# speech docs – michigan ap – ndt 2013

# r1 neg v. louisville vw

## 1nc

### 1nc negation theory

#### Condo good -- the 2ac has a lot of latitude to re-explain and spin arguments -- we should have that same latitude by collapsing down to different positions in the block -- wasting 1NC time hurts us more than it does them

#### Exploring from multiple viewpoints key to true performative pedagogy -- the fact that they fail to do so is a reason that their pedagogy is meaningless since every aff debate is a repetition of an argument they’re well familiar with -- only multiple tests of argument can create relevant knowledge -- vote neg on presumption

Medina and Perry '11 Mia, University of British Columbia, Carmen, Indiana University "Embodiment and Performance in Pedagogy Research: Investigating the Possibility of the Body in Curriculum Experience" Journal of Curriculum Theorizing Volume 27, Number 3, 2 http://www.academia.edu/470170/Embodiment\_and\_performance\_in\_pedagogy\_The\_possibility\_of\_the\_body\_in\_curriculum

The body in pedagogy and research is a site of learning, of experiencing, of becoming. Furthermore, the role of the body in research needs to be acknowledged and considered beyondits role as signifier. As we have seen here, by looking at the relationship between body and space, new perspectives and trajectories in our interpretations of students’ learning moments emerge. As argued at the beginning of this paper, the body, like any signifier, exists in relation to its environment: therefore, space matters. Acknowledging the role of space can help us open up our understanding of the body as “ being-in-the-world ” in order to move to a fuller perspective onbodies and texts.In mapping people ’ s performances, particularly in relation to embodiment, it was helpfulto reflect back with the participants, considering a specific moment, to talk about how theyconstructed their contributions and who became implicated in the performance. We were less interested in hearing what they felt the performance was about, than what they thought was happening and how that “happening” gets constructed. The influence of **nomadic thought** has helped us understand how people function in these dynamics, and the hybrid nature of people’s performative worlds. This is significant as we think of the role of the body in the construction of space and subjectivity, as opposed to simply the representation of such notions. Participants (in this case, educators) in this classroom-based drama activity, engaged in learning about drama and pedagogy, using both the physical and visual discourses of performance, and the textual discourses of reflection.As we progress in this field, we are looking at ways to analyse bodies in movement as well as when they are static. This challenge involves developing new methods of analysis but also new methods of dissemination. With the proliferation of online journals these challenges have become more realisable. **As we receive info**rmation **in more** and more **diverse** and dynamic **forms**, an engagement with ideas around embodiment, a continuation of the inquiry put forwardhere, becomes ever more relevant.

#### Our stance is not a view from nowhere but rather provisional engagement through a plurality of historically situated positions. Their insistence on proximity to oppression as a yardstick for authenticity turns the case and dooms solvency

**Disch 93** (Lisa J.; Professor of Political Theory – University of Minnesota, “More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 21:4, November)

What Hannah Arendt called “my old fashioned storytelling”7 is at once the most elusive and the most provocative aspect of her political philosophy. The apologies she sometimes made for it are well known, but few scholars have attempted to discern from these “scattered remarks” as statement of epistemology or method.8 Though Arendt alluded to its importance throughout her writings in comments like the one that prefaces this essay, this offhandedness left an important question about storytelling unanswered: how can thought that is “bound” to experience as its only “guidepost” possibly be critical? I discern an answer to this question in Arendt’s conception of storytelling, which implicitly redefines conventional understandings of objectivity and impartiality. Arendt failed to explain what she herself termed a “rather unusual approach”9 to political theory because she considered methodological discussions to be self-indulgent and irrelevant to real political problems.10 This reticence did her a disservice because by failing to explain how storytelling creates a vantage point that is both critical and experiential she left herself open to charges of subjectivism.11 As Richard Bernstein has argued, however, what makes Hannah Arendt distinctive is that she is neither a subjectivist nor a foundationalist but, rather, attempts to move “beyond objectivism and relativism.”12 I argue that Arendt’s apologies for her storytelling were disingenuous; she regarded it not as an anachronistic or nostalgic way of thinking but as an innovative approach to critical understanding. Arendt’s storytelling proposes an alternative to the model of impartiality defined as detached reasoning. In Arendt’s terms, impartiality involves telling oneself the story of an event or situation form the plurality of perspectives that constitute it as a public phenomenon. This critical vantage point, not from outside but from within a plurality of contesting standpoints, is what I term “situated impartiality.” Situated impartial knowledge is neither objective disinterested nor explicitly identified with a single particularistic interest. Consequently, its validity does not turn on what Donna Haraway calls the “god trick,” the claim to an omnipotent, disembodied vision that is capable of “seeing everything from nowhere.”13 But neither does it turn on a claim to insight premised on the experience of subjugation, which purportedly gives oppressed peoples a privileged understanding of structures of domination and exonerates them of using power to oppress. The two versions of standpoint claims – the privileged claim to disembodied vision and the embodied claim to “antiprivilege” from oppression – are equally suspect because they are simply antithetical. Both define knowledge positionally, in terms of proximity to power; they differ only in that they assign the privilege of “objective” understanding to opposite poles of the knowledge/power axis. Haraway argues that standpoint claims are insufficient as critical theory because they ignore the complex of social relations that mediate the connection between knowledge and power. She counters that any claim to knowledge, whether advanced by the oppressed or their oppressors, is partial. No one can justifiably lay claim to abstract truth, Haraway argues, but only to “embodied objectivity,” which she argues “means quite simply situated knowledges.”14 There is a connection between Arendt’s defense of storytelling and Haraway’s project, in that both define theory as a critical enterprise whose purpose is not to defend abstract principles or objective facts but to tell provocative stories that invite contestation form rival perspectives.15

#### The linkage between contradictions and racism is a logical fallacy -- just because some white supremacists use them doesn't mean contradictions are white supremacist. HOWEVER, this argument is uniquely debilitating for debate --- no one can change their minds, construct "even if" statements, or test arguments from multiple positions --- this makes them complicit with the stereotyping they criticize

#### This will link worse to them -- perms and competition arguments effectively attempt to agree with our arguments while denying them on other flows -- if they win this it’s an independent reason to vote negative

#### Performative pedagogy fails in the context of a competitive debate -- there is no rigorous criteria for deciding whether or not we have sufficiently "performed" X or Y pedagogy, and a focus on embodiment collapses in rhetorical futility

Medina and Perry '11 Mia, University of British Columbia, Carmen, Indiana University "Embodiment and Performance in Pedagogy Research: Investigating the Possibility of the Body in Curriculum Experience" Journal of Curriculum Theorizing Volume 27, Number 3, 2 http://www.academia.edu/470170/Embodiment\_and\_performance\_in\_pedagogy\_The\_possibility\_of\_the\_body\_in\_curriculum

Jean-Luc Nancy (1994) reminds us that our endeavour to write about embodiment fails before it begins, as the body is impenetrable by the means that we have at our disposal — words,ink, page, computer. And we would add that the endeavour to talk about the body is also challenging if not futile, due to the discourses that we have at the ready, that is, the dominant discourses of the mind. In the face of this methodological predicament, Caroline Fusco (2008)regrets that in educational research a “discursive and material disinfecting and cleansing take[s] place” in the transcription of body and space to written or visual texts (p. 160). In the following analysis, we acknowledge the limitations of representing research in the written and visualformat of a journal article, but embrace the affordances that analytic discourses and written text provide. In this way, we aspire to contribute to a much larger conversation that necessarily extends beyond these two authors, beyond this study, and beyond the modalities of written andvisual texts.

**Refuse any affirmative claim to "starting point" or "prerequisite" -- those notions erect a hierarchy that makes true performative pedagogy impossible**

Medina and Perry '11 Mia, University of British Columbia, Carmen, Indiana University "Embodiment and Performance in Pedagogy Research: Investigating the Possibility of the Body in Curriculum Experience" Journal of Curriculum Theorizing Volume 27, Number 3, 2 http://www.academia.edu/470170/Embodiment\_and\_performance\_in\_pedagogy\_The\_possibility\_of\_the\_body\_in\_curriculum

The notion of assemblage with Deleuze and Guattari’s nomadic thought can be understood as the “performed organization of language (enunciation) and ‘content’ (material and conceptual bodies)” (Leander & Rowe, 2006, p. 437). We use this understanding to frame our examinationof how things happen within a dramatic encounter. George Marcus and Erkan Saka (2006)inform our use of the concept of assemblage, suggesting that it focuses “ attention on the always-emergent conditions of the present .... while preserving some concept of the structural soembedded in the enterprise of social science research ” (pp. 101-102). In this study, we look atthe emerging relationship between the organization of partial assemblage (the emergingembodied social constructs), in relation to larger assemblages or organized institutions (largersocial performances outside of the dramatic encounter). We maintain that it is important toconsider the relationship between language and bodies “on the same level” (Deluze & Guattari,1987, as cited in Leander & Rowe p. 437), and always in flux and motion. In alignment with nomadic thought, we attempt to avoid the notions of beginnings and endings or hierarchiesbetween language and bodies. In this light, we are looking at relationships not in terms of fixed meanings, but as emerging, evolving, and unfinished within the experience under analysis.

### 1nc enviro racism + hager

#### Discrimination isn’t a total explanation for environmental inequality—their starting point’s flawed

**Kevin 97**

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Nondiscriminatory factors account for disparate results in the great majority of formal siting decisions. Some hazardous waste landfill sites which are often cited as examples of environmental racism, such as Emelle, Alabama and Warren County, North Carolina, may be technically superior to alternate sites. n92 For example, when Chemical Waste Management made its decision to site a hazardous waste landfill, Emelle was the only county east of the Mississippi River evaluated by EPA and listed as one of the ten most desirable counties for a landfill. n93 Factors accounting for its desirability as a landfill included the sparse population surrounding the site, reliable access to the site, and arid temperature in the site's location. n94 Most importantly, Emelle was underlain by dense natural chalk forming a good barrier between waste disposal activities and aquifers. n95 Other factors being equal, and independent of racism, siting proponents seek out areas where the costs of siting are low relative to comparable areas. n96 Minority communities are often in areas [\*140] with lower land values. n97 In addition, although the assertion that "no one likes to live near a waste site" n98 is probably correct, in some instances there has not been strong opposition from minority communities that have been or would be affected by a LULU siting. n99 It is reasonable to conclude that lack of opposition has resulted from the same factors that have been cited in the cases of white communities which have solicited LULUs; as well as potential problems, LULUs can bring potential benefits to communities in jobs, revenues and direct provision of social services. n100 In some cases, not only has there been a lack of local opposition to LULU sitings, but community leaders have actively sought out or welcomed such sitings. For example, the Campo Band of Mission Indians has supported the construction of a solid waste landfill on reservation land in San Diego County, California. n101 Permitting and environmental standards for the landfill would meet, at a minimum, applicable EPA standards. n102 The landfill [\*141] would bring great economic benefits to the Campo Band. n103 Tribal sources estimated that the landfill would directly create at least fifty-five permanent jobs for at least thirty-five members of the Campo Band, almost eliminating tribal unemployment. n104 Here, the most sustained and politically effective opposition to siting the landfill has come from several white neighbors of the Campo Reservation. n105 Unfortunately, LULUs have been sited despite considerable opposition from minority communities. Siting in the face of local opposition, however, is not limited to minority communities. A prominent example of LULU siting in spite of objections from non-minority communities is the decision to place a high-level radioactive waste repository in Nevada. n106 Conversely, other communities with white majorities have lobbied to have facilities, which most people would consider to be LULUs, sited in their jurisdictions in order to gain jobs and other benefits during difficult economic times. n107 In both situations, non-racial factors better explain the outcomes than intentional or societal racism.

#### This is offense—universalizing that model makes it impossible to achieve environmental justice and make decisions based on priorities—nobody should be subject to those conditions

**Foreman 98**

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The Promise and Peril of Environmental Justice

Conceptual Drawbacks of Environmental Justice From a rationalizing perspective, a major problem with the environmental justice version of the democratizing critique is that, like ecopopulism more generally, it threatens to worsen the problem of environmental policy's missing priorities. As Walter Rosenbaum elaborates: like the man who mounted his horse and galloped off in all directions, the EPA has no constant course. With responsibility for administering nine separate statutes and parts of four others, the EPA has no clearly mandated priorities, no way of allocating scarce resources among different statutes or among programs within a single law. Nor does the EPA have a congressional charter, common to most federal departments and agencies, defining its broad organizational mission and priorities.... Congress has shown little inclination to provide the EPA with a charter or mandated priorities, in good part because the debate sure to arise on the relative merit and urgency of different environmental problems is an invitation to a political bloodletting most legislators would gladly avoid. Intense controversy would be likely among states, partisans of different ecological issues, and regulated interests over which problems to emphasize; the resulting political brawl would upset existing policy coalitions that themselves were fashioned with great difficulty. Moreover, setting priorities invites a prolonged, bitter debate over an intensely emotional issue: should the primary objective of environmental protection be to reduce public risks associated with environmental degradation as much as seems practical or—as many environmentalists fervently believe—is the goal to eliminate all significant forms of pollution altogether?18 Environmental justice inevitably enlarges this challenge of missing priorities, and for similar reasons. As noted earlier, the movement is a delicate coalition of local and ethnic concerns unable to narrow its grievances for fear of a similar "political bloodletting."1? Overt de-emphasis or removal of any issue or claim would prompt the affected coalition members (for example, groups, communities, or tribes) to disrupt or depart it. And chances are they would not leave quietly but with evident resentment and perhaps accusatory rhetoric directed at the persons and organizations remaining. Real priority-setting runs contrary to radical egalitarian value premises, and no one (perhaps least of all a strong democratizer) wants to be deemed a victimizer. Therefore movement rhetoric argues that no community should be harmed and that all community concerns and grievances deserve redress. Scholar-activist Robert Bullard proposes that "the solution to unequal protection lies in the realm of environmental justice for all Americans. No community, rich or poor, black or white, should be allowed to become a 'sacrifice zone."20 When pressed about the need for environmental risk priorities, and about how to incorporate environmental justice into priority setting, Bullard's answer is a vague plea for nondiscrimination, along with a barely more specific call for a "federal 'fair environmental protection act™ that would transform "protection from a privilege to a right."21 Bullard's position is fanciful and self-contradictory, but extremely telling. He argues essentially that the way to establish environmental priorities is precisely by guaranteeing that such priorities are impossible to implement. This is symptomatic of a movement for which untrammeled citizen voice and overall social equity are cardinal values. Bullard's position also epitomizes the desire of movement intellectuals to avoid speaking difficult truths (at least in public) to their allies and constituents. Ironically, in matters of health and risk, environmental justice poses a potentially serious, if generally unrecognized, danger to the minority and low-income communities it aspires to help. By discouraging citizens from thinking in terms of health and risk priorities (that is, by taking the position, in effect, that every chemical or site against which community outrage can be generated is equally hazardous), environmental justice can deflect attention from serious hazards to less serious or perhaps trivial ones.

#### /affirming the topic DECREASES the conditions they describe—their a priori fatalism DISTANCES us from the ability to challenge technocratic forces

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

### 1nc perceptibility k

#### The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost. Conservatives and Liberals are now two sides of the same coin, and any movement that actually promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—rejecting politics is the only political act

**The Invisible Committee, 7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the Tarnac Nine by the French police), http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection\_english.pdf]

Whatever angle you look at it from, there's no escape from the present. That's not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà 4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which made no demands, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is purely political about this resolute negation of politics, and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. There’s no social solution to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather too evaporated for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

#### The 1ac presents a rhetorical device known as an agony tale, where they highlight marginalization in real, specific instances to elicit affective response. This unwittingly reinforces worldviews that render mundane prejudice and privilege invisible. Vote neg to universalize the praxis of the 1ac absent the particular tale

**Fan, ‘97** [Copyright (c) 1997 The Columbia Law Review Columbia Law Review **May,** 1997 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1202 LENGTH**:** 17247 words SYMPOSIUM: TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW: UNSCRAMBLING THE SIGNALS, UNBUNDLING THE LAW: NOTE: IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE PROMISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY: OPENING THE ACADEMY TO THE VOICES OF ALIENS AND IMMIGRANTS NAME: Stephen Shie-Wei Fan]

While the narratives of all critical race theorists bear the same purpose of bringing to the surface the perceptions of those outside of the societal mainstream, these narratives present themselves in a number of different formats. The most well-known narratives of critical race theorists fall into two primary types: the "agony tale" and the "counterstory." [n51](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n51) 1. Agony Tales. - The agony tale is often described as a "first-person account, usually of some outrage the author suffered," [n52](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n52) although these tales may also encompass experiences related by legal writers on behalf of [\*1213] third parties. [n53](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n53) While such narratives usually do not rise to the level of severity suggested by their name, they nevertheless describe occurrences that sufficiently deviate from socially-accepted norms to elicit disapproval, if not outright anger. Patricia Williams's "Benetton story" typifies the agony tale: I was shopping in Soho and saw in a store window a sweater that I wanted to buy for my mother. I pressed my round brown face to the window and my finger to the buzzer, seeking admittance. A narrow-eyed, white teenager wearing running shoes and feasting on bubble gum glared out, evaluating me for signs that would pit me against the limits of his social understanding. After about five seconds, he mouthed "We're closed," and blew pink rubber at me. It was two Saturdays before Christmas, at one o'clock in the afternoon; there were several white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for things for their mothers. I was enraged... In the flicker of his judgmental gray eyes, that saleschild had transformed my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to a shambles. He snuffed my sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there was nothing I could do to snuff his ... [n54](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n54) Agony tales are often embraced by their readers for being "so poignant, so moving, so authentic, so true. [Readers] accept them immediately and call them poetic and soulful" [n55](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n55) by virtue of their immediate and vivid format. It is **precisely because** the subject matter of agony tales is frequently shocking that the tales can be accepted so completely: [n56](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n56) overt and obvious racial discrimination elicits easy empathy. [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n57) **Such discrimination fits comfortably into a majoritarian world view** [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n58) in which discrimination still [\*1214] exists, but only **in lingering, discrete, and highly specific harms to individuals**, [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n59) which civil rights jurisprudence seeks to cure, at least whenever such discrimination falls within the purview of the law's corrective scope. [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n60) The generally receptive reactions that greet this variety of agony tale often **belie the very problems** which, from the point of view of critical race theorists, pervade a societal understanding of race and race relations in the United States. Delgado has noted that an article of his - the subject matter of which rendered it in "some respects ... a classic agony tale" [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n61) - garnered expressions of sympathy from the academy**, but little substantive suppor**t, precisely because it underscored, by contradistinction, the cherished order and sanctity of the American legal system: [Law professors] could empathize with the black subjected to the vicious racial slur. They could say how terrible it is that our legal system doesn't provide redress. They sincerely felt that way. Indeed, I think it allowed them to say to themselves how much they loved the First Amendment. They loved it so much that they had to sacrifice these unfortunate Negroes and Mexicans, for which they were genuinely sorry and apologetic. [n62](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1300206295142&returnToKey=20_T11483180202&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.136740.08629164268" \l "n62) Though frequently graphic enough to elicit genuine outrage, the agony tale often **fails** to go beyond merely engendering a passive sense of identification from sympathetic listeners.

#### To make micropolitics visible is to coopt it by giving resistance an object – this understanding allows resistance to be framed, to be declared a failure and prevents the immanence of imperceptible politics from coalescing around mundane practices of existence

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In this sense imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc. And indeed imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are three dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness, totality, trust. Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion, etc). Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations. The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements, for example - it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of imperceptible politics; it is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.

### 1nc framework interp

#### A. Interpretation—the aff should defend topical action based on the resolution

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the **broad topic** of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. **Vague understanding** results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education **without** finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by **focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Vote neg—

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the question post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### 2. Educational testing—debate is a unique game space that’s distinct from public speaking OR policymaking—the purpose of topicality is to create a balance of ground—the alternative is de facto monologue

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Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which **the teacher never learns anything new** from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth **instructs someone** who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Policy simulation is good because it’s a game—unlocks freedom to strategically experiment—empirically more effective than airing out your personal perspective

**Eijkman 12**

The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development: Implications for Practice / Dr. Henk Simon Eijkman. [electronic resource] <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf>. Dr Henk Eijkman is currently an independent consultant as well as visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is Visiting Professor of Academic Development, Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering and Technology in India. As a sociologist he developed an active interest in tertiary learning and teaching with a focus on socially inclusive innovation and culture change. He has taught at various institutions in the social sciences and his work as an adult learning specialist has taken him to South Africa, Malaysia, Palestine, and India. He publishes widely in international journals, serves on Conference Committees and editorial boards of edited books and international journal

Policy simulations stimulate Creativity

Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction

#### The impact outweighs—deliberative debate models impart skills vital to respond to existential threats

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### This card is really long and makes a bunch of arguments, so bear with me—

#### Their K of democratic deliberation rests on the assumptions they criticize—for instance, the case for structural antagonism or the impossibility of consensus presupposes that rational argument is possible. Our framework energizes the arena for interdependent reasoning—we do this by defending consensus is possible, but fallible. This means using the resolution to affirm the debate-to-be-had that is this topic—the point is not to settle which way of debating is objectively best, but to use provisional rules for reciprocal clash—that process of dialogism uniquely activates critical thinking and reflexivity

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THE arguments advanced in Chantal Mouffe's The Democratic Paradox represent a sustained attack on deliberative accounts of democracy.1 In this article I suggest that, contrary to Mouffe's claims, her model is compatible with and indeed presupposes a deliberative framework. I argue first that Mouffe's agonistic alternative to deliberation is reliant for its coherence on the notion of rational consensus, which at the same time constitutes the main target of her critique of deliberative democracy. While reliant on that notion, she is barred from using it because of her objections to it. The second stage of my evaluation of Mouffe's case therefore consists in a rehabilitation of deliberative notions of consensus against Mouffe's objections. I show how each of these obstacles can be overcome by a deliberative theory. In the process I relate the postmodern concerns, which underpin Mouffe's agonistic approach, to deliberative theory. I then show how Mouffe's model may be seen as coherent within a deliberative framework.

I. MOUFFE'S RELIANCE ON CONSENSUS

The first point to make about Mouffe's argument in The Democratic Paradox is that it promotes a single, universal characterisation of the political. The terrain of the political is portrayed as constituted through power, making antagonism ‘ineradicable’ (DP, p. 104). This is a universal claim about the political. Moreover, Mouffe seeks to establish the acceptability of these claims by giving reasons. This implies that she assumes that it is possible to establish such a universal model of politics through rational argument. This is precisely what she criticises deliberative theorists for.

Of course, the content of the model for which Mouffe seeks rational acceptance is portrayed as very different to a deliberative approach (DP, p. 102). In particular, it accepts the inevitability of antagonism, seeks to convert this into adversarial contest, and rejects the possibility of ever reaching consensus. Agreements are always contingent assertions of hegemonic power that necessarily exclude and are therefore unstable.2 However, Mouffe does not believe that politics should be left as merely the interplay of differences within this domain of power.

Firstly, Mouffe argues that there should be common adherence to – consensus on – at least minimal ‘ethico-political’ principles of democracy. She is rather vague about what these principles might be, although specifying ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ as among them (DP, p. 102). Of course this could hardly be otherwise: her theory is a theory of democracy, so there must be some shared version of democracy for individuals to adhere to, and for the theory to defend. Mouffe immediately qualifies this constraint by arguing that there will be many different accounts of how these minimal principles might be applied and pursued, and that there should be no limitations on competition between opposing versions (DP, p. 103). Nevertheless, Mouffe still owes an explanation of how there can be such a consensus in the first place, of what such a consensus might consist, why it should be privileged over other versions of the political – for example, oligarchy, or dictatorship – and how this might be justified without recourse to some form of rational argument akin to that deployed by deliberative theorists.

Although less clear, it is also apparent that Mouffe requires all participants in her preferred adversarial mode of interaction to abide by a further set of principles: a mutual respect for beliefs, and the right to defend them (DP, pp. 102–103). Given that she contrasts such exchange with more aggressive antagonistic conflict (DP, p. 102), this suggests at least some overlap with the principles of equal respect and autonomy underlying a deliberative approach. Nevertheless, on this characterisation the fit with deliberation is not complete. **It is possible to argue that** other **forms of interaction short of violence, such as** bargaining, **negotiation** and trading between different interests, **show respect for others’ beliefs and their right to defend them, and fall short of ‘annihilation’** or violence.

However, Mouffe adds a further qualification to the ‘free-play’ of differences that other theories permit. She argues that it should be possible to identify, condemn and act against relations of subordination or domination (DP, pp. 19–21). It would seem therefore that we should interpret her description of adversarial relations, and in particular the principle of respect for the right of others to defend their beliefs, in light of this further stipulation. So where relations of subordination restrict a person's ability to defend their beliefs, those relations should be opposed. If we read these two principles – of respect for belief and opposition to subordination – together, then Mouffe's model does appear to be privileging the kind of open fair exchange of reasons between equals that deliberative theorists promote. Not only do these dimensions of Mouffe's formula constitute further examples of consensus that can be reached in principle and by rational means (since Mouffe uses arguments to motivate our acceptance of them), but the content of that formula looks remarkably like the method for reaching collective decisions through a procedure for rational discussion that deliberative theorists support.

An insistence on the need to distinguish and combat relations of subordination is necessary for any theory to have critical bite. What does and what does not amount to oppression, and what should or should not be condemned, must then be gauged by reference to some sort of standard. However, Mouffe would seem to assume that we already all have access to such shared standards, or at very least that it is possible to establish them. Again, this marks her acceptance of another form of consensus – as she herself acknowledges (DP, p. 134). Furthermore, if that consensus is not to be biased against a particular group in society, it is difficult to see how the mechanism for reaching it can be other than a rational discussion. To argue otherwise would be to perpetuate the imposition of a hegemonic, partial and exclusive viewpoint – the exercise of power – that Mouffe is arguing against. So here Mouffe's theory requires the possibility, at least, of a rational consensus not merely on procedural matters that frame democratic exchange, but also on the substance or outputs of that process – practical political decisions. While she presents this as a small exception to her thesis in The Democratic Paradox, it would seem to be pretty much all-embracing. Having described politics as defined by the exercise of power, her theory turns out to admit of the possibility of rational consensus on matters of power – in other words, on any aspect of the subject matter of politics.

From all this we can conclude that Mouffe's alternative is firstly grounded in a universal account of the political and the democratic which she wishes us to accept on the basis of the rational arguments she advances in The Democratic Paradox. Since it is a defence of democracy, this model assumes further consensus on the values of liberty and equality, which are to be interpreted as incorporating respect for others’ beliefs and their right to defend them. Mouffe also argues that it is to incorporate an opposition to relations of oppression or subordination. Mouffe sees the purpose of political action as the identification of such oppression and subordination, and the organisation of collective action against it. This implies a deliberative mechanism of fair and equal exchange of reasons between all affected as the standard of legitimacy for political decisions, if decisions are not to reproduce the relations of subordination that Mouffe wishes to combat.

So it would seem that Mouffe's own agonistic alternative to deliberative democracy, designed to counter the impossibility of rational consensus, is itself reliant on that very notion. Without it, it is neither a theory of democracy (as opposed to a mere description of the domain of politics) nor a critical theory allowing for collective action against oppression and subordination. Yet Mouffe is now faced with a dilemma. The very reason for advocating her alternative was the impossibility of the notion of rational consensus, and she has offered detailed arguments to show how rational consensus was impossible. However, it now turns out that her alternative relies on the notion of rational consensus that she has rejected. Either she must abandon her alternative altogether, or she must rehabilitate the notion of rational consensus, and with it the idea of deliberative democracy that she has criticised. I will explore the second option.

II. REHABILITATION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Mouffe's objection to deliberative democracy is that it is founded on a notion of rational consensus that is not only empirically, but conceptually impossible to realise. Because of this, it is untenable that any one theory of democracy should be preferred over others on purely rational grounds, and within a democracy it is impossible to reach neutral agreement on what would be in the best interests of the collectivity. In this section I will defend deliberative democracy against these charges, showing that Mouffe's criticisms do not establish that rational consensus is conceptually impossible. It may be very difficult to achieve, but this does not undermine its utility as a goal at which we should aim. In mounting this defence I will initially concentrate on one of the two perspectives from which Mouffe launches her attack – that grounded in a Wittgensteinian theory of language. This defence will also demonstrate the similarities between that theory and a deliberative theory of rational consensus.3 These arguments can then be extended to deal with Mouffe's second line of criticism from linguistic deconstruction.

A. Wittgenstein

Mouffe explicitly identifies two sources on whose interpretation of Wittgenstein she draws in criticising deliberative democracy. They are Hannah Pitkin, in her work Wittgenstein and Justice, and James Tully.4 To do justice to Mouffe's argument, I will stick to the version of Wittgenstein advanced by these two commentators.

In arguing against the possibility of rational consensus, Mouffe uses three key Wittgenstinian concepts: the idea that general terms in language are learned through ‘practice’ and not through the application of a conceptual scheme to particular cases; that such practice is grounded in specific ‘forms of life’; and that forms of life are not susceptible of simple classification or description in the form of rules (DP, pp. 70–1). Using the sources above, I will take a closer look at these concepts, to show that it is indeed possible to reconcile such notions with the possibility of a rational consensus reached through deliberation.

As Pitkin explains, Wittgenstein's version of language suggests that we learn terms through practice. The traditional account of language learning views it as the process of associating a term, for example a name, with a particular object or picture of that object in our heads. We can then apply that name when we encounter the object again. We associate a definition with that name, and it becomes a label for the object.5 While language can be learned and used in this way, Wittgenstein argues that this is a very limited account, which only explains a small section of what we use language to do. What about learning the words ‘trust’, ‘spinster’ or ‘envy’?6 He therefore develops a more comprehensive account of language learning which sees it as a particular practice. We learn to use a particular phrase in a particular context. Having heard its use in a context before, we hear it repeated in similar circumstances. We therefore learn to associate it with aspects of those circumstances, and to reproduce and use it in those circumstances for ourselves. So, for example, the (polite!) child learns that “Please may I have the marmalade?” results in the person who uttered it being passed the marmalade. They make the same sounds, and they are themselves passed the marmalade. They later learn that “Please may I have the jam?” leads to their being passed the jam. Finally, they understand that “Please may I have x?” will lead to their being given whatever they choose to substitute for x. This example is helpful because it shows how the meaning of a word can be refined through its use. It may be that a child initially only associates “Please may I have . . .” with marmalade. It is only when the same words are used to elicit the passing of another object – in our example, jam – that they associate it with that other object, and then eventually, after several iterations, with any object. This process may also involve them using the phrase, and projecting it into new contexts of their own. It may also, of course, involve them making mistakes, which are then corrected.

Because words are developed

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through repeated use in this way, they rarely have settled meanings. By applying them to new contexts, we can use them to focus on different aspects of meaning. Pitkin suggests the example of ‘feed the monkey’ and ‘feed the meter’.7 Prior to such application, however, we may only have had a vague idea of the word's meaning, gathered through past usage. In most, if not all, cases this process is ongoing. So words are learned through a kind of ‘training’ or ‘practice’, and learning or understanding a word is an activity that involves using the word in the correct situation. It is not a case of applying a clear-cut rule to a definite situation.8

Because words develop through practices and their use in particular situations, and in many cases we continue to develop their meaning through such use, very rarely will a term have a single, fixed meaning. Rather, Wittgenstein argues, the different situations in which such a general term is used are like separate language games. Just like moves in a game, words that have meaning when used in one situation may be meaningless when used in another. For example, we cannot talk of ‘checking the King’ in football. While there are connections between games, they are linked like members of a family: some share the same colour eyes, others the same shape of nose, others the same colour hair, but no two members have all the same features.9 Wittgenstein also uses the analogy of an historic city to show how language builds up. While some areas may be uniform, many have been added to higgledy-piggledy, with no clear pattern over how streets are laid out, or which run into which.10 Wittgenstein therefore argues that it is impossible to assimilate the operation of all language to a single model, such as the ‘picture theory’ or label model of meaning. Different language games have different rules, and we can only discover these by investigating particular practices of use in specific cases.11

However, Wittgenstein concedes that there must be some kind of regularity to our use of words. Without some form of consistency, we could not know that our use of a word in a new context was supposed to indicate or evoke a similar context in which the word had been used in the past. That words do so, Wittgenstein argues, is due to their basis in activity– they are used by us in certain situations – and that such use is grounded ultimately in activities that are shared by groups of us, or all of us. Cavell sums this up well when he says:

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place, just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’.12

These forms of life are not so much constituted by, but constitute, language. They serve as its ‘ground’. Therefore, although the process of explaining a term, and of reasoning in language, may continue up to a point, it will always come to an end and have to confront simple agreement in activity, ways of going on, or forms of life.

Mouffe sees this account as ruling out the possibility of rational consensus. Following Tully, she argues that the fact that arguments are grounded in agreement in forms of life, which constitute a form of practice marking the end point of explanation or reasons, means that all attempts at rational argument must contain an irrational, practical element.13 Neither is it possible to suggest, as she accuses Peter Winch of doing, that we can see forms of life as some underlying regularity, which argument or reasoning can then make explicit. Again with Tully, she contends that the ‘family resemblance’ or ‘historic city’ analogy for the development of language shows it to be far too varied and idiosyncratic for such an account.14

Yet I would like to argue that Wittgenstein's theory as characterised above does not rule out rational argument, and the possibility of consensus, at least in principle. Wittgenstein himself characterises the offering of reasons as a kind of ‘explanation’. This much is granted by Tully.15 Explanations are requested by someone unfamiliar with a practice, who would like to understand that practice. Wittgenstein sees this as a completely legitimate use of language and reason.16 This is not surprising, as this process of explanation is precisely the form of language learning that he sets out. A person uses a term based on their understanding of its use from their past experiences. This projection either meets with the predicted response, or a different one. If the latter, the person modifies their understanding of the term. It is only when we go further, and assume that there can be an explanation for every kind of confusion, every kind of doubt, that we get into trouble.17 But this is precisely not what a deliberative theory of reasoning holds. A deliberative theory of reasoning models communicative reason – reason used to develop mutual understanding between two or more human beings. To this extent, the truths that it establishes are relative, though intersubjective. They hold, or are useful for, the collectivity that has discursively constructed them. They do not claim to be objective in an absolute sense, although the concept can be extended, in theory, to cover all people and hence to arrive as closely as possible to the notion of an absolute.

The process that Habermas calls ‘practical discourse’18 and the process that Wittgenstein calls ‘explanation’ are basically one and the same. Both are synonyms for deliberation. Habermas sees the essentially rational nature of language as the capacity for a statement to be rejected, in the simplest case with a ‘no’.19 It is with this response that the request for reasons, latent in all rational statements, is activated.20 If we widen the sense of rejection meant by Habermas beyond the paradigm case of the utterance of a ‘no’ to the broader case of a failure to elicit an expected response, we can see the similarities between Habermas’ notion of deliberation and Wittgenstein's concept of explanation. Like Wittgenstein, Habermas sees ‘normal’ language use as taking place against a backdrop of conventionally shared meanings or understandings.21 It is only when this assumption breaks down, when the response differs from what was expected, that deliberation is required. Shared understandings and usage are established anew, through a dialogical sharing of reasons, or explanations, which repairs the assumption that we do use these words in similar ways.22

But this dialogical sharing of reasons is nothing more than Wittgenstein's concept of explanation and language learning. As Tully points out, Wittgenstein's view of language is inherently dialogical. His **examples involve interlocutors who have different views** of the use of language.23 This leads to the use of a word eliciting a response that was not expected – a rejection. The rejection requires the reappraisal and refinement of our understanding of the word, based on the new information given to us about it by the unexpected reaction. Based on this adjusted understanding we use words again to try to achieve our goal. Through this process of trial and error we build up a shared vocabulary, restoring the assumption that we use these words in the same way, and in the process we understand the other's form of life that gave rise to their unexpected use. The very process of developing that understanding is the process of deliberation. Indeed, in this sense deliberation – explanation or the clarification of usage across different forms of life – can in itself be seen as the process of development of language use.

Before moving on, we should note an important feature of this process: any instance of shared understanding developed in this way will be partial. It will have emerged from particular uses tied to particular spheres of activity. It is important, therefore, that we do not stretch an understanding developed in this way too far. We must be open to its fallibility – to the possibility that new situations will open up different applications of a term, and so require further development of meaning, as we encounter others who use terms differently due to different aspects of their ‘forms of life’.24 While there may be regularities in ‘forms of life’, it is difficult to specify them a priori. They only emerge, as Wittgenstein argues, piecemeal, through the process of attempting to understand others in language. **However, the process of** explanation, or understanding through **deliberation, allows us to be open to these possibilities.** The contrast with others’ usage that this involves also makes us more clearly aware of aspects of our own usage that were previously hidden. So we can see this as an understanding developed through reason, though partial, fallible and grounded in practice.

Deliberative democracy, then, is compatible with a Wittgensteinian theory of language, which sees language as grounded in forms of life. Mouffe makes two errors that lead her to suggest it is not. The first is the assumption that because language is ultimately grounded in practice, rather than reason, it cannot be used to reach a rational consensus. However, if we read deliberative theories as mobilising a form of rationality aimed at intersubjective explanation and mutual understanding, we can see that the two accounts are perfectly compatible. The second error is to take Wittgenstein's warning that different uses of language, in different games, are so varied and diverse as to be ungovernable by rules, to rule out any possibility of reasoned communication. Here we need to understand that Wittgenstein's concept of ‘forms of life’ refers to regularities in practice that underpin language. While these do not take the form of prescriptive rules, they can still be discovered through language and the process of explanation. Indeed, this is an important purpose of language. Seen in this way, Wittgenstein's thought shows how reason, or explanation, works to bring out emergent, partial, but shared understandings grounded in people's own, but different, experiences. The partial nature of such understandings also emphasises the need to regard them as fallible and open to challenge and revision when new situations are encountered. However, this does not in principle preclude the use of reason to reach consensus. Moreover, the partiality of such understandings can only be understood against a conception of complete or comprehensive agreement. This is exactly what deliberative theory proposes. These insights will now be used to defend deliberation against the second, deconstructionist, set of arguments that Mouffe musters.

B. Deconstruction

Mouffe also uses Derrida's notions of differance and the ‘constitutive other’25 to argue that any form of consensus must always be partial and biased against a group that it excludes, while necessarily unstable as it contains the traces of this power. This precludes the very idea of a consensus that is neutral because it is reached on rational grounds.26

However, using our enhanced understanding of deliberation we can see how such an argument is flawed. While consensus through rational argument cannot be guaranteed, it cannot be ruled out either. The only way to find out whether it is possible or not is through argument. In addition, **that process of reasoning**, or explanation, **is itself a process in which we are made more aware of difference**, through the projection of language to describe others’ forms of life. Without this attempt, we may never become aware of these different forms of meaning, or their associated forms of life. **So, far from hiding difference by imposing one group's biased** or partial **interpretation** on all, **deliberation opens up** and exposes **such uses of power, making clear these divisions, and allowing for collective** agreement and collective **action to change oppressive practices**.

Another way of characterising this process is to see it as the activity of questioning. Questioning allows those from one form of life to understand those from another, by showing how their interlocutors’ understanding is different from their own. The importance of this activity for deliberation lies in the fallibilistic nature of consensus in deliberative theory, which allows for any consensus that is reached rationally to remain open to question. Such openness guards against the kind of hegemonic claims that concern Mouffe.27 This allows for sufficient stability through agreement, since challenges must be reasoned challenges, without atrophy. Moreover, the development of understanding through questioning/reasoning will relate the partial understandings or practices from whose dialectic it emerges. This reduces the potential for ongoing exclusion through, for example, a ‘tit-for-tat’ exchange in which ex-oppressors become the oppressed.

The fallibilistic and partial nature of deliberation or explanation also secures it against Mouffe's use of the Derridean concept of undecidability.28 This trades on the limitations of human foresight to argue that every element of decision must actually contain an element of unpredictability or risk. Mouffe infers from this that consensus must always be irrational (DP, pp. 135–6). However, once again we can pray in aid the fallibilistic, defeasible nature of reason. New events that were not foreseen will not be covered by the language that we have attempted to extend to govern our future actions. This leads to a need to revise such language to arrive at a more comprehensive description that will be more adequate. As we have seen, reasoned argument is well equipped to do this. So while all decisions may well contain an irreducible element of ‘undecidability’ in Derrida's sense, this does not make decisions irrational, nor does it rule out the possibility of rational consensus through deliberation.

Finally amongst Mouffe's deconstructionist arguments against deliberation we have her use of Lacan. She deploy's Lacan's notion of the ‘master signifier’29– a set of unquestioned assumptions that form the frame for any discourse – to illustrate that all discourses must be conditioned by authority. This gives her yet another reason why the idea of neutral rational consensus, free from power, is conceptually flawed (DP, pp. 137–8).

The defeasibility of deliberation, and its privileging of questions, again serves to turn Mouffe's point. While many, perhaps all, exchanges are indeed conditioned by a set of underlying assumptions that are not questioned, or of which we are dimly aware, such assumptions are in principle open to being questioned. Otherwise they would not be assumptions. The fact that Lacan can identify such assumptions, means that it is possible to do so, and thereby to expose them to questioning. While this might not happen in a particular exchange, this may well open up over time, or across discourses. Such questioning then serves as precisely the sort of critical standard that Lacan and Mouffe seek to provide. Their endeavours are therefore not invalid, but gain their validity from within, and not outside, a deliberative framework of rational argument aimed at mutual understanding. Without such an ideal their critical projects founder, just as much as deliberation's.

III. CONCLUSION

Mouffe believes in a consensus that distinguishes and opposes oppressive uses of power, seeing the purpose of politics as collective action towards its eradication. This consensus is based on shared norms of reciprocity and equality in the exchange of reasons or explanations. And she argues for this consensus using reasons. In all these senses, her agonistic theory of democracy can be seen to be deliberative. However, we could equally argue that deliberation, and rational consensus, can be seen as agonistic. Deliberation is equivalent to the Wittgensteinian process of explanation and language learning. The understandings reached through either process are partial and defeasible, formed from an encounter with difference. In this sense, there is always the risk of an agreement or consensus resulting in the erroneous projection of one party's understandings onto another, constraining their meanings – it is fraught with the possibility of hegemony. We must guard against such hegemonic tendencies by remaining open to every possibility of their exercise, holding discourses up to careful scrutiny of the language and assumptions that might underlie them. Not only will this help resist power, it will also assist in building deeper and better understanding, or more rational consensus. So we can see that the two processes of deliberative and agonistic democracy – one grounded in critical theory and the other in postmodernism, are in fact mutually dependent aspects of a solution to the same problem.

## 2nc

### personal narrative

#### This argument is the link—the injunction to perform paints a target on radical subjectivities – it also assumes there IS a public space hospitable to unspoken identities which is what we criticize – independent voter

**Vila ‘5**, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Texas at San Antonio, 2005 [Pablo, "Border Ethnographies," *Ethnography at the Border*, Ed. Pablo Vila, p. xxviii-xxxiii]

At the same time, some of the problems related to the intertwining of the ethnographic account with the personal experience of the ethnographer do not escape the most important practitioners of the genre, because "to assert that one is a 'white middle-class woman' or a 'black gay man' or a 'working-class Latina' within one's study of Shakespeare or Santería is only interesting if one is able to draw deeper connections between one's personal experience and the subject under study" (Behar 1996, 13). Being in total agreement with the points being made by Marcus, Behar, and the like, I still consider these kinds of statements problematic regarding how power works in academia in particular and in the real world in general. As I pointed out, anytime I attempted the personal narrative route, **I frequently had to abort my narratives** because **I constantly encountered things I couldn't say or didn't want to disclose** about myself to make sense of the "affinities between the ethnographer and the subject of study," which Marcus claims are behind the "most interesting research proposals." In other words, being somehow keenly aware (the "keen" in Behar's account [1996, 13-14] is quite problematic as well) of what aspects of myself were the most important filters through which I perceived the world and, more particularly, the topic being studied, I still couldn't make those connections for basic reasons of personal and academic survival.

Therefore if on the one hand most of the contributors to this collection were surely motivated in their research by important personal reasons, some of us could not or did not want to reveal some of them because they were dangerous for our current career stages, personal lives, prestiges, immigration statuses, or a combination thereof. I can offer dozens of real or imagined "affinities" that, if disclosed, could be essential to understanding not only the motivation of particular research projects but also their most important substantive findings, methodological usages, epistemological presuppositions, and the like. But if they were revealed, they would probably have ruined the careers and lives of those involved. If we push the argument to its limits, we can more clearly see the problems involved in this kind of position. For instance, what about the "projection of these affinities from the realm of the more personal to the delineation of more generic social-cultural problems and issues," or the connection "intellectual and emotional, between the observer and the observed," for the full-time anthropologist, former member of a Central American guerrilla movement, who decides to do an ethnography on the Chiapas uprising? If a contributor to this collection were such a former guerrilla member, wouldn't this type of "affinity" or "connection" have "enlightened" our understanding of the Chiapas insurrection? Let's consider another fictitious possibility: what would have been the case if the research project were about drug use and commerce on the border; wouldn't the connection between the personal and the research topic done by the ethnographer who is also a recreational drug user help us to understand the subject much better? The same can be said about the sociologist who is an alcoholic and alcohol consumption on the border. Of course nobody involved in this collection is a former Central American guerrilla member, a drug user, or a current alcoholic, but at least a couple of us have what can be called "still or not-yet-legitimized weird/deviant/not-totally legal identities considering our career stages," and almost all of us have some identities that, for different reasons, we do not want to disclose or connect with our research agendas. Obviously the connections are there, and their disclosure would doubtless contribute to understanding our findings, but for the time being we are not able or willing to come out of the closet with them. If you agree with Behar's argument, as I do, that the "exposure of the self who is also a spectator has to take us somewhere we couldn't otherwise go to. It has to be essential to the argument, not a decorative flourish, not exposure for its own sake" (1996, 14), you really suffer when you read the published research of people you know. Why is this so? Because you realize that if the ethnographers had made (but cannot for the reasons I am exposing here) the proper connections between their lives and their work, the research would have had many more layers than it already has. In other words, you know that such connections are essential for a full understanding of their work, but you also know that you have to keep those connections private. A couple of examples may suffice to illustrate my point. I was at pains reading the wonderful ethnography of a Peruvian colleague, who all the time had to use euphemisms (and sometimes plain lies), or erase the issue altogether from her ethnography, to avoid accounting for the process of adoption of her son from a poor Peruvian family because the legal papers for the boy had not yet arrived when she published her work. That is, her son was still living illegally in the United States, and the account of the adoption process, quite central to the understanding of some aspects of everyday life in the Andean villages of Peru, would have revealed that status, something my Peruvian friend could not afford. Or what about the various ethnographic accounts of female employment in the assembly plants in the Middle East done by young feminist scholars whom you know are lesbians but, because they are in the early stages of their academic careers (some of them in very conservative states and universities), cannot afford to display that identity in their work? Knowing their sexual orientation, you understand many things about their work better, and you can easily find the "affinities between the ethnographer and the subject of study" that Marcus claims are behind the "most interesting research proposals," but those affinities are not open to the public for basic issues of academic (and sometimes personal) survival. I can advance a dozen different examples in the same direction, showing how the postmodern claim we are discussing here and advanced by people such as Marcus, Behar, and the like comes from a particular subject position that, for obvious reasons of power, cannot see that others cannot follow its steps. In other words, they are performing the same "God trick" (Haraway 1988) they so fiercely criticize about the academic "other." Consequently Ruth Behar can claim without any problem that "since I have put myself in the ethnographic picture, readers feel they have come to know me. They have poured their own feelings into their construction of me and in that way come to identify with me, or at least their fictional image of who I am" (1996, 16), because the "disclosure about herself" is the one she performed in Translated Woman, in which, for instance, she relates her experience of getting tenure at Michigan with Esperanza's (the Mexican street peddler) story. In that account, her double persona as both Cuban and Jewish is important to her epistemological reflection about what kind of story she is telling about Esperanza. But what could have happened with my fictional Central American former guerrilla member, current drug user, or alcoholic turned anthropologist (or vice versa) disclosing that part of her or his multiple persona to allow readers to connect their own experiences? And if "when you write vulnerably, others respond vulnerably" (Behar 1996, 16), can we expect a string of confessions from other former guerrilla members currently living in the United States, drug users or alcoholics reading and being moved by my fictitious characters' book? That is the reason why I have claimed that **we are dealing with something like "mainstream deviant subject positions"** or "now allowed but previously deviant subject positions" from which it is permitted to make connections between personal lives and research projects **versus "still not allowed subversive/deviant subject positions" from which it is not possible to do so** .

. . yet? And this difference between subject positions is not fixed but is related to stages in the academic careers of those involved, in such a way that some "subversive/deviant subject positions" can become "mainstream" once the person moves from one stage to the other (the lesbian scholars in my account are a good example of this possibility: Janet Smith, assistant professor at Cincinnati State, cannot connect her personal life as Gloria Anzaldúa does). Simultaneously, some "deviant nonmainstream subject positions" can become mainstream or are allowed to come out of the closet when the people who occupy them get enough power in academia to request a voice (Steve Seidman, the renowned gay professor at SUNY–Albany, can connect his sexual orientation with his research in a way that John Smith, the still-free drug-using assistant professor at Wyoming State, cannot). This fact, of course, does not escape the advocates of the "subjective connection" perspective, **but I still think that they do not fully understand the consequences of their proposals.** Consider the case of Ruth Behar, who totally acknowledges the dangerous effects of publicly connecting some particular "still today deviant behaviors" with a research agenda. She quotes the work of Kay Redfield Jamison (1995, 7) in that regard: I have had many concerns about writing a book that so explicitly describes my own attacks of mania, depression, and psychosis, as well as my problems acknowledging the need for ongoing medication.... I have no idea what the long-term effects of discussing such issues so openly will be on my personal and professional life but, whatever the consequences, they are bound to be better than continuing to be silent. I am tired of hiding, tired of misspent and knotted energies, tired of the hypocrisy, and tired of acting as though I have something to hide. The problem that I think escapes both Behar and Jamison is that the latter can be "tired" of all those things precisely because she is "an established professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, who co-authored a standard medical text on manic-depressive illness" (Behar 1996, 9). My point is that **less-established scholars cannot have the luxury of being tired of the same things that compelled Jamison to reveal her own "deviancy."** However, being aware of the other reasons why Jamison can disclose her "deviancy," that her illness has lately lost much of its "deviant" character (that is, moved from "still deviant" to "no-more or at least less-deviant behavior"), Behar still does not realize the implications of her analysis to those other ethnographers who still have some kind of "not yet out of shame deviant behavior": One of my colleagues, a medical anthropologist, tells me that the main reason Jamison is able to make herself so vulnerable at this moment in time is because of advances in the field of biochemistry, which have led to new understandings of the biochemical roots of depression, making it possible to control the illness through medical supervision and drugs. Science, in other words, has drained the shame out of depression. (Behar 1996, 11) Either because "science" or the struggles of the bearers of a particular subject position have "drained the shame out of" a particular illness, behavior, habit, or identity, the question remains the same: what are the possibilities of using the "existing affinities between the ethnographer and the subject of study" to improve a research design for ethnographers who "still" have "not yet authorized deviant subject positions"? For all these reasons, it sounds problematic when Ruth Behar claims that "vulnerability, in short, is here to stay. Critics can keep dismissing these trends as forms of 'solipsism,' but a lot of us are going to continue wearing our hearts on our sleeves" (1996, 32), because she can wear her Jewishness, Cubanness, family history, and the like on her sleeve, something other ethnographers, bearers of what I have called "not yet allowed subject positions," cannot do without putting in jeopardy either their careers or even their freedom and their lives. **Therefore when she is talking about "vulnerability," she is talking about a narrow version of it, namely, the kind of vulnerability that the status quo allows to appear without major punishment**, that is, the vulnerability of settled scholars who have mainstream subject positions (deviant or not) and can intertwine them with their ethnographies.

