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1ac Strategic Petroleum Reserve
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ADVANTAGE ONE IS OIL PRICES

Spikes coming now --- 

First, geopolitical uncertainty – domestic production can’t compensate and it obstructs global spare capacity
El Zayat, 13 [January, Tamer El Zayat is a senior economist at the National Commercial Bank, Jeddah, What does 2013 hold for oil markets?, http://www.arabnews.com/what-does-2013-hold-oil-markets]

On the supply front in 2013, it seems the geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East and the North American oil bonanza will vie for the top spot. The news early last year that Iran had begun enriching Uranium up to 20 percent, the threshold for making Uranium weapons-grade, deepened the rift between Tehran and the west, and I do believe that the confrontation will escalate especially that the European sanctions that took effect early July weighed heavily on Iran’s exports that fell by 50 percent to just 2.65 million barrels a day by the end of December. An Israeli attack similar to the one undertaken against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 is not a farfetched scenario, especially that the Jewish state is adamant in maintaining superiority not only in terms of nuclear capability, but also nuclear deterrence. This cloudy geopolitical specter has obviously added between $10-$20 per barrel in the form of risk premium to oil prices and will continue to be factored in 2013 given the importance of the Strait of Hormuz, where 17-18 million barrels a day pass through the 50 km waterway, representing around 40 percent of seaborne oil and 18 percent of globally traded oil. However, the shale boom in the US will offset part of the geopolitical risk premium especially that one of the aforementioned constrains pertaining to pipelines will start to relatively ease, with the extra domestic supply finding its way to domestic markets, thus, reducing the US demand for imports. As many as twenty pipelines could come on stream transporting 1 million barrels per day to the gulf coast that accounts for 50 percent of US refining capacity. The two most important pipelines are the 400 thousand barrels Seaway pipeline that will commence operations early 2013 and the 700 thousand barrels Keystone XL pipeline that will be operational late 2013, both from Cushing to the Gulf Coast. The Canadian tar sands from Alberta will also be able to make use of these pipelines, which will augment the positive impact from a logistics basis. Thus, North America is expected to account for 60 percent of the 900 thousand barrels a day increase in non-OPEC supply next year. The aforementioned supply dynamics can act as a drag on prices, but in my opinion OPEC, and in particular Saudi Arabia as a swing producer will play a pivotal role in balancing the oil markets. When supply concerns were escalating in 2011, the Kingdom spearheaded a new quota for OPEC members in December 2011 to 30 million barrels, the first change in three years, and pumped oil at the highest rate in three decades. It also ensured that its overseas storage tanks in Rotterdam, Okinawa, and Sidi Kerir are full. However, the recent buildup in inventory in the US and the OECD’s forward demand cover that stands at 59.1 days have certainly been on the radar of the OPEC that enhanced compliance as evident from the reduced production to 30.62 million barrels a day in November, a 12-month low. The Kingdom has also recently been unilaterally decreasing its supply, curbing output to a 14-month low of 9.5 million barrels a day in December. Will 2013 be a repeat of the 1986? A question that many analysts pose to compare the North Sea substantial increase in output that eventually led to more than 50 percent decline in oil prices between December 1985 and July 1986, from $23 to $9.8 per barrel, with shale oil discoveries. The International Energy Agency had even subscribed to such theme predicting that by 2020 the US will surpass Saudi Arabia to become the largest producer of oil and that by 2030 it will be net exporter. Nevertheless, I do believe that comparing tight oil reserves from shale oil and conventional oil from the North Sea ignores three aspects, notably the high marginal cost of extraction, the technological challenges and the rapid aging of the fields. Another important aspect that will prevent a repeat of the 1986 saga is the relative solidarity among OPEC members and the financial strength of the Gulf members that will enable them to counter any abrupt surge in global supply with a reduced supply quota of their own. On the short-run, it is clear that OPEC will likely consider supply cuts next year to prevent prices from falling and to ensure market balance. On a longer-term supply perspective, the unfolding Iranian standoff had raised concerns about disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz and the lack of alternative routes for oil transportation. The world’s spare capacity, mostly located in Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait will be constrained in case of closure. Currently, there are alternatives that are either under construction or in need of maintenance. For instance, in the UAE a 1.8 million barrels a day pipeline from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman is almost operational. Another alternative is a northern pipeline in Iraq that has 1.6 million barrels a day, but requires major repairs that can last for more than 2 years. Most importantly, in Saudi Arabia, a pipeline from the Eastern province to Yanbu can transport around 5 million barrels a day in crude oil instead of refined products. Looking ahead, the issue of midstream projects that bypass the Strait of Hormuz will be of prime importance to the GCC to enhance their shock response. There is little doubt that OPEC and Saudi Arabia will be instrumental in mitigating concerns and ensuring market balance in the oil markets, which leads me to believe in a range-bound oil price that will end 2013 at an annual average of $110 per barrel for Brent, with Saudi curbing its production to an annual average of 9.5 million barrels per day. To conclude, if some people believe that the only constant thing in life is change, I do believe that the only thing constant in the world economy these days is uncertainty.

Second, chokepoint vulnerability—terrorist targets and weak states ensure disruptions—also collapses heg
Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379] 

Vulnerability Mark my words, with everything that is going on in this world with regards to terrorism, sooner or later the terrorist is going to try to sink a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, and when that occurs, and that free flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf ends, you're going to have another great energy crisis. In order to function at the level it now does, the United States absolutely relies on the uninterrupted supply and distribution of the more than 20 million barrels of oil and petroleum products a day it consumes. The Al Qaeda attack on the  Ab Qaiq Oil Refinery complex in Saudi Arabia on February 24, 2006 is clear evidence that Al Qaeda is intent on hurting the west economically by interrupting the flow of oil to American, European, and Asian markets. Al- Qaeda leaders have vowed numerous times to cut the "economic lifelines" of the world's industrialized societies. Such attacks would not only disrupt life in the west and around the world but also weaken and perhaps topple Arabian Gulf oil monarchies heavily dependent on oil revenues for their survival. 9 The United States faces numerous threats, both environmental and increasingly more human based from terrorist or political action, to maintaining the necessary supply of imported and domestically produced crude oil and imported and domestically refined petroleum products it needs to survive economically and maintain its position as the great world power that it is. Getting oil from the well to the refinery requires a complex transportation and storage system. Millions of barrels of oil are transported every day in tankers, pipelines, and trucks. This transportation system has always been the “soft underbelly” of the oil industry but it has become even more so since the emergence of global terrorism  The United States relies on imported crude oil for about two-thirds of its daily requirements. Eighty-three percent of its imported oil is received by tanker shipment from overseas. Oil tankers are used to ship 68 percent of the world’s oil supply. One-third of that is transported by Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) and Ultra Large Crude Carriers (ULCC), also called “Supertankers,” which have a capacity that can vary from two million to more than four million barrels of oil. To reach foreign ports with their oil, tankers may be required to transit through one or more narrow straits -- the entrances to the Red Sea (Bab-el-Mandeb), the Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz), the Straits of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Straits of Gibraltar while entering or exiting the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez or Panama Canal, or several other geographically limited transit points. Several of these critical passages border countries where Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are known to operate. Tankers, especially  VLCC’s and  ULCC’s, have very limited maneuverability and are very susceptible to attack. Terror organizations have planned attacks against tankers in the Arabian Gulf and the Horn of Africa, and successfully attacked a French tanker off of Yemen in 2002. Attacks on British and American tankers passing through the Strait of Gibraltar were thwarted by the Moroccan Government in 2002. And according to FBI Director Robert Mueller, many other attacks on tankers have been thwarted as well. A burning tanker or large oil slick resulting from an attack on one or more tanker could easily shut down passage through one of these key chokepoints and disrupt United States, as well as world, oil supply significantly for several weeks or longer. 10 The United States’ imported oil supply is also vulnerable to political disruption or unrest in the countries it originates from. Although its largest quantities of imported crude oil are received from Canada and Mexico, which are steady and reliable trading partners, about one-third of its supply comes from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Saudi Arabia has had attempted terror attacks on its pipelines and oil infrastructure. Nigeria suffers extreme civil unrest that could significantly affect its ability to produce and export oil. And Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez continues to escalate his hard-line anti-American rhetoric. Because Venezuela’s oil industry is nationalized, his actions could limit future oil exports to the United States.

Third, Saudi and Syrian instability 
Sumbal, 2/26/13 [Malik Ayub Sumbal is an award-winning journalist, a defense and strategic analyst, and a peace and conflict expert with more than ten years reporting on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other international issues. Malik is currently based in Islamabad, is writing a book on state sponsored terrorism, Shiite Uprising Sets Off Alarm Bells for Saudi Arabia, http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/global-cities] 

Saudi Arabia's anti-Shiite policies are leading the country closer to the worst clash of the Shiite and Sunni schools of thought in the history of the Kingdom, a clash which will branch throughout the rest of the Muslim world. The Eastern Province (Ash-Sharqīyah), the largest province of Saudi Arabia, is dominated by a population of two million Shiites and is termed as a significant site of opposition against the Saudi monarchy. Sources have revealed that Saudi higher-ups have raised the prospect of a Shiite insurgency in the Eastern Province and accused Iran for supporting the unrest. The Saudi Government, including the King, recently held a meeting to lay out a strategy on diffusing the effects of any expected Shiite uprising in the Kingdom, as unrest has been fueled by Iran in retaliation for the Saudi support of the rebels against Bashir al-Assad’s regime in Syria.  Shiites, as the minority sect at 17 percent of the total population of the country, face state-sanctioned discrimination fuelled by the Kingdom’s powerful Wahabi clerics: Shiites are banned from practicing their rituals in public, as well as from holding high positions in government, state-owned companies, and the judiciary. They are very often turned away from the government employment, including police, army, and security services positions. Every year thousands of Shiites face unfair trials and are jailed for speaking against the monarchy. Shiites are closely watched and monitored by Saudi intelligence agencies for routine activities. The Saudi government has even restricted certain activities in an attempt to discourage Shiites from showing their identity, including outlawing names specific to Shi'a Islam. Most appallingly, there is no cemetery for Shiites in Saudi Arabia. In 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring, Human Rights Watch condemned Saudi Arabia's policies towards its Shiites citizens and urged on Saudi authorities to treat the Shiites’ minority as equal citizens. However, Saudi Arabia is a major U.S. ally, and the U.S. has refrained from publicly criticizing violations of human sights or the Kingdom’s role in putting down pro-democracy protests. By supporting the rebels against the Assad’s regime in Syria, attempting to make Iran the world's only Shiite country, Saudi Arabia has unbolted a new war inside in its own territory that could unearth grave consequences for the sovereignty of the Kingdom. The monarchy of Saudi Arabia is already deeply concerned, as the Eastern Province is‎ home to most of Kingdom’s Shiite population and 90 percent of Saudi oil, not to mention it is just 30-minute drive across the causeway from Bahrain. The aim of the recent conference called by the Saudi top officials was actually to gain support from Muslims countries, excluding Iran. A Saudi state news agency quoted Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal as saying that King Abdullah has called for "an extraordinary Islamic solidarity meeting to ensure... unity during this delicate time as the Muslim world faces dangers of fragmentation and sedition". Meanwhile as Syria heads towards the fall of Assad’s regime, retribution from Iran is gradually increasing in the form of support for a Shiite uprising in Saudi Arabia, creating an increasingly dangerous situation for the stability of the Middle East as well as to the Saudi monarchy. Saudi Arabia and Iran have a long account of enmity, with centuries which have never witnessed good relations due to the Saudi hold on Holy Kaaba. But now, both have geared up to blow the Middle East, which could lead towards a severe sectarian battle categorically injurious for the entire Muslim world.

Middle East disruptions impact global prices
Insley, 2/25/13 [Matt, The Managing Editor of the Daily Resource Hunter, Matt is the Agora Financial in-house specialist on commodities and natural resources. He holds a degree from the University of Maryland with a double major in Business and Environmental Economics. Although always familiar with the financial markets, his main area of expertise stems from his background in the Agricultural and Natural Resources (AGNR) department. Over the past years he’s stayed well ahead of the curve with forward thinking ideas in both resource stocks and hard commodities. Insley's commentary has been featured by MarketWatch, “The Middle East Effect on Oil Prices: Explained!”, http://www.dailyreckoning.com.au/the-middle-east-effect-on-oil-prices-explained/2013/02/25/] 

The Middle East has a dramatic impact on the global price of oil...and today we've got visual proof! I call it the 'Middle East Effect' - and over the past few years it's responsible for the majority of oil's major moves, including a recent pullback in prices. So what's next for the Middle East Effect and oil prices?  Before we get our boots muddy in the Middle East, let's back up and take a look at how the oil market works. Consider it a crash course on crude! As you know, oil makes the world go round. It keeps cargo ships moving, airliners flying, cars driving, electric turbines spinning and heaters, well, heating. Thinking in terms of your daily activities, it wakes you up, heats your coffee, starts your car, powers your computer, transports your dinner and heats your home so you can sleep sound at night. With such a high impact on daily life, the oil market is a little more complex than just standard supply and demand. You see, most of the world-spinning factors listed above are planned well in advance. After a visit to a Chevron refinery a few years ago, it's clear that refining is much more than just turning black goo into usable products. Instead it requires loads of planning and logistics. The same goes for power plants which, order their crude weeks or months in advance. Crude is complex. So complex, in fact, that physical crude trades in what are called 'future' contracts. These future contracts add a whole new angle to the physical market - indeed, if a refiner needs to guarantee having oil six months from now at a known price, future contracts are the ticket. But to figure out that price for future crude, there's a lot of speculation at play. Speculation is a fancy word for guessing what the price of oil (or any commodity for that matter) will be at a specific point in the future. These educated guesses take everything into account, future supply and future demand - plus, for today's discussion, the likelihood of a disruption in supply. For example, if Iran threatens to close the Strait of Hormuz the price of oil would spike. But this spike doesn't just affect the current price of crude, it also affect the price of futures contracts that refiners buy. So you see, even though there may not be a real supply disruption in the crude market, the expectation of one can have a drastic effect on current and future prices. This is an important concept to keep in mind. But there's more to the story... The Middle East Effect Revealed! It should come as no surprise that Middle East supply has a lot of control over the price of oil. In that same sense, speculation about the stability of the region will also have a direct impact on prices. But don't take my word for it, take a look at this: Over the past 24 months there have been four clear oil price trends that can be traced back to action in the Middle East. Starting in the spring of 2011 with the first rising of the Arab Spring and continuing through to more recent OPEC supply cuts, you can see that when the Middle East heats up crude prices follow. But as you can also see from the chart above, when there's no real threat from the Middle East or North Africa, prices tend to fall back to their natural level - what appears to be a price baseline around $85.

The risk is high—tons of potential flashpoints, including Asia—collapses the economy
Roubini, 13 [January 24th, Nouriel Roubini, an American economist, He anticipated the collapse of the United States housing market, He teaches at New York University's Stern School of Business and is the chairman of Roubini Global Economics, an economic consultancy firm, BA in political economics at Bocconi University, Milan and a doctorate in international economics at Harvard University, he became an academic at Yale and a practising economist at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Federal Reserve, World Bank, and Bank of Israel, “Nouriel at Davos: Global Tail Risks Remain”, http://www.economonitor.com/nouriel/2013/01/24/nouriel-at-davos-global-tail-risks-remain/]
 
Speaking with CNN’s Poppy Harlow at Davos, RGE Chairman Nouriel Roubini reiterated the biggest outlying risks to the global economy: U.S. fiscal woes, the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, a potential China hard landing, and geopolitical risk in the Middle East. Nouriel argued that the worst scenario need to materialize for a meaningful impact on global growth: “The combination of all of them going in the wrong direction, and they don’t have to become virulent – if we have a bigger fiscal drag, if the problems in the eurozone become worse, if the landing of China is hard rather than softer, and, short of a war between Israel and Iran, if negotiation and sanction fail, then Israel is going to start to talk about war: the fear premium goes up … and that is a negative for the global economy.” Regarding instability in the Middle East, brought to the fore this week with Israel’s election and recent events in North Africa, Nouriel emphasizes multiple pressure points for global markets: “Instability in the Middle East is an issue: and the instability is not just tension between Israel and Iran – that if there were to become violent they could spike global oil prices to double the current level and tip the global economy into recession. If you look at the Middle East, all from Maghreb, Algeria to Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is geopolitical tension that could have economic consequences.” He also notes geopolitical tensions in Asia—territorial disputes “between China and Japan, in Korea, in Indonesia, in Vietnam, in India, you name it,” that have already negatively impacted regional trade and FDI.

The impacts ---- 

Robust empirical data proves the economy would be wrecked
Hamilton, 11 [James D. Hamilton Department of Economics University of California, San Diego, “Historical Oil Shocks”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/oil_history.pdf] 

As noted in the previous sections, these historical episodes were often followed by economic recessions in the United States. The last column of Table 1 reports the starting date of U.S. recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All but one of the 11 postwar recessions were associated with an increase in the price of oil, the single exception being the recession of 1960. Likewise, all but one of the 12 oil price episodes listed in Table 1 were accompanied by U.S. recessions, the single exception being the 2003 oil price increase associated with the Venezuelan unrest and second Persian Gulf War. The correlation between oil shocks and economic recessions appears to be too strong to be just a coincidence (Hamilton, 1983a, 1985). And although demand pressure associated with the later stages of a business cycle expansion seems to have been a contributing factor in a number of these episodes, statistically one cannot predict the oil price changes prior to 1973 on the basis of prior developments in the U.S. economy (Hamilton, 1983a). Moreover, supply disruptions arising from dramatic geopolitical events are prominent causes of a number of the most important episodes. Insofar as events such as the Suez Crisis and first Persian Gulf War were not caused by U.S. business cycle dynamics, a correlation between these events and subsequent economic 27 downturns should be viewed as causal. This is not to claim that the oil price increases themselves were the sole cause of most postwar recessions. Instead the indicated conclusion is that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some postwar recessions. That an oil price increase could exert some drag on the economy of an oil importing country should not be controversial. On the supply side, energy is a factor of production, and an exogenous decrease in its supply would be expected to be associated with a decline in productivity. However, standard neoclassical reasoning suggests that the size of such an effect should be small. If the dollar value of the lost energy is less than the dollar value of the lost production, it would pay the firm to bid up the price of energy so as to maintain production. But the dollar value of the lost energy is relatively modest compared with the dollar value of production lost in a recession. For example, the global production shortfall associated with the OPEC embargo (the area above the dashed line in Figure 10) averaged 2.3 mb/d over the 6 months following September 1973. Even at a price of $12/barrel, this only represents a market value of $5.1 billion spread over the entire world economy. By contrast, U.S. real GDP declined at a 2.5% annual rate between 1974:Q1 and 1975:Q1, which would represent about $38 billion annually in 1974 dollars for the U.S. alone. The dollar value of output lost in the recession exceeded the dollar value of the lost energy by an order of magnitude. Alternatively, oil shocks could affect the economy through the demand side. The short-run elasticity of oil demand is very low.28 If consumers try to maintain their real purchases of energy in the face of rising prices, their saving or spending on other goods 28 must fall commensurately. Although there are offsetting income gains for domestic oil producers, the marginal propensity to spend out of oil company windfall profits may be low, and by 1974, more than a third of U.S. oil was imported. Again, however, the direct effects one could assign to this mechanism are limited. For example, between September 1973 and July 1974, U.S. consumer purchases of energy goods and services increased by $14.4 billion at an annual rate,29 yet the output decline was more than twice this amount. Hamilton (1988) stressed the importance of the composition of consumer spending in addition to its overall level. For example, one of the key responses seen following an increase in oil prices is a decline in automobile spending, particularly the larger vehicles manufactured in the United States (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009; Ramey and Vine, forthcoming). Insofar as specialized labor and capital devoted to the manufacture and sales of those vehicles are difficult to shift into other uses, the result can be a drop in income that is greater than the lost purchasing power by the original consumers. Table 2 reproduces the calculations in Hamilton (2009b) on the behavior of real GDP in the 5 quarters following each of 5 historical oil shocks, and the specific contribution made to this total from motor vehicles and parts alone. This did seem to make a material contribution in many cases. For example, in the 5 quarters following the oil price increases of 1979:Q2 and 1990:Q3, real GDP would have increased rather than fallen had there been no decline in autos. In addition, there appears to be an important response of consumer sentiment to rapid increases in energy prices (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009). Combining these changes in spending with traditional Keynesian multiplier 28 See for example the literature surveys by Dahl and Sterner (1991), Dahl (1993), Espey (1998), Graham and Glaister (2004) and Brons, et. al. (2008). Examples of studies finding higher elasticities include Kilian (2010), Baumeister and Peersman (2009), and Davis and Kilian (forthcoming). 29 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.3.5.U. 29 effects appears to be the most plausible explanation for why oil shocks have often been followed by economic downturns. In addition to disruptions in supply arising from geopolitical events, another contributing factor for several of the historical episodes is the interaction of growing petroleum demand with production declines from the mature producing fields on which the world had come to depend. In the postwar experience, this appears to be part of the story behind the 1973-1974 and 2007-2008 oil price spikes, and, going back in time, in the 1862-1864 and 1895 price run-ups as well. It is unclear as of this writing where the added global production will come from to replace traditional sources such as the North Sea, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, if production from the latter has indeed peaked. But given the record of geopolitical instability in the Middle East, and the projected phenomenal surge in demand from the newly industrialized countries, it seems quite reasonable to expect that within the next decade we will have an additional row of data to add to Table 1 with which to inform our understanding of the economic consequences of oil shocks. 

