# 1

## Contention One: Our Interpretation

## A. Interpretation: Debate should be a site for contest over political proposals. This requires that the affirmative present a resolutional plan of action for the United States federal government to reform visa policy and defend that their policy should be adopted.

## B. Our interpretation is Grounded in the Resolution

**1. The topic is defined by the phrase following the colon—the USFG is the agent of the resolution, not the individual debaters**

**Webster’s** Guide to Grammar and Writing **2k**

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go one…**If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief** and **the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence**, beginning the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

## 2. The United States Federal Government is the one in D.C.

**ENCARTA WORLD ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA**, 20**06**, p. http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781/United\_States\_(Government).html

United States Government, the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington, D.C.

## 3. Should implies policy – it expresses that the government has a duty or obligation

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language04

("should." *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. 20 Sep. 2006. <Dictionary.com <http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=should>>)

**should** (shd) Pronunciation Key

aux.v. Past tense of shall

**Used to express obligation or duty:** You should send her a note.

## C. Violation –

## 1. The affirmative fails to defend the consequences of implementation of a plan carried out by the United States federal government to reform visa policy.

## Contention Two: Reasons to Prefer

## Resolution centered debate is critical to a fair debate – it’s a voting issue.

## 1. Predictability-

## A. the resolution sets the topic for discussion- allowing the aff to choose their ground outside of the resolution makes it impossible for the negative to engage the affirmative. There are an infinite amount of non-policy advocacies unrelated to the topic which are impossible to predict- this leaves the negative unprepared to debate

## B. Aff conditionality- only a resolutionally-based plan prevents shifting advocacies- their framework allows aff vagueness, enabling the aff to become a moving target which destroys discussion, advocacy skills and fair ground

## C. The resolution presents an agreed question which is the focus of the debate. Debate is worthless without the predictability that is necessary to generate a starting point for discussion

Ruth **Shively**, former professor of political science at Texas A&M, 20**00** (Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 181-2)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say “no” to- they must reject and limit- some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say “yes” to some thing particular, they must say “yes” to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the **basic accord** that **is necessary to discord**. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of **limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate**. As John Courtney Murray writes: **We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them**. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. **There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement**. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, **we cannot argue about something if** we are not communicating: if **we cannot agree on the topic** and terms of argument **or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument**. At the very least, **we must agree about what** it is that **is being debated before we can debate it**. For instance, **one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group.** One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement** or communication **about what is being contested**. Resisters, demonstrators, and **debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject** and/or the terms **of their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony**.

## D. Unpredictable or unfair debates preclude an informed discussion that allows us to critically examine their approach- this prevents informed clash which outweighs all other impacts - fairness is a prerequisite because we can’t test the truth-value of an argument or advocacy without rigorously examining it.

## 2. Education -

## A. policy options are key to real world education about possible reforms- their framework devastates learning about the real world with reciprocal and clear deliberation about the merits of an idea

## B. Topical Education—by manipulating the topic to access their political project they skirt debate about the implementation of policies by the government. Their education is distrusting of institutional study and pragmatic reform. Even if their intentions are noble, their message results in fascist totalitarianism

Martin W. **Lewis**, Professor of Geography and Regional Science at George Washington University, 19**92** (Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism. Page 247)

A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. **It is actually possible that radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today’s students may embrace only the new creed’s rejection of the past**. **Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism’s contempt for established social and political philosoph**y—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—**may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors’ intentions**.

## C. Implementation- the aff will always win the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract- we can only debate the merits of arguments if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation

Michael **Ignatieff**, Harvard Carr Center for Human Rights Policy director and human rights practices professor, **04** (*The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror*, 20-21)

There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that **articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is** relatively **easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases.** What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? **Even when** legal and **moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice.** Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. **To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life** when under terrorist attack **might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers**. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

## D. Informed Citizens - Fiat is key to being informed citizens, without it we never learn about the political process and don’t take responsibility for the possible bad outcomes of our actions. Simulating policy solves all their offense, allowing people a safe space to test new ideas

Christopher C. **Joyner,** Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, Spring 19**99** (Teaching International Law: Views From An International Relations Political Scientist, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377)

Use of the **debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education** in the social sciences. Debates, like other **role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But,** unlike other simulation games, **debates do not require that a student participate directly** in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, **debates present** the **alternatives** and consequences **in a formal**, rhetorical **fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the** class **audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion** on the issue **by providing contrasting** facts and **views and enabling** audience **members to pose challenges to each** debating **team.**

These **debates ask** undergraduate **students to examine the** international legal **implications of various** United States **foreign policy actions.** Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. **Debate questions are formulated as resolutions**, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." **In addressing both sides of these** legal **propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature** of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. **By assessing** the role of international law in **U**nited **S**tates **foreign policy**- making, **students realize that U**nited **S**tates **actions do not always measure up to** international legal **expectations; that at times,** international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of **international law, like domestic law, can be** interpreted and **twisted in order to justify U**nited **S**tates **policy in various** international **circumstances.** In this way, **the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations** and other action learning techniques, **in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become** legal **advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring** political and legal **perceptions to fit the merits of their case.** The **debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives**. First, **students** on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they **gain greater insight into the real-world** legal **dilemmas faced by policy makers.** Second, **as they work with** other members of **their team, they realize the complexities of** applying and implementing international **law**, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, **research for** the debates **forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the** United States **foreign policy agenda** and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The **debate** thus **becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.**

## Independently, the aff isn’t topical- it’s a voting issue even without the rest of the framework debate

## Increase is to make greater

**Dictionary.com Unabridged**

[Based on the Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2010., "Increase," http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/increase, accessed 8-1-10, mss]

in·crease   [v. in-krees; n. in-krees] Show IPA verb, -creased, -creas·ing, noun

–verb (used with object)

1.to make greater, as in number, size, strength, or quality; augment; add to: to increase taxes.

