunderstanding of how teacher authority can be used to create the pedagogical conditions for critical forms of education without necessarily falling into the trap of simply indoctrinating students. For instance, many conservative and liberal educators believe that any notion of critical pedagogy that is self-conscious about its politics and engages students in ways that offer them the possibility for becoming critical—what Lani Guinier (2003:6) calls the need to educate students "to participate in civic life, and to encourage graduates to give back to the community, which through taxes, made their education possible"—leaves students out of the conversation or presupposes too much or simply represents a form of pedagogical tyranny. While such educators believe in practices that open up the possibility of questioning among students, they often refuse to connect the pedagogical conditions that challenge how and what students think at the moment to the next task of prompting them to imagine changing the world around them so as to expand and deepen its democratic possibilities. Teaching students how to argue, draw on their own experiences, or engage in rigorous dialogue says nothing about why they should engage in these actions in the first place. How the culture of argumentation and questioning relates to giving students the tools they need to fight oppressive forms of power, make the world a more meaningful and just place, and develop a sense of social responsibility is missing in contemporary, progressive frameworks of education.¶ While no pedagogical intervention should fall to the level of propaganda, a pedagogy which attempts to empower critical citizens can't and shouldn't try to avoid politics. Pedagogy must address the relationships between politics and agency, knowledge and power, subject positions and values, and learning and social change while always being open to debate, resistance, and a culture of questioning. Liberal educators committed to simply raising questions have no language for linking learning to forms of public minded scholarship that would enable students to consider the important relationship between democratic public life and education, or that would encourage students pedagogically to enter the sphere of the political, enabling them to think about how they might participate in a democracy by taking what they learn into new locations and battlegrounds—a fourth grade classroom, a church, the media, a politician's office, the courts, a campus—or for that matter taking on collaborative projects that address the myriad of problems citizens face on a local, national, and global level in a diminishing democracy.¶ In spite of the professional pretense to neutrality, **academics** in the field of cultural studies **need to do more** pedagogically **than simply teach students how to argue** and question. Students need much more from their educational experience. Democratic societies need educated citizens who are steeped in more than the skills of argumentation. And it is precisely this democratic project that affirms the critical function of education and refuses to narrow its goals and aspirations to methodological considerations. As Amy Gutmann (1999) argues, education is always political because it is connected to the acquisition of agency, the ability to struggle with ongoing relations of power, and is a precondition for creating informed and critical citizens who act on the world. This is not a notion of education tied to the alleged neutrality of the academy or the new conservative call for "intellectual diversity" but to a vision of pedagogy that is directive and interventionist on the side of producing a substantive democratic society. This is what makes critical pedagogy different from training. And it is precisely the failure to connect learning to its democratic functions and goals that provides rationales for pedagogical approaches that strip critical and democratic possibilities from what it means to be educated.¶ Cultural studies theorists and educators would do well to take account of the profound transformations taking place in the public sphere and reclaim pedagogy as a central element of cultural politics. In part, this means once again recognizing, as Pierre Bourdieu (2003) has insisted, that the "power of the dominant order is not just economic, but intellectual—lying in the realm of beliefs"(p. 66), and it is precisely within the domain of ideas that a sense of utopian possibility can be restored to the public realm. Such a task suggests that academics and other cultural workers actively resist the ways in which neoliberalism discourages teachers and students from becoming critical intellectuals by **turning them into human data banks**. Educators and other cultural workers need to build alliances across differences, academic disciplines, and national boundaries as part of broader efforts to develop social movements in defense of the public good and social justice. No small part of this task requires that such groups make visible the connection between the war at home and abroad. If the growing authoritarianism in the U.S. is to be challenged, it is necessary to oppose not only an imperial foreign policy, but also the shameful tax cuts for the rich, the dismantling of the welfare state, the attack on unions, and those policies that sacrifice civil liberties in the cause of national security.¶ Opposing the authoritarian politics of neoliberalism, militarism, and neoconservatism means developing enclaves of resistance in order to stop the incarceration of a generation of young black and brown men and women, the privatization of the commons, the attack on public schools, the increasing corporatization of higher education, the growing militarization of public life, and the use of power based on the assumption that empire abroad entails tyranny and repression at home. But resistance needs to be more than local or rooted in the specificity of particular struggles. Progressives need to develop national and international movements designed to fight the new authoritarianism emerging in the United States and elsewhere. In part, this means revitalizing social movements such as civil rights, labor, environmental, and anti-globalization on the basis of shared values and a moral vision rather than simply issue-based coalitions. This suggests organizing workers, intellectuals, students, youth, and others through a language of critique and possibility in which diverse forms of oppression are addressed through a larger discourse of radical democracy, a discourse that addresses not only what it means to think in terms of a general notion of freedom capable of challenging corporate rule, religious fundamentalism, and the new ideologies of empire, but also what it might mean to link freedom to a shared sense of hope, happiness, community, equality, and social justice. Democracy implies a level of shared beliefs, practices, and a commitment to build a more humane future. Politics in this sense points to a struggle over those social, economic, cultural, and institutional forces that make democracy purposeful for all people. But this fundamentally **requires something prior**—a reclaiming of the social and cultural basis of a critical education that makes the very struggle over democratic politics meaningful and understandable as part of a broader affective, intellectual, and theoretical investment in public life (Couldry 2004).

#### This comes before any alt or perm args—plan focus rigs debate against investigating assumptions—their model trains you not to defend the process by which you make conclusions, which distorts policy analysis

**Gunder et al**, Aukland University senior planning lecturer, **2009**

(Michael, Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning pgs 111-2)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on¶ appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge¶ clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes their desired¶ enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what¶ is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In tum, this defines what is blighted¶ and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy.¶ Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a¶ lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they¶ are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack¶ and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues.¶ Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their "dominant stakeholders” can¶ ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many,¶ whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and¶ Hillier 2007a, 469).

The current “post-democratic” milieu facilitates the above through avoidance¶ of critical policy debate challenging favoured orthodox positions and policy¶ approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative “solutions”, are¶ eradicated from political debate so that while “token institutions of liberal democracy”:¶ are retained, conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003,¶ 59). Consequently, “the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are¶ repeatedly used, or their work drawn upon, by different stakeholders, while more¶ critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007,¶ 1032). The economic development or spatial planning policy analyst thus continues¶ to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox "˜successful' or¶ "best practice' economic development or spatial planning responses. This further¶ maintains the dominant, or hegemonic, status quo while providing "a cover and¶ shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the¶ political held from any research that is independent and radical in its conception¶ as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time,¶ adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses¶ for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game¶ (Blair and Kumar 1997).

### 2nc at: perm

#### Ad hoc reconfiguration of core assumptions undermines critical thinking—only the alt is conceptually coherent—this also proves they cede the political through expertism and the logic of fungibility and competition

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) **replaces critical thinking** about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process,¶ [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over¶ physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of¶ existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically¶ and technologically unassailable.¶ **Triumphant Energy Capitalism**¶Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to¶ market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just¶ as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical¶ preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005)¶ are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and¶ increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the¶ current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen¶ the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic¶ growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged¶ to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives¶ that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that¶ willingly invests in its own perpetuation.¶ While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the¶ conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings,¶ there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is¶ faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables-based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a¶ redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources¶ are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project,¶ according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of¶ growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional¶ energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel¶ capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference¶ with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature.¶ In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet¶ about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of¶ energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such¶ steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does¶ it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might¶ jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the¶ movement’s quest?¶ **Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse**¶After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy¶ futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of¶ governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new¶ technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector¶ and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics¶ 21¶ in which¶ the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high¶ technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities,¶ contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere.¶ Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition¶ (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy¶ and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”¶ Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is¶ important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the¶ two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of¶ more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a¶ sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy¶ visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal¶ of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological¶ marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start¶ the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and¶ social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree¶ to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.¶ 22¶ Nothing is said¶ on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be.¶ If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct,¶ then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of¶ acquiescence to things as they are. Building an **inquiry into energy as a social**¶ **project will require** the recovery of a **critical voice that can interrogate**, rather¶ than concede, **the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and**¶ capitalist **political economy**. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate¶ an energy-society order in which **energy systems evolve in response to social**¶ **values** and goals, **and not simply according** to the dictates of technique,¶ **prices**, or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability¶ camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is¶ non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources¶ need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage¶ the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent¶ possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the¶ global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy¶ services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to¶ between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance¶ of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed¶ professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the¶ life-world of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to¶ design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life.¶ Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot¶ overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe¶ of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism¶ are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965:¶ 52) explained why **the democratic-authoritarian bargain** and Western capitalism **should be rejected:**¶God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the¶ West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today¶ keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, **it would strip the world bare** like locusts. Unless the capitalists of¶ India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and¶ by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of¶ the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or¶ being destroyed by them.¶ As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric¶ light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places¶ efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social¶ problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our¶ political-economic problem.¶ The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

### at: policy relevance (owen)

#### Owen’s wrong – theory doesn’t kill relevance – need to ask epistemological questions to avoid policy failure – this card will win us the debate

**Reus-Smit 12** – Professor of International Relations at the European University Institute, Florence (Christian, “International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies June 2012 vol. 40 no. 3 525-540, dml)

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames. 10 Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend.

Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them. 11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision. 12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice. 13

Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided.

Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act. 14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether. 15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance.

Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance.

Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

### 2nc alt

#### All their spillover claims link harder to them—it’s more pragmatic to reflect on social dynamics than pretend we can reform politics from the campus, even if there’s no exact blueprint—this is also a DA to the perm

Pepper 10 Prof Geography Oxford, Utopianism and Environmentalism, Environmental Politics, 14:1, 3-22, SAGE

Conclusion

Academic and activist opinion nonetheless frequently argues that Utopian endeavour is necessary for radical environmentalism and for related movements such as feminism, anarchism and socialism. Utopianism is important within these movements to inspire hope and provide 'transgressive' spaces, conceptual and real, in which to experiment within alternative paradigms. To be truly transgressive, rather than lapsing into reactionary fantasy, ecotopias need to emphasise heuristic spaces and processes rather than laying down blueprints, and must be rooted in existing social and economic relations rather than being merely a form of abstraction unrelated to the processes and situations operating in today's 'real' world.

This paper suggests that by these criteria, the transgressiveness of ecotopianism is ambiguous and limited. Deep ecological and bioregional literature, for instance, can seem regressively removed from today's world. Anti-modernism is evident, for instance, in the form of future primitivism and the predilection for small-scale 're-embedded' societies echoing "traditional cultures'. Blueprinting is also suggested by the strong metanarratives driven by (ecological) science. There is a remarkable consensus amongst ideologically diverse ecotopian perspectives about what should be in ecotopia, leaving relatively little as provisional and reflexive. Additionally, idealism in the negative sense is often rife in ecotopianism.

However, idealism pervades reformist as well as radical environmentalism, and the principles behind ecological modernisation - the much-favoured mainstream policy discourse about the environment — are founded on premises that can be described as 'Utopian\* in the pejorative sense used by Marxists. That is, they do not adequately and accurately take into account the socioeconomic dynamics of the capitalist system they are meant to reform. Thus they fail to recognise that social-democratic and 'third way' attempts to realise an environmentally sound, humane, inclusive and egalitarian capitalism are ultimately headed for failure.

Notwithstanding these limitations of ecotopianism, given that the environmental problems featured in dystopian fiction for over a century seem increasingly to be materialising, it may be that we will soon be clutching at ecotopias as beacons affirming Bloch's 'principle of hope\* (1986).

And what of those who, despite these deepening environmental problems, still maintain that 'ecotopia' is Utopian fantasy in the worst sense, while considering their reformist visions to be pragmatic and attainable? These "hard-nosed realists\*, as Terry Eagleton (2000, p.33) ironically calls them, "who behave as though chocolate chip cookies and the IMF will be with us in another 3000 years time", should realise that although the future may or may not be pleasant:

to deny that it will be quite different in the manner of post-histoire philosophising, is to offend against the very realism on which such theorists usually pride themselves. To claim that human affairs might feasibly be much improved is an eminently realistic proposition.

### 2nc sustainability

#### Collapse is imminent—now is unique because public policy has exhausted the range of viable fixes

**Wallerstein, Ph.D., 11**—senior research scholar at Yale University, PhD from Columbia (Immanuel, January/ February 2011, “THE GLOBAL ECONOMY WON'T RECOVER, NOW OR EVER,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional\_wisdom?page=0,9, RBatra)

The problem is that the basic costs of all production have risen remarkably. There are the personnel expenses of all kinds -- for unskilled workers, for cadres, for top-level management. There are the costs incurred as producers pass on the costs of their production to the rest of us -- for detoxification, for renewal of resources, for infrastructure. And the democratization of the world has led to demands for more and more education, more and more health provisions, and more and more guarantees of lifetime income. To meet these demands, there has been a significant increase in taxation of all kinds. Together, these costs have risen beyond the point that permits serious capital accumulation. Why not then simply raise prices? Because there are limits beyond which one cannot push their level. It is called the elasticity of demand. The result is a growing profit squeeze, which is reaching a point where the game is not worth the candle.

What we are witnessing as a result is chaotic fluctuations of all kinds -- economic, political, sociocultural. These fluctuations cannot easily be controlled by public policy. The result is ever greater uncertainty about all kinds of short-term decision-making, as well as frantic realignments of every variety. Doubt feeds on itself as we search for ways out of the menacing uncertainty posed by terrorism, climate change, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation.

**The only sure thing is that the present system cannot continue**. The fundamental political struggle is over what kind of system will replace capitalism, not whether it should survive. The choice is between a new system that replicates some of the present system's essential features of hierarchy and polarization and one that is relatively democratic and egalitarian.

The extraordinary expansion of the world-economy in the postwar years (more or less 1945 to 1970) has been followed by a long period of economic stagnation in which the basic source of gain has been rank speculation sustained by successive indebtednesses. The latest financial crisis didn't bring down this system; it merely exposed it as hollow. Our recent "difficulties" are merely the next-to-last bubble in a process of boom and bust the world-system has been undergoing since around 1970. The last bubble will be state indebtednesses, including in the so-called emerging economies, leading to bankruptcies.

Most people do not recognize -- or refuse to recognize -- these realities. It is wrenching to accept that the historical system in which we are living is in structural crisis and will not survive.

Meanwhile, the system proceeds by its accepted rules. We meet at G-20 sessions and seek a futile consensus. We speculate on the markets. We "develop" our economies in whatever way we can. **All this activity simply accentuates the structural crisis.** The real action, the struggle over what new system will be created, is elsewhere.

### offshore oil

#### Offshore production is underpinned by a neoliberal logic of commodification that cannot reconcile or account for environmental degradation—the result is systemic destruction of ocean space

Martens ’11 (Emily, Masters’ Thesis paper at the University of Miami for a Master’s Degree in Geography and Regional Studies, overseen by Mazen Labban, Ph.D. and professor of Geography, Terri A. Scandura, Ph.D, Dean of the Graduate School, Jan Nijman, Ph.D. Professor of Geography, and Anna Zalik, Ph.D.,Professor of Environmental Sciences, York University, Toronto, “THE DISCOURSES OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY IN THE DEBATE OVER OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING POLICY IN FLORIDA,” http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=oa\_theses, AM)

The fusion of energy security and environmental protection concerns has since the energy and environmental crises of the 1970s forged a policy aimed at creating environmentally safe extraction and production processes. The emphasis on cheap energy resources, however, has come into contradiction with requirements of costly regulation and oversight practices that are thought to better ensure environmental security. The attempt to reconcile offshore drilling with concerns about environmental protection during the Nixon and Carter years was torn asunder by the hostility to regulation during the Reagan and Clinton years. As a result, a heated debate developed between proponents of offshore oil drilling who argue that (unregulated) offshore oil drilling — and expanded domestic oil production in general — ensures energy security by making the United States energy independent and opponents of offshore oil drilling who do not contest the goal of energy independence but who argue that this should not be at the expense of the protection of marine ecosystems and coastal economies from the destructive effects of offshore drilling, regulated or not. The debate, in other words, developed into a debate between a dominant discourse of energy security and a counter discourse of environmental security — at the core of it were questions of regulation as well as competing commercial interests. Though there are various actors and interests within each of these discourses, the primary tension between proponents and opponents of offshore oil drilling tends to reproduce the tensions embodied in the larger discourses of energy security and environmental security at different geographical scales. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that the credence given to either one of these two security discourses at any given time is the result of broader socio-political forces and the changing ideologies within which they operate. Underlying both seemingly opposed discourses, however, is a common logic that informs the path they take and the language they use to establish legitimacy — the logic of the commodity — an abstract representation of space that supports this logic. This space, as Lefebvre (2007: 53) points out, “includes the ‘world of commodities’, its ‘logic’ and its worldwide strategies, as well as the power of money and that of the political state”. As will be shown in the following chapters, each of these competing discourses has organized its arguments around the logics of capitalism to gain public support and federal and local state protections. This is not an arbitrary association but rather the result of specific political developments in the US that have shaped environmental concerns, and the environment, according to free market principles. Prior to the injection of neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization into the environment and discourses on the environment under the Reagan Administration, the Nixon and Carter Administrations were caught between an environmental movement, which attempted to create a new perspective from which human activity could be viewed in light of its often negative impacts on the environment – especially offshore oil drilling as a result of the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill – and the volatility of the international oil market which threatened oil imports. The Nixon and Carter strategies attempted to balance the two agendas through the expansion of domestic oil production in tandem with regulations and oversight that would monitor the offshore oil industry’s compliance with environmental standards. This was thought and presented as a temporary measure. Ultimately the aim was to create alternative fuels in the not too distant future to replace oil, in light of evidence and concern that both the production and consumption of oil were proving to be detrimental to the environment which humans depended on for their own survival. Neoliberal restructuring under the Reagan Administration, however, promoted a market-based discourse of energy security above, or more precisely against the discourse of environmental security, advocating reduction of state oversights and reliance on market signals instead as the more efficient means to regulate offshore drilling. Environmental security, in the form of government oversight, became a threat to the accumulation of wealth — a source of insecurity. Instead, environmental security could be entrusted to the multiple interests operating in the free market. The argument rested on the neoliberal mantra that the government was not as efficient as private owners and the market in managing and protecting the environment. As a result, offshore oil drilling activity has since enjoyed lax regulatory oversight, while day-to-day oil pollution continues to disrupt various ecological and economic activities that share ocean space.