Even if high prices are okay, abrupt shocks are devastating—prefer our evidence
Ronald Bailey, 3-8-2011;  award-winning science correspondent for Reason magazine; Oil Price Shocks and the Recession of 2011? http://reason.com/archives/2011/03/08/oil-price-shocks-and-the-reces

Hamilton is not arguing that oil price shocks are the sole cause of recessions, but that they tip an already vulnerable economy into contraction. A 2010 study by economists at the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank agrees: “For most countries, oil shocks do affect the likelihood of entering a recession. In particular, an average-sized shock to WTI [West Texas Intermediate crude] oil prices increases the probability of recession in the U.S. by nearly 50 percentage points after one year and nearly 90 percentage points after two years.” On the other hand, a 2005 study by the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum found that “when oil prices move gradually higher (perhaps somewhat erratically), as they have done over the last several years, they do not directly result in economic recessions, even though the economy may grow modestly slower.” Gradual price increases do not derail economic growth because consumers and entrepreneurs are able to adjust smoothly to them. So how do oil shocks cause recessions? Hamilton and many other analysts note that the actual amount spent on oil relative to the overall size of the economy initially suggests that the effect of a price increase should be relatively small. For example, as a result of the 1973 oil embargo, the world spent an extra $5.1 billion ($23 billion in 2009 dollars) on oil. Yet, U.S. real GDP declined by 2.5 percent, which is about $38 billion ($164 billion). One of the key ways oil price hikes negatively affect the U.S. economy is by provoking a decline in demand for new automobiles. Unemployed autoworkers and idled factories can’t be rapidly deployed to other sectors. In addition, uncertainty over oil prices also leads people and firms to postpone purchases of capital and durable goods. While higher oil prices contribute to recessions, lower oil prices do not appear to have much effect on economic expansions. People may postpone buying a new car when gas prices are high, but they don’t rush out to buy one just because pump prices are low. So will the recent run up in the price of crude push the U.S. economy back into recession? The good news is that the U.S. economy grew at a rate of 3.2 percent in the most recent quarter, and gross domestic product has returned to the level it reached in 2007. On March 1, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that “sustained rises in the prices of oil or other commodities would represent a threat both to economic growth and to overall price stability, particularly if they were to cause inflation expectations to become less well anchored.”

Global war
Harris and Burrows, 9 – *counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_burrows.pdf)

Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.
In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn.
The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.
Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Goes global—strong studies
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. 

Second, hegemony – minimizing supply vulnerability is key to leadership
Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379] 

Conclusion As time continues to pass without the U.S. taking firm steps to decrease its vulnerability to disruptions in crude oil supply and the supply of refined fuels, the elements of national power that require petroleum as the cornerstone of their ability to function will continue to lose effectiveness. This condition is rapidly chipping away at the foundation of United States’ power. The question is: What will it take to cause that foundation to begin to crack or even collapse, and fail to properly support the nation which relies on its foundation to keep it standing and structurally sound? The summer of 2005 provided a glimpse at just how much disruption to the United States’ petroleum supply could be caused by severe storms along the Gulf Coast. And results of oil crisis simulations, like the Oil Shockwave exercise held in June 2005, reveal the potentially devastating effects a major disruption in the United States’ supply of oil could have on its economy and national security. The scenario pointed to the large number of combinations of events that could create a similar crisis for the United States, making the risk and probability even greater for the future. Although the first order effects of an oil related crisis appear to be predominantly economic, the second and third order effects would certainly impact all facets of national security, particularly in political decisions made dealing with oil exporting 15 countries and the ability of the United States to fund, equip, and maintain the armed forces it relies on as a key component of that security. As the United States’ demand for oil and refined products continues to rise, the effects of future events like the hurricanes of 2005 will be even more dramatic and will almost certainly have an even greater negative impact on the U.S. economy and national security. The outcome of multiple events occurring simultaneously, a hurricane on the Gulf Coast and a large accident or terrorist attack on Northeast port facilities, for example, could have truly disastrous effects. The U.S. must address this critical chink in its armor now, and act quickly to start fixing the problems identified here. Although the United States arguably needs to develop a long term energy strategy that reduces or almost eliminates its dependence on oil and petroleum products as the foundation of its national strength, that will not realistically happen for several decades at a minimum. The steps outlined in this paper are the basis for a realistic and do-able Strategic Petroleum Reserve policy and strategy that, at least for the near future, will ensure that the nation’s national security will not be nearly as vulnerable to an oil related energy crisis as it is today. The policy motion in congress needed to make the necessary changes to the SPR is in place and on the political agenda. It is imperative that, while events like Hurricane Katrina and the results of simulated exercises like “Oil Shockwave” are fresh in the minds of government policymakers, the United States takes the initiative to make these changes as quickly as possible.

It’s our strategic Achilles heel
Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379] 

THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY The United States’ dependence on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products, particularly gasoline, is a strategic “Achilles Heel.” A strike in this weak spot either accidentally through environmental conditions such as extreme weather, intentionally by human means in the form of a political act or a terrorist attack, or a well-timed combination of both- would leave the U.S. very vulnerable to extreme disruption of its economy. In order to ensure a steady and reliable short term supply of oil within the United States in the event of internal disruptions or disruptions from our foreign suppliers, the United States, as part of its National Strategy regarding energy, has developed and maintains the largest reserve of crude oil in the world, known as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Although developing and maintaining a large, easily accessed reserve of crude oil has sufficed to meet past strategic needs, recent events in the United States and significant changes in its oil producing and refining capacity within the last 10 years suggest that the SPR, in its present form and capacity, is not sufficient to meet the current and future strategic needs of the United States. Specifically, the  SPR’s concentrated location along the Gulf Coast, its inability to directly send oil to all refining areas in the United States, strategic vulnerabilities in its existing distribution pipelines, its size and limited pumping capacity, and the absence of refined fuels as part of the SPR all combine to make the SPR increasingly unable to protect the United States from major disruptions in oil supply. The importance of crude oil and refined petroleum products, like gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation jet fuel, to the National Security of the United States cannot be overstated. The reliable and steady supply of these products is the cornerstone of the U.S. economy. They are absolutely essential to the ability of the U.S. Government and its elements that provide the foundations of national power, especially the military, to perform on a day-to-day basis at the required high level of performance that allows the U.S. to maintain its position as a world economic, military, and political leader. A quote from Robert E.  Ebel, Chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Energy Program, clearly states this point:

Abrupt incapacitation causes global war, even if heg fails
Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon 7, Fred’s a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan. Let us hope there will be no such large-scale missions for a while. But preparing for the possibility, while doing whatever we can at this late hour to relieve the pressure on our soldiers and Marines in ongoing operations, is prudent. At worst, the only potential downside to a major program to strengthen the military is the possibility of spending a bit too much money. Recent history shows no link between having a larger military and its overuse; indeed, Ronald Reagan’s time in office was characterized by higher defense budgets and yet much less use of the military, an outcome for which we can hope in the coming years, but hardly guarantee. While the authors disagree between ourselves about proper increases in the size and cost of the military (with O’Hanlon preferring to hold defense to roughly 4 percent of GDP and seeing ground forces increase by a total of perhaps 100,000, and Kagan willing to devote at least 5 percent of GDP to defense as in the Reagan years and increase the Army by at least 250,000), we agree on the need to start expanding ground force capabilities by at least 25,000 a year immediately. Such a measure is not only prudent, it is also badly overdue.

Oil supplies key—great power wars
Yasin Qasem, 7-9-2007; Pompeu University politics doctoral candidate, 2007;  “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage” http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm

Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, superpowers will not hesitate to unleash their economic and military power to ensure secure access to oil resources, triggering worldwide tension, if not armed conflict. And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of using nuclear weapons in pursues of national interests are high. What all of this means is that when reserves are exhausted oil will turn from a blessing to curse. When the curse strikes a new world order will emerge, in which today’s ways of life, politics, and conflicts will be not the same. The rising oil prices and current international tension over nuclear capabilities are telling signs about the kind of future awaiting humanity ahead of the road. Alas, we are all waiting for the final drop of oil to trickle before reaching the zenith of a disaster which is already in the making. 

We solve --- 

SPR expansion is key to cope with inevitable crises that wreck the economy
Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379] 

How severe could a major disruption in oil supply be to the United States? A global oil supply crisis simulation exercise, called “Oil Shockwave”, was conducted in June, 2005 by the National Commission on Energy Policy and the non-profit group Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE). Participating in the event were nine former White House Cabinet and senior national security officials, acting as a mock White House Cabinet in order to advise the President regarding a simulated seven month oil crisis. The results were significant. The scenario for the exercise involved a combination of political unrest in Nigeria (the 8th largest supplier of oil to global markets and the 5th largest supplier of imported oil to the United States) resulting in a production loss of 800,000 barrels per day (b/d), a terrorist attack on the  Haradh Natural Gas Facility in Saudi Arabia and a failed attack on  Ras  Tanura in Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil port, both resulting in a decrease of 200,000 b/d in Saudi export capacity, and a coordinated terrorist attack on oil tankers and storage tanks in the port of Valdez, Alaska, resulting in a decrease of 900,000 b/d to global supply. The net effect of this simulated scenario to the United States was a projected rise in the price of oil, at one point in the scenario, to $121 dollars per barrel and gasoline prices to $4.74 per gallon. This was estimated to result in a recession, the loss of about two million jobs, a historically significant decline in the S&P 500, and a large increase in the federal government’s current accounts deficit. By the end of the scenario the theoretical price of oil rose to $161 per barrel but the potential economic effects weren’t estimated because they were too far out of the range of experience for participating economists to predict, although it was agreed upon by all of them that the results would be at least on the order of a severe recession or worse. 2 Although this particular scenario was used for the simulation, it is pointed out in the exercise that there are virtually hundreds of other scenarios which could have the same effects. Richard M. Gates, former Director of Central Intelligence and participating in the simulation as the mock United States National Security Advisor, stated in his remarks “...the economic and national security risks of our dependence on oil- and especially on foreign oil- have reached unprecedented levels. The threat is real and urgent, requiring immediate and sustained attention at the highest levels of government.” One of the key findings in the exercise report was that the SPR offered some protection against a major supply disruption, but only limited in duration and scope, and the SPR could not sustain the United States through a prolonged crisis. 3 Without changes implemented immediately, the  SPR’s ability to provide strategic protection will continue to decrease and leave the United States increasingly more vulnerable to the effects of attacks on its ability to receive, distribute, and refine oil, whether dealt by the hands of Mother Nature, Terrorists, or a well-timed combination of both.

Increasing it keeps oil from skyrocketing, provides tools to reassure markets and mitigate supply disruptions 
Clayton,12 [September 21st, Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security Council on Foreign Relations,Expertise Energy markets, security, and policy; commodities markets; natural resource economics, U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve Needs Fixing—Fast, http://www.cfr.org/energy/us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-needs-fixingfast/p29103] 

The chaos in Libya, Egypt and elsewhere has the oil market on edge, and with good reason. But there is another scare among oil traders, much closer to home, one that could be catastrophic for gasoline prices if oil imports are disrupted this fall. Speculation among experts is rife that the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is no longer able to release oil to the market as quickly as the Department of Energy claims it can. If true – and there is good reason to believe it is – it could destroy the White House's ability to prevent oil prices from skyrocketing if the commotion in the Middle East worsens. This needs to be fixed – and fast. The SPR is the nation's last defense against a dire loss of oil supplies capable of sending the economy into a tailspin. The potential for a military confrontation between Israel and Iran, which could require the United States to release oil from the SPR, makes this resource more critical than ever. But analysts are skeptical that the U.S. federal government is as functional as advertised. The Department of Energy has offered only a weak denial of these allegations. For a lesson in how a lack of transparency can end up hurting the very market it aims to calm, Washington need look no further than Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia holds the lion's share of OPEC spare capacity – in other words, oil left unused but which could be brought online quickly and sustainably if need be. Its exalted place among producers stems in part from its ability to convince the market that it can plug an unforeseen gap in supplies, and thus keep prices stable. But traders have balked for years at Riyadh's claims that it can quickly ramp up its production as high as it says it can. Analysts are rightfully skeptical: after all, its assertions are based on untested assumptions, and the Kingdom has an incentive to overestimate them. Moreover, the Saudis are loath to give outsiders information about their domestic oil industry, a veil of secrecy that provides fodder for market speculation. Americans love to pick at Saudi opacity, yet Washington itself faces similar problems. The SPR is a powerful tool for reassuring the market that the United States, along with other major consuming countries, stands ready to stabilize the market in the case of a severe supply disruption. But market participants are becoming increasingly cynical about whether the SPR is up to the challenge. Edward Morse, a former U.S. energy official who now leads Citigroup's commodities research team, argued compellingly earlier this year that recent years' changes to North American oil infrastructure have rendered the SPR "significantly less usable than advertised." Many of the pipelines that could deliver the oil to market quickly can no longer move SPR oil. Instead, the oil would need to be exported by sea, a method that may take seven times longer than it would via pipelines. This difference in flow rates would have big consequences: the SPR would not come close to covering the loss of Iranian crude exports, for example, should they be interrupted. An anonymous official at the Department of Energy roundly rejected this sort of speculation in March: the Department is "confident," he said, "that, if needed, it could effectively react to a situation" requiring it to inject into the market the 4.25 million barrels per day of oil it claims it can. He stressed that the department "conducts routine and thorough analysis of commercial distribution capabilities to ensure accurate assessments." This rebuttal falls well short of what is needed to reassure the market that the SPR can do what U.S. officials have long said it can. If Washington is sincere about dispelling growing doubts, it needs to give traders more evidence than an unproven, anonymous "not so." U.S. officials should investigate the issue via a test drawdown and sale, and publicly disclose their findings. If market participants harbor doubts about the flow capacity of the U.S. SPR, they may discount its ability to help offset any sudden supply shortages, rendering it a less effective tool for calming the market. As any Saudi oil official knows, the market will remain skeptical of words until they are backed by actions. Greater transparency about the SPR's capabilities, particularly in light of profound recent changes in the North American oil landscape, is critical.

The Reserve needs to be big enough to be usable in a crisis
Shages, 09 [PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN D. SHAGES, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg50874/pdf/CHRG-111shrg50874.pdf] 

Expand the Reserve: The Reserve is a very powerful tool for American economic and foreign policy. While most analysts appreciate the potential of the Reserve to moderate the effects of oil shortages and control surging oil prices, there has been very little attention focused on the value of having empty storage capacity simply because we have always had more storage capacity than inventory. That situation will change in the fourth quarter of this year when the inventory reaches the rated 727 million barrel capacity of the Reserve. There are a number of reasons that jus- tify adding to the capacity of the Reserve and I will address four of the most impor- tant. First, the goal of having more oil inventory is justified by the threat posed to our economy by disruptions and price spikes. The economic rationale for the Reserve has evolved and been refined over the past thirty years. At the heart of the argument is the observation that oil price spikes have preceded 10 of the 11 recessions which have occurred since the Second World War. Regardless of whether price spikes have been the sole causes of recessions or contributory, it would be implausible to argue that the gigantic price increase that occurred during 2007-2008 had nothing to do with the current state of our economy or that its role was inconsequential. A recent paper by Professor James Hamilton, the person credited with being the first to pub- lish his observations on the frequency of recessions after oil shocks, eloquently de- fends the pertinence of this hypothesis relating the current severe recession to the oil shock. By his calculations absent the price shock during the year starting Octo- ber 2007 the GDP of the United States would have grown 3.5 percent more than it actually did, equal to about $500 billion. Having a Reserve large enough that the President would feel comfortable using it to suppress a $100 per barrel price spike rather than allowing it to drive the economy into recession would easily be worth the cost of that expansion. 

Precautionary increases are good—capacity is too small—oil optimists are gambling the economy
Henwood, 11 [Increase the Strategic Petroleum Reserve - Oil is too important, April 18th, Each day Commodity and Energy Specialist Christopher Henwood's work at Thomson Reuters pits him squarely against the nuance and volatility of energy markets as he evaluates them from both a technical and fundamental perspective. Chris has a law degree from Rutgers University, and he was admitted to the New York State Bar in January 2011. He earned his undergraduate degree at Dickinson College, http://longvalley.patch.com/blog_posts/increase-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve-oil-is-too-important]

In the Wall Street Journal last week, there were two articles about strategic petroleum reserves. The first was an Op- Ed Piece by Austan Goolsbee, former Chairman of President Obama’s council of Economic Advisors and professor of economics at the University of Chicago – Booth School of Business. In his article, Mr. Goolsbee lays out the case for reducing the size of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve from its current level of just under 700 Million barrels to 510 million barrels as this more closely reflects the generally accepted level of 75 days worth of oil imports. In the Markets section there was also an article about China steadily adding to their strategic oil reserves to achieve a level that will cover the petroleum needs for the entire country for 90+ days. I found the contrast startling. On the one hand we have President Obama’s former chief economic advisor advocating for a reduction in our Strategic Petroleum Reserve, while China continues to increase their strategic oil reserves. First let’s take a look at what the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is and why we have it. The SPR was created in 1975 in response to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74. As a result of the embargo, the US realized that it had become too dependent on foreign oil producers and decided to create its own stockpile of oil to ensure the flow of oil for domestic needs in the event of a significant supply disruption. The result is the U.S. has currently just under 700 million barrels of oil stored in four sites along the Gulf of Mexico.  According the Energy Information Administration (EIA) the US consumes about 20 million barrels of oil per day so that 700 million barrels represents about 35 days of supply. Domestically the US produces just over 5.5 million barrels of oil per day, which in the event of a supply disruption will stretch the SPR to just over 48 days of total domestic usage. None of this takes into account the oil we import from Canada and Mexico, the US’s two main suppliers of oil. China has a known history of stockpiling grains and other staples as insurance against drought or any type of supply disruption. China will typically keep a year’s worth of corn, wheat, and soybeans in state owned warehouses to ensure its population will have access to these basics in the event of a calamity that might severely curtail their domestic food production. Copper is another commodity the Chinese stockpile in bulk. Copper is considered the bellwether of economic health and the Chinese economy has been experiencing rapid growth over the past several years. China keeps vast stores of copper on hand to ensure that its manufacturing sector has access to a stable supply stream. It only makes sense that China would now look to increase its reserves of its most important commodity, oil. The recent tensions and oil export restrictions with Iran highlight China’s vulnerability to oil supply disruption. China is a big purchaser of Iranian crude oil and is building and delivering a number of crude oil tankers to Iran this spring. Not surprising, Iran is taking several steps to circumvent the sanctions being placed on it by the U.S. and world community. I would not be surprised if a good portion of Iranian crude winds up in Chinese storage facilities in the coming months. The bottom line here is that like it or not, the U.S. and world economies are still dependent on cheap, reliable fuel from oil and natural gas to fuel their economies. It would be a grave mistake for the U.S. to ignore the realities of high oil prices and possible supply disruptions and reduce the amount of oil in the SPR as Mr. Goolsbee recommends. In my opinion the Chinese economic model has some serious flaws, but stockpiling a crucial ingredient to the national economy makes sense. Any reduction in the SPR for short-term price gains would be harmful in the long run, while increasing the amount of oil in the SPR is likely the right answer. Oil is here to stay and the U.S. should take the appropriate steps to avoid another crisis like the 1973-74 Arab Oil Embargo.

Size matters—it’s linear—protection will keep shrinking without new increases
Peck, 06 [USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT THE U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: NEEDED CHANGES TO COUNTER TODAY’S THREATS TO ENERGY SECURITY by Commander Bruce L. Peck Jr. United States Navy Captain Albert F. Lord Project Adviser, 15 MAR 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA449379] 

Additionally, current demand in the United States for crude oil is about 15.2 million barrels per day. Of that amount, about 10.1 million barrels are imported. Imported oil is brought into the United States either via pipeline from Canada, its biggest supplier of imported oil at about 1.7 million b/d, or it is brought from all other countries via tankers through its seaports. The International Energy Agency, which has 26 member nations including the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Korea, and almost all European countries, requires its members to hold oil reserves equal to 90 days of net imports averaged from the previous year, either in government owned stocks or a combination of government and private company inventory. European countries maintain a combined reserve of approximately one billion barrels of crude oil, roughly equivalent to 90 days of total consumption, vice just imports. Japan maintains a combination of government and private company reserves for over 150 days of total consumption. And South Korea, the most recent member of the IEA, has built a 90-day stockpile of government and private reserves. The SPR currently contains about 684 million barrels of oil. At today’s import requirements, it provides the United States with about 65 days of import protection, and the nation relies on industry held stocks to make up the difference in order to meet the 90 day IEA requirement. Even when filled to its current capacity of 727 million barrels, which President Bush has directed the Energy Secretary to do, the SPR would only provide about 70 days of import protection. And United States oil import requirements are expected to increase to about 13.5 million b/d by 2030, significantly decreasing the level of import protection provided by the SPR if it is maintained at its current capacity. The SPR is now not sufficiently large enough to protect the United States from a long term disruption in crude oil supply, and without an increase in capacity will be even less able to do so in the future.