## They net decrease energy production- even if they increase it in the long run, the aff relies on REDUCING dependence on the grid. That makes the topic bidirectional, making the neg have to prepare to have specific debates on both sides of the resolution- the aff always wins

# 2

## Fixed identities are the basis for systems of oppression- collaborative movements are responsible for the dichotomies that deny the queer body in the first place

Joshua **Gamson**, professor of sociology at the University of San Francisco, 19**95**

(“Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma”, Social Problems, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp. 390-407, JSTOR) RKB

On the one hand, lesbians and gay men have made themselves an effective force in this country over the past several decades largely by giving themselves what civil rights movements had: a public collective identity. Gay and lesbian social movements have built a quasi ethnicity, complete with its own political and cultural institutions, festivals, neighborhoods, even its own flag. Underlying that ethnicity is typically the notion that what gays and lesbians share-the anchor of minority status and minority rights claims-is the same fixed, natural essence, a self with same-sex desires. The shared oppression, these movements have forcefully claimed, is the denial of the freedoms and opportunities to actualize this self. In this ethnic/essentialist politic, 3 clear categories of collective identity are necessary for successful resistance and political gain. Yet this impulse to build a collective identity with distinct group boundaries has been met by a directly opposing logic, often contained in queer activism (and in the newly anointed "queer theory"): to take apart the identity categories and blur group boundaries. This alternative angle, influenced by academic "constructionist" thinking, holds that sexual identities are historical and social products, not natural or intra psychic ones. It is socially produced binaries (gay/straight, man/woman) that are the basis of oppression; fluid, unstable experiences of self become fixed primarily in the service of social control. Disrupting those categories, refusing rather than embracing ethnic minority status, is the key to liberation. In this deconstructionist politic, clear collective categories are an obstacle to resistance and change. The challenge for analysts, I argue, is not to determine which position is accurate, but to cope with the fact that both logics make sense. Queerness spotlights a dilemma shared by other identity movements (racial, ethnic, and gender movements, for example):4 Fixed identity categories are both the basis for oppression and the basis for political power. This raises questions for political strategizing and, more importantly for the purposes here, for social movement analysis. If identities are indeed much more unstable, fluid, and constructed than movements have tended to assume-if one takes the queer challenge seriously, that iswhat happens to identity-based social movements such as gay and lesbian rights? Must sociopolitical struggles articulated through identity eventually undermine themselves?

**Heteronormativity creates an invisible center around which abnormal ways of life are organized and violently systemically eliminated in the name of normalization.**

**Yep, Professor of Communication Studies at San Francisco State University, 2004**. (Gust A., Ph.D. in Communication., *Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the Discipline(s)*, pg. 18). Jt

In this passage, Simmons vividly describes the devastating persuasiveness of hatred and violence in her daily life based on being seen, perceived, labeled, and treated as an “Other.” **This process of othering creates individuals, groups, and communities that are deemed to be less important, less worthwhile, less consequential, less authorized, and less human based on historically situated markers of social formation such as race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and nationality. Othering and marginalization are results of an “invisible center”** (Ferguson, 1990, p.3). The authority, position, and power of such a center are attained through normalization in an ongoing circular movement. **Normalization is the process of constructing, establishing, producing, and reproducing a taken-for-granted and all-encompassing standard used to measure goodness, desirability, morality, rationality, superiority, and a host of other dominant cultural values**. **As such, normalization becomes one of the primary instruments of power in modern society** (Foucault, 1978/1990). **Normalization is a symbolically, discursively, psychically, psychologically, and materially violent form of social regulation and control, or as Warner (1993) more simply puts it, normalization is “the site of violence”** (p.xxvi). **Perhaps one of the most powerful forms of normalization in Western social systems is heteronormativity. Through heteronormative discourses, abject and abominable bodies, souls, persons, and life forms are created, examined, and disciplined through current regimes of knowledge and power**

**(Foucault, 1978/1990). Heteronormativity, as the invisible center and the presumed bedrock of society, is the quintessential force creating, sustaining, and presumed bedrock of society, is the quintessential force creating, sustaining, and perpetuating the erasure, marginalization, disempowerment, and oppression of sexual others. Heternormativity is ubiquitous in all spheres of social life yet remains largely invisible and elusive.** According to Berlant and Warner (in Warner, 2002), heteronormativity refers to: "the institutions, structures of understanding, and practical orientations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organized as a sexuality – but also a privileged. Its coherence is always provisional, and its privilege can take several (sometimes cotradictory) forms: unmarked as the basic idiom of the personal and the social; of marked as natural state; or projected as an ideal or moral accomplishment. It consists less of norms that could be summarized as a body of doctrine than of a sense of rightness produced in contradictory manifestations – often unconscious, immanent to practive or to institutions. (pg 309, my emphasis). **Heteronormativity makes heterosexuality hegemonic through the process of normalization. Although it is experienced consciously or unconsciously and with different degrees of pain and suffering, this process of normalization is a site of violence in the lives of women, men, and transgenders – across the spectrum of sexualities – in modern Western Societies.** Not unlike the experiences of children who must learn to survive in an emotionally and physically abusive environment where violence is the recipe for daily existence (Miller, 1990), 1991, 1998, 2001), individuals living in the heteronormative regime used to learn to conform, ignore, and banish their suffering to survive. The process of coping by repressing the pain and identifying with the perpetrator is, in my view, a powerful mechanism for heteronormativity to perpetuate itself in current forms of social organization. Drawing from the work of feminists and womanists, critical scholars, and mental health researchers, I identify and examine the injurious and violent nature of heteronormativity in this section. For purposes of discussion, I focus on the violence of heteronormativity enacted upon: (a) women inside the heteronormative borders, (b) men inside the heteronormative borders, (c) lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer people and (d) individuals living at the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality.