#### Authenticity tests shut down debate—turns case and proves they turn dialogue into lecture

**Subotnik 1998** – professor of law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 681)

Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but that **the minority scholar** himself or herself hurts and hurts badly.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by **effectively precluding objection**, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti [\*695] cles. n76 Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition. n77

 [\*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of **open and structured conversation** with others. n78

 [\*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues raised by Williams are too important in their implications  [\*698]  for American life to be confined to communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

### at: topical version write out black labor

#### Knowledge from personal experience reifies privilege by assuming someone can have epistemic entitlement to see reality better than us

**Parrish ’11** Jesse, student commenter on Victor Reppert’s blog Dangerous Idea, devoted to exploring biases in argumentation, August http://dangerousidea.blogspot.com/2011/08/sltf.html

I think that **whenever we are looking to calibrate the effect of evidence on probability, we should rely first and foremost on `public knowledge', but there is theoretical room for differences, including legitimate differences in intuitions**. Trivially, my confidence in the contents of a first-hand testimony may be less than the person who is providing the testimony. Is it that I am more of an `outsider' than that person? Is it that I am more `objective'? Not necessarily. Our critical faculties may all be functioning perfectly well, and we may still have legitimate differences in credence. There are cases where we trust `outsiders' more than `insiders', say whenever we are investigating the claims of homeopaths. But this is not an intrinsically objective fact about the epistemic superiority of outsiders; rather, it is that we have known biases to deal with which may be partially controlled for by introducing a skeptical opinion. In the case of homeopathy, these would include placebo affects and confirmation bias. In general, the best `outsider position' is not a particular agent. The best `objective' means of controlling for biases, as employed in the sciences, is "argument amongst friends." **Barring decisive argumentation, we give each other a presumption of similar reasonableness and attempt to state the arguments at their strongest. We seek out opposing views to avoid the errors of confirmation bias. We seek to nail down *as exactly as we can* what is required for the preservation of disagreement or the arrival to consensus. We seek fervently the outlines of our opinions, and find their shortcomings. In other words, we should *never* assume that we in general have special privileges - epistemic entitlements, if you prefer - over knowledgeable peers.**

#### Side switching does not equate to speaking from nowhere or divesting yourself of social background—our argument is that if your only exposure to the topic is finding ways to critique or avoid it, then you become solely capable of preaching to the choir. Debate is unique because it gives opportunities to tactically inhabit other perspectives without enlisting in those causes for the sake of skill development and mutual testing

**Haskell 1990** – history professor at Rice University (May, Thomas, History and Theory, 29.2, “Objectivity is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream”, p. 129-157)

Detachment functions in this manner not by draining us of passion, but by helping to channel our intellectual passions in such a way as to insure collision with rival perspectives. In that collision, if anywhere, our thinking transcends both the idiosyncratic and the conventional. Detachment both socializes and deparochializes the work of intellect; it is the quality that fits an individual to participate fruitfully in what is essentially a communal enterprise. Objectivity is so much a product of social arrangements that individuals and particular opinions scarcely deserve to be called objective, yet the social arrangements that foster objectivity have no basis for existence apart from individual striving for detachment. Only insofar as the members of the community are disposed to set aside the perspective that comes most spontaneously to them, and strive to see things in a detached light, is there any likelihood that they will engage with one another mentally and provoke one another through mutual criticism to the most complete, least idiosyncratic, view that humans are capable of. When the ascetic effort at detachment fails, as it often does, we "talk past one another," producing nothing but discordant soliloquies, each fancying itself the voice of reason. The kind of thinking I would call objective leads only a fugitive existence outside of communities that enjoy a high degree of independence from the state and other external powers, and which are dedicated internally not only to detachment, but also to intense mutual criticism and to the protection of dissenting positions against the perpetual threat of majority tyranny. Some hypothetical examples may clarify what I mean by objective thinking and show how remote it is from neutrality. Consider an extreme case: the person who, although capable of detachment, suspends his or her own perceptions of the world not in the expectation of gaining a broader perspective, but only in order to learn how opponents think so as to demolish their arguments more effectively - who is, in\* short, a polemicist, deeply and fixedly committed as a lifelong project to a particular political or cultural or moral program. Anyone choosing such a life obviously risks being thought boorish or provincial, but insofar as such a person successfully enters into the thinking of his or her rivals and produces arguments potentially compelling not only to those who already share the same views, but to outsiders as well, I see no reason to withhold the laurel of objectivity. 10 There is nothing objective about hurling imprecations at apostates or catechizing the faithful, but as long as the polemicist truly engages the thinking of the enemy he or she is being as objective as anyone. In contrast, the person too enamored of his or her own interpretation of things seriously and sympathetically to entertain alternatives, even for the sake of learning how best to defeat them, fails my test of objectivity, no matter how serene and even tempered. The most common failure of objectivity is preaching to the converted, proceeding in a manner that complacently presupposes the pieties of one's own coterie and makes no effort to appreciate or appeal to the perspectives of outsiders. In contrast, the most commonly observed fulfillment of the ideal of objectivity in the historical profession is simply the powerful argument-the text that reveals by its every twist and turn its respectful appreciation of the alternatives it rejects. Such a text attains power precisely because its author has managed to suspend momentarily his or her own perceptions so as to anticipate and take account of objections and alternative constructions -not those of some straw man, but those that truly issue from the rival's position, understood as sensitively and stated as eloquently as the rival him- or herself could desire. Nothing is rhetorically more powerful than this, and nothing, not even capitulation to the rival, could acknowledge any more vividly the force and respectability of the rival's perspective. To mount a telling attack on a position, one must first inhabit it. Those so habituated to their customary intellectual abode that they cannot even explore others can never be persuasive to anyone but fellow habitues. That is why powerful arguments are often more faithful to the complexity and fragility of historical interpretation - more faithful even to the irreducible plurality of human perspectives, when that is, in fact, the case -than texts that abjure position-taking altogether and ostentatiously wallow in displays of "reflexivity" and "undecidability." The powerful argument is the highest fruit of the kind of thinking I would call objective, and in it neutrality plays no part. Authentic objectivity has simply nothing to do with the television newscaster's mechanical gesture of allocating the same number of seconds to both sides of a question, or editorially splitting the difference between them, irrespective of their perceived merits

### at: deliberation impossible

#### Independently, breaking a NEW K AFF destroys engagement. Even if we can debate them on an undisclosed topical aff or a previously run critical aff, the combination is impossible and proves they value strategy over community.

#### The alternative is open source

**Torvalds and Diamond ‘1**

[Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); “Why Open Source Makes Sense”; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2 //nick]

It's the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the PC wasn't developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened for any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a project's development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the General Public License - the anticopyright - as the movement's powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to accept widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of Linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source expanding beyond the technical and business domains. At Harvard University Law School, professors Larry Lessig (who is now at Stanford) and Charles Nesson have brought the open source model to law. They started the Open Law Project, which relies on volunteer lawyers and law students posting opinions and research on the project's Web site to help develop arguments and briefs challenging the United States Copyright Extension Act. The theory is that the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project, and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and repostings. The site nicely sums up the trade off from the traditional approach: "**What we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument."** (Put in another context: With a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It's a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for diseases, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realise the tight-fisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system - is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, exploit it. But those improvements, changes and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and everyone. When a project is opened up, there is rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That's what we experienced with Linux. Imagine: Instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to the project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no, er, peer.

## 1nr

### Condo Good

#### says multiple tests are key to optimal knowledge with rigorous criteria—the fact that there’s no threshold for sufficiently performing or arguing against that performance proves their more interested in exhibitionism than radical change

**Sholock 12** – Chatham University

(Adale, “Methodology of the Privileged: White Anti-racist Feminism, Systematic Ignorance, and Epistemic Uncertainty”, Hypatia Volume 27, Issue 4, pages 701–714, November 2012, dml)

However, something profound happens in The Color of Fear that troubles the epistemological arrogance and self-deception that epitomize normative whiteness. David frustrates everyone to the point where Victor Lewis, an African American man in the group, finally loses his patience and lashes out in anger at David's willful ignorance. This is a climactic moment in the film and one that I find instructive to white anti-racist efforts both feminist and otherwise. Lee Mun Wah, the filmmaker and facilitator of the discussion, gently but skillfully asks David what is keeping him from believing Victor's claims about pervasive racism: “So what would it mean David, then, if life really was that harsh? What if the world was not as you thought, that [racial injustice] is actually happening to lots of human beings on this earth?” He continues, “What if he knew his reality better than you?” What then occurs is best described as a “lightbulb moment”: David says with uncharacteristic thoughtfulness, “Oh, that's very saddening. You don't want to believe that man can be so cruel to himself and his own kind.” David's comment startlingly echoes what James Baldwin has described as the double-bind of white folk: “White America remains unable to believe that Black America's grievances are real; they are unable to believe this because they cannot face what this fact says about themselves and their country” (Baldwin 1985, 536). David's newfound awareness not only challenges his self-assuredness—as Baldwin suggests—but also his very authority as a knower. In other words, David shifts from the cognitive comforts of not knowing that he doesn't know to the epistemic uncertainties of knowing that he doesn't know.

I admit that The Color of Fear has sometimes made me feel a depressing lack of confidence in the ability of the privileged (myself included) to achieve any kind of mutually reciprocal relationship with the racially and geopolitically oppressed. Yet I believe that it is more accurate to view The Color of Fear as an allegory of hope and possibility for the future of feminism without borders. Of course, it is still uncomfortable to watch The Color of Fear and recognize that I might think and act more like David than I can fully comprehend, that his ignorance is structurally related to my own, and that I will not always know better. Nevertheless, I remind myself that it is the very moment when David admits his ignorance that Victor extends the offer, “from here I can work with you.”

David and Victor's breakthrough indicates that effective coalition across racial and other power inequities might actually benefit from epistemic uncertainty among the privileged. Of course, this observation will likely unsettle whites who are conditioned to assert epistemic mastery and authority. As Pratt admits, “to acknowledge … that there are things that I do not know … [is] an admission hard on my pride, and harder to do than it sounds” (Pratt 1984, 42). However, Bernice Johnson Reagon sagely reminds us that comfort is rarely part of coalition-building, as verified by the contentious conversations in The Color of Fear. Coalition work is “some of the most dangerous work you can do. And you shouldn't look for comfort. Some people will come to a coalition and they rate the success of the coalition on whether or not they feel good when they get there” (Reagon 1983, 359). Accordingly, a methodology of the privileged might embrace the discomforts of epistemic uncertainty as an indication of effectiveness rather than failure within coalitional politics.

Perhaps more than self-reflexivity or racial sedition, epistemic uncertainty is a methodology that highlights the necessary interdependence of the privileged and the oppressed in struggles to eliminate injustice.12 For instance, when David's intellectual confidence finally wavers, he must rely upon the knowledge claims of non-whites in the group. In other words, it is only through Victor's keen understanding of racial oppression and white privilege that David recognizes his ignorance. According to Harding, in order for anti-racist and transnational solidarity to flourish, white women's reliance on insights developed by women of color feminists is “not a luxury but a necessity” (Harding 1991, 282). This methodological directive is itself evidence of the instruction Harding takes from women of color who assert that the epistemic accomplishments of the oppressed hold the key to the eradication of ignorance within feminist theory and praxis (Collins 1986; Narayan 1989; Anzaldúa, 1987; Sandoval 2000).

### AT: Inequality

#### First, Multiple measures prove a trend towards equality---this isn’t to say that everything is OK or that the status of Rubbertown is problematic but that falsifiable claims matter for assessing impacts AND that engagement can be effective

Currie 8

<http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-11-08/the-long-march-of-racial-progress/>

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Measuring racial progress is all about perspective. Since Appomattox, the struggle for racial equality has seen triumphs and setbacks alike. On balance, however, the story of race relations in America is one of extraordinary change and transformation. According to Princeton historian James McPherson, the rate of black illiteracy dropped from roughly 90 percent in 1865 to 70 percent in 1880 and to under 50 percent in 1900. “From the perspective of today, this may seem like minimal progress,” McPherson wrote in his 1991 book, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (a collection of essays). “But viewed from the standpoint of 1865 the rate of literacy for blacks increased by 200 percent in fifteen years and by 400 percent in thirty-five years.” McPherson also noted that the share of school-age black children attending school jumped from 2 percent in 1860 to 34 percent in 1880. “During the same period,” he said, “the proportion of white children of school age attending school had grown only from 60 to 62 percent.” In 1908, 100 years before the election of America’s first black president, there was a bloody race riot in Springfield, Illinois, which began when an angry mob surrounded a prison where a black man falsely accused of rape was being held. As columnist George Will has observed, “The siege of the jail, the rioting, the lynching, and mutilating all occurred within walking distance of where, in 2007, Barack Obama announced his presidential candidacy.” Over the past century, the racial attitudes of white Americans have undergone a sea change. The shift toward greater racial tolerance was driven by many factors, including blacks’ participation in World War II, the integration of professional sports and the military, and the civil rights movement. “Even as Americans were voting more conservatively in the 1980s, their views on race were becoming more liberal,” Wall Street Journal senior editor Jonathan Kaufman wrote recently. “More than three quarters of whites in 1972 told pollsters that ‘blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.’ Two-thirds of whites that same year said they opposed laws prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale of homes. Forty percent said whites had the right to live in segregated neighborhoods.” However, “By the end of 1980s, all those numbers had fallen markedly and [they] continued to fall through the following decades.” As University of Michigan sociologist Reynolds Farley points out in a new paper, there are now 41 African Americans serving in the House of Representatives, compared to only six when the Kerner Commission issued its famous report on race and poverty in 1968. During the years following the Kerner Report, “The slowly rising incomes of black men and the more rapidly rising incomes of black women produced an important economic change for African Americans,” Farley writes. “In 1996, for the first time, the majority of blacks were in the economic middle class or above, if that means living in a household with an income at least twice the poverty line.” According to Farley, “Only three percent of African Americans could be described as economically comfortable in 1968. That has increased to 17 percent at present. This is an unambiguous sign of racial progress: one black household in six could be labeled financially comfortable.” He notes that the black-white poverty gap “is much smaller now” than it was in the late 1960s. Residential and marriage trends are also encouraging. “The trend toward less residential segregation that emerged in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s continues in this century,” says Farley. Meanwhile, interracial marriage rates have increased dramatically. “At the time of the Kerner Report, about one black husband in 100 was enumerated with a white spouse. By 2006, about 14 percent of young black husbands were married to white women.”

#### Second, voting neg solves better – progress is possible but it requires a strategy – our offense turns the case

Clark, professor of law – Catholic University, ‘95

(Leroy D., 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 23)

I must now address the thesis that there has been no evolutionary progress for blacks in America. Professor Bell concludes that blacks improperly read history if we believe, as Americans in general believe, that progress--racial, in the case of blacks--is "linear and evolutionary." n49 According to Professor Bell, the "American dogma of automatic progress" has never applied to blacks. n50 Blacks will never gain full equality, and "even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary 'peaks of progress,' short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance." n51

Progress toward reducing racial discrimination and subordination has never been "automatic," if that refers to some natural and inexorable process without struggle. Nor has progress ever been strictly "linear" in terms of unvarying year by year improvement, because the combatants on either side of the equality struggle have varied over time in their energies, resources, capacities, and the quality of their plans. Moreover, neither side could predict or control all of the variables which accompany progress or non-progress; some factors, like World War II, occurred in the international arena, and were not exclusively under American control.

With these qualifications, and a long view of history, blacks and their white allies achieved two profound and qualitatively different leaps forward toward the goal of equality: the end of slavery, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, despite open and, lately, covert resistance, black progress has never been shoved back, in a qualitative sense, to the powerlessness and abuse of periods preceding these leaps forward. n52

### Visibility Overview/ AT: Self Image

#### their aff functions to make debate NECESSARY as an institution to fight racism, as per their framework—the best way to performatively challenge racism in debate might be the worst way to fight racism overall—they trade off with autonomous communities outside of conceptual regulation which are key to make changes without relying on the thing they criticize as a condition for existence

**Hershock**, East-West Center, **1999** [“Changing the way society changes”, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 6, 154; http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed and empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of unallowable acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### AT: Cant Shed ouir Identities

#### Our K isn’t about shedding your identity and neither is framework—it’s about the role you choose for your advocacy—even if you can’t shed your identity, you can choose not to make that the foundation of resistance.

#### They link harder--by their logic, the fact that the 1AC didn't mention ableist privilege or nonveteran privilege or ageist privilege enacts a discursive violence against them -- this cannot be a contest to see who can acknowledge MORE marginalized groups and the search for a discursive starting point in race is violent. Treat this as an independent disad to voting aff and a total solvency take-out

**Their claim that they cannot be political without discussing their identities is NOT TRUE -- the political actions of groups like Anonymous and the ethical hacker movement include people of color and rely on anonymity -- they represent a potential alternative political model -- we are not suggesting that this is a universal model, merely that it is a possible one**

Halpin '12 Harry, "The Politics of Anonymous: Ontological Politics without Identity" Nov/Dec

http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/the-philosophy-of-anonymous

You cannot arrest an idea. The last tweet of Topiary, before his arrest Ranging from WikiLeaks to the global struggle against treaties such as ACTA, over the last few years the Web has become a centre of political struggle ***in and of itself*** rather than a mere adjunct of other struggles. At the same time, a new social force has emerged from the Internet: Anonymous. It is unclear at this moment even what Anonymous ***is***, much less where it is going. Is Anonymous the vanguard defending the Internet, the Internet not only in-itself but for-itself, whose denial-of-service attacks are ‘Internet street protests’, as Richard Stallman put it?1 Is Anonymous the incarnation of the long-awaited altruistic invisible army of hackers needed by various social movements, as promised by science-fiction writers for the last decade? Or is Anonymous a phenomenon more similar to a mass panic, a sort of collective behaviour that falls outside of organized politics, an ‘Internet Hate Machine’ that embodies the libidinal subconscious of the lost children of the Web? All of these theories are attempts to grasp something that is both radically new and the return of a certain long-repressed collective force whose existence pre-dates the Enlightenment ideology of the individual. Anonymous, it will be argued here, is an ontological shift on the terrain of identity at the very moment that identity has become the highest form of selection and exploitation in cognitive capitalism, the first glimpse of a form of life without identity on the Internet. Heidegger was wrong: the coming of the gods after cybernetics is possible: they do not forgive and they do not forget.

**Our praxis is not in the business of providing alternatives -- it is the responsibility of the 1ac to justify itself methodology FIRST -- however, we can look to Anonymous as an example of achieving power via opacity**

**Halpin '12** Harry, "The Politics of Anonymous: Ontological Politics without Identity" Nov/Dec

http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/the-philosophy-of-anonymous

In these chat channels, ideas for actions and news are spread, as is various informal gossip. Instead of a simple anonymous non-identity, various pseudonyms (often of a humorous nature) are often self-identified in order to distinguish the people in the chat room, although many people use multiple chat channels with both multiple pseudonyms and anonymous identities. Very basic security precautions are used in order not only to be anonymous in name only, but to prevent governments or other repressive forces from tracking down their presence in the IRC channel to a particular physical computer, with VPNs being popular. In particular, the methods used by Anonymous are easy to use, as they taking advantage of the open sourcing of tools such as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon to let almost anyone with a computer participate in the kinds of denial-of-service attacks needed to bring down sites like Visa and PayPal, although security flaws in some early versions of this software are precisely what led the FBI to arrest some of Anonymous for participating in these attacks. These kinds of attacks are not hacks, but are similar to techniques of ‘electronic civil disobedience’ (a term popularized by the Critical Art Ensemble)36 where by virtue of sending too many requests simultaneously to a website, the website overloads and goes off the Internet. **The thing about Anonymous is that it escapes the grasp of power by opacity**. The myriad IRC channels, 4chan and others, are essentially zones of opaque offensity, as ‘opaque to power as gypsy camp’ according to the Invisible Committee,37 although the actual opacity depends on a myriad purely technical factors such as whether or not IP addresses are logged or not. Thus, one cannot help but notice the affinity of Anonymous with the politics of the **Invisible Committee**, with the Blooms of 4chan becoming the Imaginary Party of Anonymous – as the French press put it, a ‘Tarnac numérique’.38 If the arrests of the people that are claimed to be ‘members’ of Anonymous39 are a good sample, the demographics of Anonymous are those of what Marx would term the ‘surplus population’ produced by the economic crisis: mostly rather young, unemployed, computer-literate, global, stretching across racial boundaries and often from low-income backgrounds. While the stereotype of Anonymous, particularly on 4chan, was of sexist 16-year-old boys, what has been revealed is that 4chan and Anonymous are as global as any Internationale and include many women and transgender people. ‘No’, one of the ex-operators of Anonymous’s chat channel, was claimed by the FBI to be Mercedes Haefer, a 20-year-old journalism student. One of the most famous hackers of Anonymous and Lulzsec, Kayla, claimed to be a 16-year old girl but was instead a 25-year old unemployed ex-army veteran from South Yorkshire – and one of the core arrests of Lulzsec, Tflow, was a 16-year old in London who was one of the more talented hackers in the group. The group is also multiracial. For example, the infamous hacker Sabu, who was involved in both Anonymous and Lulzsec, was a 29-year-old unemployed New Yorker of Puerto Rican descent who began working for the FBI when his children were threatened. Less well known arrests testify to the internationalism of Anonymous, including arrests in the Dominican Republic, Spain, Turkey, Chile and Romania. In Eastern Europe the protests against ACTA that were sparked in part by Anonymous **were the largest street demonstrations since the fall of the Soviet Bloc governments**. One can only suspect that a far larger section of the population enjoys the freedom of expression that Anonymous provides: those who are marginalized for reasons of class, age, gender, as well as those who simply live in a remote places where no other form of political expression is easily available, all find a vital new form of politics in participating in the actions of Anonymous. The issues of censorship and anonymity may be the kernel of a distinctive political spirit of the Internet that resonates far more widely than those involved in traditional politics, including those of the radical strain, may expect. In the seedy bars of the 4chan – Interzone of the Internet – it is perhaps surprising that ‘the space appropriate to the future crowd, the space that will beckon them, interpellate them, accommodate them’, in the words of Kristen Ross, is not ‘the bleak landscapes of Rimbaud’s later poetry … the tactile, haptic landscapes of desert, sea, and poles, more sonar than visual’ but the visual and linguistic spaces of message boards, viral videos and group chat on the Internet.40 To take the words of Jake Davis (Topiary) in his final message on Anonymous at face value: the ontology of the ‘hivemind’ is not a mere epiphenomenon; it constitutes Anonymous.

# r4 neg v. texas gm

## 1nc

### 1nc immigration politics

#### Immigration passing now – now key

I-Hsien Sherwood (writer for the Latino Post) 3/21, 2013 “Immigration Reform 2013 News: Delays Could Hinder Reform Bill, So Speed is Necessary” http://www.latinospost.com/articles/14995/20130321/immigration-reform-2013-news-delays-hinder-bill-speed-necessary.htm

Lately, proponents of immigration reform have been optimistic about the progress of bipartisan bills in both the Senate and House of Representatives. But many pitfalls still remain, and the **sooner** an immigration reform bill emerges from Congress, the greater its chances of eventually passing.¶ In general, the longer a piece of legislation remains before Congress, with its partisan bickering, disparate constituencies and army of lobbyists each pursuing targeted ends, the more easily it is torn apart, poked through with exceptions and slandered in the press. A bill unsheltered is a bill likely doomed.¶ So while some conservatives opposed to immigration reform are raising policy objections, other are attempting a procedural flank.¶ Six Republican senators, led by Jeff Sessions of Alabama, sent a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) demanding that the process move more slowly and senators be given several months to review the bill.¶ In addition, the GOP is still reeling from its resounding loss in last year's presidential election, when 71 percent of Latinos voted to reelect their opponent, President Obama. That sent the Republicans into a bout of soul searching, prompting the latest openness to reform.¶ But that willingness may be short-lived, especially as the lessons of November fade and Congress gears up for primary battles from the conservative right and the Tea Party.¶ The **window for reform is short**, and the stakes are high, so the potential for heated arguments and tense standoffs increases, further endangering any kind of compromise bill.¶ For now, the Senate's "Gang of Eight" seems to be moving quickly and relatively smoothly toward a proposal, despite delays. They admit they'll miss their first self-imposed deadline at the end of the month, but the White House, which has been keeping the pressure on, says it is still confident they will present a worthwhile bill.¶ "The good news is that the Gang of Eight seems to be making progress. We are engaged with them. We are encouraged by their progress," Cecilia Muñoz, head of the White House Domestic Policy Council, which is spearheading the immigration initiative, said.¶ Whether Congress can maintain momentum on the issue remains to be seen.

#### Plan ignites a highly controversial federalism debate

**Kay, 12** - Cornell Community and Regional Development Institute (CaRDI) (David, “Energy Federalism: Who Decides?” July, cardi.cornell.edu/cals/devsoc/outreach/cardi/programs/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=1071714

Questions about energy production and consumption are acquiring renewed urgency in the 21 st Century. Some go to the heart of our nation’s system of federalism, as an underlying but everpresent friction mounts over the way in which decision making power has been divided between central and more locally distributed political units. What is at stake? According to one author, “the choice of regulatory forum often seems to determine the outcome of the controversy. That may explain why **Americans have** traditionally **shed** so much metaphorical and genuine **blood deciding** what are essentially **jurisdictional disputes** between governmental institutions.” i¶ A number of factors have raised these issues into greater prominence. Energy specific ¶ influences include the depletion of low cost oil, advances in energy extraction technology, and ¶ increased awareness of the link between climate change and energy consumption and ¶ production. Another element is the long standing but increasingly hardened absence of a ¶ broad based consensus over energy policy at the federal level, **despite calls** for such a policy ¶ that date back to at least the Nixon administration. These have been superimposed on shifting ¶ political trends in other areas, including the expanding national political divide. After the crest ¶ of federal adoption of new environmental legislation in the 1960’s and 1970’s, powerful and¶ complex cross currents arose. Mostly “conservative” and anti- (or anti-“big”) government ¶ forces mobilized in the devolution, deregulation, privatization, and property rights movements. ¶ In contrast, “progressive” movements evolved in response to increased globalization (of ¶ economic and environmental issues) and personalization (eg. of communications/information ¶ technology) by promoting global governance in some arenas and relocalization or local ¶ empowerment in others.¶ Several energy examples being played out in New York State, as well as in other states and on ¶ the national stage, serve as useful and representative illustrations of the fundamental but ¶ insufficiently appreciated tensions raised. The first involves the spread of the controversial ¶ hydraulic fracturing technology that is used to extract oil and gas from “unconventional” ¶ reserves of shale and other rocks. The second and third involve the generation and distribution ¶ of electricity: where the authority to site electricity generating stations is vested, and who has¶ the authority to site transmission lines that move electricity from their mostly rural points of extraction or generation to their mostly urban points of consumption. ii These are but a few among many examples that highlight the extent to which the proliferating threads of debate about energy federalism are being cinched into an increasingly dense tangle.

#### **Top of the Agenda and PC key**

Shifter 12/27 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?” 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3186

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. ¶ Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear.

#### Reform is a shot in the arm for China—skilled visas

Williams 11/9 Carol is an LA Times international affairs writer. “Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform,” 2012, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a **significant shot in the arm for India and China**."¶ There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### Key to China relations and growth

**Koehn and Yin, ‘2**

[Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-Huang Yin, “The expanding roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China relations: transnational networks and trans-Pacific interactions”, M.E. Sharpe, pg. 16, 2002]

Among the various social forces that could re-shape U.S.-China relations, Chinese American families are among **the most established** global players. Chinese-immigrant entrepreneurs have not only transplanted their family networks, they also have expanded Chinese-owned trans-Pacific trade, transportation businesses, and banks. The third type of trans-Pacific family, in particular, illustrates how Chinese Americans who maintain borderless family networks act to strengthen U.S.-China economic relations—one critically important aspect of the overall relationship. Businesses on both sides need a gateway to help penetrate each other’s market. Trans-Pacific family networks of all three types can provide such a gateway. Family and kinship connections are the Chinese rim’s building blocks. Given their global family networks and economic power, Chinese Americans have profoundly shaped and will continue to influence U.S.-China relations.

#### Extinction

**China Daily, 8** (Rikki N. Massand and Gazelle Emami, “U.S.-China relations at the world's fingertips,” 4-20-2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-04/20/content\_6629700.htm, JMP)

To frame the importance of this discussion and the topics that must be met, Siegal used the analogy of “the U.S. and China having their hands around each other’s necks and we’re both going over the waterfall.” After that comment a man in the audience then suggested that in that case both countries would have to look to the other for help and teamwork would be the only way to survive.

That theme resonated from coast to coast. At the University of California-Berkeley, speaker Sidney Rittenberg took a more intimate approach to U.S.-China relations. A man who lived in China for 35 years, Rittenberg has worked for the past two decades as an advisor to major corporations doing business in China such as AIG, Intel, Hughes Aircraft, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, and Ford. At the Bay Area gathering he emphasized respect and dignity through his own stories, and instead of categorizing the issues into right and wrong Rittenberg advocates looking at the bigger picture. For him the imperative for Americans is to learn to get along with the Chinese.

 “We must -- we don't have a choice. **The crises that threaten the human race**, like weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups, global warming, **none of the issues will get resolved unless we work with China**, Brazil, India and of course Europe and other countries. Really the central axis that holds the whole thing together is the U.S. and China," Rittenberg said.

### 1nc t regulations

#### The aff decreases regulations but not restrictions—restrictions are direct prohibitions on production

Sinha 6

Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus:

"It appears that a distinction between **regulation and restriction** or prohibition has always been drawn, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied. The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use **of energy,** the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect."

#### The aff removes a regulation not a restriction

**Pursley and Wiseman 11 1AC Author** (Garrick, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law, and Hannah, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, “Local Energy”, Emory Law Journal, 60 Emory L.J. 877)

Our suggestion, then, is that the federal government should first establish some minimum standard - most likely a simple prohibition on state and local regulations that impede renewables siting - for fostering the adoption of distributed renewable energy technologies and should allocate primary [\*935] authority for implementation and regulation, with substantial discretion, to local governments. 311 Since land-energy regulations enabling the use of distributed renewable energy may raise business costs in the short term and may at least appear capable of deterring industrial siting, we contend that a federal minimum standard is necessary to prevent local governments from engaging in races to the bottom. 312 A federal minimum requirement for implementing policies designed to promote the adoption of distributed renewables also should offset the local-level public choice problems that we have mentioned 313 and thereby help to avoid "negative experiments" in which cities empowered with land-energy rule-making authority respond disproportionately to anti-renewables interests and stifle the adoption of distributed renewables. 314

#### Voter for limits—expansive readings confound research predictability and undermine our ability to engage in meaningful energy debates

Eric Heinze (Senior Lecturer in Law, University of London, Queen Mary. He has held fellowships from the Fulbright Foundation and the French and German governments. He teaches Legal Theory, Constitutional Law, Human Rights and Public International Law. JD Harvard) 2003 “The Logic of Liberal Rights A study in the formal analysis of legal discourse” http://mey.homelinux.org/companions/Eric%20Heinze/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20%28839%29/The%20Logic%20of%20Liberal%20Rights\_%20A%20Study%20in%20%20-%20Eric%20Heinze.pdf

Variety of ‘restrictions’

The term ‘restriction’, defined so broadly, embraces any number of familiar concepts: ‘deprivation’, ‘denial’, ‘encroachment’, ‘incursion’, ‘infringement’, ‘interference’, ‘limitation’, ‘regulation’. Those terms commonly comport differences in meaning or nuance, and are not all interchangeable in standard legal usage. For example, a ‘deprivation’ may be distinguished from a ‘limitation’ or ‘regulation’ in order to denote a full denial of a right (e.g. where private property is wholly appropriated by the state 16 Agents without compensation) as opposed to a partial constraint (e.g. where discrete restrictions are imposed on the use of property which nonetheless remains profitably usable). Similarly, distinctions between acts and omissions can leave the blanket term ‘restriction’ sounding inapposite when applied to an omission: if a state is accused of not doing enough to give effect to a right, we would not colloquially refer to such inaction as a ‘restriction’. Moreover, in a case of extreme abuse, such as extrajudicial killing or torture, it might sound banal to speak merely of a ‘restriction’ on the corresponding right. However, the term ‘restriction’ will be used to include all of those circumstances, in so far as they all comport a purpose or effect of extinguishing or diminishing the right-seeker’s enjoyment of an asserted right. (The only significant distinction which will be drawn will be between that concept of ‘restriction’ and the concept of ‘breach’ or ‘violation’. The terms ‘breach’ or ‘violation’ will be used to denote a judicial determination about the legality of the restriction.6) Such an axiom may seem unwelcome, in so far as it obliterates subtleties which one would have thought to be useful in law. It must be stressed that we are seeking to eliminate that variety of terms not for all purposes, but only for the very narrow purposes of a formal model, for which any distinctions among them are irrelevant.

#### And, neg ground—questionable restrictions affs are terminally skewed because no counterplans and few DAs apply—that’s the core of our prep.

### 1nc grid da

#### Grid upgrades now, but pacing is key

**POWERGRID International, 12/17/12** – from the editors based on an interview with Andre Begosso, managing director in the Accenture management consulting practice and is focused on the resources operating group. He has more than seventeen years of experience in the utility and energy industries and advises clients in the alternative energy, power generation and oil and gas sectors (“2013 trends for the power industry” December, <http://www.elp.com/blogs/eye-on-the-grid/2012/12/2013-trends-for-the-power-industry.html>)

In the absence of some major advance in energy storage, Andre said, he expects that renewable energy installation will probably start to slow as its shortcomings become more apparent to utilities and power companies.¶ "I would not expect these trends to continue because of the tremendous limitation that renewable technologies have. You cannot break the laws of physics or the laws of chemistry. The wind doesn't blow all the time and it never will, and the sun doesn't always shine and it never will," he said.¶ Trend No. 4: Energy back on the agenda¶ In my last blog post , I speculated about what it might take to get energy policy back on the agenda. When I asked about this, Andre said energy already is back on the agenda.¶ "Over the next 3 years, over $220 billion in new **infrastructure will be built. But** the problem with infrastructure is Rome wasn't built in a day. It takes time," he said.¶ This new wave of infrastructure upgrades will require a level of patience and understanding on the part of ratepayers that Andre wonders whether the average person is capable of. During Hurricane Sandy, for example, Con Edison had one of the most sophisticated electric grids available — yet it still failed, and people wonder why.

#### Decentralized solar causes overproduction and trades off with grid stability

**Jansson and Michelfelder, 8** - \*Associate Professor at Rowan University in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering AND \*\*assistant professor of finance at Rutgers University's School of Business (Peter and Richard, “Integrating Renewables into the U.S. Grid: Is It Sustainable?,” The Electricity Journal, July, science direct)

From utility economic and practical engineering perspectives, we have reached an impasse. Electric utilities are motivated by investors to provide real and growing returns on their capital investments and by state and national regulators to provide reliable electric power at the lowest costs to their consumers. Market-driven, independent power producers (IPPs) are motivated to develop projects that maximize shareholder value and minimize other investments that do not provide direct returns to their project investors. In today’s market-driven paradigm investing in major transmission facilities to increase reliability and new renewable generation technologies to achieve environmental responsibility goals will not provide high short-term ﬁnancial performance for any of the major players. Also, **since the utilities can no longer control where customers may site** new generation sources, new capacity additions (in either generation or transmission) will not necessarily increase grid reliability. Present evidence suggests that U.S. grid reliability in the early 21st century may actually be degrading (Anderson and Boulanger, 2004; NERC, 2004) with the areas most affected by massive outages being those states that have most aggressively embraced industry restructuring (Jansson and Michelfelder, 2005). As we move to more decentralized, market-driven, power generation systems based upon intermittent renewable energy sources the strain on existing utility infrastructure will mount unless wise public policy direction is provided.

#### Overloads the entire grid

**Rutgers News 8** (“Sustainable Energy Must Be Integrated Into Existing Power Grid, Says Rutgers–Camden Finance Scholar,” 11/18, <http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/news-releases/2008/11/sustainable-energy-m-20081118/>)

CAMDEN -- Engineers and entrepreneurs are rushing to explore alternative sources of efficient and renewable energy in New Jersey and elsewhere in the country. A Rutgers School of Business—Camden professor has strong words of caution as projects involving wind farms and photovoltaic cells proliferate.¶ With the electric-power industry poised for its most dramatic changes in decades, too little thought is being devoted to coordinating these piecemeal initiatives, warns [Richard Michelfelder](http://business.camden.rutgers.edu/FacultyStaff/Directory/michelfelder.htm) in a recent edition of The Electricity Journal, the leading policy journal for the electric industry.¶ The consequence, he fears, might well be a disastrous overload of the nation’s electrical grid.¶ An assistant professor of finance at the Rutgers School of Business—Camden and former president and CEO of Quantum Consulting Inc., a national public utilities consulting firm based in Berkeley, Cal., Michelfelder comes to his assessment after a quarter-century in the energy-technology industry.¶ “When you start adding random assets to the grid, you also add the possibility of disruptions in the coordination of the flow of electricity,” says Michelfelder.

#### Blackouts cause nuclear meltdowns

**Cappiello ‘11** (Dina, reporter for the AP March 29, 2011 “AP IMPACT: Long Blackouts Pose Risk to US Reactors” The Post and Courier <http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2011/mar/29/ap-impact-long-blackouts-pose-risk-us-reactors/?print>)

Long before the nuclear emergency in Japan, U.S. regulators knew that a power failure lasting for days at an American nuclear plant, whatever the cause, could lead to a radioactive leak. Even so, they have only required the nation’s 104 nuclear reactors to develop plans for dealing with much shorter blackouts on the assumption that power would be restored quickly. In one nightmare simulation presented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2009, it would take **less than a day** for radiation to escape from a reactor at a Pennsylvania nuclear power plant after an earthquake, flood or fire knocked out all electrical power and there was no way to keep the reactors cool after backup battery power ran out. That plant, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station outside Lancaster, has reactors of the same older make and model as those releasing radiation at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, which is using other means to try to cool the reactors. And like Fukushima Dai-ichi, the Peach Bottom plant has enough battery power on site to power emergency cooling systems for eight hours. In Japan, that wasn’t enough time for power to be restored. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Institute trade association, three of the six reactors at the plant still can’t get power to operate the emergency cooling systems. Two were shut down at the time. In the sixth, the fuel was removed completely and put in the spent fuel pool when it was shut down for maintenance at the time of the disaster. A week after the March 11 earthquake, diesel generators started supplying power to two other two reactors, Units 5 and 6, the groups said. The risk of a blackout leading to core damage, while extremely remote, **exists at all U.S. nuclear power plants**, and some are more susceptible than others, according to an Associated Press investigation. While regulators say they have confidence that measures adopted in the U.S. will prevent or significantly delay a core from melting and threatening a radioactive release, the events in Japan raise questions about whether U.S. power plants are as prepared as they could and should be. A top Nuclear Regulatory Commission official said Tuesday that the agency will review station blackouts and whether the nation’s 104 nuclear reactors are capable of coping with them. As part of a review requested by President Barack Obama in the wake of the Japan crisis, the NRC will examine “what conditions and capabilities exist at all 104 reactors to see if we need to strengthen the regulatory requirement,” said Bill Borchardt, the agency’s executive director for operations. Borchardt said an obvious question that should be answered is whether nuclear plants need enhanced battery supplies, or ones that can last longer. “There is a robust capability that exists already, but given what happened in Japan there’s obviously a question that presents itself: Do we need to make it even more robust?” He said the NRC would do a site-by-site review of the nation’s nuclear reactors to assess the blackout risk. “We didn’t address a tsunami and an earthquake, but clearly we have known for some time that one of the weak links that makes accidents a little more likely is losing power,” said Alan Kolaczkowski, a retired nuclear engineer who worked on a federal risk analysis of Peach Bottom released in 1990 and is familiar with the updated risk analysis. Risk analyses conducted by the plants in 1991-94 and published by the commission in 2003 show that the chances of such an event striking a U.S. power plant are remote, even at the plant where the risk is the highest, the Beaver Valley Power Station in Pennsylvania. These long odds are among the reasons why the United States since the late 1980s has only required nuclear power plants to cope with blackouts for four or eight hours. That’s about how much time batteries would last. After that, it is assumed that power would be restored. And so far, that’s been the case. Equipment put in place after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks could buy more time. Otherwise, the reactor’s radioactive core could begin to melt unless alternative cooling methods were employed. In Japan, the utility has tried using portable generators and dumped tons of seawater, among other things, on the reactors in an attempt to keep them cool. A 2003 federal analysis looking at how to estimate the risk of containment failure said that should power be knocked out by an earthquake or tornado it “would be unlikely that power will be recovered in the time frame to prevent core meltdown.” In Japan, it was a one-two punch: first the earthquake, then the tsunami.

#### Extinction

**Lendman ‘11** (Stephen, Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,” <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Nuclear-Meltdown-in-Japan-by-Stephen-Lendman-110313-843.html>)

Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized.

#### And, local solar jacks up customer electricity prices

**Burr, 12** – editor in chief of Public Utilities Fortnightly (Michael, “Rooftop Tsunami; Utilities sound the alarm as PV nears grid parity” PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, July, lexis)

From the utility's point of view, a growing wave of rooftop PV projects is starting to look ominous. And now, some utilities are taking action to shore up their defenses--advocating legislative and regulatory changes that pull back net metering policies and other solar incentives. Concerns focus in part on operational challenges from integrating dispersed generation that's variable, non-dispatchable, and sometimes beyond the utility's ability to control. But the biggest worry seems to involve the prospect of a fixed-costs dilemma, which I addressed in this column last issue. (see "Facing Facts," Fortnightly, June 2012). The shorthand is this: As PV gets cheaper, an increasing number of PV-owning customers will pay less than their fair share of utility system costs, leaving a shrinking number of non-solar customers to pick up the tab for keeping the lights on. Although PV's market penetration is tiny today, it's growing rapidly enough to raise real concerns for many utilities.¶ "Distributed generation is becoming one of the largest subsidies on our system," said Ron Litzinger, president of Southern California Edison, during a panel discussion at this year's Edison Electric Institute Annual Convention. "That subsidy tends to go from low-income to higher-income customers. We need to make sure all the costs of distributed generation are known before decisions are made.¶ "Left unchecked, we could see rates increase by 40 to 50 percent by 2020, which we know isn't sustainable."

#### This causes a depression

**Entine, 9** – adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (Jon, “U.S. and Climate Change--Rescue of the Planet Postponed?”, 2/24, [http://aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29333/pub\_detail.asp](http://aei.org/publications/filter.all%2CpubID.29333/pub_detail.asp))

**The correlation between** economic **growth and energy costs is high and negative**; when energy costs go up, productivity takes a nosedive. In these extraordinary times, arguably the top priority must be to ensure that a secular financial downturn doesn't turn into a worldwide structural depression. If that happens, both the economy and the environment will be losers.

#### Nuclear war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### 1nc expropriation cp

#### The United States Federal Government should expropriate solar power production from the private domain and assert direct oversight control over both the solar power production sector and its market competitors for the purpose of local solar, placing the industry under direct management by independent boards of unionized industrial workers, collectively and democratically accountable to the majority of workers in the industry.

#### It’s competitive—they decrease restrictions on solar production—we maximize them to infinity and say state expropriation good

#### Solves better

The Militant '1 "Nationalize the energy companies!" Vol.65/No.3 1/22/01 http://www.themilitant.com/2001/6503/650302.html

The labor movement needs to respond to the power shortages, rate hikes, and skyrocketing fuel prices that are creating a disaster for working people by demanding government expropriation of the power and energy companies. These monopolies control a resource vital to society. But they are in the business of making profits, not of providing energy. Through their drive for ever-higher profits they have created a situation endangering the lives and livelihoods of millions of workers and farmers, as well as small business-people. They must be taken out of private hands, nationalized, and run as public utilities for the benefit of the majority rather than the interests of a handful of super-wealthy capitalists, bankers, and bondholders. Working people, especially on the West Coast, where the crisis is most acute, would respond massively to calls by the labor movement for a campaign of mobilizations calling for the nationalization of this industry.

#### Energy disenfranchisement is inevitable under their mechanism

Liatos '6 Deborah, reporting for The Militant "Socialist candidates in N.Y.: Nationalize energy industry!" 8/7/06 Vol.70/No. 29 http://www.themilitant.com/2006/7029/702902.html

WOODSIDE, Queens, July 23—“The cause of this blackout is not mainly a technical problem. The problem is Con Edison is in the business to make profits for its owners, not to provide electrical service,” said Martín Koppel, the Socialist Workers Party candidate for New York State attorney general. He was speaking with residents of this working-class area, which had been hit by a weeklong power outage. “Our campaign calls for nationalizing the energy industry,” he said. “The energy companies must be taken out of private hands and run as a public utility for the benefit of the majority. “This means opening their books to expose all their so-called business secrets and profit-motivated decisions, like the refusal to invest adequately in maintenance and new power plants. Those decisions by the capitalists guarantee there will be more disastrous breakdowns.” Koppel said **the nationalized energy companies “must be operated under workers’ control on the job—control over the pace of production, over how the job is organized, over the safety of workers and the public at large**.” The Socialist Workers Party campaign, he said, is calling for a massive public works program to rebuild the deteriorating infrastructure and create thousands of needed jobs.

### 1nc k

#### The 1ac endorses a model of energy policy that perpetuates the neoliberal appropriation of technology and public resources

Harvey '5 David, David Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. "A Brief History of Neoliberalism" http://messhall.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/A-Brief-History-of-Neoliberalism.pdf

Neoliberals are particularly assiduous in seeking the privatization of assets. The absence of clear private property rights––as in many developing countries––is seen as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development and the improvement of human welfare. Enclosure and the assignment of private property rights is considered the best way to protect against the socalled ‘tragedy of the commons’ (the tendency for individuals to irresponsibly super-exploit common property resources such as land and water). Sectors formerly run or regulated by the state must be turned over to the private sphere and be deregulated (freed from any state interference). Competition––between individuals, between firms, between territorial entities (cities, regions, nations, regional groupings)––is held to be a primary virtue. The ground-rules for market competition must be properly observed, of course. In situations where such rules are not clearly laid out or where property rights are hard to define, the state must use its power to impose or invent market systems (such as trading in pollution rights). **Privatization and deregulation combined with competition, it is claimed, eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden. The neoliberal state should persistently seek out internal reorganizations and new institutional arrangements that improve its competitive position as an entity vis-à-vis other states in the global market.** While personal and individual freedom in the marketplace is guaranteed, each individual is held responsible and accountable for his or her own actions and well-being. This principle extends into the realms of welfare, education, health care, and even pensions (social security has been privatized in Chile and Slovakia, and proposals exist to do the same in the US). Individual success or failure are interpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings (such as not investing significantly enough in one’s own human capital through education) rather than being attributed to any systemic property (such as the class exclusions usually attributed to capitalism). The free mobility of capital between sectors, regions, and countries is regarded as crucial. All barriers to that free movement (such as tariffs, punitive taxation arrangements, planning and environmental controls, or other locational impediments) have to be removed, except in those areas crucial to ‘the national interest’, however that is defined. State sovereignty over commodity and capital movements is willingly surrendered to the global market. International competition is seen as healthy since it improves efficiency and productivity, lowers prices, and thereby controls inflationary tendencies. States should therefore collectively seek and negotiate the reduction of barriers to movement of capital across borders and the opening of markets (for both commodities and capital) to global exchange. Whether or not this applies to labour as a commodity is, however, controversial. To the degree that all states must collaborate to reduce barriers to exchange, so co-ordinating structures such as the group of advanced capitalist nations (the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan) known as the G7 (now the G8 with the addition of Russia) must arise. International agreements between states guaranteeing the rule of law and freedoms of trade, such as those now incorporated in the World Trade Organization agreements, are critical to the advancement of the neoliberal project on the global stage. Neoliberal theorists are, however, profoundly suspicious of democracy. Governance by majority rule is seen as a potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties. Democracy is viewed as a luxury, only possible under conditions of relative affluence coupled with a strong middle-class presence to guarantee political stability. Neoliberals therefore tend to favour governance by experts and elites. A strong preference exists for government by executive order and by judicial decision rather than democratic and parliamentary decision-making. Neoliberals prefer to insulate key institutions, such as the central bank, from democratic pressures. Given that neoliberal theory centres on the rule of law and a strict interpretation of constitutionality, it follows that conflict and opposition must be mediated through the courts. Solutions and remedies to any problems have to be sought by individuals through the legal system. Tensions and ContradictionsThere are some shadowy areas as well as points of conflict within the general theory of the neoliberal state. First, there is the problem of how to interpret monopoly power. Competition often results in monopoly or oligopoly, as stronger firms drive out weaker. Most neoliberal theorists consider this unproblematic (it should, they say, maximize efficiency) provided there are no substantial barriers to the entry of competitors (a condition often hard to realize and which the state may therefore have to nurture). The case of so-called ‘natural monopolies’ is more difficult. It makes no sense to have multiple competing electrical power grids, gas pipelines, water and sewage systems, or rail links between Washington and Boston. State regulation of provision, access, and pricing seems unavoidable in such domains. While partial deregulation may be possible (permitting competing producers to feed electricity into the same grid or run trains on the same tracks, for example) the possibilities for profiteering and abuse, as the California power crisis of 2002 abundantly showed, or for deadly muddle and confusion, as the British rail situation has proven, are very real. The second major arena of controversy concerns market failure. This arises when individuals and firms avoid paying the full costs attributable to them by shedding their liabilities outside the market (the liabilities are, in technical parlance, ‘externalized’). The classic case is that of pollution, where individuals and firms avoid costs by dumping noxious wastes free of charge in the environment. Productive ecosystems may be degraded or destroyed as a result. Exposure to dangerous substances or physical dangers in the workplace may affect human health and even deplete the pool of healthy labourers in the workforce. **While neoliberals admit the problem and some concede the case for limited state intervention, others argue for inaction because the cure will almost certainly be worse than the disease. Most would agree, however, that if there are to be interventions these should work through market mechanisms (via tax impositions or incentives, trading rights of pollutants, and the like).** Competitive failures are approached in a similar fashion. Rising transaction costs can be incurred as contractual and subcontractual relations proliferate. The vast apparatus of currency speculation, to take just one example, appears more and more costly at the same time as it becomes more and more fundamental to capturing speculative profits. Other problems arise when, say, all competing hospitals in a region buy the same sophisticated equipment that remains underutilized, thus driving up aggregate costs. The case here for cost containment through state planning, regulation, and forced co-ordination is strong, but again neoliberals are deeply suspicious of such interventions. All agents acting in the market are generally presumed to have access to the same information. There are presumed to be no asymmetries of power or of information that interfere with the capacity of individuals to make rational economic decisions in their own interests. This condition is rarely, if ever, approximated in practice, and there are significant consequences.2 Better informed and more powerful players have an advantage that can all too easily be parlayed into procuring even better information and greater relative power. The establishment of intellectual property rights (patents), furthermore, encourages ‘rent seeking’. Those who hold the patent rights use their monopoly power to set monopoly prices and to prevent technology transfers except at a very high cost. Asymmetric power relations tend, therefore, to increase rather than diminish over time unless the state steps in to counteract them. The neoliberal presumption of perfect information and a level playing field for competition appears as either innocently utopian or a deliberate obfuscation of processes that will lead to the concentration of wealth and, therefore, the restoration of class power. The neoliberal theory of technological change relies upon the coercive powers of competition to drive the search for new products, new production methods, and new organizational forms. This drive becomes so deeply embedded in entrepreneurial common sense, however, that it becomes a fetish belief: that there is a technological fix for each and every problem. To the degree that this takes hold not only within corporations but also within the state apparatus (in the military in particular), it produces powerful independent trends of technological change that can become destabilizing, if not counterproductive. Technological developments can run amok as sectors dedicated solely to technological innovation create new products and new ways of doing things that as yet have no market (new pharmaceutical products are produced, for which new illnesses are then invented). Talented interlopers can, furthermore, mobilize technological innovations to undermine dominant social relations and institutions; they can, through their activities, even reshape common sense to their own pecuniary advantage. There is an inner connection, therefore, between technological dynamism, instability, dissolution of social solidarities, environmental degradation, deindustrialization, rapid shifts in time–space relations, speculative bubbles, and the general tendency towards crisis formation within capitalism.3 There are, finally, some fundamental political problems within neoliberalism that need to be addressed. A contradiction arises between a seductive but alienating possessive individualism on the one hand and the desire for a meaningful collective life on the other. While individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective institutions (such as trade unions) as opposed to weak voluntary associations (like charitable organizations). They most certainly should not choose to associate to create political parties with the aim of forcing the state to intervene in or eliminate the market. To guard against their greatest fears––fascism, communism, socialism, authoritarian populism, and even majority rule––the neoliberals have to put strong limits on democratic governance, relying instead upon undemocratic and unaccountable institutions (such as the Federal Reserve or the IMF) to make key decisions. This creates the paradox of intense state interventions and government by elites and ‘experts’ in a world where the state is supposed not to be interventionist. One is reminded of Francis Bacon’s utopian tale *New Atlantis* (first published in 1626) where a Council of Wise Elders mandates all key decisions. Faced with social movements that seek collective interventions, therefore, the neoliberal state is itself forced to intervene, sometimes repressively, thus denying the very freedoms it is supposed to uphold. In this situation, however, it can marshal one secret weapon: international competition and globalization can be used to discipline movements opposed to the neoliberal agenda within individual states. If that fails, then the state must resort to persuasion, propaganda or, when necessary, raw force and police power to suppress opposition to neoliberalism. This was precisely Polanyi’s fear: that the liberal (and by extension the neoliberal) utopian project could only ultimately be sustained by resort to authoritarianism. The freedom of the masses would be restricted in favour of the freedoms of the few.