Best economic analysis agrees—SPR growth key to provide an economic buffer—alternatives fail
Leiby, 2k [The Value of Expanding the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Paul N. Leiby2 and David Bowman,Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 30, 2000, Over 25 years of experience conducting and leading research projects on the economic analysis of resource and energy policy including renewable energy resources Particular experience in energy security, advanced motor fuels and technology transitions. Work History and Accomplishments 1987 to present Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Environmental Science Division, Oak Ridge, Tennessee Distinguished Research Scientist, Group Leader: Energy Analysis Conducted and led multiple research projects on the economic analysis of resource and energy policy. Leader of Transitional Advanced Vehicle and Fuel modeling project. Focus on quantitative energy analysis and modeling. 1979 to 1987 Energy And Environmental Policy Center, Harvard University Research Coordinator, International Energy Study, 1986-1987. Research Fellow in Oil and Gas Policy, 1985-1986. Examined U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve policy in context of oil market risk and uncertainty. Research Assistant (part and full time, 1981-1985). Member of Synthetic Fuels Study Group. Studied solar energy policy and natural gas curtailment (1979-1981). Education and Training Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, (ABD) in Public Policy. Kennedy School of Government, 1981, Master's Degree in Public Policy. Specialized in Modeling Energy and Environmental Policy. Harvard College, 1979, AB Magna Cum Laude, with Highest Honors in Science and International Affairs. Honors Thesis: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Initiatives, p. online]  

1.0 Introduction This report evaluates the net economic benefits of enhancing the U.S. SPR size and drawdown capability. The assessment of alternative U.S. sizes and drawdown capabilities is done using a numerical simulation model known as DIS-Risk. Input conditions and sensitivity cases are based upon the recommendations of the 1999 Department of Energy/Interagency SPR size study working group. As in the 1990 SPR size study, we recognize that substantial drawdown capacity already exists, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. The starting point of this analysis is the current U.S. maximum sustainable drawdown rate of 4.1 million barrels a day (MMBD) and a 580 MMB SPR size.3 The focus of this study is thus placed on the incremental net benefits that expanding the current drawdown capacity would provide to the U.S. economy. The world oil market has endured at least 18 significant oil supply shocks since 1951. The most notable of these, the 4 largest world oil shocks which occurred between 1973 and 1991, are now recognized to have cost the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars. These costs include a loss in GDP as well as higher payments for oil imports. Since oil is traded globally, a major oil price increase spreads quickly throughout the world, with disruptive effects on most energy-using Economies. Within each economy, the shock costs are spread through many sectors, the .social aspect. of which is invariably greater than the .private costs.. For this reason, oil-using firms and private consumers acting on their own behalf do not have sufficient motivation to adequately insure themselves and the nation against the widespread costs of oil price shocks. That is, the private sector will store oil at a level which is deemed profitable but which is less than socially optimal. Because most of the economy-wide costs of disruptions are external to the cost benefit considerations of private agents, public investment in a program of strategic oil storage is needed. Strategic oil stocks, by buffering oil supply losses and mitigating sudden major oil price shocks, are a direct and effective means for dealing with the risk to economies of persistent supply and price volatility. Private agents cannot justify holding large oil stocks for the long term as a contingency against unlikely, but potentially dramatic, market upheavals or geopolitical struggles. The private storage costs are too high, the planning time horizons are too long, and the direct benefits to the private agents are too low.4 Thus, it is incumbent on the public sector to hold strategic oil reserves since private agents are either unwilling or unable to do so. This paper summarizes the estimated net benefits of expanding U.S. strategic oil stocks from the current 580 million barrel (MMB) size, and analyzes the efficient reserve size. It recognizes that substantial strategic oil reserves already exist, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. The focus is on the incremental net benefits of expanded stocks to the U.S. economy. The estimates are based on Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2 SPR Size Study the economic protection that additional stocks would provide, beyond that protection already provided by the current U.S., Asian, and European strategic oil stocks. Thus we are considering the incremental net benefits to the U.S. of incremental changes in U.S. stockpile size. The assessment of alternative U.S. reserve sizes is done with a numerical simulation model. In Section 2.1 we begin by summarizing the analytical approach used, a probabilistic cost-benefit analysis. In Section 2.2 and 2.3 we characterize base oil market conditions used, and possible disrupted market conditions. Section 2.4 discusses the similarities to and differences from the 1990 DOE/Interagency Study. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the cost and benefits of oil stockpiling. In establishing cost and benefit determinants for this study, we draw on other background studies, including the engineering-estimates of storage facility costs developed by PB-KBB (1998, 1999). Section 3.3 summarizes the best available understanding of the macroeconomic cost of oil price shocks to U.S. economies. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 show the results for what we characterize as the Base Case. There we find that a moderate expansion of the U.S. reserve (on the order of at least 120 million barrels) is justified on the basis of its expected net benefits to the U.S. economy alone. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we explore the sensitivity of this conclusion to our treatment of oil market risk, sensitivity of GDP to shocks, and other relevant uncertainties. Finally, section 5.0 summarizes the implications of this economic net benefit analysis for efficient U.S. strategic reserve size. The analysis presented here strongly supports the conclusion that expanding the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve by at least 120 Million barrels is justified on the basis of its expected net benefits to the U.S. economy. Our evaluation included the reserves ability to reduce GDP losses and oil import costs during oil shocks, and subtracted the costs of building, filling, and operating the reserve. The conclusion that a substantial reserve expansion is justified holds true over a range of conditions, including more optimistic oil market assumptions which entail lower disruption risk over the next few decades. It also holds true for a range of variation in other key parameters such as the GDP elasticity with respect to oil price shocks, and for substantially higher storage costs than those of the least expensive alternative, underground salt caverns.

Historically proven—even if oil declines, absolute consumption levels make a large reserve key
Fredriksen, 2008 Katharine Statement of  Office of Policy and International Affairs  U.S. Department of Energy  Before The  Energy and Natural Resources Committee  United States Senate  February 26, http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=5bc84c7d-d12a-1225-c7f0-0c0f2d13a926] 

ENERGY SECURITY Our Nation’s energy security is directly intert wined with our national security. In fact, we are in a time of great risk when it comes to both realities. Global energy consumption will increase by roughly 50 percent by 2030, with 70 per cent of that growth co ming from the world’s emerging economies. While oil’s share of total energy use is projected to decline, it is projected to remain the single largest source of energy through 2030, with oil increasing in absolute terms. Oil resources are often located in places geographically hard to reach, difficult to develop and politically unstable, or unfriendly to new fore ign investment, superior technology, and modern business practices of intern ational energy companies. Record high oil prices re flect growing global demand, limited spare oil production capacity due to insufficient investment in producing new supply, lack of investment in exploration and rising development costs. In 2006, the United States imported over 12 million barrels of petroleum a da y, accounting for roughly 60% of our daily consumption. Although we must answer today’s question on reserve capacity, we must also confront the question of tomorrow, which is how to redu ce America’s dependence on fossil fuels to begin with? We must, as a global le ader, fundamentally transform the way the world produces and consumes energy. We must expand and diversif y our energy supply and our suppliers, increase our energy efficiency, modernize and expand our infrastructure and improve our environmental stewardship. We must confront the reasons we are dependent on foreign oil, and how we can mitigate these circumstances, including increased domestic exploration and produc tion. Our domestic exploration has nearly bottomed out. Despite all the concern about relianc e on foreign oil this Nation continues to forego available self help: the tremendous resource available in ANWR and the vast majority of the Outer Continental Shel f. The Department is continually working to develop alternative energy sources and improve our existing energy infrastructure and eliminate the road blocks to that progress. Only by confronting our energy security in its entire context, can we properly make decisions on our national reserves and their critical importance to our Nation in time of natural or unnatural emergencies. In looking at the two emergency drawdowns in the SPR’s history, it is clear this vital tool was essential during both even ts, whether as the result of a global conflict like Operation Desert Storm, or a natural disaster , such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita where approximately 25 percent of our Nation’s refining capacity was impacted. Our reserves were critical in these time periods a nd were immediately put into action. The conversation should not focus on whether the Strategic Petroleum Reserve serves a significant role in our energy security, because it unquestionably does as our Nation’s one and only insurance policy against gl obal supply disruption. The conversation should also not focus on whether the Reserve serves its purpose as Amer ica’s fulfillment of its international treaty commitments, as agreed to in the Agreement for an International En ergy Program, because we 3 do. The conversation should instead focus on a shared philosophy to in crease the capacity of the Reserve, and answer the Pres ident’s call in his 2007 State of the Union address to double it. This conversation is imperative and needs to be addressed so that the United States has the appropriate and necessary layer of protection it needs to ensure that adequate energy supplies are available to the American people in the case of a severe supply disrupt ion. Our energy and national security concerns must be paramount. 

1ac Adv 2

ADVANTAGE 2 IS CHINA	

Chinese oil source aggression drives revisionism and competition
Herberg, 11 [China’s Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China Energy Relations, By Mikkal Herberg, Research Director, Energy Security Program The National Bureau of Asian Research
http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations] 

China is gradually emerging as a new superpower in global energy markets and energy geopolitics. This reflects the enormous scale of China’s current and future energy and oil consumption, Beijing’s growing energy investments abroad and expanding energy diplomacy, its rising carbon emissions, and China’s emergence as a global leader in clean energy technology development. The scale of China’s energy expansion is quite breathtaking. For example, in the decade to 2010, the increase in China’s energy consumption added the equivalent of two Latin Americas to global energy demand.1 China is now the world’s largest energy consumer exceeding U.S. energy consumption which had led the world for over half a century. China’s oil consumption doubled in the decade of the 1990s and doubled again in the decade to 2010, making it the second largest oil consumer and importer after the U.S. In 2000, China represented only 6% of global oil demand but it has accounted for nearly one-half of global oil demand growth over this past decade and is now the largest vehicle market by annual sales. It is by far the largest coal-based economy, in 2009 consuming three times as much coal annually as the U.S., the second largest coal user. The increase in China’s coal consumption over just the past five years added the equivalent of another U.S. to world coal demand. Not surprisingly China recently surpassed the U.S. as the largest greenhouse gas emitter. On a more positive note, China also is now by far the leader in investment in clean energy and renewables, in 2010 accounting for roughly one-half of global investment in clean energy.2 Hence, China is on a trajectory to potentially reshape the global energy and oil landscape in the same way its broader “peaceful development” seems likely to transform the global economic and strategic landscape. This growing energy importance is a product of the convergence of the scale of its expanding impact on global energy markets with its broader economic and political rise. Growing dependence on imported energy and Beijing’s efforts to secure those supplies and transportation routes to deliver them are accelerating China’s international political and economic engagement and influence and, at the same time, are reshaping Beijing’s vital global economic and energy interests. The last time this happened was in the early postwar period when the rise of American oil demand and import dependence converged with America’s growing strategic power to thrust the U.S to the forefront of global energy markets and geopolitics. ¶ China’s “energy rise” poses similar dilemmas for the U.S. and the established Western-dominated energy institutions and market structures as its broader economic rise poses for global strategic and economic relations. In energy terms, will China emerge as a status quo or as a “revisionist” power? And what does this mean for long-term U.S. energy security and global energy interests? The U.S. has been the superpower of global energy just as it has been in strategic and economic affairs. The U.S. consumes nearly one-quarter of daily world oil production, is the third largest oil producer, the largest electricity and total vehicle market. The U.S. is home to many of the largest, most powerful and sophisticated global oil companies. The U.S. has been the dominant strategic power in the key petroleum exporting regions, most importantly, the Persian Gulf and the U.S. Navy and military dominate the sea lanes and airspace that are vital to global oil production and transportation. The current structure of global energy institutions and energy security arrangements have been established under the U.S.-led post-war liberal order and energy “Pax Americana”.¶ ¶ China’s growing global energy clout will evolve in the context of these existing global oil and energy market structures, institutions of multilateral energy cooperation, and U.S. strategic power created under U.S. leadership over the past 50 years. So the question is will China use its growing market power and diplomatic influence to support the existing open and flexible global oil and energy market arrangements, support western efforts to stabilize key exporting regions, and join in multilateral energy governance institutions like the IEA established under U.S. leadership? Or will it continue along its “go-it-alone” path of seeking privileged access to energy supplies through close collaboration with its national oil companies (NOCs), bilateral rather than multilateral energy and financial diplomacy, and a politicized approach to securing oil supplies? In short, will Beijing’s energy path be through markets or mercantilism?¶ ¶ Broadly speaking, energy decisions made in Beijing will be influential along five important dimensions of the global energy outlook. First, China has replaced the U.S. as the engine of global oil demand growth and, therefore, Beijing’s decisions on future oil use, vehicle efficiency, the growth of its mushrooming vehicle industry, and managing its growing oil import dependence are now deeply consequential for world oil prices and the energy security of the U.S. and other major oil importing countries. Second, Beijing’s strong instinct for a statist and political approach to ensuring its energy security and oil import needs through national ownership of “equity oil” and promotion of its national oil companies (NOCs) is strongly at odds with the west’s focus since the oil shocks of the 1970s on increased oil investment globally and a more flexible and integrated global oil market as the basis for energy security rather than a national competition to control supplies. Third, China’s global energy geopolitical footprint and potential influence is expanding with its large petroleum investments, long-term supply deals and huge state bank loans, and active energy and pipeline diplomacy. China has become or is likely to become a key diplomatic player in most major oil and gas exporting regions of the world. How will China use its growing capability to influence developments in these critical regions? Fourth, China has become a central player in carbon emissions and global climate negotiations. Beijing’s choices on its future coal use, on finding a successor to the Kyoto Protocol or instead to pursue a strictly national approach to carbon and climate is central to future climate change outcomes. Finally, China has emerged as the global leader in future renewable energy technologies through its huge investments and development incentives. Beijing’s decisions on cooperation in developing these industries, control of those technologies, and their potential role as a new “strategic industry” will have important renewable energy trade and technology implications.¶ U.S. Energy Primacy is Coming to an End ¶ As the dominant oil market driving force, rule-maker, institution-builder, strategic power, and technology leader in global energy, the U.S. has major stakes along all these dimensions of rising Chinese energy power and influence. As noted energy expert John Mitchell has written, “For every issue on the energy geopolitical agenda, there is at least one telephone line to Washington.” However, China’s growing role in global energy affairs, particularly oil markets and governance, means that the U.S. will no longer be the unipolar energy power.¶ ¶

The impact is US Sino war and South China Sea conflict 
CWCP, 11 [Center for World Conflict and Peace (CWCP) is an independent, non-partisan think tank. It was formed in January 2011 by Dr. Brad Nelson and Dr. Yohanes Sulaiman. Brad and Yohanes are experts on international politics, security, and policymaking. For more information about CWCP, please see the blog post "CWCP Contributors" (Feb., 9, 2011). “Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist Power?”, http://centerforworldconflictandpeace.blogspot.com/2011/11/is-china-status-quo-or-revisionist.html]

There are two rough ways to look at this topic. On the one hand, it's very possible that current economic relations and international and regional institutions lock China into certain patterns of behavior, making it way too costly for China to push for significant change to the regional or international orders. For instance, upsetting the status quo, and as a consequence disturbing ties with the West, carries great cost for China. At a minimum, China would find itself strategically encircled by a coalition of countries seeking to contain it. We could see a broken, unstable world economy, causing economic chaos in China. Which in turn might lead to internal political and social instability and perhaps even conflict and violence. Keep in mind that China has risen in power, worked its economic magic, by working through the international system. And China knows this. It can continue its rise, in way that's not too threatening or disruptive, if it remains committed to the world order that's currently in place. This is a rather rosy picture of China. On the other hand, we can view China's rise through a different, more ominous prism. As China grows in power, it could very well want to alter the regional and world orders in ways that allow China to accrue power, satisfy its security needs, and promote its values. The history of the rise of great powers offers numerous examples of this. In prior centuries, this type of behavior took the form of land grabs, large empires, and overseas colonies. Not anymore. Today, China won't seek to control others (people, groups, institutions, and countries), but instead will try to exercise its influence over them. And it's going to use all means of influence--that is, the instruments of pressure and coercion and inducements at its disposal--to sustain, strengthen, and enlarge its economic ties, which is what China cares most about. What's the evidence? For most of the last decade, Chinese officials have stated that their country is experiencing a "peaceful rise." Clearly, this slogan was crafted and disseminated to calm any fears of a rising, potentially dominant, China. So yes, China is growing and expanding, in a host of different ways, they admit, but it poses no threat to others in the world, especially its neighbors. Beijing wants to convey that China has benign intentions, that it's not an expansionist, imperialist, acquisitive country. But when we move from words to actions, China's story becomes more complicated. China has made a concerted effort to strengthen its military. It has steadily increased its investment in almost all things military, with the aim of producing a better, more efficient, more sophisticated armed forces. At this point, China is unable to fight land wars in distant lands, and it might never be able to do so, but it is improving its power projection capabilities, especially its naval ones, in the region. Sure, this could be a function of China seeking to protect its vibrant, expanding economic interests. But it could also signal something more, that Beijing is pursuing a more confrontational and truculent foreign policy. After all, much to the dismay of its neighbors, energy-hungry China has been assertive, even aggressive, in pursuing its territorial and waterway interests in the South China Sea. It has engaged in rather senseless diplomatic tussles with Japan, including several incidents involving Chinese fishing boats. Furthermore, China has beefed up its military muscle directed at Taiwan, using it as a deterrent mechanism to prevent Taiwan from straying too far from China's orbit. All of these actions deeply worry Asian countries, especially those in Southeast Asia, who already fear being dominated by a powerful China. Chinese aggression just puts them even more on edge. Asian countries view these actions as markers foreshadowing further, perhaps even more dangerous, Chinese recklessness and belligerence. And remember, Chinese actions aren't viewed in isolation by outsiders. Rather, they're added to the litany of nettlesome behavior that China has exhibited over the last few decades. This is particularly true for the West. Indeed, the West continually complains about China's currency, its violations of intellectual property rights, its support for dictators and human rights abusers across the world, its reluctance to deal with nuclear proliferation, its obstructionism in the United Nations, among many other things. In light of all this, former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called for China to become an "international stakeholder," a country able and willing to provide a sense of stability and order to world politics. On economic matters, China enjoys its position and status in the world economy. It likes its role in regional and international institutions, its place in the G-20, its leverage over the U.S., European, and Asian economies, and the general sense of respect that comes with being the second largest economy in the world. But China isn't completely satisfied on this front. Chinese officials shudder at the thought of continuing to interact in a world economy that's primarily dominated by America. Beijing wants a much larger voice in the making and meaning of the rules that govern world trade and finance and related economic issues. Indeed, I recently came across a very revealing quote that sheds light on this point: ¶ Using some of his toughest language yet against China, Obama, a day after face-to-face talks with President Hu Jintao, demanded that China stop "gaming" the international system and create a level playing field for U.S. and other foreign businesses.  "We're going to continue to be firm that China operate by the same rules as everyone else," Obama told reporters after hosting the 21-nation APEC summit in his native Honolulu. "We don't want them taking advantage of the United States."  China shot back that it refused to abide by international economic rules that it had no part in writing.  "First we have to know whose rules we are talking about," Pang Sen, a deputy director-general at China's Foreign Ministry said. "If the rules are made collectively through agreement and China is a part of it, then China will abide by them. If rules are decided by one or even several countries, China does not have the obligation to abide by that."¶ Right now, we're in the very early stages of China's rise to dominance, as a peer competitor to the U.S., so it's hard to make definitive conclusions about what Beijing wants and the direction it will ultimately go. And let's not forget that we will soon see a changing of the guard in Beijing, as the current generation steps out of power, and will probably also see some jockeying for power between military and civilian leaders as the new political elites try to consolidate their grip over the Chinese state. These events will certainly impact the choices that China makes in the future. But so far it's clear that Beijing has a preference for change to the status quo. Full-scale change or minor tinkering? It's up for debate. Let's take the above quote as an example. It indicates a reluctance to play by the established rules--rules that were created by the West, mind you--but at the same time a willingness to work with others to achieve an economic order that's consensual, flexible, and open to greater participation from more countries. China isn't pushing unilateral change or advocating coercive measures to get what it wants economically. But what does China see as the end result from such change? Perhaps something much different that what we have today? Or maybe a world economy that looks and operates about the same as it does now, just with a greater role for China. If China only seeks minor changes, then maybe the West can make adjustments to the world order and give China a greater place at the table and more voice opportunities. Perhaps any changes to the status quo can be negotiated over time. In this way, China can fully integrate itself into the existing world order, leaving the existing rules and institutions and patterns of behavior mostly intact. But if China envisages major economic changes, then it will place itself on a collision course with America. The U.S. will not easily forgo the rules and institutions from which it has so enormously benefited the past 60 years. Additionally, any U.S. presidential administration will have difficulty selling the idea of giving China a major say in rewriting the economic rules of the road. U.S. citizens already fear that China is gradually undermining American sovereignty, economic performance, and overall quality of life. Granting China its day in the sun, at least at the moment, would likely be seen by Americans as capitulating to an economic threat. But even more than that, the U.S. will likely find making room for China, or any other country for that matter, at the great power table very problematic, given the centrality of "American exceptionalism" to the narrative of U.S. history. In short, America's values, politics, economics, institutions, schools of higher learning, and so on, are the best on Earth. America is a "shining city upon a hill." As such, U.S. stands as an example to other countries, pointing out to them how they should look and function. Moreover, logic dictates that the U.S. ought to take an active place in the world, serving as a steward to guide and steer the world in a proper and just direction. Now, how can Americans reconcile these ideas, which many take as self-evident, with the prospect of permitting China to make major changes to the current economic order. Not easy, right? If one believes in American exceptionalism, then there is no other country qualified to run the show; it's America's mission, alone, ordained by a higher power, to carry out. I suspect a faction of Americans--both ordinary citizens and Congresspersons--would argue that ceding power to China is treasonous and probably push for impeachment. In looking at military and security affairs, there are two keys, in my opinion. First, will economic troubles cause the U.S. to retrench from Asia? For now, of course, that's not going to happen. But over the long-term? Who knows? If it happens, though, it would make life easier for China. It could spread its wings in the region as it pleases without the threat of significant resistance. Second, will China aim to squeeze the U.S. out of Asia? If it does, we will see nasty consequences for the region. There will likely be an escalation of tensions and hostilities, as well as a sharp increase in the likelihood of conflict, between China and the U.S. The region will splinter, with countries taking sides and some eventually getting dragged into the mess. And the fallout likely won't be confined to security issues, as conflicts involving the first and second largest economies is sure to destabilize the entire world economy.