**Their attempt to clean up Mexico is paternalistic and destined to fail—putting it under the auspices of regulation just means the state can seize profits**

William **Harms**, University of Chicago Chronicle, 11-27-19**95**; Lomnitz: Understanding history of corruption in Mexico, http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/951127/lomnitz.shtml

The oil crisis resulted from the [deregulation of oil markets and increased speculation](http://stopoilspeculation.com/), prompting many countries, including Bolivia and Russia, to step up the regulation and nationalization of their oil industries. Yet Mexico’s ruling conservative National Action Party (PAN) is portraying the industry’s privatization as the only way forward. Non-Binding Referendum This push toward privatization has sparked an enormous and growing response. Nearly two million Mexicans participated in a public referendum organized by the governments of Mexico City and nine other states, giving a voice to the people in the most successful initiative of its kind in the country. Although not binding, the result has been substantial opposition to the proposed presidential bill for the privatization of the operations of Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the national oil company. [In Mexico City, a staggering 87% and 84% out of 826,000 people voted “No”](http://www.consultaenergetica.df.gob.mx/) to the following questions: Presently, the production, transportation, storage and refining of oil resources are exclusive activities of the state. Do you agree or not that private companies can participate in these activities? In general, do you agree or not that the initiatives being discussed in Congress on energy reform should be approved? In the [other nine states](http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/08/01/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol) in which some 967,000 Mexicans participated, the results against the privatization were even more dramatic. Approximately 94.5% and 92.5%, respectively, answered “No” to those two questions. This referendum is a product of the broad and growing citizen movement led by former presidential candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, and the political action of opposition parties grouped in the (FAP) coalition. It’s also a rejection of an initiative taken by President Felipe Calderon, who won a suspect electoral victory in 2006 and whose legitimacy is still questioned by many Mexicans. This movement has produced a plethora of debates around the future of the oil industry in which intellectuals, workers, members of Mexico’s Congress, politicians, students, and many others have stymied Calderon’s efforts to push the bill through without much discussion by lawmakers. Constitutional Ban The presidential initiative is not only illegal and unconstitutional, but would also harm the economy. As [many intellectuals](http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/07/16/index.php) have argued, Calderon’s bill violates the Mexican constitution because an amendment is required to allow private investors, either national or foreign, to enter the oil industry. Investors would be allowed to build, operate, and own infrastructure, equipment, and pipelines for the exploration and development of oil and gas fields, the refining of oil and gas processing, and the transportation, storage, and distribution of basic petroleum and petrochemical products. In other words, the oil industry and the state-run oil monopoly PEMEX could end up in private hands. Mexican sensitivity to this issue dates back to 1938, when President Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the oil industry and expropriated all operations in the country because U.S. and British oil companies refused to comply with labor laws and evaded taxes. Nationalization immediately became a symbol of national pride, and PEMEX is to this day an emblem of Mexican modern identity. Despite a lack of reinvestment of the company’s profits and the widespread corruption that has hurt PEMEX for decades, the industry remains the backbone of the national economy.

### at: violence down

#### Wars increasing—disproves their theory—and neolib doesn’t solve it

**Hadley**, History Today editor, **2011**

(Kathryn, “Alarming increase in wars”, 7-12, http://www.historytoday.com/blog/2011/07/alarming-increase-wars, DOA: 7-4-12, ldg)

New research by Professors Mark Harrison from the University of Warwick and Nikolaus Wolf from Humboldt University has revealed that between 1870 and 2001, the frequency of wars between states increased steadily by 2% a year on average. Between 1870 and 1913, the frequency of ‘pairwise’ conflicts (the numbers of pairs of countries involved in conflicts) increased on average by 6% per year. The frequency of wars increased by 17% per year in the period of the First and Second World Wars, and by 31% per year during the Cold War. In the 1990s, the frequency of wars between states rose by 36% per year.¶ Professor Mark Harrison explained how: ‘**The number of conflicts has been rising** on a stable trend. Because of two world wars, the pattern is obviously disturbed between 1914 and 1945 but remarkably, after 1945 the frequency of wars resumed its upward course on pretty much the same path as before 1913.’¶ The graph below illustrates this increase in pairwise conflicts. It only includes wars between states and does not include civil wars. Conflicts range from full-scale shooting wars and uses of military force to displays of force (sending warships and closing borders, for example). Although Harrison and Wolf’s study does not measure the intensity of violence, it reflects the readiness of governments to settle disputes by force.¶ According to Harrison and Wolf, this increase in the frequency of pairwise conflicts can be explained by two principal factors: economic growth and the proliferation of borders. The number of countries has thus almost quadrupled since 1870, rising from 47 countries in 1870 to 187 in 2001.¶ Harrison continued: ‘More pairs of countries have clashed because there have been more pairs. This is not reassuring: it shows that there is a close connection between wars and the creation of states and new borders.’¶ Looking specifically at the countries that have initiated disputes, the study shows that there is no tendency for richer countries (defined by a higher GDP per head) to make more frequent military interventions than others. The readiness to engage in war is spread relatively uniformly across the global income distribution.¶ Thinkers of the Enlightenment believed, and many political scientists still believe today, that the political leaders of richer and more democratic countries have fewer incentives to go to war. Over the course of the twentieth century, on the whole, countries have become richer, more democratic and more interdependent. Yet, Harrison and Wolf’s study disproves the theory that as GDP increases countries are less likely to engage in warfare.

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### Overview

**The depth of education outweighs, key to educational success in a globalized world**

**WP, 09** [Washington Post, “Will Depth Replace Breadth in Schools?” http://voices.washingtonpost.com/class-struggle/2009/02/will\_depth\_replace\_breadth\_in.html]

The truth, of course, is that students need both. Teachers try to mix the two in ways that make sense to them and their students. But a surprising study — certain to be a hot topic in teacher lounges and education schools — is providing new data that suggest educators should spend much more time on a few issues and let some topics slide. Based on a sample of 8,310 undergraduates, the national study says that students who spend at least a month on just one topic in a high school science course get better grades in a freshman college course in that subject than students whose high school courses were more balanced. The study, appearing in the July issue of the journal Science Education, is “Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Science Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework.” The authors are Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington, Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics and Robert H. Tai of the University of Virginia. This is more rich ore from a goldmine of a survey Sadler and Tai helped organize called “Factors Influencing College Science Success.” It involved 18,000 undergraduates, plus their professors, in 67 colleges in 31 states. The study weighs in on one side of a contentious issue that will be getting national attention this September when the [College Board’s Advanced Placement program](http://www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/ap/about.html) unveils its major overhaul of its college-level science exams for high school students. AP is following a direction taken by its smaller counterpart, the [International Baccalaureate program](http://www.ibo.org/). IB teachers already are allowed to focus on topics of their choice. Their students can deal with just a few topics on exams, because they have a wide choice of questions. AP’s exact approach is not clear yet, but [College Board](http://www.collegeboard.com/) officials said they too will embrace depth. They have been getting much praise for this from the [National Science Foundation](http://www.nsf.gov/), which funded the new study. Sadler and Tai have previously hinted at where this was going. In 2001 they reported that students who did not use a textbook in high school physics—an indication that their teachers disdained hitting every topic — achieved higher college grades than those who used a textbook. Some educators, pundits, parents and students will object, I suspect, to sidelining their favorite subjects and spending more time on what they consider trivial or dangerous topics. Some will fret over the possibility that teachers might abandon breadth altogether and wallow in their specialties. Even non-science courses could be affected. Imagine a U.S. history course that is nothing but lives of generals, or a required English course that assigns only Jane Austen. “Depth Versus Breadth” analyzes undergraduate answers to detailed questions about their high school study of physics, chemistry and biology, and the grades they received in freshman college science courses. The college grades of students who had studied at least one topic for at least a month in a high school science course were compared to those of students who did not experience such depth. The study acknowledges that the pro-breadth forces have been in retreat. Several national commissions have called for more depth in science teaching and other subjects. A 2005 study of 46 countries found that those whose schools had the best science test scores covered far fewer topics than U.S. schools.

**Stale Debate – large topics encourage a race to topic generics – decimates the pedagogical benefits of debate --- and it independently kills participation --- link turns their offense**

**Rowland, 84** (Robert C., Debate Coach – Baylor University, “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective, Ed. Parson, p. 53-54)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that **entire programs** either **cease functioning** or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

### A2 Stratfor

#### Their stratford ev says the agreement was already signed – the core framing issue is do they cause compliance

**Mohammed 7**

Kerala High Court Sri Chithira Aero And Adventure ... vs The Director General Of Civil ... on 24 January, 1997 Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 Ker 121 Author: P Mohammed Bench: P Mohammed

Microlight aircrafts or hang gliders shall not be flown over an assembly of persons or over congested areas or restricted areas including cantonment areas, defence installations etc. unless prior permission in writing is obtained from appropriate authorities. These provisions do not create any restrictions. There is no total prohibition of operation of microlight aircraft or hang gliders. The **distinction between 'regulation' and 'restriction'** must be clearly perceived. The 'regulation' is a process which aids main function within the legal precinct whereas 'restriction' is a process which prevents the function without legal sanction. Regulation is allowable but restriction is objectionable. What is contained in the impugned clauses is, only regulations and not restrictions, complete or partial. They are issued with authority conferred on the first respondent, under Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules consistent with the provisions contained in the Aircraft Act 1934 relating to the operation, use etc. of aircrafts flying in India.

#### Makes you extra t --- the ACT includes a bunch of stuff and takes a diff step

State Department, 12 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184235.htm

The United States and Mexico today signed an agreement concerning the development of oil and gas reservoirs that cross the international maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Mexico. The Agreement is designed to enhance energy security in North America and support our shared duty to exercise responsible stewardship of the Gulf of Mexico. It is built on a commitment to the safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of transboundary reservoirs with the highest degree of safety and environmental standards.¶ **Elements of the Agreement**¶ · The United States and Mexico jointly announced their intention to negotiate a [transboundary hydrocarbons agreement](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/143573.htm) on June 23, 2010, following the [Joint Statement](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-president-barack-obama-and-president-felipe-calder-n) adopted by Presidents Obama and Calderon at the conclusion of President Calderon’s State Visit to Washington on May 19, 2010.¶ Upon entry into force, the current moratorium on oil exploration and production in the Western Gap portion of the Gulf of Mexico will end.¶ The Agreement establishes a cooperative process for managing the maritime boundary region that promotes joint utilization of transboundary reservoirs.¶ The Agreement provides a legal framework for possible commercial activities at the maritime boundary and sets clear guidelines for transboundary developments. It establishes incentives for oil and gas companies to voluntarily enter into arrangements to jointly develop any transboundary reservoirs. In the event such an arrangement is not achieved, the Agreement establishes a process by which U.S. companies and PEMEX can individually develop the resources on each side of the border while protecting each nation’s interests and resources.¶ The legal certainty created by the Agreement will enable U.S. companies to explore new business opportunities and carry out collaborative projects with PEMEX.¶ The Agreement also provides for joint inspections teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both governments will review all plans for the development of any transboundary reservoirs.

#### Hold the line on restrictions—no good reason to broaden the term

**Pashman**, justice – New Jersey Supreme Court, 3/25/**’63**

(Morris, “ISIDORE FELDMAN, PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. URBAN COMMERCIAL, INC., AND OTHERS, DEFENDANT,” 78 N.J. Super. 520; 189 A.2d 467; 1963 N.J. Super. LEXIS 479)

HN3A title insurance policy "is subject to the same rules of construction as are other insurance policies." Sandler v. N.J. Realty Title Ins. Co., supra, at [\*\*\*11] p. 479. It is within these rules of construction that this policy must be construed.

Defendant contends that plaintiff's loss was occasioned by restrictions excepted from coverage in Schedule B of the title policy. The question is whether the provision in the deed to Developers that redevelopment had to be completed [\*528] within 32 months is a "restriction." Judge HN4 Kilkenny held that this provision was a "condition" and "more than a mere covenant." 64 N.J. Super., at p. 378. The word "restriction" as used in the title policy cannot be said to be synonymous with a "condition." A "restriction" generally refers to "a limitation of the manner in which one may use his own lands, and may or may not involve a grant." Kutschinski v. Thompson, 101 N.J. Eq. 649, 656 (Ch. 1927). See also Bertrand v. Jones, 58 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1959), certification denied 31 N.J. 553 (1960); Freedman v. Lieberman, 2 N.J. Super. 537 (Ch. Div. 1949); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435 (Ch. 1948), affirmed per curiam, 1 N.J. 508 (1948). It would not be inappropriate to say that the word "restrictions," as used [\*\*\*12] by defendant insurers, is ambiguous. The rules of construction heretofore announced must guide us in an interpretation of this policy. I find that the word "restrictions" in Schedule B of defendant's title policy does not encompass the provision in the deed to Developers which refers to the completion [\*\*472] of redevelopment work within 32 months because (1) the word is used ambiguously and must be strictly construed against defendant insurer, and (2) the provision does not refer to the use to which the land may be put. As the court stated in Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, supra, at p. 440, "HN5equity will not aid one man to restrict another in the uses to which he may put his land unless the right to such aid is clear, and that restrictive provisions in a deed are to be construed most strictly against the person or persons seeking to enforce them." (Emphasis added)

#### Including regulation cracks the curriculum—even full-time professionals can’t manage that research burden

Stafford 83

<http://felj.org/elj/Energy%20Journals/Vol6_No2_1985_Book_Review2.pdf>

Associate, Ross, Marsh & Foster, Washington, D.C. The assistance of David L. Wallace, a third

year student at the Georgetown University Law Center, in the preparation of this review is greatly appreciated.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF ENERGY by William F. Fox, Jr. Shepard'slMcGraw-Hill, 1983, 846 pages Reviewed by G. William Stafford\* It may safely be said that any effort to catalogue "the entire spectrum of federal regulation of energy"' in a single volume certainly requires an enterprising effort on the part of the author. In this regard, Mr. William F. Fox, Jr., an Associate Professor of Law at Catholic University of America, has undertaken an examination of a vital aspect of United States policy in Federal Regulation of Energy, published in 1983 with an annual pocket supplement available. Despite the complex nature of the subject of his work, Mr. Fox has prepared a text that provides a significant description of many aspects of federal energy regulatory policy. Initially, the book's title may prove somewhat misleading in that it approaches the subject from an historical perspective focused more on substantive than procedural issues. Although a reader gets the impression that the author at time has tried to do too much -at least from the standpoint of the energy practitioner- the historical and technical insights it offers the student of federal energy relation are valuable. Moreover; its detailed explanations of the methods used to tneet federal energy goals are useful for those in the position of initiating energy policy. This strength notwithstanding, it appears unlikely that an energy law practitioner would benefit significantly from its use, other than from its historical point of view. A general impression is that the author may have been overly ambitious in his effort to undertake the **monumental task** of evaluating laws, regulations, and significant judicial decisions in a single work.

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#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and unsustainable practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The **financialisation**¶ **of “energy**”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ **jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just**¶ **transition** to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies **marginalise the role of communities** and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over **how society might be differently organised** to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

**Holleman 2012** – assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1, WEA)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “**social gravity**” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ **belies the notion that “there is no alternative.”** They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, **the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives**, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that **there’s no way we can just subcontract** our ¶ **environmental conscience to** the **new** breed of **green marketers**” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ **planetary boundaries** will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through **collective deliberation** ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ **rather than finding a “solution”** to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still **acting as if economic incentives are the only viable** ¶ **policy tool** in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (**because they are** **designed** to ¶ function **under such behavioral assumptions** in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, **limiting the only channels for** ¶ **communication** available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### DA

#### Obama will get a deficit deal because he has enough polcap to roll Republicans

**Judis 1-3** – John, senior editor for The New Republic (Obama Wasn't Rolled. He Won!, The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111573/obama-didnt-get-rolled-the-fiscal-cliff-in-fact-he-won#)

With a new House and Senate, Obama stands a good chance of winning these battles in the months to come -- *if he continues to conduct these negotiations as political campaigns* and not as backroom Washington affairs. The fiscal cliff deal took tax rates out of the discussion. What’s left are spending cuts. If Obama allows the Republicans and obnoxious groups like Fix the Debt to frame the issues, he’ll be in trouble. And he did seem to fall into this trap briefly when he proposed changing the cost of living index for Social Security. But if he reminds the public that what the Republicans and their allies want to do is cut their Medicare and Social Security, he and the Democrats should be in good shape.¶ As for the Republicans, the debate over the fiscal cliff, like the debate last year over the debt limit, revealed serious divisions within the party and its rank-and-file that Obama and the Democrats could exploit over the next months. There are at least three different kinds of divisions that have become visible. First is between the Senate and the House. Senate Republicans, who are in a minority, have proven more amenable to compromise on fiscal issues. Unlike most Republican House members, many senators can’t count on being re-elected by solid Republicans majorities. McConnell himself comes from a state where Democrats still hold most of the state offices. ¶ Secondly, there is a regional division in the party between the deep South, which contains many of the diehard House Republicans, and the Republicans from the Northeast, industrial Midwest, and the Far West. In the House vote on the fiscal cliff, Republican House members from the deep South opposed it by 83 to 10, while Republicans from the Northeast favored it by 24 to one, and those from the Far West by 17 to eight. After the Republican leadership refused to bring a Sandy hurricane relief bill to the floor before the end of the session – effectively killing it – New York Republican Peter King called on New York and New Jersey Republicans to withhold donations to the GOP. New Jersey Governor Chris Christe blew his top at the House Republicans.¶ Third, there is a division among Republican lobbies, political organizations and interest groups that surfaced in the wake of the election and once again this week. It’s not easy to define, but it runs between pro-business conservatives, on the one hand, and the right-wing libertarians of the Tea Party and Club for Growth and their billionaire funders. Grover Norquist and Americans for Tax Reform gave their approval the Senate bill. The Chamber of Commerce grudgingly endorsed the final bill, and the National Federation of Independent Business said the tax provisions were acceptable. The Club for Growth, the Koch Brothers’ Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks (which itself has fallen under the sway of its most ideological elements), and the Tea Party Patriots opposed any compromise. ¶ These divisions don’t necessarily augur the kind of formal split that wrecked the Whig Party in the 1850s. Nor do they suggest widespread defection of Republicans into the Democratic Party as happened during the 1930s. There is still far too much distance between, say, McConnell and Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid. But they do suggest that a process of erosion is under way that will weaken the Republicans’ ability to maintain a united front against Democratic initiatives. That could happen in the debates over the sequester and debt ceiling if Obama and the Democrats make the kind of public fuss that they did over fiscal cliff.