**Vote negative to queer concepts of freedom- that negation is a strategy of resistance that allows us to disrupt heteronormativity by tracing back to the points where identities were constructed.**

**Winnubst 06**

(Shannon philosophy PhD, Penn State UniversityShannon, Queering Freedom 2006. p 139 GoogleBooks, CW, accessed on 11/25/10)

So, why queer freedom? As queer theory has demonstrated for some time, categories of identity narrow our field of vision, and subsequently our fields of resistance. They constrict our experiences into parameters that are too sharply delineated and differentiated from one another: none of us experiences this complex world as only a gender or a race or a class or a nationality or sexuality, and so on. The infamous ‘and so on’ already renders any such listing of identities incomplete. And yet identity categories, and the identity politics that they spawn, claim completion: they claim to totalize our experience of ourselves and of the world. To queer freedom is not to disavow the political work of calling out the power differentials buried in these identity categories: it is not to return us to the allegedly neutral space of ‘the human.’ To queer freedom is, on the contrary, to deepen our grasp of the historicity of these categories. The conflation of dominant subjectivities with the posture of neutrality that we find in our contemporary cultures of phallicized whiteness did not occur recently. It reaches back, at a minimum, to the emergence of classical liberalism in the seventeenth century and its valorization of particular kinds of labor, rationality, temporality—and thereby of particular bodies, particular identities. We need to return to those roots of classical liberalism and trace out its subtle valorization of these characteristics, if we are to historicize the categories of identity that have since become some of its best tools.27 This work of historicizing our categories of identity is, among other activities, the work of queering freedom. It will both give us a deeper sense of how these categories emerged and show how the categories themselves intersect and interact to perpetuate the systems of domination in which we now find ourselves living. I develop much of this through the logic of the limit, a kind of logic that binds classical liberalism to phallicized whiteness through the shared value of individualism—a cornerstone, in turn, of advanced capitalism. Individualism simultaneously demands two apparently contradictory moves: 1) that we transcend material differences and understand ourselves as “just human”; and 2) that we conceive of ourselves through the rigid categories of identity that lock us into raced, sexed, classed (and so on) individuals. Individualism demands both identity and difference: the first of these perpetuates the Myth of Sameness, while the second reduces our subjectivities to the delimited categories of difference. But these categories of difference are ultimately that which must be transcended—erased—if we are to ascend into the treasured neutrality of humanity. And, even more perniciously, these categories of difference only lock us into politics of alleged resistance, wherein difference is pitted against difference

(e.g., the old story of race or gender), while the one who transcends such differences altogether walks away unscathed. In Hegelian parlance, difference is always only mediated by identity here. The logic of the limit shows how these concepts of identity and difference are ultimately two sides of the same coin—namely, the currency of phallicized whiteness. It also rings a loud cautionary note about the viability of any politics of resistance that grounds itself in identity. The logic of the limit thereby helps to excavate how classical liberalism presents a hollow concept of freedom. In classical liberalism, freedom holds itself out as the transgression of boundaries and liberation from constraint. For example, we might think that we will liberate ourselves from domination if we engage in transgressive behaviors that violate our designated race, sex, gender, class, nationality, or religion. But the logic of the limit shows, as Bataille and Foucault among others also see, that such notions of freedom as the transgression of boundaries or liberation from constraint only enmesh us further in the very systems of domination we seek to resist. To queer freedom we must learn not only to resist the limited notions of difference enacted in categories of identity, but to resist differently altogether

# 3

## Engaging political questions corrupts our relationship to god

**Copeland, University of Miami School of Law associate professor, 9**

(Charlton C., "God-Talk in the Age of Obama: Theology and Religious Political Engagement," Denver University Law Review, 86 Denv. U.L. Rev. 663, 2009, l/n, accessed 1-27-12, mss)

The rejection of the social order and its culture as a response to the call of Jesus Christ represents the separatist resolution to the problem of Christ and Culture. Based on its theological interpretation of both the identity and activity of Jesus Christ and the social order as impossibly at odds, the exclusivist Christian articulates a resolution that places Christ against culture. The exclusivist reads the gap between Christ and culture as unbridgeable, and resolves that **the social order must be rejected, if Christ is to be retained**. **The rejection of "the world" and abdication of responsibility for its transformation is the outcome** of the exclusivist's theological worldview. Adherents of the exclusivist type foreground Jesus' identity as the founder of a new law. The exclusivist's interpretation of the meaning of the life of Jesus emphasizes the power, authority, and love of God, as evidenced in the person of Jesus, and the command that man respond to God through love of neighbor. n16 Jesus inaugurates a new order at whose root lies love. To the extent that the "new creation" requires a changed community, the evidence of the community's authentic commitment to the sovereignty of Jesus is its response to the commands of God in its actions. This chasm between the new creation and the social order is evident in the gap between the norms that govern each domain. In contrast to the "new creations" norm of love, the social order is governed and maintained by power, violence, and threat. n17 Richard Niebuhr describes the exclusivist type's view of the created order is "a realm under the power of evil." n18 The relationships in the realm of the world "characterized by the prevalence in it of lies, hatred, and murder; it is the heir of Cain." n19 The exclusivist's separation of Christ from culture is parasitic upon his understanding of the "nature and prevalence of sin." The exclusive Christian is required to reject the world because it continues to be a place in which sin persists. In fact, the world is not merely the place in which sin is resident, but the exclusivist maintains that sin is endemic to the world. Rather than explaining the prevalence of sin by locating it in hu [\*669] man nature, the exclusivist sites the explanation for sin's continued prevalence in the corrupted culture in which humanity resided. By distinction, those who are members of the community marked by the sovereign lordship of Jesus "have passed from the darkness [of the culture] into the light," and must separate from the world in order to maintain the purity and integrity of this community. n20 The exclusivist discourages Christian involvement in political life. Political life is envisaged as brutish and base. Political life in the social order is seen as involving nothing more than the pursuit and deployment of power. **The state and its maintenance through political life are incompatible with Christianity.** Beyond the merely neutral recognition of the state as necessary for the constraint of an otherwise sinful order, the exclusivist sees the state as "the chief offender against life." n21 The only safety against its domination is "nonparticpation." Thus the only appropriate resolution to the conflict between life in Christ and life in culture is near-complete separation of the two realms.

## Your ultimate concern ought to be how to be properly related to God- it’s the only worthwhile source of value

**Craig, Talbot School of Theology philosophy research professor, 4**

(Dr. William Lane, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Birmingham (England), Th.D. under from the University of Munich, "Does God Exist?" 2004, delveintojesus.com/Articles/64/Does-God-Exist.aspx, accessed 11-20-11, mss)