#### Decentralization is a tactic to diffuse power and vilify institutions—clean energy policy under this guise empowers corporate forces

MacNeil '12 Robert, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Political Science School of Political Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Robert MacNeil, Ottawa, Canada, 2012 "Neoliberal Climate Policy in the United States: From Market Fetishism to the Developmental State" http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/bitstream/handle/10393/23587/Macneil\_Robert\_2012\_thesis.pdf?sequence=1

On the pull side, the project looks at four particularly prominent selectivities used by actors to implement greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation, in cluding the use of a) sub national regulation within the fifty states, b) civil litigation to impose structural legal requirements upon the federal government to impose climate regulation c) favourable tax policies and government subsidies through appropriations riders, and d) the use of executive authority by the administration to create and enforce new emissions laws outside of Congress. On the push side, the project argues that the actors pushing for developmental state policies have also been forced to heed alternative implementation strategies because of the harsh neoliberal climate . The main way that this has been accomplished is by building the developmental state as a radically decentralized entity. That is, unlike the developmental states of East Asia and Western Europe – referred to as Developmental Bureaucratic States – which are often housed in a single location , with a single agency title, and a single budget, Washington has established what is commonly referred to as a Developmental Network State. This form of developmental apparatus is, by contrast, highly decentralized, with its activities being carried out across literally thousands of labs, coordinated across a labyrinth of hundreds of different office s and state level agencies, and its budge ts being extremely diffuse . This decentralization has helped to render the American developmental state considerably less visible than others found in Western Europe and East Asia, and has allowed it to develop and mature throughout the heart of neoliberal ism’s ideological ascendency. Following in this tradition, much of the alternative energy innovation policy in question has been forced to adopt this somewhat ‘hidden’ or stealthy characteristic in order to avoid political scrutiny. Finally, the project attempts to demonstrate that, in spite of their continued progress, the policies and institutions that promote and underpin this state led development of alternative technologies are always rather precarious and fragile, and that as these two competing logics continue to do battle with each other, the future of a technology centric American climate policy remains highly uncertain. The project thus traces the ebb and flow of this political battle over the past three decades, with a particular focus on the dev elopments taking place since 2009. Contributions to the existing literature In undertaking this type of analysis, the thesis aims to make at least three important contributions to the existing literature. The first is a critical rethinking of the implications of conceptualizing climate policy (and perhaps environmental policy more generally, though I do not extend the empirics beyond climate policy in this work) in terms of neoliberalism’s influence. By focusing specifically on neoliberalism’s tenuous relationship with the state’s broad requirement to foster accumulation, the project attempts to walk back the common depiction of neoliberal climate policy as being either anti state in its orientation, or otherwise solely focused on markets in abstract environmental commodities. In so doing, it further aims to generally reframe the common conception of the neoliberal state as an ‘absentee state’, and underscore the extent to which these pressure to promote accumulation may serve to enhance state capacity under conditions of market fundamentalism. Second, this thesis appears to be the first body of work to focus on conceptualizing US climate policy in terms of a developmental state logic. In so doing, it seeks to provide a new understanding of the federal government’s role in promoting and acting upon a technology centric climate policy, as well as contribute to the limited existing literature on the American developmental state. Finally, as there are actually very few book length studies of US climate policy from any perspective, the project aims to make an important contribution to stud ies of American climate policy in general, particularly underscoring the increasingly dynamic and robust shape of the country’s climate policy arena. Methods The policy process within large states (the US federal government not least of which) is a profoun dly complex subject of analysis, and thus direct and/or unambiguous relationships between objects and variables are extremely difficult to determine with certainty. As this body of work is largely an analysis of how existing structures shape the strategies of actors within the climate policy process, there are, in effect, three primary research tasks. The first is to develop an understanding of the historical evolution of the structures and selectivities in question and how they have come to play the roles that they have within the policy process. This has been accomplished through critical analysis of a range of secondary texts focused on each of the structures and selectivities in question. With regard to the developmental network state apparatus, Chapter 4 is the primary site of this analysis, while the four primary alternative policy pathways used to execute this logic are taken up primarily in Chapter 6 . In so doing, I am attempting to understand the factors that helped to consolidate them over time, as well as how and why actors within the policy process have felt compelled to recursively reselect for them. Beyond the use of secondary texts, government documents and reports (particularly from the Committee for Climate Change Science and Technology Integr ation) have been used to obtain and incorporate additional contemporary developments related to these structures. The second task is to attempt to understand the specific role of these structures and selectivities in the development of contemporary climate policies – specifically how they have shaped, refracted, and facilitated the goal of fostering accumulation under conditions of neoliberalism. With regard to the four specific alternative pathways, this task is taken up in Chapter 6, while the research on the developmental state is subject of Chapter 7. This has been accomplished through analysis of a combination of governmental documents (Congressional reports, federal agency reports and budgets, Congressional Research Service primers and reports , docume nts disclosed by federal R&D programs and agencies – particularly the National Climate Change Technology Initiative and Climate Change Technology Program), laboratory reports from the Federal Laboratory Consortium and Department of Energy National Laborato ry Network (budgets, objectives, project manifests, etc.), and the limited existing secondary academic literature on these structures and selectivities. Finally, I am attempting to understand how these structures and selectivities can be subject to change and alteration in the context of **anti regulationist ideology** and the changing strength of neoliberal actors in the policy process. This task shifts the analysis into the contemporary moment , as it assesses the major rollbacks that unfolded between 2010 and 2012 as anti regulationist actors enhanced their relative positions in the policy process and sought to reshape the selectivities used to achieve progressive climate policy. This task, which is the subject of Chapter 8, relies primarily on analysis of US newspapers, Congressional bill proposals , policy platforms, and (in particular) analysis of the 2012 budget passed by the Republican controlled House of Representatives, formally titled The Path to Prosperity: Restoring America’s Promise. Pl an of the dissertation In Chapter 2, the existing literature against which the project situates itself is laid out and described in detail. The chapter is concerned specifically with the three main bodies of literature briefly described above – those focus ed on the so called ‘neoliberalization’ of contemporary environmental and climate policy, and the ‘Ecological Modernization’ literature’s assumptions regarding the political and legislative conditions necessary for progressive socio technical transitions w ithin a given polity. In so doing, the chapter attempts to set the predicate for understanding why these frameworks have largely misdiagnosed neoliberalism’s influence on American climate policy (as later suggested by this project’s empirical findings), and suggest why the theoretical framework presented in the subsequent chapter provides a more accurate starting place for thinking about the relationship between neoliberalism and climate policy. Chapter 3 then delineates the project’s main theoretical sup positions. This framework aims to both offset the claims of the existing literature, as well as provide a theoretical rationale for the empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters. This section takes the form of four main theses which seek to provide both a synoptic understanding of the role of the state in the response to climate and energy crisis, as well as an on the ground explanation of how such policies are developed within neoliberal states like the US. Upon making the argument that states aim first and foremost to foster economic accumulation and self legitimacy, the role of neoliberal ideology is reconceptualized as an incidental (if highly influential) element of this much broader process – one which operates in tension with these first principle objectives. The concept of neoliberalism is, moreover, highly disaggregated in an attempt to both walk back its essentialist and homogenous depiction in much of the literature, as well as understand its dialectical relationship with the policy process.

#### Solar technology is a Trojan horse—don’t be fooled by their promises of social equity

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The Sustainable Energy Quest¶ The problems of the conventional energy order have led some to regard¶ reinforcement of the status quo as folly and to instead champion sustainable¶ energy strategies based upon non-conventional sources and a more intelligent ideology of managed relations between energy, environment, and society consonant with environmental integrity. This regime challenger seeks to¶ evolve in the social context that produced the conventional energy regime,¶ yet proposes to fundamentally change its relationship to the environment (at¶ least, this is the hope). Technologies such as wind and photovoltaic electricity are purported to offer building blocks for a transition to a future in which¶ ills plaguing modernity and unsolved by the conventional energy regime¶ can be overcome (Lovins, 1979; Hawken et al., 2000; Scheer, 2002; Rifkin,¶ 2003; World Bank, 2004b).¶ While technical developments always include social, material, ecological, intellectual, and moral infrastructures (Winner, 1977: 54 - 58; Toly, 2005),¶ and may, therefore, be key to promoting fundamentally different development pathways, it is also possible that **technologies, even environmentally**¶ **benign ones, will be appropriated by social forces that predate them and**,¶ **thereby, can be thwarted in the fulfillment of social promises attached to the**¶ **strategy**. Indeed, if unaccompanied by reflection upon the social conditions¶ in which the current energy regime thrives, the transition to a renewable¶ energy regime may usher in very few social benefits and little, if any, political¶ and economic transformation. This is the concern that guides our analysis¶ (below) of the sustainable energy movement.¶ At least since the 1970s when Amory Lovins (1979) famously posed the¶ choice between “hard” and “soft” energy paths, sustainable energy strategies¶ have been offered to challenge the prevailing regime. Sometimes the promise¶ was of no more than “alternative” and “least cost” energy (Energy Policy¶ Project of the Ford Foundation, 1974a, 1974b; O’Toole, 1978; Sant, 1979),¶ but adjectives such as “appropriate,” “natural,” “renewable,” “equitable,”¶ and even “democratic” have also been envisioned (Institute for Local SelfReliance, 2005; Scheer, 2002: 34).¶ 16¶ The need to depart from the past, especially in light of the oil crises of the 1970s and the energy-rooted threat of¶ climate change that has beset policy debate since the late 1980s, united¶ disparate efforts to recast and reconceive our energy future.¶ Partly, early criticisms of the mainstream were reflective of a broader social¶ agenda that drew upon, among other things, the anti-war and anti-corporate¶ politics of the 1960s. It was easy, for example, to connect the modern energy¶ regime to military conflicts of the period and to superpower politics; and it¶ was even easier to ally the mainstream’s promotion of nuclear power to the¶ objectives of the Nuclear Club. With evidence of profiteering by the oil¶ majors in the wake of the 1973-1974 OPEC embargo, connecting the energy¶ regime with the expanding power of multinational capital was, likewise, not¶ difficult. Early sustainable energy strategies opposed these alliances, offering promises of significant political, as well as technological, change.¶ However, in the thirty years that the sustainable energy movement has¶ aspired to change the conventional regime, its social commitments and politics have become muddled. A telling sign of this circumstance is the shifted¶ focus from energy politics to economics. To illustrate, in the celebrated work¶ of one of the movement’s early architects, subtitles to volumes included¶ “breaking the nuclear link” (Amory Lovins’ Energy/War, 1981) and “toward¶ a durable peace” (Lovins’ Soft Energy Paths, 1979). These publications offered poignant challenges to the modern order and energy’s role in maintaining that order.¶ Today, however, the bestsellers of the movement chart a course toward¶ “natural capitalism” (Hawken et al., 2000), a strategy that anticipates synergies between soft path technologies and market governance of energy-environment-society relations. Indeed, a major sustainable energy think tank has¶ reached the conclusion that “small is profitable” (Lovins et al., 2002) in¶ energy matters and argues that the soft path is consistent with “economic¶ rationalism.” Understandably, a movement that sought basic change for a¶ third of a century has found the need to adapt its arguments and strategies to¶ the realities of political and economic power. Without adaptation, the conventional energy regime could have ignored soft path policy interventions¶ like demand-side management, integrated resource planning, public benefits¶ charges, and renewable energy portfolio standards (see Lovins and Gadgil,¶ 1991; Sawin, 2004), all of which have caused an undeniable degree of decentralization in energy-society relations. In this vein, it is clear that sustainability¶ proponents must find ways to speak the language and communicate in the¶ logic of economic rationalism if they are to avoid being dismissed. We do not¶ fault the sustainable energy camp for being strategic. Rather, the concern is¶ whether victories in the everyday of incremental politics have been balanced¶ by attention to the broader agenda of systemic change and the ideas needed¶ to define new directions.¶ A measure of the sustainable energy initiative’s strategic success is the¶ growing acceptance of its vision by past adversaries. Thus, Small is Profitable was named ‘Book of the Year’ in 2002 by The Economist, an award¶ unlikely to have been bestowed upon any of Lovins’ earlier works. As acceptance has been won, it is clear that sustainable energy advocates remain¶ suspicious of the oil majors, coal interests, and the Nuclear Club. But an¶ earlier grounding of these suspicions in anti-war and anti-corporate politics¶ appears to have been superseded by one that believes the global economy¶ can serve a sustainability interest if the ‘raison de market’ wins the energy¶ policy debate. Thus, it has been suggested that society can turn “more profit¶ with less carbon,” by “harnessing corporate power to heal the planet” (Lovins,¶ 2005; L. H. Lovins and A. B. Lovins, 2000). Similarly, Hermann Scheer (2002:¶ 323) avers: “The fundamental problem with today’s global economy is not¶ globalization per se, but that this globalization is not based on the sun—the¶ only global force that is equally available to all and whose bounty is so great¶ that it need never be fully tapped.” However, it is not obvious that market¶ economics and globalization can be counted upon to deliver the soft path¶ (see e.g. Nakajima and Vandenberg, 2005). More problematic, as discussed¶ below, the emerging soft path may fall well short of a socially or ecologically¶ transforming event if strategic victories and rhetorics that celebrate them¶ **overshadow systemic critiques** of energy-society relations and the corresponding need to align the sustainable energy initiative with social movements to¶ address a comprehensive agenda of change.¶ Catching the Wind¶ To date, the greatest success in ‘real’ green energy development is the¶ spread of wind power. From a miniscule 1,930 MW in 1990 to more than¶ 47,317 MW in 2005, wind power has come of age. Especially noteworthy is¶ the rapid growth of wind power in Denmark (35 percent per year since 1997),¶ Spain (30 percent per year since 1997), and Germany (an astonishing 68¶ percent per year since 2000), where policies have caused this source to threaten¶ the hegemony of fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Wind now generates more¶ than 20 percent of Denmark’s electricity and the country is the world leader in¶ turbine manufacture. And as the Danes have demonstrated, offshore wind has¶ the potential to skirt some of the land-use conflicts that have sometimes beset¶ renewable energy alternatives. Indeed, some claim that offshore wind alone¶ might produce all of Europe’s residential electricity (Brown, 2004). National¶ energy strategists and environmental movements in and beyond Europe have¶ recognized the achievements of the Danes, Spaniards, and Germans with initiatives designed to imitate their success.¶ What are the characteristics of this success? One envied feature is the¶ remarkable decline in the price of wind-generated electricity, from $0.46 per¶ kWh in 1980 to $0.03 to $0.07 per kWh today (Sawin, 2004), very close to¶ conventionally-fueled utility generating costs in many countries, even before environmental impacts are included. Jubilant over wind’s winning market performance, advocates of sustainable energy foresee a new era that is¶ ecologically much greener and, yet, in which electricity remains (comparatively) cheap. Lester Brown (2003: 159) notes that wind satisfies seemingly¶ equally weighted criteria of environmental benefit, social gain, and economic efficiency:¶ Wind is...clean. Wind energy does not produce sulfur dioxide emissions or nitrous¶ oxides to cause acid rain. Nor are there any emissions of health-threatening mercury¶ that come from coal-fired power plants. No mountains are leveled, no streams are¶ polluted, and there are no deaths from black lung disease. Wind does not disrupt the¶ earth’s climate...[I]t is inexhaustible...[and] cheap.¶ This would certainly satisfy the canon of economic rationalism.¶ It is also consistent with the ideology of modern consumerism. Its politics¶ bestow sovereignty on consumers not unlike the formula of Pareto optimality,¶ a situation in which additional consumption of a good or service is warranted¶ until it cannot improve the circumstance of one person (or group) without¶ decreasing the welfare of another person (or group).¶ 17¶ How would one know¶ “better off” from “worse off” in the wind-rich sustainable energy era? Interestingly, proponents seem to apply a logic that leaves valuation of “better” and¶ “worse” devoid of explicit content. In a manner reminiscent of modern economic thinking, cheap-and-green enthusiasts appear willing to set wind to¶ the task of making “whatever”—whether that is the manufacture of low-cost¶ teeth whitening toothpaste or lower cost SUVs. In economic accounting, all¶ of these applications potentially make some in society “better off” (if one¶ accepts that economic growth and higher incomes are signs of improvement).¶ Possible detrimental side effects or externalities (an economic term for potential harm) could be rehabilitated by the possession of more purchasing power,¶ which could enable society to invent environmentally friendly toothpaste¶ and make affordable, energy-efficient SUVs. Sustainable energy in this construct cooperates in the abstraction of consumption and production. Consumption-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose, and, relatedly,¶ production-of-what, -by-whom, and -for-what-purpose are not issues. The¶ construct altogether ignores the possibility that “more-is-better” consumption-production relations may actually reinforce middle class ideology and¶ capitalist political economy, as well as contribute to environmental crises¶ such as climate change. In the celebration of its coming market victory, the¶ cheap-and-green wind version of sustainable energy development may not¶ readily distinguish the economic/class underpinnings of its victory from those¶ of the conventional energy regime.¶ Wind enthusiasts also appear to be largely untroubled by trends toward¶ larger and larger turbines and farms, the necessity of more exotic materials to¶ achieve results, and the advancing complications of catching the wind. There¶ is nothing new about these sorts of trends in the modern period. The trajectory of change in a myriad of human activities follows this pattern. Nor is a¶ critique per se intended in an observation of this trend. Rather, the question¶ we wish to raise is whether another feature in this pattern will likewise be¶ replicated—namely, a “technological mystique” (Bazin, 1986) in which social life finds its inspiration and hope in technical acumen and searches for¶ fulfillment in the ideals of technique (Mumford, 1934; Ellul, 1964; Marcuse,¶ 1964; Winner, 1977, 1986; Vanderburg, 2005).¶ This prospect is not a distant one, as a popular magazine recently illustrated. In a special section devoted to thinking “After Oil,” National Geographic approvingly compared the latest wind technology to a well-known¶ monument, the Statue of Liberty, and noted that the new machines tower¶ more than 400 feet above this symbol (Parfit, 2005: 15 - 16). It was not hard to¶ extrapolate from the story the message of Big Wind’s liberatory potential.¶ Popular Science also commended new wind systems as technological marvels, repeating the theme that, with its elevation in height and complexity¶ lending the technology greater status, wind can now be taken seriously by¶ scientists and engineers (Tompkins, 2005). A recent issue of The Economist¶ (2005) included an article on the wonder of electricity generated by an artificial tornado in which wind is technologically spun to high velocities in a¶ building equipped with a giant turbine to convert the energy into electricity.¶ Indeed, wind is being contemplated as a rival able to serve society by the¶ sheer technical prowess that has often been a defining characteristic of modern energy systems.¶ Obviously, wind energy has a long way to go before it can claim to have¶ dethroned conventional energy’s “technological cathedrals” (Weinberg,¶ 1985). But its mission seems largely to supplant other spectacular methods of¶ generating electricity with its own. The politics supporting its rapid rise¶ express no qualms about endorsing the inevitability of its victories on tech-¶ nical grounds. In fact, Big Wind appears to seek monumental status in the¶ psyche of ecologically modern society. A recent alliance of the American¶ Wind Energy Association and the U.S. electric utility industry to champion¶ national (subsidized) investment in higher voltage transmission lines (to¶ deliver green-and-cheap electricity), illustrates the desire of Big Wind to¶ plug into Giant Power’s hardware and, correspondingly, its ideology (see¶ American Wind Energy Association, 2005, supporting “Transmission Infrastructure Modernization”). The transformative features of such a politics are¶ unclear. Indeed, wind power—if it can continue to be harvested by everlarger machines—may penetrate the conventional energy order so successfully that it will diffuse, without perceptible disruption, to the regime. The air¶ will be cleaner but the source of this achievement will be duly noted: science¶ will have triumphed still again in wresting from stingy nature the resources¶ that a wealthy life has grown to expect. Social transformation to achieve¶ sustainability may actually be unnecessary by this political view of things, as¶ middle-class existence is assured via clean, low-cost and easy-to-plug-in wind¶ power.¶ **Small-is-Beautiful Solar18**¶The second fastest growing renewable energy option—solar electric¶ power—is proving more difficult to plug in. Despite steady declines in the¶ cost per kWh of energy generated by photovoltaic (PV) cells, this alternative¶ remains a pricey solution by conventional standards. Moreover, the technology does not appear to have significant scale economies, partly because the¶ efficiency of PV cannot be improved by increasing the size of the device or its¶ application. That is, unit energy costs of large installations of many PV arrays¶ do not deviate appreciably from those for small installations comprised of¶ fewer arrays. Instead, the technology seems to follow a modular economic¶ logic in which unit costs neither grow nor decline with scale. Some have¶ praised this attribute, suggesting that PV’s modularity means there are no¶ technical or economic reasons for scaling its application to iconic levels that¶ conventional power plants now represent, potentiating a more robust system¶ of distributed generation and delivering clean energy to previously¶ marginalized populations (Martinot and Reiche, 2000; Martinot et al., 2002).¶ Small-Is-Beautiful Solar is attributed with social empowerment potential¶ by Vaitheeswaran (2003: 314) who notes that PV (and other small scale electricity generation technologies) can overcome social barriers through a “collision of clean energy, microfinance, and community empowerment,” three¶ properties that may lift the burden of poverty and promote democratic social¶ relations. “Micropower,” he argues (2003: 314), “is beginning to join forces¶ with village power.” Thus, it would seem that a Solar Society might depend¶ upon a different politics than Big Wind in displacing a fossil and nuclear¶ energy driven world economy.¶ Perhaps because PV has, so far, found wider social usage in rural contexts¶ where poverty (as modernly conceived) persists, discussions, in fact, crop up¶ about solar’s social project. For example, arguments have formed around the¶ gender interests of PV, at least as it has been diffused in rural life to date (see,¶ for example, Allerdice and Rogers, 2000). And criticism has surfaced about¶ PV’s ‘capture’ by the state as a tool to quiet, if not mollify, the rural poor¶ (Okubo, 2005: 49 - 58). There has even been a charge that PV and other¶ renewables are being used by multilateral organizations such as the World¶ Bank to stall Southern development. By imposing a fragmented patchwork¶ of tiny, expensive solar generators on, for example, the African rural landscape, instead of accumulating capital in an industrial energy infrastructure,¶ the World Bank and other actors are accused of being unresponsive to the¶ rapid growth needs of the South (Davidson and Sokona, 2002; Karekezi and¶ Kithyoma, 2002). A related challenge of PV’s class interests has raised questions about the technology’s multinational corporate owners and offered¶ doubts about successful indigenization of solar cell manufacturing (AbleThomas, 1995; Guru, 2002: 27; Bio-Energy Association of Sri Lanka, 2004:¶ 20). Regardless of one’s position on these debates, it is refreshing to at least¶ see solar energy’s possible political and economic interests considered.¶ But PV’s advocates have not embraced the opportunities created by its¶ rural examiners to seriously investigate the political economy of solar energy. The bulk of solar research addresses engineering problems, with a modest social inquiry focused on issues of technological transition in which solar¶ electricity applications are to find their way into use with as little social¶ resistance or challenge as possible. A green politics that is largely unscarred¶ by conflict is, and for a long time has been, anticipated to characterize an¶ emergent Solar Society (Henderson, 1988; Ikeda and Henderson, 2004). Likewise, **solar economics is thought to be consensual** as non-renewable options¶ become too expensive and PV cells, by comparison, too cheap to be refused¶ their logical role (see, for example, Henderson, 1995, 1996; Rifkin, 2003). It¶ seems that a solarized social order is inevitable for its proponents, with technological breakthrough and economic cost the principal determinants of when¶ it will arrive.¶ In this regard, ironically, Small-is-Beautiful Solar shares with Big Wind ¶ the aspiration to re-order the energy regime without changing society. Despite modern society’s technological, economic, and political addiction to¶ large-scale, cheap energy systems that solar energy cannot mimic, most PV¶ proponents hope to revolutionize the technological foundation of modernity, without disturbing its social base. A new professional cadre of solar¶ architects and engineers are exhorted to find innovative ways of embedding¶ PV technology in the skin of buildings (Strong, 1999; Benemann, Chehab,¶ and Schaar-Gabriel, 2001), while transportation engineers and urban planners are to coordinate in launching “smart growth” communities where vehicles are powered by hydrogen derived from PV-powered electrolysis to¶ move about in communities optimized for “location efficiency” (Ogden, 1999;¶ Holtzclaw et al., 2002). The wildly oversized ecological footprint of urban¶ societies (Rees and Wackernagel, 1996) is unquestioned as PV **decorates its**¶ **structure**.¶ These tools for erecting a Solar Society intend to halt anthropogenic¶ changes to the chemistry of the atmosphere, rain, and soil mantle while enabling unlimited economic growth. In the Solar Society of tomorrow, we will¶ make what we want, in the amounts we desire, without worry, because all of its¶ energy is derived from the benign, renewable radiation supplied by our galaxy’s¶ sun. Compared to Big Wind, PV may cost more but it promises to deliver an¶ equivalent social result (minus the avian and landscape threats of the former)¶ and, just possibly, with a technical elegance that surpasses the clunky¶ mechanicalness of turbines propelled by wind. In this respect, Solar Society¶ makes its peace with modernity by leaving undisturbed the latter’s cornucopian¶ dreams¶ 19¶ and, likewise, **poses no serious challenge** to the social and political¶ structures of the modern era.¶ At this precise point, inequality and conflict can only be conceived in¶ Solar Society as the results of willful meanness and greed. While the solar¶ variety of technological politics guiding society may be relatively¶ minimalist—no towering new monuments or spectacular devices are¶ planned—it would be no less committed to the ideals of technique in shaping¶ social experience and its self-assessment. Similarly, its economics would¶ warmly embrace a form of consumptive capitalism, although with cleaner¶ inputs (and possibly throughputs) than before.¶ While the discussion here of sustainable energy advocacy has concentrated on its wind- and solar-animated versions, we believe that strategies¶ anticipating significant roles for geothermal, biomass, micro-hydro, and hydrogen harvested from factories fueled by renewables anticipate variants of¶ the social narratives depicted for the two currently most prominent renewable¶ energy options. The aim of producing more with advancing ecological efficiency in order to consume more with equally advancing consumerist satisfaction underpins the sustainable energy future in a way that would seamlessly¶ tie it to the modernization project.¶ 20

#### Their complexity arguments are a management strategy to divest us of authority for any collective action

Dean '10 Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, "Complexity as capture--neoliberalism and the loop of drive" http://www.academia.edu/859473/Complexity\_as\_capture\_neoliberalism\_and\_the\_loop\_of\_drive

Given the convergence between finance and critical theory around the notion of complexity, it's not surprising to find an overlap with Friedrich Hayek. The rejection of accountability, of politics, repeats his argument against economic planning: we cannot know. For Hayek the problem of the economy is a problem of knowledge. As he points out, economic knowledge is widely distributed; much of it is local, a matter of the availability of materials and workers and infrastructure. Economic knowledge is also subject to constant change. Infinite particulars of time and place, chance and circumstance, call for constant modulation. ³It wouldseem to follow,´ Hayek concludes, ³that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of theresources immediately available to meet them.´¶ His argument against central economic planning, then, is that it is impossible because knowledge cannot be totalized. Total knowledge, complete knowledge, is unobtainable. Foucault specifies the idea that limits on knowledge are limits on government as the economic rationality of liberalism. Liberalism extends the problem of economic knowledge into a more fundamental incompatibility between ³the non-totalizable multiplicity of economicsubjects of interest and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign.´¶ Insisting that the totality of economic processes cannot be known, liberal economics renders a sovereign view of the economy impossible. In other words, for the liberal, the limit of sovereign knowledge is a limiton sovereign power. As Foucault puts it, homo economicus tells the sovereign, ³You must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that you are powerless. And why are you powerless, why can't you? You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know.´¶ Just as the impossibility of complete knowledge served as a wedge against sovereign power, so does the inability to know emerge as an attempt to block or suppress politics, to displace matters of will and action onto questions of knowledge.

#### Our alternative is a regulated paradigm shift for decision-making framework that recognizes a material foundation for autonomy as a prerequisite to democratic communication.

Briscoe '12 Felicia, Professor of Education at UTSA, "Anarchist, Neoliberal, & Democratic Decision-Making: Deepening the Joy in Learning and Teaching" Education Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 1

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00131946.2011.637257#preview

A More Equal Distribution of Resources Emma Goldman describes anarchism as “an order that will guarantee to every human being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life” (1907, 68). Rocker (1938) describes the effects of acute inequality in the distribution of resources: Our present economic system, leading to a mighty accumulation of social wealth in the hands of a privileged minority and to a continuous impoverishment of the great masses of the people ***. . .*** sacrificed the general interests of human society to the private interests of individuals and thus systematically undermined the relationship between man and man [sic]. People forgot that industry is not an end in itself, but should be only a means to insure to man his material subsistence and to make accessible to him the blessings of a higher intellectual culture. Where industry is everything and man is nothing begins the realm of ruthless economic despotism whose workings are no less disastrous than political despotism. (2)19 Although Rocker wrote in 1938, the polarization of wealth20 and the elevation of industry (or business/corporate interests) over human interests remain true.21 **An equal distribution of economic power or resources is fundamental to equalizing power relationships**. One anarchist, Fotopoulos (2008), describes this necessary “economic democracy *. . .* as the authority of the people *demos* in the economic sphere, implying the existence of economic equality in the sense of an equal distribution of economic power” (442). Without equal power relations brought about by a fairly equal distribution of wealth, the individual autonomy advocated by deep democracy and anarchism cannot be operationalized. Each Person Directly Participates in Decisions Affecting Her or His Life (Autonomy) Anarchism’s and deep democracy’s call for a more equal distribution of resources helps to create the conditions necessary for autonomy. Perhaps the single most important foundation of anarchist thought is autonomy, as described by Anna Goldman (2010): [Anarchism is] based in the understanding that we are best qualified tomake decisions about our own lives.Anarchists believe that we must all control our own lives,making decisions collectively about matters, which affect us. Anarchists believe and engage in direct action. (para 7) Several scholars have analyzed the importance of autonomy to human experience. Although Paulo Freire (1970) does not describe himself as an anarchist, his analysis of autonomy in regards to determining one’s own thoughts and actions is often quoted by anarchists such as Spring (2008). Freire (1970) discusses the death that occurs without autonomy: Overwhelming control—is necrophilic; it is nourished by love of death, not life. Based on a mechanistic, static, naturalistic, spatialized view of consciousness; **it transforms students into receiving objects.** It attempts to control thinking and action, leads men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative power. (64) Freire’s description of overwhelming control resonates with Mr. Jackson’s description of his experience in an urban school, with students being “tested to death” under the current policies. A number of scholars22 note that without equal power relationships, there is little autonomy; without autonomy, **authentic communication becomes impossible**.

### ADV 2

#### Solar power doesn’t solve the environment

**Zycher 11** – visiting scholar at AEI (Benjamin, April 20, 2011, “The Folly of Renewable Electricity,” AEI, <http://www.aei.org/article/energy-and-the-environment/alternative-energy/the-folly-of-renewable-electricity/>)

A cleaner environment is worth it, you say? Not so fast. As counterintuitive as it may seem, increased reliance on wind and solar power will hurt the environment, not because of such phony issues as endangered cockroaches, used by the environmental left as a tool with which to obstruct the renewable energy projects that they claim to support. Instead, this damage will be real, in the form of greater air pollution. The conventional generators needed to back up the unreliable wind and solar production will have to be cycled up and down because the system operators will be required to take wind and solar generation when it is available. **This means greater operating** inefficiency **and** more emissions. That is precisely what a recent engineering study of the effects of renewables requirements found for Colorado and Texas.

#### This means they have to win total mindset shift—good luck with that

**Barnhizer, 6** (David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n)

Devotees of sustainability pin their hopes on an awakening by an enlightened populace that will rise up and insist that business and government behave in ways that reflect the idea that "[a] sustainable society is one that can persist over generations, one that is far-seeing enough, flexible enough, and wise enough not to undermine either its physical or its social systems of support." n81 This awakening is not going to happen. There will never be a populist revolution in the way humans value the environment, social justice, and other matters of moral consequence. We frequently "talk the talk," but rarely "walk the walk." n82 This discrepancy is partly an individual failure, but it is even more a result of the powerful forces that operate within our culture. Residents of Western cultures are shaped by the system in which they live. They will never possess either the clarity of agenda or the political will essential to a coherent and coordinated shift in behavior due to a combination of ignorance, greed, sloth, and inundation by political and consumerist propaganda. This combination means there will be no values shift welling up from the people and demanding the transformation of our systems of production and resource use. Paul Tournier captured the essence of the cultural forces when he observed: [People] have become merely cogs in the machine of production, tools, functions. All that matters is what they do, not what they think or feel. . . . [T]heir thoughts and feelings are . . . molded by propaganda, press, cinema and radio. They read the same newspaper each day, hear the same slogans, see the same advertisements. n83Feeling helpless in the face of inordinate complexity and vast impersonal forces causes us to flee from our personal responsibility and become absorbed into the systems of institutions. The price of the required allegiance includes accepting (or appearing to accept) the institution's values as our own. We become a contributing part of the same system that oppresses us and steals our humanity and idealism. This assimilation allows us to avoid the harshest application of the system's power while reaping the rewards of collaboration. We become, in the  [\*629]  words of Pink Floyd, "just another brick in the wall." n84 When we attempt to talk about the need to do such things as internalize costs that are now allowed to remain external to the entities generating the harms and shifting to a system of low or no impact on the Earth's natural systems, we are talking about fundamental, non-voluntary changes in entitlements and lifestyle. Even Alan Greenspan drew severe criticism when he recently suggested that social security benefits should be reduced. n85 Jacques Chirac's party in France has seen its public support plummet due to efforts to reduce social spending. n86 Germans have taken to the streets in the hundreds of thousands to protest their leaders' efforts to develop plans to gain control of the German welfare state. n87 It is impossible to generate the political will that would be required to change the system we have constructed into one that satisfies the demands of sustainability. This is not surprising because the clear message is that we need economic growth. The situation we face is akin to Bangladesh where I was part of a group urging the country's Planning Minister to take potential environmental harms and ecosystem impacts into greater account in his planning. He responded that the ideas were admirable in theory but that he had to worry about generating jobs and food for 160 million people. He indicated that while he respected the arguments for sustainability his more immediate needs were to ensure jobs and food for Bangladeshis. In a similar context, while teaching international environmental law in St. Petersburg, Russia, my discussion with Russian academic colleagues related to water pollution in the area, radioactive materials dumping, and the raw air pollution from Lada cars running on 76 octane gasoline and other uncontrolled emitters of air pollution that fouled the air of this most beautiful city. At the end of the course one of my Russian colleagues said, "I found it all fascinating. But you know we have other problems with which we must deal before we can begin to worry about the environment. Perhaps in fifteen years or so we will be ready." I found myself unable to disagree with the speakers in either Bangladesh or Russia. Return to the idea of our inability to generate the political will that would be required to achieve fundamental change if we decided that the Agenda 21 type of sustainable development ideas were good social and economic strategies. Even if  [\*630]  they were desirable, they are "impossible dreams" because the people and institutions who set policy and decide on actions in the business and governmental arenas will never accept them as guides for behavior or as requirements for decisionmaking. This impossibility exists because we are not free and independent individuals but creatures of habit, dominated by the culture in which we exist. We desire to behave according to the dictates of the powerful systems that govern our lives and culture.

#### Utilities will block distributed generation

**Vandenbergh and Rossi, 12** - \* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land Use Law Program, and Director, Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt University Law School AND \*\* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School (Michael and Jim, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1527, “Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction” lexis) **NDR = Net Demand Reduction**

Similar issues arise regarding generation of electricity at the household level. Penetration of renewables into power supply is unlikely to occur if electric distributors lack incentives to permit, much less **actively encourage**, substantial increases in the supply of household-generated electricity. n72 As a general rule, investments in alternative supply options are not consistent with volumetric rates, such as investments in distributed renewable generation by either consumers or nonutility firms. The historic emphasis on promoting low rates influences how regulated utilities and regulators view the risks associated with infrastructure investments in power production and delivery, reinforcing an industry-wide approach to planning and building power generators that favors base load plants over renewable projects.¶ Small-scale, low-carbon energy projects (such as household solar photovoltaic installation) share many characteristics with household efficiency and conservation since they reduce the demand for centralized generation and transmission by supplying energy onsite. As with efforts to reduce demand, renewable energy scholars have noted that the process of installing household renewable generation systems must become routine if these systems are to make a substantial contribution to the supply of low-carbon energy. n73 Yet firms and regulators have a strong preference for base load generators over renewable plants, because investments in base load plants (which tend to be large-scale nuclear and coal plants, or hydro facilities) can be justified as providing power on a reliable basis twenty-four hours a day. n74¶ Diversification of electric power generation towards renewable resources is especially responsive to reductions in demand because most renewable resources deploy at a smaller scale and do not immediately scale up the way traditional fossil fuel plants do. To the extent these renewable sources reduce a customer's demand and this effect is multiplied across all customers on a utility's network, this [\*1550] total reduction in demand can offset the need for larger scale investments in base load fossil plants and transmission facilities. n75¶ A formidable obstacle to this kind of penetration for renewable energy is that the conventional approach to planning and building base load power plants assumes that the statistical certainty that customers are able to receive reliable power twenty-four hours a day is a requirement for every generation unit. That approach keeps both regulators and distribution utilities from valuing smaller-scale distributed renewable facilities. Once built, a base load unit will operate most efficiently at or near its capacity level. The large capital investment in a base load plant can crowd out alternative sources of electricity supply as utility engineers make decisions to dispatch individual plants to meet demand at the margin, and operation of a base load plant will typically be most efficient where it is working at or near capacity. Also, expanded transmission, once built, creates an incentive for utilities to wheel in the lowest-cost power options from the wholesale market, which will tend to be from base load plants. Although some of these plants are low-carbon nuclear plants, most of the power generated at these plants is drawn from coal-fired generators.

### ADV 1

#### Consequentalism is good and inevitable – every credible measure proves

Greene 2010 – Joshua, Associate Professor of Social science in the D epartment of Psychology at Harvard University (The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, accessed: www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Global poverty declining faster than ever—best new metrics

**McVeigh 3/16**/2013 – chief reporter for the Observer (Tracy, Guardian, “World poverty is shrinking rapidly, new index reveals”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2013/mar/17/aid-trade-reduce-acute-poverty)

Some of the poorest people in the world are becoming significantly less poor, according to a groundbreaking academic study which has taken a new approach to measuring deprivation. The report, by Oxford University's poverty and human development initiative, predicts that countries among the most impoverished in the world could see acute poverty eradicated within 20 years if they continue at present rates.

It identifies "star performer" nations such as Rwanda, Nepal and Bangladesh as places where deprivation could disappear within the lifetime of present generations. Close on their heels with reductions in poverty levels were Ghana, Tanzania, Cambodia and Bolivia.

The study comes after the UN's latest development report published last week which stated that poverty reduction drives in the developing world were exceeding all expectations. It says: "The world is witnessing a epochal 'global rebalancing' with higher growth in at least 40 poor countries helping lift hundreds of millions out of poverty and into a new 'global middle class'. Never in history have the living conditions and prospects of so many people changed so dramatically and so fast."

The brighter global picture is the result of international and national aid and development projects investing in schools, health clinics, housing, infrastructure and improved access to water. The UN also pointed to trade as being a key factor which was improving conditions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. These improvements have not been picked up in the past when poverty has been measured strictly in income terms without taking into account other factors – health, education and living standards.

The study of the world's poorest one billion people uses a new measure, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which was just updated in the 2013 UN report. It includes ten indicators to calculate poverty – nutrition, child mortality, years of schooling and attendance, cooking fuel, water, sanitation, electricity assets and a covered floor.

The initiative hopes insights from the MPI will incentivise international donors and governments to help the poorest by allowing the results to be measured. The academics believe old methods of looking at income levels – such as those living on $1.25 a day or less – ignores other deprivations in, for example, nutrition, health and sanitation.

The system was developed in 2010 by the institute's director, Dr Sabina Alkire, and Dr Maria Emma Santos. Dr Alkire said: "As poor people worldwide have said, poverty is more than money – it is ill health, it is food insecurity, it is not having work, or experiencing violence and humiliation, or not having health care, electricity, or good housing.

#### War turns structural violence

**Bulloch 8** Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 *vol. 36 no. 3* 575-595

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 But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

#### Forecasting impact scenarios based on energy trajectories is key to effective energy policy

Paul P. Craig 2, Professor of Engineering Emeritus at the University of California, Davis, What Can History Teach Us? A Retrospective Examination of Long-Term Energy Forecasts for the United States, Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 2002. 27:83–118

The applicable measure of success here is the degree to which the forecast can prompt learning and induce desired changes in behavior. The Limits to Growth model (discussed below) has been widely used to help students understand the counterintuitive nature of dynamical systems (11). Simulations and role-playing games have also been used to teach executives in the utility industry how new markets for SO2 emissions permits or electric power might behave. Experience with exercising these types of models can improve intuition for the behavior of complex systems (12–14).¶ 2.4. Use 4: In Automatic Management Systems Whose Efﬁcacy Does Not Require the Model to be a True Representation¶ Hodges & Dewar use the example of the Kalman ﬁlter, which can be used to control (for example) the trafﬁc on freeway on-ramps. These ﬁlters can model trafﬁc ﬂow, but only in a stochastic representation that does not pretend to be exact and validated, just useful. Similar ﬁlters can also be embedded in management systems controlling power systems or factory processes. As long as the model cost-effectively controls the process in question, the issue of whether it is an exact representation of reality is not of concern. Neural networks fall into this category (15).¶ 2.5. Use 5: As Aids in Communication and Education¶ By forcing analysts to discuss data and analysis results in a systematic way, forecasting models can facilitate communication between various stakeholders. The measure of success for this use is the degree to which the model improves understanding and communication, both for individuals and between groups with different mindsets and vocabularies.¶ For example, the population of a developing country at some future time might depend on childhood survival rates, longevity, female literacy, afﬂuence, income distribution, health care, and nutrition. Modeling these inﬂuences could permit better understanding of interlinkages between them and improve communication between expert groups with diverse backgrounds. Such a model could inform, for instance, a government’s long-term plans. Another example is the U.S. DOE’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook forecast (16). This widely used forecast, based on the EIA’s latest analysis of the current data and industry expectations, provides a baseline that others can and do use for their own explorations of the future.¶ When a problem is being analyzed, word leaks out and leads to suggestions, ideas, and information from outside parties. This can add to the analysis directly, or stimulate helpful complementary work by others. A politician facing a thorny problem might commission a study to locate knowledgeable people. Thus, studies can identify talent as a by-product. The National Academy of Sciences Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems (CONAES) study, one of those assessed in the DOE review of forecasts from the 1970s (Figure 1) (5), was directly or indirectly responsible for many career shifts. The American Physical Society “Princeton Study” held during the summer of 1973 was explicitly designed with this intent (17). The oil embargos of the 1970s had led many physicists to think about making career shifts. The study gave them an opportunity to learn about energy issues, to meet and get to know experts, and to ﬁnd jobs.¶ 2.6. Use 6: To Understand the Bounds or Limits on the Range of Possible Outcomes¶ Models can enhance conﬁdence through limiting or bounding cases. The Princeton Study referred to in Use 5 includes many examples (17). This study emphasized energy efﬁciency, with a focus on physical constraints to energy use. The cornerstone of the analysis was the concept of fundamental physical limits such as the ﬁrst and second laws of thermodynamics. This work showed that great potential existed for improving efﬁciency by engineering change. Energy efﬁciency became a major theme of energy policy and remains so to this day.¶ 2.7. Use 7: As Aids to Thinking and Hypothesizing¶ Forecasts can help people and institutions think through the consequences of their actions. Researchers often begin their exercises with baseline or “business-as usual” forecasts, which attempt to predict how the world will evolve assuming current trends continue. Alternative forecasts are then created to assess the potential effects of changes in key factors on the results. For example, an economic forecaster might use such an analysis to assess the likely effects of a change in property taxes on economic growth in a particular state.¶ Computer forecasting is an excellent tool to teach people the dynamics of complex systems (12, 13). The behavior of these systems is often counterintuitive, so such forecasting games can help people learn to manage them better. For example, systems dynamics models (described below) were used in the 1960s to explain why building premium housing in urban areas can under some plausible circumstances accelerate, rather than slow, migration to suburbs (14, p. 5)2.¶ Some forecasts are generated as part of scenario exploration exercises, which can be helpful any time a person or institution faces a critical choice. Oil companies, for example, are well aware that at some point the transportation sector may have to switch to some other fuel. Even though this switch may be a long time in the future, the prospect needs to be part of current contingency planning. Considering a wide range of scenarios can help institutions prepare for the many different ways the future can evolve. Institutions use forecasts to allocate physical and personnel resources. Some businesses have massive infrastructures with long time constants and ﬁnd it useful to forecast over decades (18).¶

#### Predictions and scenario building are valuable for decision-making, even if they’re not perfect

**Garrett 12**

Banning, In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

http://www.acus.org/disruptive\_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies

 “Disruptive change” that produces “strategic shocks” has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the “Arab Spring.” These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence. This “failure” to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not “come out of the blue.” We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change. We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. We can also identify potential opportunities or at least more desirable futures that we seek to seize through policy course corrections. We should distinguish “strategic shocks” that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen. But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the “sand piles” that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional “grain of sand” and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of “butterflies” that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the “force multiplier” of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly’s delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen. Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China’s aging and India’s youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world’s largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale. Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The “rise” of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy. Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the “rules of the game” and global governance as the West’s influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors. Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a “hard ceiling” on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from “failure” of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East. Thus, looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur. Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events “catch us by surprise.” But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, “prediction is very hard, especially about the future.” One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision. With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, “prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome.” One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to “predict” what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. More broadly, the human future is not predetermined but rather depends on human choices at every turning point, cumulatively leading to different alternative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future also means the future is amenable to human choice and leadership. Trends analyses—including foreseeing trends leading to disruptive change—are thus essential to provide individuals, organizations and political leaders with the strategic foresight to take steps mitigate the dangers ahead and seize the opportunities for shaping the human destiny. Peter Schwartz nearly a decade ago characterized the convergence of trends and disruptive change as “inevitable surprises.” He wrote in Inevitable Surprises that “in the coming decades we face many more inevitable surprises: major discontinuities in the economic, political and social spheres of our world, each one changing the ‘rules of the game’ as its played today. If anything, there will be more, no fewer, surprises in the future, and they will all be interconnected. Together, they will lead us into a world, ten to fifteen years hence, that is fundamentally different from the one we know today. Understanding these inevitable surprises in our future is critical for the decisions we have to make today …. We may not be able to prevent catastrophe (although sometimes we can), but we can certainly increase our ability to respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss.

#### Complexity theory is a vacuous concept – fails to establish a coherent epistemology

NB: CT = complexity theory

Morrisson 2010 (Keith, “Complexity Theory, School Leadership and Management: Questions for Theory and Practice” Educational Management Administration & Leadership 38(3) 374–393)

This positive view of CT here is not without its critics, and some questions about CT are set out in the following discussion (see Morrison, 2002, 2006). CT is widely both considered and practised in leadership and management literature outside education, and its consideration for educational leadership and management is recommended. However, while acknowledging this, the argument here also suggests that advocacy of CT in educational leadership and management should also be mindful of its difficulties and limitations, important areas of which are considered below. These are discussed in the subsections that follow, and are intended to indicate the status and value of CT both per se and to contextualize its potential with educational leadership and management. The Challenge of Novelty Many of the concepts raised by this view of CT are not new.14 For example, the tenets of CT here can be regarded as a modern-day reformulation of the structure/function or the agency/structure dyads of pre-structuration-theory sociology (Lichtenstein, 2000). Morrison (2005) argues that CT overlaps with Giddens’s (1976, 1984) theory of structuration, and that it restates Bourdieu’s principles of ‘habitus’ (1977, 1986), ‘structuring structures’ and ‘structured structures’ (Arshinow and Fuchs, 2003; Fuchs, 2003a, 2003b). That said, to identify the pedigree of this view of CT is not necessarily a weakness, as emergent theories build on existing theories, paradigms and data. Many of the elements of the view of CT here are the everyday stuff of school leadership and management discourse and practice, for example: distributed control; self-organization and emergence; communication and networking; creativity and openness; empowerment and teamwork; bottom-up developments; relationships; dynamical systems; unpredictability and non-linearity; feedback and learning for development; redundancy and diversity; collectivity and connectedness; co-evolution, continuous development and adaptation; agency and structure (Gronn, 2002, 2003; Mansfield, 2003; Fullan, 2005). The attraction of CT is that some of its key principles, though not new, are drawn together in a conceptually neat package which may be useful for school leadership and management. Some novelty in CT is clearly demonstrated in much published work on leadership.15 However CT’s strength lies in this drawing together of existing areas of educational leadership and management into a coherent theory using several mutually reinforcing, and often familiar, concepts and constructs, rather than necessarily breaking new ground. Definitions and Coherence Houchin and MacLean (2005) argue that CT has so many different meanings that it is difficult to support its being a coherent theory at all, a feature redolent of emergent theories. Indeed Burnes (2005) suggests that the scientific community itself has doubts about the validity of CT; Schneider and Somers (2006) contend that CT’s assumptions ‘remain murky’, that this impedes its utility for leadership theory, and that its terminology is obscurantist and confusing. Several commentators16 hold that there is still no consensus on the key definitions, measures, descriptions and interpretations of complexity. This is indicative of a young theory and, indeed, the reading of CT adopted here is only one reading. CT here includes perhaps uncomfortable bedfellows: cooperation together with competition (Willis, 2004); individuality with collectivity; connectedness with separation; necessary deviance with necessary conformity; diversity with homogeneity; partial predictability with partial unpredictability; solipsism with the need to understand collectivities; similarity with difference; and centralization with decentralization (Hundnes and Meyer, 2006). There appears to be an epistemological tension at the heart of CT, It argues against predictability and law-like (both universal and statistical), totalizing, standardized, positivist behaviour, yet it specifies its own laws: of emergence, self-organization, self-organized criticality, feedback, networking, connectivity, co-evolution, the inescapability of indeterminacy and nonlinearity in partially predictable and partially unpredictable environments (Ortego´n-Monroy, 2003; Parellada, 2007: 161). Indeed Smith and Humphries (2004) write that complexity theorists such as Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) accept instability and uncertainty with too much certainty. This rehearses the postmodernist’s dilemma of proscribing fixity and firmness yet holding such proscriptions fixedly and firmly. This view of CT is trapped in a double bind: if it does prescribe and predict the future then it is unconvincing, it undermines its own tenets of unpredictability. Yet, if it does not prescribe and predict the future then it has limited value. It is caught.17 Ortego´n-Monroy (2003: 387–92) suggests that CT’s several ‘theoretical incoherencies’ include that it: (1) regards change and diversity in schemas as liberating yet adheres slavishly to one schema; (2) recognizes pluralist societies yet often suggests unitary interventions; (3) encourages a structuralist approach to intervention while simultaneously advocating social constructivist approaches to such intervention; (4) mandates self-organization that may be directive, manipulative and mechanistic; and (5) does not address the problem of how to replace command and control without using command and control. There is a possible contradiction in the view of CT adopted here: it proscribes laws yet has its own laws. It is simply replacing one set of laws with another. If the view of CT here is to stand as a robust theory then these inconsistencies need to be resolved. Without such resolution, school leadership and management practices may be castles built on sand. It was argued in the opening part of this article that CT can offer considerable purchase on understanding and managing change; this remains the case, notwithstanding the trenchant criticisms here. While CT may be valuable as an overarching set of constructs, these are not without their internal inconsistencies. Prediction, Description and Explanation CT offers post hoc explanations of change and evolution, with limited prospective or predictive power (Davis and Sumara, 2005). CT can describe and theorize what has occurred and what is occurring, rather than what will occur. It proscribes predictability other than in the very short term, regarding the future as largely unpredictable and emergent over time. As a post hoc theory, CT may explain but not predict, like doing intelligence after the war is over. This may limit its utility for school managers and leaders other than in indicating conditions that promote emergent selforganization. Further, to confuse prediction with explanation may be dangerous; CT may be explanatory but not predictive in any applied, prescriptive sense. The endeavour to derive predictions from explanations is to commit Ryle’s (1949) ‘category mistake’, confusing explanation with application. Why should school leaders commit themselves to an uncertain future on the strength of a theory or a faith that an acceptable order will emerge and, in the process, be prepared to tolerate potential confusion and unnecessary, perhaps avoidable, difficulty? As Stacey (1995: 492) asks: ‘what does it mean to lead when one can plan interventions without knowing their outcomes?’ (cf. Falconer, 2007: 139–40). Should school leadership and management take a leap into an uncertain future when the evidence is limited?18 Is that not irresponsible? How does one know which choices to make at a bifurcation point, and how does the view of CT adopted here assist school managers to make decisions on which road to take? Indeed, what does it mean to ‘know’ and to be knowledgeable in a climate of uncertainty and if knowledge is both a collective and distributed property? How can one tell whether feedback is positive or negative, particularly if the future is unpredictable? CT may be giving us a cold shower of reality, that is whether we like it or not, we do not know the future. Similarly CT may be overstating the case for unpredictability, or absolving leaders and managers of responsibility. However, CT is not arguing against the fact that leaders and managers—as do scientists—have to operate with the best evidence to date, rather than having perfect knowledge. It is saying that they have to recognize the limitations of their knowledge and that plans may have to change. It is not arguing for laissez-faire management and leadership. The Nature of ‘Theory’ in Complexity Theory A major concern amongst authors is the nature and status of the view of CT qua theory. There are several elements of a ‘good’ theory,19 for example: parsimony; falsifiability; operationalizability; predictive validity; internal coherence of its terms; precision; explanatory potential; greater validity than rival theories; outline of its conceptual framework; controllability; generalizability and universality; fertility and fecundity; ability to spawn a research enterprise and to suggest a research methodology and appropriate truth tests. In terms of spawning a research enterprise, fertility and fecundity, CT has affiliated itself with several others ideas, for example, network theory.20 However this sheds little light on itself, only its affiliates. There may be elective affinities between CT and other theories, but this does not validate the view of CT adopted here. Capra (2007: 14) argues that CT is not a scientific theory in the sense of offering empirically analytic accounts of phenomena (but Sotolongo [2007: 120] refutes this). Nor does it meet Popper’s (1963, 1992) requirement for a scientific theory to be falsifiable, as anything can count as evidence of CT (cf. Murray, 2003: 416). Falsifiability is a stringent requirement for CT if it is to become truly scientific (Gregson and Guastello, 2005). Practices as diverse as teamwork and necessary autocracy (for example to move a stagnant school) are sanctioned by CT, How can CT be shown not to explain a situation? How can it be falsified? Once one has become aware of the tenets of CT as interpreted here, one sees it everywhere. Connectedness, emergence and self-organization are all around. But so can one see examples of those practices that might lay claim to being interpreted through the lenses of Freudian or Adlerian psychology; this does not make them true. The observed phenomena may be examples of Freudian or Adlerian psychology, but equally they may be examples of something else, that is, naming them is an insufficient reason for believing their correctness. The question can be raised as to what counts as evidence for the explanatory potential of CT. Of course there are other types of theory, and this places on CT the onus of justifying itself qua theory and, if it is a theory, then what kind of theory it is. Is it essentially a ‘grand’ theory as in some social science theory, or a descriptive, explanatory, reflective or prescriptive theory, a collection of elements that run well together, a metaphor or exhortation or something else? Further, the generality of its terminology and its operational vagueness render it difficult to verify empirically; it lacks precision, and precision is, as suggested above, a key element of theory. Smith and Humphries (2004: 98) argue that CT lacks the coherence of a robust theory, and they reaffirm Cohen’s (1999) comment that it is more a framework rather than a theory. Smith and Humphries (2004: 99) suggest that CT has ‘little demonstrable empirical validity’, lacks operationally empirical definitions and contains inconsistent terminology, such that it is difficult to move from theory to empirical research (2004: 91). The view of CT adopted here argues that the organism interacts with its environment, and that they shape each other. However, this is so generalized as to be almost impossible to operationalize. How does one operationalize concepts such as self-organization or emergence (Sawyer, 2005)? Fitzgerald and van Eijnatten (2002: 406) remark that CT is more of a disparate collection of ‘concepts, premises and notions’. This is, perhaps, less of a criticism than a statement of the current situation of a nascent theory or disciplinary field; it clearly supports the ‘fertility’ criterion of a the

## 2nc

### 2nc EXPROPRIATION strategy overview

#### The counterplan is an insurrectionary proposal to seize energy profits—oil proves it’s a viable strategy—we are a gateway to Any aff solvency to if we kick the CP you vote neg on presumption

Hill '6 Monica, Freedom Socialist, Voices of Revolutionary Feminism "Save the planet, end the rip-offs: Nationalize the Energy Industry"

http://www.socialism.com/drupal-6.8/?q=node/645

Profiteering by Big Oil might just be the thing that pushes U.S. consumers over the edge into insurrection mode. Given what's happening at the gas pump, that's not so wild an idea. Gas prices have leaped 31 percent in just one year! And if that weren't enough of a problem, the burning of fossil fuels has created a global warming emergency that is already making populated parts of the Earth inhabitable. Poor and working people are being stiffed, the planet is out of whack, and everyone knows it. But what's anybody doing about it? And what could be done? Solutions versus profits. **Reams have been written,** including in this newspaper, **about possible solutions**. Put an immediate cap on gas prices for nonindustrial consumers. Make autos that don't run on fossil fuel. Create a system of free, rapid mass public transportation across the country that includes light rail, heavy rail, buses, etc. Redesign cities with lots of pedestrian and bike paths. Research and implement renewable, eco-friendly energy options. All of these proposals, and more, are conceivably doable. But there's a catch. Like free, quality healthcare and public education for all, they're not generators of guaranteed, immediate, exorbitant profits. For example, it takes a great deal more labor and energy to harness wind and solar power, at present, than to extract oil. Oil men are clear on the subject. "Renewable energy," said former ExxonMobil CEO Lee Raymond in the British newspaper Economist, is "a complete waste of money." When Raymond retired last December, ExxonMobil reported profits of $36.1 billion — the largest in U.S. history. Raymond personally raked in $400 million that year. **Clearly, when wind and solar power finally get developed, it won't be thanks to capitalist industry. There is no solution for skyrocketing consumer costs and plunging planetary health as long as control of the energy industry remains in the hands of the monster oil industry and its kindred financial and industrial monopolies. Take back the stolen wealth! The obvious answer, then — the elephant sitting in the corner — is to take the control out of their hands. Energy is too important to be anything but a nonprofit, public industry: that is, a nationalized industry.** And the oil fields and rigs, the private electrical power stations and grids, etc., should be expropriated — taken from corporations like ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch/Shell without compensation. Why? Because theirs is stolen wealth in the first place. To start with, the basis of all profits is the appropriation of the enormous surplus value created by workers. By surplus value is meant the economic value of a product over and above the amount of the stingy paycheck of the worker who produced it. But, for the energy gangsters, that's just the beginning of the theft. On top of the exploitation of workers, add consumer price-gouging; corporate subsidies, tax breaks, and tax cheats; the plunder of a planetary resource, fossil fuels, that took millions of years to form; and the lost lives and looted public treasuries that are the cost of war for oil. **These are the means by which energy fortunes are built. In workers' hands. More than 80 percent of the world's oil is already nationalized. But most countries where this is true are capitalist countries, and that's a problem, because decisions are still made in the interest of big business. For that reason, what's needed is nationalization under workers' control — the direct management of industries by working people organized together. Radical? Yes. But if we want affordable energy and a Manhattan that's still above sea level 100 years from now, radical is the only way to go. And, in many places, steps are already being taken in this direction.**

### 2nc at: perm do both

#### Expropriation is mutually exclusive with ANY authority for permissible use -- neither incentives nor lifting restrictions are compatible

WiseGeek '13 -- Access Date, "In Law, What is Expropriation?" http://www.wisegeek.com/in-law-what-is-expropriation.htm

Expropriation involves taking or depriving a property owner of his or her legal rights to a piece of real [**estate**](http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-estate.htm) or some other type of property. Generally, expropriation occurs when a government confiscates a person’s land for use by the general public. For example, if the government is building a highway system that runs through a person’s land, the government may decide to confiscate the land in order to complete the highway. In most countries, the government would give the property owner a reasonable fee for taking the land. In modern times, many countries use the term expropriation interchangeably with [eminent domain](http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-eminent-domain.htm), compulsory purchase, and compulsory acquisition. **The concept of expropriation stems from Marxism, which espouses the idea that the government should be responsible for major industries** and large properties. The thought process behind taking privately-owned land was to promote a society with members of equal social status by preventing a few individuals from owning all of the land. Under traditional Marxist theories, expropriation was to occur without paying property owners for confiscated land.