#### Congressional opposition is divisive enough to block the aff

**Morgan, 11** (Curtis, Tampa Bay Times, “A year after Deepwater Horizon disaster, opposition to oil drilling fades” 4/18, <http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/a-year-after-deepwater-horizon-disaster-opposition-to-oil-drilling-fades/1164429>) **Nelson=Florida Senator Bill Nelson, Fuller = Manley Fuller, president of the Florida Wildlife Federation**

In Washington, the Obama administration has adopted what Interior Secretary Salazar called a "thoughtful and deliberate approach'' to reopening the gulf, with a new oversight agency and new safety measures — notably, one mandating that the industry develop deep-water containment systems for worst-case blowouts, like the one that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon.

In October, the White House lifted the drilling ban it imposed after the BP spill but didn't start issuing new permits until last month, approving 10 new deep water wells so far, with 15 more in process. The administration also agreed to open new territory for exploration by selling new leases — but only in the already heavily drilled central and western gulf.

The three bills approved by a House committee last week don't target Florida waters specifically but lawmakers potentially could use them as tools to carve out prime areas for drilling, or shrink or lift the moratorium.

For now, with the House and Senate controlled by different parties, it's doubtful any drilling bill can make it out of Congress. Nelson and most environmentalists believe the ban on Florida's federal waters can survive political pressure and maneuvering.

"President Obama would have to lose and Bill Nelson would have to lose and they'd have to be replaced by people who want to remove that boundary,'' said Fuller of the Florida Wildlife Federation. "I don't think that is going to happen.''

A more serious threat, they say, is the possibility of a future Florida Legislature opening up state-controlled waters. That move would make it politically difficult to justify a continuing federal ban.

A coalition of environmental groups, Save Our Seas, Beaches and Shores, launched a petition drive after the 2009 House vote to put a ban on drilling in state waters into the Florida Constitution. Former Gov. Charlie Crist's effort to do the same thing during a special legislative session in July proved dead on arrival.

So far, Fuller acknowledged, only a few thousand signatures have been gathered through an online site, far short of the nearly 700,000 needed. In February, Crist's former chief financial officer, Alex Sink, who lost the governor's race to Scott, agreed to co-chair the petition drive with the goal of getting an amendment proposal on the ballot by 2012 or, more realistically, the following year.

Fuller doesn't anticipate lawmakers trying to ram through a divisive drilling bill in the near future but "that is one reason why we want it in the Constitution. We don't want to see it as a possibility at all.''

#### The impact is mid east war

Hutchison 9/21U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Those escalate

James A. Russell (managing editor of Strategic Insights, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS, From 1988-2001 held a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East South Asia, Department of Defense) Spring 2009 “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” <http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf>

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### DA

#### Lower prices crush the Russian economy and bring down the government

Jackson Diehl September/October 2012; deputy editorial page editor of the Washington Post. The Coming Collapse: Authoritarians in China and Russia Face an Endgame <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/coming-collapse-authoritarians-china-and-russia-face-endgame>

At the same time, the Russian government budget has become more dependent than ever on oil and gas. Energy revenue pays for more than half of government spending—and that spending has mushroomed from fifteen percent of GDP four years ago to nearly a quarter this year. Putin has compounded the problem by promising vast new outlays: a doubling of the wages of doctors, police, and teachers; higher payments to families; and $790 billion in new defense spending. Russians now commonly measure the state of the economy by calculating the price of oil needed to balance the state budget. In 2008 it was $55 a barrel; in 2011 it was $100. Now experts guess that it would take an average price of $117 to cover this year’s planned spending, and somewhere between $130 and $150 a barrel to meet Putin’s promises for the next several years. Within weeks of beginning his new mandate, with oil prices well under $100, Putin was already hinting that the budget would be scaled back. The question was whether he could avoid the swelling of public unrest that austerity might provoke. Two major polls, by the Pew Global Attitudes Project and the Associated Press, released in May and July, showed that while Putin remained relatively popular among the general population, support for him in Moscow and other big cities had plummeted—and the demand for political freedom, and support for ongoing popular protests, had expanded. Backed by eighty percent of the population as recently as 2008, Putin now attracts overall support of fifty-eight percent, reported the AP—and only thirty-eight percent in Moscow. Since 2002, according to Pew, “five of the six measures of democratic freedom tested by the Global Attitudes Project have witnessed double-digit increases in terms of the percentage of Russians describing them as ‘very important.’” Only thirty-one percent say they are satisfied with the state of democracy in the country—and sixty-four percent describe the economic situation as bad. A solid majority of fifty-eight percent said they supported the post-election opposition street demonstrations. At midyear, Putin still looked relatively strong, because the largely middle-class freedom protesters gathering in Moscow had not been joined by blue-collar workers, and rural areas were not as restless as the cities. But with the Internet’s stream of uncensored information rapidly growing, that seemed unlikely to last. According to the AP, the percentage of Russians using the Internet daily has grown from twenty-two to thirty-eight percent in just two years. Kudrin’s report outlined several scenarios for the future, chief among them “modernization through dialogue between the government and opposition,” stagnation, and a “chaotic radical transformation of power.” The director of the study, Mikhail Dmitriev, of the Center for Strategic Research, was quoted by the news agency RIA Novosti as saying that “the most likely scenario is mounting pressure on protests” by the regime, “eventually resulting in public backlash and sudden transformation of power.”

#### Extinction

**Filger 2009** – Sheldon Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, May 10, 2009, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish an international food reserve to be managed by the World Food Program.

#### Establishing international grain reserves solves price spikes and incentivizes countries to not create their own grain reserves – builds resilience

**von Braun, 09** - director general of the International Food Policy Research Institute (Joachim, “Eliminating Drastic Food Price Spikes – a three pronged approach for reserves,” March, <http://www.ifpri.org/PUBS/reservenote20090302.asp>)

The Proposed Global actions

The three global collective actions we propose—a small, independent physical emergency reserve, a international coordinated global grain reserve and a virtual reserve and intervention mechanism backed up by a financial fund—would avoid the collapse of confidence in the international grain market, with many countries now trying to achieve grain self-sufficiency and rebuild their own public reserves while ensuring that the world can respond to emergency needs for food and prevent extreme price spikes.

The independent emergency reserve. A modest emergency reserve of around 300,000–500,000 metric tons of basic grains—about 5 percent of the current food aid flows of 6.7 million wheat-equivalent metric tons—would be supplied by the main grain-producing countries and funded by a group of countries participating in the scheme (The Club). This decentralized reserve would be located at strategic points near or in major developing-country regions, using existing national storage facilities. The reserve, to be used exclusively for emergency response and humanitarian assistance, would be managed by the World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP would have access to the grain at pre-crisis market prices to reduce the need for short-term ad hoc fundraising. To cover the cost of restoring the reserve to its initial level (that is, the difference between the post-crisis price and the pre-crisis price times the quantity of reserves used by WFP), an emergency fund should be created and its level maintained by the participating countries. The fund should be accompanied by a financing facility that the WFP could draw upon as needed to cope with potentially increased transport costs, as experienced in the 2008 crisis. This arrangement could also be defined under a newly designed Food Aid Convention.

A new international coordinated global food reserve. The end result of the recent grain crisis is the collapse of confidence in the international grain market, with many countries now trying to achieve grain self-sufficiency and rebuild their own public reserves. While the motivation of each country is justifiable, the result will be a very inefficient global production system, a large total global reserve, and a very thin global grain market. In this case, if a country encounters an unexpected shock to its demand or supply which is larger than its public reserves, not only will its domestic price surge, but also any attempts to import grain from a thin global market will cause the global market price to surge. A food crisis akin to the recent one may not be avoidable by individual country action alone. It is imperative, therefore, to find a way to coordinate each country’s efforts and to restore confidence in international grain market.

While the specific features for a new international coordinated effort could be further discussed we propose that there should be an agreement under the auspices of the United Nations that each member country (from The Club) will hold a certain amount of public grain reserve in addition to the pipeline stock that the private sector holds for commercial operations. Although the exact amount of public reserve that each country holds is a subject for study, it will not be too large as a percentage of its domestic grain demand annually. These reserves would be drawn upon by the high-level technical commission only when needed for intervention in the spot market.

### Economy

#### The economy is fine

Gautam Godhwani 8-15-2012; CEO, SimplyHired.com “Signs Of Resilience In Our Economy” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gautam-godhwani/us-economy-jobs\_b\_1778664.html

These days, it's rare to see a day pass without hearing some sort of negative commentary or sentiment towards today's economy. But, there's one characteristic about our nation's economy that folks tend to overlook -- resiliency. By definition, resiliency is "an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change." Today's economy is proving to be rather resilient - the growth is slow, but we continue to head in the right direction, even at a time when economies across the globe continue to struggle. With the prospect of a modest, steady recovery in our future, employer confidence continues to rise. In Simply Hired's monthly U.S. Employment Outlook, we've seen job openings increase in each of the last three months. Nationwide job openings increased 4.5 percent in July, while June saw a 9.2 percent jump and May had a 3.3 percent increase. In addition, every one of the top 50 metropolitan areas experienced growth in job openings for the second month in a row. Nationwide, we're looking at a total of 4.3 million job openings right now. That's nearly a 10 percent increase from last year. Sounds promising, right?

#### Price rises won’t hurt it

Brad Bourland, 5-9-2008. Chief Economist & Head of Research Jadwa Investment. “Oil's surge: what's behind it and what it means for Saudi Arabia,” <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/ioi/080509-bourland-oil.html>.

We think it would take clear evidence of a slowdown in demand for oil for prices to retreat. Higher oil prices are hurting the global economy, but not by as much as analysts had expected. A benchmark study by the International Energy Agency (in conjunction with the IMF and OECD) in 2004 concluded that a 40 percent increase in oil prices takes around 1 percent off global GDP. Since the end of 2002, oil prices have risen by nearly 500 percent, yet global growth last year was 4.9 percent and even with recession looming in the US, it is expected to be around 3.7 percent this year, above its 20-year average. In part, the resilience of the global economy to the ongoing run-up in oil prices is because the price rise is the result of a shift in demand rather than a shock to supply (as was the case with the price surges in the mid-1970s and the early 1980s). In addition, the full extent of the prices rises has not been passed on to the consumer for the following reasons: \*In many emerging markets gasoline is sold at a fixed price that is not adjusted in line with movements in the global oil price. In China, for example, the retail price for gasoline has been increased by 95 percent since the end of 2002. In most Middle Eastern countries, prices have not been changed at all and in some cases they have been cut (Jordan is a notable exception; it removed all oil subsidies in February). \*In Western Europe fuel is heavily taxed. In the UK, for example, tax accounts for 55 percent of the retail price of gasoline. As crude oil prices account for less than half of the final retail price (refining, transportation and other costs make up around 10 percent of the total) the impact of the run-up in oil prices on final prices is less pronounced. Since the end of 2002, the retail price of gasoline in the UK has climbed by only 80 percent. \*The weakness of the dollar against most leading currencies over the last five years has offset some of the rise in international oil prices, which are denominated in dollars. For example, in euros the oil price has increased by just less than half of the increase in dollar terms. \*In the US, taxes are much lower than in Western Europe (they account for around 26 percent of the gasoline price) and there has been not been a beneficial exchange rate impact. Nonetheless, the retail price of gasoline is up by only 140 percent, as refiners have absorbed much the higher costs. Margins for US West Coast refiners have plunged since the middle of last year, from over $22 per barrel to less than $6 per barrel. As a percent of the oil price the decline is even more marked. Analysts assumed that higher crude prices would pass more directly to final consumers and this would cause inflation, leading central banks to raise interest rates and ultimately slowing economic growth. It is the lack of impact on inflation to date that explains why high crude prices have not significantly slowed global GDP growth.

#### Superior studies

Clifford Singer, January 2008; Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois. “Oil and Security,” published by the Stanley Foundation, http://www.policypointers.org/page\_7028.html

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that concerns about who had control of Iraq’s large oil revenue potential brought particular attention to that price increases in 1998 and 2007, no dire effects on the US or global economy have yet been observed or are clearly in the offing, for reasons discussed below. […] While outside intervention in Mideast conflicts has not been effective in stabilizing oil prices, the question of what to do about oil price instability remains. One viable answer is: nothing. After all, prices for many raw materials fluctuate substantially, and life goes on. If oil is viewed not as a strategic commodity but rather just another commodity, then there is nothing special about it.15 From a global perspective, such price fluctuations do nothing except move money around. The foreign exchange that flows to oil producers has at some point to be reinvested or used for purchases that stimulate the economies in countries from which the purchases are made—i.e., windfall profits from oil-producing and exporting countries inevitably find their way into investments in oil-receiving or importing countries.16 Oil price fluctuations themselves thus do not cause global economic recession.17 Only when they trigger or coincide with other financial instabilities do such fluctuations cause or appear to cause global economic problems. Barsky and Kilian attribute the US stagflations of 1973-1975 and 1979-1982 primarily to a response to money supply overexpansion, with oil price shocks only accounting for part of the accompanying recessions.18 The subsequent economic malaise of the early 1980s was further compounded by problems resulting from inadequate regulation of US savings and loan institutions.19 In 2007 an oil price spike coincided with exposure of overreach in the subprime mortgage market. However, in the 1970s the US economy was twice as oil-intensive as it had been when the occupation of Iraq started in 2003;20 and in 2007 the Federal Reserve responded to the downturn in the housing market with a measured reduction of interest rates in a much less difficult monetary policy environment than it had faced during the stagflations in the previous effective oil cartel period.21 There was no guarantee that monetary policy would continue to be exercised in a way that would avoid recession, but with the target for federal funds rates still at 4.5 percent in the final quarter of 2007 there remained ample room for doing so.

#### No impact to volatility

Tobias N. Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman August 2011 Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

VII. CONCLUSION Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the U.S. economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. In this paper, we offer a global perspective on the macroeconomic impact of oil prices. In doing so, we are filling a void of research on the effects of oil prices on developing economies. Our findings indicate that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy. Indeed, we find that the United States has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies, but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25 percent increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of one percent, spread over 2–3 years. One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies. We provide a model illustrating this effect and find supporting empirical evidence.

#### Oil production doesn’t increase growth—industry spam

Casey Junkins 6-13-2012; West Virginia Observer “Drilling Not Helping Jobless Numbers” http://www.theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/570900/Drilling-Not-Helping-Jobless-Numbers.html?nav=515

WHEELING - As West Virginia's unemployment rate jumps to 6.9 percent, some Mountain State residents believe a hiring boom in the oil and natural gas drilling industry is just around the corner. However, information from WorkForce West Virginia shows the Marcellus and Utica shale drilling industry has not created much direct employment over the past two years. "We've not seen much change in employment in the oil and gas industry over the past year. Employment in oil and gas in 2010 was 2,244, dropping slightly to 2,179 in 2011," said WorkForce spokeswoman Courtney Sisk. The presence of the drilling industry does lead to increased employment in certain areas, as restaurant and hotel owners report being very busy these days because of drillers working in the area. There are also companies that supply materials to the drilling industry that may hire more employees to meet these needs, while retailers may also see an upswing in some business because of mineral owners receiving spending money from lease and royalty checks. However, the WorkForce statistics show that the number of West Virginia residents working directly for gas and oil drillers has not increased over the past two years, despite a continued upswing in drilling and fracking. Gas industry jobs paying nearly $30 per hour are on the way to Marshall County soon, as Dominion Resources will look to hire 40-45 full-time, permanent workers for the natural gas processing plant set to open in December. There will be positions for electricians, plant operators and loaders. In all employment sectors combined, the number of jobless West Virginians residents rose by 1,900 in May to 55,600. There are 1,400 fewer people working in the mining and logging industries, while there are 400 fewer people employed in the manufacturing sector. West Virginia's unemployment rate was 6.7 percent in April. On the positive side, there are 400 more people working in the financial industry with another 100 more working in government. West Virginia's unemployment rate is still more than one point better than the 8.2 percent national average. In addition to serving as a Republican member of West Virginia's House of Delegates from Ohio County, Erikka Storch is also the chief financial officer for Wheeling-based Ohio Valley Steel. She said her company is not seeing much business growth right now, which hinders her ability to hire workers. "The level of construction is down," she said. "I can only keep so many people at levels like this." Storch said the company now has 26 employees, noting the optimal number should be in the range of 35 with a few more out in the field as ironworkers. "There are some out-of-area companies opening up sub-offices around here," she said. "These offices are hiring some employees, but they are mostly just taking local workers from one job to another job. These are employment shifts, rather than unemployed people getting jobs." "I am not seeing the private sector spending money like it usually does," Storch added.

**No econ impact**

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Food prices falling now – demand rationing and global supply dispersal

Reuters December 7, 2012 “Global food prices fall for 2nd month” http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/business/07-Dec-2012/global-food-prices-fall-for-2nd-month

World food prices rose over the summer, reaching levels close to those seen during the 2008 food crisis, following the worst drought in more than half a century in the United States and dry weather in the food basket regions of the Black Sea. But prices then levelled off and have eased in the past two months on demand rationing and supplies from other regions compensating for drought-hit areas, FAO senior economist Abdolreza Abbassian said.

#### Despite increased production, the economy is still slowing – proves oil’s not key

**Greenstone & Looney 12** – 3M Professor of Environmental Economics in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and senior fellow in Economic Studies and policy director of The Hamilton Project (Michael & Adam, The Role of Oil and Gas in Driving Job Growth, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/jobs/posts/2012/06/01-jobs-greenstone-looney>)

Today's employment report suggested slowing employment gains and is sure to disappoint observers hoping for greater strength in the labor market. Employers added just 69,000 jobs in May and estimates of job gains in March and April were revised lower. In addition, the unemployment rate ticked up from 8.1 percent in April to 8.2 percent in May. On top of the 12.7 million unemployed, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are approximately 2.4 million people not in the labor force who want to work, and have looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months.