C. S. Lewis once remarked that God is not the sort of thing one can be moderately interested in. After all, if God does not exist, there's no reason to be interested in God at all. On the other hand, if God does exist, then this is of paramount interest, and our **ultimate concern** ought to be how to be **properly related** to this being upon whom we depend moment by moment for our very existence. So people who shrug their shoulders and say, "What difference does it make if God exists?" merely show that they haven't yet thought very deeply about this problem. Even atheist philosophers like Sartre and Camus who have thought very seriously about this problem admit that the existence of God makes a tremendous difference for man. Let me mention just three reasons why it makes a big difference whether God exists. 1. If God does not exist, **life is** ultimately **meaningless**. If your life is doomed to end in death, then ultimately it does not matter how you live. In the end it makes no ultimate difference whether you existed or not. Sure, your life might have a relative significance in that you influenced others or affected the course of history. But **ultimately [hu]mankind is doomed to perish in the heat death of the universe.** Ultimately it makes no difference who you are or what you do. Your life is inconsequential. Thus, the contributions of the scientist to the advance of human knowledge, the research of the doctor to alleviate pain and suffering, the efforts of the diplomat to secure peace in the world, the sacrifices of good people everywhere to better the lot of the human race ultimately all these come to nothing. Thus, if atheism is true, life is ultimately meaningless. 2. If God does not exist, then we must ultimately live without hope. If there is no God, then there is ultimately no hope for deliverance from the shortcomings of our finite existence. For example, there is no hope for deliverance from evil. Although many people ask how God could create a world involving so much evil, by far most of the suffering in the world is due to man's own inhumanity to man. The horror of two world wars during the last century effectively destroyed the 19th century's naive optimism about human progress. If God does not exist, then we are locked without hope in a world filled with gratuitous and unredeemed suffering, and there is no hope for deliverance from evil. Or again, if there is no God, there is no hope of deliverance from aging, disease, and death. Although it may be hard for you as university students to contemplate, the sober fact is that unless you die young, someday you you yourselfwill be an old man or an old woman, fighting a losing battle with aging, struggling against the inevitable advance of deterioration, disease, perhaps senility. And finally and inevitably you will die. There is no afterlife beyond the grave. Atheism is thus a philosophy without hope. 3. On the other hand, if God does exist, then not only is there meaning and hope, but there is also the possibility of coming to know God and His love personally. Think of it! That the **infinite God** should love you and want to be your personal friend! This **would be the highest status a human being could enjoy**! Clearly, if God exists, it makes not only a tremendous difference for mankind in general, but it could make a life-changing difference for you as well. Now admittedly none of this shows that God exists. But does show that it makes a tremendous difference whether God exists. Therefore, even if the evidence for and against the existence of God were absolutely equal, the rational thing to do, I think, is to believe in Him. That is to say, it seems to me positively irrational when the evidence is equal to prefer death, futility, and despair over hope, meaningfulness and happiness.

[Matt note: gender-paraphrased]

# Case

## Foucault’s critique of domination fails to create a system like the law to protect individuals from domination

**Litowitz 1997**

(Douglas E., visiting assistant professor at Chicago-Kent, Postmodern Philosophy and Law, p. 82-84)

And here is precisely where Foucault’s theory leads to problems. In order to generate a program for legal change, Foucault must provide some test to measure whether a law is good or bad, moral or immoral, just or unjust. This can only be done if there is some notion of the “man” or “self” who must be liberated, yet Foucault is curiously silent on the status of this “man” or “soul.” This is a problem for Foucault. If the soul is merely a historical construct (and not a deep structure with an innate yearning for freedom), it isn’t clear how the soul (or mankind) is injured by the trend toward the disciplinary society and the carceral network.57 Traditionally one looks to the Constitution and the legal system to provide some limits on the extent to which the individual can be controlled and dominated. Unfortunately, Foucault thinks that one cannot contest the disciplinary network by invoking inherent rights against oppression because he has rejected the framework of innate rights as being part of the problem in the first place— it was precisely under cover of such notions that humanity ended up in a carceral society. Foucault thinks that one cannot look to the legal system for protection but must seek an alternative escape from domination: “If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty.”58 What Foucault is saying here, oddly enough, is that since the juridical notions of emancipation (freedom, privacy, autonomy) are themselves merely devices which facilitate power relations, there is no point in using these notions as protection against an abuse of power: “It is not through recourse to sovereignty against discipline that the effects of disciplinary power can be limited, because sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral constituents of the general mechanism of power in our society.”59 Foucault’s point is that one cannot use juridical principles (e.g., the law) as a defense against discipline because the law is, in fact, part of the disciplinary network. The disciplines are coercive, but so are the laws which purport to protect the individual from the disciplines. Given this situation, it is hard to envision an escape from domination; Foucault can only point toward the possible emergence of a “new form of right” that is neither disciplinary nor based on juridical principles. To flesh out this “new form of right” that struggles against the disciplines, one might turn to Foucault’s final works on the history of sexuality. In these Foucault explored the possibility of an ethics of self-mastery in which the subject could create him or herself through an aesthetic process. As Foucault explained: “From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art.” Presumably this project would have political ramifications in that the just state would allow thus type of aesthetic transformation. Ostensibly this would require a “new form of right” divorced from the classical juridical model; unfortunately, Foucault cannot tell us very much about this new form of right, apart from some vague statements about the need for new forms of subjectivity: The political, ethical, social, and philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state ‘s institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.6’ It seems that Foucault is calling for the creation of new forms of right and subjectivity, yet he fails to specify the parameters of such new forms. Frankly, he seems to be fumbling around in his effort to envision a more desirable political and legal system. He admittedly says that at each point at which power is exercised there is the possibility of resistance, but it is unclear how Foucault could generate an overarching program which explains why we must resist, who is resisting, and where and when resistance should be offered. Foucault may have his reasons for abstaining from these types of claims, but they are precisely the questions that need to be answered if we want to generate a positive jurisprudence.

## Foucault's critique cannot support a coherent system of laws

**Litowitz 1997**

(Douglas E., visiting assistant professor at Chicago-Kent,Postmodern Philosophy and Law, p. 81-82)