### everyday experience key

#### Nah

Mas'ud **Zavarzadeh**, Marxist author, **2003**

http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/3/v3n2\_b34.html

This mimetic theory of the social, like all forms of mimesis, is founded upon the privileging of experience. The centering of “experience” in postmodern social movements has taken the form of “identity politics.” “Identity politics” is a theory that fragments social solidarity by privileging “difference,” which derives from the different experiences of people as “woman,” “gay,” “lesbian,” “black,” “Latino,”…. It deploys the difference (of experience) to naturalize “pluralism” and “multiculturalism,” and in so doing, conceals the primacy of the social division of labor in the organization of postmodern capitalism.

“Identity politics” is founded upon the assumption that the only authentic mode of political practice is acting on the basis of one’s own unique experience as a woman, a gay, a lesbian, an African-American, an African-American woman, a lesbian African-American woman…. Only an African-American can speak for an African-American; only a woman can speak for a woman, but even this is problematic for a white woman cannot speak for an African-American woman…. Accordingly, an intellectual cannot speak with any legitimacy for the proletariat because he/she does not have the appropriate “experience.” In fact, following the Foucault—Deleuze—Guattari line of ludic politics, speaking for the other is regarded, in postmodern pluralism, to be an act of violence against the other. Any “speaking for” is considered to be “universalist” and “programmatic” (to quote the second reader). A call for revolution “from above” is without experiential authenticity and thus fraudulent. One’s moral legitimacy in politics, in other words, is confined to ones experience and legitimacy disappears the moment one transgresses the boundaries of one’s experience.

As its popularity shows, “identity politics” is a highly useful theory of politics for transnational capitalism. “Identity politics” completely erases “labor” which provides the basis for commonality in all social practices, and in so doing, it obscures the political economy of “production,” which is the main source of exploitation. Before one is a gay, an African-American, a woman, a Latina, one is situated in the social division of labor. Before the emergence of “heterogeneity” (difference), there is “homogeneity” (commonality), and it is “commonality” that is the foundation of all revolutionary praxis aimed at overthrowing not only oppression (the rule of power) but also, and more importantly, exploitation (the rule of economic inequality). It is my emphasis on commonality that the second reader violently opposes and considers to be totalitarian because, unlike him/her, I regard power to be always exercised from above. In other words, I regard Foucault’s notion of power to be an ideological alibi for blurring the line between the “powerful” (the ruling class which owns the means of production) and the “powerless” (the worker who has nothing but his/her labor power to sell). The Foucauldian theory of power posits an all-inclusive power, thus providing the powerless with the illusion that he/she has as much power as anybody else: after all, Foucault assures her/him, power elicits “resistance,” and resistance” is the strongest mark of power. All people (of all classes), according to Foucault, can resist! (This, by the way is the basis for the theory of resistance in the second reader’s text.) But “even a child knows” that there is a fundamental difference between the power (of resistance) of a worker (demonstrated, for example, by absenteeism) and the power of the buyers of labor power. Power is determined in the relations of production.

“Identity politics” obscures exploitation and therefore diverts social struggle away from a revolutionary praxis for socialism and towards mere reforms for capitalism with a more humane face. It reduces solidarity to feelings of sympathy and substitutes the “moral” for the “political”; the “local” for the “global”; “context” for “history,” and “consensus” for “critique.” A radically different theory of the “other” is offered by Marx and Engels in their Manifesto of the Communist Party where they write: Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, 42).

Solidarity, in the work of Marx and Engels, is thus founded upon a historical and “conceptual” understanding (theory) of the social totality and not on “experiencing” the locality of the lifezone of the monadic subject. It is global knowledge—this “comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole”—that is the target of poststructuralist localism as well as postmodern “social movements” (from feminism and environmentalism to queer theory, all of which advocate an “identity politics” founded upon “difference”).

### perm

#### We have a link to the aff—the presumption that they increase democratic deliberation by expanding a form of consumption is the hallmark of neoliberal promises

**Mun and Byrne 2003** – Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware (Yu-Mi and John, “Rethinking reform in the electricity sector: Power liberalisation or energy transformation?”, in “Electricity Reform: Social and Environmental Challenges”, ed: Njeri Wamukonya)

4.1 Commodity policy or policy commons¶ Experience with power liberalisation suggests that its promises of efficiency,¶ environmental improvement, greater equity and more democracy¶ are overdrawn. Several explanations can be offered for the¶ worldwide embrace of what has turned out to be a poorly performing¶ policy strategy (see, e.g., Wasserman 2001; World Bank 2001). A key¶ factor surely is the effectiveness of the ideology of market efficiency,¶ which directs policy attention to the benefits of unsubsidised prices¶ and competition. In formulating a public benefits agenda as an outgrowth¶ of market processes, this ideology conceives social need in¶ commodity terms, that is, as a good or service whose value is determined¶ by individuals being able to afford more or less of it. In the¶ case of electricity, an efficiency-based strategy expects to increase service¶ and lower short- and/or long-term costs, thereby enabling more¶ people to consumer more electricity. It is the empowerment of¶ individual choice, coupled with the promise of expanding consumption,¶ that is the hallmark of commodity policy in electricity.¶ In this respect, a commodity policy relies for its claim of being a¶ distinctive source of public benefits on two premises – cornucopianism¶ and individualism. Specifically, **a** commodity **policy’s** public **benefits**¶ are **the result of** the **production of ‘more,’ on the logic that ‘more is**¶ **better’** (cornucopianism); and/or the result of a greater exercise of¶ individual choice, on the logic that individual choice is the only true¶ expression of freedom or, at least, its principal expression (individualism).¶ The experience with power liberalisation described above has underscored¶ the existence of vital public values that are neither cornucopian nor individualistic. These include the value of reducing energy¶ use in the interest of sustainability – a direct contradiction of cornucopianism;¶ the value of social equity that can only be realised by a¶ collective commitment to, for example, universal service even when it¶ is ‘inefficient’ – a direct contradiction of ‘individualism; and the value¶ of democratic deliberation and participation, which can interfere with¶ individual choice but may build long-term confidence in the efficacy¶ of the process. Because these values **inescapably conflict** with the¶ norms of commodity policy, it is not reasonable to expect them to be¶ effectively considered under existing liberalisation strategy. Furthermore,¶ **adding ‘policies’ to address them** in some manner, while maintaining¶ the basic architecture of power liberalisation, can only¶ promise to heighten awareness of the conflict between commodity¶ and non-commodity values in electricity reform.¶ **What might be an alternative base** informed by the specific experience¶ of power liberalisation? A policy commons approach (Figure¶ 2) replaces liberalisation’s marketplace – an economic space – with¶ public discourse – a socio-political space. It

 does this in recognition of¶ the fact that non-commodity values are not intended to be efficient –¶ instead, they most often are intended to correct failures of democracy,¶ equity and sustainability. These **values are lost when the decision**¶ **space is economised**. Invigorating the socio-political character of the¶ decision space is therefore essential if a public benefits agenda is to be¶ pursued.¶ The pre-liberalisation era of electricity supply hardly offers guidance¶ in this matter. Relying on a mixture of technocracy and monopoly,¶ the era preempted public discourse and responded to social and¶ political criticism only in moments of crisis. A vigorous public discourse¶ would require that technology choice, investment commitments,¶ social impacts, and ecological implications would all be¶ routinely considered in an ‘open access’ regime of ongoing evaluation.¶ As discussed below, a policy commons would be distinguished by a¶ process of evaluation unavailable in either the marketplace or technocracy.¶ As well, **the content of decisions should differ, since a policy commons**¶ **would authorise** policy **actions** that are **responsive to** a range of¶ **values incapable of being valorised within the realm of** commodity¶ **production** and consumption. These values stand apart from the¶ cornucopian and individualist norms of power liberalisation. Broadly,¶ their content is to be found in the emerging ideas of an electricity¶ system governable by communities and responsive to criteria of¶ equity and sustainability. While specific policy content will be shaped¶ by the particulars of each societal context, the evolving discourse on¶ sustainable energy strategy (Reddy et al 1997; Byrne & Rich 1992;¶ Goldemberg et al, 1988) is likely to contribute ideas about the¶ attributes of a new energy-environment-society relationship. In this¶ respect, a policy commons approach will be less likely to yield reform¶ of the power liberalisation model than a transformation of the electricity¶ policy agenda. Moving beyond the ‘genius of the market’ appears¶ to be unavoidable. What then might be elements of process and¶ content that could help to transform the policy agenda? We first examine¶ the question of process.

#### The perm is bad:

1. The plan is a bad idea, and if it’s close we’ll win you should be skeptical about including a neoliberal concession

2. Doesn’t test competition, even if it’s compatible in the abstract—here’s an advocate for rejection

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ **discourse appears impoverished**. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may **petition for a progressive middle ground**, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but **it**¶ **hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy** and politics **is the reasonable social response**. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, **acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals**,¶ **that hardly envision incremental consequences**, would **indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position**.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” **Even the vanguard of a sustainable** energy **transition seems swayed**¶ **by** the magnetism of **technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast**¶ **and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics**.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the **emblems of modernist politics**. As a result, modernist democratic practice becomes imbued with an authoritarian quality, which “deliberately eliminates the whole human personality, ignores the historic process,¶ [and] overplays the role of abstract intelligence, and makes control over¶ physical nature, ultimately control over man himself, the chief purpose of¶ existence” (Mumford, 1964: 5). Meaningful democratic governance is willingly sacrificed for an energy transition that is regarded as scientifically¶ and technologically unassailable.¶ **Triumphant Energy Capitalism**¶Where the power to govern is not vested in experts, it is given over to¶ market forces in both the conventional and sustainable energy programs. Just¶ as the transitions envisioned in the two paradigms are alike in their technical¶ preoccupations and governance ideologies, they are also alike in their political-economic commitments. Specifically, modernist energy transitions operate in, and evolve from, a capitalist political economy. Huber and Mills (2005)¶ are convinced that conventional techno-fixes will expand productivity and¶ increase prosperity to levels that will erase the current distortions of inequality. Expectably, conventional energy’s aspirations present little threat to the¶ current energy political economy; indeed, the aim is to reinforce and deepen¶ the current infrastructure in order to minimize costs and sustain economic¶ growth. The existing alliance of government and business interests is judged¶ to have produced social success and, with a few environmental correctives¶ that amount to the modernization of ecosystem performance, the conventional energy project fervently anticipates an intact energy capitalism that¶ willingly invests in its own perpetuation.¶ While advocates of sustainable energy openly doubt the viability of the¶ conventional program and emphasize its social and environmental failings,¶ there is little indication that capitalist organization of the energy system is¶ faulted or would be significantly changed with the ascendance of a renewables-based regime. The modern cornucopia will be powered by the profits of a¶ redirected market economy that diffuses technologies whose energy sources¶ are available to all and are found everywhere. The sustainable energy project,¶ according to its architects, aims to harness nature’s ‘services’ with technologies and distributed generation designs that can sustain the same impulses of¶ growth and consumption that underpin the social project of conventional¶ energy. Neither its corporate character, nor the class interests that propel¶ capitalism’s advance, are seriously questioned. The only glaring difference¶ with the conventional energy regime is the effort to modernize social relations with nature.¶ In sum, conventional and sustainable energy strategies are mostly quiet¶ about matters of concentration of wealth and privilege that are the legacy of¶ energy capitalism, although both are vocal about support for changes consistent with middle class values and lifestyles. We are left to wonder why such¶ steadfast reluctance exists to engaging problems of political economy. Does¶ it stem from a lack of understanding? Is it reflective of a measure of satisfaction with the existing order? Or is there a fear that critical inquiry might¶ jeopardize strategic victories or diminish the central role of ‘energy’ in the¶ movement’s quest?¶ **Transition without Change: A Failing Discourse**¶After more than thirty years of contested discourse, the major ‘energy¶ futures’ under consideration appear committed to the prevailing systems of¶ governance and political economy that animate late modernity. The new¶ technologies—conventional or sustainable—that will govern the energy sector¶ and accumulate capital might be described as centaurian technics¶ 21¶ in which¶ the crude efficiency of the fossil energy era is bestowed a new sheen by high¶ technologies and modernized ecosystems: capitalism without smoky cities,¶ contaminated industrial landscapes, or an excessively carbonized atmosphere.¶ Emerging energy solutions are poised to realize a postmodern transition¶ (Roosevelt, 2002), but their shared commitment to capitalist political economy¶ and the democratic-authoritarian bargain lend credence to Jameson’s assessment (1991) of postmodernism as the “cultural logic of late capitalism.”¶ Differences in ecological commitments between conventional and sustainable energy strategies still demarcate a battleground that, we agree, is¶ important—even fundamental. But so also are the common aspirations of the¶ two camps. Each sublimates social considerations in favor of a politics of¶ more-is-better, and each regards the advance of energy capitalism with a¶ sense of inevitability and triumph. Conventional and sustainable energy¶ visions equally presume that a social order governed by a ‘democratic’ ideal¶ of cornucopia, marked by economic plenty, and delivered by technological¶ marvels will eventually lance the wounds of poverty and inequality and start¶ the healing process. Consequently, silence on questions of governance and¶ social justice is studiously observed by both proposals. Likewise, both agree¶ to, or demur on, the question of capitalism’s sustainability.¶ 22¶ Nothing is said¶ on these questions because, apparently, nothing needs to be.¶ If the above assessment of the contemporary energy discourse is correct,¶ then the enterprise is not at a crossroad; rather, it has reached a point of¶ acquiescence to things as they are. Building an **inquiry into energy as a social**¶ **project will require** the recovery of a **critical voice that can interrogate**, rather¶ than concede, **the discourse’s current moorings in technological politics and**¶ capitalist **political economy**. A fertile direction in this regard is to investigate¶ an energy-society order in which **energy systems evolve in response to social**¶ **values** and goals, **and not simply according** to the dictates of technique,¶ **prices**,

 or capital. Initial interest in renewable energy by the sustainability¶ camp no doubt emanated, at least in part, from the fact that its fuel price is¶ non-existent and that capitalization of systems to collect renewable sources¶ need not involve the extravagant, convoluted corporate forms that manage¶ the conventional energy regime. But forgotten, or misunderstood, in the attraction of renewable energy have been the social origins of such emergent¶ possibilities. Communities exist today who address energy needs outside the¶ global marketplace: they are often rural in character and organize energy¶ services that are immune to oil price spikes and do not require water heated to¶ between 550º and 900º Fahrenheit (300º and 500º Celsius) (the typical temperatures in nuclear reactors). No energy bills are sent or paid and governance¶ of the serving infrastructure is based on local (rather than distantly developed¶ professional) knowledge. Needless to say, sustainability is embodied in the¶ life-world of these communities, unlike the modern strategy that hopes to¶ design sustainability into its technology and economics so as not to seriously change its otherwise unsustainable way of life.¶ Predictably, modern society will underscore its wealth and technical acumen as evidence of its superiority over alternatives. But smugness cannot¶ overcome the fact that energy-society relations are evident in which the bribe¶ of democratic-authoritarianism and the unsustainability of energy capitalism¶ are successfully declined. In 1928, Mahatma Gandhi (cited in Gandhi, 1965:¶ 52) explained why **the democratic-authoritarian bargain** and Western capitalism **should be rejected:**¶God forbid that India should ever take to industrialization after the manner of the¶ West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom (England) is today¶ keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, **it would strip the world bare** like locusts. Unless the capitalists of¶ India help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and¶ by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the service of¶ the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying the masses or¶ being destroyed by them.¶ As Gandhi’s remark reveals, social inequality resides not in access to electric¶ light and other accoutrements of modernity, but in a world order that places¶ efficiency and wealth above life-affirming ways of life. This is our social¶ problem, our energy problem, our ecological problem, and, generally, our¶ political-economic problem.¶ The challenge of a social inquiry into energy-society relations awaits.

#### Masking—reconstructing neolib to be sustainable magnifies the damage

**De Angelis**, East London political economy professor, **2009**

(Massimo, “The tragedy of the capitalist commons”, December, http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-5/capitalist-commons/, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This platform of management of the global commons is based on one key assumption: that capitalist disciplinary markets are a force for good, if only states are able to guide them onto a path of environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive growth. What this view forgets is that there is little evidence that global economic growth could be achieved with lower greenhouse gas emissions, in spite of increasingly energy-efficient new technologies, which in turn implies that alternatives might just be necessary to stop climate change. This raises the question of how we disentangle ourselves from the kind of conception of commons offered by Stiglitz, which allow solutions based on capitalist growth.¶ COMMON INTERESTS?¶ Commons also refer to common interests. To stay with the example of climate change, if there is any chance of significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions – without this implying some form of green authoritarianism – it is because there is a common interest in doing so. But common interests do not exist per se, they have to be constructed, a process that has historically proven to be riddled with difficulties – witness the feminist movement’s attempts to construct a ‘global sisterhood’; or the workers’ movement’s project of a ‘global proletariat’. This is partly the case because capitalism stratifies ‘women’, ‘workers’ or any other collective subject in and through hierarchies of wages and power. And therein lies the rub, because it is on the terrain of the construction of common global interests (not just around ecological issues, but also intellectual commons, energy commons, etc.) that the class struggle of the 21st century will be played out. This is where the centre of gravity of a new politics will lie.¶ There are thus two possibilities. Either: social movements will face up to the challenge and re-found the commons on values of social justice in spite of, and beyond, these capitalist hierarchies. Or: capital will seize the historical moment to use them to initiate a new round of accumulation (i.e. growth). The previous discussion of Stiglitz’s arguments highlights the dangers here. Because Stiglitz moves swiftly from the presumed tragedy of the global commons to the need to preserve and sustain them for the purpose of economic growth. Similar arguments can be found in UN and World Bank reports on ‘sustainable development’, that oxymoron invented to couple environmental and ‘social’ sustainability to economic growth.

Sustainable development is simply the sustainability of capital. This approach asserts capitalist growth as the sine qua non common interest of humanity. I call commons that are tied to capitalist growth distorted commons, where capital has successfully subordinated non-monetary values to its primary goal of accumulation.¶ The reason why common interests cannot simply be postulated is that we do not reproduce our livelihoods by way of postulations – we cannot eat them, in short. By and large, we reproduce our livelihoods by entering into relations with others, and by following the rules of these relations. To the extent that the rules that we follow in reproducing ourselves are the rules of capitalist production – i.e. to the extent that our reproduction depends on money – we should question the operational value of any postulation of a common interest, because capitalist social relations imply precisely the existence of injustices, and conflicts of interest. These exist, on the one hand, between those who produce value, and those who expropriate it; and, on the other, between different layers of the planetary hierarchy. And, it is not only pro-growth discourses that advocate the distorted commons that perpetuate these conflicts at the same time as they try to negate them. The same is true of environmental discourses that do not challenge the existing social relations of production through which we reproduce our livelihoods. Given that these assertions are somewhat abstract, let us try to substantiate them by testing a central environmental postulate on subjects who depend on capitalist markets for the reproduction of their livelihoods.

### complexity link

**Decentralizing decision-making onto local actors is a suppression of class politics -- their epistemic critique is a neoliberal smokescreen to reject accountability intrinsic to economic planning**

Dean '10 Jodi, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, "Complexity as capture--neoliberalism and the loop of drive" http://www.academia.edu/859473/Complexity\_as\_capture\_neoliberalism\_and\_the\_loop\_of\_drive

Given the convergence between finance and critical theory around the notion of complexity**, it's not surprising to find an overlap with Friedrich Hayek. The rejection of accountability, of politics, repeats his argument against economic planning: we cannot know**. For Hayek the problem of the economy is a problem of knowledge. As he points out, economic knowledge is widely distributed; much of it is local, a matter of the availability of materials and workers and infrastructure. Economic knowledge is also subject to constant change. **Infinite** particulars of time and place, chance and circumstance, call for constant modulation. ³It wouldseem to follow,´ Hayek concludes, ³that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of theresources immediately available to meet them.´

His argument against central economic planning, then, is that it is impossible because knowledge cannot be totalized. Total knowledge, complete knowledge, is unobtainable. Foucault specifies the idea that limits on knowledge are limits on government as the economic rationality of liberalism. Liberalism extends the problem of economic knowledge into a more fundamental incompatibility between ³the non-totalizable multiplicity of economicsubjects of interest and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign.´

Insisting that the totality of economic processes cannot be known, liberal economics renders a sovereign view of the economy impossible. In other words, for the liberal, the limit of sovereign knowledge is a limiton sovereign power. As Foucault puts it, homo economicus tells the sovereign, ³You must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that you are powerless. And why are you powerless, why can't you? You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know.´

Just as the impossibility of complete knowledge served as a wedge against sovereign power, so does the inability to know emerge as an attempt to block or suppress politics, to displace matters of will and action onto questions of knowledge.

### energy link

**The 1AC is a privatization of the planning process of energy production via laissez-faire decentralization -- that is *par excellence* the idea of neoliberalism at work. Their aversion to central planning is part and partial of an ideological preference for "de-centralized" or, more accurately** market-based **solutions**

MacNeil '12 Robert, Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the PhD degree in Political Science School of Political Studies Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ottawa © Robert MacNeil, Ottawa, Canada, 2012 "Neoliberal Climate Policy in the United States: From Market Fetishism to the Developmental State" http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/en/bitstream/handle/10393/23587/Macneil\_Robert\_2012\_thesis.pdf?sequence=1

A second and related preoccupation in the literature focuses on increased efforts to privatize and deregulate forms of environmental and resource management previously governed as common public utilities under the state (e.g. Bakker 2003; Robertson 2000, 2004; Mansfield 2004). As McCarthy and Prudham (2004) note, the intensification of efforts to privatize environmental management over the past three decades can be understood as part of a broader attack on the state-based regulatory approach to environmental protection developed and entrenched throughout the Keynesian welfare-state era. The result has been dramatic increases in “socially produced scarcity, growing inequality, and often accelerated depletion or degradation of the very resources market mechanisms were supposed to protect” (McCarthy 2005: 9). Authors in this tradition have focused primarily on the ways in which these efforts serve to undermine democratic accountability, ecological sustainability, and basic processes of social reproduction. Specific examples of this include water ownership and provision (Smith 2004; Swyngedouw 2005; Bakker 2003), wetlands (Robertson 2000, 2004), fisheries (St. Martin 2001; Mansfield 2004), wildlife (Robbins and Luginbuhl 2005); and forests (Correia 2005; McCarthy 2005). Neoliberalism and climate governanceExtending the general logic outlined above, critical political economy literatures attempting to explain neoliberalism’s influence on climate policy have generally followed the neoliberal environments literature’s intense focus on the rise of privatization and commodification policies over the past few decades. Indeed, the primary theme in this literature is that, having emerged as a major political issue in the midst of neoliberalism’s ideological ascendency, policy responses to climate change have naturally been framed in terms of neoliberal ideology’s preference for market mechanisms and aversion to command-and-control policies (Liverman 2004; Newell and Paterson 2010; Lohmann 2005, 2006; Smith et al. 2005; Brunnengraber 2007; Bond and Data 2004; Begg et al. 2005). As Newell and Paterson describe, From early on, the debate [about climate policy] reflected the broad shift in the global economy towards the power of neoliberal ideology. In environmental policy debates more generally, there were changes during the 1980s towards the idea of using economic analysis and markets to achieve environmental goals… Cost-benefit analysis, it was argued, could allow [governments] to weigh the pros and cons of particular paths to pollution control and allocate values to them accordingly… promoting the idea that rather than develop policies which specified what technologies business and individuals must use, or to simply ban particular substances or processes (so-called ‘command and control’ policies) it would be better to use ‘market mechanisms’ to achieve environmental goals (2010: 24).

#### Jevons

**Zehner 12**

Green illusions,

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Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

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The Rebound Effect Phantom The nineteenth century brought us a collection of ghoulish and chilling immortals—the headless horseman of Sleepy Hollow, Bram Stoker's Dracula, and even Abraham Lincoln's phantom train, which has been heard leaving Washington DC late at night on a circuitous funeral route toward Springfield, Illinois, where it never arrives. It was during this era, in 1865, that a man named William Stanley Jevons wrote a book about a similar sort of phantom. His book, entitled The Coal Question, started out innocently enough. Jevons documented how James Watt's introduction of the steam engine greatly improved efficiency. Seems nice. But this increase in efficiency in turn made steam engines more popular and ultimately drove coal use ever higher.4 This rebound effect, also termed the "Jevons paradox," arises again and again in various incarnations **throughout the history of energy use**: Increases in energy efficiency make energy services relatively cheaper, encouraging greater **consumption.** Energy efficiency can actually lead to negative environmental impacts unless regions institute taxes, caps, or regulations to prevent growing consumption patterns from smothering efficiency gains. As long as energy-efficiency strategies come with checks to prevent the rebound effect, efficiency proponents argue that they are highly effective. For instance, new refrigerators use just a fraction of the energy of models sold decades ago, yet because there is a limit to the amount of refrigeration space one can fit in a kitchen, the benefits of efficiency are usually not usurped by the rebound effect. Similarly, there's no indication that drivers of small cars, who achieve twice the gasoline efficiency of those driving large vehicles, tend to drive twice as much as a result. And based on numerous case studies of businesses, Rocky Mountain Institute researchers claim, "We have not seen evidence that radically more efficient commercial buildings cause people to leave the lights on all night and set their office thermostats five degrees lower. In fact, energy savings in everything from office towers to schools have often been higher than projected. People do not seem to change their behaviors simply because they have a more efficient building."5 That's nice, too. But it's not the whole story. There's another problem. Even though energy consumers might not spend their efficiency savings to buy more energy, they may choose to spend these savings on other products or endeavors that still lead to energy consumption. In this case, energy-efficiency measures can unintentionally inspire other types of consumption, leaving overall energy footprints unchanged or even larger. This occurs at the macroeconomic level as well. In short, energy-efficiency savings frequently lead to larger profits, which spur more growth and thus higher energy consumption. For instance, another Rocky Mountain Institute study shows that reducing drafts, increasing natural light, and otherwise making workplaces more efficient, can increase worker productivity by as much as 16 percent.6 This higher productivity allows firms to grow, and the resulting labor cost savings can be spent on new machinery, buildings, or expansion. These rebound effects often dwarf the original energy-efficiency effects, leading to **far greater** overall **energy consumption.**7 In fact, the authors of a central report on the rebound effect conclude, "While the promotion of energy efficiency has an important role to play in achieving a sustainable economy, it is unlikely to be sufficient while rich countries continue to pursue high levels of economic growth."8 Thus, efficiency efforts will only prove effective as long as we institute contemporaneous reforms to move from a **consumption-based economy** to one grounded in sufficiency.

#### The idea of local empowerment—ignores structural causes of income inequality, etc—just a promise of affluence

**Byrne et al 9**

(John, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy, Member of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors, [http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf+html](http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf%2Bhtml))

Contesting the imagery is difficult. Big Wind resisters cite noise, bird mortality, and the industrialization of heretofore largely untrammeled land and seascapes in their arguments against Big Wind farms. But supporters counter with scientific evidence offered by experts ranging from ornithologists to acoustics specialists and underscore the larger threat of global warming in defense of these carbon-free alternatives. Importantly, the green energy case pits one set of environmental values against another, and depends on the priority of climate change to win out. But equally important, the environmental case for green energy fails to challenge the affluence-based development path secured by earlier energy systems. **Rather than questioning** the **underlying premise** of modern society to **produce and consume without constraint**, contemporary green energy advocates warmly embrace creating “bigger and more complex machines to spur and sate an endlessly increasing world energy demand” (Byrne & Toly, 2006, p. 3) Marketing slogans originally justifying fossil energy-based obesity can be revamped to suit the new green energy agenda: choosier mothers choose renewables and better living through green energy will motivate the postclimate change consumer to do the right thing. Yet the green energy agenda **will not change the cause of** the **global warming** threat (**and** so many other **environmental harms**), namely, unlimited consumption and production. In this sense, large renewable energy systems, touted as saviors of the planet, actually appear **mainly to save modernity**. A final problem specific to an extra-large green energy project is the distinctive environmental alienation it can produce. The march of commodification is spurred by the green titans as they seek to enter historic commons areas such as mountain passes, pasture lands, coastal areas, and the oceans, in order to collect renewable energy. Although it is not possible to formally privatize the wind or solar radiation (for example), the extensive technological lattices created to harvest renewable energy on a grand scale functionally preempt commons management of these resources.10 Previous efforts to harness the kinetic energy of flowing waters should have taught the designers of the mega-green energy program and their environmental allies that environmental and social effects will be massive and will preempt commons-based, society-nature relations. Instead of learning this lesson, the **technophilic awe** that inspired earlier energy obesity now emboldens efforts to tame the winds, waters, and sunlight—the final frontiers of he society-nature commons—all to serve the revised modern ideal of **endless**, but low- to no- carbon emitting, economic growth. Paradigm Shift Shedding the institutions that created the prospect of climate change **will not happen** on the watch of the green titans or extra large nuclear power. The modern cornucopian political economy fueled by abundant, carbon-free energy machines will, in fact, risk the possibility of climate change **continually because of the core properties of the modern institutional design**.

### pithouse—more experience ev

#### Their logic is infinitely regressive—prioritizing individual position means distinct viewpoints are incommensurable, so debate devolves into endless identity categories at the expense of actionable research to change social relations

Moore and Miller 99 [Rob, Cambridge, Johan, University of Cape Town, “The Discourse of Voice and the Problem of Knowledge and Identity in the Sociology of Education,” British Journal of Sociology of Education 20 (2) p. 199-200]

The pedagogic device (Bernstein, 1990) of voice discourse promotes a methodology in which the explication of a method's social location **precludes the need to examine the content of its data** as grounds for valid explanation. Who says it is what counts, not what is said. This approach favours an ethnography that claims to reveal the cultural specificity of the category--the 'voice' of membership. What is held to be the facts, to be the case, is only so-and can only be so-from a particular perspective. The world thus viewed is **a patchwork of incommensurable** and exclusive voices or **standpoints**. Through the process of sub-division, increasingly more particularised identity categories come into being, each claiming the unique specificity of its distinctive experience and the knowledge authorised by it. The consequence of the abolition of the knowledge boundary that follows from the epistemological theses of postmodernism is the increasing specialisation of social categories (see Maton, 1998). Maton describes this process of proliferation in terms of the way such 'knower' discourses, ... base their legitimation upon the privileged insight of a knower, and work at maintaining strong boundaries around their definition of this knower-they celebrate difference where 'truth' is defined by the 'knower' or 'voice'. As each voice is brought into the choir, the category of the privileged 'knower' becomes smaller, each strongly bounded from one another, for each 'voice' has its own privileged and specialised knowledge. The client 'knower' group thus frag- ments, each fragment with its own representative ... The procession of the excluded thus becomes, in terms of the privileged 'knower', an accretion of adjectives, the 'hyphenation' which knower modes often proclaim as progress. In summary, with the emergence of each new category of knower, the categories of knowers become smaller, leading to proliferation and fragmentation within the knowledge formation. (ibid., p. 17) As Maton argues, this move promotes a fundamental change in the principle of legitimation-from what is known (and how) to who knows it. The device that welds knowledge to standpoint, voice and experience, produces a result that is inherently unstable, because the anchor for the voice is an interior **authenticity that can never be demonstrated, only claimed** (Taylor

, 1992; Siegel, 1997; Fuss, 1990, 1995). Since all such claims are power claims, the authenticity of the voice is constantly prone to a purifying challenge, 'If you do not believe it you are not one of us' (Hammersly & Gomm, 1997, para. 3.3) that gears down to ever more rarefied specialisations or iterations of the voice category; **an unstoppable spiral** that Bernstein (1997, p. 176) has referred to as the 'shrinking of the moral imagination [10]. As Bernstein puts it, 'The voice of a social category (academic discourse, gender subject, occupational subject) is constructed by the degree of specialisation of the discursive rules regulating and legitimising the form of communication' (1990, p.23). If categories of either agents or discourse are specialised, then each category necessarily has its own specific identity and its own specific boundaries. The speciality of each category is created, maintained and reproduced only if the relations between the categories of which a given category is a member are preserved. What is to be preserved? The insulation between the categories. It is the strength of the insulation that creates a space in which a category can become specific. If a category wishes to increase its specificity, it has to appropriate the means to produce the necessary insulation that is the prior condition to its appropriating specificity. (ibid.) Collection codes employ an organisation of knowledge to specialise categories of person, integrated codes employ an organisation of persons to specialise categories of knowledge (Bernstein, 1977, pp. 106-111). The instability of the social categories associated with voice discourse reflects the fact that there is no stable and agreed-upon way of constructing such categories. By their nature, they are always open to contestation and further fragmentation. In principle, there is no terminal point where 'identities' can finally come to rest. It is for this reason that this position can reappear so frequently across time and space within the intellectual field-the same move can be **repeated endlessly under the disguise of 'difference'**. In Bernstein's terms, the organisation of knowledge is, most significantly, a device for the regulation of consciousness. The pedagogic device is thus a symbolic ruler of consciousness in its selective creation, positioning and oppositioning of pedagogic subjects. It is the con- dition for the production, reproduction, and transformation of culture. The question is: whose ruler, what consciousness? (1990, p. 189) The relativistic challenge to epistemologically grounded strong classifications of knowl- edge **removes the means whereby social** categories and their **relations can be** strongly theorised and **effectively researched** in a form that is other than arbitrary **and** can be **challenged** by anyone choosing to assert an alternative perspective or standpoint.

## 1nr

### no solvency extension

#### Filter the aff through the likely utility reaction—they have HUGE informational power and thoroughly control the private choice to use certain energy types—they would SQUASH the plan

**Vandenbergh and Rossi, 12** - \* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land Use Law Program, and Director, Climate Change Research Network, Vanderbilt University Law School AND \*\* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School (Michael and Jim, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1527, “Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction” lexis)

The incentives of retail electric distribution utilities are essential because these utilities are critical gatekeepers for household demand reduction programs. This is an important but easily overlooked point. Retail electric distributors, both public and private, interact regularly with consumers, and they control much of the flow of information to and from households and the access to opportunities for demand reduction. They can act aggressively to induce widespread adoption of new practices and more efficient equipment. Or they can conduct widely publicized programs that comply with applicable mandates and generate goodwill without actually generating major reductions in demand. In addition, **by controlling access to info**rmation **and connection with the grid, they** can encourage or **discourage other firms from selling goods** and services **that may reduce household demand**. n19 All of this can occur with little transparency to regulators and the public.

Despite the gatekeeping role of electric distribution utilities and the importance of reducing household energy demand, distributors in most jurisdictions do not have incentives to ensure that demand reduction strategies succeed on a wide scale. n20 In fact, under the regulatory regimes in most states, utilities would suffer revenue erosion if they induced substantial reductions in demand. Instead, the rate structure in most jurisdictions creates incentives for utilities to promote demand growth. If an essential gatekeeper has financial incentives to increase aggregate demand, it should not be surprising that large-scale demand reduction is not occurring.

### AT: We Meet

#### The AFF is a condition on when homeowners can enter into an agreement with her neighbor

Pashman 63 Morris is a justice on the New Jersey Supreme Court. “ISIDORE FELDMAN, PLAINTIFF AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. URBAN COMMERCIAL, INC., AND OTHERS, DEFENDANT,” 78 N.J. Super. 520; 189 A.2d 467; 1963 N.J. Super. Lexis

HN3A title insurance policy "is subject to the same rules of construction as are other insurance policies." Sandler v. N.J. Realty Title Ins. Co., supra, at [\*\*\*11] p. 479. It is within these rules of construction that this policy must be construed.¶ Defendant contends that plaintiff's loss was occasioned by restrictions excepted from coverage in Schedule B of the title policy. The question is whether the provision in the deed to Developers that redevelopment had to be completed [\*528] within 32 months is a "restriction." Judge HN4 Kilkenny held that this provision was a "condition" and "more than a mere covenant." 64 N.J. Super., at p. 378. The word "restriction" as used in the title policy cannot be said to be synonymous with a "condition." A "restriction" generally refers to "a limitation of the manner in which one may use his own lands, and may or may not involve a grant." Kutschinski v. Thompson, 101 N.J. Eq. 649, 656 (Ch. 1927). See also Bertrand v. Jones, 58 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1959), certification denied 31 N.J. 553 (1960); Freedman v. Lieberman, 2 N.J. Super. 537 (Ch. Div. 1949); Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J. Eq. 435 (Ch. 1948), affirmed per curiam, 1 N.J. 508 (1948). It would not be inappropriate to say that the word "restrictions," as used [\*\*\*12] by defendant insurers, is ambiguous. The rules of construction heretofore announced must guide us in an interpretation of this policy. I find that the word "restrictions" in Schedule B of defendant's title policy does not encompass the provision in the deed to Developers which refers to the completion [\*\*472] of redevelopment work within 32 months because (1) the word is used ambiguously and must be strictly construed against defendant insurer, and (2) the provision does not refer to the use to which the land may be put. As the court stated in Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, supra, at p. 440, "HN5equity will not aid one man to restrict another in the uses to which he may put his land unless the right to such aid is clear, and that restrictive provisions in a deed are to be construed most strictly against the person or persons seeking to enforce them." (Emphasis added)

#### And indirect effects aren’t restrictions

Viterbo 12 (Annamaria, Assistant Professor in International Law – University of Torino, PhD in International Economic Law – Bocconi University and Jean Monnet Fellow – European University Institute, International Economic Law and Monetary Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute, p. 167)

49 Measures having the **indirect effect** of limiting the ease of acquiring **foreign exchange do not amount to restrictions** (forms or applications to be filled in). The limitation may consist for instance in compulsory waiting periods for exchange.

### Complexity

#### Complexity theory confuses explanation with prescription – hopelessly fails

Morrisson 2010 (Keith, “Complexity Theory, School Leadership and Management: Questions for Theory and Practice” Educational Management Administration & Leadership 38(3) 374–393)

The view of CT adopted here has been used prospectively, to prescribe actions and situations that promote change and development. For example, school leaders and managers can promote the climate or conditions for emergence-through-self-organization by fostering creativity, openness, diversity, energy, networking, relationships and people-skills, order without control, co-evolution, connectedness, support, trust, dialogue, cooperation and competition, feedback, bottom-up developments and distributed power.22 However, the legitimacy of moving from description to prescription **is questionable**. A theory of inevitability, like evolutionary theory (with emergence through self-organization—willed or not (Falconer, 2007)—occurring both behind the backs of participants as well as intentionally), may have little to offer by way of prescription. It may be inevitable that the sun rises each day, but that sanctions or enables a range of practices to occur. To move from description to prescription is dangerous. CT is used prescriptively in leadership and management literature.23 However, this is problematic (Ortego´n-Monroy, 2003: 396), as one can question whether the view of CT adopted here is disguised ideology. Under the cloak of inevitable, emergent order it is actually advocating and prescribing a particular set of practices and principles for ‘what works’. The problem is not reduced even if, more cautiously, in school leadership and management, one provides only advice on ‘how to focus efforts’ (Davis and Sumara, 2005: 318). The question raised is whether, and in what senses, CT can, or should, constitute application and prescription for practice rather than be used only as explanation. CT not only confuses explanation with prescription, but moves rapidly from being a descriptive to a prescriptive theory, yet to do this is, again, to commit Ryle’s ‘category mistake’, to mix fact and value, to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (though post-positivists might question the tenability of such distinctions). One sees that members of the human race commit murder, and one can explain this perhaps, but this is no reason to prescribe or commend it. How easily one can slip from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ is evidenced in, for example the work of several authors24 who use tenets of CT to prescribe how leaders and managers ought to behave and what dispositions and conditions they ought to cultivate. The question is raised of why school leaders and managers should use derivatives of CT to prescribe behaviour (Fitzgerald and van Eijnatten, 2002).

#### Rampant invocations of complexity are utterly erroneous – zero empirical basis

Gallagher 2012 (Michael J. Gallagher, Captain in the US Marine Corps, Fellow in the Junior Officer Strategic Intelligence Program, and Ph.D. student in international relations at Georgetown University; Dr. Joshua A. Geltzer, law clerk to Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, graduated in 2011 from Yale Law School, where he served as editor in chief of the Yale Law Journal, received his Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College, London, where he studied on a Marshall Scholarship; Dr. Sebastian L. v. Gorka, Director of the Homeland Defense Fellows Program at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, and also teaches Irregular Warfare and US National Security at NDU and Georgetown, Spring 2012, “The Complexity Trap,” http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher\_Geltzer\_Gorka.pdf)

We live in a world of unprecedented complexity, or so we are told. President Obama’s words above echo an increasingly common narrative in the American foreign policy and national security establishments: the forces of globalization, rising nonstate actors, irregular conflict, and proliferating destructive technologies have made crafting sound national security strategy more elusive than ever before. 2 If “strategy is the art of creating power” by specifying the relationship among ends, ways, and means, 3 then the existence of unprecedented complexity would seem to make this art not only uniquely difficult today but also downright dangerous, inasmuch as choosing any particular course of action would preclude infinitely adaptive responses in the future. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates memorably described, the pre-9/11 challenges to American national security were “amateur night compared to the world today.” 4 And as former State Department Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter recently stated, there is a “universal awareness that we are living through a time of rapid and universal change,” one in which the assumptions of the twentieth century make little sense. 5 The “Mr. Y” article that occasioned her comments argued that, in contrast to the “closed system” of the twentieth century that could be controlled by mankind, we now live in an “open system” defined by its supremely complex and protean nature. 6 Unparalleled complexity, it seems, is the hallmark of our strategic age.¶ These invocations of complexity permeate today’s American national security documents and inform Washington’s post-Cold War and -9/11 strategic culture. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review begins its analysis with a description of the “complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of World War II has the international terrain been affected by such farreaching and consequential shifts.” 7 In a similar vein, the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 argues that the international system is trending towards greater degrees of complexity as power is diffused and actors multiply. 8 The Director of National Intelligence’s Vision 2015 terms our time the “Era of Uncertainty,” one “in which the pace, scope, and complexity of change are increasing.” 9 Disturbingly, the younger generation of foreign policy and national security professionals seems to accept and embrace these statements declaiming a fundamental change in our world and our capacity to cope with it. The orientation for the multi-thousand-member group of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy calls “conquering complexity” the fundamental challenge for the millennial generation. Complexity, it appears, is all the rage. ¶ We challenge these declarations and assumptions—not simply because they are empirically unfounded but, far more importantly, because they negate the very art of strategy and make the realization of the American national interest impossible. We begin by showing the rather unsavory consequences of the current trend toward worshipping at complexity’s altar and thus becoming a member of the “Cult of Complexity.” Next, we question whether the world was ever quite as simple as today’s avowers of complexity suggest, thus revealing the notion of today’s unprecedented complexity to be descriptively false. We then underscore that this idea is dangerous, given the consequences of an addiction to complexity. Finally, we offer an escape from the complexity trap, with an emphasis on the need for prioritization in today’s admittedly distinctive international security environment. Throughout, we hope to underscore that today’s obsession with complexity results in a dangerous denial of the need to strategize.

# r6 neg v. northwestern ms

## 1nc

### 1nc t increase

#### “Increase” means a net increase

Rogers 5 (Judge – New York, et al., Petitioners v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, NSR Manufacturers Roundtable, et al., Intervenors, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, Lexis)

[\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. [HN16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fe428155fdfc9074f3623f0dae9d78a&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=0ebd338d6a7793de8561db53b915effd&focBudTerms=term%20increase&focBudSel=all#clscc16)While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. [42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=42%20U.S.C.%207411&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=1f89a0e47b1996a5400e8d865d8da08a). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See [Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=104&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b541%20U.S.%20246%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=48f016ea3eabfdb898b67b348b11662c); [Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=105&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b370%20F.3d%201%2cat%2013%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=78fdfe9d48c7b91d7659b90c0198707e); [Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=106&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b342%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%207%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=fb18ff0b92931ac00621d88dae997e67). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

#### Violation – the aff lifts a restriction on eligibility – that creates a transfer of existing ITC’s to raise capital

#### Voter issue for limits and ground – increase is key to ALL Da ground – spending politics and core energy DA’s – limits expanding beyond a definitional increase makes all affs topical and kills clash

### 1nc t solar energy

#### Solar energy isn’t topical—much broader than solar power and destroys limits

**Sklar, ‘7** founder and president of The Stella Group, Ltd., in Washington, DC, is the Chair of the Steering Committee of the Sustainable Energy Coalition and serves on the Boards of Directors of the Sustainable Buildings Industry Council, the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, and the Renewable Energy Policy Project. The Stella Group, Ltd., a strategic marketing and policy firm for clean distributed energy users and companies using renewable energy (Scott Sklar, 23 October 2007, “What’s the Difference Between Solar Energy and Solar Power?” http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2007/10/whats-the-difference-between-solar-energy-and-solar-power-50358)//CC

Lee, this is a question I get often, and believe it is worth addressing. Solar "power" usually means converting the sun's rays (photons) to electricity. The solar technologies could be photovoltaics, or the various concentrating thermal technologies: solar troughs, solar dish/engines, and solar power towers. Solar "energy" is a more generic term, meaning any technology that converts the sun's energy into a form of energy—so that includes the aforementioned solar power technologies, but also solar thermal for water heating, space heating and cooling, and industrial process heat. Solar energy includes solar daylighting and even passive solar that uses building orientation, design and materials to heat and cool buildings. Now in the early 1980's, I was Political Director of the Solar Lobby, formed by the big nine national environmental groups, that embraced all solar technologies—which we viewed as wind, hydropower, and biomass, along with the long list of traditional solar conversion technologies. The thesis, which is correct, is that the sun contributes to growing plants, wind regimes, and evaporation and rain (hydropower), so that all the renewables are part of the solar family. Now, of course, most would argue that geothermal, and tidal and wave (effected by the gravitational force of the moon) are not solar, but we included these technologies as well.

#### Voter for limits and grounds – allowing solar energy makes EVERY energy type topical - hydropower and biomass – kills education and core ground specific to solar power

### 1nc immigration politics

#### Immigration deal now—avoiding costly disputes is key to effective Obama pressure

I-Hsien Sherwood (writer for the Latino Post) 3/21, 2013 “Immigration Reform 2013 News: Delays Could Hinder Reform Bill, So Speed is Necessary” http://www.latinospost.com/articles/14995/20130321/immigration-reform-2013-news-delays-hinder-bill-speed-necessary.htm

Lately, proponents of immigration reform have been optimistic about the progress of bipartisan bills in both the Senate and House of Representatives. But many pitfalls still remain, and the **sooner** an immigration reform bill emerges from Congress, the greater its chances of eventually passing.¶ In general, the longer a piece of legislation remains before Congress, with its partisan bickering, disparate constituencies and army of lobbyists each pursuing targeted ends, the more easily it is torn apart, poked through with exceptions and slandered in the press. A bill unsheltered is a bill likely doomed.¶ So while some conservatives opposed to immigration reform are raising policy objections, other are attempting a procedural flank.¶ Six Republican senators, led by Jeff Sessions of Alabama, sent a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) demanding that the process move more slowly and senators be given several months to review the bill.¶ In addition, the GOP is still reeling from its resounding loss in last year's presidential election, when 71 percent of Latinos voted to reelect their opponent, President Obama. That sent the Republicans into a bout of soul searching, prompting the latest openness to reform.¶ But that willingness may be short-lived, especially as the lessons of November fade and Congress gears up for primary battles from the conservative right and the Tea Party.¶ The **window for reform is short**, and the stakes are high, so the potential for heated arguments and tense standoffs increases, further endangering any kind of compromise bill.¶ For now, the Senate's "Gang of Eight" seems to be moving quickly and relatively smoothly toward a proposal, despite delays. They admit they'll miss their first self-imposed deadline at the end of the month, but the White House, which has been **keeping the pressure on**, says it is still confident they will present a worthwhile bill.¶ "The good news is that the Gang of Eight seems to be making progress. We are engaged with them. We are encouraged by their progress," Cecilia Muñoz, head of the White House Domestic Policy Council, which is spearheading the immigration initiative, said.¶ Whether Congress can maintain momentum on the issue remains to be seen.