Employment increased in health care, transportation and warehousing, and wholesale trade. In addition, one industry that has experienced considerable jobs growth since 2007 is the oil and gas industry, which has expanded rapidly in the wake of new technological innovations over the last few years. In particular, hydraulic fracturing—or “fracking”—and other new extraction methods have increased sharply the domestic supplies of natural gas and petroleum.

#### No resource wars

Allouche, 11 - Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (Jeremy,. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food Policy, Volume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Science Direct)

Water/food resources, war and conflict The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change **and greater inputs of capital** have **dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture.** More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries **humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable**. Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an **instrumental purpose**; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none **of these declarations have been followed up by military action**. The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems. None **of the** various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, **more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale** (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]). The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however **no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict**. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity **does not make much sense in the light of the recent** historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, **the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin** ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### Geopolitics

#### Mead is a hack and you won’t make evyerone peaceful through oil

**Bryce 8** – a senior fellow with the Center for Energy Policy and the Environment at the Manhattan Institute (Robert “5 Myths About Breaking Our Foreign Oil Habit” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/10/AR2008011002452.html>) Jacome

4 Energy independence will mean reform in the Muslim world.

The most vocal proponent of this one is New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, who argues that the United States should build "a wall of energy independence" around itself and thereby lower global oil prices: "Shrink the oil revenue and they will have to open up their economies and their schools and liberate their women so that their people can compete. It is that simple." When the petro-states are effectively bankrupt, Friedman argues, we'll see "political and economic reform from Algeria to Iran."

If only it were that easy. Between about 1986 and 2000, oil prices generally stayed below $20 per barrel; by the end of 1998, they were as low as $11 per barrel. As Alan Reynolds pointed out in May 2005 in the conservative National Review Online, **this prolonged period** of "cheap oil **did nothing** to promote **economic or political liberty** in Algeria, Iran, or anywhere else. **This theory has been tested -- and it failed completely."**

#### Meads about gas

Mead, 12 [7/15/12, Walter Russell, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, Editor at the American Interest, “Energy Revolution 2: A Post Post-American Post,” American Interest, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/15/energy-revolution-2-a-post-post-american-post/]

Forget peak oil; forget the Middle East. The energy revolution of the 21st century isn’t about solar energy or wind power and the “scramble for oil” isn’t going to drive global politics. The energy abundance that helped propel the United States to global leadership in the 19th and 2oth centuries is back; if the energy revolution now taking shape lives up to its full potential, we are headed into a new century in which the location of the world’s energy resources and the structure of the world’s energy trade support American affluence at home and power abroad.¶ By some estimates, the United States has more oil than Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran combined, and Canada may have even more than the United States. A GAO report released last May (pdf link can be found [here](http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-740T)) estimates that up to the equivalent of 3 trillion barrels of shale oil may lie in just one of the major potential US energy production sites. If half of this oil is recoverable, US reserves in this one deposit are roughly equal to the known reserves of the rest of the world combined.¶ Edward Luce, an FT writer usually more given to tracing America’s decline than to promoting its prospects, cites estimates that as early as 2020 the US may be producing more oil than Saudi Arabia.¶ So dramatic are America’s finds, analysts talk of the US turning into the world’s new Saudi Arabia by 2020, with up to 15m barrels a day of liquid energy production (against the desert kingdom’s 11m b/d this year). Most of the credit goes to private sector innovators, who took their cue from the high oil prices in the last decade to devise ways of tapping previously uneconomic underground reserves of “tight oil” and shale gas. And some of it is down to plain luck. Far from reaching its final frontier, America has discovered new ones under the ground.¶ Additionally, our natural gas reserves are so large that the US is likely to become a major exporter, and US domestic supplies for hydrocarbon fuels of all types appear to be safe and secure for the foreseeable future. North America as a whole has the potential to be a major exporter of fossil fuels for decades and even generations to come.¶ Since the 1970s, pessimism about America’s energy future has been one of the cornerstones on which the decline theorists erected their castles of doom; we are now entering a time when energy abundance will be an argument for continued American dynamism.¶ The energy revolution isn’t a magic wand that can make all America’s wishes come true, but it is a powerful wind in the sails of both America’s domestic economy and of its international goals. The United States isn’t the only big winner of the energy revolution — Canada, Israel and China among others will also make gains — but the likely consequences of the energy revolution for America’s global agenda are so large, that the chief effect of the revolution is likely to be its role in shoring up the foundations of the American-led world order.¶ I will look at the global consequences for geopolitics and the environment in some upcoming posts, but first things come first and I’d like to look at the domestic consequences of the boom before moving on to its impact on the world.¶ Domestically, the energy bonanza changes the American outlook far more dramatically than most people yet realize. This is a Big One, a game changer, and it will likely be a major factor in propelling the United States to the next (and still unknown) stage of development — towards the next incarnation of the American Dream.¶ The energy revolution is first and foremost a revolution that affects jobs. We are in the very early stages, but since the financial crisis of 2008, fracking alone has created something like 600,000 new jobs in the United States, says the FT. Throw in more jobs in both extracting and refining the new energy wealth, and add the manufacturing and processing industries that will return to US shores to benefit from cheap, secure and abundant energy and feedstock, and it is clear that the energy revolution will be a jobs revolution.¶ These jobs pay well; for the first time in a generation we are looking at substantial growth of high-income jobs for skilled blue collar workers. Some of these jobs, especially with overtime, will pay in the six figures; most offer wages well above the national blue collar average.¶ The boom has the potential to change the debate over immigration. The best blue collar jobs in the new oil and gas patches will demand workers with good English language skills and some technical background — good junior colleges and strong vocational high schools will prepare workers for these new jobs. Low skilled, non-English speaking workers will have a hard time competing for these jobs but will work instead in less well paid jobs servicing the energy sector and its workers. They will build houses for the oil workers to live in and staff the restaurants where they eat. As more blue collar native-born Americans see their living standards rise, it is likely that (legal) immigration will lose some of its political salience.¶ Towards A New Geography of Power?¶ There’s another advantage: these jobs will mostly be located away from the coasts. The hollowing out of Middle America has been one of the tragedies of the last generation. Looking at the depopulation of the northern Great Plains, planners began to speculate about returning large chunks of whole states to the wild: the “Buffalo Commons” idea that would have taken up to 20 million acres out of private hands. The buffalo will have to move over now for the oil rigs and the people who work them; North Dakota will not be reverting to the wild anytime soon.¶ But there are large oil and/or gas reserves in other downtrodden areas. Western New York State and much of Pennsylvania and Ohio appear to have commercial quantities of fossil fuel. The revival of the Rustbelt may be getting under way. And Dixie will not lose out: the US share of the Gulf of Mexico is now believed to have the potential to produce 2 to 3 million more barrels per day than the 1.2 million that it currently pumps.¶ Overall, the new energy geography points toward a revival of the Mississippi-Ohio-Missouri river system as the axis of American growth. That’s likely among other things to be good for America’s political climate; the Midwest has traditionally been something of a swing region — less liberal than the coastal northeast and less aggressively conservative than Dixie. Middle Westerners have tended to be pragmatic optimists over time, and it would be interesting to see how a revival of this political tendency would work out in our politics today. In any case, we may be looking at a decline in the power of the northeast and (unless California embraces its inner tycoon and begins to exploit its own energy riches) the Pacific, while Dixie continues current rates of growth and the Middle West booms.¶ Energy frontiers tend to be individualistic places. Canada, where the oil boom is a few years ahead of the US, has shifted to the right as power and money flow from blue Ontario and Quebec to Alberta. Prosperous blue collar workers and aspiring oil tycoons are not generally the strongest supporters of expensive welfare states, and American greens are already feeling the political consequences of a newly energized hydrocarbon sector. They are also not very interested in subsidizing the fiscal problems of other states; should California’s woes worsen and the state come to Washington for more help, the energy rich states and their representatives are likely to take a hard, skeptical look at its requests.¶ Even so, the Middle West’s traditional moderation is going to soften the rough edges a bit; much of the oil is coming to places where people historically have valued community ties and concerned themselves about the well being of the less fortunate. This won’t be the second coming of Ayn Rand.¶ Heartland Economics¶ There are significant economic benefits in having all this prosperity in the heartland. North Dakota and Wyoming are states where shipping costs from China and Japan are high — but Chicago and St. Louis are much better placed to serve them. Put cheap and secure energy in the Middle West, and build large new cities and centers of economic demand in the neighborhood, and the energy revival in a few states will support general economic growth in many more.¶ The long term outlook for the dollar and even for the federal government’s accounts will also improve. Even quite recently people assessing the long term health of the United States pointed toward inexorably rising energy imports as an important drain on the balance of trade and on the health of the dollar. But oil imports are going to decline, and exports — especially of natural gas — will help offset them. The federal government is also going to be collecting taxes on the new energy production — and on all the incomes of the individuals and companies involved, directly or indirectly, in the new energy boom.¶ The United States will be a more attractive place for foreign investment. Building the infrastructure required to get the new energy industry up and running and to transport its products to the market offers some very profitable and secure investment opportunities. And with the US much less dependent on foreign oil (and with the foreign oil it does need coming largely from Canada), the US economy will be much less exposed to the risks associated with turmoil in the Middle East. That is the kind of thing investors look for: high growth in safe places.¶

#### Status quo solves mead internal link

Mead, 12 [Walter Russell, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, Editor at the American Interest “Energy Revolution 3: The New American Century”, http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/18/energy-revolution-3-the-new-american-century/]

Get ready for an American century: that appears to be the main consequence of the energy revolution that is now causing economic and political experts to tear up their old forecasts all over the world. The new American century won’t be a repeat of the last one, but in some very important ways the world now looks more likely to continue in the direction of global liberal capitalism that the US—like Britain before us—has seen as its geopolitical goal for many years.¶ Energy was critical to the geopolitics of the 20th century; energy shortages shaped some of the strategic decisions that led both Germany and Japan to defeat in World War II, and the struggle over the energy-rich Middle East played an important role in the Cold War. The assumption that the world was at or near “peak oil” has been a driving force behind predictions that the 21st century would be an era of U.S.-China competition as China’s desperate quest for more energy resources led it to push an aggressive global energy policy that would conflict with vital U.S. interests. The assumption that there were few major discoveries left to be made also led many to forecast that the Middle East and especially the Gulf region would continue to be a major fulcrum in global affairs; indeed, countries like Saudi Arabia, with the ability to increase production to meet the thirst of an oil-starved world, would become more important than ever as the geopolitics of oil scarcity took hold.¶ But as I’ve been [writing](http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/08/the-energy-revolution-part-one-the-biggest-losers/) recently, none of that looks true anymore. Advances in extraction technology have changed our understanding of the world’s energy future. As I wrote in my last post, the U.S. and Canada each may have more energy potential than the entire Middle East. China also has significant resources. So do Israel and Brazil.¶ It is too soon to tell just how much of this potential can be unlocked, but for several years now it has begun to look as if much more of these unconventional resources will be available much sooner than thought, and serious people now argue that the US could pass Saudi Arabia to become the world’s leading oil producer by 2020.¶ Even if some of the new sources prove difficult to extract at a reasonable economic and environmental price, the amount of available energy out there may be even greater than we now think. Because the extraction technology is new, and because it is still developing, much of the world has not been surveyed for these unconventional deposits. Both on land and under the sea, there is a lot of territory still to explore.¶ It’s going to take time for us to develop a clear picture of what the new energy future looks like, but there is more than enough information already available to start thinking through some of the important consequences of the new energy situation for 21st century politics and policy. In the first of these energy posts I identified some geopolitical losers; in the second I took a look at the domestic implications of the new energy situation for the United States. In this post I’ll sketch out some initial thoughts about how the new energy picture—if it isn’t a mirage—will affect American foreign policy.¶ The effects won’t be trivial. Changes this profound in the energy outlook imply major changes in world politics and given the unique global role of the United States and the global scale of its interests, those changes matter hugely for American foreign policy. Much of the punditry of the last ten years is looking suddenly obsolete; a number of writers are going to hope that some of the books and articles they’ve recently published will be quickly forgotten. They shouldn’t worry; the public is quick to forget, and most prophets of decline and Malthusian struggle will have little trouble in reinventing themselves as analysts of abundance.¶ The U.S. may not be the biggest geopolitical winner in the new dispensation; that title may go to Israel if it’s energy potential proves out. If Israel’s potential as an energy superpower is actually realized, the Jewish state will be like a pudgy orphan girl who inherits a billion dollar trust fund and suddenly tranforms from social pariah to belle of the ball. Not only will it replace or supplement Arab countries as a principle source of oil and gas for Europe, it will see the weight of its most serious enemies in world politics decline as the Gulf becomes only one of a number of energy-rich regions.¶ But on the bigger stage of world politics, it’s the United States that benefits most from the energy revolution. To begin with, the core objective of the United States—a reasonably stable, orderly and liberal global system—is a lot easier to achieve in an era of energy abundance than in one of tough resource competition. Oil is a lubricant, and the more the world has, the more smoothly things are likely to run. A world in which jealous, competing states are trying to elbow each other aside to access the last few remaining pools of oil is a much nastier place than one in which the whole oil question is a lot more laid back.¶ Abundant energy will also promote global economic growth, an effect that strengthens and stabilizes the world system. It is easier for countries to cooperate when their economies are doing well. There is less nationalist pressure inside countries driving political leaders to take confrontational stands, and it is easier to negotiate win-win solutions and build functioning international institutions when all parties are relatively optimistic about their prospects.¶ On the whole, a world of energy abundance should be particularly good for U.S.-China relations. If both China and the United States have large energy reserves at home, and if new discoveries globally are making energy more abundant, there is less chance that China and the U.S. will compete for political influence in places like the Middle East. More energy security at home may also lessen the political pressure inside China to build up its naval forces.¶ Oil may calm the troubled waters around China’s shores. The maritime disputes now causing trouble from Korea and Japan to Malaysia and the Philippines will be easier to manage if the potential undersea energy resources are seen as less vital to national economic security. Nationalist passion will still drive tough stands on the maritime issues, but nationalism is a much stronger force when powerful economic arguments share the agenda of radical nationalist groups. If the South China Sea issue is seen as both a question of national pride and, because of perceived energy supply issues, a vital national interest, Chinese policy will be much tougher than if it is simply a question of pride.¶ Depending on the size of China’s unconventional domestic reserves (and some analysts think the country could have something like the equivalent of double Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves), China will feel marginally less constrained by Washington’s global naval supremacy. As it now stands, in any serious clash with China, the U.S. could bring Beijing to its knees with a naval blockade. With much larger domestic energy production, China would be less vulnerable to this threat. This could translate into a greater willingness to take a hard line on international issues.¶ On the other hand, China is unlikely to gain complete energy independence, and in any case it will still need access to the global system for trade and investment. Indeed, assuming that the new energy abundance promotes global economic prosperity, access to the global market will become more attractive for China and its deepening economic independence with world markets would make China less willing to risk cutting off its maritime connections to the rest of the world.¶ The energy revolution is likely to have profound implications for American policy in the Middle East. American public opinion, already deeply depressed about the prospects for constructive change in the region and deeply weary of war, is likely to welcome any chance to think less about a part of the world in which U.S. initiatives rarely seem to go well. The Gulf in particular will, however, continue to be important to countries like India, China and Japan as well as to Europe. Over time, as the world’s energy picture becomes less Middle East-centric, the U.S. is likely to explore the possibility of becoming more of a balancer, less of a hegemon in the region. It will still be a goal of U.S. policy to prevent any single other power from being able to dominate the region and interrupting the oil flow, but the U.S. will likely look to achieve that more through agreements and power balancing than through overwhelming military superiority by land, sea and air. This will not happen all at once, and may not happen at all if initial U.S. attempts to disengage lead to greater threats, but both public and elite opinion would much rather reduce than increase the U.S. presence in this part of the world, and if the changing world energy picture makes that easier to do, the U.S. will take the opportunity to step back.¶ India, Russia, Turkey, China, Japan, Israel, Iran and the European powers will all have interests in the Middle East. If the U.S. goal is to manage and limit competition among these players and other local governments, the multiplicity of interests and powers involved in the region could make that a complex but not altogether impossible task. The future of this region remains hard to predict, but the U.S. may well find that its key interests in the Middle East can be achieved with much less sweat in the next fifty years than in the last thirty.¶ The one exception is likely to be U.S. support for Israel. Israel’s security does not require U.S. ground troops or even naval forces, but U.S. public opinion will likely continue want Israel to be safe. Arms sales, aid and cooperation can be expected to continue, though if Israel’s own potential energy resources come online, Israel may have more friends, more money and fewer and weaker enemies than it now has.¶ Globally, America’s ambition is not and never has been to be an active, busy hegemon. At its core, America is a lazy power. The world order America wants is liberal, capitalist, predominantly democratic and broadly accepted by the major powers. It wants to prevent the domination of either end of Eurasia by a single power and it doesn’t want any part of the world to close itself off for purposes of investment and trade, but otherwise it is open to a wide range of political and security arrangements.¶ An American century is one in which the world is moving towards this kind of configuration. The 21st century already appeared to be heading America’s way—less because the U.S. has the will or the power to impose its designs on the world than because American objectives match up reasonably well with the vital interests of most of the world’s important powers. The new energy picture supports that kind of outcome in three ways.¶ The American economy will gain important advantages that will ease the transition to a post-blue social model and promote social cohesion and public confidence in our economic model.¶ Energy abundance will promote global economic growth, increasing global acceptance of liberal capitalism as living standards rise.