Certainly, Foucualt’s analysis generates insights into the law, but can it provide the normative grounds for a program of legal reform? In what follows I will argue that Foucault does not have a program for a positive jurisprudence, and therefore should be understood chiefly as a social critic who points out the failure of the Enlightenment to live up to its own emnancipatory pretensions. In other words, I see Foucault as offering a critical perspective on modern law (from an external vantage point), but I don’t see him as offering a program of legal change within the system of modern law. Much of Foucault’s work seems to play out the Nietzschean theme that “the highest values devalue themselves. “ Foucault wants to show that what seemed like progress in politics (the arrival of democracy, the power of reason, and the humanitarian reform of the prison) is in fact an excuse for repression and discipline. That is, the social changes made in the name of humanity (as well as freedom, truth, and liberty) have led to the creation of a society which is just as coercive as the barbaric practices from which humanity was trying to liberate itself, although it is barbarism of a subtle sort. Foucault points out that the civil state of the eighteenth century was heralded as the delivery of the individual from brute power, yet it has handed the individual over to another type of power which is more diffuse, decentralized, and involves constant monitoring arid normalization. Foucault’s overarching theme is that there is a “dark side” to the Enlightenment5’ As he explains, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous.”53 Foucault’s questioning of “everything” extends to a problematization of the very use of “reason,” which thereby calls into question the Enlightenment notion that reason is a neutral court of appeal. Instead, we should see reason as a tool, a tactic, employed for specific ends: “I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and What are its dangers?” Not only is reason suspect, but justice is suspect as Well: “I will he a little bit Nietzschean about this. . - - [Ijt seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea Which in effect has been invented and put to Work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power.”55 Judging from these comments, Foucault’s approach to law can be seen as questioning such basic ideas in jurisprudence as neutrality, objectivity, reason, freedom, and justice. We automatically view these as the building blocks of jurisprudential theory and seldom see them as problematic in and of themselves. For example, we employ legal reasoning as a way of reaching a just decision in a legal case, but we seldom bother to ask the following questions of legal reasoning itself as a “discursive practice”: When was it first employed? For what purpose? Who determines the parameters of acceptable legal reasoning and to what effect? These are important, critical questions that can (and should) be asked of traditional jurisprudence. But in order to make the claim that the new methods of discipline are “bad” or “morally impermissible,” Foucault will need to employ the time-honored (but discredited) concepts of reason, neutrality, and inherent dignity. **In short, he must have recourse to some sort of normative ground in order to anchor his critique of the carceral society**. Foucault’s hidden normative agenda rises to the surface time and again, as evidenced in the following call for struggle against the seemingly neutral institutions of the modern state: “It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent: to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them.”56 But if Foucault doesn’t like the way in which the disciplines and the law are headed, then he needs some mechanism whereby he can critique them as immoral. It is hard to see how Foucault’s positivistic, descriptive analysis of modern law could give rise to a value judgment that this law has been erected at the expense of mankind. Most important, who is this “man” (if he exists for Foucault) who has been harmed by modernity? It seems that Foucault’s theory implies and needs to imply—a particular view of man which he never outlines or discusses but simply adopts as the victim of disciplinary society.)

## Foucault’s nihilistic framework destroys the law, which is our last line of defense against domination

**Litowitz 1997**

(Douglas E., visiting assistant professor at Chicago-Kent,Postmodern Philosophy and Law, p.84)

Here, I think, one must finally admit that Foucault cannot generate a positive jurisprudence. By arguing that one cannot look to the juridical notions of privacy and autonomy as a defense against the disciplines, **Foucault eliminates the possibility of an emancipatory program of jurisprudence.** For it is these juridical notions of autonomy and privacy, however jaded, which are the only available way to challenge the disciplinary network. Even though the law can be faulted for enabling the disciplines (it was under cover of the law that individuals were subjected to discipline), the law remains the best way to resist the disciplines on the grounds that they violate basic constitutional rights. For example, the best way to challenge inhumane police tactics is to claim that they infringe on privacy, that they are cruel and unusual, or that they violate the right against self-incrimination. It may be a cliché, but **our rights are the last line of defense against inhumane treatment.**

Foucault cannot make this move because he thinks that these rights are mere chimeras which have, in fact, furthered the domination of the individual. By making this move, Foucault paints himself into a corner**: he decries the disciplines and the legal system, refusing to see the law as an avenue for protection of the individual**. **This nihilistic attitude may strike some as overly defeatist.** As Cohn Gordon writes “Readers of Foucault sometimes emerge with a dismaying impression of a paranoid hyper-rationalist system in which the strategies-technologies-programs of power merge into a monolithic regime of social

subjugation.

## Foucault’s theories cede the political

**Boggs, professor of social sciences at National University, 1997**

(Carl, “The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America”, December, Volume 26, Number 6, http://www.springerlink.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/content/m7254768m63h16r0/fulltext.pdf, ldg)

While multiple sites of power and resistance need to be more clearly theorized than in the past, and while Marxian fixation on class struggle, the primacy of capital-labor relations, and social totality has lost its rationale, the extreme postmodern assault on macro institutions severs the connection between critique and action. Moreover, to the extent that postmodernism embraces a notion of subjectivity that is decentered and fragmented, the very idea of citizenship gets obscured. As Philip Wexler argues, the social, legal, and political requirements of citizen- ship were historically founded upon universal norms of democracy, freedom, and equality, but postmodernism, which blurs everything and dissolves politics into the sphere of culture and everyday life, destroys this foundation. Once the subject melts into a murky cultural diffuse- ness, into a world of images and spectacles, the elements of citizenship simply evaporate.56 Various democratic ideals may be kept alive within the official ideology, mainly to legitimate the electoral ritual, but they fail to resonate with the times. AsWexler concludes: ``For now, citizen- ship will remain the appropriate sign of post-modernism and semiotic society ^ a restored sign artifact that may be recycled and used so long as it does not disturb contemporary society's profound need for super- ¢ciality.''57In the splintered, discontinuous world inhabited by Baurdrillard, Fou- cault, and kindred theorists, social bonds are weakened and the link between personal life and the public sphere is fractured. Where truth, language, and ideology are perpetually contested, nothing is settled or taken for granted. While this ethos corresponds well to an era in which emphasis is placed on local knowledge and identity movements, it is a depoliticizing ethos insofar as it blurs or dismisses macro forms of economic and political power. Where the state is either ignored or broken down into a mosaic of localized and partial entities, politics too winds up obliterated. Symbols and images become far more important than concrete struggles involving rival claims to power, economic interests, and visions of a better society.58

## Moving away from anti politics is vital to check the everyday problems

**Small, editorial director of Break Media, 2006**

(Jonathan, “Moving Forward”, 6-5, <http://www.mesacc.edu/other/engagement/Journal/Issue7/Small.pdf>, ldg)