#### The aff is political suicide

The Huffington Post March 18, 2013 “Hiding Renewables Inside the "All of the Above" Energy Strategy Won't Work” Lexis

"Given that the DoE's main energy efficiency and renewable energy research office (EERE) has a potential 2013 budget of about $2 billion, the trust could represent a 10 percent increase overall, and a 25 percent boost if you look only at their transportation related budget." There is a sort of poetic justice to using royalties from fossil fuel extraction to discover a way to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, but this is no one's idea of a crash program to fund alternative energy research. In fact, in an era of ideologically based antigovernment budget-cutting, an increase here will likely be offset by decreased research funding elsewhere. As John Broder wrote [2]recently in the New York Times: "Argonne National Laboratory, which has done groundbreaking research in vehicle battery technology that has helped jump-start the electric car industry in the United States...is now facing reductions under the mandatory budget cuts known as sequestration. The laboratory's director, Eric D. Isaacs... warned this week that the spending cuts would have a devastating impact on scientific innovation now and far into the future." Even worse, no sooner had the President announced his meager plan, than the usual suspects responded with their automatic, reflex-like rejection. As Phillip Rucker reported [3]last week in the Washington Post: "After details of Obama's plan emerged Friday morning, a spokesman for House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) voiced skepticism about it and suggested that the administration ought to do more to grow domestic oil and gas production." It is clear that no great national renewable energy project is possible with an anti-government Republican Party in charge of the U.S. House of Representatives. The basic research on alternative energy so vital to America's future will not take place until we elect a Congress willing to spend more money on science and technology research. It is useful for the President to use his executive authority to do whatever he can to fund this research and to raise to cost of global warming pollution through EPA's command and control style regulation. But this "small ball" strategy is not enough, and no one should be fooled into thinking it is. As I wrote [4]last week, the strategy of "all of the above" is not a real energy policy, but a political slogan designed to reduce political heat and in this case, squeeze a little renewable energy research through under the broad cloak of a policy that continues to promote fossil fuels. If we promote every form of energy, why would anyone oppose throwing a few crumbs at alternative energy? You can almost hear the Administration pleading to industry lobbyists: "We're not some soft-minded advocates of renewable energy, we're not against fossil fuels; we're in favor of every form of energy." This may sound like pragmatic, hard-headed politics inside the beltway, but from out here it seems weak, confused and self-defeating. We're not going to transition off fossil fuels by continuing to promote their extraction and use. We need strong, direct, Presidential leadership. **We need a President willing to expend real political capital** and take this issue on directly. The world doesn't need America to lead an "all of the above" approach to energy. The intense demand for energy in the developing world is already following that strategy. China is spending money on solar. But the real money is going to fossil fuels. Coal fired power plants are being built and planned at a ferocious rate. According to the World Resources Institute[5]: "...1,199 new coal-fired plants, with a total installed capacity of 1,401,278 megawatts (MW), are being proposed globally. These projects are spread across 59 countries. China and India together account for 76 percent of the proposed new coal power capacities." There is no question that demand for energy will continue to increase, and that inadequate energy supplies would be economically devastating and politically destabilizing. It is easy to see why national leaders, like our own President, gravitate to the "all of the above" energy strategy. My point is that we do not need governments to advocate or pursue "all of the above". The free market will take care of that on its own. The only way to intervene in that market is to fund the basic research that will generate a transformative energy technology. The only way to reduce the use of fossil fuels is to develop an energy source that is cheaper and hopefully safer and cleaner than fossil fuels. Until government funds the basic research needed to develop renewable alternatives, we will have no choice but to burn fossil fuels. It's certainly true that an extra $200 million a year for energy research can't hurt. Perhaps the President will find a few other billion in the military and NSF budgets to add to the fund. A little extra cash can go a long way in the hands of capable scientists. But something this important needs more attention, more rhetoric and much more money. There is no single issue more important to the development of a sustainable economy than the transition to renewable energy. We have a President who seems to understand this in his brain, but his awareness has not made the journey to his gut. In contrast to President Obama's understanding of the issue and his sense that it requires government action, we see Republicans in Congress denying climate science and delegitimizing any role for government in addressing our energy needs. While one would think that our nation's economic well-being might stimulate some consensus on this issue, we see either a cynical denial of scientific fact or a level of scientific illiteracy that is truly terrifying. The approach followed by some political leaders, such as President Obama and Governor Andrew Cuomo is to give climate deniers a pass: "Even if you don't think we have a climate problem we should certainly...(fill in the blank):\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ protect our infrastructure from flooding; pursue all energy sources we can find; invest in energy efficiency, and so on. They and their advisors will argue that we need to be politically realistic, and build consensus. Most of the time I agree with that approach; but the private market forces behind fossil fuels are strong and growing. The demand for energy in the developing world, and our own deep dependence on energy here in America ensures a growing demand for energy. Americans can get more efficient and stop wasting energy; but no one around here is going to go off the grid and power down. The climate problem will only get worse if we do not transition off of fossil fuels. The political power of energy companies is an intense and central part of the environment of policy decision making in Washington. It may well be that the Obama team has decided to invest its political capital elsewhere, where the probability of success seems greater. It would take unusual courage and skill to pursue government energy policy that resists this economic and political force. It may be too much to expect President Obama to push back against this force, but without strong and constant Presidential leadership, rapid change is unlikely.

#### **Top priority—PC stewardship key**

Shifter 12/27 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?” 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3186

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. ¶ Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear.

#### Reform is a shot in the arm for India and China—skilled labor visas

Williams 11/9 Carol is an LA Times international affairs writer. “Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform,” 2012, <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a **significant shot in the arm for India and China**."¶ There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### Key to China relations and growth

**Koehn and Yin, ‘2**

[Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-Huang Yin, “The expanding roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China relations: transnational networks and trans-Pacific interactions”, M.E. Sharpe, pg. 16, 2002]

Among the various social forces that could re-shape U.S.-China relations, Chinese American families are among **the most established** global players. Chinese-immigrant entrepreneurs have not only transplanted their family networks, they also have expanded Chinese-owned trans-Pacific trade, transportation businesses, and banks. The third type of trans-Pacific family, in particular, illustrates how Chinese Americans who maintain borderless family networks act to strengthen U.S.-China economic relations—one critically important aspect of the overall relationship. Businesses on both sides need a gateway to help penetrate each other’s market. Trans-Pacific family networks of all three types can provide such a gateway. Family and kinship connections are the Chinese rim’s building blocks. Given their global family networks and economic power, Chinese Americans have profoundly shaped and will continue to influence U.S.-China relations.

#### Extinction

**China Daily, 8** (Rikki N. Massand and Gazelle Emami, “U.S.-China relations at the world's fingertips,” 4-20-2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-04/20/content\_6629700.htm, JMP)

To frame the importance of this discussion and the topics that must be met, Siegal used the analogy of “the U.S. and China having their hands around each other’s necks and we’re both going over the waterfall.” After that comment a man in the audience then suggested that in that case both countries would have to look to the other for help and teamwork would be the only way to survive.

That theme resonated from coast to coast. At the University of California-Berkeley, speaker Sidney Rittenberg took a more intimate approach to U.S.-China relations. A man who lived in China for 35 years, Rittenberg has worked for the past two decades as an advisor to major corporations doing business in China such as AIG, Intel, Hughes Aircraft, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, and Ford. At the Bay Area gathering he emphasized respect and dignity through his own stories, and instead of categorizing the issues into right and wrong Rittenberg advocates looking at the bigger picture. For him the imperative for Americans is to learn to get along with the Chinese.

 “We must -- we don't have a choice. **The crises that threaten the human race**, like weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist groups, global warming, **none of the issues will get resolved unless we work with China**, Brazil, India and of course Europe and other countries. Really the central axis that holds the whole thing together is the U.S. and China," Rittenberg said.

### 1nc t tax credit

#### - the plan is a fiscal incentive, not a financial incentive

Rudolph & Rudolph 1 Lloyd I. Rudolph is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Chicago, AND Susanne Hoeber Rudolph is professor of political science at the University of Chicago, "Iconisation of Chandrababu: Sharing Sovereignty in India’s Federal Market Economy" Economic and Political Weekly May 5, 2001 http://dss.ucsd.edu/~mshugart/federmarketeconomy.pdf

34 Financial incentives are “defined as those where the government is directly involved in the financing of the projects and comprise: – provisions of funds for financing investment operations; government involvement in fixed capital investment for new industrial units; financing and other assistance in setting up technologically pioneering and prestigious units; expansion and diversification of existing units.” Fiscal incentives – “mainly aim at reducing the tax burden and (or providing subsidies) to an investor. These include: provisions for various sales tax exemptions; deferment of tax schemes; octroi exemptions (an indirect tax); reductions and exemptions of other taxes such as property taxes; other incentives such as export based incentives.” Other incentives – “many other incentives are also provided to help in the setting up of projects. These include: help in formulating project analysis; allowances for subsidising services like generating sets; feasibility reports; incentives for modernisation schemes, special incentives and all other incentives that cannot be classified under a common head but basically which increase the economic viability of a foreign unit by non-financial means” [Venkatesan and Varma 1998:45].

#### Voting issue---Broad definitions could include 40 different mechanisms---destroys limits and makes it impossible to be negative

Moran, 86 **-** non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development and holds the Marcus Wallenberg Chair at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University(Theodore, Investing in Development: New Roles for Private Capital?, p. 29 - googlebooks)

Guisinger finds that if “incentives” are broadly defined to include tariffs and trade controls along with tax holidays, subsidized loans, cash grants, and other fiscal measures, they comprise more than forty separate kinds of measures. Moreover, the author emphasizes, the value of an incentive package is just one of several means that governments use to lure foreign investors. Other methods—for example, promotional activities (advertising, representative offices) and subsidized government services—also influence investors’ location decisions. The author points out that empirical research so far has been unable to distinguish the relative importance of fundamental economic factors and of government policies in decisions concerning the location of foreign investment—let alone to determine the effectiveness of individual government instruments.

#### They destroy core negative ground--- fiscal incentives take away spending and budget tradeoff disads, the best politics links and core counterplans

### 1nc k

#### Financialization of energy production is a neoliberal tool to subvert communal agency—fuels inequality and unsustainable practices

**Hildyard et al 2012** – \*founder and Director of The Corner House, a U.K. research and advocacy group focusing on human rights, the environment, and development, co-editor of The Ecologist, \*\*co-founder of the Durban Group for Climate Justice (February, Nicholas Hildyard, Larry Lohmann and Sarah Sexton, The Corner House, “Energy Security For What? For Whom?”, http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Energy%20Security%20For%20Whom%20For%20What.pdf, WEA)

The neoliberal market-driven approach to energy policy in Europe and¶ North America that is actively promoted throughout the world by the¶ International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and through bilateral¶ investment treaties and the Energy Charter Treaty is barely 30 years¶ old. Prior to the 1980s, energy – oil, gas, coal and electricity – was¶ largely provided either by state monopolies at prices determined by the¶ state with investment centrally planned by government bureaucracies,¶ or by private monopolies subject to government oversight and regulation to protect users from excessive charges. Markets, in which for-profit companies competed with each to generate, distribute and supply¶ “energy”, were considered “hopelessly inadequate in providing appropriate energy supplies,”¶ 3¶ considered to be “the lifeblood of the world¶ economy.”4¶ “Moving to the market,” however, was proposed as a way of ensuring¶ investment in energy infrastructure – power plants, transmission systems and storage capacity – that would not only guarantee supplies to¶ consumers at cheaper prices but would also direct investment to the¶ most cost-effective means of reducing carbon emissions.¶ 5¶ But markets have singularly failed to deliver on these promises. Directly opposed to forms of social and economic organisation that seek¶ to guarantee the shared right of all to survival, market-based energy¶ policies have led to the exclusion of those who cannot afford to pay for¶ the energy they require to meet their basic needs. The **financialisation**¶ **of “energy**”– where the production and distribution of oil, gas and electricity is mediated and shaped not just by markets in general but by¶ financial markets in particular,¶ 6¶ and where capital is accumulated primarily through financial speculation rather than production – is also¶ **jeopardising investment in the infrastructure that might enable a just**¶ **transition** to a sustainable and equitable climatic future. Investment is¶ diverted into trading on money or the products of money, often creating¶ energy shortages in the process through the speculative “gaming” of¶ energy markets. Just as energy is now “saturated with the language of¶ security”,¶ 7¶ so, too, it is “infused by the logic of finance”,¶ 8¶ even though¶ financialisation is conspicuously absent from energy security narratives.¶ Market-led policies **marginalise the role of communities** and ordinary¶ people in decision-making: instead “choices” about future energy technologies and use are left to those who have economic and political¶ power within the range of markets that affect energy. The input of¶ consumers is reduced to the (limited) decisions they can make within¶ energy retail markets based on price signals alone: the cost of electricity or gas. Debates over **how society might be differently organised** to¶ generate and use (less) “energy” in different ways are entirely sidelined,¶ except where they might provide opportunities to make money.¶ Meanwhile, efforts to address climate change through carbon trading¶ and other market mechanisms are fatally delaying the action that is¶ necessary to prevent runaway global climatic instability, whilst at the¶ same time creating new sources of conflict and insecurity.

#### The impact is extinction—focus on production and technology in the neoliberal frame generates crises and precludes other orientations

**Holleman 2012** – assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon (June, Hannah, sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy”, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1, WEA)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for market intervention in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the market shaping energy policy. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust.

The current version of capitalist ideology, which absorbs energy scholars (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt green rhetoric today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to re-write the history of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars.

Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “**social gravity**” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006).

In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the mythological basis of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ feminist ecologists, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the empirical evidence, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an alternative approach to energy that¶ **belies the notion that “there is no alternative.”** They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ inequalities around the global and between North and South have only worsened in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43).

Today, neoliberal mythology has severely hindered the development of a wider ¶ environmental justice consciousness in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In energy studies this view is especially pronounced in the focus on ¶ technology, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and alternative energies that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, feminist and critical human ecology, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is in contrast to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “internalize the externalities,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative.

Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, **the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives**, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that **there’s no way we can just subcontract** our ¶ **environmental conscience to** the **new** breed of **green marketers**” (McKibben 2010).

Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation

The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social catastrophe with much of the ¶ damage irreversible. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, increased warfare to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009).

These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production.

As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical thresholds in the biosphere’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ **planetary boundaries** will be irreversible (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011).

This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system:

“Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and feminist ecology, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are gendered and racialized. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Vote neg to eschew neoliberal frameworks—they’re unsustainable and insulate decisionmaking from deliberation and alternative assumptions needed to solve

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a ¶ mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ¶ ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with ¶ incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global ¶ warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, ¶ in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our ¶ future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, ¶ consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the ¶ aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent ¶ valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through **collective deliberation** ¶ and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., ¶ Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions ¶ that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which ¶ although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of ¶ calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature ¶ arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single ¶ dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria ¶ methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but ¶ also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., ¶ Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that ¶ **rather than finding a “solution”** to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted¶ dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from ¶ below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be ¶ explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, ¶ designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and ¶ calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social ¶ field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any ¶ type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by ¶ many of us—even if some of them are still **acting as if economic incentives are the only viable** ¶ **policy tool** in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is ¶ decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The ¶ fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic ¶ and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up¶ soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (**because they are** **designed** to ¶ function **under such behavioral assumptions** in the first place). In other words, these solutions ¶ subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and ¶ “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and ¶ Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also ¶ Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory ¶ experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity ¶ that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, ¶ e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity ¶ instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in ¶ an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of ¶ natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization ¶ and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus ¶ public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is ¶ precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of ¶ neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political ¶ demands of various stakeholders and the general public, **limiting the only channels for** ¶ **communication** available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps ¶ most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur ¶ behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into ¶ market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Needless to say, economic activities that generate pollution and consume energy are not recent ¶ phenomena that are exclusive to what is now increasingly being called the neoliberal era. If ¶ anything, postwar Keynesian developmentalism was possible precisely because of the ¶ availability of cheap oil, and is responsible for an enormous amount of environmental pollution ¶ and ecological degradation (Mitchell, 2011). In this sense, it would be wrong to present ¶ neoliberal as being the only responsible mode of governmentality for the dual crises of climate ¶ change and natural resource depletion. Yet, this does not change the fact that the neoliberal ¶ reason (in its free-market and mechanism-design variations) is pushing its agenda in an era ¶ where both of these crises are reaching catastrophic levels, and it is highly questionable whether ¶ neoliberal methods of handling the environmental pollution and the extraction crisis will be¶ capable of addressing long-term concerns.

### 1nc grid da template

#### Grid upgrades now, but pacing is key

**POWERGRID International, 12/17/12** – from the editors based on an interview with Andre Begosso, managing director in the Accenture management consulting practice and is focused on the resources operating group. He has more than seventeen years of experience in the utility and energy industries and advises clients in the alternative energy, power generation and oil and gas sectors (“2013 trends for the power industry” December, <http://www.elp.com/blogs/eye-on-the-grid/2012/12/2013-trends-for-the-power-industry.html>)

In the absence of some major advance in energy storage, Andre said, he expects that renewable energy installation will probably start to slow as its shortcomings become more apparent to utilities and power companies.¶ "I would not expect these trends to continue because of the tremendous limitation that renewable technologies have. You cannot break the laws of physics or the laws of chemistry. The wind doesn't blow all the time and it never will, and the sun doesn't always shine and it never will," he said.¶ Trend No. 4: Energy back on the agenda¶ In my last blog post , I speculated about what it might take to get energy policy back on the agenda. When I asked about this, Andre said energy already is back on the agenda.¶ "Over the next 3 years, over $220 billion in new **infrastructure will be built. But** the problem with infrastructure is Rome wasn't built in a day. It takes time," he said.¶ This new wave of infrastructure upgrades will require a level of patience and understanding on the part of ratepayers that Andre wonders whether the average person is capable of. During Hurricane Sandy, for example, Con Edison had one of the most sophisticated electric grids available — yet it still failed, and people wonder why.

#### Rapid solar development overwhelms the rate of transmission upgrades and collapses the grid—sequencing key

**Martin, 9** (Christopher, Bloomberg, “Wind Promises Blackouts as Obama Strains Grid With Renewables” 8/7, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=arbHcz0ryM_E>)

President Barack Obama’s push for wind and solar energy to wean the U.S. from foreign oil carries a hidden cost: overburdening the nation’s electrical grid and increasing the threat of blackouts.¶ The funding Obama devoted to get high-voltage lines ready for handling the additional load of alternative supplies is less than 5 percent of the $130 billion that power users, producers and the U.S. Energy Department say is needed.¶ Without more investment, cities can’t tap much of the renewable energy from remote areas, said Jon Wellinghoff, chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. He serves as the administration’s top official on grid issues and recognizes the dilemma it faces.¶ “As we add more and more wind power, the grid will get more stressed, and there’s going to be a point where the grid can’t handle any more,” Wellinghoff said at an energy conference in Chicago. “The first thing we need is to build out transmission.”¶ The country’s electricity network sprawls over 211,000 miles (340,000 kilometers) of high-voltage power lines, a patchwork connecting substations and transformers owned by utilities and federal agencies.¶ Obama’s $787 billion stimulus plan to end the deepest U.S. recession since the 1940s dedicates $6 billion in the next two years to expand the country’s transmission system for renewable energy. By contrast, China is spending 23 percent of its 4 trillion yuan ($585 billion) in stimulus to make its grid ready for alternative sources, using advanced electrical technologies from Zurich-based ABB Ltd. and American Superconductor Corp.¶ Grid Gets Less¶ “China’s our fastest-growing market,” said Jason Fredette, investor relations manager at Devens, Massachusetts- based American Superconductor, which has outperformed the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index by 93 percentage points this year. “We’re not counting on U.S. stimulus money.”¶ The Energy Department’s latest round of loan guarantees, announced July 29, underscored the government’s emphasis on alternative energy over the transmission system itself. The department said it will provide as much as $30 billion for renewable projects, compared with $750 million to increase the reliability of the nation’s power network.¶ The administration is counting on private utilities and transmission developers to complement its investment, according to Wellinghoff. Yet a full refit of the U.S. grid would cost $13 billion annually over 10 years, compared with the $5 billion a year averaged over the last decade, said Rich Lordan of the Electric Power Research Institute, an industry-funded energy research organization in Palo Alto, California.¶ Consumer Backlash¶ The amount utilities will spend is limited by how much consumers are willing to pay for transmission work and alternative energy, said Keith Martin, a lawyer at New York- based Chadbourne & Parke LLP who represents developers of renewable projects. A new solar-power facility costs three times as much as a coal-fired plant of the same size, the Energy Department estimates.¶ “Five years from now, we could experience ratepayer backlash,” Martin said.¶ Encouraging alternative sources without preparing the grid heightens the risk of shortages, said Will Gabrielski, an analyst with Broadpoint AmTech Inc. in San Francisco. He ranked first in a Bloomberg analyst survey based on the 12-month accuracy of his calls on Houston-based Quanta Services Inc., the largest U.S. builder of power lines.

#### Overloads the entire grid

**Rutgers News 8** (“Sustainable Energy Must Be Integrated Into Existing Power Grid, Says Rutgers–Camden Finance Scholar,” 11/18, <http://news.rutgers.edu/medrel/news-releases/2008/11/sustainable-energy-m-20081118/>)

CAMDEN -- Engineers and entrepreneurs are rushing to explore alternative sources of efficient and renewable energy in New Jersey and elsewhere in the country. A Rutgers School of Business—Camden professor has strong words of caution as projects involving wind farms and photovoltaic cells proliferate.¶ With the electric-power industry poised for its most dramatic changes in decades, too little thought is being devoted to coordinating these piecemeal initiatives, warns [Richard Michelfelder](http://business.camden.rutgers.edu/FacultyStaff/Directory/michelfelder.htm) in a recent edition of The Electricity Journal, the leading policy journal for the electric industry.¶ The consequence, he fears, might well be a disastrous overload of the nation’s electrical grid.¶ An assistant professor of finance at the Rutgers School of Business—Camden and former president and CEO of Quantum Consulting Inc., a national public utilities consulting firm based in Berkeley, Cal., Michelfelder comes to his assessment after a quarter-century in the energy-technology industry.¶ “When you start adding random assets to the grid, you also add the possibility of disruptions in the coordination of the flow of electricity,” says Michelfelder.

#### Blackouts cause nuclear meltdowns

**Cappiello ‘11** (Dina, reporter for the AP March 29, 2011 “AP IMPACT: Long Blackouts Pose Risk to US Reactors” The Post and Courier <http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2011/mar/29/ap-impact-long-blackouts-pose-risk-us-reactors/?print>)

Long before the nuclear emergency in Japan, U.S. regulators knew that a power failure lasting for days at an American nuclear plant, whatever the cause, could lead to a radioactive leak. Even so, they have only required the nation’s 104 nuclear reactors to develop plans for dealing with much shorter blackouts on the assumption that power would be restored quickly. In one nightmare simulation presented by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2009, it would take **less than a day** for radiation to escape from a reactor at a Pennsylvania nuclear power plant after an earthquake, flood or fire knocked out all electrical power and there was no way to keep the reactors cool after backup battery power ran out. That plant, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station outside Lancaster, has reactors of the same older make and model as those releasing radiation at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, which is using other means to try to cool the reactors. And like Fukushima Dai-ichi, the Peach Bottom plant has enough battery power on site to power emergency cooling systems for eight hours. In Japan, that wasn’t enough time for power to be restored. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Institute trade association, three of the six reactors at the plant still can’t get power to operate the emergency cooling systems. Two were shut down at the time. In the sixth, the fuel was removed completely and put in the spent fuel pool when it was shut down for maintenance at the time of the disaster. A week after the March 11 earthquake, diesel generators started supplying power to two other two reactors, Units 5 and 6, the groups said. The risk of a blackout leading to core damage, while extremely remote, **exists at all U.S. nuclear power plants**, and some are more susceptible than others, according to an Associated Press investigation. While regulators say they have confidence that measures adopted in the U.S. will prevent or significantly delay a core from melting and threatening a radioactive release, the events in Japan raise questions about whether U.S. power plants are as prepared as they could and should be. A top Nuclear Regulatory Commission official said Tuesday that the agency will review station blackouts and whether the nation’s 104 nuclear reactors are capable of coping with them. As part of a review requested by President Barack Obama in the wake of the Japan crisis, the NRC will examine “what conditions and capabilities exist at all 104 reactors to see if we need to strengthen the regulatory requirement,” said Bill Borchardt, the agency’s executive director for operations. Borchardt said an obvious question that should be answered is whether nuclear plants need enhanced battery supplies, or ones that can last longer. “There is a robust capability that exists already, but given what happened in Japan there’s obviously a question that presents itself: Do we need to make it even more robust?” He said the NRC would do a site-by-site review of the nation’s nuclear reactors to assess the blackout risk. “We didn’t address a tsunami and an earthquake, but clearly we have known for some time that one of the weak links that makes accidents a little more likely is losing power,” said Alan Kolaczkowski, a retired nuclear engineer who worked on a federal risk analysis of Peach Bottom released in 1990 and is familiar with the updated risk analysis. Risk analyses conducted by the plants in 1991-94 and published by the commission in 2003 show that the chances of such an event striking a U.S. power plant are remote, even at the plant where the risk is the highest, the Beaver Valley Power Station in Pennsylvania. These long odds are among the reasons why the United States since the late 1980s has only required nuclear power plants to cope with blackouts for four or eight hours. That’s about how much time batteries would last. After that, it is assumed that power would be restored. And so far, that’s been the case. Equipment put in place after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks could buy more time. Otherwise, the reactor’s radioactive core could begin to melt unless alternative cooling methods were employed. In Japan, the utility has tried using portable generators and dumped tons of seawater, among other things, on the reactors in an attempt to keep them cool. A 2003 federal analysis looking at how to estimate the risk of containment failure said that should power be knocked out by an earthquake or tornado it “would be unlikely that power will be recovered in the time frame to prevent core meltdown.” In Japan, it was a one-two punch: first the earthquake, then the tsunami.

#### Extinction

**Lendman ‘11** (Stephen, Research Associate of the Center for Research on Globalization, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan,” <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Nuclear-Meltdown-in-Japan-by-Stephen-Lendman-110313-843.html>)

Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized.

#### Solar over-reliance drives up electricity prices

**Bedzak, 12** - president of Management Information Services Inc (Rocger, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, “Not-So-Green Superhighway; Unforeseen consequences of dedicated renewable energy transmission” February, lexis) **LCOE = levelized cost of electricity**

Deriving accurate, comparable LCOE estimates for RE is difficult, and it might not even be possible to meaningfully compare the LCOEs of dispatchable and non-dispatchable energy sources. Renewables suffer from problems of low and highly variable capacity factors, intermittency, unreliability, need for storage and backup, requirements for expanded transmission, and reliance on government subsidies and government-mandated utility quotas.¶ For example, while coal plants can have capacity factors above 85 percent, the estimated capacity factor the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA) uses for wind is 34 percent. EIA assumes 31 percent for ST and 22 percent for PV. In its RES study, JP Morgan used slightly lower capacity factors: 30 percent for wind, 30 percent for ST, and 20 percent for PV. While these might be reasonable as national averages, they also might be somewhat high. n13 An accurate LCOE for RE must take into account these low capacity factors, but even such an adjustment might not fully account for the fact that few renewable resources actually might be available when they're needed most. n14¶ EIA's levelized cost estimates for RE use a 31 percent capacity factor for wind, 31 percent for ST, and 22 percent for PV. n15 However, if actual capacity factors are lower than this, these LCOE estimates have to be increased.¶ Further, it isn't clear how backup power costs should be incorporated into RE LCOE estimates. Given the fact that many RE technologies are variable and non-dispatchable, near 100 percent backup might be required--as it is in Germany. n16 Further, given that RE resources might not be reliably available when they're needed most, 24x7 spinning reserve or dedicated, firm demand response resources often might be required. **This need** for backup **translates into a** large RE premium--paying once for the RE system and again for either load-shedding capabilities or fossil fuel systems, which must be kept continually running at a low level to be able to quickly ramp up when needed. Thus, the total cost of such a system should include the cost of the RE system and the cost of the backup power system. n17

#### This causes a depression

**Entine, 9** – adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (Jon, “U.S. and Climate Change--Rescue of the Planet Postponed?”, 2/24, [http://aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29333/pub\_detail.asp](http://aei.org/publications/filter.all%2CpubID.29333/pub_detail.asp))

**The correlation between** economic **growth and energy costs is high and negative**; when energy costs go up, productivity takes a nosedive. In these extraordinary times, arguably the top priority must be to ensure that a secular financial downturn doesn't turn into a worldwide structural depression. If that happens, both the economy and the environment will be losers.

#### Nuclear war

Cesare Merlini 11, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs, May 2011, “A Post-Secular World?”, Survival, Vol. 53, No. 2

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### 1nc nrdc cp

#### The United States federal government should eliminate energy tax credits and subsidies. The Environmental Protection Agency should set technology-neutral performance standards requiring a state-specific, scalable reduction in carbon emissions from existing power plants in the United States, based on recommendations from the Natural Resources Defense Council.

#### The CP substantially decreases CO2 emissions, air pollution and boosts the economy by driving a mix of investments in energy efficiency and renewables

**NRDC, 12 –** Natural Resources Defense Council Issue Brief (“Using the Clean Air Act to Sharply Reduce Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, Creating Clean Energy Jobs, Improving Americans’ Health, and Curbing Climate Change” December, <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-IB.pdf>)

This administration can create jobs, grow the economy, and curb climate change by going after the country’s largest source of climate-changing pollution—emissions from the hundreds of existing power plants. NRDC’s proposal shows how the Environmental Protection Agency, in partnership with the states, can set new carbon pollution standards under existing authority in the Clean Air Act that will cut existing power plant emissions 26 percent by 2020 (relative to peak emissions in 2005). The approach includes an innovative provision that will drive investment in cost-effective energy efficiency, substantially lowering the cost of compliance, lowering electricity bills, and creating thousands of jobs across the country. Further, NRDC’s analysis shows that the benefits—in saved lives, reduced illnesses and climate change avoided—far outweigh the costs, by as much as 15 times.¶ Having endured a year when climate change contributed to damaging floods, widespread wildfires, record drought and superstorm Sandy, which cost Americans hundreds of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, we can’t afford to wait any longer to act. For the health and welfare of Americans, for the nation’s economy, and for the stability of the planet, now is the time to reduce pollution from America’s power plants, dramatically increase the energy efficiency of our economy and reduce the threat of climate change.¶ We know where the pollution is; now we just have to go get it.¶ THE IMPERATIVE TO CUT CARBON POLLUTION¶ Unless heat-trapping carbon pollution is sharply reduced, negative impacts on the health of our families, communities, economy and our planet will only grow. ¶ Already, climate change is increasing the numbers of record heat waves, droughts, and floods—and these extreme weather events will become even more powerful and frequent, threatening both lives and the global economy. In the wake of superstorm Sandy, which devastated swaths of the U.S. coastline, states and cities must rebuild for this new reality. But simply preparing for more extreme weather is not an answer by itself. Future storms will be stronger and do even worse damage unless we act now to curb the carbon pollution that is driving dangerous climate change. ¶ To this end, nothing is more important than reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the largest industrial source of pollution: electricity-generating power plants. In the United States these plants emit about 2.4 billion tons of CO2 each year, roughly 40 percent of the nation’s total emissions. ¶ To be sure, the EPA has taken important first steps by setting standards that will cut the carbon pollution from automobiles and trucks nearly in half by 2025 and by proposing standards to limit the carbon pollution from new power plants. But the EPA has yet to tackle the CO2 pollution from hundreds of existing fossil-fueled power plants in the United States. ¶ The EPA has both the authority and responsibility to reduce pollution from these plants under the Clean Air Act, the nation’s bedrock air pollution law adopted in 1970. NRDC has crafted an effective and flexible approach to cut carbon pollution from existing power plants that: ¶ n Uses the legal authority under the Clean Air Act.¶ n Recognizes differences in the starting points among states.¶ n Charts a path to affordable and effective emissions reductions by tapping into the ingenuity of the states and the private sector.¶ n Provides multiple compliance options, including cleaning up existing power plants, shifting power generation to plants with lower emissions or none at all, and improving the efficiency of electricity use.¶ Using the same sophisticated integrated planning model used by the industry and the EPA, NRDC calculated the pollution reductions that would result from the proposed approach—and the costs and benefits of achieving those reductions.¶ The plan would cut CO2 pollution from America’s power plants by 26 percent from 2005 levels by 2020 and 34 percent by 2025. The price tag: about $4 billion in 2020. But the benefits— in saved lives, reduced illnesses, and climate change avoided —would be $25 billion to 60 billion, 6 to 15 times greater than the costs. For Americans’ health and welfare, for the nation’s economy, and for the health of the planet, we can’t afford not to curb the carbon pollution from existing power plants. ¶ EPA HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO REDUCE CARBON POLLUTION ¶ The Clean Air Act has been remarkably successful over its 40-year history. Most Americans now breathe much cleaner air, our cities are no longer enveloped in smoke and smog, the nation’s lakes and rivers are recovering from acid rain, and the ozone layer that shields us from dangerous ultraviolet radiation is healing after the phase-out of CFCs and other ozone-destroying chemicals.¶ The Clean Air Act can also help stem the threat of climate change by reducing carbon pollution. In 2007, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the EPA has the authority and responsibility to curb heattrapping pollutants under the Clean Air Act, rejecting the Bush Administration’s claim that greenhouse gases are not pollutants under that law. In that case, the nation’s highest court ruled that if the science shows CO2 and other heattrapping pollutants endanger public health and welfare, then the EPA must set standards to reduce their emissions from new cars and trucks. In President Obama’s first term, the EPA responded to the Supreme Court decision by presenting overwhelming scientific evidence that CO2 and the other heat-trapping pollutants do indeed endanger public health and welfare. The administration then set new standards in 2010 and 2012 to dramatically cut the carbon pollution from new cars and SUVs and from heavy trucks and buses. ¶ In a second Supreme Court decision in 2011, American Electric Power v. Connecticut, the high court ruled that it is also the EPA’s responsibility to curb the carbon pollution from the nation’s power plants. The legal authority for power plant standards comes from Section 111 of the Clean Air Act, which directs the EPA to set “standards of performance” (typically a maximum emissions rate) for stationary sources like power plants that emit harmful air pollutants. Section 111(b) covers new facilities, while Section 111(d) gives the EPA and states shared responsibility for curbing pollution from existing facilities. Under Section 111(d), the EPA issues guidelines on “the best system of emission reduction,” and then each state is required to adopt and submit a plan for setting and meeting emissions standards. ¶ In April 2012, the agency took the first step toward addressing power plant pollution by proposing the “Carbon Pollution Standard for New Power Plants” under Section 111(b). The standard would require that new plants emit no more than 1000 pounds of CO2 per megawatt-hour (lbs/ MWh). To put that in context, coal power plants typically produce about 2100 lbs/MWh, while natural gas-fired plants emit 1000/MWh or less. Power companies building new facilities could thus meet the standard with existing natural gas power plant technologies, zero-emitting renewables, or with efficient coal plants equipped with systems to capture and sequester carbon dioxide. ¶ The EPA’s assessment, widely shared in the private sector, is that even without the proposed carbon pollution standard new power supply needs will be met by a combination of natural gas, renewables, energy efficiency, and other resources because the construction of new conventional coal-fired power plants is uneconomic. The new source standard is expected to be finalized in the next few months. EPA, however, still hasn’t addressed the largest source of carbon pollution, existing power plants. NRDC’s approach addresses the challenge of creating equitable regulations for these sources under Section 111(d), recognizing that the type and mix of power plants varies among the states. If all existing power plants were limited to 1000 lbs of CO2 /MWh, for instance, states with a high percentage of coal-fired plants would face a much larger task compared to those with lots of natural gas plants or renewables. The flexible approach NRDC proposes will help reduce the carbon pollution from existing power plants in a fair, affordable, and achievable manner.¶ STATE-SPECIFIC STANDARDS AND FLEXIBLE COMPLIANCE OPTIONS ¶ The NRDC plan has two key elements: ¶ (1) EPA would set state-specific emissions rates, reflecting the diversity of the nation’s electricity sector, as well as the state-by-state structure of Section 111(d).¶ (2) Power plant owners and states would have broad flexibility to meet standards in the most cost-effective way, through a range of technologies and measures.¶ Here’s how it would work: the EPA would first tally up the share of electricity generated by coal and gas-fired plants in each state during the baseline years (2008-2010 was used for this analysis). Then the agency would set a target emission rate for each state for 2020, based on the state’s baseline share of coal and gas generation. The state standards proposed and analyzed in this report were calculated by applying a rate of 1500 lbs of CO2 /MWh for the baseline coal generation share and 1000 lbs of CO2 /MWh for the baseline gas-fired generation share. ¶ For example, a state that now gets 90 percent of its fossilfueled electricity from coal and 10 percent from gas would be required to reduce its 2020 emissions rate to 1450 lbs/MWh [(90 percent x 1500) + (10 percent x 1000)]. In contrast, a state with 90 percent gas-fired generation would have a target of 1050 lbs/MWh [(10 percent x 1500) +(90 percent x 1000)]. A state starting with a 50:50 ratio of coal and gas generation would have a target of 1250 lbs/MWh. The allowable emissions rate would drop further in 2025.¶ The emissions standard for each state would be an overall emission rate average of all fossil fuel plants in the state. An individual plant could emit at a higher or lower rate. ¶ Each covered plant with an emission rate above the state standard could meet the standard by using one or more compliance options: First, a plant could reduce its own CO2 emission rate by retrofitting a more efficient boiler or installing CO2 capture systems, for instance, or it could burn a mixture of coal and cleaner fuels, such as gas or certain types of biomass.¶ Second, the owners of multiple power plants could average the emissions rates of their plants, meeting the required emission rate on average by running coal plants less often, and ramping up generation from natural gas plants or renewable sources instead. They could retire coal plants and build new natural gas and renewable capacity, if needed, creating a cleaner overall electricity-generating fleet. Low- or zero-emitting sources, such as wind and solar, would earn credits that generators could use to lower their average emissions rate. The plan also allows trading of credits between companies within a state, and across state lines among states that choose to allow it, further lowering the overall costs of compliance.¶ An innovative feature of the proposal is the inclusion of energy efficiency. State-regulated energy efficiency programs could earn credits for avoided power generation, and avoided pollution. Generators could purchase and use those credits towards their emissions compliance obligations, effectively lowering their calculated average emissions rate. Energy efficiency is one of the lowest cost energy resources and emission reduction options. States could use this provision to slash emissions without costly and lengthy power plant retrofits or new construction, reducing the overall cost of the regulations.

#### The plan and perm rigs the market in favor of the plan’s tech over better alternatives. The CP alone solves by forcing market competition and innovation over new clean energy tech – this creates a more predictable investment climate

**Kachan, 12 -** A former managing director of the Cleantech Group, Dallas Kachan is now managing partner of Kachan & Co., a cleantech research and advisory firm (“Rethinking the role of government in cleantech” 5/16,<http://www.kachan.com/content/rethinking-role-government-cleantech>

Up with mandates and standards

Rather than funding and administering subsidies to help the clean and green tech sectors find their footing, a case could be made that governments should focus on passing aggressive policy mandates, standards and codes.

Instead of using taxpayer money to make technology bets, regional and national governments could focus on passing laws, including broad brush stroke ones like the renewable portfolio standards in the U.S. that mandate a certain percentage of power from renewable sources by certain dates, and then step back and let the private sector figure out how to deliver. Or mandate change more granularly—for example, that coal power plants need to meet certain efficiency or emissions standards by certain dates, and, again, let the private sector figure out how. (Ironically, if there were more public support to actually clean up coal power instead of simply disingenuously parroting, beginning in 2008, that “there’s no such thing as clean coal,” throwing up our hands because environmental ads told us that “clean coal doesn’t exist today”—and that translated into political will and a mandate—cleaner coal power could exist today. Yes, there’d be a penalty on the nameplate capacity of plants’ output, but there’d also be billions saved in health care costs. But we digress.)

Taxpayers should take their politicians to task for trying to play venture capitalist, i.e. by investing their money in trying to pick winners (a la Solyndra) in complicated markets. Professional venture capitalists themselves, who focus on their game full-time, barely pick one winner in 10 investments.

Drawbacks of incentives

How could government grants, loans, tax credits and other subsidies possibly be bad in cleantech? Free money is good, right? Here’s a list of drawbacks to these incentives, some of them not as obvious as others:

They can go away and cause market disruption – to wit, the points earlier in this article.

The existence of loans and grants silences critics – Few speak out against pots of free money, because they might want or need to dip into them in the future.

Incentives favor only those willing to apply for them – and therefore are often missed by companies working on disruptive, fast-moving tech, or who are focused on taking care of customers’ needs.

Criteria are often too narrowly defined – Criteria for incentives often favor certain technology (solar photovoltaic over other solar, or ethanol over other biofuels), and as a result, lock out other legitimate but different approaches.

Picking winners means designating losers – Recipients of government grants or loan guarantees get capital and an associated halo of being an anointed company. Those that don’t are comparatively disadvantaged.

Not the best track record – Incentives go to companies best staffed to apply for and lobby for them. And those aren’t necessarily the companies that could use the capital the most effectively, e.g. to compete in world markets, or create the most jobs.

What governments could and should be doing

In the cleantech research and consulting we do worldwide at Kachan & Co., we’ve come to believe that governments are best focused on activities to create large and sustained markets for clean technology products and services.

Doing so gives assurance to private investors that there will be continued demand for their investments—one of the most important prerequisites to get venture capital, limited partners and other institutional investors to write large checks.

### ADV 1

#### Solar’s too expensive even if we give away the panels

**Zehner 12**

Green illusions,

Ozzie Zehner is the author of Green Illusions and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent publications include public science pieces in Christian Science Monitor, The American Scholar, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The Humanist, The Futurist, and Women’s Studies Quarterly. He has appeared on PBS, BBC, CNN, MSNBC, and regularly guest lectures at universities. Zehner’s research and projects have been covered by The Sunday Times, USA Today, WIRED, The Washington Post, Business Week and numerous other media outlets. He also serves on the editorial board of Critical Environmentalism.

Zehner primarily researches the social, political and economic conditions influencing energy policy priorities and project outcomes. His work also incorporates symbolic roles that energy technologies play within political and environmental movements. His other research interests include consumerism, urban policy, environmental governance, international human rights, and forgeries.

Zehner attended Kettering University (BS -Engineering) and The University of Amsterdam (MS/Drs – Science and Technology Studies). His research was awarded with honors at both institutions. He lives in San Francisco.

Free Panels, Anyone? Among the ceos and chief scientists in the solar industry, there is surprisingly little argument that solar systems are expensive.46 Even an extreme drop in the price of polysilicon, the most expensive technical component, would do little to make solar cells more competitive. Peter Nieh, managing director of Lightspeed Venture Partners, a multibillion-dollar venture capital firm in Silicon Valley, contends that cheaper polysilicon won't reduce the overall cost of solar arrays much, even if the price of the expensive material dropped to zero.47 Why? Because the cost of other materials such as copper, glass, plastics, and aluminum, as well as the costs for fabrication and installation, represent the bulk of a solar system's overall price tag. The technical polysilicon represents only about a fifth of the total. Furthermore, Keith Barnham, an avid solar proponent and senior researcher at Imperial College London, admits that unless efficiency levels are high, "even a zero cell cost is not competitive."48 In other words, even if someone were to offer you solar cells for free, you might be better off turning the offer down than paying to install, connect, clean, insure, maintain, and eventually dispose of the modules—especially if you live outside the remote, dry, sunny patches of the planet such as the desert extending from southeast California to western Arizona. In fact, the unanticipated costs, performance variables, and maintenance obligations for photovoltaics, too often ignored by giddy proponents of the technology, can swell to unsustainable magnitudes. Occasionally buyers decommission their arrays within the first decade, leaving behind graveyards of toxic panels teetering above their roofs as epitaphs to a fallen dream. Premature decommissioning may help explain why American photovoltaic electrical generation dropped during the last economic crisis even as purported solar capacity expanded.49 Curiously, while numerous journalists reported on solar infrastructure expansion during this period, I was unable to locate a single article covering the contemporaneous drop in the nation's solar electrical output, which the Department of Energy quietly slid into its annual statistics without a peep.

#### Plan speed up warming

**Zycher 11** – visiting scholar at AEI (Benjamin, April 20, 2011, “The Folly of Renewable Electricity,” AEI, <http://www.aei.org/article/energy-and-the-environment/alternative-energy/the-folly-of-renewable-electricity/>)

A cleaner environment is worth it, you say? Not so fast. As counterintuitive as it may seem, increased reliance on wind and solar power will hurt the environment, not because of such phony issues as endangered cockroaches, used by the environmental left as a tool with which to obstruct the renewable energy projects that they claim to support. Instead, this damage will be real, in the form of greater air pollution. The conventional generators needed to back up the unreliable wind and solar production will have to be cycled up and down because the system operators will be required to take wind and solar generation when it is available. **This means greater operating inefficiency and more emissions**. That is precisely what a recent engineering study of the effects of renewables requirements found for Colorado and Texas.

#### No extinction—reject 1% hyperbole

Robert O. **Mendelsohn 9**, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: <http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf>

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

**Warming tipping points inevitable – too late**

**NPR 9** (1/26, Global Warming Is Irreversible, Study Says, All Things Considered, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903)

Climate change is essentially irreversible, according to a sobering new scientific study. As carbon dioxide emissions continue to rise, the world will experience more and more long-term environmental disruption. The damage will persist even when, and if, emissions are brought under control, says study author Susan Solomon, who is among the world's top climate scientists. "We're used to thinking about pollution problems as things that we can fix," Solomon says. "Smog, we just cut back and everything will be better later. Or haze, you know, it'll go away pretty quickly." That's the case for some of the gases that contribute to climate change, such as methane and nitrous oxide. But as Solomon and colleagues suggest in a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, it is not true for the most abundant greenhouse gas: carbon dioxide. **Turning off the carbon dioxide emissions won't stop global warming**. "People have imagined that if we stopped emitting carbon dioxide that the climate would go back to normal in 100 years or 200 years. What we're showing here is that's not right. It's essentially an irreversible change that will last for more than a thousand years," Solomon says. This is because the oceans are currently soaking up a lot of the planet's excess heat — and a lot of the carbon dioxide put into the air. The carbon dioxide and heat will eventually start coming out of the ocean. And that will take place for many hundreds of years. Solomon is a scientist with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Her new study looked at the consequences of this long-term effect in terms of sea level rise and drought.

**International community won’t act – means warming becomes inevitable**

**Mckibben 10** – Foreign Policy writer, author, environmentalist, and activist. In 1988, he wrote The End of Nature, the first book for a common audience about global warming. (Bill, 11-22, “Sipping Margaritas While the Climate Burns” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/22/sipping\_margaritas\_while\_the\_climate\_burns?page=0,1) Jacome

In fact, I suspect it will be mostly holding pattern and very little landing in Mexico this December. The fundamental problem that has always dogged these talks -- a rich north that won't give up its fossil-fuel addiction, a poor south that can't give up its hope of fossil-fueled development -- has, if anything, gotten worse, mostly because the north has decided to think of itself as poor, too or at least not able to devote resources to changing our climate course.

It is possible -- indeed it has been possible from the start -- that this essential gulf will prevent action to slow greenhouse gas emissions at the pace that physics and chemistry demand before it's too late to reverse or contain the impacts of climate change. There's really only one way to build a bridge across the divide, and that's with big stacks of money. Theoretically, the rich countries pledged at Copenhagen that they would pony up $30 billion in "fast-start" financing to help poor countries get going on building renewable energy. And at last scrupulous count, according to the World Resources Institute, there's actually $28.34 billion on the table, more than half of it coming from Japan. Unfortunately, much of it isn't "new and additional" -- instead it's repurposed money from other development grants. None of that increases anyone's confidence in the $100 billion a year that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton projected in Copenhagen would be available by 2020 -- especially because the only news that has emerged this year as to its source is that it won't be coming from "public funds."

**Domestic problems undercut both Chinese and U.S. action**

**Hale, 11** - PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a Visiting Fellow at LSE Global Governance, London School of Economics (Thomas, “A Climate Coalition of the Willing,” Washington Quarterly, Winter,http://www.twq.com/11winter/docs/11winter\_Hale.pdf

Intergovernmental efforts to limit the gases that cause climate change have all but failed. After the unsuccessful 2010 Copenhagen summit, and with little progress at the 2010 Cancun meeting, it is hard to see how major emitters will agree any time soon on mutual emissions reductions that are sufficiently ambitious to prevent a substantial (greater than two degree Celsius) increase in average global temperatures.

It is not hard to see why. No deal excluding the United States and China, which together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s greenhouse gases (GHGs), is worth the paper it is written on. But domestic politics in both countries effectively block ‘‘G-2’’ leadership on climate. In the United States, the Obama administration has basically given up on national cap-and-trade legislation. Even the relatively modest Kerry-Lieberman-Graham energy bill remains dead in the Senate. The Chinese government, in turn, faces an even harsher constraint. Although the nation has adopted important energy efficiency goals, the Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy and political survival on raising the living standard of average Chinese. Accepting international commitments that stand even a small chance of reducing the country’s GDP growth rate below a crucial threshold poses an unacceptable risk to the stability of the regime. Although the G-2 present the largest and most obvious barrier to a global treaty, they also provide a convenient excuse for other governments to avoid aggressive action. Therefore, the international community should not expect to negotiate a worthwhile successor to the Kyoto Protocol, at least not in the near future.

### ADV 2

#### The US isn’t an energy model and Germany has been doing this for years with no impact

**Stefes, 11** - associate professor of political science at the University of Colorado

(Christoph New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/20/why-isnt-the-us-a-leader-in-green-technology/us-should-emulate-germanys-renewable-energy-model?pagewanted=all>)

For now, the United States is a good example of how not to get there. While some states have set ambitious goals for the expansion of renewable energy, a concerted effort at the federal level is missing. Instead, the Obama administration has continued to rely on an already existing patchwork of tax breaks, loans and research and development spending that has done little to provide entrepreneurs with a nurturing investment environment. In a market that is so heavily tilted in favor of conventional energy sources, governments need to provide some reassurance to investors in green technology.

In contrast to the U.S., Germany has for two decades relied on a comprehensive policy instrument to promote renewable energy: feed-in tariffs. This model requires utilities to buy electricity from renewable energy operators at a fixed rate that is guaranteed for 20 years, providing entrepreneurs and banks with a stable investment environment. Since introduction of the first feed-in tariff in 1991, the share of renewables in the electricity sector has increased from less than 5 percent to about 20 percent, with 30 percent envisioned by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. Renewable energy has thereby become a boom industry, employing around 300,000 workers today, with 500,000 expected by 2020. Utilities have passed on the extra costs to the end consumer. Yet consumers’ electricity bills have increased by less than 5 percent because of these tariffs, and customers have had no major objections.