SCS conflict escalates
Rudd 2013 – Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, former PM (1/30, Kevin, Foreign Policy, “A Maritime Balkans of the 21st Century?”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/30/a_maritime_balkans_of_the_21st_century_east_asia)

These are no ordinary times in East Asia. With tensions rising from conflicting territorial claims in the East China and South China seas, the region increasingly resembles a 21st-century maritime redux of the Balkans a century ago -- a tinderbox on water. Nationalist sentiment is surging across the region, reducing the domestic political space for less confrontational approaches. Relations between China and Japan have now fallen to their lowest ebb since diplomatic normalization in 1972, significantly reducing bilateral trade and investment volumes and causing regional governments to monitor developments with growing alarm. Relations between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, have also deteriorated significantly, while key regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have become increasingly polarized. In security terms, the region is more brittle than at any time since the fall of Saigon in 1975.¶ In Beijing, current problems with Tokyo, Hanoi, and Manila are top of mind. They dominate both the official media and the social media, and the latter have become particularly vitriolic. They also dominate discussions between Chinese officials and foreign visitors. The relationship with Japan in particular is front and center in virtually every official conversation as Chinese interlocutors probe what they identify as a profound change in both the tenor of Japanese domestic politics and the centrality of China within the Japanese debate. Beijing does not desire armed conflict with Japan over territorial disputes, but nonetheless makes clear that it has its own red lines that cannot be crossed for its own domestic reasons, and that it is prepared for any contingency.¶ Like the Balkans a century ago, riven by overlapping alliances, loyalties, and hatreds, the strategic environment in East Asia is complex. At least six states or political entities are engaged in territorial disputes with China, three of which are close strategic partners of the United States. And there are multiple agencies involved from individual states: In China, for example, the International Crisis Group has calculated that eight different agencies are engaged in the South China Sea alone. Furthermore, these territorial claims -- and the minerals, energy, and marine resources at stake -- are vast. And while the United States remains mostly neutral, the intersection between the narrower interests of claimant states and the broader strategic competition between the United States and China is significant and not automatically containable.¶ Complicating matters, East Asia increasingly finds itself being pulled in radically different directions. On the one hand, the forces of globalization are bringing its peoples, economies, and countries closer together than at any other time in history, as reflected in intraregional trade, which is now approaching 60 percent of total East Asian trade. On the other hand, the forces of primitive, almost atavistic nationalisms are at the same time threatening to pull the region apart. As a result, the idea of armed conflict, which seems contrary to every element of rational self-interest for any nation-state enjoying the benefits of such unprecedented regional economic dynamism, has now become a terrifying, almost normal part of the regional conversation, driven by recent territorial disputes, but animated by deep-rooted cultural and historical resentments. Contemporary East Asia is a tale of these two very different worlds.¶ The most worrying fault lines run between China and Japan, and between China and Vietnam. In September 2012, the Japanese government purchased from a private owner three islands in the Senkakus, a small chain of islands claimed by both countries (the Chinese call the islands the Diaoyu). This caused China to conclude that Japan, which had exercised de facto administrative control over the islands for most of the last century, was now moving toward a more de jure exercise of sovereignty. In response, Beijing launched a series of what it called "combination punches": economic retaliation, the dispatch of Chinese maritime patrol vessels to the disputed areas, joint combat drills among the branches of its military, and widespread, occasionally violent public protests against Japanese diplomatic and commercial targets across China. As a result, Japanese exports to China contracted rapidly in the fourth quarter of 2012, and because Japan had already become China's largest trading partner, sliding exports alone are likely to be a significant contributive factor in what is projected to be a large contraction in overall Japanese economic growth in the same period.¶ In mid-December, Japan claimed that Chinese aircraft intruded over Japanese airspace above the disputed islands for the first time since 1958. After a subsequent incident, Japan dispatched eight F-15 fighter planes to the islands. While both sides have avoided deploying naval assets, there is a growing concern of creeping militarization as military capabilities are transferred to coast guard-type vessels.¶ While the "static" in Japanese military circles regarding China-related contingency planning has become increasingly audible, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took office in mid-December, has sought to moderate his public language on China, apparently to send a diplomatic message that he wishes to restore stability to the relationship. This was reinforced by a conciliatory letter sent from Abe to Xi Jinping, China's new leader, on Jan. 25 during a visit to Beijing by the leader of New Komeito, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's coalition partner. This has been publicly and privately welcomed in Beijing, as reflected in Xi's public remarks the following day. Beijing's position is that while it wants Japan to formally recognize the existence of a territorial dispute in order to fortify China's political and legal position on the future of the islands, it also wishes to see the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute managed in a manner that does not threaten regional security, which would undermine the stability necessary to complete its core task of economic reform and growth.¶ There may therefore be some softening in the China-Japan relationship for the immediate period ahead. But diplomatic and strategic realities appear to remain largely unchanged. The intensity of Abe and Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida's unprecedented mid-January diplomatic offensive involving visits to seven East Asian states demonstrates that the temperature between Beijing and Tokyo remains high -- just as the late January statement from Tokyo on the establishment of a special Japanese Coast Guard force of 12 enhanced vessels and 600 servicemen specifically dedicated to the Senkaku theater underlines the nature of the challenges lying ahead. The problem is that neither side can afford domestically to be seen as retreating from current positions. China believes that Japan has altered the status quo; Japan believes it has no need to budge because there is no sovereignty issue in the first place. All of this means that both sides remain captive to events on the high seas and in the air -- events that could quickly spiral out of control.¶ To prevent this from happening, both sides will obviously need to maintain their public political positions for domestic reasons, while both will need gradually and reciprocally to de-escalate the deployment of maritime and air assets. This would need to be done according to a schedule negotiated by an intermediary or though their own back channels. If such back-channel negotiations are not already under way (and there is some evidence they may be), then it's in the interests of both sides to get the ball rolling. Japan should not install any equipment or station any personnel on the islands, as has been discussed from time to time in Tokyo, as this would inevitably result in further retaliatory action from Beijing, with every prospect of generating a further crisis. If these steps could be taken and the situation then stabilized, perhaps longer-term consideration could be given to inviting an appropriate international environmental agency to exercise environmental management responsibilities on and around the islands, where, by informal agreement, national vessels would not go.¶ By contrast, territorial claims in the South China Sea are even more complex. According to U.S. agencies, Chinese officials have claimed that the sea contains proven oil reserves as high as 213 billion barrels (10 times U.S. reserves, though American scientists are more skeptical) and 25 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves (roughly the total proven reserves of Qatar). The South China Sea also accounts for some 10 percent of the world's annual fisheries catch. The region is already the scene of deeply disputed exploratory activities for deep-sea energy resources. Fisheries are also already the subject of multiple physical confrontations between vessels. Furthermore, unlike the Senkaku/Diaoyu, many islands in the South China Sea are already occupied, garrisoned, and home to naval bases.¶ Six states plus Taiwan have disputed territorial claims in the area, though the largest overlap by far is between China and Vietnam. The two states have already skirmished over their conflicting claims, in 1974 and 1988; they also fought a major border war in 1979. One senior Vietnamese neatly described the Sino-Vietnamese relationship in May 2011 by saying, "The two countries are old friends and old enemies." It is also clear that the Chinese today possess considerable economic leverage over Vietnam, to the extent that one senior Vietnamese official candidly remarked recently that China could simply wreck the Vietnamese economy if it so chose. It would be wrong, however, given ancient resentments, that economic dependency would automatically constrain Vietnamese diplomatic or even military action in relation to the South China Sea.¶ The China-Vietnam relationship has soured since Chinese ships severed the seismic cables of Vietnamese exploratory vessels in May 2011 and again in December 2012. According to Reuters, Vietnam subsequently stated that as of January 2013 it would deploy civilian vessels supported by marine police to stop foreign vessels from violating its waters, while India, Vietnam's partner in some of the explorations, indicated it would consider sending naval vessels to the South China Sea to protect its interests. Meanwhile, China's Hainan province announced that starting in 2013, provincial maritime surveillance vessels would begin intercepting, searching, and repelling foreign vessels violating Chinese territorial seas, including the disputed territory. These various statements concerning new and radically conflicting procedures for the interception of foreign vessels set the stage for significant confrontation in the year ahead. Vietnam and China appear to have set themselves on a collision course, and those who monitor this relationship closely fear a repeat of those earlier armed conflicts.¶ To prevent further escalation, Beijing and Hanoi need now to step back from the edge. They should agree to prioritize development of, and agreement on, the long-awaited code of conduct between ASEAN and China on the South China Sea, including the joint development of energy projects. Both governments should identify a single project in an area where both sides claim sovereignty and begin the practical negotiation of a joint development regime. If this is too difficult, then both sides could consider the development of a joint fisheries project in a single defined area, as this would further sidestep sensitive sovereignty issues more acutely connected with resource extraction regimes. In other words, rather than wait for the conclusion of a complex diplomatic negotiation over the final text of the code of conduct, start to build trust by cooperating on a real project. If this approach succeeds with China and Vietnam, similar joint development projects could be developed with the other claimant states.¶ None of this might work. Nationalism might prevail. Policymakers could simply allow events to run their course, like they did a century ago. In his recent book, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, historian Christopher Clark recounts how the petty nationalisms of the Balkans combusted with the great-power politics and failed statesmanship of the time to produce the industrial-scale carnage of World War I. This was a time when economic globalization was even deeper than it is today, and when the governments of Europe, right up until 1914, had concluded that a pan-European war was irrational and, therefore, impossible. I believe a pan-Asian war is extremely unlikely. Nonetheless, for those of us who live in this region, facing escalating confrontations in the East China and South China seas, Europe is a cautionary tale very much worthy of reflection.

So does bilateral instability
Glaser, 11 — Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University (Charles, “Will China's Rise Lead to War?: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011, lexis)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN?  THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

The plan blunts the escalation of energy aggression—allows engagement and prevents oil competition—setting a model through reserves instead of source control checks competition
Victor, 08 [In the Tank¶ Making the Most of Strategic Oil Reserves¶ David G. Victor and Sarah Eskreis-Winkler, Foreign Affairs, http://irps.ucsd.edu/dgvictor/publications/Faculty_Victor_Article_2008_In%20The%20Tank_Foreign%20Affairs.pdf] 

It’s a small world¶ The better ¶ management of oil reserves in the United States could¶ help with reserves worldwide by allowing Washington to lead by example and exert more leverage with other IEA members. For starters,¶ new standards are needed to better reflect the realities of the oil trade¶ today. The ¶ iea¶ rule requiring that members hold reserves to cover 90¶ days of imports is arbitrary and ineªective: with domestic markets¶ integrated into global ones, the exact volume of a country’s oil imports¶ is unimportant. All ¶ iea¶ members should instead be required to hold¶ reserves in proportion to the amount of oil they consume, and the ¶ iea¶ should develop metrics that could be used to adjust members’ reserve¶ requirements according to their exposure to interruptions in supply¶ and delivery. That approach, rather than a focus on the sheer volume¶ of imports, would give countries incentives to invest in securing¶ their supply networks—in the case of the United States, for exam-¶ ple, the oil platforms and ports along the Gulf of Mexico. The ¶ iea¶ should also assess its members’ compliance based on their reserve¶ management. Reserves that are overseen by independent professional¶ authorities and are fully integrated into the ¶ iea’s¶ reserve-coordination¶ system—such as would be the case under the Oil Reserve Board—¶ would be deemed most reliable because the ¶ iea¶ could count on their¶ being more readily available in times of need than those managed¶ by opaque and unpredictable processes or institutions vulnerable to¶ political interference.¶ The ¶ iea¶ should also encourage countries to count the stocks they¶ hold outside their territories as part of the fulfillment of their reserve¶ obligations. This approach would encourage Japan and South Korea,¶ for example, to satisfy their reserve requirements by holding strategic¶ stocks anywhere along the supply chain, from the Persian Gulf to their¶ own shores, at a fraction of current costs. ( Japan currently relies heavily¶ on steel tanks on high-value property at home to store its reserves.)¶ This approach would also make for a more constructive interaction¶ between producers and consumers: it would encourage producers to¶ keep their oil stocks in large importing countries, which would mean¶ more reliable deliveries and so be good for consumers, too. South¶ Korea already counts as part of its strategic reserves oil stored for it¶ by Norway’s StatoilHydro, and Saudi Arabia is exploring a similar¶ option with Chinese and Indian companies.¶ Oversight of the strategic-oil-management procedures of the ¶ iea¶ ’s¶ members could be added to the agency’s existing reviews of national¶ In the Tank¶ foreign affairs¶ .¶ July /August 2008¶ [¶ 81¶ ]¶ energy policies. The ¶ iea¶ ’s review teams should grade each country’s¶ strategic-oil-reserve system according to the credibility, transparency,¶ and independence of its management. Such an approach on the part¶ of the ¶ iea¶ would make it easier for states to integrate their choices¶ about strategic oil reserves with other aspects of their energy policies.¶ For example, a country that could reliably reduce its demand for¶ oil in a cr¶ isis—by either using other fuels or relaxing environmental¶ standards temporarily to allow for the use of high-sulfur crude—¶ would not be required to hold as large a stockpile as one that could¶ not. With such a system in place, the international management of oil¶ stocks would in time come to be less dominated by energy ministries¶ and more by the type of coordination exercised by central bankers and¶ financial-market regulators.¶ shock absorbers¶ Much of ¶ U.S. energy policy to date has focused on measures that¶ poll well but do not have much impact on real security, such as expand-¶ ing mandates for the production of corn-based ethanol (a very costly¶ way to save oil and one that wreaks ecological havoc). Many elements¶ of a sensible energy policy, such as increasing energy e⁄ciency and¶ boosting investment in research and development, are well known.¶ But others, including a better management system for the SPR¶ , have¶ largely been ignored.¶ This is unfortunate because in addition to increasing U.S. energy¶ security, the better management of the country’s oil reserves would¶ create a tremendous opportunity to engage the rising powers of China and India. Both countries have recently become major oil consumers,¶ but, unsure how best to manage their growing needs, they have tried¶ to promote their energy security by seeking direct access to supplies¶ overseas—a practice that has bred instability in already fragile countries¶ and undercut patient efforts by the West to promote good governance¶ there. They have also started building oil reserves (China is filling a¶ cache with 100 million barrels) but have not signaled how they will¶ manage them. A first step toward helping these countries understand¶ that energy security comes above all from well-functioning markets¶ is to enlist them in the ¶ iea¶ and reform the agency’s standards so that¶ David G. Victor and Sarah Eskreis-Winkler¶ [¶ 82¶ ]¶ foreign affairs¶ .¶ Volume ¶ 87¶ No. 4¶ it prizes good and independent management. A better-run and better-¶ coordinated ¶ international system of oil caches (including greater¶ reserves of their own) could help convince China and India that treating¶ oil as a true commodity and trusting the markets more are better ways¶ to improve their energy security than pursuing oil mercantilism¶ 

Mis-attribution and short decision time scales mean it goes nuclear
ANI 12 – quoting a study by John W. Lewis and Xue Litai of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (9/16, Asian News International, “Why China's nuclear weapons strategy could rapidly escalate conventional weapons strike to nuclear,” The Washington Sun, https://www.google.com/search?q=ANI+News&oq=ANI+News&sugexp=chrome,mod=11&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8)Red

Washington, Sep 16 (ANI): An expert assessment of China's nuclear weapons strategy has highlighted the risk of escalation to nuclear war from a conflict beginning with conventional weapons, due to the unusual structure of the nation's military. According to a new study by John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), China's unique deployment of modern conventional ballistic missiles had a decisive effect on its war plan. The study appears as the latest edition of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which is believed to be the first comprehensive non-governmental research on how China's nuclear-war plan was developed. The article notes that Beijing's nuclear missiles exist to deter a nuclear strike on China, and are only to be used in extreme conditions. At the same time, the conventional weapons on the formerly all-nuclear bases must be ready to strike first and hard. Targeted enemies and their allies will not immediately be able to distinguish whether any missiles fired are conventional or nuclear, the study said. "The basic dilemma for the war planners stems from the deployment of the two types of missiles on the same Second Artillery bases with fundamentally different capabilities and purposes," Lewis and Xue said. This means that those enemies may justifiably launch on warning and retaliate against all the command-and-control systems and missile assets of the Chinese missile launch base and even the overall command-and-control system of the central Second Artillery headquarters, the study cited. "That disastrous outcome would force the much smaller surviving and highly vulnerable Chinese nuclear missile units to fire their remaining missiles against the enemy's homeland. Escalation to nuclear war could become accelerated and unavoidable," they warned.

2ac

US key
US recovery is key to the global economy.
Caploe 9 (David Caploe is CEO of the Singapore-incorporated American Centre for Applied Liberal Arts and Humanities in Asia., “Focus still on America to lead global recovery”, April 7, The Strait Times, lexis)

IN THE aftermath of the G-20 summit, most observers seem to have missed perhaps the most crucial statement of the entire event, made by United States President Barack Obama at his pre-conference meeting with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown: 'The world has become accustomed to the US being a voracious consumer market, the engine that drives a lot of economic growth worldwide,' he said. 'If there is going to be renewed growth, it just can't be the US as the engine.'  While superficially sensible, this view is deeply problematic. To begin with, it ignores the fact that the global economy has in fact been 'America-centred' for more than 60 years. Countries - China, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and so on - either sell to the US or they sell to countries that sell to the US.  This system has generally been advantageous for all concerned. America gained certain historically unprecedented benefits, but the system also enabled participating countries - first in Western Europe and Japan, and later, many in the Third World - to achieve undreamt-of prosperity.  At the same time, this deep inter-connection between the US and the rest of the world also explains how the collapse of a relatively small sector of the US economy - 'sub-prime' housing, logarithmically exponentialised by Wall Street's ingenious chicanery - has cascaded into the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression.  To put it simply, Mr Obama doesn't seem to understand that there is no other engine for the world economy - and hasn't been for the last six decades. If the US does not drive global economic growth, growth is not going to happen. Thus, US policies to deal with the current crisis are critical not just domestically, but also to the entire world. Consequently, it is a matter of global concern that the Obama administration seems to be following Japan's 'model' from the 1990s: allowing major banks to avoid declaring massive losses openly and transparently, and so perpetuating 'zombie' banks - technically alive but in reality dead.  As analysts like Nobel laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman have pointed out, the administration's unwillingness to confront US banks is the main reason why they are continuing their increasingly inexplicable credit freeze, thus ravaging the American and global economies. Team Obama seems reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which its policies at home are failing not just there but around the world as well.  Which raises the question: If the US can't or won't or doesn't want to be the global economic engine, which country will?  The obvious answer is China. But that is unrealistic for three reasons.  First, China's economic health is more tied to America's than practically any other country in the world. Indeed, the reason China has so many dollars to invest everywhere - whether in US Treasury bonds or in Africa - is precisely that it has structured its own economy to complement America's. The only way China can serve as the engine of the global economy is if the US starts pulling it first.  Second, the US-centred system began at a time when its domestic demand far outstripped that of the rest of the world. The fundamental source of its economic power is its ability to act as the global consumer of last resort.  China, however, is a poor country, with low per capita income, even though it will soon pass Japan as the world's second largest economy. There are real possibilities for growth in China's domestic demand. But given its structure as an export-oriented economy, it is doubtful if even a successful Chinese stimulus plan can pull the rest of the world along unless and until China can start selling again to the US on a massive scale.  Finally, the key 'system' issue for China - or for the European Union - in thinking about becoming the engine of the world economy - is monetary: What are the implications of having your domestic currency become the global reserve currency?  This is an extremely complex issue that the US has struggled with, not always successfully, from 1959 to the present. Without going into detail, it can safely be said that though having the US dollar as the world's medium of exchange has given the US some tremendous advantages, it has also created huge problems, both for America and the global economic system.  The Chinese leadership is certainly familiar with this history. It will try to avoid the yuan becoming an international medium of exchange until it feels much more confident in its ability to handle the manifold currency problems that the US has grappled with for decades.  Given all this, the US will remain the engine of global economic recovery for the foreseeable future, even though other countries must certainly help. This crisis began in the US - and it is going to have to be solved there too.

AT: T Incentive

We meet – the plan brings financial incentives into existence 
Bingaman, 09 [COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico,  Chairman STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION, RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON S. 967, THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2009, AND S. 283, A BILL TO AMEND THE ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT TO MODIFY THE CONDI- TIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF PRODUCTS FROM THE NORTHEAST HOME HEATING OIL RESERVE ACCOUNT, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg50874/pdf/CHRG-111shrg50874.pdf] 
Answer. Yes, the incentives for the government to sell oil are   different from and complement the incentives that motivate the private   sector. As with most energy programs in a free market economy, the   government has a role to play when private markets fail, or the   consequences of balancing supply and demand by price changes are   unacceptable for reasons such as economic stability. Petroleum is a   special case in that efficient free markets are the general rule on a   day-to-day basis but with fairly frequent instances of cartel   interventions, wars, and Acts of God disrupting supply. While the   private sector builds inventories and systems redundancies to take   advantage of statistically predictable disruptions, the financial   incentives are just not there to guard against disruptions caused by   random events such as the hurricanes that disrupted supplies in 2005   and 2008. Therefore, while it is generally preferable to allow profit   incentive to drive private enterprise to supply markets, there is a   role for government stockpiling. The government's incentive to use its   stocks would obviously be to protect the welfare of people. In   addition, but less obvious, the government wants to protect the free   market system which would be highly criticized if it cannot supply   essential products such as heating oil and transportation fuels, and   which would become vulnerable to oppressive and inefficient regulation   in the event it should fail to supply essential fuels at reasonable   prices. Preservation of the market approach for supplying and balancing   demand is well worth the modest cost of insuring against unlikely but   potentially devastating disruptions.
 