What will be the challenges of the new millennium? And how should we equip young people to face these challenges? While we cannot be sure of the exact nature of the challenges, we can say unequivocally that humankind will face them together. If the end of the twentieth century marked the triumph of the capitalists, individualism, and personal responsibility, the new century will present challenges that require collective action, unity, and enlightened self-interest. Confronting global warming, depleted natural resources, global super viruses, global crime syndicates, and multinational corporations with no conscience and no accountability will require cooperation, openness, honesty, compromise, and most of all solidarity – ideals not exactly cultivated in the twentieth century. We can no longer suffer to see life through the tiny lens of our own existence. Never in the history of the world has our collective fate been so intricately interwoven. Our very existence depends upon our ability to adapt to this new paradigm, to envision a more cohesive society. With humankind’s next great challenge comes also great opportunity. Ironically, modern individualism backed us into a corner. We have two choices, work together in solidarity or perish together in alienation. Unlike any other crisis before, the noose is truly around the neck of the whole world at once. Global super viruses will ravage rich and poor alike, developed and developing nations, white and black, woman, man, and child. Global warming and damage to the environment will affect climate change and destroy ecosystems across the globe. Air pollution will force gas masks on our faces, our depleted atmosphere will make a predator of the sun, and chemicals will invade and corrupt our water supplies. Every single day we are presented the opportunity to change our current course, to survive modernity in a manner befitting our better nature. Through zealous cooperation and radical solidarity we can alter the course of human events. Regarding the practical matter of equipping young people to face the challenges of a global, interconnected world, we need to teach cooperation, community, solidarity, balance and tolerance in schools. We need to take a holistic approach to education. Standardized test scores alone will not begin to prepare young people for the world they will inherit. The three staples of traditional education (reading, writing, and arithmetic) need to be supplemented by three cornerstones of a modern education, exposure, exposure, and more exposure. How can we teach solidarity? How can we teach community in the age of rugged individualism? How can we counterbalance crass commercialism and materialism? How can we impart the true meaning of power? These are the educational challenges we face in the new century. It will require a radical transformation of our conception of education. We’ll need to trust a bit more, control a bit less, and put our faith in the potential of youth to make sense of their world. In addition to a declaration of the gauntlet set before educators in the twenty-first century, this paper is a proposal and a case study of sorts toward a new paradigm of social justice and civic engagement education. Unfortunately, the current pedagogical climate of public K-12 education does not lend itself well to an exploratory study and trial of holistic education. Consequently, this proposal and case study targets a higher education model. Specifically, we will look at some possibilities for a large community college in an urban setting with a diverse student body. Our guides through this process are specifically identified by the journal Equity and Excellence in Education. The dynamic interplay between ideas of social justice, civic engagement, and service learning in education will be the lantern in the dark cave of uncertainty. As such, a simple and straightforward explanation of the three terms is helpful to direct this inquiry. Before we look at a proposal and case study and the possible consequences contained therein, this paper will draw out a clear understanding of how we should characterize these ubiquitous terms and how their relationship to each other affects our study. Social Justice, Civic Engagement, Service Learning and Other Commie Crap Social justice is often ascribed long, complicated, and convoluted definitions. In fact, one could fill a good-sized library with treatises on this subject alone. Here we do not wish to belabor the issue or argue over fine points. For our purposes, it will suffice to have a general characterization of the term, focusing instead on the dynamics of its interaction with civic engagement and service learning. Social justice refers quite simply to a community vision and a community conscience that values inclusion, fairness, tolerance, and equality. The idea of social justice in America has been around since the Revolution and is intimately linked to the idea of a social contract. The Declaration of Independence is the best example of the prominence of social contract theory in the US. It states quite emphatically that the government has a contract with its citizens, from which we get the famous lines about life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Social contract theory and specifically the Declaration of Independence are concrete expressions of the spirit of social justice. Similar clamor has been made over the appropriate definitions of civic engagement and service learning, respectively. Once again, let’s not get bogged down on subtleties. Civic engagement is a measure or degree of the interest and/or involvement an individual and a community demonstrate around community issues. T

here is a longstanding dispute over how to properly quantify civic engagement. Some will say that today’s youth are less involved politically and hence demonstrate a lower degree of civic engagement. Others cite high volunteer rates among the youth and claim it demonstrates a high exhibition of civic engagement. And there are about a hundred other theories put forward on the subject of civic engagement and today’s youth. But one thing is for sure; today’s youth no longer see government and politics as an effective or valuable tool for affecting positive change in the world. Instead of criticizing this judgment, perhaps we should come to sympathize and even admire it. Author Kurt Vonnegut said, “There is a tragic flaw in our precious Constitution, and I don’t know what can be done to fix it. This is it: only nut cases want to be president.” Maybe the youth’s rejection of American politics isn’t a shortcoming but rather a rational and appropriate response to their experience. Consequently, the term civic engagement takes on new meaning for us today. In order to foster fundamental change on the systemic level, which we have already said is necessary for our survival in the twenty-first century, we need to fundamentally change our systems. Therefore, part of our challenge becomes convincing the youth that these systems, and by systems we mean government and commerce, have the potential for positive change. Civic engagement consequently takes on a more specific and political meaning in this context. Service learning is a methodology and a tool for teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and deepening practical understanding of a subject. Since it is a relatively new field, at least in the structured sense, service learning is only beginning to define itself. Through service learning students learn by experiencing things firsthand and by exposing themselves to new points of view. Instead of merely reading about government, for instance, a student might experience it by working in a legislative office. Rather than just studying global warming out of a textbook, a student might volunteer time at an environmental group. If service learning develops and evolves into a discipline with the honest goal of making better citizens, teaching social justice, encouraging civic engagement, and most importantly, exposing students to different and alternative experiences, it could be a major feature of a modern education. Service learning is the natural counterbalance to our current overemphasis on standardized testing. Social justice, civic engagement, and service learning are caught in a symbiotic cycle. The more we have of one of them; the more we have of all of them. However, until we get momentum behind them, we are stalled. Service learning may be our best chance to jumpstart our democracy. In the rest of this paper, we will look at the beginning stages of a project that seeks to do just that.