#### Dependence prevents Iran prolif – leverage over future extraction is the biggest bargaining chip

Roger Howard, 11-29-2008; Roger Howard is a writer and broadcaster on international relations. His books include Iran in Crisis? (Zed, 2004), What’s Wrong with Liberal Interventionism (Social Affairs Unit, 2006) and Iran Oil: The New Middle East Challenge to America (IB Tauris, 2006). He has written widely for newspapers and journals ranging from the Daily Mail and Daily Express to the National Interest and the RUSI Journal. “An Ode to Oil” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html

The United States has powerful political leverage over producers because it holds the key to future oil supply as well as market demand. The age of "easy oil" is over, and as fears grow that oil is becoming harder to get, so too will the dependency of producers on increasingly sophisticated Western technology and expertise. Such skills will be particularly important in two key areas of oil production. One is finding and extracting offshore deposits, like the massive reserves reckoned to be under the Caspian and Arctic seas, or in Brazil's recently discovered Tupi field. The other is prolonging the lifespan of declining wells through enhanced "tertiary" recovery. Because Western companies have a clear technological edge over their global competitors in these hugely demanding areas, Washington exerts some powerful political leverage over exporters, many of whom openly anticipate the moment when their production peaks before gradually starting to decline. Syria illustrates how this leverage can work. Although oil has been the primary source of national income for more than 40 years, production has recently waned dramatically: Output is now nearly half of the peak it reached in the mid-1990s, when a daily output of 600,000 barrels made up 60% of gross domestic product, and can barely sustain rapidly growing domestic demand fueled by a very high rate of population growth. With enough foreign investment Syrian oil could be much more productive and enduring, but Washington has sent foreign companies, as well as American firms, a tough message to steer well clear. It is not surprising, then, that the Damascus regime regards a rapprochement with the U.S. as a political lifeline and in recent months has shown signs of a new willingness to compromise. The same predicament confronted Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi, who first offered to surrender weapons of mass destruction during secret negotiations with U.S. officials in May 1999. Facing a deepening economic crisis that he could not resolve without increasing the production of his main export, oil, Col. Gadhafi was prepared to bow to Washington's demands and eventually struck a path-breaking accord in December 2003. Col. Gadhafi had been the "Mad Dog" of the Reagan years, but oil's influence had initiated what President Bush hailed as "the process of rejoining the community of nations." Oil could also help the outside world frustrate the nuclear ambitions of Iran, whose output is likely to steadily decline over the coming years unless it has access to the latest Western technology. Many wells are aging rapidly and the Iranians cannot improve recovery rates, or exploit their new discoveries, unless Washington lifts sanctions, which have been highly successful in deterring international investment**.**

#### Oil dependence is key to prevent Middle East food and water wars

Gregory D. Miller, April 2010; assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence”, the Washington Quarterly April 2010 http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf

At the regional level, conflicts between neighboring states would become more likely. Neighbors already make up the bulk of militarized disputes, which are even more common when states must compete for scarce resources. Japan’s expansion for oil prior to World War II is one example, and several conflicts were at least partly about scarce water: Israel and Jordan (1967), Egypt and Ethiopia (1980), and South Africa and Lesotho (1986). A dramatic decrease in demand would lower the price of oil on the world market, which could lead to severe economic consequences for many oil exporters. Initially, many consumer states will benefit as they will be able to afford more oil. Oil-exporting states, however, will see profits decline; and scarcities will become more pronounced, especially in the Middle East.¶ Oil has often been a cause of regional conflicts, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or the July 2001 clash between Iran and Azerbaijan over oilbearing zones in the Caspian Sea. So, it is possible that less global demand for oil would decrease the frequency of such situations. As states lose their oil revenue, however, and thus the ability to provide their people the standard of living to which they have grown accustomed, basic necessities could become catalysts for conflict. Resources such as food and water are already scarce in many parts of the world, a problem that would be exacerbated for states that lose substantial oil¶ revenues.

#### Increasing domestic oil production doesn’t solve the reasons dependence is bad

Aaron Menenburg 9-6-2012; graduate student in international relations at The Maxwell School of Syracuse University. “Let’s Get Real: Energy Independence is an Unrealistic and Misleading Myth” http://www.economonitor.com/policiesofscale/2012/09/06/lets-get-real-energy-independence-is-a-unrealistic-and-misleading-myth/

Thus far, when energy has been discussed, the foci are “energy independence” and “alternative energy.” Although far from dominating energy markets, the latter is quickly becoming a significant source of US energy consumption and will likely to continue to gain market share. The concept of energy independence, however, is unrealistic, largely undesirable, and misleading. I am going to tackle the façade of the energy independence argument in this piece and in doing so will try to explain the issues actually affecting national energy policy. This piece will focus on oil because (1) it is our most used source of energy and (2) it is our major energy import. At the heart of the energy independence idea is the rationale that achieving energy independence will unhook us from world energy prices and disengage us from the geopolitical consequences Americans find unpalatable, namely massive engagement in the Middle East. Neither is true, and in fact they’re not even remotely plausible outcomes. If there is one take-away I want the reader to remember, it is this: the goal of self-sufficiency in energy supplies – especially in oil – misdiagnoses the problem as one characterized largely by importation of oil. Rather, energy security, the implications of energy on the economy, and America’s reliance on imported oil is a function of the importance of oil consumption in the domestic economy regardless of its source. The only way to reduce the cost of gasoline is by consuming significantly less of it, while the only way to ensure minimal political and security insulation from oil is to stop using it.

#### High prices key to dollar hegemony – forces capital investment in the US

Stratfor 1-8-2008. “Annual Forecast 2008,” web.stratfor.com/images/writers/STRATFOR\_Annual\_1\_08.pdf.

Quietly developing in the background, the global economy is undergoing a no less dramatic transformation. While we expect oil prices to retreat somewhat in 2008 after years of surges, their sustained strength continues to shove a great deal of cash into the hands of the world’s oil exporters — cash that these countries cannot process internally and that therefore will either be stored in dollars or invested in the only country with deep enough capital pools to handle it: the United States. Add in the torrent of exports from the Asian states, which generates nearly identical cash-management problems, and the result is a deep dollarization of the global system **even as the U.S. dollar gives ground**. **The talk on the ﬁnancial pages will be of dollar** (implying American) **weakness, even as the currency steadily shifts from the one of ﬁrst resort to the true foundation of the entire system**.

#### Dollar hegemony is key to overall US hegemony and prevents currency status shift

Robert Looney, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Political power and prestige. The benefits of "power and prestige" are nebulous. Nevertheless, the loss of key currency status and the loss of international creditor status have sometimes been associated, along with such non-economic factors as the loss of colonies and military power, in discussions of the historical decline of great powers. Causality may well flow from key currency status to power and prestige and in the opposite direction as well.[8] On a broader scale, Niall Ferguson[9] notes that one pillar of American dominance can be found in the way successive U.S. government sought to take advantage of the dollar's role as a key currency. Quoting several noted authorities, he notes that [the role of the dollar] enabled the United States to be "far less restrained…than all other states by normal fiscal and foreign exchange constraints when it came to funding whatever foreign or strategic policies it decided to implement." As Robert Gilpin notes, quoting Charles de Gaulle, such policies led to a 'hegemony of the dollar" that gave the U.S. "extravagant privileges." In David Calleo's words, the U.S. government had access to a "gold mine of paper" and could therefore collect a subsidy form foreigners in the form of seignorage (the profits that flow to those who mint or print a depreciating currency). The web contains many more radical interactions of the dollar's role. Usually something along the following lines: World trade is now a game in which the U.S. produces dollars and the rest of the world produces things that dollars can buy. The world's interlinked economies no longer trade to capture a comparative advantage; they compete in exports to capture needed dollars to service dollar-denominated foreign debts and to accumulate dollar reserves to sustain the exchange value of their domestic currencies…. This phenomenon is known as dollar hegemony, which is created by the geopolitically constructed peculiarity that critical commodities, most notably oil, are denominated in dollars. Everyone accepts dollars because dollars can buy oil. The recycling of petro-dollars is the price the U.S. has extracted from oil-producing countries for U.S. tolerance of the oil-exporting cartel since 1973.[10] **America's coercive power in the world is based as much on the dollar's status as the global reserve currency as on U.S. military muscle**. Everyone needs oil, and to pay for it, they must have dollars. To secure dollars, they must sell their goods to the U.S., under terms acceptable to the people who rule America. The dollar is way overpriced, but it's the only world currency. Under the current dollars-only arrangement, U.S. money is in effect backed by the oil reserves of every other nation.[11] While it is tempting to dismiss passages of this sort as uninformed rants, they do contain some elements of truth. There are tangible benefits that accrue to the country whose currency is a reserve currency. The real question is: if this situation is so intolerable and unfair, why hasn't the world ganged up on the United States and changed the system? Why haven't countries like Libya and Iran required something like euros or gold dinars in payment for oil? After all, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 the International Monitary Fund's Standard Drawing Rights (unit of account) was certainly an available alternative to the dollar.[12]

#### Heg is inevitable

Maher 11 – Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science from Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68

The United States will continue to be the ‘‘default power’’ (to use Josef Joffe’s term**)** in the near future.20 No other country will be able to duplicate the overall reach and influence of the United States—in terms of economic, political, and military power—for at least several decades. It is not clear, moreover, how many peoplewouldwant to live in aworlddominated byChina, India,Russia, or even Europe. The United States retains a number of tremendous advantages compared to possible strategic competitors: its demographics; advanced technology; raw materials; research universities and laboratories; continued dominance in global mass culture, and labor market flexibility.

**No impact**

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

**NO china impact – relations inevitable and cooperation ineffective**

**Blackwill 2009** – former US ambassador to India and US National Security Council Deputy for Iraq, former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Robert D., RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2009/RAND\_OP275.pdf, WEA)

Alternatively, will the current world economic crisis change relations between China and the United States in a much more positive and intimate direction, producing what some are calling a transcendent G-2? This seems improbable for seven reasons. First, the United States and China have profoundly different visions of Asian security. For Washington, maintaining U.S. alliances in Asia is the hub of its concept of Asian security, whereas, for Beijing, America’s alliance system is a destabilizing factor in Asian security and over time should wither away. These opposing concepts will be an enduring source of tension between the two sides. Second, these two countries systematically prepare for war against one another, which is reflected in their military doctrines, their weapons procurement and force modernization, and their deployments and military exercises. As long as this is the case, it will provide a formidable psychological and material barrier to much closer bilateral relations. Third, the United States is critical of China’s external resource acquisition policy, which Washington believes could threaten both American economic and security interests in the developing world. Fourth, despite their deep economic dependence on each other, U.S.-China economic relations are inherently fragile. China sells too much to the United States and buys too little, and the United States saves too little and borrows too much from China. This will inevitably lead to a backlash in the United States and a Chinese preoccupation with the value of its American investments. Fifth, Chinese environmental policy will be an increasing problem, both for U.S. policymakers who are committed to bringing China fully into global efforts to reduce climate degradation and for Chinese leaders who are just as determined to emphasize domestic economic growth over international climate regimes. Sixth, China and the United States have wholly different domestic political arrangements that make a sustained entente difficult to manage. Americans continue to care about human rights in China, and Beijing resents what it regards as U.S. interference in its domestic affairs. This will be a drag on the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future. And seventh, any extended application by Washington of “Chimerica,” as Moritz Schularick of Berlin’s Free University has called it,23 would so alarm America’s Asian allies, beginning with Japan, that the United States would soon retreat from the concept.24

Nevertheless, these factors are unlikely to lead to a substantial downturn in U.S.-China bilateral ties. In addition to their economic interdependence, both nations have important reasons to keep their interaction more or less stable. As Washington wants to concentrate on its many problems elsewhere in the world, especially in the Greater Middle East, Beijing prefers to keep its focus on its domestic economic development and political stability. Neither wants the bilateral relationship to get out of hand. In sum, a positive strategic breakthrough in the U.S.-China relationship or a serious deterioration in bilateral interaction both seem doubtful in the period ahead. And the current economic downturn will not essentially affect the abiding primary and constraining factors on the two sides. Therefore, the U.S.-China relationship in five years will probably look pretty much as it does today—part cooperation, part competition, part suspicion—unaffected by today’s economic time of troubles, except in the increasing unlikely event of a cross-strait crisis and confrontation.

**Iran prolif isn’t a threat – they don’t want the bomb and if they get it they won’t use it**

**Pinker, 11** [Steven, professor of psychology at Harvard University, *The Better Angels of our Nature Why Violence Has Declined*, ISBN: 067002295, for online access email alexanderdpappas@gmail.com and I will forward you the full book]

If current pundits are to be believed, then as you are reading these words the New Peace will already have been shattered by a major war, perhaps a nuclear war, with Iran. At the time of this writing, tensions have been rising over the country’s nuclear energy program. Iran is currently enriching enough uranium to fashion a nuclear arsenal, and it has defied international demands that it allow inspections and comply with other provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has taunted Western leaders, supported terrorist groups, accused the United States of orchestrating the 9/11 attacks, denied the Holocaust, called for Israel to be “wiped off the map,” and prayed for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the Muslim savior who would usher in an age of peace and justice. In some interpretations of Shi’a Islam, this messiah will show up after a worldwide eruption of war and chaos. All this is, to say the least, disconcerting, and many writers have concluded that Ahmadinejad is another Hitler who will soon develop nuclear weapons and use them on Israel or furnish them to Hezbollah to do so. Even in less dire scenarios, he could blackmail the Middle East into acceding to Iranian hegemony. The prospect might leave Israel or the United States no choice but to bomb its nuclear facilities preemptively, even if it invited years of war and terrorism in response. A 2009 editorial in the *Washington Times* spelled it out: “War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?”279 This chilling scenario of a nuclear attack by Iranian fanatics is certainly possible. But is it *inevitable*, or even highly likely? One can be just as contemptuous of Ahmadinejad, and just as cynical about his motives, while imagining less dire alternatives for the world ahead. John Mueller, Thomas Schelling, and many other foreign affairs analysts have imagined them for us and have concluded that **the Iranian nuclear program is not the end of the world**.280 Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared that Iran’s nuclear program is intended only for energy and medical research. In 2005 Supreme Leader Khameini (**who wields more power than Ahmadinejad**) issued a fatwa declaring that **nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam**.281 If the government went ahead and developed the weapons anyway, it would not be the first time in history that national leaders have lied through their teeth. But having painted themselves into this corner, the prospect of forfeiting all credibility in the eyes of the world (including major powers on whom they depend, like Russia, China, Turkey, and Brazil) might at least give them pause. Ahmadinejad’s musings about the return of the Twelfth Imam do not necessarily mean that he plans to hasten it along with a nuclear holocaust. Two of the deadlines by which writers confidently predicted that he would set off the apocalypse (2007 and 2009) have already come and gone.282 And for what it’s worth, here is how he explained his beliefs in a 2009 television interview with NBC correspondent Ann Curry: *Curry:* You’ve said that you believe that his arrival, the apocalypse, would happen in your own lifetime. What do you believe that you should do to hasten his arrival? *Ahmadinejad:* I have never said such a thing.... I was talking about peace.... What is being said about an apocalyptic war and—global war, things of that nature. This is what the Zionists are claiming. Imam . . . will come with logic, with culture, with science. He will come so that there is no more war. No more enmity, hatred. No more conflict. He will call on everyone to enter a brotherly love. Of course, he will return with Jesus Christ. The two will come back together. And working together, they would fill this world with love. The stories that have been disseminated around the world about extensive war, apocalyptic wars, so on and so forth, these are false. 283 As a Jewish atheist, I can’t say I find these remarks completely reassuring. But with one obvious change they are not appreciably different from those held by devout Christians; indeed, they are milder, as many Christians do believe in an apocalyptic war and have fantasized about it in bestselling novels. As for the speech containing the phrase that was translated as “wiping Israel off the map,” the *New York Times* writer Ethan Bronner consulted Persian translators and analysts of Iranian government rhetoric on the meaning of the phrase in context, and they were unanimous that Ahmadinejad was daydreaming about regime change in the long run, not genocide in the days ahead.284 The perils of translating foreign bombast bring to mind Khrushchev’s boast “We will bury you,” which turned out to mean “outlive” rather than “entomb.” There is a parsimonious alternative explanation of Iran’s behavior. In 2002 George W. Bush identified Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as the “axis of evil” and proceeded to invade Iraq and depose its leadership. North Korea’s leaders saw the writing on the wall and promptly developed a nuclear capability, which (as they no doubt anticipated) has put an end to any musings about the United States invading them too. Shortly afterward Iran put its nuclear program into high gear, aiming to create enough ambiguity as to whether it possesses nuclear weapons, or could assemble them quickly, to squelch any thought of an invasion in the mind of the Great Satan. If Iran does become a confirmed or suspected nuclear power, the history of the nuclear age suggests that the most likely outcome would be nothing. As we have seen, nuclear weapons have turned out to be useless for anything but deterrence against annihilation, which is why the nuclear powers have repeatedly been defied by their nonnuclear adversaries. The most recent episode of proliferation bears this out. In 2004 it was commonly predicted that if North Korea acquired a nuclear capability, then by the end of the decade it would share it with terrorists and set off a nuclear arms race with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.285 In fact, North Korea did acquire a nuclear capability, the end of the decade has come and gone, and nothing has happened. It’s also unlikely that any nation would furnish nuclear ammunition to the loose cannons of a terrorist band, thereby giving up control over how they would be used while being on the hook for the consequences.286 In the case of Iran, before it decided to bomb Israel (or license Hezbollah to do so in an incriminating coincidence), with no conceivable benefit to itself, its leaders would have to anticipate a nuclear reprisal by Israeli commanders, who could match them hothead for hothead, together with an invasion by a coalition of powers enraged by the violation of the nuclear taboo. Though the regime is detestable and in many ways irrational, one wonders whether its principals are so indifferent to continuing their hold on power as to choose to annihilate themselves in pursuit of perfect justice in a radioactive Palestine or the arrival of the Twelfth Imam, with or without Jesus at his side. As Thomas Schelling asked in his 2005 Nobel Prize lecture, “What else can Iran accomplish, except possibly the destruction of its own system, with a few nuclear warheads? Nuclear weapons should be too precious to give away or to sell, too precious to waste killing people when they could, held in reserve, make the United States, or Russia, or any other nation, hesitant to consider military action.”287 Though it may seem dangerous to consider alternatives to the worst-case scenario, the dangers go both ways. In the fall of 2002 George W. Bush warned the nation, “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof —the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” The “clear evidence” led to a war that has cost more than a hundred thousand lives and almost a trillion dollars and has left the world no safer. A cocksure certainty that Iran will use nuclear weapons, in defiance of sixty-five years of history in which authoritative predictions of inevitable catastrophes were repeatedly proven wrong, could lead to adventures with even greater costs.