#### No impact to Eurozone collapse – actually this card points out the complete and utter idiocy of their impact

BMI, 12 [October, Business Monitor International, Would The Eurozone’s Collapse Lead To War?, <http://www.riskwatchdog.com/2012/10/17/would-the-eurozone%E2%80%99s-collapse-lead-to-war/>]

Since the worsening of the eurozone crisis, various European officials, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have warned that a collapse of the currency union could lead to war in Europe. UK Business Secretary [Vince Cable became the latest figure to make such a statement](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9607889/Vince-Cable-Europe-could-be-plunged-into-war-if-Euro-collapses.html), on Monday. Perhaps the Nobel committee was thinking along similar lines when it awarded the EU the Nobel Peace Prize last week. The eurozone is not the same as the EU, but if the eurozone collapses outright, then there would be a high risk that the EU would collapse, too.¶ Long Road From Eurozone Collapse To War¶ Overall, we find the talk of war overblown to say the least. There is clearly a risk of rising civil unrest, but this would fall far short of ‘war’. The Europe of the 2010s is vastly different from the Europe of the 1930s. It is far richer and politically mature. There are several stages the eurozone crisis would need to pass through before the continent would be even remotely at risk of war:¶ 1. Severe deterioration of intergovernmental cooperation: This would require governments to tear up existing EU treaties and laws and potentially adopt protectionist economic measures.¶ 2. Severe deterioration of economic conditions in European states: This could theoretically pave the way for extremist takeovers, although this would still be far from guaranteed. Severe economic crises in the Asian ‘tigers’ in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2001-2002, the Baltic states in 2008-2010, and Greece in 2010-2012 have not led to ultra-right wing or ultra-left wing governments being elected or seizing power (although Argentina has in recent years moved in that direction). Even for the economically marginalised, living standards today are far higher than in the 1930s.¶ 3. Extremist takeovers in key states: Far-right or far-left parties would need to come to power. Even so, **they would not necessarily lead their countries to war**, since their immediate priority would be to restore economic growth. Conflict risks would rise, however, if a group of ‘moderate’ European states decided to sanction, isolate, or contain ‘extreme’ European states. The ‘extreme’ states could also conceivably seek to funnel their unemployed young people into their militaries, but this may not be affordable, financially. Military build-ups cost a lot of money.¶ 4. Revival of old territorial disputes: Europe’s 19th and 20th century wars were primarily about land-grabs. Territorial disputes used to be the norm. Nowadays, though, most territorial disputes are largely resolved. These could conceivably gain a new lease of life through manipulation by provocative politicians, but it is unclear if they would stir the passions of the public.¶ 5. Break-up of existing EU states: War could occur if an existing EU state were to break up violently. However, it is difficult to see the British or Spanish governments using force to prevent the secession of Scotland or Catalonia, or Belgium or Italy splitting up violently. All these countries and territories are much more politically and economically advanced than Yugoslavia was in 1990. However, if a group of EU states assisted the separation of a breakaway region, this could be a casus belli.¶ 6. Dissolution or neutralisation of NATO: Some European doomsayers forget that NATO still exists, and that the US still guarantees the security of Europe by basing tens of thousands of troops in Germany, the UK, and Italy. The existence of NATO means that even if the eurozone and EU were to collapse, any hypothetical march towards war would still have a powerful brake. Potential warring states would have to leave the Western alliance first, or conclude that NATO and the US military presence are meaningless or unreliable. This is certainly possible, given that NATO has been weakened by budget cuts in its member states, but would still require a major political gamble.

#### No Europe war

**Massie 12** (Allan Massie is a Scottish writer who has published nearly 30 books, including a sequence of novels set in ancient Rome. His non-fiction works range from a study of Byron's travels to a celebration of Scottish rugby. He has been a political columnist for The Scotsman, The Sunday Times and The Daily Telegraph and writes a literary column for The Spectator., 7/17/2012, "Nuclear Iran, revolution in Europe: it's fun to make your flesh creep, but Armageddon isn't really nigh", blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/allanmassie/100065078/nuclear-iran-revolution-in-europe-its-fun-to-make-your-flesh-creep-but-armageddon-isnt-really-nigh/)

Then we had our expert Finance blogger Thomas Pascoe in similar thank-God-it’s-Friday "I wants to make your flesh creep" Fat Boy mode. We are too complacent, he says. We are faced with “impending events that would have precipitated a revolution in almost any other place at almost any other time in history- either the collapse of the currency or the complete secession of budgetary control to a supra-natural body in the EU.” (When I read that I said “Golly”, until I realised that he probably meant to write supranational rather than supra-natural, delightfully flesh-creeping though the idea of a spectral supra-natural body taking control of national budgets may be.) Either of these may lead, he would have us think, to some form of fascist revolution. This is because in the nations enduring austerity, and indeed suffering from austerity, "the populations at large feel no culpability for the debts their leaders have amassed.” Well, I suppose he’s right there. How much culpability do you, dear reader, feel for the size of the UK’s national debt? Do you beat your breast moaning “I blame myself”, or wring your hands in shame? No? I thought not. So why should the Greeks, the Spaniards and the others “feel culpability”? In Fat Boy mode, Thomas Pascoe says that either the EU will take complete control of all national budgets or that countries will default on their debts. Either way, populist politicians will emerge to stir up the masses, and we’ll be back to the Thirties. “Europe,” it seems, “ is one demagogue away from causing an earthquake in global finance such that the current problems seem a tremor in comparison. If Silvio Berlusconi – the only truly populist politician the Continent has produced in half a century – had been twenty years younger, I fancy it might have been him…” Well, if the playboy “Mussolini in a blue blazer” is the nearest to a fascist demagogue you can come up with, there isn’t much to worry about. And indeed there isn’t, because politics now matters less than football and entertainment – both things which bind the young people of Europe together, and make revolutionary fervour somewhat unlikely. So, at the risk of being accused of complacency, I’ll suggest, first, that if a country was going to fall out of the euro, it would have done so by now; second, that the eurozone will muddle through, because the will to do so is there; and third, that while some supranational body charged with supervising national budgets will be set up, it will prove far less rigid and far more elastic in its exercise of control than many suppose or indeed hope or, alternatively, fear. This is because the EU remains a union of nation-states, and national governments will insist on retaining a great degree of autonomy. Flesh-creeping is fun and lively journalism, but Armageddon is not on the menu today, next week, next year, or in the next decade. We have come through worse and far more dangerous times, and goodwill and common sense will let us survive present difficulties and discontents. The notion that “we are one charismatic leader away from a complete reordering of the Continent” is Fat Boy stuff.

#### No Eurozone collapse – the cost of it is too high

Pravda News, 1/9/13 [“Price for eurozone to collapse too high”http://english.pravda.ru/business/finance/09-01-2013/123410-eurozone-0/]

The Eurozone will not fall apart, because the price of getting out of the game is too high for each country. When, in early September, it was announced that the ECB would buy government bonds in unlimited quantities, the bridges behind the Euro area countries have collapsed. There is no way back, and this means that one can only move forward and fight for their own happiness.¶ In order to make the path easy, the monetary union must be supported by four other unions: banking, fiscal, converged and political. To be sustainable in the long-term, political economy will have to fight for its present.¶ It is a long and ambitious list, but the more the experts think of the situation in Europe, the more inevitable such findings seem, said Professor Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Director of the World Economic Forum.¶ "Since the signing of the Treaty of Paris between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in April of 1951, European integration became more intense. Can we imagine the history of Europe without the development of institutions designed to unite the European countries under the banner of shared values ​​and common ideals? It is inconceivable.¶ The Euro provides major economic benefits: elimination of currency risks, lower inflation, growth of trade in the euro area and the closer integration of the European financial markets. In general, the single currency has contributed to monetary stability and predictability, which is often overlooked in the current debate.¶ At the same time, the crisis has revealed a number of shortcomings in the structure of the euro area. Europe lacks a strong and unified fiscal policy, the differences in competitiveness between North and South of the region brought the threat of a default, and the lack of a bank union gave rise to systemic risks. Add to this the complexity of European political institutions, lack of democracy, and here is the result: failure to make real decisions.¶ Clearly, the Euro will survive in its current form, but there is a need to deal with the problems in the surrounding institutions. First, it is a banking union. Without it, the currency will simply not succeed. Solid banking associations should implement banking supervision, mechanism of recapitalization and guarantees for bank deposits. The good news is that the first item is already being implemented. On September 12 it was proposed to create a single regulatory body under the auspices of the European Central Bank. The last two items would require

#### Eurozone breakup inevitable and tanks the economy

**Kavoussi 11-28 –** a business reporter at The Huffington Post,. She has written for The Boston Globe, The New York Observer, and The San Antonio Express-News., she is a recent graduate of Harvard University, where she studied international economic history and the history of economic thought (Bonnie, “Eurozone Crisis Threatens Global Economy” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/28/eurozone-crisis_n_1116977.html>) Jacome

As a breakup of the eurozone -- a once seemingly impossible scenario -- becomes increasingly likely, economists are starting to sketch out what a post-euro world would look like. Many are warning that if political leaders don't change course, a breakup of the eurozone would plunge the United States and the rest of the world into a slowdown and possibly another recession.

"If Europe turns out badly, it's much more likely we'll go into recession," said Michael Spence, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at the New York University Stern School of Business. "If you take a big chunk like Europe and turn it down, it would probably bring everybody else down, including us."

If the eurozone dissolves, the European banking system would likely collapse, economists said, plunging the continent into recession, which would keep European consumers from buying. Decreased demand from the continent, which represents about 20 percent of the global economy, would hurt both the United States and emerging countries, who depend on European banks not just for demand, but also for funding.

The risk of a eurozone breakup has increased dramatically over the past couple of weeks, as countries have faced increasing difficulty selling their debt. Interest rates on sovereign bonds issued by eurozone countries have spiked. The interest rate on 10-year Italian sovereign bonds rose to 7.28 percent Monday, nearly hitting a [Nov. 9 euro-era high](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/09/italy-default-debt_n_1084523.html) that was only eased afterward by limited bond purchases by the European Central Bank.

The interest rate on 10-year Spanish sovereign bonds rose to 6.58 percent Monday, near [the euro-era high reached on Nov. 17](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/18/spanish-sovereign-debt-interest-rate_n_1101368.html). Interest rates on the 10-year bonds of more fiscally sound countries, such as France and Belgium, spiked to 3.58 percent and 5.59 percent respectively on Monday, as the contagion of higher borrowing costs spread to across the eurozone, regardless of their economic fundamentals.

If European leaders don't agree to take bold economic measures for more fiscal integration -- including allowing the European Central Bank to become the lender of last resort -- the eurozone could start to unravel, said Simon Tilford, chief economist of the Center for European Reform in London.

The eurozone's future could be decided next week when leaders meet for a summit on the sovereign debt crisis on December 9. If they leave empty-handed, Tilford said, fearful depositors could pull their money out of European banks en masse, causing European banks to fail. In a "vicious death spiral," said Tilford, troubled European countries would stop being able to borrow money as borrowing costs reach unsustainable levels. Then a string of European countries could default and leave the eurozone, leading to its collapse, he said.

## 2nc

### impact

#### The perception of collapsing grid reliability kills hegemony and causes terrorism

**Lewis, 8** - senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Marlo, Statement before the House Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, 7/25, <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/062508lewis.pdf>)

In the meantime, U.S. electricity demand is growing, and coal is the fuel of choice in many markets. The EIA forecasts that between 2007 and 2030, coal will provide 67 percent of all new electric generation in the United States, and new coal generation will constitute 15 percent of all U.S. electric power in 2030.10 Moratoria that effectively ban new coal-based power could create a severe supply-demand imbalance. This would not only inflate electricity and natural gas costs (demand for coal would be diverted to natural gas as an electricity fuel), it would also jeopardize electric supply reliability. Indeed, some parts of the country may experience chronic energy crises characterized by repeated power failures and blackouts.

From a national security standpoint, this poses two main risks. One is that America will increasingly resemble a Third World country where nothing works very well. We will lose our international prestige and ability to lead by example. The other risk is that terrorists will view America’s over-stretched, failure-prone electricity grid as a tempting target. They may calculate: If America’s electric supply system is tottering on the edge, why not give it a few helpful shoves?

#### Higher prices drives manufacturing overseas – this also means zero net emissions reductions

**Lea, 12 –** director of Global Vision and Non-Executive Director and Economic Adviser to Arbuthnot Banking Group She is the author of many papers on economic matters and writes regularly for the press. Ruth was Director of the Centre for Policy Studies from 2004-2007. She was also Head of the Policy Unit at the Institute of Directors (IoD) between 1995 and 2003, before which she was the Economics Editor at ITN, Chief Economist at Mitsubishi Bank and Chief UK Economist at Lehman Brothers (Ruth, “Electricity Costs: The folly of windpower” January, http://www.civitas.org.uk/economy/electricitycosts2012.pdf

These extra costs damage competitiveness and undermine viability, especially high energy users. They risk driving industry to migrate overseas, along with their CO2 emissions, thus having zero net impact on global emissions totals. Indeed such migration could increase global CO2 emissions if the recipient country is less energy efficient than the UK. Suffice to say the supply of competitively-priced, secure and reliable sources of electricity is vital to modern industry.

### uniqueness

#### And, utilities are reacting to growing demand by pursuing centralization and utility-ownership

**Clean Energy Experts, 11** (6/11, “Utility Integrated Solar Grew 100% in 2010” <https://www.cleanenergyexperts.com/2011/06/20/utility-integrated-solar-power-grew-100-in-2010/>)

Solar Electric Power Association (SEPA) has released its latest report which showed that U.S. electric utility providers are including more and more solar power generation in their portfolios and much of this increases is happening outside of California. (Click here for the Executive Summary of the report)¶ The Solar Electric Power Association’s (SEPA) fourth annual Top 10 Utility Solar Rankings report analyzes utility solar electricity markets in the United States, focusing particularly on the top utilities that are driving solar electric power growth. The SEPA Top 10 Utility Solar Rankings measure a utility’s newly installed solar power and include photovoltaic and concentrated solar power technologies interconnected between January 1 and December 31, 2010. There are two rankings categories: Solar Megawatts, which measure a utility’s total solar capacity added that year, and Solar Watts-per-Customer, which is a measure of the utility’s new solar installed divided by its number of customers.¶ The results are intriguing and bode well for the future of solar throughout the U.S. The top 10 ranked utilities integrated 561 megawatts (MW) of solar electricity capacity in 2010, representing 100% growth since 2009. Seven of the utilities on the the SEPA list are from states outside of California and four of the top-ranking utilities were located in the Eastern United States. In addition, SEPA found that 63% of the utilities from outside of California are the largest percentage accounted. Also in 2010, thirty utilities reported owning 140 MW of solar, as opposed to purchasing the power from facilities owned by others, which represents a stunning 300% increase over 2009.¶ Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) topped the Solar Megawatt ranking in 2010 with 157 MW of solar power while Florida Power & Light Company (FPLC) was in second place 82 MW of added solar capacity (for FPLC, this is amazing considering that Florida has virtually no state solar incentives). New Jersey’s Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (PSEG) was in third place with 75 MW of solar capacity added in 2010.¶ In the Solar Watts-per-Customer category, California’s Silicon Valley Power was first by adding 40-watts per customer with PSEG at 35.2-watts per customer coming in second place (again, this is amazing considering that PSEG is an investor-owned utility with more than 2.1 million customers). In third place was Hawaiian Electric Company Inc. with 33.2-watts per customer despite being domiciled on one of the smallest states in the U.S.¶ SEPA draws some broad conclusions from this report. First, solar in Calfiornia is not nearly as dominant as it used to be with over 60% of new solar coming online outside of California. This trend has been born out in other reports namely by the Solar Energy Industries Association which showed that in 2010 California installed approximately 258.9 megawatts which represented less than 30% of the total U.S. solar power market share. States such as New Jersey with with 137 megawatts of installed solar power in 2010 (representing almost a 140% increase over the 57.3 megawatts installed in 2009 and 517% increase over the 22.5 megawatts of installed New Jersey solar in 2008) are beginning to make huge strides nationally. In addition, New Jersey became the second state (California) to install over 100 MW in a single year in 2010. Other states saw dramatic increases in solar capacity as well. Arizona installed 54 megawatts of solar and Colorado installed 53.6 megawatts of solar each of which was double the prior years output (21.1 megawatts solar in Arizona and 23.4 megawatts of solar in Colorado).¶ The other major trend that SEPA notes is the changing the profile of solar electric power in the United States: centralized projects and utility ownership. Traditionally, solar markets have relied on distributed PV for most new capacity. Utilities are beginning to look towards centralized solar projects (large scale projects where the power is sold to a utility) as eight centralized projects greater than 10 MW each were installed in 2010. This includes two of the largest solar projects in the nation: the 48 MW Copper Mountain project, in Nevada and the 30 MW Cimarron project, in New Mexico. The represents an attempt on the part of utility providers to diversify the sources of energy that they are providing to their consumers, whether it is obtaining electricity by purchasing power from solar systems, such as rooftop PV or procuring and/or owning large amounts of solar generation resources such as concentrated solar power.

#### Local ownership crushes utility profits – utility ownership is essential to more widespread renewables installation and investing in grid upgrades to allow more distributed generation

**Outka, 10** - Visiting Scholar in Energy and Land Use Law, Florida State University College of Law; faculty member, Florida State University's Institute for Energy Systems, Economics, and Sustainability (IESES) (Uma, 37 Ecology L.Q. 1041, “Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory Context” lexis)

A second consideration that implicates siting is who can own a rooftop solar system. Florida law recognizes "customer-owned renewable generation," but there is presently no regulatory structure to facilitate utility ownership of customer-sited renewable energy. n243 Elsewhere, this is beginning to change. As Professor Michael Dworkin recently observed, "the relationship between the utility and distributed energy resources is [\*1083] evolving." n244 The implication for renewable energy siting is the potential for a far greater supply of rooftop sites coming available for power generation. Utility ownership of these resources is a fairly new concept that addresses two issues: the financing barrier to installation by individual property owners, n245 and, more importantly, regulated utilities' profit imperative to obstruct widespread DG. n246 In Florida, as in most states, utility profits have not been decoupled from electricity sales. n247 Florida properties generating electricity onsite reduce consumption of utility-generated electricity. For this reason, utilities have typically perceived DG "as a third-party-owned asset that cuts into the rate base and adds a complicated and unprofitable layer to the system." n248¶ According to Professor Dworkin, policies that support utilities' ownership of PV assets on customer property could reverse that disincentive and yield a number of benefits. This model could rapidly increase the number of "available" sites for PV installation, with utilities in a position to consider the most beneficial sites and system sizes in light of grid management concerns. n249 **It would also provide a** strong incentive for utilities to perfect and streamline interconnection and advance grid updates to accommodate variable and two-way flow. n250 The NREL is pursuing research into how best to assist state agencies and utilities with pilot programs for so-called "second-generation business models," including utility shared or sole ownership of DG. n251

#### Utility ownership is superior – expertise, lower prices, safety and reliability

**Dworkin, 9** - Director and Professor of Law Institute for Energy and Environment Vermont Law School (Michael, “Distributed Photovoltaic Generation for Regulated Utilities” February, <http://www.solarelectricpower.org/media/84622/sepa%20pv%20dg.pdf>)

The entire US enjoys low electricity costs relative to the grid reliability and availability provided to consumers. And though it has been highly subsidized through the years, all types of utilities, along with the oversight of regulators can be credited with maintaining these low electricity prices. Utilities have nearly century of highly **efficient project development** and management expertise that can be applied to the utility owned distribution market.¶ Utilities also own a great deal of property serving as land buffers for existing generation and distribution. The electric distribution system includes substations, right of way, utility poles, power lines, transformers and related control, protection and metering. It is sized to meet the peak demands and voltage regulation requirements along a distribution feeder and for each consumer. This utility experience has proven to decrease balance of system costs. Indeed, Tucson Electric Power developed the Springerville PV project with a system cost nearly 30% less than any other system installed at the time, including a unique inverter design from the utility staff.¶ **With utility ownership** and rate basing of PV projects, the whole PV system, grid integration will benefit all market factions even beyond BOS system cost reductions. PV systems, especially when incentivized with an up-front capital incentive, may not provide energy for the full system life. Beyond installation quality issues,42 very **simple electric**/electronic events **can** **bump a PV system off line** and in this early consumer market, awareness of simple things like listening for inverter operation may not occur.¶ To maintain “used and useful” quality of the rate base asset, utilities owned systems will be required to be highly reliable, continuously operation. Utility experience will also expedite the development of simplified interconnection for all PV system markets. The major utility obstacle for interconnection is the utility’s desire to “protect” the grid, and with utility ownership also comes the education to identify the lowest cost (both in hardware and process) to assure grid reliability

 is not affected by PV systems.¶ Finally, standard distribution design is for centralized generation and one-way energy flow, often requiring either distribution design changes 43 or expensive protective relaying to accommodate DG. The expanded and accelerated market from utility ownership will develop design changes for new distribution plant as well as the lowest cost standard for existing distribution protection modifications and potentially standards for allowable penetration with no change necessary.¶ 3. Enhanced Safety for Utility Lineman¶ The utility exercising control over the generation assets will make line work and the interconnection process safer for utility employees. **When non-utility actors** have control or **install their own** controls on the grid there is a higher possibility that the PV systems feeding into the grid could be turned on unexpectedly. In a centralized generation system, it is simple for line workers to route power away from the line being fixed. However, in a distributed generation system, all energy sources along the line in question need to be switched off. When employees are conducting line work downstream from a distributed generation source they need to be certain that it is not and will begin adding power to the grid unexpectedly.

### link

#### Increasing solar penetration causes grid instability – independently jacks up manufacturing costs – turns their competitiveness args

**St. John, 9** – reporter and analyst for Greentech Media covering the green technology space, with a particular focus on smart grid, smart buildings, energy efficiency, demand response, energy storage, green IT, renewable energy and technology to integrate distributed, intermittent green energy into the grid (Jeff, “Will Solar Crash the Smart Grid?” Green Tech Media, 11/2,

<http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-great-solar-smart-grid-challenge>)

The proliferation of solar panels will effectively transform commercial districts and neighborhoods into small, localized power plants. While that will allow utilities to cut back on coal, the unpredictable, varying nature of solar power will force grid operators to dispatch or throttle power rapidly. Solar-balancing smart grid systems now confined to pilot projects will need to become common features pretty soon.

"That future is coming, and it's coming a lot faster than I think many people are aware of," said Chris Baker, CIO of utility San Diego Gas & Electric. (Execs from SDG&E and other utilities will speak on this and other topics at Greentech Media's The Networked Grid conference in San Francisco on Nov. 4.)

SDG&E has about 6,600 customers with solar rooftops, he said. While that's growing by about 60 customers a month, it still only represents about 50 megawatts of generation, or about 1 percent of the utility's 5,000-megawatt total load. The utility can't monitor or control it, but there isn't enough of it to matter that much, he said — yet (see Having Solar Energy System Trouble? Don't Call Your Utilities).

But what happens when 20 percent or more of the homes in a neighborhood go solar and a cloud passes overhead? That changes a neighborhood of solar power producers to utility power customers in a matter of minutes – and grids built to deliver power one way at constant voltages and frequencies have trouble accommodating that two-way, intermittent flow.

Too much solar power, and local grid voltage could rise, causing potential problems for motors, lights and other equipment. Too little, and voltage can sag. That may only flicker light bulbs at home, but it can lead to million-dollar work stoppages for customers like semiconductor manufacturers and server farms that need clean power at a near-to-constant voltage and frequency.

#### Transmission investments are increasing now

**Reuters, 2/7/13** (“U.S. power industry to invest $85 bln annually in electric grid”

<http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/02/06/utilities-eei-idINL1N0B6I7C20130206>)

U.S. investor-owned utilities will invest about $85 billion annually this year and next to keep the power grid reliable and integrate new natural gas plants while cleaning up older coal units, the president of the industry's trade group told Reuters on Wednesday.

"Our industry is the most capital-intensive industry in the United States and projects to spend an average of about $85 billion a year on capital expenditures through 2014," said Tom Kuhn, president of the Edison Electric Institute.

He told Reuters those investment levels are about double what they were 10 years ago.

Of the $85 billion, Kuhn said power companies would spend about $50 billion on new generation and upgrades, $25 billion on distribution to consumers and $10 billion on transmission between power plants and distribution networks

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#### Storage requires a smart grid to be completed first to be used effectively – they’re still putting the cart before the horse

**Wang, 12** – Technology Manager for Energy & Environmental Resources Group (W. Maria, “Chapter 5: Prospects for Renewable Energy: Meeting the Challenges of Integration with Storage” Smart Grid Integrating Renewable, Distributed & Efficient Energy, Science Direct)

As the fastest growing renewable energy sources worldwide, solar PV and wind power are gaining a stronghold in the electric grids of the United States and the world. The issues surrounding their intermittency need to be addressed so that this growth can be sustained, especially in the context of integration with smart grids that are being planned and deployed. Variations in energy output at 20–30% penetration levels of renewables may cause reliability problems in the electric grid, such as voltage fluctuations, and require a significant amount of reserves for capacity firming. The challenge of renewable resource intermittency can be met using a variety of energy storage technologies in lieu of conventional generators. The energy storage capacity for renewable generation varies from kW to hundreds of MW, depending on whether it will be used for power or energy management, (e.g., frequency regulation or capacity firming).

The optimal technologies for addressing renewable energy integration will be application-specific and will scale with the size of variable generation, ranging from pumped hydropower and CAES for centralized, bulk storage at PV plants and wind farms to batteries and electric vehicles for distributed storage near rooftop PV installations. The increasing amount of distributed renewables has triggered an evolution from centralized to distributed storage. Smart grid deployment is facilitating this transition since integration of distributed storage requires more intelligent control, advanced power electronics, and two-way communication. Both central and distributed energy storage are required for source-load matching in a smart grid with high levels of renewable penetration. A cost-benefit analysis needs to be done to determine whether certain storage applications should address the supply or demand side.

#### Transmission upgrades and backup power supplies will be charged to consumers

**Bedzak, 12** - president of Management Information Services Inc (Rocger, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, “Not-So-Green Superhighway; Unforeseen consequences of dedicated renewable energy transmission” February, lexis)

Coincident with the construction of the transmission and RE plants must be the addition of backup power supplies, n4 firm demand-response capacity, or both. If those resource additions are delayed, then the RE power generated might have difficulty accessing markets, because large quantities of widely varying electric power from wind and solar facilities might exceed the ability of existing power grids to accommodate.

The costs of backup power resources, as well as the new transmission capacity, ultimately will be charged to power consumers. The capacity of the transmission lines needed to move RE power must be sized to at least the nameplate capacity of the RE technologies, if the maximum amount of RE power is to reach markets. However, the average capacity factor of, for example, wind in the Great Plains is less than 40 percent, which means that more than 60 percent of the transmission capacity would be unused, resulting in much higher transmission costs than if the lines were more fully loaded. Locating backup power generating capacity near RE sites can make greater use of transmission capacity and reduce cost penalties.

In principle, once the approximate number of miles of required new transmission is estimated, the total cost can be projected by multiplying by the average cost per mile. Unfortunately, transmission costs per mile vary greatly (see Figure 2). Most of the new RE transmission will be through rural or semi-rural areas, but as transmission lines approach major load centers costs will escalate rapidly.

#### Backup power costs significantly increase prices and their cost evidence doesn’t factor this in – it only looks at generation costs

**Bedzak, 12** - president of Management Information Services Inc (Rocger, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, “Not-So-Green Superhighway; Unforeseen consequences of dedicated renewable energy transmission” February, lexis) **LCOE = levelized cost of electricity**

Deriving accurate, comparable LCOE estimates for RE is difficult, and it might not even be possible to meaningfully compare the LCOEs of dispatchable and non-dispatchable energy sources. Renewables suffer from problems of low and highly variable capacity factors, intermittency, unreliability, need for storage and backup, requirements for expanded transmission, and reliance on government subsidies and government-mandated utility quotas.¶ For example, while coal plants can have capacity factors above 85 percent, the estimated capacity factor the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA) uses for wind is 34 percent. EIA assumes 31 percent for ST and 22 percent for PV. In its RES study, JP Morgan used slightly lower capacity factors: 30 percent for wind, 30 percent for ST, and 20 percent for PV. While these might be reasonable as national averages, they also might be somewhat high. n13 An accurate LCOE for RE must take into account these low capacity factors, but even such an adjustment might not fully account for the fact that few renewable resources actually might be available when they're needed most. n14¶ EIA's levelized cost estimates for RE use a 31 percent capacity factor for wind, 31 percent for ST, and 22 percent for PV. n15 However, if actual capacity factors are lower than this, these LCOE estimates have to be increased.¶ Further, it isn't clear how backup power costs should be incorporated into RE LCOE estimates. Given the fact that many RE technologies are variable and non-dispatchable, near 100 percent backup might be required--as it is in Germany. n16 Further, given that RE resources might not be reliably available when they're needed most, 24x7 spinning reserve or dedicated, firm demand response resources often might be required. **This need** for backup **translates into a** large RE premium--paying once for the RE system and again for either load-shedding capabilities or fossil fuel systems, which must be kept continually running at a low level to be able to quickly ramp up when needed. Thus, the total cost of such a system should include the cost of the RE system and the cost of the backup power system. n17

### at: weather forecasting

#### Forecasting fails and the effort costs money

**Lesser, 12 -** President of Continental Economics, Inc., an economic and litigation consulting firm. Dr. Lesser has almost 30 years of experience in the energy industry working for electric utilities, state government agencies, and as an independent economic consultant. He testified before utility commissions in many U.S. states, before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), before international regulators in Latin America and the Caribbean; in commercial litigation cases; and before state legislative committees on regulatory and policy matters affecting the electric and natural gas industries (Jonathan, “WIND INTERMITTENCY AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: A HIGH COST SUBSIDY FOR LOW VALUE POWER” October, <http://www.continentalecon.com/publications/cebp/Lesser_PTC_Report_Final_October-2012.pdf>)

C. INACCURATE FORECASTS OFWIND GENERATION, SYSTEM RELIABILITY, AND COST

To ensure the lights stay on, power system planners’ ability to predict the amount of wind generation that will be available several days in advance is critical as the amount of wind generation determines how much fossil-fuel back-up generation must be available. Although even wind advocates acknowledge wind’s inherent intermittency they claim wind generation can be predicted accurately several days in advance, allowing system operators to reduce, if not eliminate, the impacts of wind’s volatility. 32 In other words, proponents argue that, because wind generation can be predicted accurately, wind does not impose higher reliability costs than conventional generating resources.

Notably, however, forecast and operational data in areas including ERCOT, as well as in European countries, 33 do not support such forecast accuracy claims. In addition, wind’s volatility can be significant. For example, on October 28, 2011, wind generation decreased in MISO by 2,700 MW in just two hours. In ERCOT, on December 30, 2011, wind generation decreased 2,079 MW in one hour and over 6,100 MW between 6AM and 4PM that day. 34

Moreover, even substantially reducing the capacity factor for wind generation, as done in ERCOT, MISO, and PJM, does not compensate for the significant forecast accuracy problem. Capacity de-rating addresses long-term planning issues: how much installed capacity must an electric system have one year from now to ensure there are sufficient reserves to meet future peak demand. In contrast, short-term planning issues are focused on the availability of generating resources over the next several days, specifically how much electricity these resources will provide to the power grid. Determinations that wind availability averages about 30% each year are meaningless in this context. As Forbes, et al. stated in their April 2012 study, “Capacity weighting is a distortion because the reported error understates the magnitude of the forecasting challenge.” 35

In ERCOT, for example, the Texas Reliability Entity measures the difference between the actual and scheduled levels of generation. This measure, called “Schedule Control Performance Standard 2” (SCPS2), measures how closely a generator that is scheduling power keeps to its predicted schedule. 36 To meet this standard, the SCPS2 score must be 90% or higher. In their 2012 study, however, Forbes, et al. determined, “During the month of March 2009, 35 out of 36 Non-Wind Only Qualified Scheduling Entities (QSEs) satisfied the reliability standard. None of the 30 Wind Only QSEs met the standard. This is not an isolated case.” 37

Furthermore, the demonstrated inaccuracy of short-term forecasts of wind generation increases the overall cost of meeting electric demand as system planners must reimburse other generators who had been scheduled to operate,

but were not needed because actual wind generation was greater than forecast, or had not been scheduled, but were required to operate because actual wind generation was less than forecast. Although generators can be penalized for erroneous forecasts, most of the resulting system costs are socialized across all users.

### iron oxide

#### Supply not key—it’s pointlessly expensive

**Lundin 13** \*Barbara L. Vergetis Lundin is the Editor of FierceMarkets' Energy Group, encompassing FierceEnergy and FierceSmartGrid [January 9th Visions of hydrogen economy fading in the distance, http://www.fierceenergy.com/story/visions-hydrogen-economy-fading-distance/2013-01-09]

Visions of a hydrogen economy are no closer now than they were decades ago, according to Lux Research, with hydrogen fuel cells turning a modest $3 billion market of about 5.9 GW in 2030. "The **hydrogen supply** chain **is not the most critical bottleneck** for fuel cell adoption," said Brian Warshay, research associate at Lux. "High capital costs and the low costs of incumbents provide a nearly **insurmountable barrier** to adoption, except in niche applications." In determing the economic viability and potential of an expansive hydrogen economy in the energy sectors, Lux found: • The costs of hydrogen compression, storage, and distribution make up the majority of the cost of hydrogen, offering the greatest opportunities for improvement and innovation. • Proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells for telecom power and backup will reach $1 billion in 2030, while fuel cells of all types for residential, commercial and utility generation will not prove cost-effective. • Hydrogen demand from fuel cells will total 140 million kg in 2030 or just .56 percent of global merchant hydrogen demand across all industries.

#### No scale-up—tons of tech hurdles and incumbent alternatives

**Pallares 12** \*Cesar O., Instituto de Estudios Sociales de la Ciencia y la Tecnología [The Barriers for a Hydrogen Economy, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060304>, May 15th]

The first step for hydrogen for being an energy paradigm is to actually have the capability to be that paradigm, e.g. the technological aspects of hydrogen have to be energy efficient and economically plausible. In current state of arts, the technology to produce hydrogen already exist, but what it is not clear is if that technology is scalable to a such level that it is capable to afford the consumers demand, at the moment they require it and a cost that is competitive in the market (Hisschemöller et al., 2006). Currently, there is a commercial production of hydrogen with a global demand of 50 million tons, whTch is desrgnated for the chemicals sector and fertiltzer industry; but tt has been estimated that by 2030, 24 million tons of hydrogen are required to meet only the 5% of European transport market. (Hetland & Mulder, 2007). Making an extrapolation of this result, the hydrogen has to expand its current production by 9 times in order to supply only the European demand in twenty years, ceteris paribus. In this order hydrogen has to overcome three fundamental technical difficulties: productions, storage, distribution, which by now are not technical efficient, least, are not scalable and even less economically competitive, solutions for them For example Ball and Wietschel (2009) estimated that oil price have to be suited permanently above USD $ 60Fbanel for an economically competitive production of hydra gen but **they did not take in mind that natural gas prices would go down**, so that “pivot” price has to be even lower. With respect to production, the main difficulty relays on the hydrogen extraction from nature, since it can be found almost everywhere but not in a pure form. There are many technological alternatives for it, but it has been found a trade off in them: producers have to choose if they want a low-emissions technology or they want an economically efficient technology. The portfolio goes from carbon, or gas natural, based extraction to a water based extraction, with electrolysis (Padró & Putsche, 1999); even more, the extraction demands energy, so the producers also have to choose which energy source the will use in their production process: most of current research is devoted to find the best energy source for the extraction, but there is no consensus about the results (Berry & Aceves, 2006; Bossel et al., 2005; Valero Matas, 2010; Valero Matas & Romay Coca, 2011).3 Nevertheless, production problem is the one that is closer to find its solution, while the other ones remain as high polemic among the experts on them, (Valero Matas, 2010). For example, storage is one of the hardest problems about hydrogen, since this is a low density gas, and it is needed large space to storage it, which in turns creates a danger because it is a flammable gas;4 and, if we talk about hydrogen-supported vehicles, they must have a big fuel tank, so the available space for passenger would be less, making the vehicle less attractive for people, (Bossel et al., 2005). Even more, there is no consensus about how many miles can the vehicle run before it has to be recharged: if large auto-sufficiency is desired, then the vehicle has to have bigger storage capacity, but if more space is desired, then there have to be recharge-infrastructure near to all consumers, otherwise the hydrogen will never be a real option for energy paradigm.5 But what has been said only is truth for a low scale market, with only pilot projects already realized and for a demand that only requires small amounts of hydrogen each time. New problems will rise when the sector makes a step forward and tries to reach bigger markets: current technology is not able, and has not been developed, and the cost is too high to be competitive. (Valero Matas & Romay Coca, 2011).

### 2nc solves emissions

#### The CP’s performance standard substantially reduces carbon emissions and boosts a mix of investments in energy efficiency and renewables

**Lashof, 12** – director of the climate and clean air program at the Natural Resources Defense Council (Daniel, “Closing the Power Plant Carbon Pollution Loophole: Smart Ways the Clean Air Act Can Clean Up America’s Biggest Climate Polluters” December, <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-report.pdf>)

NRDC has conducted an analysis of how CO2 pollution standards for existing fossil fuel–fired power plants under Section 111(d) could affect the power sector, emissions levels, and electricity costs for consumers. The policy proposal set forth in this report will decrease levels of CO2 emissions and encourage the power sector’s transition to cleaner, lower-emitting generation with increased deployment of both supply- and demand-side energy efficiency. NRDC proposes that EPA set state-specific performance standards for existing power plants, using national average emission rate benchmarks and the state-specific generation mix in a baseline period to produce state average fossil fuel emission rate standards. Each of these standards—called an “emission guideline” under EPA’s Section 111(d) regulations—would serve as a template for acceptable state plans, a yardstick to evaluate alternative plans that states may propose, and an advance notice of the federal plan that EPA must issue if states do not submit approvable plans.¶ NRDC’s performance standard proposal begins with determining each state’s generation mix during a baseline period (we used the average for 2008 through 2010 in this analysis). Then a target fossil-fleet average emission rate for 2020 is calculated for each state, using the state’s baseline coal and oil/gas generation fractions and an emission rate benchmark of 1,500 lbs/MWh for coal-fired units and 1,000 lbs/MWh for oil- and gas-fired units on a net basis. States with more carbon-intensive fleets would have higher target emission rates but greater differentials between their starting and target emission rates. NRDC’s proposal is designed to give power plant owners freedom to choose how they would achieve the required emission reductions, giving credit for increases in energy efficiency and electricity generation using renewable sources and allowing emission-rate averaging among fossil fuel−fired power plants. States would also have the freedom to design their own approach, as long as it achieved equivalent emission reductions.¶ NRDC compared this performance standard with a Reference Case representing expected trends in the absence of such standards. NRDC also tested the sensitivity of the electric power grid’s response to the stringency of emission rate targets and energy efficiency penetration in two additional scenarios.¶ The analysis demonstrates that this recommended approach would reduce power plants’ carbon pollution in an efficient and affordable way. It would reduce CO2 emissions from the fossil generating fleet by 26 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, with annualized costs of approximately $4 billion in 2020 and benefits of $25 billion to $60 billion. The benefits come from saving lives and reducing the risks of catastrophic climate change. Reducing carbon pollution is valued at $26 to $59 per ton; reducing sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen emissions beyond the levels that would be reached under other standards is valued by using an EPA-approved model of the health benefits on a regional basis. **This** recommended proposal **can deliver the** health and environmental **benefits** of reducing emissions from power plants **without interfering with** reliable and affordable **electricity supplies**. Establishing such CO2 emission **standards** now **will boost investments** in energy efficiency **and** will **give** the power industry the investment certainty it needs **to avoid billions** of dollars **of stranded investment** in obsolete power plants.

#### The CP is the best of all worlds – it achieves emissions reductions through a mix of consumer electricity efficiency, generation efficiency, co-firing, and new renewables – the mix reduces emissions more than any one technology can achieve on its own

**Lashof, 12** – director of the climate and clean air program at the Natural Resources Defense Council (Daniel, “Closing the Power Plant Carbon Pollution Loophole: Smart Ways the Clean Air Act Can Clean Up America’s Biggest Climate Polluters” December, <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-report.pdf>)

The most important existing fleet characteristics and emission control opportunities are these:

n The mix of fossil fuel–fired steam generators and natural gas combined-cycle plants differs from state to state, varying from almost entirely coal to almost entirely natural gas.

n Compared with other categories of industrial sources, the power plant fleet is operated to a unique extent as an integrated system on a state or regional basis, with interdependent management decisions on when to operate, build, upgrade, and retire individual units.

n Depending on their type and starting point, existing generating units can reduce their own CO2 emission rates by improving generation efficiency (improving heat rates) or by switching to or co-firing with lower-emitting fuels (e.g., natural gas or biomass).

n Covered units within a state or group of states can reduce their average emission rates through additional tools, including dispatch shifts (e.g., running lower-emitting plants more and higher-emitting plants less).

n Covered units can reduce their emissions by increasing generation from renewable and other non-emitting plants.

n Covered units can reduce their emissions by increasing end-use electrical energy efficiency.

**These system-wide** compliance **options** can **allow** more substantial emission reductions**—at lower overall cost**—than the restricted set of measures that individual units can take on their own.

### 2nc perm do both

#### The CP incentivizes competition between renewables – it limits overall price increases because it doesn’t favor one over the other

**Apt, 9** \*Distinguished Service Professor of Engineering & Public Policy and Associate Research Professor, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University (Jay, Congressional Testimony, Hearing on The American Clean Energy Security Act of 2009, 4/23, <http://carboncontrolnews.com/hearing_docs/ccn04232009_apt.pdf>

I commend you for searching for ways to reach the goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and pollution, enhancing energy security, maintaining electric supply reliability, and controlling costs. Renewable energy sources are a key part of the nation's future, **but** I caution that **a singular emphasis** on renewable energy sources is not the best way to achieve these goals. One goal is paramount as the greatest challenge of the century: reducing air emissions and the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide.

I have two recommendations that I hope you will consider:

Focus on reducing carbon dioxide rather than singling out renewables as the answer. There are significant savings from letting all technologies compete in satisfying the goals of lowering greenhouse gas emissions, increasing energy security, and improving sustainability, ensuring that energy prices are not so high that they derail the economy.

#### The permutation destroys efficiency incentives

**Borenstein, 12** - Severin Borenstein is E. T. Grether Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, California. He is a Co-Director of the Energy Institute at Haas, and Director of the University of California Energy Institute (“The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity Generation” Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 26, Number 1—Winter 2012—Pages 67–92 <http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.26.1.67>)

First, subsidizing green power for reducing pollution (relative to some counterfactual) is not equivalent to taxing “brown” power to reflect the marginal social damage. If end-use electricity demand were completely inelastic and green and brown power were each completely homogeneous, they would have the same effect; the only effect of the subsidy would be to shift the production share towards green and away from brown power. But the underlying market failure is the underpricing of brown power, not the overpricing of green power, so subsidizing green power from government revenues artificially depresses the price of power and discourages efficient energy consumption.7 As a result, government subsidies of green power lead to overconsumption of electricity and disincentives for energy efficiency. In addition, for any given level of reduction, it will be achieved more efficiently by equalizing the marginal price of the pollutant across sectors as well as within sectors. This is not achievable through ad hoc subsidies to activities that displace certain sources of emissions. Fowlie, Knittel, and Wolfram (forthcoming) estimate that failure to achieve uniform marginal prices in the emissions of nitrogen oxides in the United States has raised the cost of regulation by at least 6 percent.

#### That’s key to the entire success of the CP

**Roberts, 12 –** staff writer for Grist(David, Grist, “Obama can tackle climate in his second term, and he doesn’t need Congress to do it” 12/4, <http://grist.org/climate-energy/obama-can-tackle-carbon-and-doesnt-need-congress/>)

The fact that energy efficiency counts as compliance is crucial to the economics of NRDC’s proposal. If avoided carbon counts toward reducing average fleet emissions, then every utility, in every state and region, has access to inexpensive compliance measures. Efficiency is ubiquitous and in almost every case cheaper than new power sources. This is something utilities are already catching on to, as evidenced by the surge in efficiency investments over the last few years:

Remember: Efficiency saves ratepayers money. According to modeling of the NRDC proposal done by ICF International, by complying through efficiency measures, utilities could achieve the proposed carbon standards while slightly reducing power bills. And every dollar not spent on power is a dollar of annual economic stimulus.

### solves climate leadership

#### The CP is the best internal link to climate leadership – it sends a more powerful signal than the aff and gets other countries on board for emissions reductions

**Chipman, 12** (Kim, “U.S. Could Cut Power Plant Pollution 26%, NRDC Says” Business Week, 12/4, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-12-04/u-dot-s-dot-could-cut-power-plant-pollution-26-percent-nrdc-says>)

President Barack Obama could cut greenhouse-gas emissions from U.S. power plants 26 percent by 2020, the Natural Resources Defense Council said in a plan that puts pressure on the administration to issue new rules.¶ Obama can use his authority under the Clean Air Act to clamp down existing polluters in a cost-effective way, the NRDC said in a report today. These emitters, which include Southern Co. (SO) and Duke Energy Corp. (DUK), are the biggest sources of U.S. carbon-dioxide pollution, with power plants fueled by coal, oil and natural gas making up one-third of total emissions.¶ Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa Jackson said earlier this year the agency had no plans to move ahead with rules, spurring an outcry among environmentalists who say the regulations are crucial in the fight against climate change. NRDC is calling on the newly re-elected Obama to act.¶ “The time is right for the president and the EPA to address this,” David Doniger, climate policy director for NRDC in Washington, said in an interview. “While ultimately we need U.S. legislation to cut emissions deeply over the long term, we can take a big bite out of carbon pollution with the laws we already have on the books.”¶ EPA View¶ EPA Assistant Administrator Gina McCarthy said Nov. 13 that any rule regulating emissions from existing coal-fired power plants is at least several years away.¶ The NRDC is making its proposal as envoys from more than 190 nations meet in Doha this week to negotiate terms for a new climate change treaty that would require emissions cuts from the world’s biggest polluting nations, including China and the U.S. for the first time.¶ Developing countries are pressing industrial nations for further steps on global warming. The U.S. has pledged to cut greenhouse gases about 17 percent by 2020 over 2005 levels and says it won’t increase that target at this year’s United Nations meeting.¶ Resources for the Future, which gets funds through government grants, foundations and companies such as Goldman Sachs, estimates the U.S. can cut emissions 16.3 percent by 2020, assuming the EPA rules for existing polluters are enacted.¶ Plant Guidelines¶ Under NRDC’s plan, the EPA would set guidelines for existing power plants that reflect a state’s specific mix of power sources. For example, a state that gets most of its electricity from burning coal would have a different EPA guideline than one that has more of a split between coal, natural gas and oil.¶ “NRDC’s proposal is designed to give power plant owners freedom to choose how they would achieve the required emission reductions, giving credit for increases in energy efficiency and electricity generation using renewable sources and allowing emission-rate averaging among fossil fuel-fired power plants,” according to the NRDC report. “States would also have the freedom to design their own approach, as long as it achieved equivalent emission reductions.”¶ NRDC’s plan doesn’t call for emissions trading, known as “cap and trade,” though states could implement such a program if they choose, Doniger said.¶ The group says that if the new standards were put in place, carbon emissions from plants would decline 26 percent over this decade from 2005 levels. Annual costs would amount to about $4 billion in 2020, and estimated benefits from “saving lives and reducing the risks of catastrophic climate change” would range from $25 billion to $60 billion.¶ Call for Action¶ **European Union, China, Brazil and India have called on the U.S. to step up** greenhouse gas **reductions as a** first **step toward a treaty** on reducing emissions worldwide. The U.S. never ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which limits emissions in industrial nations such as the EU, Australia and Norway.¶ The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has said developed countries need to cut emissions by 25 percent to 40 percent in 2020 from 1990 levels to meet its target of keeping warming since the industrial revolution to below 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degree Fahrenheit). Only Norway and Monaco have submitted pledges in that range.¶ Obama’s climate envoys are in Doha this week for UN talks for a new global warming treaty by 2015 that would take force in 2020. U.S. lead negotiator Todd Stern told reporters yesterday that the U.S. is “on track” to meet its 17-percent emissions reduction goal, in spite of Obama’s 2010 failure to push national cap-and-trade legislation through Congress.¶ UN Talks¶ Environmentalists and delegates from countries including China say they will be closely watching the UN negotiations for any signs of how forceful Obama may be on climate policy over the next four years, both domestically and internationally.¶ “The single most important thing that President Obama can do over the next couple of months is issue standards for existing power plants,” Jake Schmidt of NRDC said in an interview in Doha. “**That’s what will** send a very clear signal to the international community that the U.S. can reduce emissions and be on track for an international agreement.”

### AT: Regulations increase prices

#### The CP involves a range of flexible enforcement mechanisms that allows utilities to achieve emissions reductions at very low cost – the aff arguments assume inflexible regulation

**Lashof, 12** – director of the climate and clean air program at the Natural Resources Defense Council (Daniel, “Closing the Power Plant Carbon Pollution Loophole: Smart Ways the Clean Air Act Can Clean Up America’s Biggest Climate Polluters” December, <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-report.pdf>)

Third, the recommended program gives each source several ways to comply.

n A source may comply by meeting the emission rate standard on its own.

n A set of sources may comply by averaging their emission rates. For example, a coal plant may average with a gas plant, such that their total emissions divided by their combined electricity output meets the applicable state standard.

n A source may comply by acquiring qualifying credits derived from low- or zero-emitting electricity generation. For example, an NGCC plant would earn credits reflecting the difference between the required state fleet average standard and its emissions per megawatt-hour. A wind plant would earn larger per-MWh credits, reflecting the difference between the state standard and its zero-emission rate.

n Finally, a source may comply by acquiring qualifying energy efficiency credits, reflecting incremental reductions in power demand (sometimes called “negawatt-hours”), which earn credits at the same rate as other zero-emission sources listed above.

The EPA emission guideline document would need to specify the rules and protocols for these compliance options. Because the compliance responsibility remains with the sources in the regulated category, and because all of the eligible compliance measures reduce or avoid emissions from covered sources in that category, these compliance options are fully compatible with the definition of a standard of performance. 39

The recommended program structure allows, but does not require, states to reach agreements to allow sources in more than one state to average their emissions, or to use compliance credits generated in another state.

Building these types of emission reduction options into the emission guideline for compliance serves several important functions:

n It expands the range of compliance techniques available to each covered unit.

n It provides an incentive for early action because measures that reduce emission rates any time after the end of the baseline period automatically count toward compliance.

n It taps the most economically efficient means of reducing emissions, including energy efficiency and non-fossil supply options.

n It reduces the overall system cost of achieving any specified percentage improvement in sources’ emission rates, thus allowing achievement of the greatest possible pollution reduction within any given cost constraints.

n It equalizes the marginal cost of emission reductions for owners and operators of different types of plants within a state and eliminates the need for different standards for different types of power plants, given the ability to use emissions averaging and/or emission reduction credits, rather than meeting the standard on site.

Whether a standard of performance set at a particular level is achievable at a reasonable cost must be assessed taking into consideration all of the permissible means of compliance. An emission rate may be unreasonably expensive to achieve if the source’s only options are measures taken at the source itself to reduce its direct emission rate. If the standard allows sources the option of additional means of compliance, as this proposal does, through averaging and crediting mechanisms, then the source’s cost of compliance will be substantially lower. Thus, EPA needs to analyze the cost and achievability of potential standards on the basis of all the compliance options that are available to plant owners and operators, including these emission credit compliance options.Based on this program structure, EPA would determine the appropriate emission rates to be met in each state. The emission rate for each state must reflect the best system of emission controls that has been adequately demonstrated, taking cost into account. In this context, the key question is the impact on the integrated system of electric generating units within a state.

#### Economic savings from this approach are substantially greater than the costs and it won’t increase electricity prices

**Lashof, 12** – director of the climate and clean air program at the Natural Resources Defense Council (Daniel, “Closing the Power Plant Carbon Pollution Loophole: Smart Ways the Clean Air Act Can Clean Up America’s Biggest Climate Polluters” December, <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-report.pdf>)

NRDC’s recommended CO2 performance standards will achieve considerable emission reductions through 2020 with manageable costs to the electric power sector. The analysis shows that the proposed policy approach will reduce CO2 emissions by 26 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, and 34 percent by 2025, with $4 billion in annualized compliance costs in 2020. These reductions will be achieved through a combination of demand-side and supply-side efficiency improvements, increased investment in renewable energy capacity, and an increased market share for lower-emitting generation sources.

The value of societal benefits could reach $60 billion in 2020, as much as 15 times the costs of compliance. NRDC estimates that in 2020 the societal, public health, and economic benefits of reducing emissions of SO2 will be $11 billion to $27 billion, while the benefits of reducing CO2 will be $14 to $33 billion. The range in total benefits is $25 billion to $60 billion, or roughly 6 to 15 times the costs of compliance. The benefits accounted for in the valuation of avoided SO2 emissions include avoided mortality, heart attacks, asthma attacks, hospital visits, respiratory symptoms, and lost workdays.

The recommended approach will lower wholesale electricity costs. NRDC’s analysis indicates that, under the recommended approach, **wholesale power prices would be 4 percent lower** than under the Reference Case in 2020. Meanwhile, energy **efficiency improvements** in households and businesses **would reduce** electricity **consumption, lowering electricity bills and emissions at the same time**.

#### The energy efficiency portion of the CP will net lower electricity prices

**NRDC, 12 –** Natural Resources Defense Council Issue Brief (“Using the Clean Air Act to Sharply Reduce Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, Creating Clean Energy Jobs, Improving Americans’ Health, and Curbing Climate Change” December, <http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution-standards/files/pollution-standards-IB.pdf>)

The results from the model show that the proposed approach would begin to modernize and clean up America’s electricity sector while modestly reducing the nation’s electricity bill. This is because energy efficiency programs adopted in response to the incentives created by the approach would cause overall demand to decline by 4 percent, rather than increase by 7 percent. Meanwhile, coal-fired generation would drop 21 percent from 2012 to 2020 instead of increasing by 5 percent without the proposed carbon standard. Natural gas generation would rise by 14 percent, while renewables rise by about 30 percent (assuming no new state or federal policies to expedite an increase in market share for renewables).