“Contract” means the acquisition of SPR petroleum 
Federal Register, 2006 [24 April 2006   Eyeballing the Strategic Petroleum Reserve: http://cryptome.org/spr/spr-eyeball.htm   DoE Environmental Report:   Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Increase in the Facility Capacity and Petroleum Inventory at the Strategic Petroleum Reserve's Bryan Mound Storage Facility, Texas   Federal Register: April 24, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 78)]  [Proposed Rules]   [Page 20909-20915]  From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]  [DOCID:fr24ap06-13] DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  10 CFR Part 626  RIN 1901-AB16    Procedures for the Acquisition of Petroleum for the Strategic   Petroleum Reserve  AGENCY: Office of Petroleum Reserves, Department of Energy.  ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking, http://cryptome.org/doe042406.htm] 
Contract means the agreement under which DOE acquires SPR  petroleum, consisting of the solicitation, the contract form signed by  both parties, the successful offer, and any subsequent modifications,  including those granting requests for deferrals.

US Code proves that’s included 
US Code 3 Legal Information Institute, “41 USC § 131 – Acquisition”, November 24, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/41/131?quicktabs_8=1#quicktabs-8
In division B, the term “acquisition”— (1) means the process of acquiring, with appropriated amounts, by contract for purchase or lease,  provor services (including construction) that support the missions and goals of an executive agency, from the point at which the requirements of the executive agency are established in consultation with the chief acquisition officer of the executive agency; and (2) includes— (A) the process of acquiring property or services that are already in existence, or that must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated; (B) the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs; (C) solicitation and selection of sources; (D) award of contracts; (E) contract performance; (F) contract financing; (G) management and measurement of contract performance through final delivery and payment; and (H) technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency requirements by contract.
At worst the plan is a restriction
Andrews and Pirog, 12 [The Strategic Petroleum Reserve:  Authorization, Operation, and  Drawdown Policy  Anthony Andrews  Specialist in Energy and Defense Policy  Robert Pirog  Specialist in Energy Economics  June 18, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42460.pdf] 
The Department of Energy (DOE) manages the SPR, which is comprised of 62 underground  storage caverns that were solution-mined from naturally occurring salt domes located at four sites  in Texas and Louisiana. The 2005 Energy Policy Act directed SPR expansion to its authorized  capacity of 1 billion barrels, but the SPR’s physical expansion has not proceeded beyond 727  million barrels. The SPR’s maximum drawdown capability is 4.4 million barrels per day, based on  the capacity of the pipelines and marine terminals that serve it. Legislation restricts SPR sales to  no more than 30 million barrels over a 60-day period for anything less than a severe energy  supply interruption.

Counter interp – incentives induce behaviors includes the aff 
Webb 93 – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online) 
In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.
Reasons to prefer 
PRECISION – DOE includes our AFF 
Waxman 98 – Solicitor General of the US (Seth, Brief for the United States in Opposition for the US Supreme Court case HARBERT/LUMMUS AGRIFUELS PROJECTS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1998/0responses/98-0697.resp.opp.pdf)
2  On November 15, 1986, Keefe was delegated “the authority, with respect to actions valued at $50 million or less, to approve, execute, enter into, modify, administer, closeout, terminate and take any other necessary and appropriate action (collectively, ‘Actions’) with respect to Financial Incentive awards.” Pet. App. 68, 111-112. Citing DOE Order No. 5700.5 (Jan. 12, 1981), the delegation defines “Financial Incentives” as the authorized financial incentive programs of DOE, “including direct loans, loan guarantees, purchase agreements, price supports, guaranteed market agreements and any others which may evolve.” The delegation proceeds to state, “[h]owever, a separate prior written approval of any such action must be given by or concurred in by Keefe to accompany the action.” The delegation also states that its exercise “shall be governed by the rules and regulations of [DOE] and policies and procedures prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate(s).” Pet. App. 111-113.

Specifically true in the context of OUR AFF – also takes out their DA links  
Cohen, 08 [Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/congress-should-not-tamper-with-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve] 
A Vital Fuel Reserve The SPR is a 700 million-barrel emergency store of oil maintained by the national government for a very rainy day: a war or a sudden interruption of the oil supply from one or more of the unstable countries-Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Persian Gulf states-from which the U.S. buys fuel. Established in the aftermath of the 1973-1974 oil embargo, the SPR gives the President a powerful response option should a disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the U.S. economy. It also allows the United States to meet part of its International Energy Agency obligation to maintain emergency oil stocks and provides a national defense fuel reserve. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Secretary of Energy to fill the SPR to its authorized billion-barrel capacity. As President George W. Bush has said, the U.S. is addicted to foreign oil-and the country has yet to cure itself of this condition: It imports 64 percent of the 20 million barrels per day that it consumes, and the habit is growing. Oil accounts for 40 percent of U.S. energy consumption, most of it for transportation. Unless and until the U.S. is no longer hooked on oil, having a reliable emergency stock is vital, especially in today's volatile world. Currently, the SPR is 27 million barrels short of its 727 million-barrel target, which would suffice for only 75 days of consumption. In his January 23, 2007, State of the Union Address, the President announced his decision to expand the SPR to 1.5 billion barrels "to further protect America against disruptions to our oil supply." The nation's need for an expanded SPR is based on (a) growing U.S. consumption, increased imports, and ever greater international risks and (b) U.S. obligations under the International Energy Program, which requires that the United States maintain a 90-day stockpile of petroleum imports. This is the minimum that a superpower should have for a global emergency. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is, first and foremost, a tool of national security policy. It was never intended that the SPR would be used to tamper with the market or to play politics, that its oil would be released in order to bring prices down, or that we would stop filling the SPR to accommodate either the market or short-term electoral interests in the campaign season. Risky Schemes Regrettably, those who are supposed to be in charge of this policy would like to appear to be "doing something" for the voters about the painful gas price issue. Thus, the Democrat-sponsored Consumer First Energy Act of 2008, Title III, Sec. 301, proposes that oil acquisition for the SPR be suspended. Beyond that, the Democrats are effectively suggesting that the President not resume filling the Reserve-possibly ever. The legislation's authors would like to tamper arbitrarily with the market price of oil, suggesting that the President may resume acquisition of oil for the SPR only if the weighted average oil price falls to less than $75 for three months. The Democrats even want to tamper with existing contracts by instructing the Secretary of Energy to "negotiate a deferral of the delivery of the oil for a period of not less than one year." Republicans, in the Domestic Energy Production Act of 2008, echo the same theme: They would like to suspend oil acquisition for the SPR for 180 days. Neither of these approaches will work, and both could be dangerous. Cutting supply to the SPR could jeopardize America's ability to respond to crises around the world, to fulfill its international obligations, and to protect the homeland and our allies. Negative Impact It is unlikely that the availability of the additional rather insignificant quantity of oil at issue-only 70,000 barrels a day-could make a serious dent in today's skyrocketing oil prices. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has already forecast that, at best, the price of oil might drop by $2 a barrel, cutting gasoline prices by 4-5 cents a gallon. Seventy-thousand barrels of oil is only one-20th of what drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) would produce and possibly only one-50th of what could be produced if exploration and drilling were allowed along the east and west U.S. continental shelves and in the Gulf of Mexico. Stopping SPR replenishment would be literally penny-wise and pound-foolish, as the result could be a shortage of fuel that denies the U.S. military operational freedom in a crisis. Moreover, congressional tampering with presidential authority to fill the SPR may be unconstitutional as it interferes with the executive branch's authority to conduct national security policy and defend the country.

AT: T Substantial
C/I – Substantial means a large amount
Dictionary.com 12
sub·stan·tial   [suhb-stan-shuhl]  Show IPA adjective 1. of ample or considerable amount, quantity, size, etc.: a substantial sum of money. 
Substantial is qualitative not quantitative  
H. Beau Baez 6, Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law, Seattle University Law Review Spring, 2006 29 Seattle Univ. L. R. 581 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit state actions that discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce as part of its Negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence. n83 A state's attempt to tax out-of-state companies may be seen as such a burden if, among other things, n84 the tax is applied to a company that does not have "substantial nexus" with the taxing state. n85 Expressly rejecting a facts-and-circumstances test, which would have weighed various factors, the Quill Court instead created a simple bright-line test measured by physical presence in a state. n86 The Quill Court held that the physical presence of a company in the taxing state satisfies the Commerce Clause substantial nexus test. n87 Unfortunately, lower courts have found some ambiguity in Quill, and have struggled to apply the bright-line to the facts of real cases. n88¶ Admittedly, part of the confusion lies in the name given to the legal requirement by the Quill Court: "substantial nexus." The word "substantial" connotes weighing of factors, yet the Court attached a bright-line test to the legal phrase "substantial nexus." Thus, we have a legal requirement that requires a company to have substantial nexus with a state before it can be subjected to a state's regulatory use tax authority, but [*596] that legal requirement is determined by a bright-line physical presence test.¶ This lack of clarity by the Court is not new. Before Quill, the Court referred to the "substantial nexus" n89 requirement alternatively as "sufficient nexus," n90 "sufficiently connected," n91 "requisite nexus," n92 "necessary basis," n93 "sufficient relation," n94 "necessary nexus," n95 "adequate nexus," n96 "obvious nexus," n97 "clear and sufficient nexus," n98 and Chief Justice Rehnquist's colorful phrase "nexus aplenty." n99 However, even after Quill -- the seminal nexus case of the last twenty-five years -- the Court has continued describing the "substantial nexus" requirement in different ways, such as "adequate nexus," n100 "sufficient nexus," n101 "Commerce Clause nexus," n102 "nexus aplenty" n103 (this phrase is apparently just too good for the Justices to let go), and, in one of its most recent state tax cases, "minimal connection." n104 These interchangeable phrases suggest that the phrase "substantial nexus" in Quill is the Court's shorthand for Commerce Clause nexus -- any substantive meaning of the phrase must be found in the case law and not in the phrase "substantial nexus" itself. n105¶ The Quill Court likewise lacks clarity when it describes the due process minimum contacts test: "due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an individual's connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the State's exercise of power over him." n106 It is curious that the Court describes the due process minimum contacts test as requiring substantial contacts; n107 a threshold that is easily met by most companies doing business across state lines. Since the Court spent so [*597] much time explaining that there are two separate nexus tests, it would be odd for the Court to then define them similarly.¶ Examining the legal definition of "substantial" provides some light as to what the Court meant by "substantial nexus" in Quill. Black's Law Dictionary defines "substantial" as "belonging to substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable." n108 This legal definition furnishes evidence that "substantial" is defined qualitatively, not quantitatively. Webster's Dictionary also lends support to the qualitative nature of the word by defining its primary meaning as "consisting of or relating to substance; not imaginary or illusory: real, true; important, essential," n109 while the notion of "substantial" as quantitative is relegated to a secondary meaning of the word. n110¶ Though the phrase "substantial nexus" is amorphous, Quill does attempt to provide guidance for Commerce Clause nexus by providing a test that examines qualitative contacts that do and do not create nexus (i.e., the bright-line physical presence test). Specifically, the Quill Court eliminates any room for quantitative nexus speculation because its bright-line test "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority." n111 A "substantial nexus" test that looks primarily at the quantity of contacts ignores both the bright-line test as well as the Court's explicit rejection of "tests with more contextual balancing inquiries." n112 The Court was aware that it could have established a facts-and-circumstances test (i.e., a test where the number of contacts is weighed); however, the Court refused to do so after extensive discussion of the topic. n113 A brightline test is "artificial at its edges . . . [however] this artificiality . . . is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule." n114 If a business has contacts that fall on one side of the state line they have nexus, while if their contacts are on the other side of the state line there is no nexus. This is a simple and clear rule that does not take into account factors like the number of contacts or the type of contact (e.g., solicitation, technical support, or training).¶ Given the history and context of the phrases used by the Court to describe Commerce Clause nexus, it is useless to try to discern any substantive meaning from the phrases "substantial nexus," "sufficient nexus," or "nexus aplenty" themselves. Should state tax jurisdiction debates be relegated to a tit-for-tat where those that want to avoid nexus [*598] use the phrase "substantial nexus" while those wanting to create nexus rely on the phrases "sufficient nexus" or "minimal contacts?" Only modern-day sophists n115 would seriously contend that such debate would be useful. n116 In the end it is case law that animates the concept of Commerce Clause nexus; out-of-context discussions on "substantial nexus" border on the frivolous and are shibboleths. The poet, admittedly taken out of context, nevertheless captures this debate best: And we are here as on a darkling plain Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, Where ignorant armies clash by night. n117
QER 
Links to politics
PCAST 10
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), Executive Office of the President, Co-Chaired by John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Eric Lander, President, Broad Institute of Harvard and MIT, Nov 2010, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON ACCELERATING THE PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH AN INTEGRATED FEDERAL ENERGY POLICY, www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-energy-tech-report.pdf
A QER process would, in some sense, formulate an integrated energy policy for the twenty­first century. It will span mission and vision definition, strategy, and tactics. The QER and the process leading to it would provide an effective tool for Administration­wide coherence on energy and for effective dialog with Congress on a coordinated legislative agenda. Presidential interest and engagement will be a necessary ingredient for success.
While the QER will be a product of the Administration, substantial input from the Congress, the energy industry, academia, state and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and consumers will be essential throughout the process. Transparency in the process of gathering input for the QER will be key to the development of a sound product that can gain wide support.

Delay 
Moniz 12 – Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(Ernest, “Stimulating Energy Technology Innovation”, Daedalus 141.2 (2012): 81–93, dml)
Given the magnitude of the task, PCAST recommended in 2011 that the DOE carry out a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR)–a first step centered in a single department and focused on technology. The QTR resulted in a rebalancing of the R&D portfolio toward the oil dependence challenge through advanced vehicle development, particularly transportation electrification. The key now will be to extend the processes developed for the QTR to the multiagency QER, involving the EOP in a leadership role. Taking the next steps in 2012 will maintain momentum and establish the capabilities needed for the QER by early 2015, the time frame recommended by PCAST. While some may view 2015 as a frustratingly long time away, the alternative is to rely on wishes rather than analysis while failing to gain multiple perspectives in a fair and open manner. Rushing the process will result in a poorly done job that will not accomplish any of the key QER goals. Certainly, it will not bring together succeeding administrations and Congresses around a reasonably shared vision and set of objectives that can accelerate innovation in service of national competitiveness and environmental and security goals. Continuing with fragmented and economically inefficient policies, technologies “du jour,” and frequent shifts will complicate private-sector decisions rather than facilitate innovation. The government unavoidably plays a strong role in the innovation process, even when this is unacknowledged in policy and political debates. The issue now is to present both a set of principles and fact-based analyses supporting coordinated government wide actions that earn decent buy in from major stakeholders.
The impact is the case 
Bayless 3 (Robert, President – Independent Petroleum Association of Mountain States, “Energy Production on Federal Lands,” Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 4-30)
Mr. BAYLESS. Senator, if I could follow up, not only is it an issue of whether those lands are available, but as you pointed out, the timing, if there is a long delay, it impedes industry. You are not worried about the industry; you are worried about gas supply. There are signals that come out of the market, price signals, that say we need more gas. We need greater—the price has gone up. Where is the supply? With these long delays, it creates uncertainty for companies to be able to drill those additional wells, to budget for drilling those additional wells. It really puts a bad filter on those price signals.

No implementation
Barlas, ‘12
[Stephen, Financial Executive Magazine, Jan/Feb, “Does the U.S. Really Need An Energy Policy?” http://wa-dcwriter.blogspot.com/2012/01/does-us-really-need-energy-policy.html]
But it is highly unlikely that Obama's Blueprint will lead to a firmer footing for U.S. energy security than past Blueprints from other presidents, or, perhaps more importantly, whether a Blueprint is even necessary. Obama's Blueprint policy is a loosely knit set of policies which focus on producing more oil at home and reducing dependence on foreign oil by developing cleaner alternative fuels and greater efficiency. The Blueprint is not the result of any particular deep thinking or strategy. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) called for the development of such a strategy in its November 2010 Report to the President on Accelerating the Pace of Change in Energy Technologies Through an Integrated Federal Energy Policy. The PCAST called for a Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) as the first step in preparing a Quadrennial Energy Review. The DOE completed the QTR in November 2011, six months after Obama published his Blueprint. Steven E. Koonin, Under Secretary for Science, DOE, says the QTR is limited in scope and all the DOE felt it could get done given budget and time. "Technology development absent an understanding and shaping of policy and market context in which it gets deployed is not a productive exercise," he states. At this point there is no indication that the DOE will even undertake the much more important QER, much less complete it any time soon. The larger reality is that any energy independence plan proposed by any U.S. President--whether based on a QER or not--has as much a chance of coming to fruition as Washington's hapless Redskins have of getting into the Super Bowl. In any case, the rhetoric of President after President aside, maybe the U.S. doesn't even need an energy independence or energy security policy. The biggest energy input for industrial and commercial business users is natural gas. Natural gas prices are incredibly important, both because the fuel is used directly to run industrial processes, heat facilities and commercial buildings, and make products such as fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics and other advanced materials. Thanks to the Shale Revolution, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts natural gas prices will stay low for the foreseeable future, rising to $4.66 m/BTU in 2015 and $5.05 m/BTU in 2020. That is good news for the owners of 15,000 to 17,000 industrial boilers in this country, most of which use natural gas (and many of those who still use coal are switching to natural gas). In addition, companies such as Dow Chemical are restarting operations at facilities idled during the recession, Bayer is in talks with companies interested in building new ethane crackers at its two industrial parks in West Virginia, and Chevron Phillips Chemical and LyondellBasell, are considering expanding operations in the U.S. Fracking has also had a much less remarked-upon effect on petroleum prices, which are important to businesses with transportation fleets. New oil sources are spurting from the Bakken and Eagles Ford shale plays. U.S. oil prices have fallen from $133.88 a barrel of Texas intermediate crude in June 2008 to $86.07 today. The EIA predicts oil prices will rise to $94.58/bbl in 2015 and $108.10/bbl in 2020. Beyond the flood of natural gas washing over them, U.S. companies are also benefitting from three decades of investments--most of which made without federal subsidies or support--into facility energy efficiency. Ralph Cavanagh, Co-Director, Energy Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, member of Electricity Advisory Board at the DOE, says the most important single solution for U.S. businesses worried about energy prices and energy access is aggressive energy efficiency. "Energy independence is the wrong issue," he says. "It is reducing the cost of energy services and improving energy security. "U.S. business has done a tremendous job in energy efficiency over the past three decades," he states. "It takes less than one-half of a unit of energy to create $1 of economic value than it did in 1973. Industry has done that by upgrading the efficiency of process equipment and upgrading lighting." Others may well argue that the U.S. needs, and has always needed, an energy policy, but one narrowly targeted. Kenneth B Medlock III, PhD, Deputy Director, Energy Forum, James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, notes that the DOE and the Gas Research Institute helped develop, with federal funding, the horizontal drilling (i.e. fracking) technology that Mitchell Energy (now a part of Devon Energy) pioneered. "Government ought to be focused on research & development," he states. He also is a supporter of loan guarantees to promote investment activity in frontier technologies, and argues that as long as there are more good bets than bad bets in that kind of portfolio, the funds committed in total are a good investment. But spectacular failures like Solyndra and other less publicized busts such as Beacon Power's Chapter 11 filing kill the prospect of any additional congressional funding for energy loan guarantees of any kind. That is true even when legislation has bi-partisan support, which is the case for the Energy Savings and Industrial Competitiveness Act of 2011 (S. 1000) which would, among other things, provide grants for a revolving loan program designed to develop energy-saving technologies for industrial and commercial use. The bill passed the Senate Energy Committee by a vote of 18-3 in July. However, the Congressional Budget Office has pegged the cost of the bill's provisions at $1.2 billion over five years. That is a serious barrier to passage. And in any case, even if it did pass, the bill would simply authorize funding. Congressional appropriations committees would have to approve the money as part of the DOE's budget, which would be highly unlikely, Solyndra aside, since similar programs authorized by the 2005 and 2007 energy bills are still begging for appropriations.