## Case impacts are inevitable-they can’t solve the mindset they are indicting:

## 1. Evolution- it makes groupings like nation states and violence inevitable.

**Shaw and Wong, British Columbia University and Simon Fraser University, 1987**

(International Studies Quarterly, “Ethnic Mobilization and the Seeds of Warfare: An Evolutionary Perspective”, 31:1, March, JSTOR, ldg)

Alexander’s hypothesis divides early human history into three broad periods of sociality (1979: 223): (1) small, polygynous, probably multimale bands that stayed together for protection against large predators; (2) small, polygynous, multimale bands that stayed together both for protection against large predators (probably through aggressive defenses), and in order to bring down large game; and (3) increasingly large polygynous, multimale bands that stayed together largely or entirely because of the threat of other, similar, nearby groups of humans. He submits that there is not an iota of evidence to support the idea that aggression and competition have not been central to human evolution. The point we wish to stress is that in the past one million years or so an increasing proportion of man’s “hostile environment” has been other nucleus ethnic groups engaged in resource competition. While the unit of selection remains that of the gene and their individual carriers, intergroup conflict has rendered groups of ever-expanding size and internal structure effective forces of selection. According to this idea, expansion of nucleus ethnic groups through intermarriage, or their expansion via amalgamation with other nucleus ethnic groups, was motivated by the fact that other groups were doing so. Failure to maintain a balance of power (initially in terms of numbers only), would inevitably mean the domination of group by a larger group and, consequently, equal access to fitness enhancing resources. From this perspective, large scale agriculture and an increasingly elaborate division of labor follow as concomitant developments. The Underlying momentum of such developments is “group selection” (to maintain the balance of power) which, in turn, is a consequence of “genetic selection.” Baer and McEachron (1982) extend Alexander’s hypothesis by proposing that the evolution of weapons had the effect of making unrelated individuals far more dangerous to one another, and that this, in turn, reduced intergroup transfer of individuals, and made nucleus ethnic groups much more closed. Weapons would have altered the costs and benefits of aggressive behavior as they could be developed faster than physiological protection against them would evolve. They could also be thrown, thereby removing the need for the attacker to be in close proximity to the attacked. Thus weapons would have lowered the cost of attacking while increasing the costs of being attacked. In doing so, they probably increased xenophobia, fear, and antagonism toward strangers. This would work to reduce intergroup transfer of individual where fighting was necessary initiation because(i) the costs of injury would be so much higher, and (ii) one group might have better, or unknown, weapons than others. One-group enmity would be strongly reinforced in the process The thrust of Baer and McEachron’s hypothesis is that one of the first evolutionary steps taken as weapons developed was to severely restrict individuals from changing groups. From the residents’ point of view, the admission of an extra-groups would have resulted in two beneficial effects from the standpoint of inclusive fitness. First, because of the increased tendency of males to remain in their natal group, the genetic relatedness among the adult males, and in the group as a whole, would increase. This would have increased solidarity among group members and thus cohesion of the group per se. It would also work to reduce within group aggression and thus genetic loss through injury or death from fighting. Second, the new high costs of overt aggression would act to change the character of the dominance system. Insofar as dominant individuals could not afford to be injured in rank-order fighting, there would be an increased selection for social skills in attaining and maintaining stoat, and decreased emphasis on overt aggression. These would combine to produce a more effective internal orienting of power relations to the extent that groups could be more quickly mobilized to meet the challenges from outsiders. In the process, intergroup conflict would select for greatly increased human capacity to recognize enemies versus relatives and friends (Alexander, 1971).

## 2. National Interest – mean nations won’t give up nuclear weapons or will at least fill in with conventional weapons.

**Payne, strategic studies professor Missouri St. University, 1998**

(Keith, “THE CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR ABOLITION AND FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE”, Comparative Strategy, 01495933, Jan-Mar98, Vol. 17, Issue 1, ebsco, ldg)

Those abolitionists who rely on the argument about globalization and interdependence to justify, and enable, nuclear disarmament, are simultaneously too optimistic and too pessimistic. This is not the place to offer a full critique of the view that the Westphalian international system has become impotent and obsolete. Clearly there is something to the globalization phenomenon, the information revolution, and the shrinkage of the globe in terms of physical accessibility--as well as evidence of loss of political control--but this hardly indicates the fundamental change in international politics suggested by many abolitionists. Nature, and power, abhor a vacuum. People will want to reassert control over their lives in the face of transnational forces of all sorts, and the nation-state still remains the means of choice to do so. The recent history of Europe and the former Soviet Union alone illustrates the continuing currency of the nation-state as the desire of peoples to regroup into nation-states following the cold war has led to the emergence of numerous new states. As nation-states try to reassert control over their domestic affairs and their national security, some will do better than others, and a hierarchy of regional powers and great powers will emerge in more or less traditional fashion: we will still have international relations, and the international system will be dominated and defined by the relationships between and among recognized great powers or bloc

s. Such a process will not be smooth, easy, predictable, or peaceful. Transnational and subnational forces are indeed powerful, and nations will struggle mightily to control, harness, or mitigate them. In many cases, this struggle may well be violent as some nations or blocs conclude that their ability to survive in this difficult world may require the use of force against other nations and peoples. As part of this process, new ideologies, associated with particular nations or "civilizations," may well emerge to offer new means of organization and power to deal with disorder, and to offer the prospect of control and even mastery of domestic and international environments. New ideologies might also offer new means of empire-building and new ways of creating alliances among like-minded powers. Peaceful international cooperation offers an avenue by which these transnational and even subnational pressures can be managed, and nations can be expected to pursue this route when they believe it is in their interests to do so. But events over the past several years must leave us cautious about the degree to which a truly cooperative international community and an international set of norms will replace more particular communities and sets of norms. To repeat: even if the post-cold war world is not one of business as usual, neither does it appear to move so far away from traditional, and competitive, international politics--where military power and deterrence calculations still matter a great deal. The abolitionists put the cart (disarmament) before the horse (the underlying political relationship) [ 65]. The massive drawdown in U.S. and Soviet/Russian nuclear forces did not precede, much less bring about, the end of the cold war. Instead, these reductions were enabled and symbolized by the improvement of political relations between Washington and Moscow in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This improvement required that one of those powers (the Soviet Union) change its political goals, and alter correspondingly the military forces and doctrine that supported those goals. Until then, negotiated nuclear or conventional force reductions were simply not in the cards. Some forms of armament and means of combat have been outlawed, such as soft-nosed bullets, chemical warfare, and the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space and the seabed, the Antarctic, and some other terrestrial regions. But such agreements generally codified only what all parties perceived as being relatively inconsequential. Such views can change, and are often abandoned in the heat of warfare--as evidenced by the use of chemical weapons by nations such as Iraq. In any case, nuclear weapons are a different order of military power: they remain the ultimate trump card, in that they cannot be combated by other known types of weapons [ 66]. At relatively high levels of nuclear forces, and/or with amicable political relations among nuclear powers, this potential military advantage may largely be negated or irrelevant. But at very low, or zero, levels, the temptation to use the advantages that nuclear weapons can provide, if only via coercion or deterrence, could be irresistible to a revisionist power. By the same token, states such as Israel, which truly believe their survival to be at stake in future wars, will continue to regard nuclear weapons as the ultimate existential guarantee.