Investments in energy efficiency and demand response are the lowest cost compliance pathway—much cheaper than building new power plants or installing pollution control equipment—so including this flexibility significantly reduces overall costs. Energy efficiency consistently delivers over three dollars in savings for every dollar invested, which is one of the many reasons utilities have scaled up annual investment from $2.7 billion in 2007 to nearly $7 billion in 2011, with a corresponding increase in energy savings. See Figure 3: U.S. Electric Efficiency Program Investments, 2007-2011. Efficiency investments reduce the need to build additional power plants and infrastructure, reduce wholesale power prices, and deliver significant bill savings to individuals and businesses. Because substantial reductions in CO2 can be achieved through energy efficiency without building many new power plants or installing lots of expensive pollution control equipment, the total costs of compliance would be low—netting out at $4 billion in 2020.

## 1nr

### AT: Legally only thing you can do

#### The plan includes both solar electric and solar thermal – means things like solar water heaters are topical

**Mission Mountain Green, no date** - a renewable energy company that sells solar panels (<http://mmgrn.com/3901.html>)

Save an additional 30% on the cost of a solar system As of October 3, 2008 the Federal Solar Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for homeowners and businesses has been extended through the end of 2016 via the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Residential and Commercial system owners can take a 30% tax credit for both Solar Electric and Solar Thermal Systems.

As of February 13, 2009 and the signing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by President Barack Obama, the $2,000 cap on qualified solar water heating property has been removed providing a full 30% credit. This means that both Residential and Commercial customers can take 30% of the system cost as a credit with no cap on both Solar Electric and Solar Thermal systems on solar systems placed in service after January 1, 2009.

#### Plan says “solar energy” – that includes a lot of nontopical things like heat and energy efficiency through passive solar

**Roberts, 12** – David “What’s the Best Solar Technology for Your Home, Community, Business or Farm?”

Read more at <http://cleantechnica.com/2012/03/01/what-is-solar-energy-types-solar-energy-technology/#FLqh5F6DYli9t7Oe.99>)

What is solar energy? What are the differences in different types of energy technology in existence today?

Solar energy, quite simply, is energy that comes from the sun. (Simple.) But there are now many types of solar energy technology focused on making use of that energy and turning it into usable electricity or heat (or both).

The scale of energy generation ranges from the home water heater to serving 100,000+ homes. Below is an outline of the many solar energy forms, starting with hybrid solar power, since it is the least understood and publicized.

Hybrid Solar Energy

By definition, “hybrid energy” includes combinations of clean energy sources such as solar power, wind energy, or geothermal heat pumps, combined with engines or generators. Many in operation are do-it-yourself projects for off-grid use. Sunwize (CA) combines PV solar power and diesel engines, while N. Arizona Wind & Sun incorporates both solar and wind sources. Cogenra Solar capitalizes on the inefficiency of PV solar panels (ranging 15-20%) and captures the wasted heat thrown off to heat water, resulting in 4-5 times the amount of total energy versus PV panel systems alone. Its best “cogeneration” customers are industries or institutions where significant hot water is needed.

Another hybrid solar energy company is SunScience, whose Energy Management System integrates both a concentrated photovoltaic (PV) capability (for electricity) and a thermal component (for hot water), on a compact footprint. Its systems architecture incorporates data from a network of sensors that measures temperature, humidity, and other environmental elements. Proprietary software monitors—and controls—the elements of energy output, storage and environmental elements for total systems management. SunScience’s first application is “controlled-environment agriculture” within greenhouses, to achieve year-round farming in cold climates. Technological “proof of concept” was achieved at a formal “harvest” event late January.

Photovoltaic (PV) panels. This is what most people think of to lower their electricity bills

Traditional photovoltaic panels

or supply clean power to communities. Examples of large solar PV companies are Sunpower (CA) and SunTech (China). Glenn wrote a post in September on how PV solar panels work, and Wikipedia has much more about this decades old technology, but essentially PV panels are made of silicon semiconductors within solar cells that convert sunlight (photons) to electricity (electrons). Scientists at national labs are experimenting with organic materials and “quantum dots” to achieve this process, but most PV panels are still being made with crystalline (or wafer) silicon, with manufacturing now dominated by China. Cost per watt is falling under $1.00, but efficiency is still only 20+%, resulting in large land areas needed for significant electricity output. PV roof panels are the predominant technology for home use, whereas huge multi-acre arrays of PV panels are required for utility-scale projects, mostly in remote locations.

Thin-Film Photovoltaic. Once touted as the next generation of PV because of a) lighter weight, b) less of the expensive silicon material needed, and c) other forms of photovoltaic material (amorphous silicon) can be used. The result is a lighter, thinner product with a greater variety of applications, such as its own rooftop material, on top of shingles, or even on windows. But the dramatic price reduction of traditional PV panels out of China slowed market acceptance of thin-film PV. Other disadvantages include higher manufacturing costs, lower efficiency, and greater corresponding space needed for energy equivalency. The top thin-film company in the world, in terms of market share, is First Solar.

Concentrated Photovoltaic (CPV). In a broad sense, this newer form of electricity production competes directly with utility-scale PV and CSP (described below) solar arrays. The CPV advantage over these other systems involves a smaller footprint because the solar panels are made of multi-junction solar cells with concentrating lenses, rather than flat silicon cells. The result is increased efficiency anywhere from 2-3 times greater than traditional PV panels, ranging upwards of 43%. Therefore, corresponding less land space is required. Disadvantages include greater complexity of cell manufacture and price per kilowatt hour. Current thinking is that in order to be competitive, CPV systems need to be larger, approaching 100 MW, and located in high-DNI (direct normal irradiance) areas such as the southwest U. S., Mexico, Chile, Mediterranean countries, etc. But now, with PV panels from China becoming dramatically less expensive, economic challenges for CPV only increase. Some successful companies include Amonix and Semprius.

Solar thermal energy. Most thermal energy news is about Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) Concentrated (thermal) Solar Power

because of the billions of dollars involved and the tens of thousands of homes served with electricity, from one project. America’s first and the world’s largest CSP project is being completed near Tonapah in eastern Nevada. Technically, this highly efficient thermal energy system creates electricity with huge arrays of mirrors (flat, parabolic or troughs) that track and reflect sunlight onto a solar tower that heats fluid to over 1000 degrees F, creating steam that turns a generator, in turn creating electricity. SolarReserve’s Crescent Dunes project of 10,000 mirrors has the capacity to generate 110 megawatts and will serve 75,000 homes. And due to an accompanying molten salt storage system, electricity can be delivered 24/7. Another example company is Brightsource Energy (CA) and here’s a video from the Dept of Energy on the technology:

Medium to lower temperature forms of thermal energy creation—well under 1000 degrees—are best suited for heating water and are not efficient for converting heat to electricity. Ancient iterations of this technology have been around for thousands of years (roman baths in Ephesus, Turkey). Today’s applications do not involve the large land use arrays of CSP systems, but rather employ on-site, flat-panel solar heat collectors. Applications include direct heating of residential or commercial air spaces, water heaters, swimming pools and now soil within greenhouses. Many systems are available locally through your telephone book or thru the Solar Energy Society.

Active versus Passive Solar Energy. “Active” solar energy includes installing electrical or mechanical devices such as solar panels or thermal energy set-ups to create electricity, heat water, or heat space, as described above. These can be added to a home or building after it is already built, but are best when incorporated into new construction.

“Passive” solar involves recognizing the sun’s radiation properties to either increase the natural heating benefits of the sun or, conversely, to minimize them. This is best achieved when a structure is being built or window renovations are planned. The basic idea for colder climates is for windows to be south-facing to allow the sun’s heat into the rooms. Or, in warmer climates, to have smaller windows facing south and larger windows north-facing. Here’s a good explanation of active and passive solar energy usage.

#### And the solar energy tax credit includes eligibility for heating and cooling, not just power

**HubPages, 2013** – a tax advice website (“Federal Solar Energy Investment Tax Credits for 2012, 2013” <http://creditguide.hubpages.com/hub/Federal-Solar-Energy-Investment-Tax-Credits>

Federal Solar Energy Investment Tax Credits

The solar energy tax credit began in 1978 and allowed you to claim a tax credit for solar energy purchases. It remained at the 15 percent credit until 1986 when it was reduced to 12 percent and was again reduced to 10 percent in 1988.

In 2005 the energy policy act was put in to place and allowed for a 30 percent tax credit of up to $2,000.00. This act was set to expire as of December 31, 2008 but received an 8 year extension. The $2,000.00 cap will also be lifted on solar purchases after December 31, 2008. So it may be a good time to consider using solar energy in your home.

AMT & Solar Energy Credits

Effective December 31st, 2008 alternative minimum tax (AMT) filers will be able to also apply for the solar investment tax credit as well. This credit was not previously available to AMT filers.

Qualifying Solar Equipment

To qualify for the solar energy investment tax credit you must use solar energy to generate electricity, heat, cool, or to provide light inside of a structure. Solar pool heating equipment does not qualify for this credit.

### more

#### Precision controls solvency and research quality

**Resnick 1** [Evan Resnick, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring 2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, “Defining Engagement”]

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

#### Precision outweighs on energy topics

Gene Whitney (Section Research Manager at the Congressional Research Service), Carl E. Behrens (Specialist in Energy Policy at the CRS) and Carol Glover (Information Research Specialist at the CRS) November 2010 “U.S. Fossil Fuel Resources:

Terminology, Reporting, and Summary” http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.view&FileStore\_id=04212e22-c1b3-41f2-b0ba-0da5eaead952

Terminology A search for energy statistics in the literature quickly reveals a large number of terms used to describe amounts of fossil fuels. Most of these terms have precise and legitimate definitions, and even a careful comparison of statistics for diverse forms of fossil fuels can become quite difficult to reconcile or understand. Not only do oil, natural gas, and coal occur in many diverse geologic environments, but each commodity may occur in different modes or in different geologic settings that impose vastly different economics on their recovery and delivery to market. A vocabulary of terms has developed over the decades to capture the nature of deposits in terms of their likelihood of being developed and their stage of development.

#### Precision key to education

**Petress**, Professor Emeritus of Communication at the University of Maine at Presque Isle, 9/22/**2006**

(Ken, “The value of precise language usage,” Reading Improvement, Highbeam Research)

Precision in language usage can be thought of as an ego boosting activity, a snobbish pastime, an arrogant trait; or it can be interpreted as an attempt to aid audiences in understanding exact meaning, an effort to reduce ambiguity, and/or as a positive role model for others in one's language community. This essay argues that the latter set of interpretations are desirable and that we should all make modest efforts to learn how to write and speak more precisely and then to actually practice [most of the time] what we have learned. Reading (like listening) is the reception of and interpretation of messages. In order for readers to garner full impact, power, and intention of messages, the message makers must do all in their ability to aid the eventual receiver. A major component of this message creator duty is to form as precise messages as possible. **Language precision eliminates or reduces ambiguity** and equivocation (when not intended). (1) As Hayakawa and Hayakawa have convincingly pointed out, precise language aids in adapting appropriately and successfully when needing to employ skills to reach various language levels such as variant age levels, education levels, class structures, and degrees of familiarity to the language being used. (2) Precision is defined as possessing exactitude; the opposite of precise is that which is vague, **"close enough,"** somewhat "fuzzy," and perhaps ambiguous. Precision is not designed to be knit picking, obtuse, a way to show off, nor a way to demonstrate linguistic superiority; it is a way to state directly, clearly, specifically, exactly, and vividly what you mean. Precision does not guarantee that readers or hearers will better understand you or that they will personally appreciate the effort of being precise; however, we stand a better chance of being understood when we are precise.

### ADV 2

#### Finishing BMI

BMI, 12 [October, Business Monitor International, Would The Eurozone’s Collapse Lead To War?, <http://www.riskwatchdog.com/2012/10/17/would-the-eurozone%E2%80%99s-collapse-lead-to-war/>]

Since the worsening of the eurozone crisis, various European officials, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have warned that a collapse of the currency union could lead to war in Europe. UK Business Secretary [Vince Cable became the latest figure to make such a statement](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9607889/Vince-Cable-Europe-could-be-plunged-into-war-if-Euro-collapses.html), on Monday. Perhaps the Nobel committee was thinking along similar lines when it awarded the EU the Nobel Peace Prize last week. The eurozone is not the same as the EU, but if the eurozone collapses outright, then there would be a high risk that the EU would collapse, too.¶ Long Road From Eurozone Collapse To War¶ Overall, we find the talk of war overblown to say the least. There is clearly a risk of rising civil unrest, but this would fall far short of ‘war’. The Europe of the 2010s is vastly different from the Europe of the 1930s. It is far richer and politically mature. There are several stages the eurozone crisis would need to pass through before the continent would be even remotely at risk of war:¶ 1. Severe deterioration of intergovernmental cooperation: This would require governments to tear up existing EU treaties and laws and potentially adopt protectionist economic measures.¶ 2. Severe deterioration of economic conditions in European states: This could theoretically pave the way for extremist takeovers, although this would still be far from guaranteed. Severe economic crises in the Asian ‘tigers’ in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2001-2002, the Baltic states in 2008-2010, and Greece in 2010-2012 have not led to ultra-right wing or ultra-left wing governments being elected or seizing power (although Argentina has in recent years moved in that direction). Even for the economically marginalised, living standards today are far higher than in the 1930s.¶ 3. Extremist takeovers in key states: Far-right or far-left parties would need to come to power. Even so, **they would not necessarily lead their countries to war**, since their immediate priority would be to restore economic growth. Conflict risks would rise, however, if a group of ‘moderate’ European states decided to sanction, isolate, or contain ‘extreme’ European states. The ‘extreme’ states could also conceivably seek to funnel their unemployed young people into their militaries, but this may not be affordable, financially. Military build-ups cost a lot of money.¶ 4. Revival of old territorial disputes: Europe’s 19th and 20th century wars were primarily about land-grabs. Territorial disputes used to be the norm. Nowadays, though, most territorial disputes are largely resolved. These could conceivably gain a new lease of life through manipulation by provocative politicians, but it is unclear if they would stir the passions of the public.¶ 5. Break-up of existing EU states: War could occur if an existing EU state were to break up violently. However, it is difficult to see the British or Spanish governments using force to prevent the secession of Scotland or Catalonia, or Belgium or Italy splitting up violently. All these countries and territories are much more politically and economically advanced than Yugoslavia was in 1990. However, if a group of EU states assisted the separation of a breakaway region, this could be a casus belli.¶ 6. Dissolution or neutralisation of NATO: Some European doomsayers forget that NATO still exists, and that the US still guarantees the security of Europe by basing tens of thousands of troops in Germany, the UK, and Italy. The existence of NATO means that even if the eurozone and EU were to collapse, any hypothetical march towards war would still have a powerful brake. Potential warring states would have to leave the Western alliance first, or conclude that NATO and the US military presence are meaningless or unreliable. This is certainly possible, given that NATO has been weakened by budget cuts in its member states, but would still require a major political gamble.

#### No Europe war

**Massie 12** (Allan Massie is a Scottish writer who has published nearly 30 books, including a sequence of novels set in ancient Rome. His non-fiction works range from a study of Byron's travels to a celebration of Scottish rugby. He has been a political columnist for The Scotsman, The Sunday Times and The Daily Telegraph and writes a literary column for The Spectator., 7/17/2012, "Nuclear Iran, revolution in Europe: it's fun to make your flesh creep, but Armageddon isn't really nigh", blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/allanmassie/100065078/nuclear-iran-revolution-in-europe-its-fun-to-make-your-flesh-creep-but-armageddon-isnt-really-nigh/)

Then we had our expert Finance blogger Thomas Pascoe in similar thank-God-it’s-Friday "I wants to make your flesh creep" Fat Boy mode. We are too complacent, he says. We are faced with “impending events that would have precipitated a revolution in almost any other place at almost any other time in history- either the collapse of the currency or the complete secession of budgetary control to a supra-natural body in the EU.” (When I read that I said “Golly”, until I realised that he probably meant to write supranational rather than supra-natural, delightfully flesh-creeping though the idea of a spectral supra-natural body taking control of national budgets may be.) Either of these may lead, he would have us think, to some form of fascist revolution. This is because in the nations enduring austerity, and indeed suffering from austerity, "the populations at large feel no culpability for the debts their leaders have amassed.” Well, I suppose he’s right there. How much culpability do you, dear reader, feel for the size of the UK’s national debt? Do you beat your breast moaning “I blame myself”, or wring your hands in shame? No? I thought not. So why should the Greeks, the Spaniards and the others “feel culpability”? In Fat Boy mode, Thomas Pascoe says that either the EU will take complete control of all national budgets or that countries will default on their debts. Either way, populist politicians will emerge to stir up the masses, and we’ll be back to the Thirties. “Europe,” it seems, “ is one demagogue away from causing an earthquake in global finance such that the current problems seem a tremor in comparison. If Silvio Berlusconi – the only truly populist politician the Continent has produced in half a century – had been twenty years younger, I fancy it might have been him…” Well, if the playboy “Mussolini in a blue blazer” is the nearest to a fascist demagogue you can come up with, there isn’t much to worry about. And indeed there isn’t, because politics now matters less than football and entertainment – both things which bind the young people of Europe together, and make revolutionary fervour somewhat unlikely. So, at the risk of being accused of complacency, I’ll suggest, first, that if a country was going to fall out of the euro, it would have done so by now; second, that the eurozone will muddle through, because the will to do so is there; and third, that while some supranational body charged with supervising national budgets will be set up, it will prove far less rigid and far more elastic in its exercise of control than many suppose or indeed hope or, alternatively, fear. This is because the EU remains a union of nation-states, and national governments will insist on retaining a great degree of autonomy. Flesh-creeping is fun and lively journalism, but Armageddon is not on the menu today, next week, next year, or in the next decade. We have come through worse and far more dangerous times, and goodwill and common sense will let us survive present difficulties and discontents. The notion that “we are one charismatic leader away from a complete reordering of the Continent” is Fat Boy stuff.

#### No Eurozone collapse – the cost of it is too high

Pravda News, 1/9/13 [“Price for eurozone to collapse too high”http://english.pravda.ru/business/finance/09-01-2013/123410-eurozone-0/]

The Eurozone will not fall apart, because the price of getting out of the game is too high for each country. When, in early September, it was announced that the ECB would buy government bonds in unlimited quantities, the bridges behind the Euro area countries have collapsed. There is no way back, and this means that one can only move forward and fight for their own happiness.¶ In order to make the path easy, the monetary union must be supported by four other unions: banking, fiscal, converged and political. To be sustainable in the long-term, political economy will have to fight for its present.¶ It is a long and ambitious list, but the more the experts think of the situation in Europe, the more inevitable such findings seem, said Professor Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Director of the World Economic Forum.¶ "Since the signing of the Treaty of Paris between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in April of 1951, European integration became more intense. Can we imagine the history of Europe without the development of institutions designed to unite the European countries under the banner of shared values ​​and common ideals? It is inconceivable.¶ The Euro provides major economic benefits: elimination of currency risks, lower inflation, growth of trade in the euro area and the closer integration of the European financial markets. In general, the single currency has contributed to monetary stability and predictability, which is often overlooked in the current debate.¶ At the same time, the crisis has revealed a number of shortcomings in the structure of the euro area. Europe lacks a strong and unified fiscal policy, the differences in competitiveness between North and South of the region brought the threat of a default, and the lack of a bank union gave rise to systemic risks. Add to this the complexity of European political institutions, lack of democracy, and here is the result: failure to make real decisions.¶ Clearly, the Euro will survive in its current form, but there is a need to deal with the problems in the surrounding institutions. First, it is a banking union. Without it, the currency will simply not succeed. Solid banking associations should implement banking supervision, mechanism of recapitalization and guarantees for bank deposits. The good news is that the first item is already being implemented. On September 12 it was proposed to create a single regulatory body under the auspices of the European Central Bank. The last two items would require

#### Eurozone breakup inevitable and tanks the economy

**Kavoussi 11-28 –** a business reporter at The Huffington Post,. She has written for The Boston Globe, The New York Observer, and The San Antonio Express-News., she is a recent graduate of Harvard University, where she studied international economic history and the history of economic thought (Bonnie, “Eurozone Crisis Threatens Global Economy” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/28/eurozone-crisis_n_1116977.html>) Jacome

As a breakup of the eurozone -- a once seemingly impossible scenario -- becomes increasingly likely, economists are starting to sketch out what a post-euro world would look like. Many are warning that if political leaders don't change course, a breakup of the eurozone would plunge the United States and the rest of the world into a slowdown and possibly another recession.

"If Europe turns out badly, it's much more likely we'll go into recession," said Michael Spence, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at the New York University Stern School of Business. "If you take a big chunk like Europe and turn it down, it would probably bring everybody else down, including us."

If the eurozone dissolves, the European banking system would likely collapse, economists said, plunging the continent into recession, which would keep European consumers from buying. Decreased demand from the continent, which represents about 20 percent of the global economy, would hurt both the United States and emerging countries, who depend on European banks not just for demand, but also for funding.

The risk of a eurozone breakup has increased dramatically over the past couple of weeks, as countries have faced increasing difficulty selling their debt. Interest rates on sovereign bonds issued by eurozone countries have spiked. The interest rate on 10-year Italian sovereign bonds rose to 7.28 percent Monday, nearly hitting a [Nov. 9 euro-era high](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/09/italy-default-debt_n_1084523.html) that was only eased afterward by limited bond purchases by the European Central Bank.

The interest rate on 10-year Spanish sovereign bonds rose to 6.58 percent Monday, near [the euro-era high reached on Nov. 17](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/18/spanish-sovereign-debt-interest-rate_n_1101368.html). Interest rates on the 10-year bonds of more fiscally sound countries, such as France and Belgium, spiked to 3.58 percent and 5.59 percent respectively on Monday, as the contagion of higher borrowing costs spread to across the eurozone, regardless of their economic fundamentals.

If European leaders don't agree to take bold economic measures for more fiscal integration -- including allowing the European Central Bank to become the lender of last resort -- the eurozone could start to unravel, said Simon Tilford, chief economist of the Center for European Reform in London.

The eurozone's future could be decided next week when leaders meet for a summit on the sovereign debt crisis on December 9. If they leave empty-handed, Tilford said, fearful depositors could pull their money out of European banks en masse, causing European banks to fail. In a "vicious death spiral," said Tilford, troubled European countries would stop being able to borrow money as borrowing costs reach unsustainable levels. Then a string of European countries could default and leave the eurozone, leading to its collapse, he said.

#### No chance of EU collapse

Brooks 10 (Kathleen, Research Director – Forex.com, “Will the Euro Survive Europe’s Latest Sovereign Debt Crisis?”, Reuters, 11-19, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate-uk/2010/11/19/will-the-euro-survive-europe%E2%80 %99s-latest-sovereign-debt-crisis/)

While the fund may be able to cope with the claims of Ireland and Greece, it could not cope with those of Spain, another debt-laden southern European economy that is at risk from bond vigilantes once the focus shifts from Ireland’s woes. If Spain was to require financing in the coming months then it would come down to Germany, as the largest economic force in the Euro zone, to cough up more cash. Angela Merkel certainly doesn’t seem to have the political will to “donate” any more money to bail out its Eurozone peers, and if the funds are not there then a situation where Spain is “too big to bail” could break the Eurozone and cause the demise of the Euro. But we believe this is an extremely unlikely scenario. So what is a more realistic conclusion to the current crisis in Europe? At the moment, it appears that Ireland will receive some form of financial assistance, which will reduce the near-term risks of an Irish default and should calm the markets. But on a more fundamental level, the Irish crisis has shown the political will in Europe to keep the Union afloat. Ireland has been pushed to accept financial assistance from all corners of Europe in an attempt to calm the markets and stop contagion in other fiscally challenged members like Portugal and Spain.¶ This suggests that although the way that Europe has coped with its first major challenge has been inconsistent and laden with confusion, there is an overwhelming desire to keep the monetary union intact. Thus, investors who believe that this is the death knell for the Eurozone will have to battle the political will of Brussels.¶ Secondly, Spain is a large economy and although it has suffered the bursting of its real estate bubble, it has other industries to try and pull it out of its economic malaise. As well as this, its financial position is clear, whereas Ireland’s financial liabilities are still technically unknown as more bad mortgages turn sour on Irish banks’ balance sheets. This should help Spain avoid a similar fate to Greece and Ireland in the capital markets.¶ Lastly, although the euro has come under some selling pressure during this most recent debt crisis, it hasn’t suffered a capitulation. The forex market is not pricing in the chance of a collapse in the euro any time soon. While there are major structural issues – including implementing strict fiscal rules and setting up an automatic default mechanism for member states – this is to be expected with a political union that is essentially only 10-years old.¶ Essentially the peripheral nations need to be more like Germany, and Germany needs to consume a little more. If Europe can get succeed in its own balancing act, then it could emerge from this crisis as the strongest of the major economies.

# r8 neg v. north texas kp

## 1nc

### 1nc framework

#### A. Interpretation—the aff should defend federal action based on the resolution

#### Most predictable—the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### A general subject isn’t enough—debate requires a specific point of difference

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.

To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### B. Vote neg—

#### 1. Preparation and clash—changing the question post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

#### 2. Dialogue—game spaces like debate require balanced ground to prevent one side from create de facto monologue—prerequisite to mutual education

**Hanghoj 2008** – PhD, assistant professor, School of Education, University of Aarhus, also affiliated with the Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials, located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (Thorkild, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Deliberation is the best alternative to activism because it requires continual testing that bolsters advocacy and inclusion—refusal of side switching leads to group polarization and isolation

**Talisse 2005** – philosophy professor at Vanderbilt (Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”) \*note: gendered language in this article refers to arguments made by two specific individuals in an article by Iris Young

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals.

In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write:

Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172)

That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed.

The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable.

According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement.

The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects.

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational.

It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists.

Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17

The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### The impact outweighs—key to respond to all major global challenges

Christian O. **Lundberg 10** Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p. 311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.

The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:

To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)

Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.

There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.

Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

### 1nc ispec

#### Next of is ISPEC—this is external to framework—even if they don’t affirm federal action, they should have to SPECIFY how they actualize wind energy as a resistance mechanism—affirming wind is just a vague gesture of encouragement

**Marbek Resource Consultants, 6** (Report prepared for the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment “NATIONAL EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY (EPR) WORKSHOP,” 9/27, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/epr\_wkshp\_rpt\_1376\_e.pdf

The suggestion was made, and supported by others, that the word “incentives” for producers be replaced with the word “encourage”, since the term “incentive” usually **implies a particular mechanism** (#1).

#### Incentive design matters—prior question to discussing energy

**Webb, 93** – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993)  Hein Online)

In this paper, "**financial incentives**" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired **behaviour may vary with the type of incentive** in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, **an incentive to encourage that** type of **activity** has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a **cursory discussion** of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By **limiting the definition** of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory **programs with incentive effects** which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 **are excluded** from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both **more manageable and** more **particular**. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### Vote neg—too late to clarify:

#### 1. Aff condo—makes them a moving target that reframes their advocacy based on the nature of 1nc ground.

#### 2. The devil’s in the details—their 1ac backfires without precise attention to mechanism design

**Ilex Associates, 96** – Consultants to the British Department of Trade and Industry (“A REVIEW OF OVERSEAS FINANCING MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES FOR COMMERCIAL RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS”, <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file15101.pdf>)

Ilex Associates has conducted a **comprehensive world study** of incentive and financing mechanisms for supporting renewable technologies. A number of countries have been identified as having particularly interesting current or past policies for the development and commercialisation of renewable energy technologies and which can, therefore, be used to inform policy decisions in the UK. These countries are: Austria, Denmark, Greece, India, The Netherlands, Spain and two States of America together with its federal programme. Detailed case studies for each of these countries are presented in Volume 2, and the summaries for each of these countries are included in Appendix I of this volume. Shorter reports for those countries which were studied in less detail as part of the initial world study are presented in Volume 3 of this study, and brief 'thumb-nail' sketches of the countries are included in Appendix II of this report. The findings of the different country studies have been reviewed to identify the main forms of "incentive mechanisms" and "financing mechanisms" that are used to support renewable technologies world-wide, and the successes and failures of the different approaches. The overall objectives of different governments vary and, combined with the context of the industry structure, these variations are reflected in the range of mechanisms used. Schemes can probably be placed along a spectrum whose two extremes are government­ driven consensus mechanisms at one end, and market mechanisms at the other. One of the key results to come out of the work is the fact that **whilst some incentive mechanisms may be appropriate** to some technologies, they may not be appropriate to others. This is either because of the different characteristics of the technologies (i.e. whether they are grid-connected electricity generating technologies, or heat producing, or stand-alone/domestic scale electricity generating technologies), or because of the different stages of maturity of the technology. **No single incentive mechanism is appropriate to all types** of technology.

#### 3. Intention is a bad focus for ethics—consequences trump ideals, which means all our arguments about tactics are key

**Isaac 2002** – political science professor at Indiana University (Jeffrey, Dissent, Spring, “Ends, means, and politics”, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=601, WEA)

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left—by which I mean “progressive” faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates—has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing—about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq—continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it—about globalization and sweatshops— is new and in some ways promising (see my “Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement,” Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic—petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. case in point is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: “Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law.” This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9- 11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: “vengeance offers no relief. . . retaliation can never guarantee healing. . . and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice.” On this view military action of any kind is figured as “aggression” or “vengeance”; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, “healing” is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response—or at least any U.S. military response—is simply defined as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of any military response. It is virtually impossible either to “apprehend” and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the “criminals” in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to “arrest” them. And, finally, while “healing” is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a political goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for “social justice abroad.” It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility—these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter—the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America’s use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare— which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation—make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left’s reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of “materialism” and evocations of “struggle,” especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable “anti-militarism” of today’s campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post–cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post–September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

### 1nc Occular

#### We advocate the 1AC minus their visual presentation of the video.

#### The 1AC is structured around vision – by playing this video they make the 1AC an experience that is necessarily visual – people who cannot see are structurally incapable of fully experiencing the full force of the 1AC because they are incapable of participating in the act of the 1AC. This turns the case – vision based politics is a distinctly western way of understanding language

Sampson 1996 (Edward, CSUN, “Establishing Embodiment in Psychology” Theory & Psychology 1996 Vol. 6 (4): 601-624. Special issue: The body and psychology

It is apparent from my preceding remarks that I distinguish between the object-body, which has been of some interest to both the dominant and successor traditions, and embodiment, which has generally been ignored by both. I shortly examine what I mean by embodiment. But first, it is necessary to develop further the idea of the object-body.¶ It should come as no surprise that the object-body, that is, the body that a third-person observer encounters much as any other object of knowledge, would have become of general interest to the western scientific community. In great measure this focus on the object-body can be understood to be an aspect of what has come to be known as the ocularcentric bias (i.e. vision-dominated) of the western tradition in which vision and visual metaphors dominate our understanding.¶ Both Jay's (1993) and Levin's (1985, 1993) rather thorough analyses suggest that the privileging of vision and of visual metaphors has been so central to our language and our practices (including our scientific practices) since at least the Greek era that it operates as a kind of seen but unnoticed background (as even my own words attest) to all that we think. Others have similarly commented on the West's privileging of vision and its parallel denigration of the other senses, a conclusion that emerges from both historical (e.g. see Lowe, 1982; Romanyshyn, 1992, 1993; Synnott, 1993) and cross-cultural analyses (e.g. see Bremmer & Rodenburg, 1991; Featherstone, Hepworth, & Turner, 1991; Howes, 1991).¶ Both Jay (1993) and Levin, 1985, 1993) among others (e.g. Synnott, 1993) argue that some of the most notable philosophers whose works serve as the foundation of the western paradigm, Plato and Aristotle, for example, extolled the nobility of vision, while the keynoter of modernism, Descartes, employed a visual metaphor as central to his ideas. For example, Jay (1993) describes Descartes as 'a quintessentially visual philosopher' (p. 69) who, while sharing Plato's distrust of the senses, including the illusions of sight, nevertheless built his entire framework upon the inner or mind's eye, whose clear and distinct vision would establish a secure basis for human knowledge and truth itself. The very term Enlightenment describes both the era within which scientific understanding began its hegemonic rise and the use of a visual metaphor to inform the scientific task. In each of these cases, foundational to the western understanding, a visual metaphor that stressed a disembodied, angelic eye (e.g. see Jay, 1993, p. 81) became central. [p. 603]¶ This ocularcentric understanding is nowhere more evident today than in our scientific conceptions. Not only do we demand observation of phenomena in order to understand their workings, but we also insist that these observations be carried out as a spectator, a third-person observer who remains at a distance from what is being observed, so as not to affect or be affected by what is seen (i.e. the angelic eye). It is no wonder then that whenever the body has emerged within this ocularcentric tradition, it has been the object-body: to be seen, observed and manipulated from the outside.

### 1nc kritik

#### The 1AC is a one-dimensional epistemology of oppression -- an insistence on the self-evident perspectivism of oppressed peoples by focusing attention on the uniqueness and irrefutability of their personal experience participates in a *mythos* of implicit solidarity where all oppressed peoples are thought to assume the same interests -- this orientation romanticizes complicity with totalitarian violence

**Gur-ze-ev, 98** - Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education at Haifa, (Ilan, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy,” Educational Theory, Fall 48, <http://haifa.academia.edu/IlanGurZeev/Papers/117665/Toward_a_Nonreperssive_Critical_Pedagogy>)

**The postmodern and the multicultural discourses that influenced Giroux took a one-dimensional attitude towards power. They denoted the importance of deconstructing cultural reproduction and the centrality of relations of dominance to the “voices” of groups whose collective memory ,knowledge, and identity were threatened or manipulated by power relations and knowledge conceptions that reflect and serve the hegemonic groups**. Freire is not aware that this manipulationhas two sides, negative and a positive. The negative side allows the realization of violence by guaranteeing possibilities for the successful functioning of a normalized human being and creating possibilities for men and women to become more productive in “their” realm of self-evidence.Their normality reflects and serves this self-evidence by partly constituting the human subject aswell as the thinking self. Giroux easily extracted from Freire’s Critical Pedagogy the elements denoting the importance of acknowledging and respecting the knowledge and identity of marginalized groups and individuals. In fact, this orientation and its telos are in contrast to the central concepts of postmodern educators on the one hand and Critical Theories of Adorno,Horkheimer, and even Habermas on the other. But many similar conceptions and attitudes are present as well. **The aim of** Freire’s **Critical Pedagogy is to restore to marginalized groups their stolen “voice”,to enable them to recognize identify, and give their name the things in the world.** The similarity to postmodern critiques is already evident in his acknowledgment that to correctly coin a word isnothing less than to change the world. 10 However, to identify this conception with the postmodernstand is a over-hasty because the centrality of language in Freire‘s thought relates to his concept of “truth” and a class struggle that will allow the marginalized and repressed an authentic “voice”, 11 asif their self-evident knowledge is less false than that which their oppressors hold as valid**. Implicitly, Freire contends that the interests of all oppressed people are the same, and that one general theory exists for deciphering repressive reality and for developing the potentials absorbed in their collective memory**. An alternative critique of language which does not claim to empower the marginalized and the controlled to conceive and articulate their knowledge and needs on the onehand, and is not devoted to their emancipation on the other, is mere “verbalism”, according toFreire. 12 The purpose or common cause of the educator and the educated, the leader and the followers, in a dialogue between equal partners is called here “praxis”. Praxis in education aims to bridge the gap between theory and transformational action that effectively transforms human existence. This concept of transformation contrasts with educational concept of Critical Theory. Here learning andeducation are basically the individual’s responsibility and possibility, and are always an ontological issue while epistemologically concretized in the given historical social context. They are conditioned by an individual’s competence to transcend the “father image”, prejudices, habits, and external power relations that constitute the collective in order to attain full personal and humangrowth. 13 According to Freire, this personal development is conditioned by critical acknowledgment and should occur as part of the entire community’s revolutionary practice. Only there can successful educational praxis realize its dialogical essence. The dialogue is an authentic encounter between one person and another, an educator and her/his fellow who wants to be dialogically educated, and the encounter should be erotic or not realized at all. “Love” is presented as the center and the essence of dialogue. 14 Freire’s **Critical Pedagogy** is foundationalist and positivist, in contrast to his explicit negation of this orientation. It **is a synthesis between dogmatic idealism and vulgar collectivism meant to soundthe authentic voice of the collective, within which the dialogue is supposed to become aware of itself and of the world. The educational links of this synthesis contain a tension between its mystic-terroristic and its reflective-emancipatory dimensions. In Freire’s attitude towards Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the terroristic potential contained in the mystic conception of the emancipated“group”, “people”, or “class” knowledge is revealed within the concept of a dialogue**. **Freire introduces Che Guevara as an ideal model for anti-violent dialogue between partners in the desirable praxis. Che Guevara used a structurally similar rhetoric to that of Ernst Juenger and National Socialist ideologues on the creative power of war, blood, and sweat in the constitution of a new man, the real “proletar” in South America. Freire gives this as an example of the liberation of the oppressed within the framework of new “love” relations which allow to speak the silenced“voice”.**

#### The prioritization of indigenous epistemology provides a colonialism as an excuse for every local injustice, weirdly interpreting any indigenous practice -- including violent and exclusionary traditions -- as "emancipatory" resistance to colonial encroachment -- this reliance on indigenous identity for the production of self-evident visions of reality culminates in Fascist authoritarianism

**Sarkar ’93** Tanika, feminist activist and Professor of Modern History at the Centre for Historical Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India “Rhetoric against Age of Consent Resisting Colonial Reason and Death of a Child-Wife” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 36 (Sep. 4, 1993), pp. 1869-1878

A few words are necessary to explain why, in the present juncture of cultural studies on colonial India, it is important to retrieve this specific history of revivalist-nationalism, and to work with a concept of nationalism that incorporates this history**.** Edward **Said's Orientalism has fathered a received wisdom on colonial studies that has proved to be as narrow and frozen in its scope as it has been powerful in its impact**. **It proceeds from a conviction in the totalising nature of a western power knowledge** that gives to the entire Orient a single image with absolute efficacy. Writings of the Sub-altern Studies pundits and of a group of feminists, largely located in the first world academia, have come to identify the struc-tures of colonial knowledge as the originary moment for all possible kinds of power and disciplinary formations, since, **going by Said, Orientalism alone reserves for itself the whole range of hegemonistic capabili-ties. This unproblematic and entirely non-historicised 'transfer of power' to struc-tures of colonial knowledge has three major consequences; it constructs a necessarily monolithic, non-stratified colonised sub-ject who is, moreover, entirely powerless and entirely without an effective and opera-tive history of his/her own. The only history that s/he is capable of generating is neces-sarily a derivative one. As a result, the colonised subject is absolved of all com-plicity and culpability in the makings of the structures of exploitation in the last two hundred years of our history**. The only culpability lies in the surrender to colonial knowledge. **As a result, the lone political agenda for a historiography of this period shrinks to the contestation of colonial knowl-edge since all power supposedly flows from this single source. Each and every kind of contestation**, by the same token, **is taken to be equally valid. Today, with a triumphalist growth of aggressively communal and/or fundamentalistic identity-politics in our country, such a position comes close to indigenism and acquires a near Fascistic potential in its authoritarian insistence on the purity of indigenous epistemological and autological conditions**. **It has weird implications for the feminist agenda as well. The assumption that colo-nialism had wiped out all past histories of patriarchal domination, replacing them neatly and exclusively with western forms of gender relations, has naturally led on to an identification of patriarchy** in modern India **with the project of liberal reform alone. While liberalism is made to stand in for the only vehicle of patriarchal ideology since it is complicit with western knowl-edge, its opponents**-the revivalists, the orthodoxy-**are vested with a rebellious, even emancipatory agenda, since they re-fused colonisation of the domestic ideol-ogy. And since colonised knowledge is re-garded as the exclusive source of all power, anything that contests it is supposed to have an emancipatory possibility for the women. By easy degrees**, then, **we reach the position that while opposition to widow immolation was complicit with colonial silencing of non-colonised voices and**, consequently, **was an exercise of power, the practice of widow immolation itself was a contestatory act outside the realm of power relations since it was not sanctioned by colonisation**. In a country, where people will still gather in lakhs to watch and celebrate the buming of a teen-aged girl assati, such cultural studies are heavy with grim political implications. We will try to contend that colonial structures of power compromised with, indeed learnt much from indigenous patriarchy and upper caste norms and practices which, in certain areas of life, retained consider-able hegemony. This opens up a new con-text against which we may revaluate liberal reform. Above all, we need to remember that other sources of hegemony, far from becoming extinct, were reactivated under colonialism and opposed the liberal ratio-nalist agenda with considerable vigour and success. **The historian cannot afford to view the colonial past as an unproblematic retro-spect where all power was on one side and all protest on the other. Partisanship has to take into account a multi-faceted nationalism** (and not simply its liberal variant), **all aspects of which were complicit with power and domination even when they critiqued western knowledge and challenged colonial power.**

#### Ours is not a critique of their goal but rather of their methodological framing of Western systems of knowledge as a root cause for indigenous violence. Our challenge to their description is our alternative. Before establishing the desirability of their speech act, we must first understand how they act upon the edifices of Power which they claim to change. Our politicization of THOUGHT ITSELF is necessary to a truly liberatory politics of conceptual mobility

**Deleuze ’87** Gilles, famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, (two translations used) *The Opera Quarterly* 21.4 (2005) 716-724 AND Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62

**How does one "act" on something,** and what is the act or actuality of this potential? **The act is reason. Notice that reason is not a faculty but a process, which consists precisely in actualizing a potential or giving form to matter.** Reason is itself a pluralism, because nothing indicates that we should think of matter or the act as unique. **We define or invent a process of rationalization each time we establish human relations in some material form, in some group, in some multiplicity.****[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) The act itself, qua relation, is always political.** **Reason, as a process, is political.** This may well be the case within a city, but it goes for other, smaller groups as well, or even for myself—and nowhere but in myself. Psychology, or rather the only bearable psychology, is politics, because I am forever creating human relationships with myself. There is no psychology, but rather a politics of the self. There is no metaphysics, but rather a politics of being. No science, but rather a politics of matter, since man is entrusted with matter itself. The same even applies to sickness: we have to "manage" it when we cannot conquer it, and thereby impose on it the form of human relationships. Consider the case of sonorous matter. The musical scale, or rather *a* musical scale, is a process of rationalization that consists in establishing human relationships via this matter in a manner that actualizes its potentiality and it itself becomes human. Marx analyzed the sense organs in this way in order to demonstrate through them the immanence of man and Nature: the ear becomes a human ear when the resonant object becomes musical. The very diverse group of processes of rationalization is what constitutes human becoming or activity, Praxis, or practices. We do not know in this regard if there is such a thing as a human unity, whether from the historical or the generic point of view. Is there a properly human matter, pure potential, distinct from actuality, that has the ability to fascinate us? **There is nothing like "freedom" within us that does not also appear as its opposite: as something that "imprisons" us,** as Châtelet is always saying. **It would be quite obtuse of potentiality to oppose the act capable of realizing it—an inversion of reason, more than its opposite, a privation or alienation. It is as if there were a nonhuman relationship that nevertheless was internal or immanent to human relations, an inhumanity specific to humans: freedom that becomes the capacity of man to vanquish man, or to be vanquished.** Potentiality is pathos, which is to say passivity or receptivity, but receptivity is first and foremost the power to receive blows and to give them: a strange kind of endurance. To be sure, **one can draw up the history of systems of domination, in which the activity of the powerful is at work; but this activity is nothing without the appetite of those who aspire to give blows in the name of the blows they have received. They fight for their servitude as if it were their freedom,** as Spinoza put it. Thus, whether exercised or endured, **power is not merely the activity of man's social existence; it is also the passivity of man's natural existence.** There is a unity of war **[End Page 717]** and land, the traces of which Châtelet detected in the work of Claude Simon—or in Marxism, which never separated the active existence of man as a historical being from its "double," the passive existence of man as a natural being: Reason and its irrationality: this was Marx's own theme, [and] it is also ours. . . . He wants to produce a critical science of the actual, fundamental passivity of humanity. Man does not die because he is mortal (any more than he lies because he is a "liar," or loves because he is a "lover"): he dies because he does not eat enough, because he is reduced to the state of bestiality, because he is killed. Historical materialism is there to remind us of these facts, and Marx, in *Capital*, lays the foundations for what might be a method enabling us to analyze, for a given period—quite a revealing period, in fact—the mechanisms at work in the fact of passivity. . . .[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT5) Aren't there values specific to pathos? Maybe in the form of a despair about the world, something which is quite present in Châtelet, underneath his extreme politeness. **If human beings are constantly in a process of mutual demolition, we might as well destroy ourselves, under pleasant, even fanciful conditions. "Of course all life is a process of breaking down,"** as Fitzgerald said.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT6) This "of course" has the ring of a verdict of immanence: the inhuman element in one's relationship to oneself. Châtelet's only novel, *Les années de démolition* (*The Demolition Years*), has a profoundly Fitzgeraldian motif, an elegance in the midst of disaster. **It is not a question of dying, or of a desire to die, but of investing the temptation to die in a sublime element like music.** Once again, this has less to do with psychoanalysis than with politics. We must take account of this vector of destruction, which can traverse a community or a man, Athens or Pericles. *Périclès* was Châtelet's first book.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT7) Pericles was always the very image of the great man, or great hero, for Châtelet—even in Pericles's "passivity," even in his failure (which was also the failure of democracy), even in spite of his disturbing trajectory [*vecteur* ]. Another value proper to pathos is politeness—a Greek politeness, in fact, which already contains an outline of human relationships, the beginnings of an act of reason. Human relationships begin with a reasoned system, an organization of space that undergirds a city. An art of establishing the right distances between humans, not hierarchically but geometrically, neither too far nor too close, to ensure that blows will not be given or received. To make human encounters into a rite, a kind of ritual of immanence, even if this requires a bit of schizophrenia. **What the Greeks taught us,** and [Louis] Gernet or [Jean-Pierre] Vernant reminded us, **is to not let ourselves be nailed down to a fixed center, but to acquire the capacity to transport a center along with oneself, in order to organize sets of symmetrical, reversible relations established by free men.** This may not be enough to defeat the despair of the world, for there are fewer and fewer polite men, and there must be at least two for the quality itself to exist. But François Châtelet's **[End Page 718]** extreme politeness was also a mask concealing a third value of pathos: what one might term goodness, a warm benevolence. The term is not quite right, even though this quality, this value, was deeply present in Châtelet. More than a quality or a value, **it is a disposition of thought, an act of thinking. It consists in this: not knowing in advance how someone might yet be able to establish a process of rationalization, both within and outside himself. Of course there are all the lost causes, the despair. But if there is a chance** [at establishing a process of rationalization], **what does that someone need, how does he escape his own destruction? All of us, perhaps, are born on terrain favorable to demolition, but we will not miss a chance. There is no pure reason or rationality par excellence. There are processes of rationalization—heterogeneous and varied, depending on conditions, eras, groups, and individuals. These are constantly being aborted, receding, and reaching dead ends, and yet resuming elsewhere, with new measures, new rhythms, new allures.** The inherent plurality of processes of rationalization is already the object of classic epistemological analyses (Koyré, Bachelard, Canguilhem), and sociopolitical analyses (Max Weber). In his late works, Foucault too pushed this pluralism toward an analysis of human relationships, which would constitute the first steps toward a new ethics from the standpoint of what he called "processes of subjectification": Foucault's analysis emphasized bifurcations and derivations, the broken historicity of reason, which is always in a state of liberation or alienation as it equates to man's relationship to himself. Foucault had to go back as far as the Greeks, not in order to find the miracle of reason par excellence, but merely in order to diagnose what was perhaps the first gesture toward a process of rationalization, and one that would be followed by many others, in different conditions, under different guises. Foucault no longer characterized the Greek polis in terms of the organization of a new space, but as a human relation that could take the form of a rivalry between free men or citizens (in politics, but also in love, gymnastics, or justice . . . ). Within this sort of process of rationalization and subjectification, a free man could not govern other free men, in principle, unless he were capable of governing himself. This is the specifically Greek act or process, which cannot be treated as a foundational act but rather as a singular event in a broken chain. It is undoubtedly here that Châtelet, having taken the Greek polis as his point of departure, meets Foucault. Châtelet defines the Greek polis with reference to the magistrate—not only in terms of how he differs from other functionaries, such as the priest or the imperial civil servant, but also with respect to his correlative duties, which belong to a corresponding process of rationalization (for instance, the drawing of lots). No one has analyzed how the process of drawing lots captures the gist of reason better than Châtelet. For Châtelet, rationalization is also a historical and political **[End Page 719]** process, in which Athens is its key event yet is also its failure and its erasure—namely, Pericles, from which other events spin off and are absorbed into other processes. Athens was not the advent of an eternal reason, but the singular event of a provisional rationalization, and is as such all the more striking. **When we posit a single, universal reason de jure, we are falling precisely into what Châtelet calls** **presumption**—a kind of metaphysical rudeness. He diagnoses this ailment in Plato: **even when we recognize that reason is a human, solely human, faculty, a faculty tailored to human ends, we nevertheless continue to grant it theological transcendence. We draw up a dualism of processes instead of a pluralism of processes; this dualism opposes discourse to violence, as if violence were not already concealed within discourse itself, providing it with its various impetuses and ins and outs.** For a long time, under the influence of Eric Weil[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT8) and according to a Platonic and Hegelian model, **Châtelet** believed in the opposition between violence and discourse. But what he **discovers,** on the contrary, is **the ability of discourse to give voice to man's distinct inhumanity. Indeed, it is the purview of discourse to engage the process of its own rationalization, but only in a certain becoming, and due to the pressure of certain motivations and events.** This is of extreme importance in Châtelet's *La naissance de l'histoire (The Birth of History)*[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT9) , because the image of discourse or Logos that he presents there is closer to Thucydides than to Plato or Hegel. Indeed, **he never ceases challenging the two corollaries of a doctrine of universal reason: first, the utopian need to invoke an ideal city or a universal State of right, which would prevent against a democratic future; second, the apocalyptic impetus to locate *the* moment, the fundamental alienation of reason that occurred once and for all, comprising in one stroke all violence and inhumanity**. It is one and the same presumption that grants transcendence to both reason and to reason's corruption, and, since Plato, renders the one the twin of the other.

## 2nc

### cards

#### No link to rules or predictability bad—our argument isn't rules-based in the sense they identify, it’s a set of contestable guidelines for evaluating competitions. Rejecting the topic because rules are oppressive doesn’t solve and only a standard like the resolution is limited enough to enable preparation and testing but has enough internal complexity to solve their impact

**Armstrong 2K** – Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, “The Politics of Play: The Social Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory,” New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223

\*aleatory = depending on luck, i.e. the throw of a die

Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking.8 Iser shares Lyotard’s concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotard’s endorsement of the “sublime”—the pursuit of the “unpresentable” by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and smashing the limits of existing paradigms—is undermined by contradictions, however, which Iser’s explication of play recognizes and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Iser’s sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new games, this crossing of boundaries **depends on** and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. ¶ The radical presumption of the sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual reciprocity of Iserian play. ¶ Iser’s notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Iser’s analysis of “regulatory” and “aleatory” rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a game, “permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion, and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own” (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and openended and more susceptible to variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and possibility, limitation and unpredictability, discipline and spontaneity.

#### Their K of democratic deliberation rests on the assumptions they criticize—for instance, the case for structural antagonism or the impossibility of consensus presupposes that rational argument is possible. Our framework energizes the arena for interdependent reasoning—we do this by defending consensus is possible, but fallible. This means using the resolution to affirm the debate-to-be-had that is this topic—the point is not to settle which way of debating is objectively best, but to use provisional rules for reciprocal clash—that process of dialogism uniquely activates critical thinking and reflexivity

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I. MOUFFE'S RELIANCE ON CONSENSUS

The first point to make about Mouffe's argument in The Democratic Paradox is that it promotes a single, universal characterisation of the political. The terrain of the political is portrayed as constituted through power, making antagonism ‘ineradicable’ (DP, p. 104). This is a universal claim about the political. Moreover, Mouffe seeks to establish the acceptability of these claims by giving reasons. This implies that she assumes that it is possible to establish such a universal model of politics through rational argument. This is precisely what she criticises deliberative theorists for.

Of course, the content of the model for which Mouffe seeks rational acceptance is portrayed as very different to a deliberative approach (DP, p. 102). In particular, it accepts the inevitability of antagonism, seeks to convert this into adversarial contest, and rejects the possibility of ever reaching consensus. Agreements are always contingent assertions of hegemonic power that necessarily exclude and are therefore unstable.2 However, Mouffe does not believe that politics should be left as merely the interplay of differences within this domain of power.

Firstly, Mouffe argues that there should be common adherence to – consensus on – at least minimal ‘ethico-political’ principles of democracy. She is rather vague about what these principles might be, although specifying ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ as among them (DP, p. 102). Of course this could hardly be otherwise: her theory is a theory of democracy, so there must be some shared version of democracy for individuals to adhere to, and for the theory to defend. Mouffe immediately qualifies this constraint by arguing that there will be many different accounts of how these minimal principles might be applied and pursued, and that there should be no limitations on competition between opposing versions (DP, p. 103). Nevertheless, Mouffe still owes an explanation of how there can be such a consensus in the first place, of what such a consensus might consist, why it should be privileged over other versions of the political – for example, oligarchy, or dictatorship – and how this might be justified without recourse to some form of rational argument akin to that deployed by deliberative theorists.