White House blocks recommendation solvency
Kirsh 11 (Steven T. Kirsh, Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in electrical engineering and computer science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Why Obama should meet Till," 9/28/11) http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/09/28/why-obama-should-meet-till/-http://bravenewclimate.com/2011/09/28/why-obama-should-meet-till/

If you delegate this to someone else, nothing will happen. Here’s why. Delegating this letter downward from the White House to someone in DOE to evaluate will result in inaction and no follow up. I know this from past attempts that have been made. It just gets lost and there is no follow up. Every time. The guys at DOE want to do it, but they know that they will get completely stopped by OMB and OSTP. Both Carol Browner and Steven Chu asked former DOE nuclear management what to do about nuclear waste. They were told that using fast reactors and reprocessing was the way to go. But nothing happened. So Chu has given up trying. According to knowledgeable sources, the White House has told DOE in no uncertain terms, “do not build anything nuclear in the US.” It’s not clear who is making these decisions, but many people believe it is being driven by Steven Fetter in OSTP.
AT: Water Counterplan

No extinction from ag collapse
Allouche 11, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11
(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.
Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations
In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.
In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.
The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.
None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).
As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).
The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).
In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.
The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

They would say no – why would they choose the government if there is an extra requirement 
Perm do the counterplan

a. Government’s not monolithic
Chicago Manual No Date (University of Chicago Manual of Style, “Capitalization, Titles”,http://web.archive.org/web/20061125021652/http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/CMS_FAQ/CapitalizationTitles/CapitalizationTitles29.html)

A. The government of the United States is not a single official entity. Nor is it when it is referred to as the federal government or the U.S. government or the U.S. federal government. It’s just a government, which, like those in all countries, has some official bodies that act and operate in the name of government: the Congress, the Senate, the Department of State, etc.

b. “It’s acceptable within the range of “should”
GAO 8 (Government Accounting Office, Exposure Draft of Proposed Changes to the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, http://www.gao.gov/govaud/cl_iia080331.pdf)

The second sentence of the “must” definition used in the exposure draft instructions is more aligned with the definition of “should” as used by other standards setters, including GAO. The definition of “should” as used by GAO, which is intended to be consistent with the definition used by the AICPA and the PCAOB, indicates a presumptively mandatory requirement and contains the following language: “…in rare circumstances, auditors and audit organizations may depart from a presumptively mandatory requirement provided they document their justification for the departure and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the presumptively mandatory requirement.”  We suggest that the IIA move the second sentence of the “must” definition to the “should” definition. The definition of “must” needs to be clear that “must” indicates an unconditional requirement and that another procedure cannot substitute for a “must.” Also, we suggest adding language to the definition of “should” to indicate that substituting another procedure for a “should” requirement is allowed only if the auditors document their justification for the departure from the “should” and how the alternative procedures performed in the circumstances were sufficient to achieve the objectives of the “should” requirement. The IIA should review every “must” requirement in the Standards to determine whether there are acceptable alternatives to the procedure; if so, “should” is the appropriate word. 

c. “Resolved” isn’t in the rez
DOD 6 – US Department of Defense (6/28, The Colon, http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:CRkgc8Pi1TsJ:www.dod.state.hi.us/HIARNG/298rti/298rti/l230is_app_d.pdf, AG) 

The colon introduces the following: [continues] g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

Holding the AFF to the most reasonable interpretation of the plan, federal implementation doesn’t have specific contracting requirements – the CP just ADDS an external condition
 Code of Federal Regulations, 06 [TITLE 10 — ENERGY [ 10 CFR ] PART 626 — PROCEDURES FOR ACQUISITION OF PETROLEUM FOR THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE [ 10 CFR 626 ], http://cfr.regstoday.com/10cfr626.aspx] 
§ 626.1   Purpose.
This part establishes the procedures for acquiring petroleum for, and deferring contractually scheduled deliveries to, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The procedures do not represent actual terms and conditions to be contained in the contracts for the acquisition of SPR petroleum. 

2AC Security 
Framework – the k needs to prove that the plan is a bad idea -- only disproving small parts makes it impossible to be aff – destroys predictability and fairness 
Empirically no link between enframing and war
Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9
(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434) 

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

Perm do the plan and 
Economics predictions are accurate 
Hands, 84 [Douglas, W. department of economics at Puget sound, “What Economics Is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg Source: Philosophy of Science”, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 495-503, p. jstor]
1. Economic Predictions. Much of Rosenberg's discussion is directed toward explaining the "predictive weakness" (p. 297) of modem economics and the discipline's inability (or lack of desire) to "improve its predictive content" (p. 301). This failure to generate successful predictions and to improve the few predictions which are made is taken as an empiricafl act about even the most applied economic theories. No evidence is provided, or even suggested, to support this empirical claim. Rosenberg certainly needs to provide evidence for the ubiquitous predictive failure of applied economic theory. Such criticism is by no means "well known" or "standard" in the literature on economic methodology. It is "standard” to argue that economic theories are insulated from direct falsification, that they are built on inadequate behavioral foundation s, and that in their most abstract form they fail to yield predictions or even to systematically connect up with applied theories which might yield predictions. But systematic predictive failure is not a standard methodological criticism of applied economic theory. The reason why such predictive failure i snot a standard criticism i squite simple: Rosenberg has exaggerated the extent of this failure. Predictive failure is simply not the ubiquitous fact of modem economic theory which Rosenberg assumes. While nowhere n ear the standards ofthe best natura ls cience, applied economic theories (both micro and macro) do generate an ocean of successful predictions, on everything from the impact of trucking deregulation to the demand for consumer credit. Rosenberg's claim that economic predictions have not "improved"(p . 301) with time is also exaggerated. W hile there is always room for more improvement, modern macroeconometric models provide extraordinary accuracy relative to pre-World W ar I1b usiness cycle models. Where substantiael errros ooccur, such as the inability to predict the inflationary im pacto fthe OPEC i nduceds upply-sides hock, the models are improved so that failures of the same type are less likely to reoccur.3 Rosenberg even goes so far as to argue that more predictively successful alternatives currently exist (at least in the micro domain) and are neglected, ostensibly because of an irrational professional attraction to intentional and extreme views of human behavior. He tells us that even if a more predictive theory were available: "it is not likely to actually deflect practicing economists from their intentional extreme research program . . . the reason is that they are not really much interested in questions of empirical applicability at all. Otherwise some of the attractive nonintentional and/or nonextremal approaches to economic behavior that are available would long ago have elicited more interest from economists than they have" (p. 308). An adequate defense of this position would of course require a demonstration of both the predictive failure of traditional microeconomics and the predictive success of the proposed alternatives. We have already questioned the validity of the former; Rosenberg merely asserts the latter. Contrary to Rosenberg's claim, predictive success is an important criterion of theory choice in economics. One of the reasons for this is that economic predictions are consumed by the business community. These business interests do not care whether the underlying economic theory is intentional or nonintentional. In fact, they do not even care whether the predictions are from scientific theories or not. They are only concerned with (and pay for) predictive accuracy. In addition to these business interests, labor unions, governments, and other organizations are also consumers of economic predictions. These groups approach economic theory with the same nomological nonchalance as the corporate consumers. Of course, the fact that organizational consumers of economic predictions often purchase information based on traditional economic models does not imply that these models constitute "science" or that there is no room for nontraditional models. The argument is only that the survivability of the traditional approach in such applications indicates that (relative to the available alternatives), its predictive failings are not as great as Rosenberg would have us believe.

Floating pics are a voting issue -- 
No comparative literature – decreases research skills, and makes aff offense impossible
Steals aff offense – artificially narrows the debate to wherever the neg is strategically ahead

Rejection of securitization causes the state to become more interventionist—turns the K
Tara McCormack, ’10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)
The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before.  Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan.  Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security.  For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without  causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony.  Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.
Ontology is silly and irrelevant to resolution of the political
Gathman 9
http://limitedinc.blogspot.com/2009/10/dialectics-of-diddling.html
Professional editor, translator, publishes pieces in salon.com and Austin Chronicle

IT – and I will interrupt the continuity of this post in the very first sentence to say that I, at least, refuse to identify the semi-autonomous heteronym, Infinite Thought, with the semi-autonomous philosopher, Nina, so this is about IT – recently wrote a post that makes an oblique but telling point against the current fashion for returning to things as they are via some kind of speculative realist ontology. As she notes, this gesture seems to go along with a taste for a politics that is so catastrophic as to be an excuse for no politics. “proliferating ontologies is simply not the point - further, what use is it if it simply becomes a race to the bottom to prove that every entity is as meaningless as every other (besides, the Atomists did it better). Confronting 'what is' has to mean accepting a certain break between the natural and the artificial, even if this break is itself artificial. Ontology is play-science for philosophers; I'm pretty much convinced when Badiou argues that mathematics has better ways of conceiving it than philosophy does and that, besides, ontology is not the point. What happens, or what does not happen, should be what concerns us: philosophers sometimes pride themselves on their ignorance of world affairs, again like watered-down Heideggarians, no matter how hostile they think they are to him, pretending that all that history and politics stuff is so, like, ontic, we're working on something much more important here.” Being the Derridean type, I expect that any attempt to create another, better ontology will produce the kinds of double binds that Derrida so expertly fished out of phenomenology. There have been a lot of replies to I.T.'s post. I thought the most interesting one was by Speculative Heresy, because he makes it clear that Speculative Realism is a return to a distinction that was popular among the analytic philosophers in the 50s, where a value neutral view of philosophy as a technique supposedly precluded the relevance of any political conclusions from conceptual analysis, and at worst blocked the advance of philosophy as a science. Here, the part of the natural is played by the question, which apparently asks itself in the void: “Which is to say that philosophy and politics are born of two different questions: ‘what is it?’ and ‘what to do?’ The latter, political, question need never concern itself with the former question.” IT rightly sees this reverence for the question in itself, and its supposedly fortunate alignment with the disciplines we all know and love, with their different mailboxes in the university, as a very Heideggerian gesture. And, as an empirical fact of intellectual history, it is very curious to think that a discipline is “born” from a syntactical unit peculiar to certain languages. Again, we run into a very old thematic, in which the question giving "birth" is entangled in the parallel series of logos and the body, in which each becomes a privileged metaphor for the other. There's nothing more political than this.

No lash out – institutional safeguards check 
Buchanan 7 [Allen, Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke, 2007, Preemption: military action and moral justification, pg. 128] 
The intuitively plausible idea behind the 'irresponsible act' argument is that, other things being equal, the higher the stakes in acting and in particular the greater the moral risk, the higher are the epistemic requirements for justified action. The decision to go to war is generally a high stakes decision par excellence and the moral risks are especially great, for two reasons. First, unless one is justified in going to war, one's deliberate killing of enemy combatants will he murder, indeed mass murder. Secondly, at least in large-scale modem war, it is a virtual certainty that one will kill innocent people even if one is justified in going to war and conducts the war in such a way as to try to minimize harm to innocents. Given these grave moral risks of going to war, quite apart from often substantial prudential concerns, some types of justifications for going to war may simply be too subject to abuse and error to make it justifiable to invoke them.  The 'irresponsible act' objection is not a consequentialist objection in any interesting sense. It does not depend upon the assumption that every particular act of going to war preventively has unacceptably bad consequences (whether in itself or by virtue of contributing lo the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war); nor does it assume that it is always wrong lo rely on a justification which, if generally accepted, would produce unacceptable consequences. Instead, the "irresponsible act' objection is more accurately described as an agent-centered argument and more particularly an argument from moral epistemic responsibility. The 'irresponsible act' objection to preventive war is highly plausible if— but only if—one assumes that the agents who would invoke the preventive-war justification are, as it were, on their own in making the decision to go to war preventively. In other words, the objection is incomplete unless the context of decision-making is further specified. Whether the special risks of relying on the preventive-war justification are unacceptably high will depend, inter alia, upon whether the decision-making process includes effective provisions for reducing those special risks. Because the special risks are at least in significant part epistemic—due to the inherently speculative character of the preventive war-justification—the epistemic context of the decision is crucial. Because institutions can improve the epistemic performance of agents, it is critical to know what the institutional context of the preventive-war decision is, before we can regard the 'irresponsible agent' objection as conclusive. Like the 'bad practice' argument, this second objection to preventive war is inconclusive because it does not consider— and rule out—the possibility that well-designed institutions for decision-making  could address the problems that would otherwise make it irresponsible for a leader to invoke the preventive-war justification. 

AT: Immigration DA – Top Level
No bio-threat
Dove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶ Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

No skills gap – their evidence is corporate propaganda
Roger Bybee (writer for In These Times) February 27, 2013 “Study Demolishes the Myth That U.S. Workers Lack Skills” http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/14660/the_medias_skills_gap_thesis_is_a_myth/
Over the last few years, the media has blared warnings that a “skills gap” among American workers is preventing full economic recovery.¶ According to this narrative, the problem is not an inadequate supply of family-sustaining jobs; it’s a workforce lacking in skills, training and education. The skills gap thesis has been spread by influential pundits like the New York Times' Thomas Friedman, top CEOs like Caterpillar's Doug Oberhelman, and PIMCO hedge fund owner Bill Gross, who declared, “Our labor force is too expensive and poorly educated for today's marketplace." ¶ In my home state of Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel has repeatedly given lavish coverage to a November 2011 comment by Tim Sullivan, former CEO of Bucyrus International and special advisor to Gov. Scott Walker on workforce development: “We don’t have a jobs crisis in Milwaukee, we have an education crisis.”¶ But in a study released this week called “The Skills Gap and Unemployment in Wisconsin: Separating Fact From Fiction,” urbanologist Marc Levine, a professor of history and economic development at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, applies a data-laden sledgehammer to this notion. And while Levine’s report focused primarily on Wisconsin, his critique of the “skills gap” notion has national implications.¶ Levine’s report decimates the skills gap thesis one point at a time:¶ False: The skills of the workforce somehow dropped sharply between 2007 and 2009. Numerous studies by Nobel laureates, highly regarded economics institutes, and two former chairs of presidential councils of economic advisers all conclude that a sudden dropoff in workers’ skills over two years is utterly implausible as an explanation for massive unemployment. In the words of economist Heidi Shierholz of the Economic Policy Institute, “It is not the right workers we are lacking, it is work."¶ False: There is a vast pool of high-skilled jobs waiting to be filled. As Levine commented in the report, “Even if every unemployed person were perfectly matched to existing jobs, over 2/3 of all jobless would still be out of work.” ¶ False: Employers are trying in vain to attract skilled workers. If a “skills shortage” truly existed, employers would raise wages to attract workers with the special skills they seek. Instead, wages have fallen in Wisconsin since 2000, including in occupations like welding, where there is a supposed shortage of workers, Levine pointed out.¶ False: Understaffed employers must make do with the skilled workers they have. A shortage of sought-after workers would lead employers to increase these workers’ hours. However, the report says, "average weekly hours worked in manufacturing have remained unchanged since 2000, while the average weekly overtime hours have actually declined by 12.8 percent since 2000."¶ False: New high-skill jobs have been created. Overall, Wisconsin retains a jobs deficit of 243,000, based on job losses since the Great Recession plus new positions needed for entrants into the labor market, according to a study by the Center on Wisconsin Strategy. Though Scott Walker came into office in 2011 famously promising the creation of 250,000 jobs during his four-year term, Wisconsin has ranked 42nd in job creation out of the 50 states.¶ False: Workers with advanced degrees are more highly sought-after. A pervasive skills gap would raise the demand for workers with higher skills, measured in indicators like college degrees. Instead, the percentage of college-educated workers in jobs where they are obviously overqualified—as bartenders and retail clerks, for example—has risen sharply. "College graduates comprise 25% of retail salespersons and 21.6% of bartenders in the Milwaukee metro area—both jobs classified as requiring less than a high school diploma," the report reads. ¶ False: The American job market will increasingly demand higher-skilled workers. Forecasts of future workforce needs show not an increased demand for high education and skills, but for occupations that require a high school degree or less, according to the report: "Of the 25 jobs projected by the Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Development to provide the largest number of job openings in the state between 2010-2020, 22 of them require a high school degree or less and almost all require short-term, on-the-job training."¶ Speaking with Working In These Times, Levine blasted media like the Journal Sentinel for recklessly spreading the “skills gap” myth. “They’ve relied on anecdotes and claims by CEOs that simply don’t measure up to reality,” says Levine. “There are still three unemployed people for every possible job opening.”¶ Adding injury to insult, the purveyors of the skills gap myth don’t just sidestep corporate responsibility for the shortage of well-paying jobs; they use the alleged deficiency in the workforce to justify shifting jobs out of Wisconsin. ¶ In 2008, while still CEO of Bucyrus International (now part of Caterpillar), Tim Sullivan—Wisconsin's leading alarmist on the skills gap—decried a shortage of “qualified, factory-grade” welders in Milwaukee. Sullivan proceeded to move about 80 welding jobs to Kilgore, Texas. ¶ However, Sullivan’s rationale doesn’t hold up under scrutiny. To quote the report, “Around the time Bucyrus was opening its Kilgore plant, there were 635 unemployed welders in metro Milwaukee, and 1,935 unemployed welders in Wisconsin.” The real attraction of Kilgore was likely not skills, but savings: Workers in Kilgore make lower salaries—31 percent of welders make less than $25,000, compared to only 22 percent in Milwaukee—and, very significantly, are not unionized.¶ “The people pushing the skills gap have an agenda that they are not talking about publicly,” Levine told Working In These Times, “and that agenda focuses on keeping wages low and having non-union workers.”

Not top of the docket, won’t pass, and Obama’s not spending the PC
Hennessey 3-25-13 (Kathleen Hennessey, Obama tries to push stalled immigration talks forward, http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-obama-stalled-immigration-talks-20130325,0,7503326.story)
In January, Obama threatened to send his own bill to Congress if the group did not produce a proposal “in a timely fashion.” His remarks Monday suggest the White House is willing to give the group more time to work before it takes that step.¶ “I expect the debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible,” he said. “We know that real reform means continuing to strengthen our border security and holding employers accountable. … Let’s get this done.”¶ Obama’s time frame may be tough for senators to reach. U.S. Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), chairman of the judiciary committee, already has cast doubt on the chances of getting a bill through his committee by the end of April. Even if the bill comes to the floor next month a vote would not necessarily follow quickly. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) has said he plans to let senators debate the legislation at length, and there remains no clear path for the bill through the Republican-led House.¶ The senators remain deadlocked over several issues, including the details of a guest-worker program and how the legislation will implement and define security at the border.¶ Obama has largely steered clear of the talks, instead offering broad elements he wants to see included. The president on Monday used the platform to revive his call for a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants, the key requirement for any bill.
No issue spillover
Judson Berger, 3/4/13, Recurring budget crises could put squeeze on Obama's second-term priorities, www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/04/recurring-budget-crises-could-put-squeeze-on-obama-second-term-priorities/
¶ Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., a vocal advocate for immigration reform, voiced confidence Monday that the administration and Congress could handle the busy agenda. ¶ "The spirit of bipartisan cooperation that is keeping the immigration issue moving forward has not been poisoned by the sequester and budget stalemate, so far," he said in a statement. "The two sets of issues seem to exist in parallel universes where I can disagree with my Republican colleagues strenuously on budget matters, but still work with them effectively to eventually reach an immigration compromise.  ... I remain extremely optimistic that immigration reform is going to happen this year." ¶ Immigration reform efforts are still marching along despite the budget drama. Obama met last week on the issue with Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., who both are part of a bipartisan group crafting legislation. 

No legislation is required 
Shages, 09 [PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN D. SHAGES, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg50874/pdf/CHRG-111shrg50874.pdf] 
 The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is fully authorized to one billion barrels by the  Energy Policy and Conservation Act and no further legislation is required for these  necessary improvements. However, as always, the Reserve will be in competition for  resources to create the necessary facilities. As we have seen in the past, such com- petition can cause the Reserve to be static for many years between bursts of activ- ity. For this reason, I recommend that authorization be given to the Reserve for self  funding expansion, and I will address this proposal later in my testimony. 

Secretary of energy takes the blame
Cohen, 08 [Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/congress-should-not-tamper-with-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve] 

A Vital Fuel Reserve The SPR is a 700 million-barrel emergency store of oil maintained by the national government for a very rainy day: a war or a sudden interruption of the oil supply from one or more of the unstable countries-Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Persian Gulf states-from which the U.S. buys fuel. Established in the aftermath of the 1973-1974 oil embargo, the SPR gives the President a powerful response option should a disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the U.S. economy. It also allows the United States to meet part of its International Energy Agency obligation to maintain emergency oil stocks and provides a national defense fuel reserve. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Secretary of Energy to fill the SPR to its authorized billion-barrel capacity. As President George W. Bush has said, the U.S. is addicted to foreign oil-and the country has yet to cure itself of this condition: It imports 64 percent of the 20 million barrels per day that it consumes, and the habit is growing. Oil accounts for 40 percent of U.S. energy consumption, most of it for transportation. Unless and until the U.S. is no longer hooked on oil, having a reliable emergency stock is vital, especially in today's volatile world. Currently, the SPR is 27 million barrels short of its 727 million-barrel target, which would suffice for only 75 days of consumption. In his January 23, 2007, State of the Union Address, the President announced his decision to expand the SPR to 1.5 billion barrels "to further protect America against disruptions to our oil supply." The nation's need for an expanded SPR is based on (a) growing U.S. consumption, increased imports, and ever greater international risks and (b) U.S. obligations under the International Energy Program, which requires that the United States maintain a 90-day stockpile of petroleum imports. This is the minimum that a superpower should have for a global emergency. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is, first and foremost, a tool of national security policy. It was never intended that the SPR would be used to tamper with the market or to play politics, that its oil would be released in order to bring prices down, or that we would stop filling the SPR to accommodate either the market or short-term electoral interests in the campaign season. Risky Schemes Regrettably, those who are supposed to be in charge of this policy would like to appear to be "doing something" for the voters about the painful gas price issue. Thus, the Democrat-sponsored Consumer First Energy Act of 2008, Title III, Sec. 301, proposes that oil acquisition for the SPR be suspended. Beyond that, the Democrats are effectively suggesting that the President not resume filling the Reserve-possibly ever. The legislation's authors would like to tamper arbitrarily with the market price of oil, suggesting that the President may resume acquisition of oil for the SPR only if the weighted average oil price falls to less than $75 for three months. The Democrats even want to tamper with existing contracts by instructing the Secretary of Energy to "negotiate a deferral of the delivery of the oil for a period of not less than one year." Republicans, in the Domestic Energy Production Act of 2008, echo the same theme: They would like to suspend oil acquisition for the SPR for 180 days. Neither of these approaches will work, and both could be dangerous. Cutting supply to the SPR could jeopardize America's ability to respond to crises around the world, to fulfill its international obligations, and to protect the homeland and our allies. Negative Impact It is unlikely that the availability of the additional rather insignificant quantity of oil at issue-only 70,000 barrels a day-could make a serious dent in today's skyrocketing oil prices. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has already forecast that, at best, the price of oil might drop by $2 a barrel, cutting gasoline prices by 4-5 cents a gallon. Seventy-thousand barrels of oil is only one-20th of what drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) would produce and possibly only one-50th of what could be produced if exploration and drilling were allowed along the east and west U.S. continental shelves and in the Gulf of Mexico. Stopping SPR replenishment would be literally penny-wise and pound-foolish, as the result could be a shortage of fuel that denies the U.S. military operational freedom in a crisis. Moreover, congressional tampering with presidential authority to fill the SPR may be unconstitutional as it interferes with the executive branch's authority to conduct national security policy and defend the country.