## 2nc

### 2nc impact overview

#### Magnitude

Nick Bostrum March 2002 faculty of philosophy at Oxford and winner of the esteemed Eugene Gannon Award, <http://marukuwato.multiply.com/journal/item/157>

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Even if Russia doesn’t collapse, opportunistic aggression by China would escalate – causes extinction

AlexanderSharavin2001 Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)

Now, a few words about the third type of war. A real military threat to Russia from China has not merely been ignored; it has been denied by Russia's leaders and nearly all of the political forces. Let's see some statistic figures at first. The territory of Siberia and the Russian Far East comprises 12,765,900 square kilometers (75% of Russia's entire area), with a population of 40,553,900 people (28% of Russia's population). The territory of China is 9,597,000 square kilometers and its population is 1.265 billion (which is 29 times greater than the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East). China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally **be the only way out**, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

#### Russia is key to the global economy—solves the aff

Martin Gilman, 1-16-2008; Former senior representative of the IMF in Russia and professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. “Well-Placed to Weather an Economic Storm,” Moscow Times, <http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2008/01/16/008.html>

Faced with this gloomy global outlook, Russia is well placed to weather the storm. In fact, not only is the Russian economy **likely to decouple largely from a sagging U**nited **S**tates and even Europe, but its continuing boom -- mostly but not solely **fueled by high energy revenues** -- **is** sucking in both consumer and investment goods, and so **acting as a motor of world growth**. And the planned $1 trillion public investment program over the next decade should ensure that the country remains decoupled for years to come.

#### Turns heg

Zeyno Baran et al, Summer 2007. Senior Fellow and Director Center for Eurasian Studies, Hudson Institute. “U.S. – RUSSIAN RELATIONS : IS CONFLICT INEVITABLE?” Hudson Institute Symposium on US-Russian Relations, www.hudson.org/files/pdf\_upload/Russia-Web%20(2).pdf

The West needs a stable Russia in order to maintain the global balance of power against China. In the event of Russia’s disintegration, her resources will go to China, not the West. The West cannot stop Russia’s slide into a systemic cri- sis, and can only help get out of it once it has begun. This is a challenge for the future. Currently, the West needs a “Cold War” only with Russia’s new masters, not with the Russian people. Russians are protesting against the politics of the Russian bureaucracy, and their protest should not be re-directed at the bureaucracy’s strategic partners in the West. If the West understands and accepts this, it needs to learn to acknowledge Russians’ rights to patriotism and to a normal level of freedom—not as a religious symbol, but as the only path to prosperity and justice. Russian “democrats” and “liberals” have forgotten these demands and rights, and therefore the terms “dem - o crat” and “liberal” are cursed in Russia. Official propa- ganda uses this to divert Russian citizens from asserting their interests and rights to fighting the West. The West needs to explain to Russia that these rights have been destroyed not by rivalry with the West, but solely by the avarice of the new Russian leaders. It is true that in the future, the issue of global competition will arise. Currently, however, there is only one key prob- lem—corruption (including, of course, corruption in the interests of the West) and a lack of bureaucratic integrity. After Russia experiences a systemic crisis the West must be able to say to Russians; “You see? We are for democracy, but not for “democrats,” for law, but not for lawyers, for prosperity, but not for prospering oligarchs.” All of these are things that the West could not say after the 1990s. Russia will be useful to the West if the West can side with Russia against China and global Islam in foreign policy and with the Russian people against the Russian bureaucracy in domestic policy. If the West attempts to transform Russia according to its own conceptualization of the correct societal order, or simply to seize Russian raw materials, intellect, and money, it will destroy Russia and pay dearly for the rela- tively small gain. **As a consequence** of doing so, **the West will experience large-scale, global systemic problems**.

#### Vulnerability now is worse than before – the Oil Reserve fund is gone and non-oil deficits are higher

Juha Kähkönen and Daria Zakharova 9-27-2011; IMF mission chief for Russia Juha Kähkönen and deputy mission chief Daria Zakharova “Russia Should Leverage Commodity Boom to Boost Growth” <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/int092711a.htm>

IMF Survey online: Russia has been riding high on the commodity boom, but what will happen if prices start to falter? Zakharova: Russia has been rescued from the recent financial crisis by a strong recovery in oil prices, but in the process the economy has become much more vulnerable to a sudden drop in commodity prices. Russia’s nonoil deficit has almost tripled following the crisis. Just to put this in perspective, if oil prices were to fall to $40 per barrel as they did during the most recent financial crisis, Russia would be running deficits in the order of 8 percent of GDP. At the same time, the Oil Reserve Fund, which Russia successfully used to cushion the economy in the most recent downturn, has been almost exhausted. This means that the government would have to borrow from the markets—and possibly at high rates—if there is a precipitous drop in oil prices. The external current account would also be severely affected by a decline in oil prices. We would expect that the current high surplus would turn into a deficit fairly quickly, putting pressure on the exchange rate.

### reform

#### Low prices don’t cause democracy – just a new regime

Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal 8-9-2012; Russian current affairs journal, Russian opposition figure ponders when, how "Putin's regime" will fall, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring Lexis

Story of the "oil factor" The idea that real political changes will start when oil prices collapse is popular. It is especially touching when liberals hasten this day. What are their hopes connected with? With the fact that budget revenue will fall, salaries and social benefits will shrink, and the people will rebel. Hungry stomachs will dictate political changes! This has already happened! We have already gone through this! Our people are gullible, naive, and love fairytales. They want a miracle to happen by itself, without their participation. I am afraid that a hungry man, even in a fair election, will not elect as president someone who promises to lead the country to freedom and democracy but one who promises to feed everyone. To clothe everyone, provide them with shoes, treat them free of charge, teach them, and pay millions in pensions. An apartment for each family, a man for each woman, a cheap car for each man. He will be lying, of course. And this will most probably be someone from the left - Communists or socialists, irresponsible people who lie easily. Then all equality and fortune will be reduced to an even distribution of poverty among everyone and the rest - among the elite, and anyone who gets indignant is guaranteed a bullet in the head or a place in prison. So it is in vain that the liberals who put their trust in a fall in oil prices are expecting a regime change - if it happens, it will not be in their interests. A revolt of the hungry and destitute will certainly lead to a regime change, but it will not change the system for the better, and it will again send Russia on an endless journey along the same path. Those who value freedom higher than anything will construct the new and free Russia.

#### Drop in oil prices causes Russian nationalism

Newsweek8-15-2011(“Fascist Russia?; The Kremlin plays a dangerous game by pandering to far-right hate groups,” lexis)

As Norway's tragedy showed, paranoid and violent minds can lurk in the calmest, most prosperous countries. But the cancer of ultranationalism has found a particularly fertile breeding ground in the frustrations and resentments of young Russians. Belov claims to have predicted his country's future as far back as August 1991. Manezh Square, in the shadow of the Kremlin, was thronged with Russians celebrating the sudden collapse of Soviet communism; to most, the evening marked the birth of Russian democracy. But Belov, who was there with a friend, distributing pamphlets for the anti-Semitic Pamyat organization, says he saw something else. "We knew that these liberals would fail," he says. "And that their failure would fuel our rise--the rise of the right."

Twenty years later, at least half of that apocalyptic vision has come true. Russia's liberals have indeed failed; Russia is now ruled by an authoritarian clique of former KGB men. And Belov may also have accurately foreseen the triumph of the far right. On the surface, a decade of high oil prices has brought ordinary Russians rising living standards and a semblance of political stability. But even the Kremlin's closest allies fear that when oil prices eventually fall and the tide of easy money recedes, the ugly reality of an angry, fascist Russia could be revealed.

#### Slow diversification is inevitable, but fast diversification forced by low oil prices would destroy comparative advantage – that’s key to the economy

Clifford G. Gaddy 6-16-2011; Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, economist specializing in Russia, “Will the Russian economy rid itself of its dependence on oil?” http://en.rian.ru/valdai\_op/20110616/164645377.html

To ask whether the Russian economy will rid itself of its “dependence on oil” is to ask whether ideology will trump economics. Many people in Russia—including President Medvedev—seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive.” Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.” From the economic point of view, this makes no sense. Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage. It is the most competitive part of the economy. Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else. It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause. The causes of Russia’s backwardness lie in its inherited production structure. The physical structure of the real economy (that is, the industries, plants, their location, work forces, equipment, products, and the production chains in which they participate) is predominantly the same as in the Soviet era. The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth (the so-called oil rent) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure. For the sake of social and political stability, a large share of Russia’s oil and gas rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital. The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains.” A serious attempt to convert Russia’s economy into something resembling a modern Western economy would require dismantling this rent distribution system. This would be both highly destabilizing, and costly in terms of current welfare. Current efforts for “diversification” do not challenge the rent distribution system. On the contrary, the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts will preserve and reinforce the rent distribution chains, and hence make Russia more dependent on oil rents. Even under optimal conditions for investment, any dream of creating a “non-oil” Russia that could perform as well as today’s commodity-based economy is unrealistic. The proportion of GDP that would have to be invested in non-oil sectors is impossibly high. Granted, some new firms, and even entire sectors, may grow on the outside of the oil and gas sectors and the rent distribution chains they support. But the development of the new sectors will be difficult, slow, and costly. Even if successful, the net value they generate will be too small relative to oil and gas to change the overall profile of the economy. Thus, while it is fashionable to talk of “diversification” of the Russian economy away from oil and gas, this is the least likely outcome for the country’s economic future. If Russia continues on the current course of pseudo-reform (which merely reinforces the old structures), oil and gas rents will remain important because they will be critical to support the inherently inefficient parts of the economy. On the other hand, if Russia were to somehow launch a genuine reform aimed at dismantling the old structures, the only realistic way to sustain success would be to focus on developing the commodity sectors. Russia could obtain higher growth if the oil and gas sectors were truly modern. Those sectors need to be opened to new entrants, with a level playing field for all participants. Most important, oil, gas, and other commodity companies need to be freed from the requirement to participate in the various informal schemes to share their rents with enterprises in the backward sectors inherited from the Soviet system. Certainly, there are issues with oil. It is a highly volatile source of wealth. But there are ways to hedge those risks. A bigger problem is that oil will eventually lose its special status as an energy source and therefore much of its value. But that time is far off. It will not happen suddenly. In the meantime, sensible policies can deal with the problems. Otherwise, the approach should be to generate the maximum value possible from the oil and protect that value through prudent fiscal policies. Russia should not, can not, and will not significantly reduce the role of oil and gas in its economy in the foreseeable future. It will only harm itself by ill-advised and futile efforts to try.

#### Zero evidence agrees

Mark Adomanis 6-22-2012; analyst for Forbes Is Russia Suffering From Dutch Disease? <http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/06/22/is-russia-suffering-from-dutch-disease/>

Part of the reason that Russia is not experiencing Dutch Disease (which is something you would normally expect in a country that has earned such an enormous pile of money from selling oil and natural gas) is that the world economy has been in turmoil for most of the past 4 years: there has been a “flight” to quality in “safe” assets and currencies which has surely worked to weaken the ruble and depress its value. The “new normal” is actually a pretty bizarre state of affairs, and is characterized by any number of things, such as negative real interest rates on German Bunds and US treasuries, that ten years ago would have seemed impossible. Russia’s economy faces an awful lot of risks, and its over-dependence on natural resources is extremely dangerous, particularly at a time that global growth is slamming to a halt. Buckley is right that Russia needs to diversify, and that its government will find this process to be an extremely difficult and complicated one. But, at the present time, one of the very few economic risks that Russia doesn’t face is Dutch Disease: its currency isn’t overvalued and, if anything, is actually trending lower against the main reserve currencies.

#### Russians are smart

Mark Adomanis 6-22-2012; analyst for Forbes Is Russia Suffering From Dutch Disease? <http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/06/22/is-russia-suffering-from-dutch-disease/>

Dutch Disease is basically about natural resources affecting a country’s position in the international economy: its currency becomes too strong which discourages domestic production and encourages imports. This is extremely dangerous for many reasons, but perhaps the most severe is that if the flow of natural resources ever comes to a sudden stop the value of the currency will crash. Normally a country would respond to a weakening of its currency by increasing exports, but in an economy ravaged by Dutch Disease there is little immediate ability to increase exports because the manufacturing sector has become so weak and withered and the country so dependent on imports. Balance will eventually be achieved, a cheaper currency will eventually spur a growth in manufacturing and exports and a decrease in imports, but this nightmare scenario explains why so many countries with significant oil production have “sequestered” most of their earnings either by paying down foreign debts or by creating various types of sovereign wealth funds. Russia, of course, essentially followed the textbook economic playbook from 1999-2005 by using almost all of the increase in oil earnings to pay down its sovereign debt ahead of schedule and to create the “reserve fund” and the “national welfare fund.”

### key to econ

#### Spending hasn’t caused runaway inflation despite extensive intervention

Mark Adomanis 6-22-2012; analyst for Forbes Is Russia Suffering From Dutch Disease? <http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/06/22/is-russia-suffering-from-dutch-disease/>

Crowding out is a serious concern, particularly because the Russian state continues to play far too large a role in the country’s economy and also because Putin’s proposals from his election campaign would suggest a huge increase in state spending, but even there the story is a complicated one. Russian inflation is at or near its post-Soviet low, and interest rates are also near post-Soviet lows.

#### High prices key—the short-term impact would devastate for stability and growth

Michael Schuman 7-5-2012 ; writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Hong Kong. B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia; “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices” http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity. That’s why Putin hasn’t been scaling back even as oil prices fall. His government is earmarking $40 billion to support the economy, if necessary, over the next two years. He does have financial wiggle room, even with oil prices falling. Moscow has wisely stashed away petrodollars into a rainy day fund it can tap to fill its budget needs. But Putin doesn’t have the flexibility he used to have. The fund has shrunk, from almost 8% of GDP in 2008 to a touch more than 3% today. The package, says Capital Economics, simply highlights the weaknesses of Russia’s economy: This cuts to the heart of a problem we have highlighted before – namely that Russia is now much more dependent on high and rising oil prices than in the past… The fact that the share of ‘permanent’ spending (e.g. on salaries and pensions) has increased…creates additional problems should oil prices drop back (and is also a concern from the perspective of medium-term growth)…The present growth model looks unsustainable unless oil prices remain at or above $120pb.

#### Key to outside investment—solves currency, inflation, and wages

RT 4-3-2012; Russia Today, “Oil prices: The make or break of the Russian economy - World Bank” http://rt.com/business/news/world-bank-report-russia-543/

Russia has to thank high oil prices for the better state of its economy. A World Bank report says it has the edge over other emerging countries and the EU, but the rosy picture will become bleaker unless the country deals with a number of challenges. The growth rose from 3.8% year-on-year in the first half to 4.8% in the second half of 2011 and in September was 0.3% better than predicted in the previous Russian Economic Report. Restocking and growing consumptions were the most important growth drivers in 2011 after the sharp decline in 2009. Private consumption was supported by growing employment, solid wage growth, lower inflation, and a strong rouble in the first half of the year. Although the Russian economy returned to pre-crisis level by the end of 2011, the recovery from the crisis was slower than that in 1998. By comparison, GDP took 7 quarters to recover to pre-crisis level after 1998 crisis, yet twice as long after the 2008 crisis. However consumption held up better in 2008 than in 1998 partly due to stronger fiscal policy. Imports recovered faster in 2008. The capital investment showed slowest recovery in 2011. Overall investment reached 22% of GDP in the third quarter of 2011, some 4.4% of GDP below the pre-crisis level in the second quarter of 2008. “It is going to be very important for the Russian government to make sure that investors want to put money in Russia,” said Kaspar Richter, World Bank's Lead Economist and Country Sector Coordinator for Russia. “Macroeconomic policy should emphasize stability; all buffers have to be rebuilt. So when the next crisis comes Russia is a good place to address this crisis”. The lower inflation rate is among the major achievements of Russian economy, according to the World Bank. CPI inflation fell for 10 months in a row from 9.7% in April 2011 to 3.8% in February 2012, the lowest level since the early 1990s. Russia’s labor market improved in 2011, as unemployment was 6.5 % in July, and remained around this level through to the end of the year, according to the report. Though real income growth was 1.1% in 2011, the lowest rate in many years, real wages increased 4.2%, although only 2% for the public sector. In 2011 the Russian budget turned in a surplus thanks to surging oil prices and moderate spending. But the World Bank expects the budget to turn to a deficit in 2012 as spending on extra-budgetary funds and social policy is projected to jump from 5.8% of GDP in 2011 to 7.5% of GDP in 2013. World Bank also warns against increasing reliance on resources exports as oil and gas revenues grew to 10.4% of GDP from 7.6% in 2009. “Even a moderate correction in the oil prices could reverse improvements on the revenue side achieved in 2011,” experts say.

### dutch disease

#### Russia is diversifying but attracting foreign capital is key to sustained growth

CatherineBoyle6-16-2011, CNBC, “Russia Will Diversify Beyond Oil and Gas: UBS”, 16 Jun 2011, <http://www.cnbc.com/id/43421253>, ZBurdette)

Russia is ready to develop substantial business interests beyond the oil and natural gas driven wealth that has been generated since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the head of investment bank UBS in the region told CNBC. Around 40 percent of the Russian government’s tax take comes from tax on oil and gas-related businesses, and this is set to rise with plans to remove tax breaks on several big new oil fields and raise taxes on natural gas. Some analysts have expressed concerns that Russia is overly reliant on its extensive natural resources. “There’s no question that the Russian government understands that they have got to diversify,” Nicholas Jordan chief executive of UBS Russia and CIS, told CNBC at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) Thursday. “The last several years have shown they are happy to do that. Russian growth is becoming more diverse: there’s more retail and consumer and other companies that have sprung up. "Whether it will work, we will see,” he added. "I think there’s appetite to get industry started up again, but they realise that these days it’s not so easy and they need to find other things, such as technology." Finding the capital to start new, non-oil and gas related businesses, could be a problem, according to Jordan. "That’s something that this government needs to look at and do something about," he said. "I think that will start with some of the new statues on pension reform, on larger infrastructure, property rights and stability. I’m very optimistic these will happen.

#### Oil profits are re-invested to create a financial exchange center and make Russia more attractive for investment

Pirani 2010 — researcher and journalist, senior research fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy studies (Simon, 05/10/10, “RUSSIAN ECONOMY: Russia's oil problem” http://www.emergingmarkets.org/Article/2682714/RUSSIAN-ECONOMY-Russias-oil-problem.html)

Of course oil money coming onshore is itself no guarantee of progress: it depends how much of it is saved and invested. The news on household savings is all good, Grafe says. “Russia is now the highest saving country in Europe – a completely different place in that respect from what it was in the 1990s.” The volume of individual bank deposits grew by 27% in 2009 and by May 2010 exceeded 8 trillion roubles, according to a recent report by the National Agency of Financial Research. And at least part of the capital account inflows registered in the first half of 2010 was due to Russians changing euros into roubles, many of which then stayed in the banking system. But too much is still saved in other currencies, says Grafe: “Unless you get the money into the system in roubles, you’ll always be dependent on capital inflows.” The government’s ability to encourage investment – specifically, into innovation and infrastructure – is a key part of the argument. Natalia Orlova, chief economist at Alfa Bank in Moscow, is optimistic on this score. She points to the plans to create an international financial centre in Moscow and the renewed insistence by prime minister Vladimir Putin and president Dmitry Medvedev that Russia welcomes foreign investment.