## 3. Conventional shift- failure to address conventional weapons replicates harms

**Schwartz and Derber, Boston college political science professor and PhD candidate, 1990**

(William and Charles, The Nuclear Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn’t Matter, pg 171, ldg)

Arms control is certainly not the answer to the nuclear peril, and, as currently practiced, it probably will not make us any safer at all. Nor will it achieve another oft-cited goal: saving money now wasted on redundant weapons. Arms control could deliver some security and economic benefits if it seriously took on important problems, such as conventional weapons, nuclear proliferation, doomsday weapons, preventing nuclear accidents and redirecting the vast sums wasted on the arms race to the urgent problems of our time.

## 4. Focusing on the weapons is worse than the weapons themselves.

**Schwartz and Derber, Boston college political science professor and PhD candidate, 1990**

(William and Charles, The Nuclear Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn’t Matter. P. 66, ldg)

Pretending that weapons matter is thus in every way more dangerous than the weapons themselves. Such a pretense-whether by the superpower governments or by the peace movements opposing those governments-can only confuse people about the existential risks and horror of a war fought with any nuclear weapons. This pretense also distracts attention from the occasional new weapons that actually adds to the risk of nuclear war. The furor over so-called U.S. first-strike weapons, for example has almost totally eclipsed discussion of the real hazards of the U.S. sea-launched cruise missile (discussed in Chapter 9). If the arms race doesn’t matter, we should simply say so, point out the genuine exceptions, and confront all who harbor or spread misperceptions or who speak and act like madmen. Otherwise we only add to the confusion, and to the danger.

## 5. Top down approaches don’t produce change in thinking

**Blight, Watson institute for international studies, 1986**

(James,” How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?”, Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 617-660, ldg)

The same holds true for the top-down approach. There is simply no precedent for what the interactionists must try to envision and no reason to suppose a new precedent will be set. Morton Deutsch, for example, argues that the superpower psychopathology could eventually be eliminated if only “ bold and courageous American leadership would take a risk for peace. . .[and] announce its determination to end the crazy arms race” (1983, p. 230. But consider the limiting case so far of top-down initiatives: President Kennedy’s announcement on June 10, 1963, that the United States would there after forego atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons so long as the other nuclear powers (the Soviet Union and Great Britain) did likewise. Psychologist Carl Rogers has argued that this bold move, combined with the Limited test ban Treaty which followed, is the prototype of the sort of process needed to begin to cure the pathological superpower relationship (Rogers, 1982, pp. 12-13). Yet nothing remotely resembling any such radical transformation actually occurred. In fact, the event which probably contributed most to creating a need for a “thaw” in the cold war-the terrifying Cuban missile crisis of October, 1962-was also, paradoxically, a significant point of origin for the nuclear arms competition now so greatly feared by nuclear depth psychologists. For while one Soviet action to that near miss was a certain amount of increased receptivity to President Kennedy’s proposal for an atmospheric test ban, yet another was probably the initiation (or at least the acceleration) of a massive Soviet nuclear arms buildup that, a generation later, continue unabated (Trachtenberg, 1985). Thus, viewed in their full context, the events of 1963 were, in relation to the goals of the interactionists, utterly equivocal and cannot plausibly be regarded collectively as a potential point of departure for ending the arm race. They may in fact have contributed more to the cause of it than to some imagined cure.

## Free-market environmentalism allows for the socioeconomic boundaries to be broken down and for exchange to limit harmful environmental waste. This also destroys incentive for coercion and breaks down the barrier of statism.

Anderson & Leal 2003

(Terry L and Donald, Spring of '03 L Field Expert at Political Economy Research Center in Bozeman, Montana. The Cato Review of Business & Government, "Regulation" Enviro-Capitalism vs. Environmental Statism)

**The alternative to environmental statism is free-market environmentalism**. As Kellogg notes, free-market environmentalism seems "like an oxymoron" but only because it does not depend on the coercive hand of government to steer the boat. Instead**, free-market environmentalism depends on property rights and the law of contracts and torts, wherein willing buyers and sellers determine the course through their bargaining over the exchange of property rights. In the context of free-market environmentalism, pollution is not pollution as long as those who receive the byproducts are compensated for taking on what is unwanted by others.** Hence the sign on the garbage truck that reads, "It may be garbage to you, but it's our bread and butter."

**Free-market environmentalism is based on two premises, the first of which is that free markets provide the higher incomes that in turn increase the demand for environmental quality.** Few would deny that the demand for environmental quality has increased dramatically in the past 25 years, and there is growing consensus that the cause of that increased demand is rising incomes. **New studies show that the relationship between per capita income and environmental quality follows a "J-curve" pattern. At very low levels of income, environmental quality may be high because**

 **no effluent is produced**. As incomes rise above some minimum, pollutants increase and the environment deteriorates. But then at per capita incomes of approximately $5,000 per year, environmental quality begins to become a luxury good. Above that income level, estimates by Don Coursey of Washington University in St. Louis show that for every 10 percent increase in income there is a 30 to 50 percent increase in the demand for environmental quality. We may all be environmentalists now, but the cause is not a born-again experience at Walden Pond; it is increasing wealth generated by free markets that has given us the wherewithal to afford environmental luxuries.

**The second bulwark of free-market environmentalism is that markets for environmental amenities provide incentives for individuals to treat the environment as an asset rather than a liability.** Kellogg acknowledges that there may be something to free-market environmentalism in that "the market can take us almost anywhere we want to go." But this misses the basic problem that the free-market environmentalism paradigm confronts: where do we want to go? **Coercive environmentalists claim to know where we ought to go and use the powers of government to get us there. For them there is never enough wilderness, species should not go extinct, and pollution should not exist. That asserted, why not use command and control?**