That shields politics
Dobkin 8—past Chairperson of the Immigration Law Section of the Oakland County (Michigan) Bar Association and has lectured and presented seminars on immigration in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. (Donald, THE RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: APRESCRIPTION FOR LAWLESSNESS, www.law.ku.edu/publications/journal/pdf/v17n3/dobkin.pdf)
Because an agency’s actions often receive far less media attention than the actions of the President, the general public is often unaware of political decisions being made at the agency level. This lack of accountability in general makes it easier to pursue a political agenda at the agency level. 25 President George W. Bush has also used the inattention to agency action to pursue some of the more unpopular aspects of his political agenda to avoid direct accountability. For example, rather than openly challenging environmental protections, President Bush has used agencies to help him pursue his anti-environmental agenda to ensure the “systematic dismantling of various environmental regulations.” 26 ¶ The White House’s tightening of control via executive orders had its origins in the alteration of the context of presidential leadership during the 1960’s and 1970’s: [table omitted]¶ In an era of growing budget deficits, divided government, a more open political process, and a general loss of public faith in “big government,” presidents beginning with Richard Nixon no longer saw unalloyed benefits in relying on “neutral” staff agencies. Instead, they sought greater political responsiveness. This meant relying more heavily on aides within the White House Office, and appointing political loyalists to exercise topdown control of the other Executive Office of the President (EOP) agencies. 27 ¶ The attached Table 1 illustrates the magnitude of the EOP, which by 2004 had reached 1,731 staffers ranging from everything to Homeland Security Staff, OMB, CEA, and other agencies:¶ During this same time period, “presidents have increased the number of political appointees at the upper levels of the non-White House EOP agencies, and brought the agencies more tightly under White House staff control.” 29 The appointment process has allowed presidents to use agencies as a means for major—and often unpopular—policy changes. For instance, President Reagan made “a series of fox-in-the-chicken-coop appointments to undermine public interest regulation,” notably of his infamous anti-environment interior secretary, James Watt. 30 Many commentators have noted that the current Bush Administration has made similar appointments. 31 These types of appointments make it difficult for agencies to exhibit expertise and to execute the law in an impartial manner. As a result, we are left with “a more thoroughly politicized, White House-dominated EOP, but one that is short on institutional memory, administrative expertise, and organizational continuity.” 32 ¶ The rise in the presidentially-led Administrative States merely reflects the growing use—and creation—of unilateral powers by the President:¶ To pursue a unilateral strategy, of course, presidents must be able to justify their actions on some blend of statutory, treaty or constitutional powers; and when they cannot, their only recourse is legislation. But given the ambiguity of Article II powers and the massive corpus of law that presidents can draw upon . . . the appeal of unilateral powers is readily apparent. 33 ¶ Although some would argue that a unilateral executive branch is justified based on the majoritarian “mandate” produced by a presidential election, it is difficult to take this notion very seriously when “a President can be elected without obtaining a majority of the popular vote—as in the cases of President Clinton in 1992 and 1996 and President George W. Bush in 2000.” 34 Indeed, in the 2000 election, the winning candidate did not even garner a plurality of the popular vote. 35 Furthermore, presidential elections often center on issues like national security, which are far removed from the everyday decisions of administrative agencies. 36 ¶ The situation is only likely to worsen. In the early days of President George W. Bush’s administration, Professor Kagan predicted that President Bush would continue Clinton’s “expansion of presidential administration.” 37 Professor Sargentich has noted that this prediction has undoubtedly “come to pass,” as exemplified by recent executive branch acts such as the OMB’s farreaching and controversial Peer Review Bulletin, which guides agency decisions. 38 

Congressional support is widespread - their link doesn’t assume the specifics of the plan 
Levin, 03 [The Strategic Petroleum Reserve Wednesday, Septe mber 24, 2003,http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=01ba4000-dbd9-4841-8a28-8560062de699] 
This amendment establishes a cost-effective program to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. I understand it has been cleared by both of the managers.  Since late 2001 the Department of Energy--DOE--has been steadily adding oil to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, SPR, in order to fill the reserve to its maximum capacity of 700 million barrels. In late 2001, the reserve held about 560 million barrels of oil; today holds nearly 620 million barrels. DOE anticipates that at the current fill rate it will reach its goal of 700 million barrels sometime in 2005.   Since early 2002, DOE has been acquiring oil for the SPR without regard to the price of oil. Prior to that time, DOE sought to acquire more oil when the price of oil was low, and less oil when the price of oil was high. In early 2002, however, DOE abandoned this cost-based approach and instead adopted the current approach, which does not consider cost when buying oil for the SPR. Since over this period the price of oil has been very high--often over $30 per barrel--and the oil markets have been tight, this cost-blind approach has increased the costs of the program to the taxpayer and, of great significance, put further pressure on tight oil markets, thereby helping boost oil and gasoline prices to American consumers and businesses.   The bipartisan amendment Senator COLLINS and I are offering today is simple. It would encourage DOE to consider the price and supply of oil when buying oil for the SPR. It would direct DOE to minimize the program's cost to the taxpayer while maximizing our energy security.  The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations spend a year and a half looking at oil markets and the SPR. In March of this year my staff on the subcommittee published the repot of the investigation.   In summary our investigation found:   -In 2002, DOE began to fill the SPR without regard to the price of oil.  -Filling the SPR in tight market increased U.S. oil prices and hurt U.S. consumers.  -Filling the SPR regardless of oil prices increased taxpayer costs.  -Despite its high cost, filling the SPR [in 2002] did not increase overall U.S. oil supplies.  The March report also warned that the deliveries that were then scheduled for later in 2003 would drive oil prices higher because prices were high and inventories were low. Unfortunately, this prediction turned out to be accurate.   Our Report recommended:   -DOE should defer all SPR deliveries . . . until near-term crude oil prices fall and U.S. commercial inventories increase.  -DOE should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the previous SPR fill policy compared to the current policy.  -DOE should restore its SPR business procedures allowing deferrals of oil deliveries to the SPR when crude oil prices are high or commercial crude oil supplies are tight.   Both Houses of Congress support the goal of filling the SPR to its capacity. I support this goal, too. This amendment seeks to further this goal and our national energy security at least cost to the taxpayers. For many years the SPR program followed the types of procedures that DOE has recently abandoned. The SPR program office itself has recommended the DOE return to using these market-based procedures. Under the amendment DOE would continue to have the discretion to determine when to buy oil for the SPR, and under which procedures, but DOE would be encouraged to use that discretion in a way to minimize costs while maximizing national energy security.   Any successful businessperson knows the saying, ``Buy low, sell high.'' This is as true for oil as it is for pork bellies and stocks. It is as true for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as it is for any business involving a commodity. Indeed, in a recent presentation to other countries on how to create and manage a strategic reserve, DOE itself states: ``The Key To A Successful Strategic Reserve Is Cost Control.'' DOE identifies the major cost elements of a strategic reserve as capital costs, maintenance costs, and oil acquisition costs. Once constructed, the capital costs and the maintenance costs are largely fixed. The main variable cost, therefore, is the cost of acquiring oil for the SPR. DOE itself identifies for other countries the ``Lessons Learned to Control Oil Acquisition Costs'' as follows:   -Let the markets determine your buying pattern.  -Buy in weak markets.  -Delay deliveries during strong markets.  -Use your acquisition strategy to stabilize markets.   Prior to early 2002 DOE followed this sensible strategy when acquiring oil for the SPR.   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from this DOE presentation to other countries be entered into the record.   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.  (See exhibit 1.)   Part of this strategy--allowing deliveries to be deferred when prices were high and supplies tight--was spelled out in the ``Business Procedures'' for the SPR program issued by DOE in January 2002. The Business Procedures spell out how scheduled deliveries of oil to the SPR can be deferred. Generally, companies will ask for a deferral when the market is tight so they can meet their supply commitments to refiners who have an immediate need for the oil. DOE's procedures provided that a company could be granted a deferral in return for additional barrels of oil to be delivered at the later date. DOE calculated the amount of additional oil that would be delivered by comparing the market prices at the time of delivery was originally scheduled and at the time of the deferred delivery.   DOE's own documents state that deferrals of oil scheduled to be delivered in 2001 provided an additional 3 1/2 million barrels of oil for the SPR at no additional cost to the Government. Deferrals of deliveries scheduled for 1999 and 2000 had added another 3 1/2 million barrels. At an average cost of $25 per barrel, these deferrals added a total of 7 million barrels of oil to the Reserve, worth about $175 million, for no cost to the taxpayer. The SPR program projected:   The potential for savings to the Treasury if we continue to follow this business model until the Reserve is full is additional hundreds of millions of dollars.   But in April 2002, DOE stopped allowing deferrals of scheduled deliveries. Instead, DOE began to buy oil for the SPR without regard to the cost of oil or the supply of oil, and refused requests for deferrals. DOE has not explained the reason for abandoning its previous policy.   In addition to losing the benefits from deferrals, both in terms of oil gained and dollars saved, the abandonment of the previous policy is costing taxpayers because DOE has been paying top dollar for the oil placed into the SPR. Oil acquired for the SPR at $35 per barrel costs the taxpayers $10 more per barrel than oil acquired at $25 per barrel. Even more modest savings per barrel add up to large savings over the course of the program. In 2002, DOE's SPR program calculated:   If the SPR can average down the price of oil it injects in the Reserve by $1 per barrel between now and 2005, the U.S. Treasury will be better off by $125 million, a direct benefit.   But in these times of high gas prices, the DOE shift has another highly negative effect.  Filling up the SPR affects the price of oil and gasoline. In a tight market, filling the SPR reduces the amount of oil in private sector inventories, which, because it reduces available supply, will then lead to increases in the price of oil and petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, and home heating oil. When prices are high and the market is tight, refiners will use up the oil in their inventories rather than purchase new oil in an expensive market, and wait for prices to fall before buying more oil. In a tight market, therefore, the additional demand for oil created by the SPR program will lead companies to take even more oil out of their own inventories to fill Government needs. In a tight market, the net result of the SPR program will not be any overall increase in domestic oil supplies, since the amounts of oil added to the SPR will come at the expense of oil in private sector inventories. These private commercial inventories are thereby reduced as a result of filling the SPR.   Oil prices are directly related to the supply of oil. When supplies are plentiful, prices fall. When supplies are scarce, prices rise. The supply of oil is determined by the amount of oil produced in oil wells around the world and the amount of oil in storage. As either the amount of oil produced or the amount of oil in storage decreases, prices will increase. In a tight market, therefore, when supplies are scarce, filling the SPR will lead both to a decrease in private sector inventories and a corresponding increase in the price of oil.   The Department of Energy's own documents explain this effect as follows:   If we look at the SPR from the perspective of daily supply and demand, the SPR fill rates are inconsequential. The fill rate is 100-170,000 barrels per day compared to world production and consumption of 75 million barrels per day. However, when OPEC countries are determined to maintain discipline in their export quotas, the cumulative impact of filling the SPR becomes more significant when compared to U.S. and Atlantic basin inventories. Essentially, if the SPR inventory grows, the OPEC does not accommodate that growth by exporting more oil, the increase comes at the expense of commercial inventories. Most analysts agree that oil prices are directly correlated with inventories, and a drop of 20 million barrels over a 6-month period can substantially increase prices.   Oil companies doing business with the SPR program supported DOE's business procedures in place prior to the spring of last year. These procedures afforded the contractors the flexibility to re-schedule deliveries to the SPR in accordance with market conditions. In exchange for providing the oil companies with this flexibility, the U.S. government was able to obtain additional barrels of oil for the SPR at no additional cost to the taxpayer. This enabled the Reserve to be filled faster and at less cost than if contractors were not allowed to reschedule their deliveries. These procedures were a win-win for taxpayers and the SPR.   And, of course, any increase in the price of oil will soon lead to an increase in the price of the various petroleum products, including gasoline, diesel fuel, home heating oil, and jet fuel. Hence, the SPR program affects price of basic oil products for a wide variety of American consumers and businesses.   The amendment I am offering today would encourage DOE to reinstate these ``win-win'' procedures for filling the SPR.   Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a recent editorial critical of DOE's cost-blind approach to filling the SPR.   The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.  (See Exhibit 2.)   The editorial, in the Omaha World Herald, dated August 14, reads:   In general, we are strong supporters of keeping the nation's Strategic Petroleum Reserve at or near capacity in case of a national emergency. However, there is such a thing as bad timing. We believe the administration has been making a mistake by refilling the reserve to the tune of about 11 million barrels since the start of May. Commercial U.S. oil stocks have been low for months. Filling the reserve just now puts upward pressure on prices. ..... Washington should back off until oil prices fall somewhat. Doing otherwise is costing the Treasury unnecessarily and is punishing motorists during summer vacation driving time.   Under our amendment DOE would retain the complete discretion to determine the pace and schedule for filling the SPR. However, DOE would be required to issue procedures to guide this discretion, and would be required to consider how to maximize our national energy security and minimize costs to the taxpayers while filling the SPR. If implemented properly, such procedures can promote our national energy security, save taxpayers money, and lower oil and gasoline prices for consumers. 
Support is robust – breaks political stalemate 
Holdren, 05 [John P. Holdren Heinz Professor of Environmental Policy, Harvard Director, The Woods Hole Research Center Co-Chair, National Commission on Energy Policy Presentation at the Kennedy School 27 October 2005, www.hks.harvard.edu/m.../NCEP_EnergyBill_10-27-05.ppt] 
The Commission’s overarching objective Develop recommendations that can… Ensure ample, clean, reliable, and affordable energy for the United States in the 21st century while responding to growing concerns about the nation’s energy security and the risks of global climate change. Command the bipartisan support necessary to be break the stalemate and be enacted. The Commission’s principles for policy Prefer markets and market-based solutions Prefer gradual adjustments to dramatic interventions Appreciate the law of unintended consequences Aim for… Economic efficiency High cost-effectiveness Low consumer impacts Appropriate incentives for future action Flexibility for adjustment with experience & new information Equity Political viability Ease of implementation, monitoring, & measurement Achieve revenue neutrality in recommended measures. Recommendations were in five categories Expanding oil & gas supply and strategic petroleum reserves Strengthening & protecting energy-supply infrastructure Accelerating energy-technology innovation Dampening growth of demand for liquid fuels Limiting & reducing greenhouse-gas emissions Listed here not in the order of presentation in the NCEP report, but from highest to lowest degree of “success” in getting into the energy legislation that was signed into law in August 2005. 

That trumps politics ideology 
Russell, 12 [Barry Russell 12 is President of the Independent Petroleum Association of America,  “Energy Must Transcend Politics”, 8-15-12, http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php#2238176, Accessed date: 12-10-12 y2k]
There have been glimpses of great leadership, examples when legislators have reached across the aisle to construct and support common-sense legislation that encourages American energy production. Recent legislation from Congress which would replace the Obama administration’s five-year offshore leasing plan and instead increase access America’s abundant offshore oil and natural gas is one example of such bipartisanship. The House passed legislation with support from 25 key Democrats. The support from Republicans and Democrats is obviously not equal, but this bipartisan legislative victory demonstrates a commitment by the House of Representatives to support the jobs, economic growth and national security over stubborn allegiance to political party. The same is happening on the Senate side. Democratic Senators Jim Webb (VA), Mark Warner (VA), and Mary Landrieu (LA) cosponsored the Senate’s legislation to expand offshore oil and natural gas production with Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski (AK), John Hoeven (ND), and Jim Inhofe (OK). Senator Manchin (WV) is another Democratic leader who consistently votes to promote responsible energy development. 

XO solves
Keegan Hamilton (writer for the Atlantic) 3/26, 2013 “How Obama Could (but Probably Won't) Stop Deporting Illegal Immigrants Today” http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/how-obama-could-but-probably-wont-stop-deporting-illegal-immigrants-today/274352/
If the current congressional push for immigration reform were to fail, however, a presidential pardon for undocumented immigrants with no criminal history might be Obama's last ditch alternative to prosecutorial discretion. Rather than scaling back on detentions, Obama could instantly--and permanently-- legalize millions of illegal immigrants. Beck, the Georgia law scholar, notes that the Constitution empowers the president to "grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."¶ The question, he says, is "whether coming into the country in violation of the immigration laws or overstaying a visa could be deemed an 'offense against the United States.'" But the president has broad powers of pardon, and it seems that Obama could exercise those powers here. Beck cites United States v. Klein, an 1871 Supreme Court case that involved a presidential pardon issued during the Civil War to confederates who rejoined the union and took an oath of loyalty.
Border security kills 
Fawn Johnson, 3/21/13, Border Triggers Could Sink Immigration Deal, www.nationaljournal.com/daily/border-triggers-could-sink-immigration-deal-20130321
Republicans' insistence that border-security benchmarks be met before legalizing 11-12 million illegal immigrants could sink an emerging compromise measure that is expected to be unveiled in a few weeks.¶ The “Gang of Eight” senators negotiating a sweeping immigration bill are on track to unveil draft legislation at the beginning of April, according to congressional aides. Similarly, a bipartisan group of House members is honing its own version. The cornerstone of both measures is a mass probationary legalization of noncriminal undocumented immigrants.¶ Legalization is a significant concession from Republicans, who are reluctant to give breaks to immigrants who violated the law. They acknowledge, however, that mass deportation is not possible and that millions of illegal residents are bad for national security.¶ Conservatives are worried that once a bill passes, legalization will take the pressure off immigration authorities to stop further illegal entry and to find and deport those who manage to make it in without authorization. To keep that from happening, the negotiators are discussing a variety of enforcement-related benchmarks, or “triggers,” that would need to be met before the population of undocumented immigrants can move toward citizenship.¶ But some lawmakers worry that forestalling citizenship in the name of border security may not be enough of an incentive for the authorities. After all, only half of legal immigrants in the country now go to the trouble of becoming U.S. citizens. Once the illegal population is given provisional legal status, they might not be clamoring as hard for government action that would allow them to become full-fledged citizens.¶ Rep. Raul Labrador, R-Idaho, a leading voice for tea-party conservatives on immigration, has suggested that even the probationary legalization of illegal immigrants should wait until some enforcement mechanisms are in place. “We have to have enforcement triggers happen before anyone receives any kind of legal status,” he said Wednesday. “Certain objective triggers that we can measure.”¶ Labrador is walking a tightrope between the tea-party House members who follow his lead on immigration and the immigrant-friendly lawmakers with whom he is trying to strike a deal. The two groups don’t speak the same language. For hardcore conservatives, only tough enforcement benchmarks could give them enough comfort to support the legislation. “We cannot simply legalize 12 million people and enforce the laws later,” Senate Judiciary Committee ranking Republican Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, said Wednesday.¶ But Labrador’s suggestion is a deal-breaker for immigrant advocates and Democrats. “Whoever’s saying that, they’re trying to kill the bill before it even gets started,” said Alison Reardon, legislative consultant for the Service Employees International Union, which represents thousands of immigrant workers. “We should continue to work to secure our borders, but there’s no way to do that and wait for legalization. Border security is an ongoing thing.”¶ The Obama administration isn’t helping on this front, because it has been more aggressive than any previous administration in deporting and detaining illegal immigrants. Almost half of those in deportation proceedings have committed no other crimes.¶ 

PC not key
Amie Parnes and Justin Sink (writers for The Hill) 3/20, 2013 “Obama honeymoon may be over” http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/289179-obama-honeymoon-may-be-over
The White House disputes any notion that Obama has lost any political capital in recent weeks.¶ “The president set out an ambitious agenda and he’s doing big things that are not easy, from immigration to gun control,” the senior administration official said. “Those are policies you can’t rack up easily, and no one here is naive about that.”¶ The White House is aware that the clock is ticking to push its hefty agenda, but the official added, “The clock is not ticking because of president’s political capital. The clock is ticking because there’s a timetable in achieving all of this. [Lawmakers] are not going to sign on because the president’s popular.” ¶ And administration officials believe they still have the leverage.

Econ thumps
Xinhua News March 26, 2013 “Obama pushes Congress to put forward immigration bill next month” http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-03/26/c_124501794.htm
About 63 percent of Americans agree that the immigration system should deal with immigrants who are currently living in the country by allowing them a way to become citizens, according to a survey released last Thursday by the Public Religion Research and the Brookings Institution.¶ However, a bad news for supporters of immigration reform is that among the seven issues with political priority for the White House and Congress, immigration only ranked sixth, far behind economic issues.