Although less clear, it is also apparent that Mouffe requires all participants in her preferred adversarial mode of interaction to abide by a further set of principles: a mutual respect for beliefs, and the right to defend them (DP, pp. 102–103). Given that she contrasts such exchange with more aggressive antagonistic conflict (DP, p. 102), this suggests at least some overlap with the principles of equal respect and autonomy underlying a deliberative approach. Nevertheless, on this characterisation the fit with deliberation is not complete. It is possible to argue that other forms of interaction short of violence, such as bargaining, negotiation and trading between different interests, show respect for others’ beliefs and their right to defend them, and fall short of ‘annihilation’ or violence.

However, Mouffe adds a further qualification to the ‘free-play’ of differences that other theories permit. She argues that it should be possible to identify, condemn and act against relations of subordination or domination (DP, pp. 19–21). It would seem therefore that we should interpret her description of adversarial relations, and in particular the principle of respect for the right of others to defend their beliefs, in light of this further stipulation. So where relations of subordination restrict a person's ability to defend their beliefs, those relations should be opposed. If we read these two principles – of respect for belief and opposition to subordination – together, then Mouffe's model does appear to be privileging the kind of open fair exchange of reasons between equals that deliberative theorists promote. Not only do these dimensions of Mouffe's formula constitute further examples of consensus that can be reached in principle and by rational means (since Mouffe uses arguments to motivate our acceptance of them), but the content of that formula looks remarkably like the method for reaching collective decisions through a procedure for rational discussion that deliberative theorists support.

An insistence on the need to distinguish and combat relations of subordination is necessary for any theory to have critical bite. What does and what does not amount to oppression, and what should or should not be condemned, must then be gauged by reference to some sort of standard. However, Mouffe would seem to assume that we already all have access to such shared standards, or at very least that it is possible to establish them. Again, this marks her acceptance of another form of consensus – as she herself acknowledges (DP, p. 134). Furthermore, if that consensus is not to be biased against a particular group in society, it is difficult to see how the mechanism for reaching it can be other than a rational discussion. To argue otherwise would be to perpetuate the imposition of a hegemonic, partial and exclusive viewpoint – the exercise of power – that Mouffe is arguing against. So here Mouffe's theory requires the possibility, at least, of a rational consensus not merely on procedural matters that frame democratic exchange, but also on the substance or outputs of that process – practical political decisions. While she presents this as a small exception to her thesis in The Democratic Paradox, it would seem to be pretty much all-embracing. Having described politics as defined by the exercise of power, her theory turns out to admit of the possibility of rational consensus on matters of power – in other words, on any aspect of the subject matter of politics.

From all this we can conclude that Mouffe's alternative is firstly grounded in a universal account of the political and the democratic which she wishes us to accept on the basis of the rational arguments she advances in The Democratic Paradox. Since it is a defence of democracy, this model assumes further consensus on the values of liberty and equality, which are to be interpreted as incorporating respect for others’ beliefs and their right to defend them. Mouffe also argues that it is to incorporate an opposition to relations of oppression or subordination. Mouffe sees the purpose of political action as the identification of such oppression and subordination, and the organisation of collective action against it. This implies a deliberative mechanism of fair and equal exchange of reasons between all affected as the standard of legitimacy for political decisions, if decisions are not to reproduce the relations of subordination that Mouffe wishes to combat.

So it would seem that Mouffe's own agonistic alternative to deliberative democracy, designed to counter the impossibility of rational consensus, is itself reliant on that very notion. Without it, it is neither a theory of democracy (as opposed to a mere description of the domain of politics) nor a critical theory allowing for collective action against oppression and subordination. Yet Mouffe is now faced with a dilemma. The very reason for advocating her alternative was the impossibility of the notion of rational consensus, and she has offered detailed arguments to show how rational consensus was impossible. However, it now turns out that her alternative relies on the notion of rational consensus that she has rejected. Either she must abandon her alternative altogether, or she must rehabilitate the notion of rational consensus, and with it the idea of deliberative democracy that she has criticised. I will explore the second option.

II. REHABILITATION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Mouffe's objection to deliberative democracy is that it is founded on a notion of rational consensus that is not only empirically, but conceptually impossible to realise. Because of this, it is untenable that any one theory of democracy should be preferred over others on purely rational grounds, and within a democracy it is impossible to reach neutral agreement on what would be in the best interests of the collectivity. In this section I will defend deliberative democracy against these charges, showing that Mouffe's criticisms do not establish that rational consensus is conceptually impossible. It may be very difficult to achieve, but this does not undermine its utility as a goal at which we should aim. In mounting this defence I will initially concentrate on one of the two perspectives from which Mouffe launches her attack – that grounded in a Wittgensteinian theory of language. This defence will also demonstrate the similarities between that theory and a deliberative theory of rational consensus.3 These arguments can then be extended to deal with Mouffe's second line of criticism from linguistic deconstruction.

A. Wittgenstein

Mouffe explicitly identifies two sources on whose interpretation of Wittgenstein she draws in criticising deliberative democracy. They are Hannah Pitkin, in her work Wittgenstein and Justice, and James Tully.4 To do justice to Mouffe's argument, I will stick to the version of Wittgenstein advanced by these two commentators.

In arguing against the possibility of rational consensus, Mouffe uses three key Wittgenstinian concepts: the idea that general terms in language are learned through ‘practice’ and not through the application of a conceptual scheme to particular cases; that such practice is grounded in specific ‘forms of life’; and that forms of life are not susceptible of simple classification or description in the form of rules (DP, pp. 70–1). Using the sources above, I will take a closer look at these concepts, to show that it is indeed possible to reconcile such notions with the possibility of a rational consensus reached through deliberation.

As Pitkin explains, Wittgenstein's version of language suggests that we learn terms through practice. The traditional account of language learning views it as the process of associating a term, for example a name, with a particular object or picture of that object in our heads. We can then apply that name when we encounter the object again. We associate a definition with that name, and it becomes a label for the object.5 While language can be learned and used in this way, Wittgenstein argues that this is a very limited account, which only explains a small section of what we use language to do. What about learning the words ‘trust’, ‘spinster’ or ‘envy’?6 He therefore develops a more comprehensive account of language learning which sees it as a particular practice. We learn to use a particular phrase in a particular context. Having heard its use in a context before, we hear it repeated in similar circumstances. We therefore learn to associate it with aspects of those circumstances, and to reproduce and use it in those circumstances for ourselves. So, for example, the (polite!) child learns that “Please may I have the marmalade?” results in the person who uttered it being passed the marmalade. They make the same sounds, and they are themselves passed the marmalade. They later learn that “Please may I have the jam?” leads to their being passed the jam. Finally, they understand that “Please may I have x?” will lead to their being given whatever they choose to substitute for x. This example is helpful because it shows how the meaning of a word can be refined through its use. It may be that a child initially only associates “Please may I have . . .” with marmalade. It is only when the same words are used to elicit the passing of another object – in our example, jam – that they associate it with that other object, and then eventually, after several iterations, with any object. This process may also involve them using the phrase, and projecting it into new contexts of their own. It may also, of course, involve them making mistakes, which are then corrected.

Because words are developed through repeated use in this way, they rarely have settled meanings. By applying them to new contexts, we can use them to focus on different aspects of meaning. Pitkin suggests the example of ‘feed the monkey’ and ‘feed the meter’.7 Prior to such application, however, we may only have had a vague idea of the word's meaning, gathered through past usage. In most, if not all, cases this process is ongoing. So words are learned through a kind of ‘training’ or ‘practice’, and learning or understanding a word is an activity that involves using the word in the correct situation. It is not a case of applying a clear-cut rule to a definite situation.8

Because words develop through practices and their use in particular situations, and in many cases we continue to develop their meaning through such use, very rarely will a term have a single, fixed meaning. Rather, Wittgenstein argues, the different situations in which such a general term is used are like separate language games. Just like moves in a game, words that have meaning when used in one situation may be meaningless when used in another. For example, we cannot talk of ‘checking the King’ in football. While there are connections between games, they are linked like members of a family: some share the same colour eyes, others the same shape of nose, others the same colour hair, but no two members have all the same features.9 Wittgenstein also uses the analogy of an historic city to show how language builds up. While some areas may be uniform, many have been added to higgledy-piggledy, with no clear pattern over how streets are laid out, or which run into which.10 Wittgenstein therefore argues that it is impossible to assimilate the operation of all language to a single model, such as the ‘picture theory’ or label model of meaning. Different language games have different rules, and we can only discover these by investigating particular practices of use in specific cases.11

However, Wittgenstein concedes that there must be some kind of regularity to our use of words. Without some form of consistency, we could not know that our use of a word in a new context was supposed to indicate or evoke a similar context in which the word had been used in the past. That words do so, Wittgenstein argues, is due to their basis in activity– they are used by us in certain situations – and that such use is grounded ultimately in activities that are shared by groups of us, or all of us. Cavell sums this up well when he says:

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place, just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humour and of significance and of fulfilment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation – all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls ‘forms of life’.12

These forms of life are not so much constituted by, but constitute, language. They serve as its ‘ground’. Therefore, although the process of explaining a term, and of reasoning in language, may continue up to a point, it will always come to an end and have to confront simple agreement in activity, ways of going on, or forms of life.

Mouffe sees this account as ruling out the possibility of rational consensus. Following Tully, she argues that the fact that arguments are grounded in agreement in forms of life, which constitute a form of practice marking the end point of explanation or reasons, means that all attempts at rational argument must contain an irrational, practical element.13 Neither is it possible to suggest, as she accuses Peter Winch of doing, that we can see forms of life as some underlying regularity, which argument or reasoning can then make explicit. Again with Tully, she contends that the ‘family resemblance’ or ‘historic city’ analogy for the development of language shows it to be far too varied and idiosyncratic for such an account.14

Yet I would like to argue that Wittgenstein's theory as characterised above does not rule out rational argument, and the possibility of consensus, at least in principle. Wittgenstein himself characterises the offering of reasons as a kind of ‘explanation’. This much is granted by Tully.15 Explanations are requested by someone unfamiliar with a practice, who would like to understand that practice. Wittgenstein sees this as a completely legitimate use of language and reason.16 This is not surprising, as this process of explanation is precisely the form of language learning that he sets out. A person uses a term based on their understanding of its use from their past experiences. This projection either meets with the predicted response, or a different one. If the latter, the person modifies their understanding of the term. It is only when we go further, and assume that there can be an explanation for every kind of confusion, every kind of doubt, that we get into trouble.17 But this is precisely not what a deliberative theory of reasoning holds. A deliberative theory of reasoning models communicative reason – reason used to develop mutual understanding between two or more human beings. To this extent, the truths that it establishes are relative, though intersubjective. They hold, or are useful for, the collectivity that has discursively constructed them. They do not claim to be objective in an absolute sense, although the concept can be extended, in theory, to cover all people and hence to arrive as closely as possible to the notion of an absolute.

The process that Habermas calls ‘practical discourse’18 and the process that Wittgenstein calls ‘explanation’ are basically one and the same. Both are synonyms for deliberation. Habermas sees the essentially rational nature of language as the capacity for a statement to be rejected, in the simplest case with a ‘no’.19 It is with this response that the request for reasons, latent in all rational statements, is activated.20 If we widen the sense of rejection meant by Habermas beyond the paradigm case of the utterance of a ‘no’ to the broader case of a failure to elicit an expected response, we can see the similarities between Habermas’ notion of deliberation and Wittgenstein's concept of explanation. Like Wittgenstein, Habermas sees ‘normal’ language use as taking place against a backdrop of conventionally shared meanings or understandings.21 It is only when this assumption breaks down, when the response differs from what was expected, that deliberation is required. Shared understandings and usage are established anew, through a dialogical sharing of reasons, or explanations, which repairs the assumption that we do use these words in similar ways.22

But this dialogical sharing of reasons is nothing more than Wittgenstein's concept of explanation and language learning. As Tully points out, Wittgenstein's view of language is inherently dialogical. His examples involve interlocutors who have different views of the use of language.23 This leads to the use of a word eliciting a response that was not expected – a rejection. The rejection requires the reappraisal and refinement of our understanding of the word, based on the new information given to us about it by the unexpected reaction. Based on this adjusted understanding we use words again to try to achieve our goal. Through this process of trial and error we build up a shared vocabulary, restoring the assumption that we use these words in the same way, and in the process we understand the other's form of life that gave rise to their unexpected use. The very process of developing that understanding is the process of deliberation. Indeed, in this sense deliberation – explanation or the clarification of usage across different forms of life – can in itself be seen as the process of development of language use.

Before moving on, we should note an important feature of this process: any instance of shared understanding developed in this way will be partial. It will have emerged from particular uses tied to particular spheres of activity. It is important, therefore, that we do not stretch an understanding developed in this way too far. We must be open to its fallibility – to the possibility that new situations will open up different applications of a term, and so require further development of meaning, as we encounter others who use terms differently due to different aspects of their ‘forms of life’.24 While there may be regularities in ‘forms of life’, it is difficult to specify them a priori. They only emerge, as Wittgenstein argues, piecemeal, through the process of attempting to understand others in language. However, the process of explanation, or understanding through deliberation, allows us to be open to these possibilities**.** The contrast with others’ usage that this involves also makes us more clearly aware of aspects of our own usage that were previously hidden. So we can see this as an understanding developed through reason, though partial, fallible and grounded in practice.

Deliberative democracy, then, is compatible with a Wittgensteinian theory of language, which sees language as grounded in forms of life. Mouffe makes two errors that lead her to suggest it is not. The first is the assumption that because language is ultimately grounded in practice, rather than reason, it cannot be used to reach a rational consensus. However, if we read deliberative theories as mobilising a form of rationality aimed at intersubjective explanation and mutual understanding, we can see that the two accounts are perfectly compatible. The second error is to take Wittgenstein's warning that different uses of language, in different games, are so varied and diverse as to be ungovernable by rules, to rule out any possibility of reasoned communication. Here we need to understand that Wittgenstein's concept of ‘forms of life’ refers to regularities in practice that underpin language. While these do not take the form of prescriptive rules, they can still be discovered through language and the process of explanation. Indeed, this is an important purpose of language. Seen in this way, Wittgenstein's thought shows how reason, or explanation, works to bring out emergent, partial, but shared understandings grounded in people's own, but different, experiences. The partial nature of such understandings also emphasises the need to regard them as fallible and open to challenge and revision when new situations are encountered. However, this does not in principle preclude the use of reason to reach consensus. Moreover, the partiality of such understandings can only be understood against a conception of complete or comprehensive agreement. This is exactly what deliberative theory proposes. These insights will now be used to defend deliberation against the second, deconstructionist, set of arguments that Mouffe musters.

B. Deconstruction

#### Agonistic games require provisional rules like topicality—opposing the structures that enable clash is a reactive gesture hostile to struggle and competition

**Acampora 2002** – philosophy professor at Hunter College of the City University of New York (Fall, Christa Davis, International Studies in Philosophy, 34.3, “Of Dangerous Games and Dastardly Deeds”, http://christaacampora.com/uploads/news/id18/Dangerous%20Games.pdf)

**The agonistic game** is organized around the test of a specific quality the persons involved possess. When two runners compete, the quality tested is typically speed or endurance; when artists compete, it is creativity; craftsmen test their skills, etc.. The contest has a specific set of **rules and criteria** for determining (i.e., measuring) which person has excelled above the others in the relevant way. What is tested is a quality the individual competitors themselves possess; and external assistance is not permitted. (This is not to say that agonistic games occur only between individuals and that there can be no cooperative aspects of agonistic engagement. Clearly individuals can assert themselves and strive against other individuals within the context of a team competition, but groups can also work collectively to engage other groups agonistically. In those cases what is tested is the collective might, creativity, endurance, or organizational ability of the participating groups.) Ideally, agonistic endeavors draw out of the competitors the best performance of which they are capable. Although agonistic competition is sometimes viewed as a "zero-sum game," in which the winner takes all, in the cases that Nietzsche highlights as particularly productive agonistic institutions, all who participate are enhanced by their competition. **Winning must be a significant goal** of participation in agonistic contests, but it would seem that winning might be only one, and not necessarily the most important one, **among many reasons to participate** in such a competition. In his later writings, Nietzsche appears to be interested in thinking about how the structures of contests or struggles can facilitate different possibilities for competing well within them. In other words, he questions whether the structure of the game might limit the way in which one might be able to compete. His study of slavish morality illuminates well that concern.

II. Dastardly Deeds

The so-called "Good Eris," described in "Homer's Contest," supposedly allowed the unavoidable urge to strive for preeminence to find expression in perpetual competition in ancient Greek culture. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche seeks to critique Christianity for advocating a kind of altruism, or selflessness, that is essentially self-destructive, and for perverting the urge to struggle by transforming it into a desire for annihilation. Read in light of "Homer's Contest," Nietzsche's Genealogy enables us to better grasp his conception of the value of contest as a possible arena for the revaluation of values, and it advances an understanding of the distinctions Nietzsche draws between creative and destructive forms of contest and modes of competing within them.

Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, a Streitschrift—a polemic, a writing that aims to provoke a certain kind of fighting—portrays a battle between "the two opposing values 'good and bad,' 'good and evil'." Nietzsche depicts slavish morality as that which condemns as evil what perpetuates the agon—namely, self-interest, jealousy, and the desire to legislate values— but rather than killing off the desire to struggle, slavish morality manipulates and redirects it. **Prevention of struggle** **is** considered by Nietzsche to be **hostile to life**: an "order thought of as sovereign and universal, not as a means in the struggle between power-complexes but as a means of preventing all struggle in general—... would be a principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness" (GM II:11). "The 'evolution' of a thing, a custom, an organ is [...] a succession of [...] more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions"(GM II:12). For Nietzsche, human beings, like nations, acquire their identity in their histories of struggles, accomplishments, and moments of resistance. The complete cessation of strife, for Nietzsche, robs a being of its activity, of its life.

In the second essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche identifies the notion of conscience, which demands a kind of self-mortification, as an example of the kind of contest slavish morality seeks: "Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction—all this turned against the possessors of such instinct: that is the origin of the 'bad conscience'" (GM II:16). Denied all enemies and resistances, finding nothing and no one with whom to struggle except himself, the man of bad conscience:

impatiently lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and maltreated himself; this animal that rubbed itself raw against the bars of its cage as one tried to 'tame' it; this deprived creature... had to turn himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness — this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner became the inventor of the 'bad conscience.' But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness... a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and terribleness had reached hitherto (GM II:16).

Bad conscience functions in slavish morality as a means of self-flagellation, as a way to vent the desire to hurt others once external expressions of opposition are inhibited and forbidden. "Guilt before God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture to him" (GM II:22). In that case, self-worth depends upon the ability to injure and harm oneself, to apply the payment of selfmaltreatment to one's irreconcilable account with God. It is the effort expended in one's attempt to make the impossible repayment that determines one's worth. xi The genuine struggle, that which truly determines value for the ascetic ideal is one in which one destructively opposes oneself—one's value increases as one succeeds in annihilating oneself. Slavish morality is still driven by contest, but the mode of this contest is destructive. It mistakes self-inflicted suffering as a sign of strength. The ascetic ideal celebrates cruelty and torture—it revels in and sanctifies its own pain. It is a discord that wants to be discordant, that enjoys itself in this suffering and even grows more self-confident and triumphant the more its own presupposition, its physiological capacity for life decreases. 'Triumph in the ultimate agony': the ascetic ideal has always fought under this hyperbolic sign; in this enigma of seduction, in this image of torment and delight, it recognized its brightest light, its salvation, its ultimate victory (GM III:28).

Slavish morality, particularly in the form of Pauline Christianity, redirects the competitive drive and whips into submission all outward expressions of strife by cultivating the desire to be "good" xii in which case being good amounts abandoning, as Nietzsche portrays it, both the structure of the contests he admired in "Homer's Contest" and the productive ways of competing within them. It does not merely redirect the goal of the contest (e.g., struggling for the glory of Christ rather than competing for the glory of Athens), rather **how one competes well is** also **transformed** (e.g., the "good fight" is conceived as tapping divine power to destroy worldly strongholds xiii rather than excelling them). In other words, the ethos of contest, the ethos of the agon is transformed in slavish morality. xiv

III. Dangerous Games

Moralities effect contests in two ways: 1) they articulate a structure through which the meaning of human being (e.g., excellence, goodness, etc.) can be created and meted out, and 2) they simultaneously cultivate a commitment to a certain way of competing within those structures. By cultivating not only a desire to win but a desire to compete well (which includes respect for one's competitor and the institutions that sets forth the terms of the engagement), xv we can establish a culture capable of deriving our standards of excellence internally and of renewing and revaluing those standards according to changes in needs and interests of our communities. This is the legacy that Nietzsche strives to articulate in his "Homer's Contest," one that he intends his so-called "new nobility" to claim. If the life of slavish morality is characterized by actions of annihilation and cruelty, Nietzsche's alternative form of valuation is marked by its activity of surmounting what opposes, of overcoming opposition by rising above (erheben) what resists, of striving continually to rise above the form of life it has lived. As a form of spiritualized striving, self-overcoming, must, like Christian agony, be selfdirected; its aim is primarily resistance to and within oneself, but the agony—that is, the structure of that kind of painful struggle—differs both in how it orients its opposition and in how it pursues its goals . Self-overcoming does not aim at self-destruction but rather at selfexhaustion and self-surpassing. It strives not for annihilation but for transformation, and the method of doing so is the one most productive in the external contests of the ancient Greeks: the act of rising above. Self-overcoming asks us to seek hostility and enmity as effective means for summoning our powers of development. Others who pose as resistances, who challenge and test our strength, are to be earnestly sought and revered. That kind of reverence, Nietzsche claims, is what makes possible genuine relationships that enhance our lives. Such admiration and cultivation of opposition serve as "a bridge to love" (GM I:10) because they present a person with the opportunity to actively distinguish himself, to experience the joy and satisfaction that comes with what Nietzsche describes as "becoming what one is." xvi

This, Nietzsche suggests, is what makes life worth living—it is what permits us to realize a certain human freedom to be active participants in shaping our own lives. xvii

Agonists, in the sense that Nietzsche has in mind, do not strive to win at all costs. Were that their chief or even highly prominent goal we would expect to see even the best contestants hiding from their serious challengers to their superiority or much more frequently resorting to cheating in order to win. Rather, agonists strive to claim maximal meaning for their actions. (That's the good of winning.) They want to perform in a superior manner, one that they certainly hope will excel that of their opponent. In other words, the best contestants have a foremost commitment to excellence, a disposition that includes being mindful of the structure through which their action might have any meaning at all—the rules of the contest or game. Xviii

#### [MARKED HERE]

What makes this contest dangerous?xix

To be engaged in the process of overcoming, as Nietzsche describes it, is to be willing to risk oneself, to be willing to risk what one has been— the meaning of what one is—in the process of creating and realizing a possible future. The outcome is not guaranteed, that a satisfactory or "better" set of meanings and values will result is not certain. And when the contest is one in which rights to authority are in play, even the Nietzschean contest always runs the risk of supporting tyranny—of supplying the means by which the tyrannical takes its hold. Nietzsche is, of course, mindful of this danger, which is why in his account of the Greek agon he finds it important to discuss the alleged origin of ostracism as the mechanism for preserving the openness of contest. xx

Nietzsche claims agonistic institutions contribute to the health of individuals and the culture in which these institutions are organized because agon provides the means for attaining personal distinction and for creating shared goals and interests. Pursuit of this activity, Nietzsche claims, is meaningful freedom. Late in his career, Nietzsche writes, "How is freedom measured in individuals and peoples? According to the resistance which must be overcome, according to the exertion required, to remain to top. The highest type of free men should be sought where the highest resistance is constantly overcome: five steps from tyranny, close to the threshold of the danger of servitude" (TI, "Skirmishes," 38). Nietzsche believes that it is **only when our strength is tested** that it will develop. Later in the passage just cited, Nietzsche continues, "Danger alone acquaints us with our own resources, our virtues, our armor and weapons, our spirit, and forces us to be strong. First principle: one must need to strong—otherwise one will never become strong" (TI, "Skirmishes," 38). Nietzsche takes upon himself, in his own writing, the task of 11 making these kinds of challenges for his readers. Nietzsche's critiques of liberal institutions, democracy, feminism, and socialism should be read in the context of his conception of human freedom and the goal he takes for himself as a kind of liberator. Read thus, we could very well come to see the relevance of agonistic engagement as a means of pursuing a kind of democracy viewed **not as** a **static preservation of some artificial** and stultifying sense of **equality**, but as a process of pursuing meaningful liberty, mutual striving together in pursuit of freedom conceived not as freedom from the claims of each other but as the freedom of engagement in the process of creating ourselves. xxi

IV. A Nietzschean ethos of agonism

In a recent essay, Dana R. Villa examines the general thrust of arguments of those advocating agonistic politics. These "contemporary agonists," xxii he claims, largely look to Nietzsche and Foucault (cast as Nietzsche's heir, at least with regard to his conception of power and contest) for inspiration as they make their "battle cry of 'incessant contestation'," which is supposed to create the space a radical democratic politics. These theorists, remind us that the public sphere is as much a stage for conflict and expression as it is a set of procedures or institutions designed to preserve peace, promote fairness, or achieve consensus. They also (contra Rawls) insist that politics and culture form a continuum, where ultimate values are always already in play; where the content of basic rights and the purposes of political association are not the objects of a frictionless 'overlapping consensus' but are contested every day in a dizzying array of venues. xxiii

Villa would commend them for this reminder, but he claims that "recent formulations of an agonistic politics […] have tended to celebrate conflict, and individual and group expression, a bit too unselectively". xxiv

He argues that "Nietzsche-inspired" agonists would do better to look to Arendt's conception of the agon and its place in political life for pursuing democratic aims, because she stipulates "that action and contestation must be informed by both judgment and a sense of the public if they are to be praiseworthy. The mere expression of energy in the form of 12 political commitment fails to impress her." "'Incessant contestation,' like Foucauldian 'resistance,' is essentially reactive." What such a politics boils down to is "merely fighting"; so conceived, "politics is simply conflict". xxv

Placing the expression of energies of the individual, multiplicities of selves, or groups at the center of an agonistic politics that lacks some aim beyond just fighting does not advance the aims of democracy. Without specifying an agonistic ethos that crafts a sense of "care for the world—a care for the public realm," politics as the socalled "contemporary agonists" conceive it cannot be liberatory. Arendt, Villa argues, supplies such an ethos in a way that Nietzsche does not. My goal here has been to argue that Nietzsche does supply us with an agonistic ethos, that despite the fact that the advocates of "incessant contestation" might fail to distinguish agonistic conflict from "mere fighting" or "simply conflict" Nietzsche does. My aim is more than mere point-scoring. I am not interested in supporting a case that Nietzsche's views are better than Arendt's. I do think Nietzsche's work offers conceptual resources useful for amplifying and clarifying agonistic theories that are pervasive in numerous fields, including political science, moral psychology, and literary criticism. If we are attentive to how Nietzsche distinguishes different kinds of contests and ways of striving within them we can construct an ethos of agonism that is potentially valuable not only for the cultivation of a few great men but which also contributes to the development of a vibrant culture. By way of concluding, I shall draw on the distinctions developed in Nietzsche's conception of agon and sketch the outlines of a productive ethos of agonism.

Some competitions bring with them entitlements and rewards that are reserved for the sole winner. Nearly all of these can be described as zero-sum games: in order for someone to win, others must lose. Further, if I choose to help you to prepare your dossier for your promotion application for the only available post, I risk reducing my own chances for success. Let's call these kinds of competitions antagonistic ones, in which the competitors are pitted against each other in an environment hostile to cooperation.

We can also imagine competitions that are not zero-sum games, in which there is not a limited number of resources. Such contests would allow us to enact some of the original meanings at the root of our words for competition and struggle. The Latin root of compete means "to meet," "to be fitting," and "to strive together toward." The Greek word for struggle, which also applied to games and competitions, is agon, which in its original use meant "gathering together." xxvi

Practicing an agonistic model of competition could provide results of shared satisfaction and might enable us to transform competitions for fame and status that inform so much of our lives into competitions for meeting cooperatively and provisionally defined standards of aesthetic and intellectual excellence. xxvii

If we can revive the sense of agon as a gathering together that vivifies the sense of **competition** that initiates a striving together toward, we can better appreciate the unique relational possibilities of competition. Recalling the definitions of agon and competition provided above, from which I tried to indicate a sense of competition that could facilitate a process of gathering to strive together toward, consider another example. When two runners compete in order to bring out the best performances in each, their own performances become inextricably linked. When I run with you, I push you to pull me, I leap ahead and call you to join me. When you run faster, I respond to your advance not by wishing you would run slower or that you might fall so that I could surge ahead. I do not view your success as a personal affront, rather I respond to it as a call to join you in the pursuit. When in the course of running with me, you draw from me the best of which I am capable, our performances serve as the measure of the strength in both of us. Neither achievement finds its meaning outside of the context in which we created it. When two (or more) compete in order to inspire each other, to strive together toward, the gathering they create, their agon, creates a space in which the meaning of their achievements are gathered. When your excellent performance draws mine out of me, together we potentially unlock the possibilities in each. For this we can certainly be deeply indebted to each other. At the same time, we come to understand and appreciate ourselves and our own possibilities in a new way. Furthermore, this way of coming to understand and appreciate our difference(s), and 14 of recognizing perhaps their interdependence, might be preferable, to other ways in which differences might be determined. Although surely not appropriate in all circumstances, agonistic endeavors can provide an arena for devising a more flexible and creative way of measuring excellence than by comparison with some rigid and externally-imposed rule. xxviii

Agonism is not the only productive way of relating to each other, and we can certainly play in ways that are not agonistic, but I do think such an ethos of agonism is compatible with recognition of both the vulnerability of the other and one's dependence upon others for one's own identity. It incorporates aggression, instructive resistance, as well as cooperation, and it is compatible with the practice of generosity. It cultivates senses of yearning and desire that do not necessarily have destructive ends. It requires us to conceive of liberation as something more than freedom from the constraints of others and the community, but as a kind of freedom— buttressed with active support—to be a participant in the definition and perpetual recreation of the values, beliefs, and practices of the communities of which one is a part. That participation might entail **provisional restraints**, limitations, and norms **that mark** out the **arenas in which such recreations occur**.

At his best, I think Nietzsche envisions a similar form for the agonistic life. Competitive "striving together toward" can be a difficult condition to create and a fragile one to maintain. It requires the **creation of a common ground** from which participants can interact. It needs a **clearly defined** goal that is appropriately demanding of those who participate. It requires that the goal and the acceptable means of achieving it are cooperatively defined and clearly articulated, and yet it must allow for **creativity within those rules**. It demands systematic support to cultivate future participants. And it must have some kind of mechanism for keeping the competition open so that **future play can be anticipated**. When any one of the required elements is disrupted, the competition can deteriorate into alternative and non-productive modes of competition and destructive forms of striving. But when agonistic contest is realized, it creates enormous opportunities for creative self-expression, for the formation of individual and communal identity, for acquiring self-esteem and mutual admiration, and for achieving individual as well as 15 corporate goals. It is one of the possibilities that lie not only beyond good and evil but also beyond the cowardly and barbarous.

### ispec

#### The devil is in the details—outweighs whiney marginal aff offense

**Choong 7** (William, The Straits Times (Singapore), “Just hot air?,” 2/4, lexis

In Cebu, leaders from the grouping called for intensified energy conservation programmes, the expansion of renewable energy systems, biofuels production and - 'for interested parties' - civilian nuclear power. The initiatives underscore three mutually reinforcing themes in energy security - soaring oil prices, resource scarcity and worries over climate change. But while the statements go down well, most environmentalists and analysts argue that green policies are more about the right execution than making the right noises. In other words, the devil is in the details. Firstly, critics argue that the East Asia Summit pact offered no concrete targets. In contrast, the European Union's new energy policy, also unveiled last month, called for a 20 per cent cut in greenhouse gas emissions over 13 years.

#### History supports a presumption ballot – incentive policy has failed thanks to detail aversion regarding incentive structure

**Esty 1** - Professor of Environmental Law and Policy, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies and Yale Law School. (Daniel, “NEXT GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A RESPONSE TO RICHARD STEWART,” 29 Cap. U.L. Rev. 183, lexis

Professor Stewart's discussion of economic incentive systems again provides an excellent survey of the various market mechanisms that are available to pursue environmental goals. He assesses with great care the **strengths and weaknesses** of these tools and strategies, providing important insights on the **contexts in which particular mechanisms** are likely to be most effective. n43 Stewart's analysis of the reasons why economic incentive-based systems have penetrated so little into the environmental regulatory regime over the last twenty- five years is also illuminating. He notes that in too many cases, incentive strategies have been ineffective. n44 For example, environmental taxes have often been set at levels too low to change behavior. n45 He recognizes that competitiveness fears have often led jurisdictions to tread lightly in the market mechanism realm for fear of disadvantaging their own industries in increasingly competitive inter-jurisdictional markets. Stewart also observes that any change in policy creates losers and winners and that the losers often have a considerable incentive to resist new regulatory approaches. n46 In the environmental realm, ironically, the potential "losers" in a new system represent a set of rather odd bedfellows: businesses whose current emissions are "permitted" and not fully paid for through cost-internalizing market mechanisms; environmental groups who are invested in campaigns that depend on the current portfolio of problems to attract public support; agency bureaucrats whose skill sets and relative power derives from the current structure of harms and regulatory approaches; and congressional committee members and staffs whose capacity to generate media attention and public interest is [\*191] a function of their established expertise within the existing system. n47

#### Not specifying means evaluating desirability is IMPOSSIBLE and a moot point

**Azurin 8** [Rene B., Business World, "Strategic Perspective: Renewable Energy Barriers," February 7th, Lexis]

Chatting at the just-concluded Energy Summit with the very charming Dr. Nandita Mongia, regional coordinator for the Energy Program for Poverty Reduction in Asia and the Pacific of the UNDP, I learned that Indonesia mobilizes funding for renewable energy for the poor through taxes on fossil fuels. That, to me, is an example of a logical public finance policy: Penalize, through taxes, what you wish to discourage and use the funds raised to help develop what you wish to encourage. It is also a manifestation of a strategic perspective, the kind of system-wide thinking and long-run view we need to see exhibited by more of our own government's finance and economic managers. One of the things our highest officials sometimes seem to be unconscious of is a principle I drum repeatedly into the minds of my strategy students: Outcomes are the product of the prevailing structure of incentives; if you want a particular outcome, **you must first design the incentive system** to lead to it. Exhortations and directives without an accompanying incentive structure consistent with the desired outcomes are no more than expressions of **wishful thinking.** The exhortations are simply ignored and the directives simply make people **waste time** and, uh, energy inventing ways to avoid complying while vigorously pretending to be absolutely, completely in favor of the announced action. Filipinos are particularly creative in this regard. We say - or, more precisely, our public officials say - that the country's energy strategy should be to develop more renewable and alternative energy sources - solar, wind, geothermal, ocean, hydro, biomass - that, because they are indigenous and climate friendly, will reduce our country's dependence on imported fossil fuels that pollute our environment. Currently (according to Department of Energy figures), power plants using renewable energy have an installed capacity of 5,260 megawatts, or 33.5% of total power generating capacity in the country. This is broken down into hydro (3,257 MW), geothermal (1,978 MW), and wind (25 MW). The DOE, according to the hardworking director of DOE's Energy Utilization Bureau, Mr. Mario Marasigan, launched in August 2003 an aggressive Renewable Energy Policy Framework that targeted the doubling of renewable energy capacity by 2013. This proposed Renewable Energy Bill, says Mr. Marasigan, will "provide incentives and remove some major market and financial barriers to renewable energy development [and] should create a better investment environment for private proponents." Unfortunately, the bill remains stuck in Congress. A workshop participant wryly commented that congressional energy is naturally directed more toward increasing congressional pork barrel allocations than achieving energy independence for the country. The **principal barrier** to renewable energy development is the fact that the energy it produces is still generally more costly than the energy produced by conventional fossil fuels. One estimate indicates that electric power from renewable or alternative fuels is 25% to 50% more expensive than electric power from oil or coal. The higher costs stem in large measure from the site-specific nature of renewable energy projects - you cannot set up a windmill farm where there is no wind or a mini-hydro plant where there is no water - which leads to high construction costs and, later, high transmission costs. Moreover, the modern imported technologies required to build efficient renewable energy plants are hardly cheap. This is why the **structure of incentives** needs to be modified as proposed in the RE Bill. The RE Bill provides for the usual tax-break incentives but complement these with the setting up of an RE Trust Fund that can finance research and development, help pay for preparatory studies, and provide loan guarantee facilities. Non-fiscal, market development-directed incentives are also provided, like the mandating of a 1% bio-diesel mix which increases to 2% by 2009, and a 5% bio-ethanol gasoline blend in 2009 which increases to 10% by 2011. Similarly, for electric utilities, it will be mandated that the electric power produced from renewable energy sources must constitute 7% to 12% of the total electric power mix and, further, that such power must be dispatched as soon as it is made available.

## 1nr

### creative legalism

#### You should be a strategic legalist because it’s more effective and increases activist CREATIVITY – this card is sorta long

Smith 2012 (Andrea, “The Moral Limits of the Law: Settler Colonialism and the Anti-Violence Movement” settler colonial studies 2, 2 (2012) Special Issue: Karangatia: Calling Out Gender and Sexuality in Settler Societies)

Aside from Derrick Bell, because racial and gender justice legal advocates are so invested in the morality of the law, there has not been sustained strategising on what other possible frameworks may be used. Bell provides some possibilities, but does not specifically engage alternative strategies in a sustained fashion. Thus, it may be helpful to look for new possibilities in an unexpected place, the work of anti-trust legal scholar Christopher Leslie. Again, the work of Leslie may seem quite remote from scholars and activists organizing against the logics of settler colonialism. But it may be the fact that Leslie is not directly engaging in social justice work that allows him to disinvest in the morality of the law in a manner which is often difficult for those who are directly engaged in social justice work to do. **This disinvestment, I contend is critical** for those who wish to dismantle settler colonialism to rethink their legal strategies. In ‘Trust, Distrust, and Anti-Trust’, Christopher Leslie explains that while the economic impact of cartels is incalculable, cartels are also unstable.18 Because cartel members cannot develop formal relationships with each other, they must develop partnerships based on informal trust mechanisms in order to overcome the famous ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The prisoner’s dilemma, as described by Leslie, is one in which two prisoners are arrested and questioned separately with no opportunity for communication between them. There is enough evidence to convict both of minor crimes for a one year sentence but not enough for a more substantive sentence. The police offer both prisoners the following deal: if you confess and implicate your partner, and your partner does not confess, you will be set free and your partner will receive a ten-year sentence. If you confess, and he does as well, then you will both receive a five-year sentence. In this scenario, it becomes the rational choice for both to confess because if the first person does not confess and the second person does, the first person will receive a ten-year sentence. Ironically, however, while both will confess, it would have been in both of their interests not to confess. Similarly, Leslie argues, cartels face the prisoners’ dilemma. If all cartel members agree to fix a price, and abide by this price fixing, then all will benefit. However, individual cartel members are faced with the dilemma of whether or not they should join the cartel and then cheat by lowering prices. They fear that if they do not cheat, someone else will and drive them out of business. At the same time, by cheating, they disrupt the cartel that would have enabled them to all profit with higher prices. In addition, they face a second dilemma when faced with anti-trust legislation. Should they confess in exchange for immunity or take the chance that no one else will confess and implicate them? Cartel members can develop mechanisms to circumvent pressures. Such mechanisms include the development of personal relationships, frequent communication, goodwill gestures, etc. In the absence of trust, cartels may employ trust substitutes such as informal contracts and monitoring mechanisms. When these trust and trust substitute mechanisms break down, the cartel members will start to cheat, thus causing the cartel to disintegrate. Thus, Leslie proposes, anti-trust legislation should focus on laws that will strategically disrupt trust mechanisms. Unlike racial or gender justice advocates who focus on making moral statements through the law, Leslie proposes using the law for strategic ends, even if the law makes a morally suspect statement. For instance, in his article, ‘Anti-Trust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability’, Leslie critiques the federal Anti-Trust’s 1993 Corporate Lenience Policy that provided greater incentives for cartel partners to report on cartel activity. This policy provided ‘automatic’ amnesty for the first cartel member to confess, and decreasing leniency for subsequent confessors in the order to which they confessed. Leslie notes that this amnesty led to an increase of amnesty applications.19 However, Leslie notes that the effectiveness of this reform is hindered by the fact that the ringleader of the cartel is not eligible for amnesty. This policy seems morally sound. Why would we want the ringleader, the person who most profited from the cartel, to be eligible for amnesty? The problem, however, with attempting to make a moral statement through the law is that it is counter-productive if the goal is to actually break up cartels. If the ringleader is never eligible for amnesty, the ringleader becomes inherently trustworthy because he has no incentive to ever report on his partners. Through his inherent trustworthiness, the cartel can build its trust mechanisms. Thus, argues Leslie, the most effective way to destroy cartels is to render all members untrustworthy by granting all the possibility of immunity. While Leslie’s analysis is directed towards policy, **it also suggests an alternative framework for pursuing social justice through the law, to employ it for its strategic effects rather than through the moral statements it purports to make**. It is ironic that an anti-trust scholar such as Leslie displays less ‘trust’ in the law than do many anti-racist/anti-colonial activists and scholars who work through legal reform.20 It also indicates that it is possible to engage legal reform more strategically if one no longer trusts it. As Beth Richie notes, the anti-violence movement’s primary strategy for addressing gender violence was to articulate it as a crime.21 Because it is presumed that the best way to address a social ill is to call it a ‘crime’, this strategy is then deemed the correct moral strategy. When this strategy backfires and does not end violence, and in many cases increases violence against women, it becomes difficult to argue against this strategy because it has been articulated in moral terms. If, however, we were to focus on legal reforms chosen for their strategic effects, it would be easier to change the strategy should our calculus of its strategic effects suggest so. We would also be less complacent about the legal reforms we advocate as has happened with most of the laws that have been passed on gender violence. Advocates presume that because they helped pass a ‘moral’ law, then their job is done. If, however, the criteria for legal reforms are their strategic effects, we would then be continually monitoring the operation of these laws to see if they were having the desired effects. For instance, since the primary reason women do not leave battering relationships is because they do not have another home to go, what if our legal strategies shifted from criminalising domestic violence to advocating affordable housing? While the shift from criminalisation may seem immoral, women are often removed from public housing under one strike laws in which they lose access to public housing if a ‘crime’ (including domestic violence) happens in their residence, whether or not they are the perpetrator. If our goal was actually to keep women safe, **we might** need to **creatively rethink what legal reforms would actually increase safety**.

### condo

#### Conditionality forces the embrace of epistemic uncertainty – uncertainty creates unique benefits

**Sholock 12** – Chatham University

(Adale, “Methodology of the Privileged: White Anti-racist Feminism, Systematic Ignorance, and Epistemic Uncertainty”, Hypatia Volume 27, Issue 4, pages 701–714, November 2012, dml)

However, something profound happens in The Color of Fear that troubles the epistemological arrogance and self-deception that epitomize normative whiteness. David frustrates everyone to the point where Victor Lewis, an African American man in the group, finally loses his patience and lashes out in anger at David's willful ignorance. This is a climactic moment in the film and one that I find instructive to white anti-racist efforts both feminist and otherwise. Lee Mun Wah, the filmmaker and facilitator of the discussion, gently but skillfully asks David what is keeping him from believing Victor's claims about pervasive racism: “So what would it mean David, then, if life really was that harsh? What if the world was not as you thought, that [racial injustice] is actually happening to lots of human beings on this earth?” He continues, “What if he knew his reality better than you?” What then occurs is best described as a “lightbulb moment”: David says with uncharacteristic thoughtfulness, “Oh, that's very saddening. You don't want to believe that man can be so cruel to himself and his own kind.” David's comment startlingly echoes what James Baldwin has described as the double-bind of white folk: “White America remains unable to believe that Black America's grievances are real; they are unable to believe this because they cannot face what this fact says about themselves and their country” (Baldwin 1985, 536). David's newfound awareness not only challenges his self-assuredness—as Baldwin suggests—but also his very authority as a knower. In other words, David shifts from the cognitive comforts of not knowing that he doesn't know to the epistemic uncertainties of knowing that he doesn't know.

I admit that The Color of Fear has sometimes made me feel a depressing lack of confidence in the ability of the privileged (myself included) to achieve any kind of mutually reciprocal relationship with the racially and geopolitically oppressed. Yet I believe that it is more accurate to view The Color of Fear as an allegory of hope and possibility for the future of feminism without borders. Of course, it is still uncomfortable to watch The Color of Fear and recognize that I might think and act more like David than I can fully comprehend, that his ignorance is structurally related to my own, and that I will not always know better. Nevertheless, I remind myself that it is the very moment when David admits his ignorance that Victor extends the offer, “from here I can work with you.”

David and Victor's breakthrough indicates that effective coalition across racial and other power inequities might actually benefit from epistemic uncertainty among the privileged. Of course, this observation will likely unsettle whites who are conditioned to assert epistemic mastery and authority. As Pratt admits, “to acknowledge … that there are things that I do not know … [is] an admission hard on my pride, and harder to do than it sounds” (Pratt 1984, 42). However, Bernice Johnson Reagon sagely reminds us that comfort is rarely part of coalition-building, as verified by the contentious conversations in The Color of Fear. Coalition work is “some of the most dangerous work you can do. And you shouldn't look for comfort. Some people will come to a coalition and they rate the success of the coalition on whether or not they feel good when they get there” (Reagon 1983, 359). Accordingly, a methodology of the privileged might embrace the discomforts of epistemic uncertainty as an indication of effectiveness rather than failure within coalitional politics.

Perhaps more than self-reflexivity or racial sedition, epistemic uncertainty is a methodology that highlights the necessary interdependence of the privileged and the oppressed in struggles to eliminate injustice.12 For instance, when David's intellectual confidence finally wavers, he must rely upon the knowledge claims of non-whites in the group. In other words, it is only through Victor's keen understanding of racial oppression and white privilege that David recognizes his ignorance. According to Harding, in order for anti-racist and transnational solidarity to flourish, white women's reliance on insights developed by women of color feminists is “not a luxury but a necessity” (Harding 1991, 282). This methodological directive is itself evidence of the instruction Harding takes from women of color who assert that the epistemic accomplishments of the oppressed hold the key to the eradication of ignorance within feminist theory and praxis (Collins 1986; Narayan 1989; Anzaldúa, 1987; Sandoval 2000).

#### We aren’t a view from nowhere – situated impartial knowledge is neither objective nor disinterested – they are the flip side of the same coin by claiming to have unique access to knowledge

**DISCH ‘93** (Lisa J.; Professor of Political Theory – University of Minnesota, “More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of Hannah Arendt,” Political Theory 21:4, November)

What Hannah Arendt called “my old fashioned storytelling”7 is at once the most elusive and the most provocative aspect of her political philosophy. The apologies she sometimes made for it are well known, but few scholars have attempted to discern from these “scattered remarks” as statement of epistemology or method.8 Though Arendt alluded to its importance throughout her writings in comments like the one that prefaces this essay, this offhandedness left an important question about storytelling unanswered: how can thought that is “bound” to experience as its only “guidepost” possibly be critical? I discern an answer to this question in Arendt’s conception of storytelling, which implicitly redefines conventional understandings of objectivity and impartiality. Arendt failed to explain what she herself termed a “rather unusual approach”9 to political theory because she considered methodological discussions to be self-indulgent and irrelevant to real political problems.10 This reticence did her a disservice because by failing to explain how storytelling creates a vantage point that is both critical and experiential she left herself open to charges of subjectivism.11 As Richard Bernstein has argued, however, what makes Hannah Arendt distinctive is that she is neither a subjectivist nor a foundationalist but, rather, attempts to move “beyond objectivism and relativism.”12 I argue that Arendt’s apologies for her storytelling were disingenuous; she regarded it not as an anachronistic or nostalgic way of thinking but as an innovative approach to critical understanding. Arendt’s storytelling proposes an alternative to the model of impartiality defined as detached reasoning. In Arendt’s terms, impartiality involves telling oneself the story of an event or situation form the plurality of perspectives that constitute it as a public phenomenon. This critical vantage point, not from outside but from within a plurality of contesting standpoints, is what I term “situated impartiality.” Situated impartial knowledge is neither objective disinterested nor explicitly identified with a single particularistic interest. Consequently, its validity does not turn on what Donna Haraway calls the “god trick,” the claim to an omnipotent, disembodied vision that is capable of “seeing everything from nowhere.”13 But neither does it turn on a claim to insight premised on the experience of subjugation, which purportedly gives oppressed peoples a privileged understanding of structures of domination and exonerates them of using power to oppress. The two versions of standpoint claims – the privileged claim to disembodied vision and the embodied claim to “antiprivilege” from oppression – are equally suspect because they are simply antithetical. Both define knowledge positionally, in terms of proximity to power; they differ only in that they assign the privilege of “objective” understanding to opposite poles of the knowledge/power axis. Haraway argues that standpoint claims are insufficient as critical theory because they ignore the complex of social relations that mediate the connection between knowledge and power. She counters that any claim to knowledge, whether advanced by the oppressed or their oppressors, is partial. No one can justifiably lay claim to abstract truth, Haraway argues, but only to “embodied objectivity,” which she argues “means quite simply situated knowledges.”14 There is a connection between Arendt’s defense of storytelling and Haraway’s project, in that both define theory as a critical enterprise whose purpose is not to defend abstract principles or objective facts but to tell provocative stories that invite contestation form rival perspectives.15

### k

#### The aff creates an artificial separation between indigenous knowledge and western knowledge – this is a flawed epistemological strategy because it both ignores the historical connections between western and indigenous people and also incorrectly characterizes both knowledge systems

Agrawal 1995 (Arun, “Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge” Development and Change Vol. 26 (1995), 413-439.)

A number of inconsistencies and problems mark the assertions from the neoindigenistas. Their case seems superficially persuasive. Indigenous knowledge and peoples, the argument goes, are disappearing all over the world as a direct result of the pressures of modernization. Their disappearance, in turn, constitutes an enormous loss to humanity since they possess the potential to remedy many of the problems that have emasculated development strategies during the past five decades. Greater efforts must, therefore, be made to save, document and apply indigenous strategies of survival. But neo-indigenistas remain committed to the same kind of dichotomous classification that dominated the world view of the modernization theorists,\* in spite of their seeming opposition to the idea that indigenous institutions and knowledge are obstacles to the march by the Angel of Progress. Both groups of theorists seek to create two categories of knowledge - western and indigenous - relying on the possibility that a finite and small number of characteristics can define the elements contained within the categories. This attempt is bound to fail because different indigenous and western knowledges possess specific histories, particular burdens from the past, and distinctive patterns of change. Colin MacCabe (1988: xvii) puts it: ‘any one world is always, also, a radical heterogeneity which radiates out in a tissue of differences that undoes the initial identity’. Western knowledge is supposedly guided by empirical measurements and abstract principles that help order the measured observations to facilitate the testing of hypotheses. Yet, by what yardstick of common measure can one club together the knowledges generated by such western philosophers as Hume and Foucault, Derrida and Von Neumann, or Said and F ~ g e l ?And by what tortuous stretch of imagination would one assert similarities between the Azande beliefs in witchcraft (Evans-Pntchard, 1936), and the decision-making strategies of the Raika shepherds in western India (Agrawal, 1993, 1994), or between the beliefs among different cultures on intersexuality (Geertz, 1983: SW), and the marketing activities in traditional peasant communities (Bates, 198 1; Schwimmer, 1979)? Thus, on the one hand we find striking differences among philosophies and knowledges commonly viewed as indigenous, or western. On the other hand we may also discover that elements separated by this artificial divide share substantial similarities, as, for example, agroforestry, and the multiple tree cropping systems of small-holders in many parts of the world (Rocheleau, 1987; Thrupp, 1985, 1989); agronomy, and the indigenous techniques for domestication of crops (Reed, 1977; Rhoades, 1987, 1989); taxonomy, and the plant classifications of the Hanunoo or the potato classifications of the Peruvian farmers (Brush, 1980; Conklin, 1957); or rituals surrounding football games in the United States, and, to use a much abused example, the Balinese cockfight. A classification of knowledge into indigenous and western is bound to fail not just because of the heterogeneity among the elements - the knowledges filling the boxes marked indigenous or western. It also founders at another, possibly more fundamental level. It seeks to separate and fix in time and space (separate as independent, and fix as stationary and unchanging) systems that can never be thus separated or so fixed. Such an attempt at separation requires the two forms of knowledge to have totally divorced historical sequences of change - a condition which the evidence simply does not bear out. According to Levi-Strauss, contact and exchange among different cultures, including between Asia and the Americas, was a fact of life from as early as thousands of years ago (1955: 253-60). Certainly, what is today known and classified as indigenous knowledge has been in intimate interaction with western knowledge since at least the fifteenth century (Abu- Lughod, 1987-88, 1989; Eckholm, 1980; Schneider, 1977; Wallerstein, 1974, 1979a, 1979b; Wolf, 1982). In the face of evidence that suggests contact, variation, transformation, exchange, communication, and learning over the last several centuries, it is difficult to adhere to a view of indigenous and western forms of knowledge being untouched by each other. As Dirks et al. remark (1994: 3), it was the ‘virtual absence of historical investigation in anthropology (because of which) cultural systems have, indeed, appeared timeless, at least until ruptured by “culture contact” ’