### inflation—general

#### No impact

**Zakaria 2009** – PhD in political science from Harvard, editor of Newsweek International, former managing editor of Foreign Affairs (12/12, Fareed, Newsweek, “The Secrets of Stability”, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2, WEA)

The second force for stability is the victory—after a decades-long struggle—over the cancer of inflation. Thirty-five years ago, much of the world was plagued by high inflation, with deep social and political consequences. Severe inflation can be far more disruptive than a recession, because while recessions rob you of better jobs and wages that you might have had in the future, inflation robs you of what you have now by destroying your savings. In many countries in the 1970s, hyperinflation led to the destruction of the middle class, which was the background condition for many of the political dramas of the era—coups in Latin America, the suspension of democracy in India, the overthrow of the shah in Iran. But then in 1979, the tide began to turn when Paul Volcker took over the U.S. Federal Reserve and waged war against inflation. Over two decades, central banks managed to decisively beat down the beast. At this point, only one country in the world suffers from -hyperinflation: Zimbabwe. Low inflation allows people, businesses, and governments to plan for the future, a key precondition for stability.

Political and economic stability have each reinforced the other. And the third force that has underpinned the resilience of the global system is technological connectivity. Globalization has always existed in a sense in the modern world, but until recently its contours were mostly limited to trade: countries made goods and sold them abroad. Today the information revolution has created a much more deeply connected global system.

Managers in Arkansas can work with suppliers in Beijing on a real-time basis. The production of almost every complex manufactured product now involves input from a dozen countries in a tight global supply chain. And the consequences of connectivity go well beyond economics. Women in rural India have learned through satellite television about the independence of women in more modern countries. Citizens in Iran have used cell phones and the Internet to connect to their well-wishers beyond their borders. Globalization today is fundamentally about knowledge being dispersed across our world.

This diffusion of knowledge may actually be the most important reason for the stability of the current system. The majority of the world's nations have learned some basic lessons about political well-being and wealth creation. They have taken advantage of the opportunities provided by peace, low inflation, and technology to plug in to the global system. And they have seen the indisputable results. Despite all the turmoil of the past year, it's important to remember that more people have been lifted out of poverty over the last two decades than in the preceding 10. Clear-thinking citizens around the world are determined not to lose these gains by falling for some ideological chimera, or searching for a worker's utopia. They are even cautious about the appeals of hypernationalism and war. Most have been there, done that. And they know the price.

### at: us oil investment

#### Energy production doesn’t solve jobs

Levi 12 – Senior Fellow (at CFR) for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Michael, July/August, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=full>) Jacome

"The U.S. Energy Boom Will Create Millions of New Jobs."

**Overstated**. The U.S. oil and gas boom has come at an auspicious time. With record numbers of Americans out of work, hydrocarbon production is helping create much-needed jobs in communities from Pennsylvania to North Dakota. Shale gas production alone accounted for an estimated 600,000 U.S. jobs as of 2010, according to the consultancy IHS CERA.

It's much harder, though, to extrapolate into the future. In a deeply depressed economy, new development can put people to work without reducing employment elsewhere. That's why boom states have benefited massively in recent years. The same is not true, though, in a more normal economy. Unemployment rates are typically determined by fundamental factors such as the ease of hiring and firing and the match between skills that employers need and that workers have. The oil and gas boom won't change these much.

That's why we should be skeptical about rosy projections of millions of new jobs. Wood MacKenzie, for example, claims that the energy boom could deliver as many as 1.1 million jobs by 2020, while Citigroup forecasts a whopping 3.6 million. Unless the U.S. economy remains deep in the doldrums for another decade, these will mostly come **at the expense of jobs elsewhere.**

#### Oil jobs trade off with other parts of the energy industry – those would create more growth than the aff

Jen Alic 6-12-2012; Energy Independence Equals Jobs across the Environmental Divide <http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Energy-Independence-Equals-Jobs-across-the-Environmental-Divide.html>

With that in mind, let’s look at the prospects for energy jobs at a time when the national unemployment rate is about 8.2% and millions of Americans remain without jobs and with dwindling if not completely exhausted unemployment benefits. From a global perspective, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) said the off-grid electricity industry alone is poised to create 4 million jobs alone in accordance with the United Nation’s goal of providing sustainable energy for all by 2030. Currently, renewable energy companies worldwide employ an estimated 5 million people. Germany alone forecasts it will employ over half a million people in the renewable energy sector by 2030, while currently over 380,000 people work in the sector. Worldwide, between 2007 and 2011, the number of jobs in the renewable energy sector doubled. According to the UN, renewables are poised to have a better job-creation rate than oil and gas sector in the longer term. In the US, the solar industry in particular has seen a massive job boom. According to the National Solar Jobs Census 2011, employment growth in the solar sector was nearly 10 times higher than the average national rate last year, translating into over 100,000 solar jobs for Americans and a forecasted increase of 24% for 2012. And these figures are said to reflect the bare minimum. In the State of California, for instance, despite two major recessions, job creation in the renewable energy sector has outpaced job growth in any other sector, according to the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF).

#### The plan just creates an oil jobs bubble – exacerbates unemployment

Russell Gold 2-12-2012; Columnist for the Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2012, “Oil and Gas Boom Lifts U.S. Economy” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204652904577195303471199234.html

Though the energy boom looks like a road to prosperity, it may be a bumpy one. Drilling is disrupting communities in ways that are still unfolding, creating concerns about the costs to local governments for things like road damage. It is also raising fears about potential water contamination, air pollution and even earthquakes from the effects of drilling thousands of new deep wells.¶ Skeptics warn that individual shale communities could experience an employment boom, followed by a painful bust. Rosy economic models "tell us nothing about what will happen when drilling ends," warns a May 2011 paper published by Cornell University's City and Regional Planning Department and funded in part by a foundation opposed to shale drilling.

#### No exports

Levi 5-7 – Senior Fellow (at CFR) for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Michael, July/August, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom (Michael, “Oil and Gas Euphoria Is Getting Out of Hand” <http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2012/05/07/oil-and-gas-euphoria-is-getting-out-of-hand/>) Jacome

But there is more. Ignatius’s column isn’t just about energy; it’s also about the resurgence of U.S. manufacturing. Here’s how he links the two:

“Energy security would be one building block of a new prosperity. The other would be the revival of U.S. manufacturing and other industries. This would be driven in part by the low cost of electricity in the United States, which West forecasts will be relatively flat through the rest of this decade, and one-half to one-third that of economic competitors such as Spain, France or Germany.”

Once again, these sorts of claims have become increasingly common. Indeed the quantitative assertions are perfectly plausible. But the big picture implications don’t make sense. As of 2010, total sales of U.S. manufactured goods were about five trillion dollars. At the same time, the sector spent about 100 billion dollars on energy. That’s a mere two percent of total sales. You could slash energy costs to zero, **and it would barely move the needle** for most U.S. manufacturers. There are, of course, exceptions, like some iron, steel, cement, and paper makers. But even these industries care about much more than their electricity prices. Will lower energy costs move things at the margin? Of course they will, and that’s good news. **But they are nowhere close to what’s needed for U.S. manufacturing to broadly thrive.**

### dutch disease

#### The plan gives the US an injection of Dutch Disease – doesn’t solve any of their internal links and guarantees long-term decline

David Rothkopf January 2013; David Rothkopf is the CEO and Editor-at-Large of Foreign Policy. “Cursed With Plenty” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/02/cursed\_with\_plenty?wp\_login\_redirect=0

It looks like the United States is showing the early symptoms of a particularly nasty case of the Resource Curse**.** The dreaded syndrome, also known as Hugo Chávezitis, tends to strike countries when they tap into large finds of oil, gas, or other valuable natural resources. Although such bonanzas clearly have their advantages, the influx of new wealth often leads countries to neglect real underlying problems or the requirements of long-term growth simply because they can spend their newfound riches to paper over their troubles. Political leaders don't have to do the hard work of building human capital and promoting sustainable economic growth -- they can just coast along, riding the benefits of the resource boom. You can understand the appeal, especially to America's dysfunctional governing class. That is precisely what is so worrisome about all the talk of how these new energy finds will literally fuel the country's next period of economic expansion. You heard it during the recent presidential campaign from both candidates. You heard it in a slew of reports from Wall Street and international organizations. America is on the verge of energy independence. It will soon overtake Saudi Arabia as an energy producer. It will no longer have to worry about the messy realities of the Middle East. New boomtowns like those springing up in Canada and North Dakota will spread across the United States. Cheap energy will attract foreign investment! Revitalize U.S. manufacturing! Help America beat China and India! Here's the biggest problem with all those assertions: They are plausible. America's energy boost is possibly the biggest geopolitical change to hit the world since China's rise. It almost certainly will stimulate U.S. growth, reduce U.S. dependency on foreign oil, and provide Americans with large amounts of comparatively clean natural gas. And since growth leads to higher revenues, it may help cut the federal deficit. Because America won't be as dependent on the Middle East, it may even be able to reconsider its involvement in the region. Already, U.S. monthly oil imports have nearly halved from their high in November 2005, and annual natural gas production has increased almost 30 percent from 2005 to 2011. What's not to like? In truth, however, we don't yet know the real nature of this impending energy revolution. Natural gas prices are still too low to warrant profitable drilling in some areas. The environmental impact of widespread fracking -- the controversial water-intensive process of using pressurized fluid to release natural gas -- in different geological settings remains a mystery. Many regulatory decisions that will affect the growth of U.S. shale gas and oil will be made at the state level or by municipalities whose only "regulatory" option is an outright ban, and the resulting patchwork of rules may produce roadblocks to expansion and achieving necessary economies of scale. We are not sure of the economics of some of these new wells, when they might be depleted, and how that uncertainty might constrain the infrastructure investment needed to bring these resources to market. The whole boom could happen more slowly, or falter more widely, than expected. It's probably going to do a lot of good for a lot of people and for the U.S. economy as a whole, but it is unlikely to unfold without twists, setbacks, and disappointments. Nor should the shale boom in America, even if it produces growth, be seen as a get-out-of-jail-free card for politicians. Tax revenues might go up, but nowhere nearly enough to address the $16 trillion federal debt plus the perhaps $87 trillion in unfunded retiree health-care liabilities the country faces. We may see growth associated with energy, but the United States will not be competitive without also fixing what's broken in the other drivers of long-term prosperity, such as education and infrastructure. America may be able to pivot away from the Middle East -- Lord knows it should -- but energy markets are global, and upsets in that region will still have big consequences. Not to mention that instability in the region will still produce security risks and threats to U.S. citizens, no matter where the country gets its energy from.

#### Dutch disease has no impact on growth – actually boosts non-hydrocarbon export capacity

Nicolas Magud and Sebastián Sosa 3-15-2011; Magud, Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund, and Sosa, Economist at the International Monetary Fund When and why worry about real exchange-rate appreciation? The missing link between Dutch disease and growth http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6212

While a natural resource boom (or any other shock entailing an increase in foreign exchange inflows) is in principle a positive development due to wealth effects, there have long been concerns among economists about the potential negative impact of Dutch disease on long-term growth (see for example Rajan and Subramanian 2005 and Ismail 2010). These concerns are usually based on the idea that the declining (usually manufacturing) tradable sectors may possess some special characteristics that would stimulate growth and welfare in the long term (such as increasing returns to scale, learning by doing, spillover effects, or other positive externalities). Motivated by the experiences of China and other east Asian countries, a new literature based on the export-led growth strategy states that maintaining an undervalued or “competitive” real exchange rate may foster economic growth – where the operative channel is the size of the (manufacturing) tradable sector. In this view, while real exchange-rate overvaluations hurt growth, undervaluations foster it. This contrasts with another position, which argues that any real exchange-rate misalignment from its long-run (fundamentals’ based) equilibrium will lower growth – regardless of whether it is over- or under-valuation (Berg and Miao 2010). However, to show that Dutch disease reduces growth needs a strong assumption that the manufacturing tradable sector is somehow “special”. Mostly, learning by doing or other types of externalities in this sector have been assumed to obtain theoretical models linking Dutch disease with lower growth. Absent these assumptions, Dutch disease only depicts an equilibrium real exchange-rate appreciation reflecting stronger fundamentals and de-industrialisation, but would not necessarily be bad for overall growth.

#### Dutch disease doesn’t exist – economic myth

BARRIE McKenna 7-15, 2008; Globe and Mail correspondent and columnist in Washington “Oil wealth: Proving to be more purse than curse” http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinions/columnists/Barrie+McKennaBio.html

WASHINGTON -- The world has known a plethora of famous curses - from King Tut's tomb to the Bambino and the Chicago Cubs' billy goat. None of these, however, has grabbed the attention of serious academics quite like the curse of oil. The theory is a simple one: Countries rich in oil and other natural resources typically - and counterintuitively - do less well economically over the long haul than other countries. The oil curse theory is a close relative of the so-called Dutch disease, a term coined by The Economist in 1977 to describe the vanishing manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas a decade earlier. In a nutshell, a resource boom attracts a sudden flood of investment, pushes up the value of the currency and weighs down other sectors, including manufacturing and farming. Over the ensuing decades, economists have produced considerable research to support the oil curse. It has become a virtual economic truism, often helping to guide development aid by such institutions as the World Bank. Subsequent research has also linked resource wealth to weaker government institutions. Alas, like all curses, this one was bound to be broken some time. The Boston Red Sox, of course, have won the World Series twice in three years after 86 years of futility. Economists Michael Alexeev of Indiana University and Robert Conrad of Duke University argue in a new paper that, **like the Bambino's, the curse of oil is really just a myth**. "While mineral wealth may have some negative consequences for a country, the general curse of natural resources as understood in the current literature does not seem to exist," the authors conclude in a recently released paper, The Elusive Curse of Oil. The paper is due to be published in the Review of Economics and Statistics. The authors say there is "little or no evidence" that an abundance of natural resources slows down long-term economic growth. They also debunk the notion that oil wealth degrades public institutions. Institutions may not be markedly better, they said, but they are not any worse. The economists point to the post-Soviet collapse experience of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as a "natural experiment" of the influence of oil and mineral resources. All three Slavic nations emerged from the Soviet era with similar cultural, governmental and economic backgrounds, but with distinctly unequal resource wealth. Russia was a powerhouse, Ukraine had less and Belarus had none. If the curse exists, Belarus would have emerged the big winner. That isn't the case. It's Russia, and it isn't even close, based on key measures, including gross domestic product per capita, rule of law, control of corruption and government effectiveness. "The comparison of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine is instructive because of its stark divergence from the prediction based on the natural resource curse," the study notes. So what about Canada? There's been a lively academic debate for decades about whether the country has enjoyed the full fruits of its various resource bonanzas - from fur and lumber to gold, hydro, Hibernia and the oil sands. The consensus among economists is that Canada is a winner, and its resources are a big part of that success. The country ranks highly in various global measures of well being (including fourth in the 2007-08 United Nations' Human Development Index and 5th in the 2007 Legatum Prosperity Index). And yet the debate endures, particularly now as a boom in one part of the country (Alberta) hurts another (Quebec and Ontario) by pushing the dollar higher and making other exports less competitive. Some economists argue that the latest energy boom hasn't necessarily been good for Canada, as high oil prices drag down large swaths of the economy. The more pertinent question is: Where would Canada be without its oil, its trees and its minerals? The implication of the latest research is that it would be a lot less well off. And don't forget: Everything worked out pretty well for the Dutch in the end.

### oil shocks

#### Oil price spikes don’t hurt growth – US and world economies are decoupled from the worst effects

Oliver Blanchard and Jordi Gali 2007; Blanchard, Prof. Econ. @ MIT, and Gali, Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional, NBER Working Paper #13368, “THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OIL SHOCKS: WHY ARE THE 2000S SO DIFFERENT FROM THE 1970S?” http://www.nber.org/papers/w13368)

Since the 1970s, and at least until recently, macroeconomists have viewed changes in the price of oil as as an important source of economic fluctuations, as well as a paradigm of a global shock, likely to affect many economies simultaneously. Such a perception is largely due to the two episodes of low growth, high unemployment, and high in°ation that char- acterized most industrialized economies in the mid and late 1970s. Con- ventional accounts of those episodes of stag°ation blame them on the large increases in the price of oil triggered by the Yom Kippur war in 1973, and the Iranian revolution of 1979, respectively.1 The events of the past decade, however, seem to call into question the relevance of oil price changes as a significant source of economic fluctuations. The reason: Since the late 1990s, the global economy has experienced two oil shocks of sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s but, in contrast with the latter episodes, GDP growth and inflation have remained relatively stable in much of the industrialized world. Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the nature of the apparent changes in the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks, as well as on some of its possible causes. Disentangling the factors behind those changes is obviously key to assessing the extent to which the episodes of stag°ation of the 1970s can reoccur in response to future oils shocks and, if so, to understanding the role that monetary policy can play in order to mitigate their adverse effects. One plausible hypothesis is that the effects of the increase in the price of oil proper have been similar across episodes, but have coincided in time with large shocks of a very different nature (e.g. large rises in other commodity prices in the 1970s, high productivity growth and world demand in the 2000s). That coincidence could signi¯cantly distort any assessment of the impact of oil shocks based on a simple observation of the movements in aggregate variables around each episode. In order to evaluate this hypothesis one must isolate the component of macroeconomic °uctuations associated with exogenous changes in the price of oil. To do so, we identify and estimate the effects of an oil price shock using structural VAR techniques. We report and compare estimates for different sample periods and discuss how they have changed over time. We follow two alternative approaches. The ¯rst one is based on a large VAR, and allows for a break in the sample in the mid 1980s. The second approach is based on rolling bivariate VARs, including the price of oil and one other variable at a time. The latter approach allows for a gradual change in the estimated effects of oil price shocks, without imposing a discrete break in a single period. Two conclusions clearly emerge from this analysis: First, there were indeed other adverse shocks at work in the 1970s; the price of oil explains only part of the stag°ation episodes of the 1970s. Second, and importantly, the effects of a given change in the price of oil have changed substantially over time. Our estimates point to much larger effects of oil price shocks on in°ation and activity in the early part of the sample, i.e. the one that includes the two oil shock episodes of the 1970s. Our basic empirical ¯ndings are summarized graphically in Figure 1 (we postpone a description of the underlying assumptions to Section 3). The left-hand graph shows the responses of U.S. (log) GDP and the (log) CPI to a 10 percent increase in the price of oil, estimated using pre-1984 data. The right-hand graph displays the corresponding responses, based on post-1984 data. As the Figure makes clear, the response of both variables has become more muted in the more recent period. As we show below, that pattern can also be observed for other variables (prices and quantities) and many (though not all) other countries considered. In sum, the evidence suggests that economies face an improved trade-off in the more recent period, in the face of oil price shocks of a similar magnitude.