1ar

AT: Resilience
Not resilient in 2013
Steidtmann, 12/13/12 [Commentary from Carl E. Steidtmann, Ph.D., chief economist, Deloitte Services LP, and director of Deloitte Research–Consumer Business, who is nationally recognized for economic forecasting of general economic and consumer trends, retail sales activity and te] chnology, Uncharted Economic Waters for the United States, http://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/2012/12/13/united-states-uncharted-economic-waters/
From the performance of the U.S. economy to the unprecedented policy mix being employed to address the current malaise, the United States is in uncharted economic waters. The U.S. economy’s performance over the past 18 months has been unprecedented. There has never been a time when growth has been so anemic for so long. There have been 14 instances since the end of the Second World War when real economic growth fell to less than 2%. In 11 of those cases, a recession followed within two quarters of hitting the 2% stall level. In three cases, expansion reaccelerated. This is the first case where growth has neither accelerated nor fallen into recession.¶ What is also unprecedented about the weakness of the current recovery is that it is following a deep recession. Historically, deep recessions create pent-up demand. During a recession, businesses put off investments, and inventories are drawn down. Consumers put off purchases of cars and homes. Young people stay at home with their parents, putting off marriages and delaying the process of household formation to save money. When a recovery comes, much of this pent-up demand gets released, producing a strong recovery. In the three years following the end of the Great Depression in 1933, real GDP rose a sizzling 38.9%. That has not been the case this time; growth is up a modest 5.8% in the two and a half years since the end of the recession, which is the slowest pace of growth for any recovery since 1948 (see figure 1).¶ The performance of the labor force has also been uncharacteristic. Throughout the past 50 years, labor force participation has risen as women and baby boomers moved into the work force. With the baby boomers approaching their retirement years, one would expect labor force participation to begin to fall.¶ However, the mix of the decline in overall labor force participation does not fit the narrative of retiring baby boomers. Over the past five years, even as participation rates for other age cohorts have fallen, boomers have lingered in the labor force. Since the beginning of the last recession in December 2007, labor force participation among the 55-64-year-old cohort has actually risen slightly from 69.2 to 69.6 (see figure 2).¶ Over the same period of time, participation among 16–24-year-olds has plummeted from 61 to 55.6. Of the 4.3 million jobs created since 2010, nearly 3 million of them went to workers over the age of 55. The inability of young people to gain a footing in the labor market will stunt their career development and earning power for years to come. It will also make it more difficult for them to service their student loans. The default rate for the first three years on student loans has jumped $120 billion or roughly 13.4% of all outstanding student debt.¶ A Falling Standard of Living¶ Weakness in the labor market has translated into an unprecedented decline in the standard of living, according to data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Real per capita income has dropped over a five-year period for the first time in the post-World War II era not once but twice in the past five years. Slow job growth coupled with declining labor market participation has made for a toxic combination for income growth. In addition, record low interest rates have cut deeply into interest income, sending it down from $1.4 trillion in May 2008 to $986 billion in August 2012.¶ In addition to the decline in per capita income, the household sector has also experienced an unprecedented decline in net worth. After peaking at $67.3 trillion in the third quarter of 2007, household net worth fell to $51.2 trillion in the first quarter of 2009, a stunning $16.1 trillion destruction of wealth. Since then, wealth has climbed due entirely to the rise in the value of financial assets. Even with the rebound, net worth is still down $4.7 trillion from its peak, and it actually fell by $300 million in the second quarter of this year.¶ The Fed’s Response¶ Faced with a weak labor market and a declining standard of living, the Federal Reserve’s response to the current business conditions has also been unprecedented. Founded in 1913, it took the Federal Reserve 95 years to grow its balance sheet to just under $1 trillion. In the fall of 2008, in response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Fed pursued its first round of quantitative easing (QE), purchasing a wide variety of financial assets in the process of doubling its balance sheet to just over $2 trillion. The purpose of the first round of QE was to provide liquidity to the banking system that was reeling from the shock of the Lehman bankruptcy.¶ In the fall of 2012, the Fed initiated a second round of quantitative easing, adding another $1 trillion to its balance sheet through the purchase of mortgage backed securities and U.S. Treasury bonds. While the banking system no longer needed liquidity, the Fed’s objective was to lift asset prices in an attempt to encourage investment from banks and businesses and spending from consumers.¶ Two years later, with unemployment still above 8% and the economy still growing at a subpar rate of growth, the Fed has initiated a third round of quantitative easing. Unlike the previous efforts at QE, this one has no end date and no set amount. The Fed will buy $40 billion in Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities every month until unemployment falls below a level that is deemed acceptable by the Fed. Most Fed watchers expect QE3 to go on through 2013 at the very least, resulting in a $600 billion expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet at the very least.¶ Quantitative easing is not a risk-free policy. Printing money for the purpose of buying government debt risks higher inflation and a weaker dollar. While a weaker dollar would give a boost to exporters, it will result in higher import prices, particularly for energy.¶ The case for quantitative easing is that by suppressing interest rates, the Federal Reserve will force investors to take more risk in both the bond market and the stock market. The reduction in interest rates and the increase in investor risk taking will give a boost to asset prices in the housing market, the stock market, and the bond market. The corresponding rise in wealth from these three developments will bring about a recovery in the housing market and induce consumers to spend more and businesses to invest more.¶ The downside argument against more quantitative easing is that it results in a mispricing of risk. It reduces the income of retirees who depend on low-risk, interest-bearing assets. It also gives a boost to the price of food and energy, reducing the purchasing power of all consumers.¶ The Fiscal Cliff¶ The debate in the United States over fiscal policy revolves around the pending fiscal cliff. What is remarkable about this debate is how unremarkable it really is. Over the past decade, more and more of the tax code has become a part of a year-end dance between political parties, making longer-term tax and investment planning for businesses and individuals more challenging. In most years, indexing of the automatic minimum tax and various investment and R&D tax credits were among these items. Medicare’s “Doc fix” also seemed to require a yearly vote.¶ Three factors make this year’s fiscal cliff debate different: one is size, the second is timing, and the final issue is the reaction of the bond rating agencies.¶ Taken together, the tax increases and spending cuts that make up this year’s fiscal cliff come to roughly $600 billion. While there is no guarantee, there does seem to be some agreement on at least some of the elements of the fiscal cliff. Both sides are on record as favoring a phase out of the payroll tax cuts. The 2% payroll tax holiday that went into effect in 2010 represents roughly $95 billion in additional taxes. The automatic minimum tax gets bigger every year. The fix for the automatic minimum tax plus the “Doc fix” for Medicare are also likely to gain bipartisan support as they have in the past.¶ The big sticking point will be extending the Bush tax cuts for high-earning households. This was the point of contention back in August 2011 that led to the downgrade of U.S. debt by the credit rating agencies. A second impasse over this issue could result in another downgrade. While the outcome of the fiscal cliff debate remains uncertain, at the very least, it seems certain that the United States will face much tighter fiscal policy in 2013 than it has in recent years. With an economy growing near 2%, tighter fiscal policy will slow growth in the short term. A failure to resolve any of the issues of the fiscal cliff could result in a significant increase in the fiscal contraction and a sharp recession in early 2013.¶ Conclusions and Observations¶ The U.S. economy has shown a combination of luck and resilience in avoiding a recession while growing well below its potential for the past 18 months. That resilience and luck are going to be tested in 2013 as the economy sails off into uncharted waters. Current monetary policy risks higher inflation and lower incomes for retirees and lower spending power for everyone else. The fiscal cliff impasse all but guarantees a more restrictive fiscal policy and potentially another credit downgrade. Sluggish employment growth, declining labor force participation, and shrinking real incomes are a dangerous combination that could push the economy into recession in 2013.

CP competition

Grammar means don’t defend resolved
Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing – 2000
[http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm]
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

Resolution says “should,” not “shall” – means it’s not unconditional
Atlas Collaboration, 1999, “Use of shall, should, may can,” http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html
shall 'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances.  Examples:    # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory."      This is a good example.   # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line."      This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong.  should 'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.  Examples:    # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant."      A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we should try.   # "Code should be tested thoroughly."      Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).

"Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --- this is the USUAL and CUSTOMARY meaning of the term
Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)

D.S.C. 1966.  The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal  

politics

No overall economic benefit to legalization
Hill et al. 10 – Laura E. Hill is a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California. She has been a research associate at The SPHERE Institute and a National Institute of Aging postdoctoral fellow. She holds a Ph.D. in demography from the University of California, Berkeley AND***  Magnus Lofstrom is a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California. He also holds appointments as a research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) at the University of Bonn and as a research associate at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, San Diego. He has also served as a researcher and has taught at IZA and at the University of California, Irvine. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, San Diego. AND*** Joseph M. Hayes is a research associate at the Public Policy Institute of California, where he studies migration and population change throughout the state. He has studied migration in the Central Valley, the families of newly arrived immigrants to California, and the state’s prison population. He holds an M.S. in agricultural economics from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. 2010, “Immigrant Legalization Assessing the Labor Market Effects,” Public Policy Institute of California, www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_410LHR.pdf#ppic
Legalization of the estimated 12 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States would lead to both economic benefits and costs for the nation. Some arguments for comprehensive immigration reform suggest that legalizing immigrants will help end the current recession. This seems unlikely. Our research suggests that earlier findings from the IRCA era may overstate anticipated earnings from a new reform, at least in the short run. ¶ We do expect occupational mobility to improve for formerly unauthorized immigrants with higher skill levels. When compared to the continuously legal, their occupational earnings growth was about 9 to 10 percent. These higher-skill unauthorized immigrants are more likely to be overstayers than crossers, but unauthorized immigrants with college degrees are found in both groups. Lower-skill unauthorized immigrants are not likely to experience strong occupational mobility as a result of a legalization program (although their occupational earnings grow over time in the United States). It will be important that any new legislation give legalized immigrants incentives to improve their skills, especially in English. ¶ The majority of studies investigating the effect of legalizing immigrants on natives’ earnings suggest that the effects are slightly negative for workers with low skill levels. Since we find no improvements in occupational mobility or wages for the lowest skill levels in the short run, we do not expect that legalizing immigrants would place any increased pressure on the wages of low-skill natives or low-skill legal immigrants. Tax revenues may increase, although many unauthorized immigrants already file federal and state tax returns and pay sales and payroll taxes. We found that about 90 percent of unauthorized immigrants filed federal tax returns in the year before gaining LPR status. We expect that increases in tax revenues resulting from increased earnings among the formerly unauthorized would be modest.

No skills gap – their evidence is corporate propaganda
Roger Bybee (writer for In These Times) February 27, 2013 “Study Demolishes the Myth That U.S. Workers Lack Skills” http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/14660/the_medias_skills_gap_thesis_is_a_myth/
Over the last few years, the media has blared warnings that a “skills gap” among American workers is preventing full economic recovery.¶ According to this narrative, the problem is not an inadequate supply of family-sustaining jobs; it’s a workforce lacking in skills, training and education. The skills gap thesis has been spread by influential pundits like the New York Times' Thomas Friedman, top CEOs like Caterpillar's Doug Oberhelman, and PIMCO hedge fund owner Bill Gross, who declared, “Our labor force is too expensive and poorly educated for today's marketplace." ¶ In my home state of Wisconsin, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel has repeatedly given lavish coverage to a November 2011 comment by Tim Sullivan, former CEO of Bucyrus International and special advisor to Gov. Scott Walker on workforce development: “We don’t have a jobs crisis in Milwaukee, we have an education crisis.”¶ But in a study released this week called “The Skills Gap and Unemployment in Wisconsin: Separating Fact From Fiction,” urbanologist Marc Levine, a professor of history and economic development at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, applies a data-laden sledgehammer to this notion. And while Levine’s report focused primarily on Wisconsin, his critique of the “skills gap” notion has national implications.¶ Levine’s report decimates the skills gap thesis one point at a time:¶ False: The skills of the workforce somehow dropped sharply between 2007 and 2009. Numerous studies by Nobel laureates, highly regarded economics institutes, and two former chairs of presidential councils of economic advisers all conclude that a sudden dropoff in workers’ skills over two years is utterly implausible as an explanation for massive unemployment. In the words of economist Heidi Shierholz of the Economic Policy Institute, “It is not the right workers we are lacking, it is work."¶ False: There is a vast pool of high-skilled jobs waiting to be filled. As Levine commented in the report, “Even if every unemployed person were perfectly matched to existing jobs, over 2/3 of all jobless would still be out of work.” ¶ False: Employers are trying in vain to attract skilled workers. If a “skills shortage” truly existed, employers would raise wages to attract workers with the special skills they seek. Instead, wages have fallen in Wisconsin since 2000, including in occupations like welding, where there is a supposed shortage of workers, Levine pointed out.¶ False: Understaffed employers must make do with the skilled workers they have. A shortage of sought-after workers would lead employers to increase these workers’ hours. However, the report says, "average weekly hours worked in manufacturing have remained unchanged since 2000, while the average weekly overtime hours have actually declined by 12.8 percent since 2000."¶ False: New high-skill jobs have been created. Overall, Wisconsin retains a jobs deficit of 243,000, based on job losses since the Great Recession plus new positions needed for entrants into the labor market, according to a study by the Center on Wisconsin Strategy. Though Scott Walker came into office in 2011 famously promising the creation of 250,000 jobs during his four-year term, Wisconsin has ranked 42nd in job creation out of the 50 states.¶ False: Workers with advanced degrees are more highly sought-after. A pervasive skills gap would raise the demand for workers with higher skills, measured in indicators like college degrees. Instead, the percentage of college-educated workers in jobs where they are obviously overqualified—as bartenders and retail clerks, for example—has risen sharply. "College graduates comprise 25% of retail salespersons and 21.6% of bartenders in the Milwaukee metro area—both jobs classified as requiring less than a high school diploma," the report reads. ¶ False: The American job market will increasingly demand higher-skilled workers. Forecasts of future workforce needs show not an increased demand for high education and skills, but for occupations that require a high school degree or less, according to the report: "Of the 25 jobs projected by the Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Development to provide the largest number of job openings in the state between 2010-2020, 22 of them require a high school degree or less and almost all require short-term, on-the-job training."¶ Speaking with Working In These Times, Levine blasted media like the Journal Sentinel for recklessly spreading the “skills gap” myth. “They’ve relied on anecdotes and claims by CEOs that simply don’t measure up to reality,” says Levine. “There are still three unemployed people for every possible job opening.”¶ Adding injury to insult, the purveyors of the skills gap myth don’t just sidestep corporate responsibility for the shortage of well-paying jobs; they use the alleged deficiency in the workforce to justify shifting jobs out of Wisconsin. ¶ In 2008, while still CEO of Bucyrus International (now part of Caterpillar), Tim Sullivan—Wisconsin's leading alarmist on the skills gap—decried a shortage of “qualified, factory-grade” welders in Milwaukee. Sullivan proceeded to move about 80 welding jobs to Kilgore, Texas. ¶ However, Sullivan’s rationale doesn’t hold up under scrutiny. To quote the report, “Around the time Bucyrus was opening its Kilgore plant, there were 635 unemployed welders in metro Milwaukee, and 1,935 unemployed welders in Wisconsin.” The real attraction of Kilgore was likely not skills, but savings: Workers in Kilgore make lower salaries—31 percent of welders make less than $25,000, compared to only 22 percent in Milwaukee—and, very significantly, are not unionized.¶ “The people pushing the skills gap have an agenda that they are not talking about publicly,” Levine told Working In These Times, “and that agenda focuses on keeping wages low and having non-union workers.”

Secretary of energy takes the blame
Cohen, 08 [Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/congress-should-not-tamper-with-the-strategic-petroleum-reserve] 

A Vital Fuel Reserve The SPR is a 700 million-barrel emergency store of oil maintained by the national government for a very rainy day: a war or a sudden interruption of the oil supply from one or more of the unstable countries-Venezuela, Nigeria, and the Persian Gulf states-from which the U.S. buys fuel. Established in the aftermath of the 1973-1974 oil embargo, the SPR gives the President a powerful response option should a disruption in commercial oil supplies threaten the U.S. economy. It also allows the United States to meet part of its International Energy Agency obligation to maintain emergency oil stocks and provides a national defense fuel reserve. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Secretary of Energy to fill the SPR to its authorized billion-barrel capacity. As President George W. Bush has said, the U.S. is addicted to foreign oil-and the country has yet to cure itself of this condition: It imports 64 percent of the 20 million barrels per day that it consumes, and the habit is growing. Oil accounts for 40 percent of U.S. energy consumption, most of it for transportation. Unless and until the U.S. is no longer hooked on oil, having a reliable emergency stock is vital, especially in today's volatile world. Currently, the SPR is 27 million barrels short of its 727 million-barrel target, which would suffice for only 75 days of consumption. In his January 23, 2007, State of the Union Address, the President announced his decision to expand the SPR to 1.5 billion barrels "to further protect America against disruptions to our oil supply." The nation's need for an expanded SPR is based on (a) growing U.S. consumption, increased imports, and ever greater international risks and (b) U.S. obligations under the International Energy Program, which requires that the United States maintain a 90-day stockpile of petroleum imports. This is the minimum that a superpower should have for a global emergency. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is, first and foremost, a tool of national security policy. It was never intended that the SPR would be used to tamper with the market or to play politics, that its oil would be released in order to bring prices down, or that we would stop filling the SPR to accommodate either the market or short-term electoral interests in the campaign season. Risky Schemes Regrettably, those who are supposed to be in charge of this policy would like to appear to be "doing something" for the voters about the painful gas price issue. Thus, the Democrat-sponsored Consumer First Energy Act of 2008, Title III, Sec. 301, proposes that oil acquisition for the SPR be suspended. Beyond that, the Democrats are effectively suggesting that the President not resume filling the Reserve-possibly ever. The legislation's authors would like to tamper arbitrarily with the market price of oil, suggesting that the President may resume acquisition of oil for the SPR only if the weighted average oil price falls to less than $75 for three months. The Democrats even want to tamper with existing contracts by instructing the Secretary of Energy to "negotiate a deferral of the delivery of the oil for a period of not less than one year." Republicans, in the Domestic Energy Production Act of 2008, echo the same theme: They would like to suspend oil acquisition for the SPR for 180 days. Neither of these approaches will work, and both could be dangerous. Cutting supply to the SPR could jeopardize America's ability to respond to crises around the world, to fulfill its international obligations, and to protect the homeland and our allies. Negative Impact It is unlikely that the availability of the additional rather insignificant quantity of oil at issue-only 70,000 barrels a day-could make a serious dent in today's skyrocketing oil prices. The U.S. Energy Information Administration has already forecast that, at best, the price of oil might drop by $2 a barrel, cutting gasoline prices by 4-5 cents a gallon. Seventy-thousand barrels of oil is only one-20th of what drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) would produce and possibly only one-50th of what could be produced if exploration and drilling were allowed along the east and west U.S. continental shelves and in the Gulf of Mexico. Stopping SPR replenishment would be literally penny-wise and pound-foolish, as the result could be a shortage of fuel that denies the U.S. military operational freedom in a crisis. Moreover, congressional tampering with presidential authority to fill the SPR may be unconstitutional as it interferes with the executive branch's authority to conduct national security policy and defend the country.

That shields politics
Dobkin 8—past Chairperson of the Immigration Law Section of the Oakland County (Michigan) Bar Association and has lectured and presented seminars on immigration in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. (Donald, THE RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: APRESCRIPTION FOR LAWLESSNESS, www.law.ku.edu/publications/journal/pdf/v17n3/dobkin.pdf)
Because an agency’s actions often receive far less media attention than the actions of the President, the general public is often unaware of political decisions being made at the agency level. This lack of accountability in general makes it easier to pursue a political agenda at the agency level. 25 President George W. Bush has also used the inattention to agency action to pursue some of the more unpopular aspects of his political agenda to avoid direct accountability. 

For example, rather than openly challenging environmental protections, President Bush has used agencies to help him pursue his anti-environmental agenda to ensure the “systematic dismantling of various environmental regulations.” 26 ¶ The White House’s tightening of control via executive orders had its origins in the alteration of the context of presidential leadership during the 1960’s and 1970’s: [table omitted]¶ In an era of growing budget deficits, divided government, a more open political process, and a general loss of public faith in “big government,” presidents beginning with Richard Nixon no longer saw unalloyed benefits in relying on “neutral” staff agencies. Instead, they sought greater political responsiveness. This meant relying more heavily on aides within the White House Office, and appointing political loyalists to exercise topdown control of the other Executive Office of the President (EOP) agencies. 27 ¶ The attached Table 1 illustrates the magnitude of the EOP, which by 2004 had reached 1,731 staffers ranging from everything to Homeland Security Staff, OMB, CEA, and other agencies:¶ During this same time period, “presidents have increased the number of political appointees at the upper levels of the non-White House EOP agencies, and brought the agencies more tightly under White House staff control.” 29 The appointment process has allowed presidents to use agencies as a means for major—and often unpopular—policy changes. For instance, President Reagan made “a series of fox-in-the-chicken-coop appointments to undermine public interest regulation,” notably of his infamous anti-environment interior secretary, James Watt. 30 Many commentators have noted that the current Bush Administration has made similar appointments. 31 These types of appointments make it difficult for agencies to exhibit expertise and to execute the law in an impartial manner. As a result, we are left with “a more thoroughly politicized, White House-dominated EOP, but one that is short on institutional memory, administrative expertise, and organizational continuity.” 32 ¶ The rise in the presidentially-led Administrative States merely reflects the growing use—and creation—of unilateral powers by the President:¶ To pursue a unilateral strategy, of course, presidents must be able to justify their actions on some blend of statutory, treaty or constitutional powers; and when they cannot, their only recourse is legislation. But given the ambiguity of Article II powers and the massive corpus of law that presidents can draw upon . . . the appeal of unilateral powers is readily apparent. 33 ¶ Although some would argue that a unilateral executive branch is justified based on the majoritarian “mandate” produced by a presidential election, it is difficult to take this notion very seriously when “a President can be elected without obtaining a majority of the popular vote—as in the cases of President Clinton in 1992 and 1996 and President George W. Bush in 2000.” 34 Indeed, in the 2000 election, the winning candidate did not even garner a plurality of the popular vote. 35 Furthermore, presidential elections often center on issues like national security, which are far removed from the everyday decisions of administrative agencies. 36 ¶ The situation is only likely to worsen. In the early days of President George W. Bush’s administration, Professor Kagan predicted that President Bush would continue Clinton’s “expansion of presidential administration.” 37 Professor Sargentich has noted that this prediction has undoubtedly “come to pass,” as exemplified by recent executive branch acts such as the OMB’s farreaching and controversial Peer Review Bulletin, which guides agency decisions. 38