### food prices

#### High food prices reduce global poverty—developing countries export more than import

**Cline 5** – Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development (William, Doha and Development, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201faessay84707/william-r-cline/doha-and-development.html?mode=print, AG)

Liberalizing agricultural trade would boost world prices of agricultural goods, as industrial countries stop artificially stimulating supply and start importing more from developing countries. Because about threefourths of the world's poor are in the agricultural sector, and would tend to benefit from improved opportunities for agricultural exports, there is good reason to expect that liberalization of industrial-country agricultural markets would help reduce global poverty.

## 1nr

### Counterplan

**And even if speculation isn’t the root cause it’s still a major cause – so if the CP solves speculation that moves food prices back from the brink**

**Livingstone, 12** (Grace, “The real hunger games: How banks gamble on food prices – and the poor lose out” 4/1, The Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/the-real-hunger-games-how-banks-gamble-on-food-prices--and-the-poor-lose-out-7606263.html>)

Experts disagree on whether speculation actually causes price rises or simply aggravates other factors such as climate shocks, the rise in world demand for food and the growth of biofuels. Jayati Ghosh, professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, was one of 450 economists who last year called on the G20 to regulate the commodities market. She says that, although factors such as biofuels are important, speculation is now another "driving force" behind price hikes. She cites the example of world wheat prices doubling between June and December 2010, even though there was no fall in the global supply of wheat.

David Hallam of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization says that while he does not believe speculation is the cause of price rises, it does exacerbate swings in prices and should be regulated. "If you have something which is amplifying price movements, then that is a terribly important issue that needs to be addressed."

#### Outweighs input costs

**Bar-Yam and Lindsay, 10/25**/12 - Yaneer Bar-Yam is the president of the New England Complex Systems Institute, an independent academic research institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Greg Lindsay is an affiliate of NECSI and a visiting scholar at New York University (Reuters, “The real reason for spikes in food prices” <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/25/the-real-reason-for-spikes-in-food-prices/>)

Spikes in grain prices are regularly blamed on oil shocks, droughts and emerging markets’ hunger for meat. The real culprit in the three bubbles-and-busts of the last five years, however, isn’t the weather. It’s financial speculation.

The Midwest drought this summer, the worst in a half-century, produced a bumper crop of profits for derivatives traders like Chris Mahoney, the director of agricultural products for Glencore, the world’s largest commodities trading firm. Mahoney noted during one August conference call that tight grain supplies and the resulting arbitrage opportunities “should be good for Glencore.”

They’ve been a disaster, however, for the world’s poor.

More than 40 percent of grain futures can now be traced to financial institutions, which nearly doubled their commodity bets over the last five years — from $65 billion to $126 billion.

During that time, food prices have bubbled and burst twice — leaving millions of people to go hungry and stoking global unrest — before climbing to new heights this summer. Corn prices soared 65 percent between June and July alone, the same month the World Bank’s food price index recorded its highest rise ever, breaking the previous record set in February 2011.

What’s fueling this stunning price fluctuation is financial speculation. Our research team at the New England Complex Systems Institute built mathematical models to test possible explanations for the price spikes of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 — including all the above, in addition to the rise of ethanol production. We could replicate a rise in prices but couldn’t explain the bubbles and crashes. When we added speculation, the model fit precisely.

### Geopolitics - A2 Liberalism

#### Lower revenues doesn’t cause liberalization – just crackdowns or collapse

Gregory D. Miller, April 2010; assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence”, the Washington Quarterly April 2010 http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf

Another counterargument emphasizes some potential benefits of a loss of revenue, namely a reduction in power by certain domestic groups that could facilitate the emergence of democracy in these countries. There are two responses to this argument. First, it is not clear that the loss of oil revenue will automatically bring about democracy. The loss of wealth by those in power rarely leads them to give up power, but more often causes a greater crackdown on the population to prevent challenges to the state’s authority. Iraq, Libya, and North Korea illustrate that the loss of wealth does not lead to a loss of control by those in power.23 In contrast, diversified economies are more likely to bring about democratic reform, regardless of whether certain groups hold power because of oil or not.

#### Those democracies would be illiberal and unstable – internal-link turns their argument

Gregory D. Miller, April 2010; assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy Independence”, the Washington Quarterly April 2010 http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10aprilmiller.pdf

Assuming that the logic is correct and these oil-producing states are undemocratic only because of the oil revenue held by a few individuals, there is no reason to believe that the subsequently emerging democratic states would be stable or that they would bring to power individuals and groups friendly to the West. Moreover, newly democratizing states are among the least stable and are more prone to wars.24 Therefore, even if this counterargument is valid, the results will not alleviate the security concerns discussed in this article and could make them worse. Although there will be numerous benefits of reducing dependence on oil, including possibly democratization, we need to understand and prepare for the risks as well.

#### Can’t be an energy leader – structural factors

**Levi 12 –** Senior Fellow (at CFR) for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Michael, July/August, “Think Again: The American Energy Boom” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom?page=full>) Jacome

These sorts of views are quickly becoming conventional wisdom. But it takes more than sheer volume of oil and gas production to dominate world energy markets.

No doubt, the renaissance in U.S. oil and gas is really happening, fueled by new technology and high oil prices. About a decade ago, innovators aggressively began to marry horizontal drilling, which allows producers to access large swaths of an underground resource from a single well, with hydraulic fracturing -- better known as fracking -- which uses high-pressure fluids to crack dense rock and allow oil and gas to flow. The combination has unlocked vast quantities of oil and gas buried in shale rock deep underground. Technology has also allowed producers to tap resources far beneath the sea in a way that wasn't possible before; just two years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, offshore production has recovered, helping spur U.S. oil production upward.

It's no coincidence that these technologies have flourished amid record-high oil prices. Extreme offshore production makes little sense unless oil prices are above $50 or $60 a barrel. The economics of extracting oil from shale are murkier, but most think that $70 or $80 a barrel is necessary. Ten years ago, most analysts were projecting $20 crude for as far as the eye could see. In that world, the current boom would have been impossible. Oil prices have shifted decidedly higher, however, making new production possible along with them.

As a mere matter of scale, projections that the United States will reclaim the title of world's largest oil producer are entirely plausible, though hardly guaranteed. Saudi Arabia produces around 10 million barrels of crude oil each day, versus about 6 million for the United States. Surging production of natural gas liquids (NGLs) -- crude-like hydrocarbons produced alongside natural gas -- effectively takes that figure up to about 8 million barrels a day. Morse claims that total U.S. production could exceed 10 million daily barrels by 2015, and even the cautious U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) sees combined crude and NGLs production coming close to 10 million barrels a day by 2020.

But what makes Saudi Arabia such a dominant global player isn't merely the scale of its energy production. It's that it actively attempts to influence the price of oil and often does so for explicitly political reasons, whether currying favor with Washington or trying to hurt Tehran. By restraining long-term investment in oil production capacity -- manufacturing scarcity -- the desert kingdom is able to prop up the average price of crude. What's more, by keeping some of its production capacity in reserve, to be swung on and off the market at will, Saudi Arabia is able to moderate short-term price swings. It's not because they love the Saudi royal family that world leaders are so solicitous when they visit Riyadh.

Nothing about the U.S. oil and gas boom suggests that Washington can or will step into this role. No U.S. government would -- or could -- attempt to prop up world prices by restraining U.S. supplies. Besides, America's oil boom is being driven by supplies that cost huge sums of money to develop. Once new wells are drilled (at a cost of about $100 million each for offshore development), owners will produce flat out to recoup their investments; there's no way they'll leave untapped production capacity just waiting for a political crisis or global market swing.

### dollar

#### And dollar reserve status change would cause instant economic collapse

Robert Looney, November 2003. Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. “From Petrodollars to Petroeuros: Are the Dollar's Days as an International Reserve Currency Drawing to an End?” Strategic Insights, 2.11, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/nov03/middleEast.asp>.

Otherwise, the effect of an OPEC switch to the euro would be that oil-consuming nations would have to flush dollars out of their (central bank) reserve funds and replace these with euros. The dollar would crash anywhere from 20-40% in value and the consequences would be those one could expect from any currency collapse and massive inflation (think Argentina currency crisis, for example). You'd have foreign funds stream out of the U.S. stock markets and dollar denominated assets, there'd surely be a run on the banks much like the 1930s, the current account deficit would become unserviceable, the budget deficit would go into default, and so on. Your basic 3rd world economic crisis scenario. "The United States economy is intimately tied to the dollar's role as reserve currency. This doesn't mean that the U.S. couldn't function otherwise, but that the transition would have to be gradual to avoid such dislocations (and the ultimate result of this would probably be the U.S. and the E.U. switching roles in the global economy)."

#### High prices are key to dollar leadership – ensures recycled investment in US financial markets

Caroline Baum, 6-30-2011; economics columnist for Bloomberg News, author of "Just What I Said: Bloomberg Economics Columnist Takes on Bonds, Banks, Budgets and Bubbles." Fire the Fed, Let OPEC Run U.S. Economic Policy: Caroline Baum http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-30/fire-the-fed-let-opec-run-u-s-economic-policy-caroline-baum.html

Why all the hoopla over oil? Simple. There are many more oil consumers than oil producers, which is why the cry goes out to “do something” when oil breaches $100 a barrel and gas prices hit $4 a gallon, which they did in May. No one ever mentions the benefits: the windfall profits that accrue to producers, shareholders and oil industry employees, all of whom are consumers in their own right. Most analysts ignore this aspect and treat higher oil prices as a dead-weight loss on the U.S. economy. Even if the U.S. could satisfy all its energy needs domestically, the effect of oil prices on consumers and producers would still play itself out in distinct time periods. Higher oil prices translate quickly to increased prices at the pump. But because oil exploration is a drawn-out affair -- a result of regulatory red tape and the nature of the process -- producers don’t spend the additional revenue immediately, so it gets recycled into financial markets, which is reflected as an increase in U.S. savings, according to Jim Glassman, senior U.S. economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co.

### heg

#### Adaptation

Carla **Norrlof 2010** (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” 51-3

In today’s debate on American decline redux, scholars continue to assume a substitute relation between economic and political power. Bacevich, for instance, sees the United States as a global enforcer that uses new advanced means to practice old-style gunboat diplomacy, a development he laments and sees as more or less irreversible.48 Ferguson the mores and practices in other countries is seen as especially devastating for its dominance. While Mann too sees the United States as a “military giant,” he does not think military power is of much use, and disparagingly calls it an economic “backseat driver.”50 Mann clearly sees the United States as a power in decline. In two books, Chalmers Johnson describes the proliferation of American bases around the world, the resentment they create, and how it might provoke decline.51 The French analyst Emmanuel Todd indicts the United States for outright banditry, “the mugging of Europeans by Wall Street,” but does not believe the United States has the military wherewithal to ensure that it can continue to reap disproportionate economic benefits, or that it is capable of the kind of political (non-discriminatory) rule that attracts dependable followers.52 Not everyone has been convinced that the United States has declined in any meaningful way. As several authors have pointed out, the relative ascendancy of Europe and Japan was not only to be expected, but an explicit aim of American policy after the war.53 Critics charged that those who believed that the United States had declined in significant ways had failed to grasp important changes in the international economy and the prominent role played by multi-national corporations. 54 To appreciate the full extent of America’s reach one had to take into account the functioning of the world economy, the vitality of the American economy, the diversity of its population, and its military preponderance. Samuel Huntington was particularly prescient in identifying what kept America on top and in spelling out challenges to its lead position. He saw the country’s multi-dimensional power base as difficult for others to replicate and understood that the dynamism of the American economy would take a blow if consumer overstretch got out of hand, even though he believed that the most serious challenge to American power would come from a coalition of European states.55 While Huntington correctly perceived that America’s preeminence is anchored across a wide range of issue-areas, he did not connect these different sources of power. In elaborating an alternative way of thinking about the hegemon’s power arc, I show how various forms of power mutually reinforce one another as the hegemon travels up and down the power ladder. As I have already suggested, the consequences of relative decline are potentially favorable to the hegemon and can in some circumstances activate power

#### No impact

**Goldstein 2011**, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, “Thing Again: War,” Sept/Oct 2011,

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think\_again\_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- **recent geopolitical history** suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have **waned in tandem** over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19th-century Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

### iran

#### Historical evidence and effective regional nonprolif

Johan **Bergenas**, August 31, 20**10** ; Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, The Nuclear Domino Myth Dismantling Worst-Case Proliferation Scenarios http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66738/johan-bergenas/the-nuclear-domino-myth?page=show

When considering the dangers of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, those who differ on political ideology find rare common ground. According to nearly everyone, if Iran develops nuclear weapons, its neighbors will inevitably do so, too. Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), for example, said earlier this year, "The governments of the world must understand what a threat it is if the Iranians get nuclear weapons, because there are probably 10 other countries in the Middle East over the next 10 to 20 years that would follow down that road." U.S. policymakers from John Bolton, the conservative former U.S. ambassador to the UN, to Vice President Joe Biden all seem to agree with this dark prediction. But there's one problem with this "nuclear domino" scenario: the historical record does not support it. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, many have feared rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation; 65 years later, only nine countries have developed nuclear weapons. Nearly 20 years elapsed between the emergence of the first nuclear state, the United States, in 1945, and the fifth, China, in 1964. The next 40 years gave birth to only five additional nuclear countries: India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, and North Korea. South Africa voluntarily disarmed in the 1990s, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in the late 1960s, no regional nuclear chain reaction followed, even though the country is surrounded by rivals. Nor was there even a two-country nuclear arms race in the region. Similarly, it has now been four years since North Korea became a nuclear weapons state, yet South Korea and Japan have not followed suit, despite the fact that they have a latent nuclear weapons capability -- access to the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons. These countries' decisions to not go nuclear are largely thanks to extensive U.S. efforts to dissuade them. Both South Korea and Japan enjoy firm and long-standing security assurances from Washington, including protection under the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella, obviating the need for their own deterrents. Following North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, U.S. President George W. Bush immediately assured South Korea and Japan that the United States was unequivocally committed to protecting them. The fruit of these efforts to prevent rapid and widespread nuclear proliferation, then, is the very reason a nuclear domino effect remains a myth. In the Middle East, there are no signs that the nuclear dominos will fall anytime soon. Although many governments believe that Iran could be one to three years away from developing a nuclear bomb, all other Middle Eastern countries (besides Israel) are at least 10 to 15 years away from reaching such a capability. This time frame gives Washington ample opportunity to establish or reaffirm security pacts with countries that might be tempted to develop their own nuclear weapons programs in reaction to a potential Iranian bomb. In fact, that work has already begun. In July 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the possibility of the United States extending a "defense umbrella" over the Gulf region and shoring up those countries' military capabilities if Iran goes nuclear. More generally, the United States is trying to reinforce a culture of nonproliferation in the Middle East. In late 2009, Washington concluded an agreement with the United Arab Emirates to forego the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel -- crucial steps in the development of nuclear weapons. (In return, the United Arab Emirates will receive help developing a civilian nuclear-energy program.) Similar overtures are being made to both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, states that are pursuing civilian nuclear-power programs to diversify their energy supplies. Another achievement came during the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, when the United States endorsed the convening of a regional meeting on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The summit is due to be held in 2012 and, although Israel's nuclear weapons complicate matters, could serve as another step toward cementing a nonproliferation culture in the region. These are major accomplishments in preventing proliferation in the Middle East, and they contradict the worst-case scenarios about a nuclear Iran. Yet they have done little to reassure those who expect a chain reaction of proliferating states.

#### Deterrence solves the impact

**Hendrickson and Tucker, 06** (David, Distinguished Service Professor at Colorado College, and Robert, professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, “A Test of Power”, The National Interest, Sept/Oct, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=11900)

The consensus view that Iran could not be deterred if it did acquire nuclear weapons is also dubious in the extreme. These alarms were a regular feature of the Cold War, and it was confidently predicted that neither the Soviet Union nor China would be susceptible to deterrence once they acquired atomic devices. Events showed otherwise. It is said today that President Ahmadinejad is different, that he welcomes the coming of the twelfth imam that a nuclear holocaust would entail, and that a crazed religious fanatic in control of a nuclear-armed state would represent an intolerable danger to Israel, the Gulf sheikhdoms, the United States and the rest of the world. Against these considerations, however, it may be asserted that the Iranian public did not elect their new president on the basis of the expectation that they would soon be burnt to a crisp, but rather that he would improve their standard of living in the here and now; that Ahmadinejad's reputed common touch is utterly incompatible with the careless disregard for the lives of his countrymen that such an act would entail; that any decision for war by Iran could not, from all we know of Iranian decision-making, be undertaken simply on the president's say so but would also require the consent of the religious establishment; and that it is inconceivable that Iran's rulers would display such a complete disregard of Iran's true interests as to invite the retaliation against it that would surely follow. The restraints governing the use of nuclear weapons rest on far more than the strong likelihood of retaliation. Any regime that used nuclear weapons in a first strike "bolt from the blue" would almost certainly be signing its death warrant. The infamy that would attach to any such action, both at home and abroad; the license it would give to others to retaliate or otherwise attempt to bring the regime down; the international isolation and withering contempt it would draw upon itself; the reputation for brigandage it would entail--all this constitutes an insurance policy against the dangers of an Iranian bomb. As a practical matter, it makes extremely unlikely--nay, virtually inconceivable--what is now taken by consensus opinion in America as a sort of moral certainty.